We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are biased towards one of the messages and able to verify messages. A recipient of a rumor who verifies it becomes informed of the truth. Consequently, a higher rumor prevalence increases the prevalence of the truth. We employ this result to discuss how a planner may optimally choose information verification rates of the population. We find that a planner who aims to maximize the prevalence of the truth may find it optimal to allow rumors to circulate.

Can Rumors Create Truth? Optimal Debunking of Rumors in Networks

Nicole Tabasso
2023-01-01

Abstract

We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are biased towards one of the messages and able to verify messages. A recipient of a rumor who verifies it becomes informed of the truth. Consequently, a higher rumor prevalence increases the prevalence of the truth. We employ this result to discuss how a planner may optimally choose information verification rates of the population. We find that a planner who aims to maximize the prevalence of the truth may find it optimal to allow rumors to circulate.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Optimal_Verification_of_Rumors.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Documento in Pre-print
Licenza: Creative commons
Dimensione 569.89 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
569.89 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in ARCA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10278/5025040
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact