This paper analyses profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environment in the presence of trans-frontier or global pollution. Each country decides whether or not to coordinate its strategy with other countries. A coalition is formed when conditions of profitability and stability (no free-riding) are satisfied. It is shown that such coalitions exist; that they tend to involve a fraction of negotiating countries; and that the number of signatory countries can be increased by means of self-financed transfers. However, expanding coalitions requires some form of commitment. Such schemes of commitment and transfers can even lead to cooperation by all countries. © 1993.
Strategies for the international protection of the environment
CARRARO, Carlo;
1993-01-01
Abstract
This paper analyses profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environment in the presence of trans-frontier or global pollution. Each country decides whether or not to coordinate its strategy with other countries. A coalition is formed when conditions of profitability and stability (no free-riding) are satisfied. It is shown that such coalitions exist; that they tend to involve a fraction of negotiating countries; and that the number of signatory countries can be increased by means of self-financed transfers. However, expanding coalitions requires some form of commitment. Such schemes of commitment and transfers can even lead to cooperation by all countries. © 1993.
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