We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many to-many matching markets. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.
Titolo: | Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets | |
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 2017 | |
Serie: | ||
Abstract: | We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many to-many matching markets. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets. | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3716082 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 7.01 Working paper |
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