The search for definitions of justice in Nicomachean Ethics 5

In several previous studies, I have attempted to defend the thesis that, in Books 1–4 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle does not use the so-called ‘dialectical method’ or ‘method of ethics’ described in Book 7.1. This consists in establishing that which appears to be true (the phainomena), developing the problems present in them and, having resolved them, conserving the validity of at least most of the endoxa (reputable opinions) on the matter. Instead, Aristotle turns to the method of searching for scientific definitions, a method described in Posterior Analytics 2.1–3 and 8–10. It is well known that this method consists in three steps. The first step is to see if the object to be defined exists. After establishing that the object of definition exists, we must say what it is. However, in order to do that, we must first find a nominal definition of the object and after explain what this definition means. This gives us a first outline of the nature of the thing. And having some knowledge of it is a necessary step in order to find its nature. As we shall see, this does not preclude an ample use of the endoxa, though in a different type of argumentation. In the present chapter, I wish to extend my investigations to the first part of EN 5. I will try to show that the first part of the Book (EN 5.1–9) follows the same procedure as EN 1, while the second part (5.10–11) is organised in a different and less clear manner. As in EN 1, the method of the Analytics does not preclude some dialectical arguments; on the contrary, it makes use of them in order to reach the definition sought. Nevertheless, I shall argue, it is a different method from the one described in EN 7.1. At the end of the chapter I shall also add some thoughts on the relationship between EN 5 and the preceding four books.