We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are (i) biased towards one of the messages and (ii) agents are able to inspect messages for veracity. Inspection of messages implies that a higher rumor prevalence may increase the prevalence of the truth. We employ this result to discuss how a planner may optimally choose information inspection rates of the population. We find that a planner who aims to maximize the prevalence of the truth may find it optimal to allow rumors to circulate.
Optimal Inspection of Rumors in Networks
Nicole Tabasso
2022
Abstract
We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are (i) biased towards one of the messages and (ii) agents are able to inspect messages for veracity. Inspection of messages implies that a higher rumor prevalence may increase the prevalence of the truth. We employ this result to discuss how a planner may optimally choose information inspection rates of the population. We find that a planner who aims to maximize the prevalence of the truth may find it optimal to allow rumors to circulate.
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