We use two authentication primitives proposed recently as a linguistic support for enforcing authentication. They offer a way of abstracting from various specifications of authentication and of obtaining idealized protocols ''secure by construction''. Consequently, they help in proving that a cryptographic protocol correctly implements its corresponding abstract version; when the implementation is incorrect, suggestions on how to fix it may come from reasoning on the abstract specification.
Authentication primitives for secure protocol specifications
FOCARDI, Riccardo;
2005-01-01
Abstract
We use two authentication primitives proposed recently as a linguistic support for enforcing authentication. They offer a way of abstracting from various specifications of authentication and of obtaining idealized protocols ''secure by construction''. Consequently, they help in proving that a cryptographic protocol correctly implements its corresponding abstract version; when the implementation is incorrect, suggestions on how to fix it may come from reasoning on the abstract specification.File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in ARCA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.