This paper examines strategic behavior in multi-unit assignment problems, employing simple manipulation strategies. Assuming responsive preferences and priorities, we demonstrate that dropping strategies are exhaustive in the immediate acceptance mechanism, while truncation strategies fall short. This finding clarifies the trade-offs among stability, simplicity, and manipulability in assignment mechanisms, with implications for real-world applications, such as course allocation.
Simple Strategies in Multi-unit Assignment Problems
Matteo Maria Triossi VerondiniWriting – Original Draft Preparation
;Antonio Romero-Medina
Writing – Original Draft Preparation
2025-01-01
Abstract
This paper examines strategic behavior in multi-unit assignment problems, employing simple manipulation strategies. Assuming responsive preferences and priorities, we demonstrate that dropping strategies are exhaustive in the immediate acceptance mechanism, while truncation strategies fall short. This finding clarifies the trade-offs among stability, simplicity, and manipulability in assignment mechanisms, with implications for real-world applications, such as course allocation.
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