Under the leadership of Abe Shinzō and Xi Jinping, Japan and the People’s Republic of China have enhanced their bilateral relations and pledged to work together to attain strategic mutual benefits. In 2018, both parties signed a series of agreements on topics ranging from economic cooperation on the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in developing countries to the prevention of conflict over disputed waters in the East China Sea, ushering in a period of renewed friendship. After the 2018 agreements, the possibility of armed conflict between China and Japan which seemed possible just a few years ago, when protests erupted in China against Japan’s decision to nationalize the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands—now seems reduced. After the PRC’s leadership launched its “global vision” in 2013, the rationale for active Japanese involvement in the BRI versus militarily balancing China has been clear in terms of costs for the public and potential benefits for both the public and private sectors. Such an approach, however, is not new, but, as argued in this article, has its roots in the longue durée history of Northeast Asia.
Abe, Xi e il nuovo sinocentrismo “economico”. Gli accordi sino-giapponesi del 2018 in una prospettiva di lunga durata
Zappa, Marco
2023-01-01
Abstract
Under the leadership of Abe Shinzō and Xi Jinping, Japan and the People’s Republic of China have enhanced their bilateral relations and pledged to work together to attain strategic mutual benefits. In 2018, both parties signed a series of agreements on topics ranging from economic cooperation on the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in developing countries to the prevention of conflict over disputed waters in the East China Sea, ushering in a period of renewed friendship. After the 2018 agreements, the possibility of armed conflict between China and Japan which seemed possible just a few years ago, when protests erupted in China against Japan’s decision to nationalize the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands—now seems reduced. After the PRC’s leadership launched its “global vision” in 2013, the rationale for active Japanese involvement in the BRI versus militarily balancing China has been clear in terms of costs for the public and potential benefits for both the public and private sectors. Such an approach, however, is not new, but, as argued in this article, has its roots in the longue durée history of Northeast Asia.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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