We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are (i) biased towards one of the messages and (ii) agents are able to inspect messages for veracity. Inspection of messages implies that a higher rumor prevalence may increase the prevalence of the truth. We employ this result to discuss how a planner may optimally choose information inspection rates of the population. We find that a planner who aims to maximize the prevalence of the truth may find it optimal to allow rumors to circulate.

Optimal Inspection of Rumors in Networks

Nicole Tabasso
2022-01-01

Abstract

We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are (i) biased towards one of the messages and (ii) agents are able to inspect messages for veracity. Inspection of messages implies that a higher rumor prevalence may increase the prevalence of the truth. We employ this result to discuss how a planner may optimally choose information inspection rates of the population. We find that a planner who aims to maximize the prevalence of the truth may find it optimal to allow rumors to circulate.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10278/5035720
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