Historical epistemology and the ‘marriage’ between History and Philosophy of Science

The current proliferation and heated-discussion of the meaning and use of the expression “historical epistemology” in prevalently Anglophone domains (Feest & Sturm 2011; Hacking 1999) is anything but an ephemeral phenomenon introducing a transitory “brand into the market of ideas” (Gingras 2010). On the contrary, the discussion revolves around enduring difficulties in conceptualizing the correct or most fruitful interaction between history and philosophy of science. As I will argue, this recent questioning of historical epistemology can be retraced to the longstanding and prevalently Anglophone debate over the “marriage” between history and philosophy of science (Giere 1973). This debate arose in the 1960s (inter alia Hanson 1962; Kuhn 1962), picked up momentum at the beginning of the 1990s, and, thanks to renewed interest, continued on into the twenty-first century (Domski & Dickinson 2010; Laudan & Laudan 2016). My suggestion is that this renewed interest can be fruitfully framed within a French philosophical context. In particular, I will contrast the naturalizing trend prevalent in certain areas of the Anglophone debate (Laudan 1977; Giere 1988; Kitcher 2011) with the “normative turn” instantiated by French epistemology and by Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem in particular (Bachelard 1934; Canguilhem 2005). With this comparative study I hope to contribute to the ongoing discussion about the different ways of integrating history and philosophy of science.