Le due versioni della dottrina stoica del qualcosa quale genere supremo: una prospettiva di integrazione

The doctrine of something (τί) as the supreme genus condenses the salient features of Stoic ontology and constitutes an absolute novelty in the ancient ontological landscape. It consists in attributing to τί, at the ontological level, a greater extension than the Platonic being (ὄν). In particular, two versions of this theory have come down to us, always seen in opposition to each other: one reported by Seneca, the other handed down by later sources, and mostly attested in fragments attributed to the ancient Stoics. The aim of the present work is to examine the chronological and conceptual relations between the two versions of the doctrine that have come down to us from a perspective of integration, in order to recover a more complex and articulated vision of a theory that represents a fundamental stage in the history of ancient ontology.