We study the implementation of social choice rules in environments with externalities. We prove the impossibility of implementing efficient and α-individually rational rules in dominant strategies. We prove that the α-core is implementable in Nash equilibrium under mild restrictions and discuss the maximality and the minimality of our results. We extend our analysis to weakly efficient rules.

Incentives and Implementation in Allocation Problems with Externalities

Triossi Verondini, Matteo Maria
2020

Abstract

We study the implementation of social choice rules in environments with externalities. We prove the impossibility of implementing efficient and α-individually rational rules in dominant strategies. We prove that the α-core is implementable in Nash equilibrium under mild restrictions and discuss the maximality and the minimality of our results. We extend our analysis to weakly efficient rules.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10278/3747871
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