We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are biased towards one of the messages and able to verify messages. A recipient of a rumor who verifies it becomes informed of the truth. Consequently, a higher rumor prevalence increases the prevalence of the truth. We employ this result to discuss how a planner may optimally choose information verification rates of the population. We find that a planner who aims to maximize the prevalence of the truth may find it optimal to allow rumors to circulate.
Can Rumors Create Truth? Optimal Debunking of Rumors in Networks
Nicole Tabasso
2023-01-01
Abstract
We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are biased towards one of the messages and able to verify messages. A recipient of a rumor who verifies it becomes informed of the truth. Consequently, a higher rumor prevalence increases the prevalence of the truth. We employ this result to discuss how a planner may optimally choose information verification rates of the population. We find that a planner who aims to maximize the prevalence of the truth may find it optimal to allow rumors to circulate.
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