The present article is aimed to study the tight bond between nominalism and voluntarism described by Rosmini in some of his works. After a brief sketch of Rosmini’s analysis of the early medieval debates on universals, I shows that, according to the philosopher of Rovereto, the true form of realism is the Plato’s exemplarism. For Rosmini, the XIIth century medieval realists, conceptualists, and nominalists neglected, like Aristotle and Boethius, the distinction between ideal being and real being. These two kinds of being are real, i.e. existent, but in two different ways. Realists only knew the second kind of reality and, thus, considered universals as real and subsisting beings in the physical world. Rosmini agrees with nominalists and conceptualists who reacted against this error, avoiding to give a real subsistence to universals. However, they made a philosophical mistake by reducing universals to mental beings. The second part of the article, shows the connection between the misrecognition of the ideal being and voluntarism. Rosmini claims that ideal being is a particular kind of being which expresses the essential intelligibility of being. It is the transcendental principle of theoretical (the intellect) and practical reason (the will). For this very reason, the ideal being is the fundamental and necessary criterion of human knowledge and moral actions. In conclusion, for Rosmini, nominalism is a way of thinking which considers the ideal being as a pure nothing or a simple mental concept produced by human mind. By doing so, the synthesis between the human will and good as such, i.e. the ideal being as desiderable, is fully disregarded and human freedom is taken as a sort of “will to power” and arbitrarism.

Essere ideale, libertà, arbitrio. Rosmini e il legame tra nominalismo e volontarismo

Gian Pietro Soliani
2024

Abstract

The present article is aimed to study the tight bond between nominalism and voluntarism described by Rosmini in some of his works. After a brief sketch of Rosmini’s analysis of the early medieval debates on universals, I shows that, according to the philosopher of Rovereto, the true form of realism is the Plato’s exemplarism. For Rosmini, the XIIth century medieval realists, conceptualists, and nominalists neglected, like Aristotle and Boethius, the distinction between ideal being and real being. These two kinds of being are real, i.e. existent, but in two different ways. Realists only knew the second kind of reality and, thus, considered universals as real and subsisting beings in the physical world. Rosmini agrees with nominalists and conceptualists who reacted against this error, avoiding to give a real subsistence to universals. However, they made a philosophical mistake by reducing universals to mental beings. The second part of the article, shows the connection between the misrecognition of the ideal being and voluntarism. Rosmini claims that ideal being is a particular kind of being which expresses the essential intelligibility of being. It is the transcendental principle of theoretical (the intellect) and practical reason (the will). For this very reason, the ideal being is the fundamental and necessary criterion of human knowledge and moral actions. In conclusion, for Rosmini, nominalism is a way of thinking which considers the ideal being as a pure nothing or a simple mental concept produced by human mind. By doing so, the synthesis between the human will and good as such, i.e. the ideal being as desiderable, is fully disregarded and human freedom is taken as a sort of “will to power” and arbitrarism.
2024
Profili della libertà in Antonio Rosmini
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10278/5129991
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