Do Individuals Have Generality and Speciality? A Survey of a Twelfth-Century Problem

What makes animal a genus, or man a species? Some 12th-century logical texts speak of a pair of properties, “generality” (generalitas) and “speciality” (specialitas), but then encounter a problem: according to Aristotle in the Categories, whatever properties secondary substances have, they get from primary substances. But what, then, about generality and speciality? Are they also in individuals (primary substances), or does Aristotle’s statement not apply to such properties? My aim here is to provide a survey of the many extant texts which tackle this issue and frame the different strategies used. The analysis will provide us with conceptual tools and distinctions that not only offers us a glimpse of twelfth-century ontological discussions, but might also, down the road, prove helpful for future studies (for example, of other logical problems, text authorship, and school identification).