A common assumption in Political Science literature is policy commitment: candidates maintain their electoral promises. We study its validity and we prove that is an costless electoral is an effective way of transmitting information to voters. We investigate the responsiveness of policies to electoral promises depending on politicians' motivations. The results are robust to relevant equilibrium refinements.
Reliability and Responsibility: a Theory of Endogenous Commitment
Triossi, Matteo
2007
Abstract
A common assumption in Political Science literature is policy commitment: candidates maintain their electoral promises. We study its validity and we prove that is an costless electoral is an effective way of transmitting information to voters. We investigate the responsiveness of policies to electoral promises depending on politicians' motivations. The results are robust to relevant equilibrium refinements.
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