Le phénomène du fondement : essai sur la philosophie de Michel Henry

In contemporary thinking (all fields included), the traditional problem of the foundation has disappeared. Rightfully: the most important results today have been obtained, in fact, without going through a methodological hypo-stasis that the concept of “foundation” imposes to the thought. Phenomenology, more than any other approach, seems to have been through this process ; for doing so, however, it kept a vocabulary often ambiguous ; it even claimed it specifically as the foundation of science. Our work finds its starting point, in the phenomenological philosophy of Michel Henry. It suggests a basis without going through the violence of a master word, and simultaneously bypassing the dogma of a theory in which the foundation would be a reaffirmation of dualism, itself an hypo-stasis (as the "being", for example). For Henry, the foundation, understood as what is unconditional, is the appearing of something. Thus he says as an absolute condition that manifests itself as a force of manifestation of being. But the path to one foundation is difficult, since there is no theming of this concept in Henry, and no possibility of “concept” basis in the “to say the phenomenon”, in a language that has, to say fundamental, to express the immediacy of the event as such, an event which tells itself without using an external reference. Anyway, the foundation itself must build its own problems. The phenomenon is the basis, through a journey to the limits of philosophy, theoretical, empirico-transcendental and experimental, trying to understand of the foundation as what is manifest and without mediation, manifest otherness finally understood from an irreducible immanence.