We advocate here the use of two authentication primitives we recently propose in a calculus for distributed systems, as a further instrument for programmers interested in authentication. These primitives offer a way of abstracting from various specifications of authentication and obtaining idealized protocols “secure by construction”. We can consequently prove that a cryptographic protocol is the correct implementation of the corresponding abstract protocol; when the proof fails, reasoning on the abstract specification may drive to the correct implementation.
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 2003 | |
Titolo: | Authentication Primitives for Protocol Specifications | |
Titolo del libro: | Parallel Computing Technologies | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 4.1 Articolo in Atti di convegno |
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