We study the dynamics of the exploitation of a natural resource, distributed in space and mobile, where spatial diversiﬁcation is introduced by a network structure. Players are assigned to diﬀerent nodes by a regulator, after he/she decides at which nodes natural reserves are established. The game solution shows how the dynamics of spatial distribution depends on the productivity of the various sites, on the structure of the connections between the various locations, and on the preferences of the agents. At the same time, the best locations to host a nature reserve are identiﬁed in terms of the parameters of the model, and it turns out they correspond to the most central (in the sense of eigenvector centrality) nodes of a suitably redeﬁned network which takes into account the nodes productivities.
Silvia Faggian (Corresponding)
|Data di pubblicazione:||2020|
|Titolo:||On Competition for Spatially Distributed Resources in Networks|
|Titolo del libro:||Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" 2020|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||3.1 Articolo su libro|