If we look at the various contexts in which objectivity is pursued (scientific inquiry, social debates, policy decisions) we immediately realize that, by referring to this concept, there is often a chasm between what is ideally aimed at and what can be sensibly argued for and/or achieved in practice (different practices). In the first part of this article I will revisit the two main debates where the issue of objectivity has been traditionally raised and discussed: the real/constructed debate, and the fact/value debate. By retracing the general features of these two debates I will bring out what meaning of objectivity can be formulated for social science if we follow the epistemological limits and constraints set out by these debates. in the second half of this article I will look into what is expected of a concept of objectivity when this enters more practice-oriented debates, such as that on the use of science (both natural and social) in policy making, or those contentious disputes concerning the reliability of so called expert opinion. I will end by questioning whether it still makes sense to invoke such a concept, both in theory and in practice.
|Data di pubblicazione:||2016|
|Titolo del libro:||The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Social Science|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315410098-34|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||3.1 Articolo su libro|