Epicureanism in Cicero’s Lucullus: Perception, Representation, and Error

This contribution systematically examines references to the Epicurean theory of perception, representation, and error in Cicero’s Lucullus, in order to assess their function and relevance in the context of the dialogue. While not the main focus of the epistemological debate in the text, the Epicurean doctrine plays a signicant structural role, serving as a key point of comparison for both Lucullus and Cicero himself. From Lucullus’ perspective, engaging with Epicurus serves a clarifying function: by distancing himself from the Epicurean theory, he denes and strengthens his own more articulated empiricist position, which acknowledges the existence of perceptual errors and attributes them to compromised operational conditions of the senses. In turn, Cicero employs this confrontation as a dialectical tool to highlight the aporias of both the Epicurean doctrine – criticized for its inadequacy in the face of illusory phenomena – and Lucullus’ position, accused of failing to provide an epistemically valid criterion to distinguish true impressions from false ones. Therefore, although the Epicurean theory is not the direct target of Lucullus’ criticism, it crucially contributes to dening the character of the positions at stake. For Lucullus, it is a point to be overcome, while for Cicero, it serves as a testing ground for his skeptical strategy. Finally, this contribution will show that both interlocutors demonstrate familiarity with the Epicurean distinction between sensation (phantasia) and opinion (doxa), but regard it as insucient to resolve the epistemological problem of error.