Aristotle and Epicurus on kinesis. A New Explanatory Model of Change and Causation in Ancient Atomism

The paper undertakes a comparative analysis of Aristotle’s and Epicu- rus’ theories of kinesis. Some scholars have convincingly suggested that Epicurus attempted to overcome Aristotelian objections to Democritus’ doctrine and to revise his own theory of atomic motion in light of this controversy. Here I aim to broaden the comparison between Aristotle and Epicurus. In particular, I would like to show how not only the criticism of Democritus, but also the most constructive and posi- tive part of the Aristotelian theory, namely the analysis of the principles of change in Physics I 7 and the definition of kinesis provided in Physics III 1–2, enabled Epicurus to develop a theory of change, applicable to the study of phenomena at the macroscopic level of reality. To do so, I will focus on a specific case of kinesis, namely sensation, which allows a more direct comparison of the two authors’ doc- trines. Both philosophers conceive of kinesis as the actualization of potentiality, but Epicurus emphasizes the causal power of potentiality over actuality, contrary to Aristotle. This emphasis may reflect Epicurus’ attempt to reconcile Aristotelian kinesis with his materialistic anti-teleological atomism. Thus, the paper contributes to a deeper understanding of ancient theories of motion and causation, highligh- ting both similarities and divergences between Aristotle and Epicurus.