Korean Identities
in Global Context

Edited by Adam Cathcart and Morgan Potts

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Abstract

This article aims to explore the Japanese colonial government's efforts to promote mass movements in Korea which rose suddenly and showed remarkable growth throughout the 1930s. It focuses on two Governor-Generals and the directors of the Education Bureau who created the Social Indoctrination movements under Governor-General Ugaki Kazushige in the early 1930s and the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement of Governor-General Minami Jirō in the late 1930s. The analysis covers their respective political motivations, ideological orientation, and organizational structure. It demonstrates that Ugaki, under the drive to integrate Korea with an economic bloc centered on Japan, adapted the traditional local practices of the colonized based on the claim of "Particularities of Korea," whereas the second Sino-Japanese War led Minami to emphasize assimilation, utilizing the ideology of the extended-family to give colonial power more direct access to individuals as well as obscuring the unequal nature of the colonial relationship. It argues that the colonial government-led campaigns constituted a core ruling mechanism of Japanese imperialism in the 1930s.

Key Words: Migration; Japanese imperialism; Cultural assimilation

The Promotion of Mass Movements by the Colonial Government in the 1930s: A New Perspective on Japanese Wartime Imperialism in Korea

Shinyoung Kwon

The Movement for Rural Revitalization, launched by the Government-General in 1932, inaugurated an era of state-led movements in Korean history. From that year, similar campaigns were utilized through the end of the colonial rule. Examples include the Movement for Self-Reliance, the Movement for Public Works, the Movement for Developing Mind and Land, the Movement to Awaken National Spirit, the "Be Kind" Movement, the Movement to Obey the Law and economic savings movements. There were also numerous campaigns aiming to reform specific customs including clothing, cooking, punctuality, rituals, smoking, cleaning, and even physical exercise. The rise of state-led movements was a significant turning point in Japanese colonial rule. In contrast to the previous approach of maintaining good relations with a small number of landlords and local elites in order to implement its economic policies, this development signified the growing desire of the Government-General towards establishing a direct relation with the Korean masses. The fact that all these campaigns used the term "movement" signifies that they sought the participation of the Korean masses in their agenda. The themes of the movements show that the colonial government aimed for a deeper intervention into their everyday lives. In analyzing the motivations behind the changes and the approaches to Korean mass society, this article aims to examine the attempts of the colonial government to mobilize the colonial masses in the 1930s.

On state-led movements of the 1930s, academic research has generally focused on the Movement for Rural Revitalization in the early 1930s and the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement after the outbreak of war between Japan and China in July 1937. Both of these movements were integrated into the National Total Force Movement in 1940 in a bid to realize "Korean New Order," the counterpart of the "New Order" in Japan. Examining the political backdrop of the former, historians have noted the pressing concern of the colonial government to maintain social stability in a Korean society they saw as under the hold of anti-Japanese nationalism and socialism. Some interpreted it as a vital means for the social control in the rural area and detailed actual local practices, whereas others argued that it laid the foundation for the transition to state-corporatism, with a focus on the state-society relations.[1] In existing scholarship, the outbreak of war was the bridge to the latter movement which promoted voluntary participation in the wartime mobilization. Social control turned into more intensive mobilization, while state-corporatism swiftly developed into the wartime mobilization system. The focus of the movements, on the economy, and spiritual life, were utilized in two major aspects of wartime mobilization: the economic and ideological wars.

In existing scholarship, it was assumed that the Government-General's campaigns mainly relied on bureaucratic force, thereby unwittingly ignoring the differences between the two movements. Contesting this assumption, I focus on the fact that the policies were implemented in the form of mass movements. Given that the success of movements, from the Japanese perspective, was determined by a perception of consent to the cause and the extent of participation, the colonial government needed to convince Koreans to join the campaigns. However, no matter how hard the colonial government pushed, it was unlikely that Korean society readily give its consent, considering how strong feelings were of anti-Japanese nationalism, as well as interest in anti-imperialistic socialism. The colonial government therefore needed both an organizational and an ideological approach capable of shifting anti-Japanese sentiment into pro-Japanese feeling, and of overriding networks developed by socialists or nationalists.

The colonial government's planning strategies reflected its historical situation, rooted in broader historical conditions, Japanese imperialism, and the conditions at the specific moment. The main aspects of the time were the creation of an economic bloc in the early 1930s and the outbreak of war in the late 1930s. These two aspects were not well integrated with each other. Although the colonial government was designed to realize the interests of the Japanese empire, the economic bloc pushed it to represent local interests—i.e. that of its own bloc within the empire. Generally speaking, modern imperialism, in general, was based on differences that not only excluded colonies from political and full legal citizenship but also made their economy dependent on that of the colonizer. By contrast, modern war, which involved mobilization of not only military force but also economic and ideological resources, tended to deemphasize social inequalities from class, gender, and ethnicity; this fact is demonstrated in the greater emphasis on assimilation policies in this period. The contradictions among modern imperialism, the economic bloc, and warfare are particularly clear in the languages of these movements and their organizations.

Arguing that the rise of state-led movements represented a new imperial ruling mechanism, this paper examines both the factors behind the transition and the strategic approach of the colonial government toward the colonial society, covering movements that were launched both before and after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. More specifically, this article examines two movements: the Social Indoctrination Movements in the early 1930s and the National Spiritual General Mobilization Movement in the late 1930s. The primary sources used include Government-General documents and the diary of the Governor-General, transcriptions of speeches and the writings of directors of the Education Bureau. This article is divided into three parts. The first part discusses Governor-General Ugaki's views on the economic role of Korea within the Japanese imperial economic bloc; this will provide a greater understanding of the historical background behind the emergence of the state-led mass movements. In part two, I

analyze the social indoctrination movements under Ugaki, with a focus on directors of the Education Bureau who drafted the plans for the colonial government-led movements and then implemented them. The last section discusses the National Spiritual General Mobilization Movement under Governor-General Minami Jirō, shifting the focus from the relation of state-led movements with the economic bloc to its relation to war.

Ugaki Kazushige and the Rise of Social Indoctrination Movement

Governor-General Ugaki Kazushige (宇垣一成, 1868–1956) arrived in Korea in June 1931, right after he stood down as Minister of Army, taking responsibility for the March Incident, a political coup in which some young military officers attempted to make him prime minister. Having previously served as interim Governor-General in 1927, he was familiar with both Korea and the office. On arriving in Korea, he began to map out a colonial policy suitable to the political economic changes of Japan in the early 1930s.

There were heated debates in Japan on the economic bloc in response to the economic crisis which swept the world in the late 1920s. Japan had depended on Great Britain and the United States financially for its imperialistic expansion in the early twentieth century. The turn of these Western powers toward protectionism through the establishment of economic blocs dealt a serious economic blow to Japan, leading it to turn to economic autarchy in order to overcome the economic crisis. Central to the economic bloc in East Asia were the close economic links between Japan and Manchuria. That region was dominated by the Kwantung Army, which had been formed in Manchu area in 1906 when Japan obtained after the Russo-Japanese War; it played a central role in building Manchukuo later. Among the Japanese government, Japanese capitalists and the Kwantung army, however, there were wide differences of opinion on the roles of respective blocs and the extent to which the state would control the economy. Reformists in the Kwantung Army wanted to build economic autarchy through economic control by the state. They were opposed to the advance of Japanese *zaibatsu*, industrial and financial business conglomerates, to Manchuria. Criticizing *zaibatsu* for pursing only their own private interests and their private desires for the economic crisis, they planned to develop heavy industries in Manchuria under state control. By contrast, the Japan-Manchuria Business Council representing the business sector saw Manchuria as a channel to relieve the economic depression of Japan. Considering Manchuria as a market for Japan, they wanted to import primary resources from Manchuria and to export consumer goods to it. The Japanese government took steps to promote the advance of *zaibatsu* in preparation for total war.[2]

Along with observing the talk on the economic bloc, Ugaki suggested his own concept of locating Korea as an economic link between Japan and Manchuria. Envisioning that the East Sea/Sea of Japan, surrounded by Japan, Soviet Union, Manchuria and Korea, would be the center of the

future East Asian economic bloc,[3] he sought to promote a hierarchical division of labor in the region. He argued that Japan would be the leading advanced industrial power of the East Asian region while Korea would develop primary industries to support Japanese industry and the economic role of Manchuria would be to supply foodstuffs and natural resources.[4] He expected that the division of economic roles would minimize the tensions within the bloc, enhance inter-dependence among regions, and ultimately bring economic autarky to Japan.[5] For these reasons, he believed it very crucial to industrialize Korea's economy to supplement the economic weakness of Japan.[6]

To optimize Korea's economic contribution, Ugaki reconfigured industry on the peninsula, dividing Korea into two economic regions: one in the south and one in the north. He expected the southern part of Korea, a densely populated grain-producing region, to supply cotton and rice, believing that securing a supply of cotton would soon become a pressing issue for the Japanese textile industry. Northern Korea, less developed and less populated but rich in natural resources, was to be the region for the iron and steel industry and for the production of electricity. Since most of the population was located in the south, he encouraged Koreans to immigrate to the north or to Manchuria to participate in the development projects there. To support these policies, he pushed to construct roads and railroads to make transportation between Japan, Korea and Manchuria more efficient and convenient.[7]

The restructuring of the Korean economy required a huge sum of capital. Aid from the Japanese government was unlikely not only because its core focus was on Manchuria, but also because the economic downturn made the Japanese government more conservative with its fiscal policy. Frustrated with the lack of support from Japanese bureaucrats,[8] Ugaki turned to Japanese *zaibatsu* and the Korean landlord class who were willing to invest their money in industry.[9] To lure private capital, the Government-General offered favorable conditions such as cheap and abundant labor and the absence of laws to restrict the unlimited use of labor and capital. Though Japan enacted the Factory Law and the Law to Control Important Industries,[10] they were not applied to Korea. Other problems existed such as opposition to the Government-General and class tensions among landlords and peasants, as well as capitalists and workers, which had already reached alarming levels. Since annexation in 1910, the colonial government made alliances with small groups within the dominant class. They gave exclusive benefits to the traditional aristocratic class and allowed them to create advisory bodies even though they had little decision-making authority.[11]

In local society, they utilized the traditional local elites and re-educated a minority of people who received elementary education. To carry out their economic policies, they firmly supported the landlord class in their conflicts with peasants, rather than reducing tensions through reform of the landlord-tenant system.[12] It is no wonder that the majority of Koreans were suffering from

widespread poverty, food shortages, and debt in the early 1930s.[13] Granting benefits to the landlord class aggravated class conflicts, leading to local protests against landlords as well as nationwide organized strikes by peasants and workers. Consequently, socialism and anti-Japanese nationalism spread rapidly amongst Koreans.[14]

Ugaki defended the Government-General, by attributing the origins of widespread poverty to individual indolence rather than to the degree of economic exploitation by the colonialist and dominant classes—both landlords and capitalists. In his view, inertia became a characteristic of Koreans since their lives had been fully of frustration for such a long time. He said, "The ethic of hard work and frugality disappeared from the everyday lives of Koreans, and they no longer had the strong will to overcome difficulties by themselves."[15] What made it worse was that the majority of peasants, eighty percent of the total population, did not have opportunities to move into the modern sector of the economy, still living within a pre-modern subsistence economy. In consequence, every household in rural areas accumulated debts over time, which became an immediate cause of their poverty. Also, he ascribed anti-Japanese nationalism to Koreans' groundless prejudice against Japan. Given the harsh reality of international politics in East Asia in the early twentieth century, he felt that Korea would not survive on their own, but Koreans did not understand their situation, leading them to reject the goodwill of Japan. He said that the reconfirmed principle of self-determination after WWI and the rise of socialism unnecessarily intensified the bias of Koreans against Japan, thereby increasing anti-Japanese sentiment.[16]

Whilst shifting the blame to Koreans, the Government-General ran up against widespread poverty, conflicts between landlords and peasants, and resistance as it endeavored to shield the people from the forces of socialism and nationalism.

Faced with the conflicting tasks of giving benefits to capitalists and landlords and of enhancing the social milieu unfavorable to the colonial rule, Ugaki developed programs of "social indoctrination." It was a new term in state discourse that appeared in the 1920s in the context of social work. Under criticism that economic aid to poverty-stricken people was just a temporary solution, the colonial government began to shift the focus of social work from economic relief to poverty prevention. The focus of social indoctrination was bi-pronged: education on the reform of everyday life; and community-oriented welfare through settlement work, medical facilities, and libraries.[17] These principles were well suited to Ugaki, who wanted to avoid legal or institutional reform and promote economic investment from the private sector but had to reduce social unrest. The Government-General began to make efforts to offer the practical vocational education, to reform everyday life, and to build communal cooperatives.

The promotion of social indoctrination marked two substantial shifts from previous years. First,

the Government-General now took an interest in the Korean masses. Before the 1930s, they did not have much interest in the development of human resources, because its economic policies focused on turning Korea into a market for Japanese products and a major supplier of rice, agricultural products and natural resources.[18] Though the Government-General urgently needed skilled workers and peasants with practical knowledge and techniques, Korean society was unsuited for the economic development projects, as seen in the statement by an official that "Koreans did not have knowledge, techniques and notions of themselves as public persons because of the lack of education and the primitive level of social life."[19] The underdeveloped economic skills of Koreans were no longer a problem at the individual level; they were now an obstacle to the implementation of colonial policies. The importance of enlightening the Korean masses increased with a focus on vocational training and practical education in everyday life.[20]

Secondly, social indoctrination programs were explicitly called "movements," a term whose use was refreshing at the time. Before the 1930s, the Government-General associated the term with negative meanings. In the 1910s, they denied Koreans the freedom of assembly, for fear of giving opportunities for Koreans to make collective claims against them. Their concerns proved to be justified, although they could not forbid assembly completely. News of a declaration of independence by thirty-three people in a small restaurant quickly swept Korea, triggering a nationwide protest against Japan in 1919 in what became known as the March First Movement. Even in the 1920s, when a limited degree of non-political social movements were allowed, the colonial government maintained its vigilance.[21] The Government-General even replaced the term "movement" (運動, *undong* in Korean) with "program" (事業, *saŏp* in Korean) in introducing the Local Improvement Movement to Korea in that decade. Strikingly, they turned the previous reluctance toward movements into a willingness to make use of group-oriented force. To prevent the colonial government-led movements from being disoriented, Ugaki suggested the slogan "Harmony between Japan and Korea" (內鮮融和, *naesŏn yunghwa* in Korean and *naisen yuwa* in Japanese) as the ideological orientation and urged Koreans to have consciousness of their duties as a "public person" (公民, *kongmin* in Korean).[22] The rise of mass movements led by the colonial government manifested a salient feature of the new imperial ruling mechanism.

The Education Bureau and "Something Characteristic of Korea" (朝鮮特殊性, *Chosŏn t'ŭksusŏng*)

Ugaki's plan to promote social stability and economic industrialization through educational approach started to be put into action with the transfer of the Social Section from the Bureau of Home Affairs to the Education Bureau in 1932. The reshuffle was unusual not only because the Section's main task had been the relief of poverty, an area that appeared unrelated to education, but also because the Education Bureau had nothing to do with unemployment, social conflicts,

job research centers, and management of public facilities.[23]

In the reorganization, Ugaki appointed three people who had no working experience in education or social work as directors of the Education Bureau: Hayashi Shigeki (1931–1933), Watanabe Yutahiro (1933–1935), and Tominaga Fumikazu (1935–1937). What the three directors had in common was the fact that they were among the officials most knowledgeable about Korea. All of them began their career in Korea during the 1910s right after graduating from Tokyo Imperial University. When they were appointed as director of the Bureau, all of them already spent more than ten years in Korea.[24] During their long stay, they were involved in local development projects, either the Campaign for Rural Revitalization or the Self-Revitalization program which gave them some fame.[25] The Government-General also appointed Koreans as chiefs of the Social Section. This was also striking given the marginalized status of Koreans in the colonial bureaucracy. In 1938, there were just a few Koreans among the 230 high-ranking officials in the central Government-General office. One of the twelve Koreans was the chief of the Social Section.[26]

Both the Japanese directors and the Korean chiefs of the Section agreed that Korean society was so different from Japan that the existing programs for social indoctrination should be revised. Watanabe Yutahiro said, "We need to make a correction quickly. The social policies *inappropriate* to Korea under the *wrong prejudice* will invite critical *difficulties* in several years" (italics added).[27] What he meant by "wrong prejudice" was that officials generally thought that Korean society was similar to Japanese society; however, he saw that view as wrong because there were clear differences between the two. For him, one of the greatest differences was that Korea was more of an agricultural society, with about eighty percent of the population living in rural areas, whereas Japan was more urbanized. A lack of understanding of Korean society led to a failure to consider whether social work projects developed in Japan were suitable to Korean society and to be selective in employing Japanese social work programs. Noting that social work in Korea was focused on urban areas, he argued that it would cause difficulties, because such works would not be well-received by Koreans and would also waste money and effort. He insisted on turning the focus away from urban areas toward rural areas, as would be logical for Korean society.[28]

The Bureau's shift in focus to rural areas made their position similar to that of Korean nationalists who were already engaged in campaigns for the improvement of everyday life and of economic production through education campaigns and the formation of cooperatives. Since the 1920s, under the Government-General's Cultural Policy which eased its suppression of Korean activities, Korean nationalists began to form non-political cultural movements, turning their attention to the masses. For example, Protestant Christian groups began cultural enlightenment movements, trying to avoid direct conflict with the Government-General. As their education

programs and local improvement programs were well-received by Koreans, their network began to form roots in the local society.[29] Likewise, Korean socialists, closely connected with labor unions and peasant unions, were about to shift to a strategy of going "Into the Masses," in the growing recognition of their significance in the early 1930s.[30]

What the Government-General, nationalists, and socialists had in common was their criticism of the profit-oriented individualism of modern society. Nonetheless, they were at odds with one another, aiming for different goals. While Korean nationalists were opposed to Japanese rule and the socialist movement aimed to bring an end to imperialism as an essential step in abolishing capitalism, the colonial government wanted to pursue the interests of Japan. The Bureau felt it necessary to distinguish its projects from and be more effective than movements led by Koreans; thus, they needed to pursue initiatives popular with Koreans and to organize networks that were efficient and familiar to Koreans.[31]

The phrase "Harmony between Morality and Economy" encapsulated the response of the Bureau to Korean nationalists and socialists. The term "economy" referred to the goal of eliminating hunger and reducing debt. The term "morality" included the promotion of self-reliance to manage their lives efficiently, without depending on others and without attributing individual hardship to external causes; it also promoted a communal sense considering public interests, mutual understanding among people from different classes for the sake of co-prosperity, and a rational way of thinking in everyday lives.[32] Hayashi Shigeki deplored the lack of morality among Koreans, attributing its loss to the rich who were endlessly selfish to an inhumane degree, without taking account of the impact of their behavior on other Koreans. Their ruthless pursuit of individual prosperity triggered the widespread economic hardship of other Koreans. At the same time, he railed against the poor whose efforts to overcome economic hardship had been lacking but who blamed their situation on the class system, which led them to accept the theory of class struggle. He argued that the missing morality made the schism between the classes—landlord vs. peasant, and capitalists vs. workers—deeper.[33]

On the basis of the claim that the separation of economic life from moral life generated social problems, the Bureau stressed that social indoctrination movements should not emphasize only spiritual reform or material improvement. Hayashi predicted that the movements promoting only economic improvement would result in making personal profit-oriented activities predominant, ultimately deepening the class struggle. On the other hand, a moral life without an economic basis could be critiqued that it was too ideal and abstract to be realized and that disinterest in economic improvement ultimately would lead Koreans to turn their back on Government-General programs. When economic activities were supported by morality, he claimed that the pursuit of interest would not decline into a selfishness that would intensify class struggles; instead,

it would be a stimulus for economic development.[34] In short, the slogan of Harmony between Morality and Economy was a useful means to get the support of Koreans and a critical vehicle to check communism and the people's profit-oriented individualism.

When the Government-General turned toward rural areas, they found that they could not outdo Korean nationalists and socialists in organizations. During the 1910s, when local administration was reorganized, they rezoned the traditional customary districts, renaming them "towns" (面, *myŏn* in Korean). In this process, naturally-formed regions were split and re-combined for the convenience of colonial rule. As this reorganization created constant friction between local administration and local society, directives from the central government were not well received by Koreans.[35] Aware that Korean society still had a deep connection to their original localities, there was increasing support within the Bureau to consider returning to Korean traditional practice. Yi Kak-chong, an advisor to the Bureau, asserted that Koreans still had a strong connection to their naturally-formed villages in the early 1930s. He pointed out that local officials were heavily dependent on the leaders of traditional villages in dealing with local administration. It seemed that the notion of villages could not be readily dissolved, because they were evolved from families, a very strong social bond in Korean society. Families accumulated communal property in the name of their family and built communal memorial places to hold regular gatherings; grounded on the intimate economic and familial relationships, they overcame economic hardship together and even had social edification functions. Given the strong bonds of villages, he was convinced that the social indoctrination movements should make use of traditional villages.[36] Seeing the Korean traditional communal practice as a kind of a region-centered social work, Hayashi ordered a nationwide survey on the existing Community Compact (鄉約, *hyangyak* in Korean) in 1932.[37]

When Hayashi encouraged local governments to utilize Community Compacts in the social indoctrination movement, Tominaga Fumikazu, a future director of the Bureau from 1935 to 1937, was the governor of North Hamgyŏng province. He had already expressed deep interest in Community Compacts, publishing several articles and a book about them in the early 1920s. Tominaga observed that traditional local society in the Chosŏn period was the site where the power of the centralized bureaucracy came into contact with the authority of local elites. In Tominaga's view, neither of them could achieve domination over the other. State power was centralized as the government could dispatch officials to local regions, but they could not dominate over local elites nor had detailed knowledge of local society. On the other hand, local nobles had substantial authority in local society, grounded in their economic power through land ownership and in the hereditary class system; however, they could not be fully autonomous from the central government.[38] Their point of contact was the institution of the Community Compact. He saw that the Community Compact enabled local elites to exercise socio-political

authority over local society under the central bureaucratic structure. The combination of local networks with the central administrative hierarchy made it easy to spread their conception of morality, changed the nature of local self-governance, and allowed them to avoid a direct clash with the central government. At the same time, he observed that government officials, unfamiliar with local society, turned to the Community Compact for help in dealing with taxes, local safety, and mutual cooperation in economic hardship. The compacts were essential both for local elites to keep the local society safe and to lessen the economic hardships under their leaderships and for officials to govern local society. He concluded that there was no clear dividing line between the central administration and the local community compact.[39]

Noting the Government-General's strained relations with local Korean society, Tominaga warned that the ignorance of these characteristics of Korean society and the neglect of Korean social practices would lead officials to force policies on the Koreans. This would make local administration superficial and ineffective. Supportive of Hayashi's policy, he began to adapt traditional community compacts into the Kwanbuk Community Compact in North Hamgyŏng province, a region so notorious for peasant movements that the Government-General felt it difficult to govern in the 1930s.[40] Loyalty to the state and subordination to the officials were added to compacts to provide assistance to the Movement for Rural Revitalization and to undermine the peasant movement. Each village was obliged to have regular meetings four times a year as well as temporary meetings, build village storehouses, and store some provisions for the economic emergencies. They encouraged, among other things, women's outdoor activities, the abolishment of early marriage, frugality, and hygiene.[41] Starting in June 1932, the number of Kwanbuk Community Compacts reached 436, and their membership totaled 43,796 in 1934 (counting only the heads of household).[42] After being promoted to director of the Bureau, Tominaga pushed other local communities to revive and improve existing Korean local traditions.[43] From the early to mid 1930s, the traditional practices of the colonized were incorporated into the colonial government's movements by the Education Bureau.

Governor-General Minami Jirō, Director of Education Bureau Shiobara Tokisaburo, and National Spiritual General Mobilization Movement

In August 1936, a year before the outbreak of the war against China, Minami Jirō (南次郎, 1874–1955), the Governor-General nominee, came to Korea by ship. It was the second time that Minami succeeded Ugaki in a position in the 1930s. He had appointed as Ugaki's successor as Minister of Army when he resigned from Minister of the Army in 1931 and then became the Governor-General in Korea. After the Manchurian Incident, Minami assumed the positions of commander of the Kwantung Army and of Japanese ambassador to Manchukuo in 1934, but he stood down in 1936 due to the February 26 Incident in Japan. Later, he became the Governor-

General in Korea upon the recommendation of Ugaki.

As roughly reflected in their career paths, Minami was known to be close to Ugaki. He inherited Ugaki's economic policies, promoting the development of military-related industries as a preparatory step for war.[44] Unlike Ugaki, who had a difficult relationship with the Kwantung Army,[45] Minami was on good terms with the Kwantung Army, even though his views were different from that of reform-minded military officers. His good relations with leading figures in both Korea and Manchuria enabled him to act as a moderating force when tensions within the empire emerged. On arriving in Korea, Minami, aiming to reconcile with the Army, arranged compromise measures over conflicting matters between Ugaki and Kwantung Army.[46]

The conciliatory stance of Minami was expressed in two major slogans: "Chosŏn and Manchuria are like one" (鮮滿一如, *sŏnmanilyŏ* in Korean) and "Japan and Korea are One Body" (內鮮一體, *naesŏnilch'e* in Korean). In the context of Japanese imperial politics, they were clearly different from two earlier slogans, "Korea's Particularities" and "Harmony between Japan and Korea" (內鮮融和, *naesŏnyunghwa* in Korean), that captured Ugaki's main approach to colonial rule. Ugaki's emphasis on the particularities of the colonies clearly demonstrates his view that imperial order could be maintained through hierarchical but cooperative relations between the core and the periphery. He thus did not apply Japanese law in Korea indiscriminately but introduced changes where necessary; he took Korea's situation into account as long as it did not undermine the general interest of the Japanese empire, causing tension with the Kwantung Army from time to time. By contrast, Minami rejected the notion of the uniqueness of Korea, viewing Korea as a part of Japan. His slogans expressed the increasingly homogenizing tendencies of the colonial government, thereby shifting into totalitarian rhetoric, especially after the outbreak of the war against China in July 1937. The shift toward assimilation led to the launching of the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement, whose foremost goal was the making of Japanese imperial subjects (皇國臣民化; *kominka* in Korean).

The political views of the new Governor-General were reflected in the social indoctrination movements led by the Social Section in the Education Bureau. Minami put the Social Section back under the Home Bureau. Actually, it was neither sensible that the Education Bureau was tasked with the immigration from abroad and the promotion of a slew of construction projects, nor viable for them to handle the growing amount of labor-related tasks.[47] After returning the Social Section to the Bureau of Home Affairs, Minami created a Social Education Section in the Education Bureau, thereby separating cultural and educational forms of social work from other kinds. The Social Education Section was charged with three main tasks. First, they undertook ideological projects, such as programs for awakening national spirit, education of "sound"

ideology against socialism, organization of the youth groups and wives' groups. Second, they launched campaigns for the reform of daily life, and third, it managed social education facilities including the Community Compact, the Association for Movement for Rural Revitalization, and local village hall, platforms for displaying the Japanese national flag, Shinto Shrines, public wells, and public baths.[48]

The organizational change gained momentum when Shiobara Tokisaburo was appointed as the new director of the Education Bureau. In contrast to the three previous directors who were conversant with Korean culture and traditional local practices, he had little experience in Korea. After graduating from the Law School of Tokyo Imperial University, he worked at the Ministry of Transportation (Teishinshō) in Japan and moved to Taiwan and then to Manchuria. While working in Manchuria, he became acquainted with Minami, who was the commander of Kwantung Army at that time. He did not go to Korea until 1937, when Minami recruited him for a position. He was first assigned to the Secretariat in the Government-General, soon promoted as director of the Bureau in July 1937. He became the *de facto* head of all wartime mobilization programs until March 1940 when he was promoted to director of the Occupation Bureau in Japan.

The outbreak of war brought about a rapid shift in the goals of the colonial state's movements. They now focused on making a contribution to the war effort, from buttressing the economic bloc to maintaining social stability by reducing anti-Japan sentiment and interest in socialism. Seeing modern war as a "total war," Shiobara extended the scope of war beyond the use of military force to the economy and ideology.[49] As the military draft was not applied to the colonized yet, Koreans were to contribute to the war effort in both the economic and ideological sectors.

During wartime, consumption became an increasingly critical aspect of the state economy. It had been a concern of state-led campaigns in the 1930s. There had been campaigns that promoted savings at both the individual and communal level with the aim of lessening individual poverty. Savings also became thought of as a basic means to curb inflation as well as a primary source of finance for domestic industry; this was important since financing from Japan was decreasing. Frugality became essential to overcome the sharp drop of commodity imports from Japan.[50]

Shiobara, well aware that threats or coercion would neither reduce consumption nor result in the ideological support from Koreans in their everyday lives, framed the issue as a contrast between the East and the West in order to encourage Koreans' voluntary commitment to the state. In his view, Koreans preoccupied with nationalism failed to understand the West's attack on one of the East's most beautiful virtues, community-based traditions. What was the most pressing task to

break through the East Asian crisis was for Koreans to concentrate on the peace and prosperity of East Asia and the recovery of the lost beauty of Asian culture.[51] Central to the liberation of East Asian society from the West was Japanese spirit centered on the figure of the Japanese emperor. Called "Japanese totalitarianism" at the time, it was distinguished from that of Germany. Having originated in class struggle as well as the belief in the physical superiority of Germans, Nazism was seen as losing the spiritual force of totalitarianism and becoming no more than a biased and exclusive form of nationalism and aggressive imperialism. By contrast, Japanese totalitarianism was exalted as a true totalitarianism, based on a peaceful ideology that the world is like one extended family (*hakkōichiu* in Japanese, 八紘一宇).[52] The homogenizing rhetoric, resonant with the notion of *nasŏnilch'e* (Japan and Korea are one body), was realized in the notion of "imperial subjects," a neologism allegedly invented by Shiobara.

In the pursuit of Japanese totalitarianism and the voluntary restraint of consumption, what mattered most to Shiobara was the organizational structure. For him, the ideal organization was not a mere collection of individual groups but something that functioned organically from top to bottom for a national goal. He believed that a solid network in a perfect order would train individual habits and everyday behaviors that would ultimately lead Japan to victory in the war.[53] After conducting a review of the movements' scope, institutional structure, and interaction with Koreans, however, he felt that the existing institutions of the social indoctrination movements in the early 1930s were not well suited to carry out the important tasks of the late 1930s.[54] He bemoaned the fact that three-quarters of Koreans were out of reach of social indoctrination, explaining their situation as follows:

> The total population of Korea is twenty-three million. Those who have had any education are only about between one million twenty thousand to one million thirty thousand. That is less than one twentieth [of the Korean population]. All members of youth groups, of women's organizations, and of the institutions involved the Movement for Improving Rural Areas total just five million. Seventeen million people are still out of the reach of social indoctrination…[55]

This short remark reveals Shiobara's concern, acknowledging that three-quarters of Koreans out of the reach of social indoctrination might be neither positively inclined toward Japan nor committed to the causes of Japanese empire.

Women were the group that had been the most ignored in social indoctrination efforts. In the early twentieth century, one striking phenomenon was the increasing advance of Korean women in society. The growth of urbanization and the opening of formal education to women broadened the spectrum of occupations for them such as factory workers, educators, clerks, artists, and musicians. The change in the status of women was marked by the emergence of the

notion of the "New Woman" (*sin yŏsŏng*), though there are still debates on how widespread they were. However, the advance of women was restricted to only a few sectors of society. Government-General statistics in 1940 showed that 78.1 percent of women were unemployed, 83 percent of women with jobs were in agriculture, and 5.6 percent were working in commerce.[56] School attendance among girls eligible to go to elementary school was just 5.4 percent in 1927 and did not exceed 10 percent until 1936, as indicated in Table 1. Despite the emergence of the "new woman," the lives of the majority of Korean women remained unchanged until the late 1930s. The concern of a lecturer recruited by the Government-General that women's attendance was unsatisfactory and that even educated women were losing interest in society after marriage echoed the colonial government's fear that Korean women would not be interested in taking on jobs in the total war.[57]

Table 1: Elementary School Attendance[58]

Year	Total Number	Rate of Attendance	Male students	Rate of Attendance (male)	Female students	Rate of Attendance (female)
1927	451,031	16.8	380,053	27.7	70,978	5.4
1930	489,889	17.3	404,000	28.0	85,889	6.2
1931	499,160	17.6	409,502	28.4	89,658	**6.4**
1936	798,224	25.9	624,854	40.0	173,370	11.4
1937	900,657	28.8	694,029	43.8	206,628	**13.4**
1941	1,571,074	45.6	1,117,178	64.5	453,869	26.5
1942	1,752,590	47.7	1,219,156	66.1	533,434	29.1

Uneducated Korean children constituted another large group ignored in social indoctrination movements. School education had double-edged effects. On the one hand, it was an official and effective channel to disseminate a state ideology, to arouse national sentiment, and to teach the knowledge and techniques essential to individual and social development. On the other, it always had potential to challenge social norms and to promote protest against the state. Aware of the positive social function of education, Japan rapidly adopted compulsory education with the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890. However, in the fear that it might foster collective claims from Korean society and arouse national sentiment, the Government-General did not devote much attention to education and neglected the demands of Korean intellectuals to build more elementary schools.[59] Table 1 shows that the Government-General did not want to promote the growth of Korean education; in 1931, just over 17 percent of eligible children attended elementary school, whereas Japanese people in Korea had more education

opportunities than Koreans.[60]

From the early 1930s, the Government-General began to address the limited access that Koreans had to education. Under the slogans to enhance the status of housewives at home and to offer more opportunities for them to serve the state and society, the Education Bureau organized lecture tours for wives. The lectures encouraged women to go to night schools and to work outside the home; they taught basic knowledge such information on hygiene, rational house economy, and managing their everyday lives. Women were also encouraged to form their own groups.[61] As a result, the number of Wives' Groups reached 16,795 with 645,931 members in 1940. Under the policy of building one primary school in every town (*myŏn*) in 1934, school attendance, which was only 16.8 percent in 1927, doubled in just nine years to 33.2 percent in 1938, as indicated in Table 1 above. Nonetheless, this growth fell short of the goal Shiobara wanted to achieve. The total membership of wives' group was still quite small compared to the total population of women in 1940 (over 11.7 million), and elementary school attendance (33.2 percent) was insufficient for the task of making imperial subjects.

When the Government-General searched for an organization that could contribute to the effort for total war and overcome the limitations of existing state-led movements, the word "home" came to be used quite frequently in official discourse. It was because the home was a primary site for education and socializing that shaped daily habits and disseminated cultural customs. It was also because the home was historically seen as the space for women. The traditional notion of gender roles in which women managed the home and men outdoor activities were for men was still strongly rooted among Koreans.[62] Not surprisingly, it was widely accepted that taking care of eating, housing, and clothing was the job of women.[63] Moreover, women were depicted as financial managers who ran the home economy, especially consumption, as shown by the fact that they were often called the *motozime* (Finance Minister) at home.[64]

The word "home" was of course another term for the family. Totalitarianism required organizations free from internal tension among their members; however, political inequality, the peripheral economic status of Korea, and distinctive cultural practices in colonial rule were obstacles to this goal. Capitalism based on the pursuit of private interests endlessly created social differentiation. Moreover, generational gaps, differences in socioeconomic status, and gender norms also undermined social harmony. To contain wayward elements prompted by colonial rule and individual differences, the Government-General viewed the family as a harmonious place without contention among members. It was described as a space of voluntarism where people treated family affairs as their own business irrespective of their own interests, with the patriarch mediating any disputes, if they arose.[65] Furthermore, the ideal family was likened to political relations within the Japanese empire; for instance, just as righteousness mediates the relation

between the Japanese emperor and his subjects, affection mediates the relation between father and son.[66] The metaphor was well suited for the "family state" ideology at that time which stressed that Japan, unlike Western countries based on individualism, consisted of family-like intimacy and mental integration. In the allegory of family, Korea was seen as a part of the extended Japanese family.

Neighborhoods became a target of the Government-General both as a channel to extend its reach into homes and as a link between individual families and the Japanese state. Villages, which had been the basis for social indoctrination movements under Ugaki, were unsuitable for increasing women's participation in the campaigns of the colonial government, for regulating individual consumption, and for promoting devotion to the wartime mobilization, even though it was useful to increase productivity and to organize cooperative labor. It was too big to maintain harmonious relations with its residents and to have deep understanding of each other. Neighborhood was viewed as an ideal form of community in which people could be open-minded and inter-dependent each other and get over economic hardships through mutual aid.

Once organizational preparations were completed, the Government-General established the Association for National Spiritual Mobilization in Korea to promote the Movement of National Spiritual Mobilization.[67] While provincial governments built local associations through the official administrative hierarchy, Shiobara broadly contacted Korean celebrities in business, education and religion to persuade them to join the Association.[68] At the bottom, the Association had 334,495 neighborhood associations made up of about ten households each as of the end of 1939, naming them Patriotic Neighborhood Associations (NAs).[69] From that time, Patriotic NAs, linking Koreans to the general headquarters, served as the core structure for all campaigns led by the colonial government. Depicted as the "soul" of all associations within the Association by Governor-General Minami,[70] it was the institutional result of the transition to the wartime system.

Conclusion

Mass movements led by the colonial government were central to the Japanese imperial ruling mechanism throughout the 1930s, prompted by the pursuit of economic autarky through the economic bloc and intensified by territorial expansion by the war. To accomplish these goals, the colonial government recognized the importance of the Korean masses, leading them to abandon their previous approach of allying with a minority of the dominant classes. While shifting the focus to the masses, the colonial government inaugurated the period of state-led mass movements in Korean history.

In promoting the new type of mass movement, the Government-General took different approaches to Korean society. In the early 1930s, Ugaki, aiming to enable Korea to make substantial contributions in building the Japanese economic bloc, felt that it was urgent to reduce widespread anti-Japan sentiment as expressed in nationalism and socialism and to enlighten Koreans. Feeling that this was a matter of social indoctrination, he put the Social Section in the Education Bureau in charge of making specific plans and implementing them. The Bureau revised its previous understanding of Korean tradition as a symbol of pre-modern ignorance and a source of anti-Japanese sentiment; instead, it sought to utilize tradition, stressing a sense of community against individualism. It organized mass movements by making full use of Korean traditional practices.

Around the time of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, Minami put more emphasis on the assimilation and reorganized the Government-General's campaigns in the name of National Spiritual General Mobilization. Frustrated that previous social indoctrination movements did not reach three-quarters of the Korean population, the Education Bureau paid more attention to the scale of the organization. The culture of the home was regarded as one of the biggest obstacles to making Korean society suitable for total war, because most Korean women stayed in the domestic sphere, a private realm that was hard to penetrate. At the same time, the extended family was used to defend the hierarchy within the Japanese empire. For them, the neighborhood, a residential space connecting individual households, was the optimal level at which to indoctrinate families and individuals. The final institutional outcome for the wartime imperialism was the creation of about 380,000 Patriotic Neighborhood Associations.

Notes

[1] Kim Yŏng-hŭi. *Ilche sidae nongch'on t'ongje chŏngch'aek* (Regulation Policies over Rural Area during the Colonial Period). Sŏul: Kyŏngin Munhwasa, 2003; Yi Song-sun. *Ilcheha chŏnsi nongŏp chŏngcha'ek kwa nongch'on kyŏngje* (Agricultural Policies and Economy during the Wartime Period). Sŏul: Sŏnin, 2008; Yi Sŭng-il, "Ilche ŭi singminji chibae wa ilsang saenghwal ŭi pyŏnhwa (Japanese Colonial Rule and Changes in Everyday Life)," *Sahoe wa Yŏksa* 67 (2005): p.6–40; Yun Hae-dong, *Chibae wa chach'i* (Domination and Self-Rule), Sŏul: Yŏksa Pipyŏngsa, 2006; Gi-wook Shin, "1930nyŏndae Nongch'on Chinhŭng Undonggwa Nongch'on Sahoe Pyŏnhwa", *Ilche P'asisŭm Chibaejŏngch'aekkwa Minjung Saenghwal*, Sŏul: Hyean, 2004.

[2] The Outline for Economic Control in Japan-Manchuria in 1934 was the outcome of their compromise. Louise Young, Chapter 5 in *Japan's Total Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Yi Sŭng-nyŏl, "1930 – yŏndae chŏnban gi ilbon kunbu ŭi taeryuk ch'imnyakgwan kwa 'Chosŏn kong'ŏphwa' chŏngch'aek," *Kuksagwan nonch'ong* 67 (1996), p.145–196.

[3] Yi Sŭng-nyŏl, "1930 -nyŏndae chŏnbangi ilbon kunbu ŭi taeryuk ch'imnyakgwan kwa 'Chosŏn kong'ŏphwa' chŏngch'aek," *Kuksagwan nonch'ong* 67 (1996), 155–156; Pang Ki-jung, "1930-nyŏndae Chosŏn nongkong pyŏngjin chŏngch'aek kwa kyŏngje t'ongje," *Tongbang hakchi* 120 (2003), p.80.

[4] Ugaki Kazushige, *Ugaki Kazushige nikki* 2 (5 March 1935).

[5] Ugaki Kazushige, *Ugaki Kazushige nikki* (23 June 1936), 1070.

[6] Ugaki Kazushige, "Chōsen no shōrai," *Chōsen no kyōiku kenkyū* 73 (1934): p.3–4.

[7] Ibid, p.11–21.

[8] Ibid, p.4.

[9] Pang Ki-jung, "1930-yŏndae Chosŏn nongkong pyŏngjin chŏngch'aek kwa kyŏngje t'ongje," *Tongbang hakchi* 120 (2003), 86. Of the Japanese investment to Korea from 1932 to 1937, private capital amounted to 56.1 percent.

[10] Sheldon Garon, Chapters 5–6 in *The State and Labor in Modern Japan* (Princeton University Press, 1987).

[11] Yi T'ae–hun, "*Ilche ha ch'inil chŏngch'i undong*" (PhD diss., Yonsei University, 2010), p.144–153.

[12] Matsumoto Takenori, *Shokuminchi kenryoku to Chōsen nōmin* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1998).

[13] Kim In-ho, *Singminji Chosŏn kyŏngje ŭi chongmal* (Sŏul: Sinsŏwŏn, 2000), p.48.

[14] Chōsen Sōtokufu, "Nōsangyoson shinkō undō no zenbō," *Chōsen ni okeru nōsangyoson shinkō undō* (1934), p.4–5, 10–11.

[15] Ugaki Kazushige, "Chōsen no shōrai," *Chōsen no kyōiku kenkyū* 73 (1934), p.6.

[16] Ugaki Kazushige, "Chōsen no shōrai," *Chōsen no kyōiku kenkyū* 73 (1934).

[17] Takayuki Namae, *Shakai kōka jigyō gaikan* (1939), p.1–3.

[18] Hori Kazuo, *Han'guk kŭndae ŭi kongŏphwa*. Trans. Chu Ik-jong (Sŏul: Chŏnt'ong kwa Hyŭndae, 2003), p.33–40.

[19] Chōsen Sōtokufu, Gakumukyoku Shakai Kyōikuka, *Chōsen shakai kyōka yōran* (1937), p.33.

[20] Ugaki Kazushige, "Chōsen no shōrai," *Chōsen no kyōiku kenkyū* 73 (1934): p.22.

[21] Kim In-ho, *Singminji Chosŏn kyŏngje ŭi chongmal* (Sŏul: Sinsŏwŏn, 2000), p.50–52.

[22] Ugaki Kazushige, "Chōsen no shōrai," *Chōsen no kyōiku kenkyū* 73 (1934).

[23] Gakumukyoku Shakai Kyoikuka, *Chōsen shakai kyōka yōran* 1 (1923), p.1–16; Chōsen Sōtokufu. Gakumukyoku Shakaikka, *Chōsen shakai jigyō yōran* (1933), p.213.

[24] Hayashi began his career at the Bureau of Internal Affairs in 1912 and then worked in the Bureau of Railways, later becoming the provincial governor in North Chŏlla and North Kyŏngsang and finally the director of Education Bureau. Watanabe, who came to Korea in 1919, worked in the Bureau of Internal Affairs and spent eight years as chief of the Section of Agricultural Affairs. Just before being appointed as a director of the Education Bureau, he served as the provincial governor of South Kyŏngsang. Tominaga, arriving in Korea in 1916, worked in the Bureau of Police, the Bureau of Home Affairs, later becoming the provincial governor of Kyŏnggi. Their personal resumes are from *Han'guk Yŏksa Chŏngbo T'onghap* System.

[25] Hayashi was well known for the successful project to pave local roads in North Chŏlla province. Watanabe created plans for the Campaign for Self-Revitalization, working as a chief of the Section of Agricultural Affairs for about eight years in the 1920s. Sufficiently well aware of Korean traditions to write several articles and a book on Community Compact (鄉約, *hyangyak* in Korean), Tominaga Fumikazu revised the traditional community compact system, renaming it Kwanbuk Hyangyak, and used it in the local improvement movement. *Chōsen kōrōsha* 69; Fumikazu Tominaga, *Mongyō no Chōsen* 75 (May 1921), 78 (August 1921), 79 (September 1921); Fumikazu Tominaga, "Chihō Jichisei no Jyunbi," *Chosŏn* 15-1 (1931); Fumikazu Tominaga, "Hambuk no Hyangyak," *Chosŏn* 17-10 (1933).

[26] "Sōtokufu oyobi ka 'to' kōkan jibutsuhyō," *Samch'ŏlli* 10-5 (1939): p.59.

[27] Watanabe Yutahiro, "Chōsen no shakai jigyō ni tsuite," *Chōsen shakai jigyō* 11-9 (1933): p.9.

[28] Watanabe Yutahiro, "Chōsen no shakai jigyō ni tsuite," *Chōsen shakai jigyō* 11-9 (1933).

[29] Albert Park, "Visions of the Nation: Religion and Ideology in 1920s and 1930 Rural Korea" (PhD diss.,University of Chicago, 2007).

[30] Chi Su-gŏl, *Ilche ha nongmin chohap undong yŏn'gu* (Sŏul: Yŏksa Pip'yŏngsa,1993).

[31] ChōsenSōtokufu, "Nōsangyoson shinkō undō no zenbō," in *Chōsen ni okeru nōsangyoson shinkō undō* (1934), p.48.

[32] Yu Man-gyŏm, "Charyŏk kaengsaeng iran muŏt inga," *Chōsen* 17-2 (1933): p.9–11.

[33] Hayashi Shigeki, "Minshin sakkō undō no honji," *Shakai kyoka shiryo* (1933), p.126.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Yi Kak-chong, "Purak ŭi sahoejŏk yŏn'gu," *Sinmin* 64 (1931).

[36] Yi Kak-chong, "Purak ŭi sahoejŏk yŏn'gu," *Sinmin* 64 (1931): p.71, 80–85; Yi Kak-chong, "Chōsen no Nōsō to Shakaijigyou," *Chōsen shakai jigyō*. 5-3 (1927): p.2–5.

[37] Kim Yŏng-hŭi, *Ilche sidae nongch'on t'ongje chŏngch'aek* (Kyŏngin Munhwasa, 2003), p.367–372.

[38] Tominaga Fumikazu, *Ouji no Chōsen ni okeru jichi no hōga, Hyangyak no itban* (1923), p.1.

[39] Ibid, p.1–5.

[40] *Chosŏn Kongnoja* 39; Sin Chu-baek, "1930 nyŏndae hamgyŏng -do chibang hyŏngmyŏngjŏk nongmin chohap undong e kwanhan yŏn'gu," *Sŏngdae Sarim* 5 (1989).

[41] Yi Chun-sik, "Hyŏngmyŏngjŏk nongmin chohap undong kwa ilche ŭi nongch'on t'ongje chŏngch'aek" in *Ilche singminji sigi ŭi t'ongch'i ch'eje hyŏngsŏng* (Sŏul: Hye'an, 2006), p.254–262.

[42] Tominaga Fumikazu, "Hondō no tsuite nōsonn no shisetsu," *Jiriki kōsē kihō* (1934), p.1–14.

[43] Chōsen Sōtokufu Gakumukyoku Shakai Kyōikuka, *Chōsen shakai kyōka yōran* (1937), p.51–54. At the national level, the number of organizations based on Community Compacts was recorded as 35,679 in May 1937, even though five provinces were excluded from the survey.

[44] Chōsen Gyōseigakukai, *Atarashiki Chōsen* (Chōsen Sōtokufu, Jyōhōka, 1944), p.19–21.

[45] Ugaki championed the downsizing of military divisions and the shortened military service period by the Kato cabinet, taking a risk of opposition from the Army and Kwantung Army. While his stay in Korea, his close ties with *zaibatsu* in Korean industrialization programs which the Army severely criticized, and his immigration policies of bringing Korean farmers to Manchuria which caused conflicts with the Kwantung Army. In the end, due to the trouble with the Army, he aborted organizing cabinet in 1937.

[46] For example, to relieve the poverty in rural areas, Ugaki promoted the Movement for Improving Rural Areas as well as made plans to reduce overpopulation in the countryside by migrating people to Manchuria. The main detail of the plan was the annual migration of 20,000 households, which ultimately would include up to 300,000 households. Ugaki wanted to establish a company responsible for overall issues on the Korean migration separate from the Japanese migration company, in the belief that it was unnecessary to remind Korean peasants of the discrimination against Japanese peasants, and to dispatch bureaucrats from the Government-General to Manchuria, because the Government-General were mostly more familiar with Koreans than anyone else. However, Kwantung army opposed the idea of establishing an independent migration company for Korea and the advance of Ugaki's people to Manchuria. It was resolved by Minami. Regarding the immigration issue of Korean peasants, the Government-General and Kwantung army concluded that the number of Korean migrants would be 10,000 annually and their place would be restricted to two provinces, and an independent migration company would handle Korean peasants. Tanaka Ryuichi, "Chōsen tōchi ni okeru zaiman Chōsenjin mondai," *Tōyō bunka kenkyu* 3 (Gakuzutsuin Daigaku Tōyō Bunka Kenkyusho, 2001), p.152–154.

[47] The number of factories increased from 4,6l3 in 1931 to 9,566 in 1941, more than doubling in ten years. Taking a look at the workers, the total number of factory workers was 102,000 at the end of 1930. This number increased up to 139,000 at the end of 1934, 188,000 at the end of 1936, and 231,000 in 1938. Workers in the mining industry increased from 31,000 in 1930 to 96,000 in 1934, 140,000 in 1936, and to 206,000 in 1938. The workers for the construction of pavements, railroads, harbors, and waterworks numbered 60,000 in 1934, 118,000 in 1936 and 193,000 in 1938. Hori Gazuo, *Han'guk kŭndae ŭi kongŏphwa,* trans. Chu Ik-jong (Sŏul: Chŏntong kwa Hyŭndae, 2003), p.116–117.

[48] Hangmuguk Sahoe Kyoyukkwa, *Chōsen shakai kyōka yōran* (1937), p.20–47.

[49] Shiobara Tokisaburo, "Kēzaisen no suikō wa sēkatsu wo tōshite," *Sōdōin* 1-7 (1939): p.6.

[50] Mizuda Naoshō, "Chyochiku shyō no hitsuyō ni tsuite," *Jiriki Kōsē Kihō* 59 (1939), 11; Kim In-ho, "T'aep'yŏngyang chŏnjaeng sigi Sŏul jiyŏk ŭi saengp'ilpum pae'gŭp t'ongje silt'ae," *Sŏulhak Yŏn'gu* 26 (2006): p. 75–76; Anjako Yuka, "*Chosŏn Ch'ongdokpu ŭi 'ch'ongdongwŏn ch'eje hyŏngsŏng chŏngch'aek*" (PhD diss., Korea University, 2006), p.118.

[51] Shiobara Tokisaburo, "Seidō undō no unyō," *Sōdōin* 2 -7 (1940), p.8–13.

[52] Nakashima Shinichi, "Zentaishui to Nihon seishin," *Sōdōin* 2-1(1940), p.14–18.

[53] Shiobara Tokisaburo, "Kēzaisen no suikō wa sēkatsu wo tōshite," *Sōdōin* 1-7 (1939): 6; Shiobara Tokisaburo, "Seidō undō no unyō," *Sōdōin* 2 -7 (1940): 11-12; Shiobara Tokisaburo, "Kokumin seishin sōdōin undō ni tsuite," *Mongyō no Chōsen* (1939. 8): 2; Okazaki Shigeki, *Jidaio tsukuru otoko Shiobara Tokisaburo* (Tokyo, 1942), p.128–137.

[54] "Kokumin seishin sōdōin undō no tenbō," *Tsuhō* 38 (1939): 13. Kokumin seishin sōdōin Chōsen renmei rijikyoku, "Kokumin seishin sōdōin Chōsen renmeino Soshiki to sono Katsudou," *Mongyō no Chōsen* 176 (1940), p.24–25.

[55] Shiobara Tokisaburo, "Kokumin seishin sōdōin undō ni tsuite," *Monkyō no Chōsen* (August 1939), p.13.

[56] O Sŏng-Ch'ŏl, *Singminji ch'odŭng kyoyuk ŭi hyŏngsŏng* (Sŏul: Kyoyuk Kwahaksa, 2000), p.181.

[57] Son Chŏng-mok, "Hijōjikyoku to hanto no josei," *Sōdōin* 1-2 (1939), p.29.

[58] O Sŏng-Ch'ŏl, *Singminji ch'odŭng kyoyuk ŭi hyŏngsŏng* (Seoul: Kyoyuk kwahaksa, 2000), p.133.

[59] Ibid, p.36–57.

[60] The number of Korean elementary school students per ten thousand was 250.2, whereas the number of Japanese students was 1360.0 in 1930. The gap got wider for higher education. In the middle school, it was 15.4 to 372.8 (about one thirty-fifth). In advanced education, it was 0.9 to 35.2, about one thirty-sixth. Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Tsūkē nenpō* (1932, 1942); O Sŏng-ch'ŏl, *Singminji ch'odŭng kyoyuk ŭi hyŏngsŏng* (Sŏul: Kyoyuk Kwahaksa, 2000), p. 125.

[61] "Chōsen no shakai jigyō (8)," *Chōsen no shakai jigyō* 12-6 (1934): 39; *Kyŏngsŏng ilbo* (14 August 1932); *Maeil Sinbo* (20 June 1935); Chōsen Sōtokufu Gakubukyoku Shakai Kyōikuka, *Chōsen Shakai Kyōiku yōran* (1941), p. 63–66.

[62] See women's magazines in the late 1930s. For instance, *Yŏsŏng* was full of articles, talks, and interviews with elite women about how to rationalize home life and to be rational housewives.

[63] Hayashi Shigeki, "Sahoe kyohwa ŭi shisŏl e taehaya," *Chōsen* 16-9 (1932), p.4.

[64] Kawagishi Bunzaro, *Sōdōin* 2-9 (1940), p.4.

[65] Nakashima Shinichi, "Jentai shui to Nihon sheishin," *Sōdōin* 2-1 (1940), p.14–18; Minami Jirō, "Watashi no kokuhu," *Kokumin sōryoku* 3-4 (1941), p.2–3.

[66] "Naisenittai," *Sōdōin* 1-7 (1939), p.11.

[67] "Chōsen renmeiwa imamade nani wo yatsute kitaka," *Sōdōin* 1-1 (1939), p.49–52.

[68] Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Chōsen Renmei rijikyoku. "Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Chōsen Renmei no soshiki to sono katsudō," *Mongyō no Chōsen* 176 (1940), p.19.

[69] Ibid, p.19–23.

[70] "Waga kokuhu," *Kokumin sōryoku* 3-4 (1941), p.3.

Who Are The First Koreans?
The First Korean Nationality Law (1948) And Its Limits

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Abstract

Abstract

This article deals with the First Korean Nationality Act which was spurred by the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) and enacted by the first Korean Congress. Although there seemed to be a debate on the Nationality Act before Korea was colonized by Japan, the boundary of "Korean" citizenship was cultural and self-evident. The family registry (*hojŏk*) was a critical criteria to determine who was a Korean, though not identical with a Korean nationality. The colonial government accepted this definition, so the fact that the first Nationality Act inherited this tradition is not so surprising.

However, the ambiguity over the first Korean who bestowed nationality upon descendants became problematic when the post-Cold War Korean ethnics returned, especially the ones from China returning to Korea. Later, Korean-Chinese *in toto* became foreigners, according to Korean Court decisions, because they became Chinese citizens after the People's Republic of China was established in October 1949. Thus, the first Nationality Act shows a thorny issue of what the boundary of Korean nationality is.

Key words: Korean Nationality Act (*Kukjŏkpŏp*), First Korean, US Army Military
               Government in Korea (USAMGIK), Korean-Chinese, Family Registry (*Hojŏk*)

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Every country had to face globalization while newly defining its nationality. With a newly enacted nationality law in early 2011, the Korean government, as some countries do, *de facto* permitted dual citizenship to ethnic Koreans living abroad, a law that once only pertains to those who are over 65 years of age.[1] There are almost six million ethnic Koreans abroad with different nationalities and with differing cultural affinities to Korea, such that the effect of the revised law has different responses in different regions.

Although the revised nationality law supports limited dual citizenship, it has been met with diverse attitudes from overseas ethnic Koreans. While Korean-Americans show enthusiasm for the law because it permits old Korean ethnic groups to stay in Korea as Korean citizens with the caveat that they have to declare that they will not exert their US citizenship in Korea, the Korean-Chinese express some lukewarm feelings or even enmity towards the law. The latter response is due to the fact that the US permits dual citizenship and China does not, meaning that Korean-Chinese cannot obtain Korean nationality. The more fundamental difference is that Korean-Chinese are originally considered to be foreigners to the Korean government.

The law seems to be neutral at face value. However, it has a discriminatory effect when applying the law to different regions. Moreover, through the legislative intents of this law, it is easy to ascertain that the fundamental purpose of the revised law is to give Korean nationality to some, not all, ethnic Koreans abroad—particularly Korean-Americans—in the name of state competitiveness with other countries.[2] Critical is the point that the law assumes that Korean-Americans are former Koreans, while Korean-Chinese are not.

The above-mentioned law shows the complexity of nationality and the dual citizenship issues in Korea. The nationality law delineates the boundary and decides who belongs to a state regardless of culture or ethnic background. The issue of "who are Koreans" is a good window through which to see the law and society in contemporary Korea.

The Korean Nationality Law and its limits date back to 1948, when the Republic of Korea was born—those limitations are the law's man-oriented nature and the obscure definition of the first Koreans in 1948. Although the man-oriented character underwent dramatic changes in 1997 in terms of gender equality, there is no clear-cut solution for the latter issue.[3] The reason comes from the obscure features regarding how to define the first Koreans in December 1948 when the Nationality Law had been passed. The issue relates to whether Chinese or Russian nationals with

ethnic Korean background would be accepted as among the first Koreans.

I have several motives in this article. First, I intend to clarify the current tension in the Nationality Law. To do so, it is necessary to trace the historical background of the first nationality law which was promulgated just after the Republic of Korea was established. Although there is sound scholarship on the legal interpretation of the current law[4], there is little scholarship on the first Nationality Law, especially in English. Existing literature acknowledges the lack of definition in the first nationality law and tries to provide alternatives to current limits.[5]

Second, I will analyse the features of the first Korean Nationality Law. Although the 1998 revision changed a lot of patrilineal elements in naturalization and the 2011 revision permitted dual citizenship, the revised law still retains ambiguity about the first Koreans. Therefore, to clarify the unique points of the law, I will trace the legislature's intent through the first Korean Congress records.

Last but not least, while reflecting on the first Korean Nationality Law, I will address the issue of how to interpret the current discriminatory effects of the Nationality Law, particularly regarding the Korean-Chinese. In addition, I want to provide a normative but tentative answer to this thorny issue, dealing with the Korean Constitution and the Supreme Court cases.

Road to the First Nationality Issue

During the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910, renamed as Empire of Korea in 1897), there was not a clear standard by which to define Koreans, because Koreans were too self-evident with separate boundary and quite homogeneous culture, let alone language.[6] In the early Chosŏn dynasty, the state used the term *kukjŏk* (national registry) for national registry, not for nationality.[7] It is not clear whether or not the term had specific guarantee for a national of the Korean dynasty. Thus, *kukjŏk* and *hojŏk* (family registry) were interchangeable. It seems that there was no formal nationality law because Koreans were customarily or ethnically distinct from Chinese and Japanese in terms of the national record and family registry.

The modern concept of a nationality has developed from the late nineteenth century when Korea had to embrace international society as most countries did, starting from the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century.[8] Due to some Koreans who were involved in the *coup d'état* in 1884, and their escape to other countries resulting in those with different nationalities enjoying extraterritoriality, the Empire of Korea (1897–1910) retained *de facto* the dual citizenship system. According to Yi Yin, who was a prominent member of the Korean Lawyer's Association in 1931, the old Korean government probably did permit dual citizenship to those like Philip Jason (Sŏ Chep'il) and other Koreans who went to Japan because they were persona non grata to the Korean government.[9]

When Japan annexed the Korean peninsula in 1910, it had already passed its own Nationality Law in 1899 but decided not to apply it to Korea. Thus Koreans could not change their nationality.[10] The reason was related to the Japanese fear that the Koreans in Manchuria were involved in the Korean Independence Movement as Chinese nationals. Thus, with the pretext of appreciation of the old law despite Japanese colonial rule, the Japanese government did not consider Japanese Nationality Law relevant to the acquisition of a different nationality and consequent desertion of Japanese nationality. The Governor General in colonial Korea only applied old Korean law to Korean nationals when he dealt with the Koreans in Manchuria.[11] Thus, Korean ethnic people were Japanese nationals.

This had great impact on the Korean diaspora community in China. During the colonial period, China permitted only Chinese nationals to own land; thus Korean residents wanted eagerly to get Chinese citizenship and obtain Chinese nationality. However, despite diligent movement on the part of diaspora community, Japan did not permit Manchurian Koreans to escape from Japanese nationality. When Manchukuo (Manchu state) was established in 1932 following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in the previous year, a distinct nationality law was incessantly discussed up to the demise of the state in 1945, though without concrete results.[12]

In Hawaii and within the US mainland, the Japanese government even argued that it had jurisdiction over Korean residents. However, partially due to the Korean American Association's efforts in the US, the US decided not to accede to this Japanese logic and Koreans were not under Japanese jurisdiction.[13] When Korea was liberated from Japanese yoke in August 1945, Korean ethnic groups retained several types of citizenships in each hosting country regardless of Japanese policy.

At the end of World War II, Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, which limited Japanese territorial boundary to the four major islands comprising of Japan proper and its adjacent islands. Japanese sovereignty over Korea ended and Koreans were no longer Japanese nationals. In the southern part of the Korean peninsula, the United States Army Military Government in Korea (hereinafter USAMGIK) was the sole sovereignty until the Republic of Korea was born in August 1948. In addition to the Japanese government property in Korea, even the Japanese private property in Korea was vested in occupying authorities.

The first juncture for the Nationality Law was related to the USAMGIK's decision regarding Japanese property, for "who was not Japanese" became a critical question in deciding the property's beholders. On December 6, 1945, the USAMGIK passed Ordinance 33 to vest all the Japanese property as of August 9, 1945 into the military government.[14] It is ironic that the

USAMGIK only started showing interest in differentiating Korean and Japanese legally due to the vested property issue.

At the time of the Korean liberation, Japanese property comprised over 80% of Korean wealth, so this policy was crucial in securing the property foundation for a later Korea. At least in the first stage of military occupation of Japan and Korea, the US government assumed that the Japanese property would be a foundation for compensation for the US's occupation of Japan.[15]

Through Ordinance 33, the USAMGIK set the time for the decision for Japanese property on August 9, 1945 with other conditions:

> Section II. The title to all gold, silver, platinum, currency, securities, accounts in financial institutions, credits, valuable papers, and any other property located within the jurisdiction of this Command, of any type and description, and the proceeds thereof, owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or part, on or since *9 August 1945*, by the Government of Japan, or any agency thereof, or by any of *its nationals*, corporations, societies, associations, or any other organization of such government or incorporated or regulated by it is hereby vested in the Military Government of Korea as of 25 September 1945, and all such property is owned by the Military Government of Korea.[16] [Emphasis added]

August 9 was the date that Japan decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration and acknowledged its defeat in World War II.

Another important step that the USAMGIK took was to "maintain legal order and preserve legal continuity" by Ordinance 21 on November 2, 1945. It declared that

> until further ordered and exert as preciously repealed or abolished, all laws which were in force, regulations orders, notices or other documents issued by any former government of Korea having the force of law on 9 August 1945, will continue in full force and effect until repealed by express order of the Military Government of Korea.[17]

If USAMGIK did not introduce any new law in terms of the Korean Nationality Act, previous colonial rule would rule over this area, for those who were Korean were determined by Korean family registries.[18]

Just after these two important laws, there arose a critical issue to define who is a "national of Japan" and, as a corollary, who is "Korean". The Opinions Bureau at the Department of Justice in the USMAGIK, the authoritative interpreter of what the Korean law was, suggested that "Korea being still a state in the making, it became necessary to devise a test and definition of Korean nationality as far as questions of vesting were to be solved."[19]

The Property Custodian which managed all the vested property was puzzled as to the definition

of a "national of Japan" in relation to "Japanese owned property" because there were so many complicated cases such as Korean-Japanese couples or ethnically jointed companies. In solving this thorny question, first and foremost, the Opinions Bureau brought a new definition of Korean under the Japanese legal system. Since ethnic Koreans did not enjoy full political and civil rights under the laws of Japan, a Korean was a Japanese national and not "a citizen of the country to which he owes allegiance."[20] Therefore, the dividing line between Korean and Japanese is whether a person was "in possession of full civil and political rights" under the laws of imperial Japan.[21]

The civil and political rights test was appropriate in deciding whether one is a Korean in the case of common Koreans who married ethnic Koreans. However, during the colonial period, there were many inter-ethnic or inter-racial marriages between Koreans and Japanese. What nationality did a Korean woman have if she married a Japanese man, or what nationality did a Korean man have if he married a Western woman? All of these questions needed another test.

Following a civil/political rights-based nationality test, Koreans in Korea were not Japanese nationals. Another issue was how to define the Korean nationality boundary. The USAMGIK interpreted that since Koreans formed a "separate nationality of their own," the test was whether a person "belongs to a Korean 'house' and are recorded in a Korean family registry."[22] As Ordinance 21 indicates, all laws which were in force were valid until later repealed or abolished. In the case of the Korean family law, the "custom" which was incorporated in clauses 10–12 in the Korean Civil Law code was still valid under USAMGIK, with minor changes.

The Korean family registry at the time of the Korean liberation was a patrilineal system such that only man blood lines were recorded. This system was historically constructed mainly during the colonial period and had origins in the Chosŏn dynasty.[23] Therefore, an ethnic Korean who was married to a Japanese man became a member of a Japanese "house" with registration under a Japanese family registry.[24] This principle also applied to a Japanese feman who married a Korean man who was registered in the man's "house" and forfeited her privileged status as a Japanese.[25]

Other than the vested property issue and the related question of nationality, as the USAMGIK ran post-war South Korea, there arose other thorny issues related to the definition of nationality, such as in the case of a child born out of wedlock between a Korean feman and an American GI, or, a Korean man who married a German woman but did not register his bride in the Korean family registry.[26]

Another related and equally thorny issue was how to define Korean residents in Japan in terms

of nationality. In regards to Korean residents, there were two incompatible interpretations: the USAMGIK Liaison Office in Tokyo argued that since Korea was a liberated country, "any assumption that Koreans are Japanese nationals is not supportable." However, Legal Section, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) stationed in Japan held that Koreans were Japanese nationals until a peace treaty between Japan and other powers was concluded.[27]

In September 1947, the USAMGIK witnessed the failure of the second US-USSR Joint Commission, which was designed to prepare for trusteeship execution and consequent Korean independence. The US government had already decided to deliver post-war Korean issues to the United Nations so that South Korea could see independence in the offing. For various reasons, the USAMGIK had to define who was a Korean.

The USAMGIK asked the Interim Legislative Assembly (ILA) to make some tentative laws or *chorye* regarding Korean Nationality. The USAMGIK established the ILA in December 1946 as part of the "Koreanization" process of running an occupied territory, in order to secure a more politically broad support bastion after alarm at the extreme right wing movement and the dissolution of the First US-Soviet Joint Commission. Because the ILA was basically conservative due to the fact that half of its members were designated by the USAMGIK, the ILA did not hold any legislative power, but rather an advisory one. In a letter to the ILA for urgent need to enact the law, C. G. Helmick, then the Acting Military Governor, said that the administrative authorities needed more minute criteria to decide Korean citizenship, although the previous standard based upon family registry had produced good results in deciding a Korean national.[28]

The ILA members noticed a difference between Koreans who voluntarily entered the Japanese *hojŏk* (family registry) system and Koreans who voluntarily or involuntarily registered themselves as Chinese and UK nationals. However, the ILA members assumed that the pure national lineage was only preserved with the patrilineal lineage, so they considered a Korean feman married to a foreigner to be a foreigner while a foreign feman married to a Korean man was recognized as a Korean. The interim ordinance became the base upon which the first nationality law was enacted with some revisions under the First Korean Congress.
In addition to the gender issues, it is noteworthy that the ILA and the first legislative members commonly argued that the "Chosŏn" people automatically became Korean nationals only with some exceptions, while foreign naturalization was to be limited. They assumed that there would be rare cases of naturalization as Koreans, besides through the marriage processes. This ethnic Korean-centered approach still lingers in the current nationality law.

Following this direction, *Kukjŏk e kwanhan imsi chorye* (Tentative Nationality Act Law) was promulgated on May 11, 1948.[29] The law had been valid until the time when the Nationality Act

was passed because the law stipulated that a new law under an independent government would replace this law.[30] In the Act, the strange thing is that there was no definition of a "Chosŏnin" (Korean). Rather, it seemed that it was prior given or was self-evident. This is also the same in the first Nationality Law.[31] Who are the "Chosŏn" people is also a thorny question to answer, a topic that I will deal with below.

In the tentative Act, the legislature members did not debate much about who the first Koreans were according to the law. Rather, they assumed that Koreans were ethnically homogenous with easily discernible characters. Thus, the issue was how to differentiate people who voluntarily entered the Japanese registry and people who did not. Whether a person preserved Chinese nationality, which was involuntarily achieved for their livelihood, was not an issue.[32] Perhaps it can be argued that family registry was still a valid standard to decide whether a person was a Korean national, such that the discussion about the definition of who was the first Korean was needless.

The Limitations of Defining "Original Koreans"

Although the USAMGIK and ILA's definition of Korean nationality was a good source to refer to, only the Nationality Act in the first Parliament was binding and valid in the new republic. When the first Parliament was opened, the Department of Justice was very swift in devising a draft for the Nationality Act.

Yi Yin, Minister of the Department of Justice, introduced the background of the law before Korean legislators in the first Parliamentary session. First and foremost, according to him, the man-blood line, the patrilineal or paternal line, should be an underpinning principle of the Act. That is *jus sanguinis* based upon man bloodline. Thus, even if a foreign feman married a Korean, she was supposed to obtain Korean nationality instantly by nature.[33] Second, Yi Yin argued that the Act tried to avoid dual citizenship or persons without nationality. The principle represented the Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of National Laws (1930) [Hague Convention].[34] Third, as a complement to the *jus sanguinis*, partial *jus soli* applied in some cases such as to orphans. Fourth, family registry and nationality were intimately related in deciding nationality.[35] As for the fourth point, even today, the family record (*kajok kwangye tŭngrokpu*) which was introduced in 2008 in replacement of family registry, reveals a presumptive power in deciding nationality.

As for the first Koreans, Yi Yin introduced a highly controversial issue from the contemporary perspective in national continuity. He argued that on the Korean peninsula there had been a state with the March First Movement and the subsequent Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai in 1919.[36] He said more explicitly that, "the Republic of Korea existed even before

August 1945. Therefore, we have to stick to the Republic of Korea (proclaimed by the Provisional Government)." The implication of this statement is that Korean nationality is able to date back at least until April 12, 1919, when the Provisional Government was established. Also, it was widely accepted that the Republic of Korea established de facto in August 15, 1945, when they inherited the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai.[37]

There were many debates about the law in the Legislature. However, it is a mystery that there is no definition of those who are entitled to be a Korean at the time of the first Nationality Law making. This might be related to the fact that was no person would deny the Republic of Korea as a pre-existing entity before 1945, probably up to 1919, when the Korean Provisional Government was born in Shanghai, China. Maybe to all the members, the definition of Korean seems self-evident based upon the family registry system and the man lineage.[38]

As I have indicated above, the definition of the Korean who automatically becomes a Korean national is not clear. In order to verify Korean nationality besides blood, it would be better to refer to other models that stressed naturalization. Japan had a similar problem in terms of man-lineage up until the 1985 Nationality Law revision.[39] However, Japan did not have the same problems as Korea in terms of definition of a Korean at the time of the passage of the first nationality law due to pre-existing legislature, the 1899 Nationality Act.

In the United States, citizenship was not well defined at the time of the Constitutional making. It was rather the socially constructed concept which developed in history. In the preamble, to the Constitution starts with "We the people of the United States," such that the legal definition of the "the people of the United States" is not provided.[40] The Constitution defines naturalization as inherent in Congressional discretion, as Congress outlines its task "To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization."[41]

This is understandable because the population in 1790, the year that the census was first introduced, was with only 3,227,000 people. More than 75 percent were of British origin and most people were descendants of the 16th and 17th century arrivals.[42] It seems that the Founding Fathers did not pay much attention to the first American definition because of the sparse population in the vast lands. Who was American was self-evident.

Indeed, policy makers were lenient so as to secure more Americans such that the first naturalization law, "An act to Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization" (1 Stat. 103), required only a two-year residency and renunciation of allegiance to one's former country. From the contemporary perspective, the required duration shows "an extremely liberal or generous policy."[43] The states were main responsibility for the actual processing of immigrants. Under

these circumstances, it was almost redundant to legally define the "people of the United States."

However, as it is well known, African Americans had not been full-fledged citizens until the Civil War. In apportioned numbers of Representatives, the Constitution divided "free Persons" and "all other Persons;" the latter was equal to three-fifths of the former. The category "all other Persons" indicates African Americans with euphemism.[44] Even before the Civil War, although some African Americans were "free" and "persons" at the time of the Constitution's adoption, in reality African Americans had been considered to be "property" rather than a person.[45]

After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment was passed in 1866. It stated "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."[46] At last, the definition of citizen and consequent equal protection was *de jure* secured in the Constitution.[47] However, how to secure real due process remained debatable until the early twenty-first century. Racial discrimination is now prohibited in the due process clause in the U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. However, racial blindness prevents some "Native" Americans, who aspire to apply for "Native American" status, to be recognized as such. A legal remedy should be determined to help politically and socially oppressed people to secure a fair playing field in society.[48] Thus, the definition of the first Korean may be not formed based upon blood, as is the case for Korean-Chinese who may be categorized as politically and socially marginalized people in Korea.

In the Korean Nationality Law, the issue of how to define the first Koreans was more complicated because of the "mono-ethnic" reality at the time of Korean Constitution making. However, the issue is not resolved. For example, in the case of Korean residents in Sakhalin, it is not clear how to prove their nationality because it is difficult to do so without a family registry dating back to 1919. Indeed, the date may need to go back further, to 1905, when Korea became a Japanese protectorate, as many Koreans started going abroad at this time in order to evade Japanese control. In such cases, it is not so easy to determine Korean nationality.

The Korean government still has not determined a new standard by which to treat ethnic Koreans abroad, whether they are former Koreans or foreigners. The former standard has led to unconstitutional decision-making.[49] In the case of the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans, there is still tension regarding how the Korean government equally treat the ethnic Koreans who have moved to other countries.[50]

The Current Nationality Act

With globalization in full swing in Korea and pressure from the international norms starting in the 1990s, the Korean government decided to change its Nationality law from its man lineage

principle to a "gender-equal" one in 1997. It permitted maternal descendants to inherit their mother's nationality, if she married a foreigner and retained Korean nationality. The Constitutional Court was also decisive in bringing this reform to Korean society.[51] Gender is now much less part of the standard of determining nationality.

In addition to the gender-equality issue, a revised Korean Nationality Law also permits "dual citizenship," mostly to Korean-Americans. If Korean-Americans who were naturalized into US citizenship and are over 65 years of age, then they would be able to apply for Korean citizenship only if they decide to come back to Korea. The law uses a de facto utilitarian approach to the dual citizenship issue.[52]

On the contrary, Korean-Chinese are not entitled to apply for this category because they are not Koreans under the Korean Nationality Law, as they themselves or their descendants became Chinese citizens after October 10, 1949. Thus, when the first Korean Nationality Law was passed, they were excluded from the category of Korean nationals. This also applies to Korean-Russians who became Soviet citizens in the 1930s. Only the Korean ethnic groups that went to Sakhalin during World War II are able to apply for the nationality reinstatement (*kukjŏk p'anjŏng*).[53] This is related to the Overseas Korean Act (*chaeoe tongp'o pŏp*) (OKA) and its implications for each Korean diaspora group.

Amid the great need of foreign investment just after Korea received the International Monetary Fund (IMF) guideline, the OKA took effect on December 3, 1999. The Korean government, at the time, sought to support Overseas Koreans, especially the Korean ethnic groups in the US.[54] This controversial point is relevant to Article 2.2, which says that:

> A person prescribed by Presidential Decree from among those who, having held the nationality of the Republic of Korea (including those who had emigrated abroad before the Government of the Republic of Korea was established) or as their lineal descendants, have acquired the nationality of a foreign country (hereinafter referred to as a "foreign nationality Korean").[55]

The point at issue is "those who, having the nationality of the Republic of Korea." The Execution Ordinance of the Law has two definitions in Article 3: 1. People who lost their nationality because emigration abroad before the Government of the Republic of Korea was established, and their descendants. 2. People who emigrated to other countries and ascertained their nationality as of the Republic of Korea before their nationality changed, and their descendants. (Translation by author). Under the Act and its Execution Regulation, the Korean ethnic groups in China were excluded because Korean-Chinese were not able to ascertain their Korean nationality before their change of nationality.[56] The court struck down the clause as unconstitutional because the law arbitrarily divided the line on the establishment of the Republic of Korea in applying the law to those who are beneficiaries. Thus, the Court declared that the

Act was against equal protection of Korean ethnic groups.[57]

Even though the Overseas Korean Act is not related to the Nationality Act, the problem still remains due to the ambiguous character of the first Koreans before the establishment of the Republic of Korea, which, for instance, discriminates against Korean-Chinese and Korean-Russians.

Although the Overseas Korean Act was devised to incorporate Korean-Chinese and other Korean ethnic groups, Korean law still did not accept Korean-Chinese as first Koreans because they lost their Korean nationality after they became Chinese citizens on October 1, 1949.[58] Thus, people who were born in Korea during the colonial period, moved to Manchuria, and then came back to Korea after the 1990s, sometimes became illegal aliens. They brought their cases to the Constitutional Court.[59] One of the issues was whether the Constitution would delegate the Korean government to conclude a treaty with China to resolve the Korean-Chinese nationality.[60]

The Court's majority opinion noted that the Constitution should not delegate the duty because said individuals were not dual citizens and, even if they were, the treaty with China requires highly sensitive political questions to be asked.[61] The minority opinion produced by Cho Tae-Hyŏn is that the first Koreans were ethnic Koreans who were registered by the Family Registry Law (*hojŏkpŏp*).[62] Thus, one should be more cautious not to declare all Korean-Chinese as aliens. His opinion is that the Department of Justice should differentiate dual citizenship holders; Chinese nationals who lost Korean nationality, and Chinese nationals.[63]

Korean-Chinese had to submit tax returns and income documents to the Korean government to obtain Korean Overseas status (F-4). Korean-Chinese who applied for this change of visa argued that the ordinance to supply the documents is against the principle that important rights should not be delegated to lower laws.[64] The Court argued that the delegation is not prohibited because the delegation is about the law regarding foreigners. The delegation is about the social policy regarding the "social, economic relations and diplomatic relations."[65] The issue is in fact related to those who are the first Koreans.

As I indicated before, the debates of the Nationality Law and its application to each Korean diaspora group is related to the definition of those who were the first Koreans. The most troublesome issue is in how to apply the Korean Nationality Law to those who were born in other countries before August 1945. As has been shown, Korean-Chinese and Korean- Russians were strictly excluded from the category of first Korean nationals. Thus, Korean society should now address whether the first Koreans should include these Korean ethnics.

This is in contrast with a Korean Supreme Court decision to recognize a North Korean residents

who fled to Korea from China as a Korean.[66] A marriage between a Korean-Chinese and a Korean should follow the Korean domestic laws so that even if the marriage is valid, the Korean government has the discretion to review whether the marriage has other purposes, such as for obtaining employment in Korea, a purpose that is not valid under Korean family law.[67] The Korean Supreme Court says that if a person voluntarily accepts the host country's nationality, he or she will automatically lose their Korean nationality.[68] The Court even avers that the Minister of Justice has the discretion to decide whether a person would be able to obtain Korean nationality.[69]

Although the Korean government is sensitive to the Chinese government's response to dual citizenship, the Korean government needs to set up a standard to reinstall Korean-Chinese as a Korean national or had better consult this thorny issue with the Chinese government. In addition, they must limit the time of discussion regarding this issue because the surviving ethnic Koreans in China and Russia are growing very old. Without sincere discussion between Korea and China, many people may think that the Korean government only thinks about economic issues, which is embedded in racism.

Conclusion

When the first Korean Parliament passed the first Nationality Act in December 1948, the definition of a Korean who bestowed nationality upon his descendants seemed to be self-evident because of the extent of the family registry. However, in lieu of the first Constitution and the first Minister of Justice, Yi Yin's remark on the legislative intent, the first Korean was able to date back to the verifiable Korean registry at least up to 1922 when the family registry law was enacted under the colonial Japanese law. Therefore, if an ethnic Korean from another country later tries to change their nationality, the person had to show that they or one of their parent's side had some verifiable document that dates back to at least the early 1920s.

There are still remains of unsolved issues. What about a person who fled to China just before or after 1910 when Japan annexed Korea? What about the case in which they obtained Chinese nationality as some Korean nationalists did, and their descendants who stayed in China after Korea was liberated from Japan for various reasons? With several ethnic diaspora Koreans having difficulty in returning to Korea due to the national division and the Korean War, the first Korean Nationality Law has a detrimental impact on them as was shown after the Korean-Chinese normalization treaty of 1992. At the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, the Korean government tried to reinstate members of some Korean ethnic groups who were born during the colonial period and stayed in mostly China, by paying tribute to their contribution to the Korean independence. However, later the Korean government shut the door for reinstallation of their Korean nationality in fear of diplomatic conflict with China, arguing that they became Chinese

nationals after the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in October 1949. This is because the First Nationality Act of 1948 is not clear on who the first Koreans are.

If someone has difficulty in proving their connection to Korea, we therefore need to think about some other guidelines. Thus, I argue that at least the Japanese Annexation of Korean (1910) would be a critical juncture from which point we can think about reinstalling ethnic Koreans as Korean nationals. As the Korean-Chinese case shows, an issue of the definition of citizenship, including ethnic overseas Koreans is still lingering not only in contemporary Korea, but also on the whole of East Asia, particularly China

<u>Appendix I</u>

[Korean] Nationality Act [1–4 articles][70]

Wholly Amended by Act No. 5431. Dec. 13, 1997
Amended by Act No. 6523, Dec. 19, 2001
Act No. 7075, Jan. 20, 2004
Act No. 7499, May 24, 2005
Act No. 7435, May 14, 2007
Act No. 8892, Mar. 14, 2008
Act No. 10275, May 4, 2010

<u>Article 1 (Purpose)</u>
The purpose of the Act is to prescribe requirements to become a national of the Republic of Korea
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 8892, Mar. 14, 2008]

<u>Article 2 (Attainment of Nationality by Birth)</u>
A person falling under any of the following subparagraph shall be a national of the Republic of Korea at birth:
A person whose father or mother is a national of the Republic of Korea at the time of the person's birth;
A person whose father was a national of the Republic of Korea at the time of the father's death, if the person's father died before the person's birth;
A person who was born in the Republic of Korea, if both of the person's parents are unknown or have no nationality.
An abandoned child found in the Republic of Korea shall be recognized as born in the Republic of Korea.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 8892, Mar. 14, 2008]

<u>Article 3 (Attainment of Nationality by Acknowledgement)</u>
Where a person who is not a national of the Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as "foreigner") is acknowledged by his/her father or mother who is a national of the Republic of Korea, and meets each requirement of the following subparagraphs, the person may attain the nationality of the Republic of Korea upon reporting to the Minister of Justice.
The foreigner is to be a minor under the Civil Act of the Republic of Korea;
At the time of the foreigner's birth, his/her father or mother was to be a national of the Republic of Korea.
A person who makes a report under paragraph (1) shall attain the nationality of the Republic of

Korea at the time of reporting.

Procedures for reporting under paragraph (1) and other necessary matters shall be determined by President Decree.

[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 8892, Mar. 14, 2008]

Article 4 (Attainment of Nationality through Naturalization)

A foreigner who has never attained the nationality of the Republic of Korea may attain the nationality of the Republic of Korea by obtaining permission for naturalization from the Minister of Justice.

In receipt of an application for naturalization, the Minister of Justice shall determine whether a foreigner meets the requirement for naturalization under Article 5 through 7 and then allow naturalization only to a person who meets such requirements.

A foreigner who obtains permission for naturalization under paragraph (1) shall attain the nationality of the Republic of Korea at the time the Minister of Justice grants such permission.

Necessity matters for application procedures, the screening thereof, etc. under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be determined by Presidential Decree.

[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 8892, Mar. 14, 2008]

<u>Appendix II</u>

Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans[71]

<u>Article 1 (Purpose)</u>
The purpose of this Act is to ensure overseas Koreans the entry into and departure from the Republic of Korea and the legal status therein.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 8896, Mar. 14, 2008]

<u>Article 2 (Definitions)</u>
The term "overseas Korean" in this Act means a person who falls under any of the following subparagraphs:

1. A national of the Republic of Korea who has acquired the right of permanent residence in a foreign country or is residing in a foreign country with a view to living there permanently (hereinafter referred to as a "Korean national residing abroad"); and
2. A person prescribed by Presidential Decree from among those who, having held the nationality of the Republic of Korea (including those who had emigrated abroad before the Government of the Republic of Korea was established) or as their lineal descendants, have acquired the nationality of a foreign country (hereinafter referred to as a "foreign nationality Korean").

[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 8896, Mar. 14, 2008]

<u>Article 3 (Scope Of Application)</u>
This Act shall apply with respect to the entry into and departure from the Republic of Korea and the legal status therein of Korean nationals residing abroad and foreign nationality Koreans who have the qualification for sojourn as overseas Korean (hereinafter referred to as the "qualification for sojourn as overseas Korean") from among the qualifications for sojourn under <u>Article 10 of the Immigration Control Act</u>.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 8896, Mar. 14, 2008]

<u>Article 4 (Duty Of Government)</u>
The Government shall give necessary support to overseas Korean lest he/she should suffer unfair regulation or treatment in the Republic of Korea.
[This Article wholly Amended by Act No. 8896, mar. 14, 2008]

<u>Article 5 (Grant of Qualification for sojourn as Overseas Korean)</u>
The Minister of Justice may grant qualification for sojourn as overseas Korean to a foreign nationality Korean who intends to engage himself/herself in activities in the Republic of Korea

based on his/her application thereto.

1. Where a foreign nationality Korean has a reason falling under any of the following subparagraphs, the Minister of Justice shall not grant him/her qualification for sojourn as overseas Korean under paragraph (1): Provided, That when a foreign nationality Koran falling under subparagraph 1 or 2 has become 38 years old, the same shall not apply: <Amended by Act No. 10275, May. 4, 2010; Act No. 10543, Apr. 5, 2011>
2. Where a male who became a multiple national as he was born in a foreign country and acquired a foreign nationality while his lineal ascendants stayed in a foreign country without any purpose of permanent residence in a foreign country, and became a foreigner with a view to evading military service by renouncing the nationality of the Republic of Korea before January 1 of the year when he becomes 18 years old according to obligation of nationality selection of a dual national under the former provisions of Article 12 prior to enforcement of Act No. 7499, the amended Nationality Act;
3. Where a male of the Republic of Korea became a foreigner with a view to evading military service by acquiring a foreign nationality and by losing the nationality of the Republic of Korea; and
4. Where it is apprehensive that he may impair the interests of the Republic of Korea, such as national security, maintenance of public order, public welfare and diplomatic relations of the Republic of Korea.
5. When the Minister of Justice grants a foreign nationality Korean qualification for sojourn as overseas Korean under paragraphs (1) and (2), he/she shall consult with the Minister of Foreign Affairs as prescribed by Presidential Decree. <Amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013>
6. The requirements for acquisition of qualification for sojourn as overseas Korean and the scope of activities of a person who has acquired such qualification shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 8896, Mar. 14, 2008]

Notes

[1] Article 10, Korean Nationality Act (2011), *available at* http://www.law.go.kr/lsEfInfoP.do?lsiSeq=104818#0000 (last access on December 31, 2014); English translation is *available at* http://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=18840&lang=ENG (last access on December 31, 2014).

[2] Tonghyŏn Sŏk, *Kukjŏkpŏp* [Nationality law] (Seoul: Pŏpmunsa, 2011), p. 81.

[3] Article 2(1), Korean Nationality Act (effective in 1998) contained a new word "mother" as "A person whose father or mother is a national of the Republic of Korea at the time of his or her birth." The law is *available at* http://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=727&lang=ENG (last access on December 31, 2014).

[4] *See e.g.* Sŏk, *Kukjŏkpŏp*.

[5] Yŏng-Don Noh, "Urinara kukjŏkpŏp ŭi myŏtkaji munche e kwanhan Koch'al" [Study on Several Issues on Korean Nationality Act], *Kukchepŏp hakhoe nonch'ong* [Society of International Law Review] 41/2 ("we need a legislative step [to change the lack of definition of first Koreans]," p. 56); In Sŏp Han, "Uri kukjŏkpŏp sang ch'oe ch'o kukmin hwakchŏng e kwanhan kŏmto" [A Review of the Delineating Standard of the Fist Korean under the Korean Nationality Act], *Kukchepŏp hakhoe nonch'ong* [Society of International Law Review] 43/2 ("when we take jus sanguine nationality act, it is not possible to adopt a perfect procedure [of recognizing the first Koreans]. Thus the administrative procedure is sufficient to solve this issue," pp. 247-248); Sŏk, *Kukjŏkpŏp*, pp. 308-331 ("if we properly manage the nationality reinstatement system, then we are able to solve several problems from the first nationality act without definition of the first Korean nationals"). Thus, it seems that majority opinion about the definition of the first Koreans is that the court administration suffice to reinstate or evaluate one's nationality. The problem is that this practical solution is not consistent in this issue, whether the court accepts 1919 Korean Provisional Government or 1909 *Minjŏk pŏp* [People's Registration Law] during the Empire of Korea in evaluating one's Korean nationality.

[6] Romanizing Korean words, I will follow the McCune-Reischauer System.

[7] *See e.g.* "P'yŏkdong saram Pakjŏng i saettang ŭl palgyŏn haet ssum ŭl malhada"[Pakjŏng from P'yŏkdong said that he found a new territory] in *Chosŏn wangjo sillok* [Dynastic records of Chosŏn] (January 10, 1443); *see also*, an article in *Ibid*. (April 29, 1753).

[8] Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 10-17.

[9] Yi Yin, "Chosŏnin ŭi kukjŏk munje" [Korean nationality issue] in *Pyŏlkŏnkon* (Sep. 1, 1930), *available at* http://db.history.go.kr/front2010/srchservice (last access on May 7, 2012).

[10] This does not mean that Koreans were not be considered to be Japanese during colonial period. Rather Koreans lacked civil liberty under Japanese rule. *See* |Edward I-te Chen, "The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945* (Edited by Raymon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie)(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 244-246.

[11] Yi Yin, "Chosŏnin ŭi kukjŏk munje."

[12] Mariko Asano Tamanoi, "Knowledge, Power, and racial Classification: The 'Japanese' in 'Manchuria', " *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59/2 (2000), pp. 255-256.

[13] Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun* (NY: W.W. Norton, 2005), p. 454.

[14] United States Army Forces in Korea, *Selected Legal Opinions of the Department of Justice, United States Army Military Government in Korea.* (Compilation prepared by the Department of Justice Headquarters, United States Army Military Government in Korea, 1948), Vols. 1-2 (Reprinted by Hallym University, 1997)[hereinafter *Selected Legal Opinions*], Forward.

[15] There seemed different opinions on this issue between US occupation authorities of Japan and Korea. *See* Opinion # 1269, "Status of Koreans in Japan. Effect of Cairo Agreement and Potsdam Declaration"(October 22, 1947), in *Selected Legal Opinions II*, p. 376.

[16] Headquarters, United States Army Forces in Korea, Ordinance 33, "Vesting Title to Japanese Property within Korea," in US Army Military Government in Korea, *Mikunjŏng Pŏpryŏng Ch'ongram: Yŏngmunp'an* [Comprehensive compilation of US Army Military Government Law: English version] (Han'guk pŏpje yŏn'guhoe, 1971)[Hereinafter *US Military Government Law Collection*], p. 95.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] *See* footnote 22 with accompanying texts.

[19] *US Military Government Law Collection*, p. 95. The Opinions Bureau provided judicial review and legal interpretation to the USAMGIK, so that here I will use the Bureau's opinion as the USAMGIK's opinion.

[20] It is interesting whether the US legal advisors had in mind the fact that African American was a US national, but not citizen in the case of "freed blacks" in Dred Scott case before the Civil War. *See* III-A below.

[21] Opinion # 67, "Ordinance #33. Definition of "National of Japan," and "corporation of Japan or regulated by it"" (April 25, 1946), in *Selected Legal Opinions I*, p. 13.

[22] Ordinance # 73, "Descent and distributions, Korea, Laws of,"(March 28, 1946), in *Selected Legal Opinions I*, at 16 (in re inheritance of a German woman, married to a Korean, who dies intestate, with one surviving daughter, age 8 years, the Bureau opinioned that succession is governed by Korean "custom" law).

[23] Hyun-ah Yang, "A Journey of Family Law Reform in Korea: Tradition, Equality, and Social Change," *Journal of Korean Law* 8(Dec. 2008), p. 79.

[24] Ordinance # 178, "Vesting-Effect of Ordinance # 33 on Property of Korean Women, Married to Japanese Before but Subsequently Divorced," (April 25, 1946), in *Selected Legal Opinions I*, p. 36 ("a Japanese wife, even if she was divorced after August 9, 1945 was not entitled to her husband property because she was a Japanese national on August 9, 1945").

[25] Ordinance # 332, "Nationality of Japanese wives married to Korean Having Permanent residence in Korea," (May 13, 1946), in *Selected Legal Opinions I*, p. 83.

[26] Ordinance # 851, "Nationality of Child Born Out of Wedlock Jurisdiction Over Children of American Military Persons," (January 17, 1947), in *Selected Legal Opinions II*, p. 237; # Opinion 923, "Nationality of Alien Women Married to Koreans," (March 25, 1947), in *Ibid.*, p. 261.

[27] Opinion # 1269, "Status of Koreans in Japan. Effect of Cairo Agreement and Potsdam Declaration," (October 22, 1947), in *Selected Legal Opinions II*, p. 376. From the perspective of Opinions Bureau, the SCAP's position was that "from the standpoint of international law Japan can be required to pay Korean occupation costs only as long as Korea remains, legally, a part of Japan." It was because of occupation costs issue. This topic is outside this paper.

[28] Korean Assembly, *Namchosŏn Kwado ipbŏp ŭiwŏn Sokkirok* [South Chosŏn Interim Legislative Assembly records] Vol. 5, No. 201 (Jan. 27, 1948) [hereinafter *Ipbŏp ŭiwŏn Sokkirok*].

[29] For the 6 article Act, *see Ibid.*, p. 55.

[30] For the brief history of the tentative Nationality Act, *see* Sŏk, *Kukjŏkpŏp*, pp. 55-56.

[31] In order for clarity, the original intent should be carefully studied. However, researchers did not pay careful attention to the historical records.

[32] *Ipbŏp ŭiwŏn Sokkirok*, No. 208 (February 17, 1948) and No. 216 (March 19, 1948).

[33] This law was valid until 1997 when marriage fraud between Korean-Chinese and Koreans became an issue. Sŏk, *Kukjŏkpŏp*, p. 177.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[35] All four points, *see* Korean Assembly, 2 *Chehŏn kukhoe Sokkirok* [Constitution-Making Congress Records], No. 118 (December 1, 1948)[hereinafter *Kukhoe Sokkirok*], p. 1144.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] Some parliament member argued that Chosŏn, Taehan Empire, and Taehan Republic is all should be included in the Republic of Korea. *Kukhoe Sokkirok* (December 2, 1948), p. 1158. It is not clear how much his idea was accepted. I think Yi In's explanation was more corresponding to the First Constitution.

[38] For example, *see* Opinion # 332, "Nationality of Japanese wives married to Korean Having permanent residence in Korea [*sic*]" (May 13, 1946), in *Selected Legal Opinions I*, pp. 83-84.

[39] *See* Mie Murazumi, "Japan's Laws on Dual Nationality in the Context of a Globalized World," *Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal* 9 (2000).

[40] U. S. Const. Preamble.

[41] U. S. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

[42] Michael C. Lemay, *Guarding the Gates: Immigration and National Security* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 17.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 38. In 1795, the required residency was extended to five years. In fear of French "radicals" naturalization and their instigation of turmoil in the US, the Congress amended the 1795 requiring the residential year to be extended to fourteen years (infamous "Alien and Sedition Acts"). In 1802, the residential requirement returned to five years. *Ibid.*

[44] U. S. Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

[45] *Dred Scott* 60 U.S. 393 (1857); for the detailed analysis of this case, *see e.g.* Peter Irons, *A People's History of the Supreme Court: the Men and Women Whose Cases and Decisions Have Shaped Our Constitution* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), pp. 168-176.

[46] U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.

[47] Currently the US Nationality Law is codified as 8 USCA §1481(a).

[48] Native Hawaiians, the largest unrecognized indigenous people, are exemplary group for this because they are not legally "Native Americans." *See* Alex Zen, "Defining a Hawaiian: The Limitations of Race and Blood Quantum Laws" (2nd Year Seminar Paper submitted to University of Hawai'i Law School, 2010).

[49] Korean Constitutional Court, November 29, 2001, 99hŏnma494 (The law seemingly discriminated Korean-Chinese because the legal protection for Korean overseas only applied to a person who went abroad after the Republic of Korea was established). There is also tension surrounding the law in regards to how to deal with Korean-Americans.

[50] Art. 2-2.

[51] August 31, 2000. 97hŏnga12 (Constitutional Court decision), *P'anryejip* 12/2 [Cases], p. 167, available at http://search.ccourt.go.kr/ths/pr/selectThsPr0101List.do (last accessed on December 30, 2014).

[52] Revised Korean Nationality Law (2011)

[53] Regarding evaluation of Korean nationality towards Sahkalin ethnic Koreans, *see* Chulwoo Lee, "How Can You Say You're Korean? Law, Governmentality and National Membership in South Korea," *Citizenship Studies* 16/1(2012), pp. 89-92.

[54] Jung-Sun Park and Paul Y. Chang, "Contention in the Construction of a Global Korean Community: the Case of the Overseas Korean Act," *Journal of Korean Studies* 10/1 (Fall 2005).

[55] "Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans" (Act No. 6015).

[56] Although this law applies to Korean-Chinese, it also applies to Korean-Russians (*Koryŏin*).

[57] November 29, 2001. 99hŏnma494 (Constitutional Court decision), *P'anryejip* [Cases] 13/2, available at http://search.ccourt.go.kr/ths/pr/selectThsPr0101List.do (last accessed on December 30. 2014).

[58] The above case, 99hŏnma494 does assume that Korean-Chinese are "foreigners" in *Id.*, p. 720.

[59] March 30, 2006. 2003hŏnma806 (Constitutional Court Decision), *P'anryejip* [Cases] 18/1, available at http://search.ccourt.go.kr/ths/pr/selectThsPr0101List.do (last accessed on December 30. 2014).

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 385. The second and minor issue is whether the ordinance of the Department of Justice that discriminated Korean-Chinese in applying for the nationality recovery procedure is unconstitutional. The ordinance was invalid so that the issue is moot.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 393.

[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 395-396.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 398.

[64] April 24, 2014, 2012hŏnba412, *P'anryejip* [Cases] 21/1, available at http://search.ccourt.go.kr/ths/pr/selectThsPr0101List.do (last accessed on December 30, 2014).

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[66] Korean Supreme Court, November 12, 1996, 96nu1221. Korean Supreme Court cases are available at http://glaw.scourt.go.kr/wsjo/intesrch/sjo022.do (last accessed on October 24, 2014) (I will omit the website below for Korean Supreme Court cases).

[67] Korean Supreme Court, November 22, 1996, 96do2049.

[68] Korean Supreme Court, December 24, 1999, 99do3354. In the case of a person who was born in the US, however, he still retains a Korean national even if his father obtained the US citizenship. He had to complete military service before he reports to Korean government and loses his Korean nationality. *See* Korean Supreme Court, May 30, 2003, 2002du9797.

[69] Korean Supreme Court, July 15, 2010, 2009du19069 ("Considering the format, language, and contents in a document of nationalization permission, although an applicant for naturalization meets all the requirement of naturalization, Minister of Justice has a discretion").

[70] The whole Act has 22 articles and 8 addenda. From Article 5, the Act has various requirements for different types of naturalization. The whole text is *available at* http://elaw.klri.re.kr (last accessed on May 5, 2012).

[71] The whole Act has 17 articles. The whole text is *available at* http://elaw.klri.re.kr (last accessed on June 14, 2014).

The Political Identity Of Korean Protestantism (1945–1948): How Korean Protestantism Became A Political Power

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Abstract

Throughout the history of post-1945 Korea, evangelical Protestants in South Korea reinforced their political, economic, and cultural ascendancy over the country with extensive economic and administrative supports from the US government as well as missionaries from that country. This paper will examine in what ways Korean evangelical Protestantism gained hegemonic power in nation-building. It is broadly categorised into three spheres: firstly, the sphere of international relations, analysing to what extent the US army administration intervened the religious sphere in South Korea; secondly, the religious-cultural sphere, exploring in what ways Protestant dogma has been combined with the Cold War discourse; and finally, the political sphere, examining in what ways the Christian morality combined with American values in the first ROK government. The role of Pyong'an Christians will also be taken up.

Key Words: Protestantism; Christianity; Missionaries; Separation of church and state

The Political Identity Of Korean Protestantism (1945–1948): How Korean Protestantism Became A Political Power

Anna Seonglim Noh

When it appeared widely within Korean society for the first time in the late nineteenth century, Christianity took on symbolic aspects of modernity. Since then, throughout the colonial period, Christianity, and in particular Protestantism, went through a dramatic development among its Korean converts. Already having grown at a rate far exceeding that of Christianity in China or Japan, Korean Christianity faced new opportunities when freed from Japanese Occupation in 1945. In that autumn of "liberation", Korean Protestantism was already perceived as one of the most powerful socio-political groups, with a following of numerous intellectuals and a well-organised system. Throughout the experiences of US military administration, nation-building, the Korean War, dictatorial regime, and democratisation, some evangelical Protestants in South Korea reinforced their political, economic, and cultural ascendancy over the country with extensive economic and administrative support from the US. They formed an elite culture by capitalising on their advanced knowledge acquired from the modern educational institution founded by American missionaries. Alongside the Protestant privileged class, the American middle-class culture that Korean Protestantism sought was also regarded as the superior culture of the modern society in South Korea.

After 1945, Korean Protestant churches became the spearhead of anti-communist interest groups in South Korean society. This anti-communist identity of the Korean Protestantism was consolidated shortly before and during the Korean War by pro-American defectors, mostly from the north-western Province (Pyong-an-do) who successfully settled down in the South. Providing moral justification for anti-communism, the Protestant church's rigid conservatism as well as its political strength harnessed hostility to North Korea by incorporating evangelical moral values in ideological practice. That is, referring to the North Korea's communist regime not only as "enemy" but also as "anti-Christ" or "devil", they represented the force of "good over devil".

This paper will examine in what ways Korean evangelical Protestantism gained hegemonic power in nation-building. It is broadly categorised into three spheres: firstly, the sphere of international relations, analysing to what extent the US army administration intervened the religious sphere in South Korea; secondly, the religious-cultural sphere, exploring in what ways Protestant dogma has been combined with the Cold War discourse; and finally, the political sphere, examining in what ways the Christian morality combined with American values in the first ROK government.

The US Cultural Policy during the Cold War: The Return of American Missionaries

In the modern history of Korea, an ironic fact is that Korean communism did not originate in Pyongyang, the current capital city of DPRK, but Seoul, the capital of ROK. The authority of the South Korean Communist Party in Seoul was asserted when Kim Il Sung was subjected to approval by Seoul with foundation of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) in Pyongyang. One year after decolonisation from Japan, an official opinion survey on the political preference conducted by the US military government in 1946 indicated the political atmosphere in South Korea was moving rapidly to the left. According to this survey of ten thousand Korean citizens in the South, only thirteen per cent of people were in favour of capitalism while seventy per cent was in favour of socialism and even ten per cent of communism.[1] Indeed, at this moment, communism, emerged by the Korean radical intellectuals and suppressed by the government during the colonial period, seemed to resurge as a new social order to substitute for old colonial rule. For instance, among South Korean intellectuals and politicians, regardless of their ideological tendencies ranging from right to left, there was a shared consensus on nationalisation of all industries and institutions such as factories, banks, and transportation founded during colonisation, which composed the largest part of the domestic capital. In 1946, Edwin Pauley, the US ambassador plenipotentiary, reported to US President Truman that the South Korean society was in an optimum condition for transforming into a communist country.[2] In addition to the pro-communist tendency in the South, both North and South Korean citizens' aspiration for the establishment of a unitary nation already heralded communisation of the Korean Peninsula, which led to the security crisis near the front line against the Soviet Union. For fear of the spread of communism in the Korean Peninsula through socialisation, the US Army immediately launched the project that consolidated the pro-American groups in Seoul since the trusteeship agreement in the United Nations (UN). Indeed, for the US government, East Asia—including Japan and Korea—was a crucial point of the US geopolitical strategy in the Cold War. With this region, the US sought reorganisation as a part of the so-called "Free World"; the establishment of a security alliance; and economic integration. However, the situation in East Asia was too complicated to fulfil the US' purpose. Historically, this region has shown a strong independent identity against western hegemony, which led to the emergence of Japanese imperialism; furthermore, nationalist movements in East Asia arose in pursuit of their own independent political-economic domains rather than being subjugated to either the "free world" or communism. South Korea was not exceptional. In this regard, the US government was confronted not only with the Soviet Union also with nationalism in this region.[3]

To integrate South Korea into the Free World order, the US government put an emphasis on the establishment of cultural hegemony in South Korea, apart from economic, military, and administrative supports. Since the early twentieth century, the US foreign policy began to focus on culture. At that moment, the US government regarded culture as an explicit weapon in the

arsenal of national power, tightly interwoven with economic and political influences.[4] They instrumentalised cultural diplomacy, aiming to reinforce their political leverage over the international community as well as protecting its culture. American films, books, and music were diffused all over the world through the various policies at the governmental level. The same approach was devised to South Korea. It was necessary for the US to share its moral values with the South Korean people, such as freedom, democracy, and individualism; central to this policy was to inculcate the superiority of American values over the communist totalitarianism as well as Korean—underdeveloped—culture into the South Korean society.[5]

In fact, "freedom of religion" was one of the most important values promulgated by the US Army, representing the superiority of American democracy. Since this government declared to protect "Korean people's human rights and freedom of religion" in 1946, all the religions—not only those which sustained their positions during colonisation but also those once-disappeared religious institutions under Japanese oppression—were re-established. Besides Protestant and Catholic churches, the Buddhist Jogye Order and nationalist religions including Daejonggyo and Cheondokyo emerged as influential religious organisations with huge memberships and systematic management.[6] Furthermore, all these religions in this period were influential for nation-building, thereby indicating more or less political identities. Notwithstanding its multi-religious aspect, the religious sphere of the South Korean society was swayed by the "Pax Americana" ideology under the US military Occupation, which prioritised the formation of "free world alliance around the US" and "establishment of free-market economy in association with the US" against the Soviet Union.[7] In line with the goal, the US necessarily suppressed anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea, as Japan became a part of the anti-Soviet front after the Second World War. As a result, during this period, there was an implicit policy in favour of religions—conservative Protestant and Catholic churches—that espoused the social-stability with anti-communism that thereby justified the division of the Korean Peninsula; on the contrary, such religions as Cheondokyo and Buddhism that strongly appealed nationalism, leftism, anti-Japanese sentiment, and a unitary government between South and North were discriminated against by the US Army. For example, when establishing the Advisory Council on 5 October 1945, shortly after their arrival, the US Army appointed six pro-American Christians to the prominent positions, which comprised more than half of the total positions in the Council.[8]

However, the most important facilitators of the US government were American missionaries who had been deported from Korea in 1940s.[9] Before liberation, around sixty-five per cent of the foreign missionaries dispatched to Korea were American, and in this situation, Korean Protestants were almost the only Koreans who had a constant connection with Americans.[10] In the early 1940's, these American missionaries, mostly from conservative Presbyterian and Methodist churches, who foresaw the fall of the Japanese Imperialism, were eager to return to

Korea. In 1944, the Korea Committee of the Foreign Missions Conference of North America began to prepare for rehabilitating their mission stations in South Korea based on the agreement of "Some Comments and Actions on Resumption of Work in Korea".[11] On the other hand, in 1945, the US Army suffered from the lack of knowledge and information of the Korean society since its arrival in Korea. The US Army sought to recall the missionaries to Korea in order to rely on those who understood the Korean language, had long experiences with Koreans, and had a wide network with Korean intellectuals. Furthermore, Douglas MacArthur, who was a sincere Christian himself and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers occupying Japan after World War II, pursued to impart values of Christianity and American democracy in post-war Japan.[12] Under the supervision of MacArthur, the US army in South Korea was not freed from the influence of MacArthur's pro-Christian policy, despite the American principle of separation between religion and the state. With governmental support, ten Protestant missionaries returned to Korea in 1946, comprising two from South Presbyterian Church (US), two from North Presbyterian Church (US), three Methodists (US), one from the United Church of Canada, one from the Seventh Day Adventist Church (US), and one from Holiness Church (US).[13] All the missionaries were experienced intellectuals, having worked for education and health care in South Korea during the colonial period. Also, except for one Canadian clergy, all the missionaries had a conservative-evangelist tendency to a greater or lesser extent. Following these missionaries, another series of American missionaries entered into South Korea from 1946 to 1948.[14]

Considering the engagement of American missionaries with the US military government, it is easy to assume a close relationship between them. These missionaries had a regular meetings with the US Army officers once a week, and freely used the US Army's facilities such as the post office, hospitals, and even army transportation. Furthermore, some missionaries and their second generations, many of whom grew up in Korea during their parents' missionary works, also became officers employed by the US military government.[15] They introduced their Korean Protestant friends to the government, many of whom came from wealthy landlord families, and hence enjoyed the privilege of high-quality education in Korea as well as the US during the colonial period. Particularly, George Williams, a son of Frank Williams who was a missionary dispatched to Korea during the Japanese Occupation, had a close relationship with the Korean Democratic Party (*Hangukminjudang*, KDP) members consisting of pro-American intellectuals. As one of the few Americans who spoke Korean, he worked for the Personnel Affairs, in charge of hiring Korean officers for the US military administration.[16] Needless to say, large members— around four hundred—of KDP members were designated as officers for the US Army by Williams.[17] Particularly, most of them were employed as Korean-English translators. In doing so, Korean Protestants were able to establish a political foothold for their hegemonic power surpassing socialists through what is called "translation politics".[18] Because the US Army used

English as the only official language excluding Korean, competence in English was the best weapon to enter government service as well as to strengthen their relationship with the US Army. However, in the Williams' personnel management, while the pro-American intellectuals successfully took the initiative in the political sphere as translators, a considerable number of socialists, who studied abroad and could speak in English, were ruled out.[19]

Economic assistance from the American churches also accelerated the revival of Korean Protestantism. The North Presbyterian Church established a "Restoration Fund Committee" for the South Korean society, and provided Christian schools, churches, and broadcasting companies with financial support. With the financial investment from the American church, Christian schools such as Jungshin Girls' Middle School, Severance Medical College, Yonhui College, and Kyungshin High School were rapidly developed in this period.[20] In addition to old schools founded during the colonial period, a number of Christian educational institutions and churches had been newly established in South Korea during the US Occupation with the support from churches in the US.

Educational Institutions	Fund	Date
Jungshin Girls' Middle School	$ 5,000	1st Dec 1948
Yonhui College	$ 25,000	21st Jun 1948
Severance Medical College	$ 23,750	1st Dec 1948

Table 1: Financial Fund from the Restoration Fund Committee[21]

In this process, American evangelical Churches could dominate the educational and welfare spheres in South Korea, on the basis of financial funding from its headquarters and political-administrative privilege from the US Army. Regardless of social classes, we can assume that pro-American values have been widely disseminated through these private sectors. This tendency was also reflected by the composition of the Board of Education of the US military government: among twelve members of the Board, seven were Protestants and three studied in the US.[22] Although the US Army's educational policy officially aimed to inculcate democratic values into the South Korean people's minds, the term "democracy" in this case was regarded as equivalent to "pro-Americanism" as well as "anti-communism". Oh Cheon-suk, a Protestant member of the Board of Education and deputy of the Educational Affairs of the US military government, stipulated the educational objectives under the US Occupation as follows:

> The victory of the US-led Allied Forces in the Second World War signified the victory of the democracy against dictatorship. However, … another dictatorship newly emerged, that is, communism. Our nation and the United States, which liberated our nation,

became confronted with this new enemy. In this situation, our supreme task was to consolidate the democratic system in the South Korean society.[23]

The understanding of the term "democracy" in this way connoted two significant points in relation to the US Occupation. First, by prioritising anti-communism rather than nationalism, it justified the division of the Korean Peninsula; that is, the South did not approve of the North due to its communist system. Second, it urged the Korean people to respect the US Occupation, which lead the Korean people in the right way, protecting against the enemy (communism).

New Social Force: Protestant Defectors from the North

Under the US Occupation, not all Protestants were pro-American or conservative. Rather, Protestants in the South were fragmented due to their denominations, regions, and political tendencies; it was an obviously different scene from that in the North, representing a very cohesive political unity. Notably, South Korean Protestants revealed acute split in their opinion surrounding the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (*Kunkukjunbiwiwonheo* CPKI), the largest political administrative body, voluntarily organised by the Korean intellectuals and politicians shortly after decolonisation. As the largest political organisation, the CPKI had a strong connection with the Protestant church community, utilising vast network of churches with sheer number of adherents encompassing the entirety of South Korea; some well-known Christian ministers and lay leaders such as Kim Chang-jun, Yi Kyu-gap, and Yi Tong-hwa, were involved, and its leader, Yeo Un-hyoung, was himself pastor who studied in Pyongyang Presbyterian Theological Seminary.[24] However, due to its leftist and nationalist tendencies, the US Army ignored the CPKI whereas their counterpart in the northern area (the CPKI in the North) was officially approved by the Soviet Army. The CPKI in the South eventually collapsed for political turmoil manoeuvred by returned leaders from exile.[25] After the assassination of some prominent Christian nationalist leaders, including Yeo Un-hyoung and Kim Ku, a new alliance between the right-wing and the returned political leaders, especially Syngman Rhee, emerged in the Korean Protestant society.

With his educational background in the US and pronounced anti-communist aspects, Syngman Rhee derived his primary support from the leadership of the US Eighth Army. At the same time, he also had devoted adherents that were very much "bottom-up"; that is, North Korean defectors. Between 1945 and 1948, it is notable that most of the Protestants who played an important role in forming anti-communism sentiments in both religious and political spheres were North Korean defectors, or more accurately, defectors from Pyong-an Province to the South.

This province had been under the strong influence of American evangelical missionary in the

colonial era; in the mid-1920s, in addition to a huge middle-class of rich Protestant merchants, there were around five thousand Christian propertied intellectuals working for religious, educational, and cultural organisations managed by churches.[26] With the overthrow of the Confucian hierarchy, these Christians gained respect in the community with their modern intelligence and status in the religious community. However, since their political and economic privileges were undercut in 1945 and 1946 by the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), these Pyong-an Protestants defected to the South and rebuilt their power in a new society. Kang (2004) and Rivé-Lasan (2013) analysed how the Pyong-an defectors attained influential positions in South Korea. First, their huge population and ecclesiastical authority enabled those Pyong-an Protestants to reorganise South Korean Protestantism. Second, they maintained solidarity after defecting to the South; this was a marked contrast to other South Korean Protestants, who had established neither a concrete regional characteristics nor systemic solidarity. Third, the Pyong-an Protestants were already well represented among the South Korean elites due to their high educational and professional backgrounds during the colonial period. Finally, they were able to revive their connection with American missionaries in South Korea, which also meant their close relations with the US military administrations as well as Syngman Rhee's alliance. The most remarkable contribution to North Korean Protestant defectors from the US Army was the distribution of properties confiscated from Japan. After the collapse of Japanese imperialism, all the Japanese properties in South Korea were in the custody of the US Army. The US Army bestowed a great deal of properties, which originally belonged to the Japanese religious institutions in the colonial period, to the Protestant churches.[27] More than one hundred Japanese shrines and temples were displaced by Protestant churches established by the North Korean Protestants under the US Occupation.[28]

The affiliation between North Korean defectors and the US Army (and American missionaries in post-1945 South Korea) was demonstrated by the activities of two prominent clergymen from Sinuiju in North Korea: Yun Ha-young and Han Kyong-jik. Both Yun and Han were the beneficiaries of having studied (via missionary help) in the US during the period of Japanese colonisation. In particular, Han often officially presented his desire to establish a Christian state in the North which would ultimately look "like America, the most blessed and peaceful country in the world."[29] These two men initially held positions of political leadership in the North as leaders of the regional People's Committees, but were exiled to the South in 1945, after failing to establish their political party, the Christian Social Democracy Party (*Kidokkyosaheominjudang* CSD) in the North. After his defection, Yun was appointed as the governor of North Chung-cheong Province by the US Army, and worked for the US Information Service in Tokyo during the Korean War.[30] In contrast to Yun who became governmental officer, Han remained the religious leader, concentrating on reconstructing his church in the South Korea. Han was a highly reputed cleric with his achievement in Sinuiju; during his joining the Second Sinuiju Church between

1993 and 1945, the church's membership was dramatically increased from 150 to 2,000.[31] Also, his activities for social work surrounding Boriwon, an orphanage opened in the same city, enhanced his reputation as a social worker to reach beyond the church. When coming to the South, he took over the headquarter building of Tenrikyo[32] from the US Army and established the Youngnak Presbyterian Church in December 1945. For the establishment of the church, Restoration Fund Committee supported him with around 30,000 dollars. Based on the economic support from the US churches and the US Army, the North Korean Christians consolidated around Han and his Youngnak Church. According to the statistics in 1946, the church's membership was already increased to 1,438.[33] Furthermore, he was designated as the chairmen of numerous educational institutions founded by North Korean defectors in the South such as Dae-kwang High School, Youngnak High School, Soongsil Middle and High School, Soongui Girls' Middle and High School, and Soongsil University. All these achievements exhibited his strong Protestant leadership.

Needless to say, due to the conflict with the KWP and their bourgeois status, they actively cooperated with the US Army to reinforce anti-communist sentiments over the South Korean society. They claimed that, "North Korea oppresses religion, but South Korea at least guarantees the freedom of religion."[34] In return for their cooperation, not only could the Pyong-an Protestants join the ruling class of South Korea, but they could also be financially supported by US missionaries who themselves made a great contribution to increase the power of the Korean Protestant church. After defecting to the South, Han therefore developed a new theology, adapting anti-communist (or anti-North Korean regime) beliefs into Christian theology. His eschatological theology, comparing the North Korean communist regime to the anti-Christ, has been regarded as the mainstream view in the conservative Presbyterianism in the South.[35] In this process, anti-communism was cemented as a religious dogma rather beyond the ideological view for the secular society.

These North Korean Protestants actively mobilised their networks, aiming to maintain a pro-Christian regime, and pro-American regime, in the making of political goals and displaying a pro-governmental attitude, and supported Syngman Rhee and his alliance. They were prepared for using violence in pursuit of the annihilation of communism, which brought mass-scale turmoil to South Korean society. From 1946 to 1949, there was a storm of huge violent attacks on the socialist groups, and Protestant churches were engaged with this bloodshed in diverse way. For instance, some Protestant defectors, who came to the South after failing to form the Christian Liberal Party (*Kidokkyojayudang* CLD) in the North, organised a North-West branch of Christian Endeavour (NWCE) in the South, representing a spiritual prop of the church against communism. Above all, the North-Western Youth (*Seobukchungnyeondan*, NWY) was an outstanding figure in this period with its violence. In 1946, when some leftist church leaders of the CPKI

founded the Democratic League of Christians (*Kidokkyominjuyounmaeng*) at the YMCA building in Seoul, their opening address was disrupted by a violent invasion of three hundred NWY members.[36] Wherever violent clashes between leftists and rightists occurred, there were churches and CPKI branches involved.[37] From 1946 to 1949, around three hundred thousand innocent South Korean people, including those on Jeju Island, were massacred by the NWP in cooperation with the US Army—and Syngman Rhee's regime later—on suspicion of pro-communist activities. The NWY was established on 30th November 1946 with the foundation ceremony in the YMCA building. Although the close relationship between NWY and North Korean Protestants have currently become blurred in the public memory, some scholars revealed in their recent research that its majority members came from the young North Korean Protestants belonging to the Youngnak Church with concrete evidence and testimonies.[38] Ironically, the most concrete testimony came from an interview with Han Kyong-jik, the founder of Youngnak Church, before his death:

> At the moment, our society was disrupted by a number of communists. Therefore, some young Protestants from the Youngnak Church organised "the North-Western Youth". They were even dispatched to Jeju Island in order to suppress a revolt. In doing so, our Youngnak young believers incurred hatred from the people.[39]

In this interview, Han directly addressed the relationship between the Youngnak Church, Jeju Uprising on April 3 (1948) and NWY. Indeed, NWY initially formed based on the coalition of five Youth Corps of young defectors from North Korea. Among them, Pyong-an Youth Corp played a key role in this organisation. It is remarkable that Pyong-an Youth Corp was originally a branch of the Chosun Democratic Party (*Chosunminjudang*, CDP) formed by Christian intellectuals in North Korea.[40] Furthermore, *The History of Democratic Reunification Movement in North Korea* (1990) provides a detailed description of their anti-communist movement aroused in North Korea. In this book, we can see that NWY's violent activities were not limited within the South. They also formed an underground organisation as an affiliated group under the CDP in the North, and developed various political struggles against communist regime.

The First Christian Regime

The pro-American and anti-communist atmosphere endured when Syngman Rhee, a staunch Protestant politician, became the first President of ROK with massive supports from the US and right-wing Protestants after the US military administration. When organising this cabinet, Rhee fully utilised his personal connections with conservative Protestants who were engaged with such US intelligence agencies such as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Combat Information Centre (CIC).[41] As a result, among twenty-one members of the first cabinet, there were nine Protestant members, but only one Buddhist and even no Cheondokyo believer or Confucianist, despite the fact that the populations of those religious followers was much higher than

Protestants.

Religion	Name (Department)
Protestantism	Yun Chi-young (Home Affairs)
	Kim Do-yeon (Treasury)
	Im Young-sin (Commerce and Industry)
	Ku Young-sook (Health)
	Yun Seok-gu (Postal Service)
	Lee Yun-young (Ambassador-at-large)
	Kim Byung-yeon (Government Administration)
	Kim Dong-seong (Bureau of Public Information)
	BaeEun-hui (Examination Committee)
Daejongkyo	Lee Beom-seok (Prime Minister & National Defense)
	An Ho-sang (Culture and Education)
	Myong Je-se (General Accounting Office)
	Jung In-bo (Audit Committee)
Buddhism	Jeon Jin-han (Social Affairs)
Irreligious member	Jang Taek-sang (Foreign Affairs)
	Lee In (Justice)
	Cho Bong-am (Agriculture and Forestry)
	Min Hui-sik (Transportation)
	Lee Cheong-cheon (Ambassador-at-large)
	Yu Jin-o (the Office of Legislation)
	Lee Sun-tak (Projects Agency)

Table 2: The Composition of the First Cabinet[42]

Indeed, Rhee had constantly contended to establish a state on the basis of Christianity even before becoming the President. On 9th September 1948, he dispatched Jang Myun (Catholic Priest) and Cho Byong-ok (Presbyterian clergy) to the UN seeking recognition of the South Korean state. The first meeting of the Constitutional Assembly as well as the first President's inaugural address in South Korea opened by Rhee's Christian prayer.[43] Despite the principle of separation of religion and the state being written in the Constitution (1948), he introduced

several religious systems in his regime. For instance, taking over from the US Army government, Christmas became a national holiday, with President's address to the nation: "Let's make Christmas cards and presents!"[44] Christian Broadcasting Corporation (CBS) and Far East Broadcasting Corporation (International Christian Broadcasting Corporation, FEBC) were granted licenses by the government as the first private broadcasting companies.[45] The first National Assembly election was held on weekday, avoiding Sunday. Ceremonies for national events also became Christianised, such as the opening ceremony of the National Assembly and the state funerals. Most of all, the implementation of the chaplain service in the prison, the police, and the army was the highlighted Christian policy by Rhee's regime. The chaplain service in the prison was a typical policy favouring Christianity, as only Protestantism was allowed. Furthermore, employing church members (chaplains) as civil servants for religious activities implied the inculcation of Christian values into the state system.

At this stage, the pro-American sentiment was already assimilated into the ROK Christian values. Sharing the Christian culture, Korean Protestants equated themselves with the US, as God's chosen people. They believed the ROK deserved a blessing of God because it represented democracy like the United States. In his inaugural speech in 1948, Rhee stressed a national solidarity for the purpose of the achievement of reunited nation in the future. However, what is implicit here was that the leftist and pro-communist people were excluded from his "national solidarity". During his regime, Rhee continued to disapprove of DPRK, emphasising that ROK is the only legitimate state in the Korean Peninsula. While regarding the North Korean regime as an "enemy", he separately considered North Korean people as the object of salvation. He thought his Christian mission was "to save the North Korean people who were suppressed under the red-devil."[46] In the future, his reunification policy by military force was on the basis of this crusader's spirit.[47]

To conclude, the conservative Protestant churches in South Korea were actively engaged in ideological discourse and association with the US Army; the first government later, in creating moral values, contributed to the Christian transformation of the society. Despite their numerical inferiority, the Korean Protestants eventually seized the hegemonic power over the South Korean society, defeating the overwhelming socialist sentiment by assimilating their cultural value with the American value under the US Occupation. In this regard, in Korean history, Protestantism did not merely remain a traditional religious organisation in pursuit of individual faith, but transformed itself as an active political-ideological social force.

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Islam And South Korea's Middle East Diplomacy

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Abstract

Islam was reintroduced into South Korea during the Korean War due to the participation of the Turkish army. In its more than 50 years' development process, the achievements of Korean Islam include the establishment of legal Islamic organizations, the construction of mosques all over the country, pilgrimage to Mecca, translation of the *Koran* into Korean, and the establishment of an Islamic Institute. The number of Muslims in South Korea has grown considerably. South Korea's Middle East diplomacy began in 1957; its spheres include economic diplomacy, international contribution diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy. South Korea has gained a certain level of influence in the Middle East. South Korea's Islamic communities take part in the government's Middle East diplomacy at various levels, and this is a powerful supplement to official Middle East diplomacy.

Key Words: South Korea; Islam; Middle East; Diplomacy; Turkey

Islam And South Korea's Middle East Diplomacy

Niu Song

Since the 1970s, with the rapid development of the economy, South Korea has been among Four Asian Tigers. Its successful democratic transition in the 1980s has laid solid foundations for its economic and social development. As a marginalized small country in Asia, South Korea not only has traditional cultures, but also embraces religions and civilizations from all over the world. Its openness can be reflected on its full-range diplomacy, not only in Asia, but in the whole world. Guided by such inclusive and open spirit, Islam has once again appeared in South Korea and begun to take shape. South Korea's influence can also be found in the Middle East. Moreover, development of Islam in South Korea has played a role in its diplomacy toward the Middle East.

The Development of Islam in Modern South Korea

Islam was introduced to South Korea under the Silla Dynasty. With the changing times and the influence of various powers, the role of Islam became increasingly small and finally vanished under the Chosun Dynasty. Islam's reentering to modern South Korea was no accident; it was due to the breakout of the Korean War in 1950.[1] With the expansion of the war, 90% of South Korea was rapidly occupied by North Korea, and the United Nations (UN) authorized UN troops to fight back. Besides South Korea's own forces, Turkey sent Brigades, the number of which was surpassed only by US troops. Some religious people were enrolled in the Turkish Brigades. Zubeyr Koch and Abdul Rahman, brothers among the soldiers in the Turkish Brigades, established a mobile house with the semicircular arch as a Mosque and spread Islam to the local people. Besides the value of Islam, the wounds left by the war was another reason for the South Korean people to convert to Islam. With strong interest, many South Korean people gathered around the Turkish Imams.[2]

In this process, the freedom of beliefs in South Korea provided guarantees to Islam's spread. Although Christianity is still developing rapidly in South Korea, evidenced by South Korea's first president's swearing on the Bible, this has not had a negative impact on Islam's continued expansion in the country. According to Article 20 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, "All citizens shall enjoy freedom of religion," and "No state religion shall be recognized, and church and state shall be separated."[3] Influenced by these multiple factors, the first generation of Muslims has been formed, constituted by Muslim converts in the northeastern part of China after World War II and new Muslims influenced by Turkish Imams.

In 1955, for the Korea Islamic Society (한국이슬람교협회), KIS, was established as the first Islamic organization in South Korea. Almarhum Muhammad Umar Kim Jin Kyu was elected as

the first president of KIS. Islamic groups in South Korea began to carry out international religious communications. Many Muslims in South Korea visit Islamic countries; some went to study at the International Islamic University in Malaysia. The Malaysian government has donated $33,000 to help Muslims in South Korea to build a *masjid* (mosque) in 1963. Unfortunately, the construction of the masjid could not be completed due to various reasons, among which inflation figured prominently.[4] With the increase of Muslims in South Korea and the improving of the organizational functions, Muslims in South Korea established the Korea Muslim Federation (KMF, 한국이슬람교중앙연합회) in 1965 and the Korea Islamic Foundation (KIF, 재단법인한국이슬람교) in 1967. The Korea Muslim Federation was constituted of KMF and the Korea Institute for Islamic Culture. The KMF includes organizations for the youth, students, women and the elderly people.[5]

KMF has made great contributions to Islam's spreading in South Korea. It has translated the *Quran* to Korean, taught Arabic and Islamic culture in South Korea, sent South Korean students to Islamic countries, carried out relief to the poor, and published pamphlets such as the *Korea Islam Herald* (코리아이슬람헤럴드), the *Muslim Weekly Newsletter* (주간무슬림), and the *Al-Islam*. The *Quran* is the holiest book of Islam; hence, it is of great significance to translate it into Korean to Muslims in South Korea. This work has lasted for centuries, and has not been published until 2005 when the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY, 세계무슬림청년협의회), located in Saudi Arabia, helped the KMF in completing the last 10 chapters. They have printed 1,000 copies, and intend to print another 4,000. The printed copies were distributed to Islamic Centers and Muslims in South Korea.[6] The *Korea Islam Herald* was first published in June 1967, and after years of suspension, was reopened on August 15, 2005 with the aim of publicizing activities of South Korean Muslims and understanding the rights of Muslims. In April 2008, the KMF and the Organization of the Islamic Conference jointly held the first Asian Muslims international conference, which lasted for 3 days in Seoul, with the goal of improving the situation of Muslims in non-Islamic countries.

The KMF has a very close relationship with the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. They participate in the activities held by each other. On August 8–9, 2009, an Islamic Special Toastmasters (이슬람특별강연회) was co-held by KMF, sponsored by the World Assembly of Muslim Youth in the conference room of the Seoul Central Mosque, covering the topics of Islamic culture, catechism, and stories on the wife of the Prophet.[7]

With the support of President Park Chung-hee and funds from Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries, the biggest Mosque in South Korea, the Seoul Central Mosque, was officially opened on May 21, 1976. In the next decades, 10 Mosques or Islamic centers have been built in the Gyeonggi Province, North Jeolla Province, North Gyeongsang Province, South Gyeongsang

Province and Jeju Province in South Korea, named Paju Seongwon (파주성원), Bupyeong Seongwon (부평성원), Ansan Seongwon (안산성원), Anyang Seongwon (안양성원), Gyeonggi Gwangju Seongwon (경기광주성원), Jeonnam Gwangju Seongwon (전남광주성원), Pocheon Seongwon (포천성원), Jeonju Seongwon (전주성원), Gimpo Seongwon (김포성원), Daegu Seongwon (대구성원), Changwon Seongwon (창원성원), Busan Seongwon (부산성원), Daejeon Seongwon (대전성원), and Jeju Seongwon (제주성원).[8] In short, mosques are obviously not limited to the Seoul metropolitan region, and Islam is therefore part of daily exposure in many communities.

After the establishment of the Muslim organizations and mosques in South Korea, Hajj, one of the five Pillars of Islam, has also been achieved.[9] In 1960, Muslims in South Korea performed the Hajj to the holy lands of Mecca and Medina for the first time. In 1978, the Hajj delegation had 130 Muslims, marking the biggest Hajj delegation ever in South Korea's history. A report published by *Arab News* in 1991 stated that among all religions in South Korea, Islam was developing fastest.[10]

Abdul Rahim Shin and Hussain Yu Chang Sik, two leaders of South Korean Muslims, actively promoted the development of Islam in South Korea. They showed the devotion and modesty of Muslims in South Korea. They said that "We are happy to be here at the invitation of the Muslim World League. The facilities are superb and the Saudi government under the leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd has provided consummate services to the guests of God."[11]

In 2002, the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs approved the establishment of the Korea Middle East Association (KOMEA) jointly formed by South Korea Muslims and scholars on Middle East and Islamic studies. The association aims the study of Islam, Korean culture and the promotion of communication with the Islamic world. After establishing many Mosques and the Hajj, the first Islamic school was opened in March 2009 in South Korea. It enrolls both Muslim and non-Muslim students. Islamic courses there were taught in Arabic and the rest of the courses in English. There is a mosque in the institute for students to pray. Abdullah Al-Aifan, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to Seoul, delivered $500,000 to KMF in 2008 on behalf of the Saudi Arabian government. For this reason, the school was named "Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz Elementary School". "One of our goals is delivering correct and unbiased information about Islam to not only children but also the general public. Of course, the school will serve as a mission," KMF Secretary General Kim Hwan-yoon said.[12]

As of 2002, the number of Muslims in South Korea was estimated at about 45,000, in addition to some 100,000 foreign workers from Muslim-majority countries.[13] The *Korea Islam Herald*

detailed records of the names, gender, ages, and nationalities of the 80 people who converted to Islam in 2006 in South Korea. Some 37 people among them are males and 43 females; 71 of them are South Korean and nine are not; three of them are from the US, and there are one Russian, one Vietnamese, one Canadian, one Pakistan, one Filipino, and one Indonesian. Among these 80 people, the oldest is 61 years old and the youngest is 12 years old.[14] Up to the end of 2007, the number of Muslims in South Korea remains at about 14,000.[15]

Since 1955, Islam emerged, developed, and transformed from a private voluntary organization to a registered legal religion. Mosques have developed steadily and Islamic education has improved, sending students abroad and establishing schools. Results have also been achieved in translating the *Koran* to Korean, completing the Hajj, and holding international Islamic conferences. For the first time, South Korea's Islamic development has direct communication with foreign Muslims and Islamic countries without the participation or guidance from the government. This process can be viewed as a development dominated by independent civil forces. Islam could be accepted by South Koreans because "Islamic civilization usually respects the rights of others and freedom and has a positive attitude toward others," said Dr. Lee Hee-soo, and he believes that "the principles and basic thought of Islam are in many parts parallel with the Korean value system."[16] Nonetheless, Islam's role in South Korea remains limited. "On the whole, Islam in Korea is not that relevant, despite the efforts of Muslim preachers. It is considered to be an exotic phenomenon, although the number of Korean Muslims is much larger than the number of Orthodox Koreans."[17]

South Korea's Foreign Policy in the Middle East

Due to the friendship during the Korean War, South Korea established diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1957 and later launched its Middle East diplomacy. By 2002, South Korea has established diplomatic ties with all Middle East countries, except with Palestine and Syria, but it did set up offices in Palestine in 2005. In his speech, titled, "Together We Shall Open a Road to Advancement" delivered by South Korea's former president Lee Myung-bak during his inaugural ceremony in Seoul, he said, "There is a map of the Republic of Korea within each of us. I will take that map and expand it so that it reaches out to the world."[18] He also mentioned three missions of the diplomacy of South Korea: first, as befitting our economic size and diplomatic capacity, South Korea's diplomacy would contribute to promoting and protecting universal values; second, Korea would actively participate in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations as well as enlarge its official development assistance (ODA); third, by emphasizing the importance of cultural diplomacy, South Korea would work to allow Korea to communicate more openly and easily with the international community.[19] Concurrently, Lee Myung-bak has summarized the fields of South Korean diplomacy: economic diplomacy, which focuses mainly on energy; international diplomacy; and cultural diplomacy. South Korea's interests and

cooperation activities in the Middle East in the previous decades can be reflected in these fields. Hence, undoubtedly, the Middle East figures in Lee Myung-bak's speech.

First, South Korea's economic diplomacy toward the Middle East can be mainly reflected in two areas: energy diplomacy and construction diplomacy. South Korea's energy diplomacy comes from its demands for oil and gas resources in the Middle East. South Korea is an emerging industrial country. Since the 1960s and the 1970s, its demands for oil have greatly increased. Since South Korea itself is not an oil-producing country, the Middle East, a region with rich oil resources, becomes the first choice for South Korea. Out of economic and security interests, oil plays an important role in the improvement of South Korea's relationship with Arab countries. South Korea currently is the 13th largest economy in the world, and its demand for oil resources is considerable.

Present day South Korea mainly gets oil through two methods: exploitation of oil in Middle Eastern countries and direct imports. In 1979, South Korea established the Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) for its oil demands. As of today, this corporation has signed agreements on oil exploitation with many Middle Eastern countries, such as Libya, Iraq, and Yemen. In 2007, NNOC's oil production in Libya amounted to 125,000 barrels per day. South Korea's investment in oil industries in the Middle East also promotes the changes in its own industrial structure. In the first half of 2008, its export of oil production ranked at the top of all export products, with $18.348 billion. The refining industry in South Korea has shifted from an industry guided by domestic demands to becoming one of the world's biggest exporting industries.[20] Although South Korea tries to diversify the sources of its oil imports, the Middle East's importance is difficult to change. Due to the marking up of the international oil price, the Middle East replaced Japan in 2006 and became the biggest importing target of South Korea with the import volume $30.76 billion.[21] In May 2005, then South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun visited three Middle Eastern countries, including the United Arab Emirates, which is South Korea's second biggest oil importing country. In March 2007, Roh Moo-hyun visited Gulf oil producers, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar to carry out energy diplomacy. It was the first time throughout the country's history for South Korean presidents to visit Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the past 27 years, and the first time to visit Qatar. Former South Korea president Lee Myung-bak called for energy diplomacy toward the Middle East and Africa. Under his administration, South Korea signed oil cooperation agreements with Iraq's Kurdish autonomous region.

Construction diplomacy refers to South Korea's contracted projects in the Middle East since the 1970s. The construction market overseas plays an important role in stimulating South Korea's economic growth. South Korea's contractors in the Middle East include Hyundai Engineering, GS E&C, and Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction. Every year, South Korea's amount of its

project contracts in the Middle East accounts for 65%–70% in the total amount. In 2005, South Korea's amount of its project contracts in the Middle East was as high as $6.445 billion. South Korea's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport which is responsible for the competent authorities of the projects, has sent officials to the Middle East to coordinate the investment and opening of the construction market there. It has also sent many construction and transportation counselors to be stationed in South Korean embassies in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which is rare in diplomacy.[22] From January–November 2006, the number of South Korea's contracted projects in the Middle East amounts to $8.258 billion, accounting for 61.41% of the world, in which Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan rank at the top three with 21, 4, and 2 projects worth $3.322 billion, $1.889 billion, and $1.184 billion, respectively.[23]

Energy diplomacy and construction diplomacy are just two aspects of South Korea's economic diplomacy toward the Middle East. The South Korean government has various economic exchanges with the Middle East countries. On July 8 and 9, 2009, the third round of the discussion on the Free Trade Area between South Korea and the Gulf Cooperation Council was held in Seoul, covering many fields, including goods, services, and investments. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) established a strategic partnership with South Korea in December 2009 with the import of nuclear power stations as an opportunity; that is, civilian nuclear energy cooperation as a precursor while taking into account other civilian economic cooperation fields, such as oil and gas development; and then stretched to military exchange, import of weapons and fighting together against piracy. Its long-term goals also include healthy cultural cooperation.[24]

Second is South Korea's international contribution diplomacy. South Korea actively cooperated in the US-led Afghan War and in the Iraq War by sending troops to shoulder combat missions. Because the Afghan War was authorized by the UN, coupled with the fact that the Taliban regime is of an extremist nature and sheltered Al-Qaeda, it was not controversial for South Korea to send troops to Afghanistan. However, this was not the case in the Iraq War led by the US and the UK. It was controversial for South Korean troops to participate in the Iraq War, the number of which is preceded only by the armies of the US and UK.

Due to the 2007 South Korean hostage crisis in Afghanistan, South Korea began to withdraw its army in December 2007. With the increasingly stabilization of the situation in Iraq, the last South Korean troops were withdrawn on December 19, 2008—four years after their stationing in Iraq. The South Korean government tries to play a positive and active role in peace-making and security affairs on the stage. At the first stage of its establishment, South Korea has received aid from the international community, which laid solid foundations for its infrastructure construction and economic growth. South Korea has launched ODA in 1977 and established KOICA in 1991 as the specific implementing agency of the former.

In January 2007, the UN approved South Korea's request of sending UN peacekeepers to Lebanon. On June 21, 2007, UN peacekeepers in Lebanon sent by South Korea were formally established in Gwangju. On July 5, the advance team with about 60 peacekeeping soldiers arrived in Lebanon. On July 19, another 300 peacekeepers had also been sent to Lebanon. "Their main task will be guarding and patrolling the Tyre area in southern Lebanon, 30 kilometers north of the border with Israel, inspecting for weapons, smuggling, and hostile activities by the Hezbollah forces as part of the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon Command."[25]

The benefit brought by ODA of South Korea has covered Iraq and Afghanistan, which suffered from the wars in the 21st century. In its assistance program to Iraq, South Korea received 100 Iraqi officials from the Iraqi Oil Ministry to attend 5 training courses, so as to protect the oil industry in Iraq. Through reforming the Calama Hospital and building the central employment-training center, South Korea helps in Iraq's infrastructure construction. South Korea also provided assistance to Iraq on drinking water and sewage treatment by providing tankers and garbage sweepers. Additionally, South Korea had given 3,500 personal computers to Baghdad and Erbil to help Iraq lay the foundations for its IT industry from 2003 to 2006. Between 2003–2007, about 2,400 officials from the Iraqi central or local governments have been trained in South Korea.[26] South Korea has sent many trainers and carried out similar programs to Afghanistan, especially with regard medical services. The Korean government announced in May 2009 that it would provide medical services to around 40,000 Afghans annually, or 150–200 a day.[27]

Third is South Korea's cultural diplomacy in the Middle East. South Korea, which has long lived within the circle of Chinese civilization, actively received Western civilization while safeguarding its unique traditional cultural factors. With the development of South Korea's economy and its social diversity, international communication of this country covers not only ordinary economic, trade, and political interactions, but also cultural industries. Cultural communication has been an important tool in international exchanges. South Korean culture has generated a strong "Korean wave" (한류).[28] The Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism has a special department responsible for exporting South Korean culture to the whole world, including the Middle East. The department of international culture under the Arts Council Korea is the main executive agency in this regard.

The link between South Korea and the Middle East on culture is that South Korea shares a similar colonial experience with many Middle Eastern countries. Hence, its cultural diplomacy does not carry an image of cultural hegemony. Ambassador Lee Soon-chun from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has pointed that "Culture is the spirit, a philosophy, and a part of life";

"Culture is an important vehicle for introducing our country to others"; "Our first and foremost task is to take our traditional culture and develop it further for wide introduction overseas"; "the government should provide support for private performing troupes"; and "the government should also support the introduction of popular Korean music, dramas and movies in other countries."[29] The "Korean wave" promoted by South Korea TV can also be found in the Middle East. At the end of 2004, Korean television programme *Winter Sonata* (겨울연가) was broadcast in Egypt; in October 2005, *Poseidon* arrived in Turkey and its ratings ranked 32 out of 1,000 TV programs; *Winter Sonata* and *Emperor of the Sea* (해신) have also been shown in countries, such as Jordan, Tunisia, and Iraq; *Dae Jang Geum* (대장금) has been released in Iran.[30] South Korea's diplomacy toward the Middle East has raised Middle Eastern people's understanding of South Korea as well as enhanced South Korea's national image.

In March 2009, former South Korean president Lee Myung-bak launched the "New Asia Initiative". His "four powers diplomacy" has since expanded to the whole Asia, including the Middle East, covering full fields including culture, which greatly promotes South Korea's cultural diplomacy toward the Middle East.

South Korean Islamic Groups' Participation in ROK-Middle East Diplomacy

As indicated above, both Islam's taking root in modern South Korea and South Korea's Middle East diplomacy started in the 1950s, and both are closely related to Turkey. Such a relationship is worth noticing. With increasing interactions between South Korea and the Middle East, more questions and challenges for Islam and the Middle East will rise in South Korea. Against such a background, Islam's participation in South Korea's Middle East diplomacy is precious.

First, Islamic groups in South Korea participate in the country's economic diplomacy and international contribution diplomacy. They train the South Korean workers and technical staff members through labor exportation, as well as through the Muslims among South Korea soldiers. They also actively provide aid to Islamic countries.

With respect to South Korea's economic diplomacy, many South Korean workers have been expatriated to serve in the energy companies and construction projects in the Middle East. Since the 1970s, many South Koreans have been to the Middle East to engage in construction projects. In recent years, some of them have also joined oil and gas development ventures.

Through communication with locals, many South Korean workers have been gradually converted to Islam.[31] The rights and interests of these workers are protected mainly by South Korean embassies and consulates whereas the rights and interests of South Korean Muslims are

maintained mainly through the Middle East branch of the Korean Muslim Committee. The first branch of KMF was established in 1978 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where more than 8,000 members were enrolled at that time. Another branch has also been established in Kuwait. With the development of the comprehensive national strength, many laborers have been expatriated from the Middle East to South Korea.

Currently, most of the approximately 100,000 foreign Muslims in South Korea come from Middle Eastern countries. The religious rights of these foreign Muslims are protected through the KMF and mosques. Mosques in South Korea have provided spaces for their religious activities. According to reports, about 800 foreign Muslims, including diplomats, businessmen, workers, and students, gather in the Seoul Central Mosque to pray every week. Mosques in South Korea have directly contributed to the communication between South Korea and sections of the population in the Middle East. What is more, Muslim groups in South Korea have also played a role in dispelling misunderstandings of Muslims in the Middle East on the part of South Korean government. For instance, a Muslim-Uzbek worker who came to Korea as a trainee worker under the South Korean government's training program for Asians was unfortunately assigned to a pig farm. After spending two years raising pigs, the worker called the mosque for help. "The Uzbek worker cried and felt he had sinned by raising pigs," said an official of that mosque; "That kind of incident signifies Korea's negligence over Muslims."[32] Mosques in South Korea also carry out free medical services for Muslim workers; "Dawah activities extend to a counseling service for underpaid, injured or illegal Muslim laborers," "on the last Sunday of every month, a medical clinic with visiting doctors, provide treatment and medicine free of charge."[33]

Islamic groups' participation in South Korea's international contribution mainly covers two aspects: training Muslims in the South Korean army who are stationed in the Middle East, and raising funds to assist Muslim countries. South Korea has already taken into consideration the fact that there are few Muslims in the South Korean army and Islam is the main belief in the Middle East before they sent troops to Iraq to assist the US. Hence, they invited people from mosques to provide knowledge about Islam to the Zaytun[34] Division (자이툰부대). In May 2004, 37 soldiers, who were about to be sent to Iraq, formally converted to Islam in Seoul Central Mosque. During the training, they were entranced by Islam and decided to convert. A soldier named Paek Seong-uk said, "If we are sent to Iraq, I want to participate in religious ceremonies with the locals so that they can feel brotherly love and convince them that the Korean troops are not an army of occupation but a force deployed to provide humanitarian support." Moreover, these 37 South Korean Muslim soldiers all hold that "I became a Muslim because I felt Islam was more humanistic and peaceful than other religions. And if you can religiously connect with the locals, I think it could be a big help in carrying out our peace reconstruction mission."[35] From February 16–18, 2005, KMF held lectures on Islam in Seoul Central Mosque for the troops to be

sent to Iraq, some of whom had already converted to Islam. KMF also gave out Islamic lectures to 6 and 7 soldiers in the Zaytun Division on April 5, 2007 and February 27, 2008, respectively, aiming to help the South Korean army to better understand and respect Islam and provide more religious knowledge to Muslim soldiers.

Islamic groups in South Korea also help Muslim countries through funds raising and disaster relief, which improve South Korea's image in Middle Eastern countries. In 2004, the South Korea Muslim Federation donated money to Muslim victims of the tsunami in Indonesia and other countries in South Asia, and, in 2005, they raised funds for the victims of the earthquake in Pakistan.

Second, South Korean Islamic groups have put great efforts in dissipating South Korean people's misunderstandings toward Islam and Middle Eastern countries, and rescuing South Korean hostages in the Middle East. With South Korea's rapid development, Christians increased communication with the secular society. Christianity has played a vital role in promoting South Korea's democratization. Its overseas preaching has also expanded the world over. South Korea's government's attitude is quite ambiguous toward South Korean Christians preaching overseas. Due to the principle of the separation of church and state, the South Korean government does not directly support such activities. Yet, at the same time, it also acquiesces to missionaries' spreading South Korean culture.[36] The South Korean government's action offered a good image in the Western Christian world.

According to incomplete statistics, there are more than 12,000 South Korean missionaries overseas now, spread over more than 160 countries and regions all over the world.[37] However, comparatively speaking, these missionaries' activities seem incompatible with the Islamic countries in the Middle East. Especially after the 9/11 attacks on the US, there has been confrontation in thoughts between the Islamic and Western worlds, caused by Islamic extremists and terrorist activities, as well as the US military activities targeting so-called "Islamofascism". South Korean missionaries have been kidnapped in turbulent Iraq and Afghanistan. In May 2004, Kim Sun-il, a South Korean translator and Christian missionary working for the Gana General Trading Company (a South Korean company under contract with the American military) was kidnapped in Fallujah by an Islamist group and taken hostage. At the same time when diplomats, governments, and religious figures carried out "rescue diplomacy", South Korean Muslim groups also communicated with Iraq through religious channels. More than 20 threatening calls were made to the Seoul Central Mosque from angry people, after the report of Kim's death and the failure of the rescue of South Korean government on June 23, 2004. Against such backdrop, Imam Lee Haeng-Lae pointed out that "We Muslims were also shocked and felt heartbroken like everyone else. I am worried that this incident may damage the

perception of Islam on the whole. The group that kidnapped and murdered Kim Sun-il is a political group that has nothing to do with Islam. They do not obey Islamic doctrines and are even against Islam. Islam itself is peace."[38] KMF has also comforted Kim's family and condemned the terrorist activities on behalf of South Korean Muslims. Compared with the South Korea Muslim group's relative weak rescue in the Kim Sun-il incident, the organization was more effective and direct in 2007 when more than 20 South Korean missionaries and volunteers were kidnaped in Afghanistan by the Taliban.[39]

On July 26, 2007, KMF and other South Korean Muslims expressed condolences for the death of Bae Hyeong-gyu, a 42 year old South Korean pastor. They also called for the release of the hostages. Family members of the hostages visited the Seoul Central Mosque and asked for help on August 4, 2008. The Imam there said that their former head had already joined the delegation and arrived in Afghanistan, and he was still providing assistance.[40] It shows that Muslim groups in South Korea have formally participated in official activities in rescue missions. South Korean officials also cooperated in rescuing Muslim groups. For instance, then- Korean ambassador to the Saudi Kingdom, Jaegil Lee, stressed that, "Korea was home to 140,000 Muslims" when he asked for help from the Saudi government.[41] Joining in official rescue diplomacy, Muslim organizations in South Korea also sent delegations to Pakistan. Four members of the KMF set camp in Peshawar and met with several religious leaders, including the chief of the powerful Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Maulana Samiul Haq. The Maulana assured them of his all-out support and said he would also make a request to the Taliban for the release of the hostages. "The holy month of Ramadan is approaching. We [ask] the Taliban to release the hostages immediately and prove to the world that the Muslims do not believe in violence," Suliman Lee Haeng-Lae, the imam of the Seoul Central Mosque, said.[42] Through the efforts of different parties, except two killed hostages, the other 21 hostages were rescued. In this process, the Korea Muslim Federation and members in Seoul Central Mosque had played an exceptional role, which is a very good participation and complement to the "rescue diplomacy."

Conclusions

The growth of Islam in modern South Korea, which started in the 7th century, has already been a part of its global expansion. Differing from the traditional expansion accompanied by imperial conquests, Islam in modern South Korea came about as the result of wars and was protected by the religious freedom policy of the secular government. Unlike in the US and Europe, Muslims in South Korea are mainly made up of local Muslims and foreign Muslim laborers. There are few immigrant Muslims which explains why Islam has developed rapidly in South Korea. As a religion which came to South Korea quite late, Islam has received help from various Muslim groups from all over the world. Deepening and expanding of South Korea's Middle East diplomacy involves many aspects, including import and investment of Middle East energy,

mutual flow of labors, participation in peacekeeping activities in the Middle East and many religious emergencies. Besides governments, Islamic groups in South Korea have also played a proper role within the framework of a secularized and democratic nation and made up for the lack of government's Middle East diplomacy on Islam related affairs. Islam in South Korea has developed healthy and actively taken part in social affairs, which helps removing the misunderstanding of South Korea people, and even people all over the world, toward Islam and improving South Korea's national image on the global stage.

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Notes

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Technologies of Self in Contemporary Korea:
The Notion of *Suryŏn* (修練) in GiCheon (氣天)

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Abstract

GiCheon (氣天) is one of many contemporary South Korean mind-body disciplines focused on physical and moral self-cultivation. Utilizing a series of interviews with the adherents of this movement, this paper examines their individual experience and understanding of GiCheon praxis in the new social and political context, revealing the mechanisms of self-construction in modern and post-modern South Korea. Within my analysis of this empirical material, I focus on the notion of *Suryŏn* (修練, training), often referred to by the interviewees as central to GiCheon. The process and the goal of self-transformation, generally associated with *Suryŏn,* are further conceptualized within this paper through the framework of "technologies of self" provided by Michel Foucault.

Key words: GiCheon, *ki suryŏn,* technologies of self, mind-body, self-cultivation.

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The East Asian cultural realm is home to long traditions of psycho-physical practices commonly referred to as qigong and taijiquan, which have now spread globally. Extensive scholarship exists on Chinese psycho-physical practices.[1] However, similar phenomena in Korea have been studied very little in the English-speaking academic world; Don Baker has examined Korean internal alchemy, but primarily from a religious angle.[2]

In South Korean academia, Korean psycho-physical practices are examined within various frames of reference, usually being referred to as *ki suryŏn* (氣修練)—that is, training related to *ki*, or life energy. The word *suryŏn* (修練) consists of two characters: *su* (修), to cleanse, to wash, to master; and *ryŏn* (練), to master, to practice, to exercise. *Suryŏn* is most commonly used in the context of life-long dedication, whole-hearted acceptance, and constant diligent practice. *Ki suryŏn* adepts of various lineages use the term *suryŏn* often.

Studies on *ki suryŏn* in Korean academia tend to focus on meditation and the martial art Kouksundo (國仙道, *Kuksŏndo)*, addressing issues of quality of life,[3] Korean dance and philosophy,[4] sports, and modern history.[5] *Ki suryŏn* is also approached in the context of stress management,[6] nationalistic discourse, and globalisation.[7] There is also anthropological research on *ki suryŏn* based on interviews with practitioners.[8] This paper analyses the meaning of the term *suryŏn* for the adepts of GiCheon (*KiCh'ŏn)*, one of the contemporary South Korean practices.

As I start with categorizing GiCheon as *ki suryŏn* and as a psycho-physical practice, I have to clarify from where the term "psycho-physical" originates. It was coined by Russian sinologist Abayev: Psycho-physical training aims at cultivating, at "forming" a person toward a culturally defined "ideal".[9] This process includes different methods of the conscious, goal-oriented and systematic regulation of psychic processes, involving corporeal practices.[10] Abayev takes a comprehensive view of psycho-physical culture as a research subject of its own.[11]

Other scholars use different terminology in their study of East Asian psycho-physical practices. To name but a few, Thomas Ots calls them "techniques of health preservation and exercises prolonging life";[12] Catherine Despeux names similar practices martial arts, techniques prolonging life, and gymnastics.[13] Geoffrey Samuel and Jay Johnston refer to them as "subtle body

practices",[14] while Peter Van der Veer defines Chinese psycho-physical practices as qi (氣) exercises, connected to cosmological concepts, bodily health, concentration of the mind, meditation and quietness. While continuing to relate to these practices as *"disciplines of the self"*, Peter Van der Veer connects them to "techniques of the body" by Mauss[15] and "technologies of self" as articulated by Foucault.[16]

Starting with historical-philosophical analysis of such institutions as madness, illness, criminality, and sexuality, in his later years Foucault moved toward the questions of self-reflection, self-formation, and self-constitution. Foucault's concern with the technologies of self starts with his investigation into the practices he categorizes as *epimeleia heautou*, translated into English as "the care of the self." Technologies of self "permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality."[17] "Care of the self" is an important motif in an historical-philosophical discussion on subjectivity by Charles Taylor[18] and Pierre Hadot.[19]

Foucault notes that in ancient Greece self-transformation was connected to *gnothi seauton*, or "know yourself", the third precept of the Delphic temple, where people came to consult the oracle. Foucault clarifies that in ancient Greece the philosophical principle of "know yourself," often coupled with *epimeleia heautou* "taking care of yourself," was originally subordinated to "taking care of the self". It is in the context of "taking care of yourself" that you had to "know yourself".[20] You have to know yourself in order to transform yourself. In this context the object of knowledge is the old, "pre-transformed" self, modeled by the factors external to the self, and applied without self-awareness of this process, or contrary to the wishes of the self. Countering this is the intentional effort to realize and modify the self, a conscious process of activated self-modification, with a goal to create a "new self" in the world.[21]

Foucauldian technologies of self were taken up by the scholarly community and developed in various directions. Recent research, for example, includes James Laidlaw's examination of Foucault's ideas on self-formation in relation to freedom and self-discipline in the context of Marxist and psychoanalytic thought. Laidlaw explains that Foucault sees the desire, the self, and ethics as historical. Laidlaw views Foucault's discussion on techniques of the self as a conceptual resource utilized within an historical-philosophical project, tracing the time when the self was not given and discovered by examining one's sexual desires, but instead was produced by the subject through active self-crafting. In Laidlaw's interpretation, Foucault saw ethics as consisting of the ways individuals make themselves into objects of reflective action, adopting voluntary practices for shaping and transforming themselves in various ways. The history of such self-transformative

practices is the genealogy of ethics.[22]

In the Foucauldian view, self-creation or self-transformation is a creative activity of shaping the self, parallel to the way an artist designs and models her oeuvre. Not surprisingly, in a latter-day scholarly discussion on technologies of self connections are drawn with contemporary art. Among various self-altering techniques Foucault addresses, Paul Rabinow singles out the *melete*, or "meditation", drawing a parallel between Stoic technologies of self and the work of the artist Gerhard Richter.[23] In a similar vein, James Faubion compares a modern poet Constantine Cavafy to ancient Greek Cynics—Faubion focuses on the practice of *parrhesia*, or "speaking the truth", another technique of the self reviewed by Foucault.[24] Foucauldian technologies of self initially incited and continue to stimulate a lively discussion on the formation of the self in the context of subjectivation and religion, involving bodily experiences,[25] though sometimes Foucault's contribution to this debate goes almost unnoticed.[26]

The notion of technologies of self is engaged and implemented by Sonia Ryang in her analysis of practices of "writing and reading novels" in North Korea. She examines reading novels as a technique for cultivating the self, as the novels assist in and direct the process of self-reform and self-discipline required of each citizen by the regime. The act of reading the novel is a technology of self, and additionally the novels suggest to the readers other particular technologies, such as self-reflection, self-exploration, and questioning one's motives.[27] As to the analysis of the living psycho-physical practices of today, scholars such as David Palmer and Nashima Selim mention the relevance of Foucauldian technologies of self but do not themselves actively apply this concept in their analysis of qigong[28] or vipassana.[29]

The current paper approaches Korean *ki suryŏn* as a technologyt of self through the case study of a contemporary psycho-physical practice of GiCheon. For my research I conducted interviews with about 60 GiCheon trainees and trainers in South Korea from September 2010 to April 2011. Beside being based on participant observation, my work is a classic example of autoethnography as conceived of by David Hayano in 1979. Hayano was one of the first anthropologists who brought the term "autoethnography" into wider usage. For him it meant a researcher writing an ethnography of "her own people", while fully identifying herself with a group, and enjoying a full membership in a group, as recognized both by the researcher and the people of the group.[30] My case certainly answers these criteria, as for the last 15 years I have been a GiCheon practitioner and teacher. Besides the knowledge gained through the years of teaching and practice, I also use information acquired from co-trainees, instructors and friends during formal sessions, semi-formal gatherings, and informal conversations.

The notion of autoethnography has evolved since its introduction by Hayano in 1979, and

according to more contemporary classifications my researches falls under the category of embodied knowledge and personal experience, reflexive ethnography, narrative ethnography, and self-ethnography. The questions of self-construction and self-narration are essential for autoethnography,[31] thus connecting the notion of autoethnography to the concept of technology of self. Writing the self—bringing the self into being and into awareness, shaping it through writing—is a technique of the self. But the contents of this written narrative bring in additional experiences and events the self has passed through. The contents of my narrative, the GiCheon experiences related by other practitioners I discuss in the present paper, connect directly to myself, and are in fact interpreted by me through the lens of my own GiCheon experience. It is a combination of ethnography and autoethnography, of interpretation and self-interpretation.

GiCheon appeared in South Korea in 1970s, and the followers of Lee Sang-wŏn, who formed the majority of my interviewed, regard it as a meditative discipline for self-healing. Investigating the experiences of the adepts and inquiring into their perceptions and conceptualizations of the practice are goals of my research. The interview material presented in this paper shows that the notion of *suryŏn* arises often in the narratives of the practitioners.[32] This made me ask myself: what meaning and content does the concept of *suryŏn* carry for the adherents? Why it is so important for them to emphasis that GiCheon is *suryŏn,* and not something else? In this paper I argue that the notion of *suryŏn* in the mind-hearts of the practitioners connects directly to the ideas of self-consciousness, self-understanding, and self-construction.

In my theoretical approach I also deploy the Confucian schematic *sŏngŭi jŏngsim susin ch'ega ch'iguk p'yŏngch'ŏnha* (誠意正心修身齊家治國平天下 "authenticize the intention, rectify the mind-heart, cultivate the body, love the family, govern the country, bring peace to the world")[33]. This diagrammatic strategy is repeatedly called for by GiCheon practitioners themselves when describing their experiences. In my application of this scheme we might portray the self as a live, busy, active movement. Like a ray of light, it bursts from the inside towards the outside, towards the world. Following Confucian terminology we could recount its progress as starting from intentionality and progressing towards emotion and cognition, further coming into actualized being on personal, familial, social, and cosmic planes.[34]

But active and cosmic as it is, the self is always already in the world.[35] The moment we look at the self, we see how it is conditioned to this fact. The social, for example is defined by the cosmic (at least in East-Asian cosmology), the social that moulds the familial and the personal; the ways of acting, thinking, feeling and intending are shaped by bodily, familial and social factors. This is the reality the actualized self finds itself in, seized by a dualism of forces and pulled in two opposite directions—one outward, from inside the self toward the outside world, another inward, from the outer world toward the inner self. In my analysis I relate to these two forces as a pair of

vectors. The first vector is intentional influence, the unfolding of the self towards the external. The second vector is the unintentional influence through which the self is formed, from the external towards the internal. My paper investigates the experiences of Korean *ki suryŏn* adepts utilizing this two vectors theory as a methodological tool. My two vectors theory is developed on the basis of Confucian self-cultivational schema and technologies of self elaborated by Michel Foucault.[36]

We can schematically portray the vectors as following:

the first vector:
intentional→emotional→cognitive→physical→familial→social→cosmic
the second vector:
cosmic→social→familial→physical→cognitive→emotional→ intentional

The definition of the "self" in this schema is relational. Depending on the context, the self can shrink and swell, sometimes limiting herself to the intention or the physical body only, other times stretching to embrace the whole universe. The notion of "external" here exists mainly along the second vector. "External" are the forces applied on the self from outside, without an awareness or against the wish of the self. Alongside the first vector the "external" shifts. What is the perimeter of the willingly expanding self? If my self is my body, then my family is "external". If my family is my self, then the society is external. If I define my "social self" as "real me"— then other societies are outside it. But my self can also embrace the cosmos.

Examination of those technologies of self, which operate along the vectors, is essentially the study of self-crafting by the self. But as the self is always already in the world, already existent, this self-crafting becomes a question of re-making and re-modeling the "old" self, in order to achieve a "new" self in the world.[37]

This problem of building the self opens here on two analytical levels. When it comes to a timescale, the first level of analysis is the past. The question is the gaze toward the past: what is my "old" self? What pushed it into being? Who am I and how did I come to appear like that? This is an inquiry into the old, "pre-modified" self. The second analytical level sets forth the future. It looks toward the future: what do I want to develop into and whom am I becoming? This is an examination of a new, "potential" self, and her possible trajectories of progress. On a theoretical level these are two different questions, one relating to the past, the other querying the future. Yet, for the self and her relation to the world the past and the future intersect and merge in a present moment.

The analysis of empirical material below—the story of Cho Chin-sik—shows that realization of the quality of the old self and coming to life of a new self take place simultaneously, in the present moment. The moment I see the old self, it changes. This is the moment of self-knowledge turning into a moment of self-transformation. A different dynamic is revealed in the story of Yi, though. For her, self-modification preceded self-realization. Only after her old self was left behind, her newly formed self became aware of what her old self had previously been. As to Pak, the third adherent coming into view in the current paper, for her the notion of self-knowledge, it seems, did not constitute an issue at all. Both her previous self and her desired future self were visible to her current self clearly. For Pak, what was at stake was the developing an ability to bear with dignity the burdens of life, and to successfully progress from the "old self" toward the "new self", strong and forbearing.

The narrations of Cho, Yi and Pak are related in the context of *suryŏn*. Many trainees assert that GiCheon practice should not be categorized as *undong* (運動 sports) but instead understood as *suryŏn* (self-cultivation). Labeling GiCheon as "sports" is regarded by most practitioners as diminishing the value of the practice, whereas defining GiCheon as *suryŏn* has far-reaching significance for its conceptual vitality. Adherents of GiCheon also use the words *suyang* (修養 personal improvement) and *suhaeng* (修行 asceticism) in a mode of meaning similar to *suryŏn*.[38]

After having briefly introduced the notions of *ki suryŏn*, psycho-physical practices, the conceptual framework of Technologies of Self as elaborated by Foucault, and the way Technologies of Self are approached in contemporary scholarship, the paper will proceed to investigate the technologies of self applied in real life. I have introduced the Confucian diagrammatic *sŏngŭi jŏngsim susin ch'ega ch'iguk p'yŏngch'ŏnha,* and my vectors theory. In order to more holistically explore these notions we will examine participants' self-conceptualization in practice, by examining empirical material gained through interviews. The self-transformational mechanisms, the tools in the work of self-modification which Foucault itemizes in his account on Technologies of Self, and which we can identify in the narrations of the GiCheon adepts presented in this article, include the role of the "other", the notion of "going back to the origin", and the notions of freedom, hardship and purification.[39] We will examine how these vehicles of self-transformation are accounted for and utilized by the trainees, both in their direct experience and in its articulation. Later, in the conclusion, we will investigate the inner connection of these instruments with each other.

Empirical material

In this section of the paper I address three ways GiCheon trainees interpret the concept of *suryŏn*. For the GiCheon instructor Cho Chin-sik *suryŏn* is a review of past experiences which

allows the realization of old behavioral patterns and appropriation of new strategies and criteria for action. A university student Yi Kyŏng-won talks about *suryŏn* as a self-chosen and self-directed study continued voluntarily by the subject. Pak Kyŏng-hae, the manager of a bank team believes that *suryŏn* is a process of effort through which the suffering of the body and mind-heart are made bearable.

Let us start with the extract from the interview with Cho Chin-sik:

> First of all, I started looking at my habits and observing the patterns [of my actions]. My GiCheon practice became a chance to observe the habits and patterns connected to my body that were wrong. I realized something. … For example, when I was training and other people were also practicing [behind me], those who came six month ago, and I just came less than a month ago. … And I thought that I could not perform the exercises in a way that I perceived as successful or well. When you cannot achieve something in this way, you should try harder, you should show more [effort], but [instead of doing this] …when the teacher Kim Hŭi-sang[40] came to me, my facial expression demonstrated [to him] everything [I felt internally and he said] "what is the problem?" [I replied] "I cannot do that well." When the teacher responded "no one can do that well in the beginning," I had a moment of sudden realization. My reason for coming here is not to demonstrate anything [to anyone], but to develop some space in my heart. At this point my previous habits became visible [to me].

Cho continues:

> [I tell them] "in suryŏn, do not look at me, but instead look at yourself." These people … are very self-conscious and conscious of others, so …they want to make themselves perfect and dislike criticism [of themselves]. So in the beginning, they are very conscious of the teacher and the people around. After some time passes, I begin to tell them to focus on themselves. When they do so and start to focus primarily on themselves, from that moment they become subjects for themselves. But they do not gain this knowledge by themselves. These people, similarly to me, grew up in a different environment [from mine] but have tendency similar to mine; there are many people like that. So, now [it is] not the idea of undong that categorizes GiCheon but suryŏn, suhaeng, that concept. … Through continuous suryŏn, I started observing myself and my way of thinking.

Cho Chin-sik describes a certain type of people within his narrative whom he terms "perfectionists". These people are usually very conscious of themselves and of others and whatever they do, they aspire to perfection and detest criticism. When they come to GiCheon studio and perform exercises, their main goal (of which they are unconscious) is to show others that they "can do it well" and to impress others. Cho Chin-sik counts himself among these people. When he initially came to the GiCheon studio and started the practice, his goal, of which he was unaware, was to "do well". Cho Chin-sik describes one eventful moment of his practice

within the studio and which happened less than a month after he began his engagement with GiCheon. Cho had been training with co-practitioners who already had a six month training experience behind them. Performing an exercise, we was feeling unhappy and dissatisfied that he could not seem to "do that well". At that moment the instructor approached him and following a short conversation between the teacher and the student, the "self" of Cho became visible to him. This was a moment when his teacher, Kim Hŭi-sang, remarked "no one can do that well in the beginning." Cho became conscious of his old behavioral pattern and realized that impressing others with his practice had been his purpose. Cho Chin-sik also realized that it didn't have to be that way and that a better motivational strategy would be "practicing for yourself" rather than "practicing to impress others." The reason for practice thus altered into what he termed "getting some space in my heart". We might also categorize this as Cho having "recollected" his "real" motivation as being practicing for himself, not for others. After turning into a teacher, when encountering students with similar issues to those he confronted in the past, Cho attempts to "reconstruct anew" his own pedagogic experience with Kim Hŭi-sang, his own teacher. But the roles have shifted: Cho now seeks to carry out for others the role Kim Hŭi-sang played for Cho. Cho stands in the place of Kim Hŭi-sang, while Cho's students come "in the shoes" of Cho himself: Cho Chin-sik wishes to deliver to them the office Kim Hŭi-sang had administered to him. The content of this role and this office is provoking a transformation of the students' own subjectivity and inducing them perform GiCheon positions for themselves rather than for others.

According to Cho, through GiCheon practice his "self" got modified. His teacher's remark revealed the nature of Cho's "old self", and at that instant a "new" self emerged. The moment of self-visibility is thus the moment of self-transfiguration. When I see my old self, my old self fails, and a new self is born. The important point here is the presence of the "other" and Foucault stresses that only through an active involvement of the "other" can the moment of self-alteration take place.[41] The other—a teacher, a friend, a co-practitioner—has an essential role to play in the transformation of the self. The "other" serves as a mirror, revealing to us our "self". As an example, for Cho Chin-sik old habits and behavioral patterns only became observable when his teacher had intervened and asked "what's the problem?" At that moment Cho realized that what he (Cho) wanted was to look well in the eyes of other people. Now similarly Cho Chin-sik plays the role of the "other" in his interaction with his own students.

This precisely is the meaning of *suryŏn* for Cho: "through … suryŏn I started observing myself and my way of thinking." *Suryŏn* is the ability to see yourself and through seeing yourself, through developing consciousness of your old habits and aspirations, to modify your "self".

The adherents perceive the practice of GiCheon as the act of "re-making" the self. In order to

re-make ourselves we have to go back, to the place where we started. A number of times in his discussion Foucault comes back to the idea of "going back to the origin" as an important element of self-care.[42] Chronologically, this 'return to the source' can be interpreted also as going back in time. Many practitioners say that the training makes them re-call their childhood, for example this is how an image of a toddler is evoked by Cho Chin-sik: "When I was learning GiCheon steps, … I thought that it is like I was learning to walk as a youngster. Accordingly, when the teacher says "do this, do that", I become a young child." The "self" is an important concept within the narration of Cho. He uses Korean word *jagi* (자기) for the "self" and while he does not give definition of the self, the meaning of his narration is clear:

> The important thing is, that the "self" enters there. I chose it [the practice] myself, and I found it myself. GiCheon is a fixed practice: "you have to do like this." People do it, and if the position becomes wrong, we say that it is a mistake [you have to correct] but, if I, on the contrary, make [the student] choose [the way she wants to perform] the position… I adjust the position, if I lower the position, more power is generated, if I raise the position, you get more space to breath. [As a teacher] you have to let the students themselves opt for the degree of hardness in suryŏn. [If] the teacher [says] "this is how you do that," it might become a torture for the student. From the point of view of the body, physically, it might be effective, but if the "self falls out", [the student] cannot practice [alone] at home. However if the student regulates the training by herself, she will practice at home even if you don't tell her.

The "self" for Cho Chin-sik is an independent agent capable of acting freely and of making choices. If you are forced to practice GiCheon against your will, it might contribute to your health, but the "self falls out": you are no longer an agent as the free choice of the self is her essential characteristic.

The story of Cho Chin-sik relates to different selves on the vectors, but mainly to the cognitive and the social self. The focus of his narrative is the conscious realization of who he was and how he came to be like that—that is analyzing the presence of second vector in his life and revealing that he was motivated by the desire to "look good in the eyes of other people". Cho further contemplates whom he wants to be, and how to awaken similar realization in others. In his correlation with his students the self of Cho is his social self on the first vector: he is bringing about the change not just in himself, but in the selves of other people, in a sense placing them within the boundaries of his responsibility. And his idea of 'freedom' relates of course to multiple selves on the first vector: freedom to desire, to think, to feel and to act.

The notion of freedom and free choice is another important moment in self-formation discussed by Foucault in his account on self-care in ancient Greece and Rome.[43] This free agency is also a

fundamental element of GiCheon practice for the university student Yi Kyŏng-won. Now let us turn to the extract from her interview:

> [GiCheon practice and university study] are similar, I think. Because actually they are hard during their completion … But if I want to do it, I do it. And other people around me, for example family and friends, cannot say anything [against that] to me. However those people also cannot help. In any case … university study is something you do as self-directed practice, and GiCheon you also do alone. The teacher cannot threaten me [into practicing by saying] "you'll be punished if you don't do that" …. Because it is something I do. Suryŏn is something I do by myself, of my own accord. … That process is hard, but I bear it, endure it and develop myself [through it] …. Not everything can be suryŏn, because the value I grant [to it] is different.

Yi defines *suryŏn* as a self-directed study, chosen and continued voluntarily. Not every study is *suryŏn,* but only those through which you endure hardship, generate self-development, and to which a high value is attached. The sense of subjectivity is characteristic of *suryŏn:* you engage in it because you want to, and not because others made you to. In the narrative of Cho Chin-sik the subjectivity was directed by the goal toward which the action flows: the motivation focused on impressing others changed into "getting some space in my heart." In case of Yi Kyŏng-won the subjectivity is defined by the manner of how the action is performed, freely or under pressure: "do I practice because I want to, or because others forced me to?" This sense of actualized subjectivity Yi developed through the practice is related to her new motivation: doing things because she wants.

> My thoughts changed so much. … before I did not have much self-confidence. … I just went to school in an irresponsible fashion. My father was very stubborn and … authoritarian and he used to give orders ... Like in the army. … Father said "do this", "do that". He was also like this about GiCheon, first he said "Let's go!". [So] we had to go. The atmosphere at home was such that we could not say "I do not want to do it". ... But while I was doing GiCheon … my own thoughts started to appear. Of course I listened to my father, but I did not follow him 100%, not absolutely. … Because I did what father said I did not have self-confidence. [When my own thoughts started appearing] I developed self-assurance … [before this time] I had not done anything extra. [At school] I only studied, [but now] I wanted to play musical instruments, I wanted to learn dancing. I wanted to compete outside the school. I wanted … to go out with friends. … What I wanted to do, what I liked … I discovered things like the dream [of my future] …

The father of Yi Kyŏng-won compelled her and her sister Yi Ji-wŏn (aged thirteen and twelve at the outset) to practice GiCheon against their will. Every morning when he woke them up for the practice "it was a battle," says Yi Kyŏng-won. Ironically however, it was this involuntary training

imposed on the child that resulted in the unfolding of her subjectivity and free will. Years later Yi felt grateful to her father, with whom her relationship has also gradually improved.

Similarly to Cho, the account of Yi shows her step-by-step realization of how the second vector —external influences—shaped her life. As the first vector activated, her subjectivity, self-determination and freedom grew; she gained vision on how unfree she was before, and how her actions and function were actually determined by the surrounding: her family and society. So inversely to the case of Cho, it is a formation of a new self that brought about the realization of the quality of the "old" self.

Without deliberate consideration and without any self-making on the part of Yi in the past, her "old self" appears pretty much as "familial" and "social", formed along the second vector. Her intentional self was very weak—it seems she hardly had any intentions or desires at all, associating instead with what her family and her society expected from her and planned for her. Her "new self", on the contrary, comes across as intentional and active.

For Yi an important element of *suryŏn* is hardship, the endurance of hardship and self-development that ensues following it. As GiCheon positions are hard and painful to sustain, this is not surprising and this aspect of GiCheon training is referred to by practically all the adherents and participants. Foucault stresses the aspect of hardship as central to the techniques of self-development,[44] and bearing hardship is often linked to cleansing and purification.[45] For bank team manager Pak Kyŏng-hae sustaining hardship and performing purification are the main characteristics of GiCheon *suryŏn,* as demonstrated in this extract from her interview:

> —GiCheon is really good sports (undong). … It is actually suryŏn, not sports.
>
> —What is suryŏn, in your opinion?
>
> —Suryŏn? … suryŏn is the cleansing of body and mind together. … Habits or wrong things are corrected …. And the mind also … through the process of "making it bright?" To suppress the bad heart and to make it secure … relaxed? … The ability to maintain the heart in a relaxed state … When one is relaxed because she is lucky and has no troubles … but this is not always possible for a human being. In life everyone has troubles. But despite of these troubles the act of staying calm and peaceful—is suryŏn. This is also true of the body … the pain of the physical should be manageable. Suryŏn is bringing yourself to the level where you can manage your pain. Even if it hurts, to be able to handle your condition, or just to accept the fact that it hurts. … We cannot correct everything …. Even if it is a bit uncomfortable, we have to go with it together.

For Pak *suryŏn* is an exercise in "cleansing" the wrong habits of the body and "brightening the

mind—suppressing the bad heart." She talks about "suppressing" and "managing the pain", describing her effort of and work on self-modification. The concepts of patience and endurance evoked by Pak are all contingent with the idea of "suppressing". To accept the hard, the painful, the uncomfortable, "to be able to handle your condition" and "cleanse the mind-body" are the outcome of her GiCheon training. Another extract from her interview supports that interpretation:

> … in family relationships… I learned to ch'amta (참다 bear with things[46]) better. Before that I would be fighting... But with the family, you have to accept things because there is no choice. … It is not something you can solve by fighting. We have to accept things and let them go, with GiCheon suryŏn I learned to do it a little bit better. …. So while my tolerance for stress has increased, I could now maintain continuously what was important for me and my strength to go forward has increased.

In her interview Pak Kyŏng-hae also talks about the difficulty of maintaining a highly demanding career and simultaneously functioning as a mother and a wife in contemporary Korea. Her various tasks are not easy to fulfill and her life is full of stress. For Pak GiCheon *suryŏn* is a stress-relieving method. It helps her to bear what she has to bear: she observes that with GiCheon her *ch'amta* potential and her strength have grown. In the interview, she shows aspiration to develop a contemplative view on life, to learn acceptance and reconciliation. These aspirations and intentions lie along the first vector and relate to her mind-set, her intentions, her emotion and cognition, her body, and to her family relationships. But the hardships themselves Pak is confronting are coming from the outside, they are the forces of the second vector she attempts to counteract. This is achieved by building a stronger self, one capable of forbearance and determination: "my tolerance for stress has increased, I could now maintain continuously what was important for me and my strength to go forward has increased."

Conclusion

This paper suggests the analysis of Korean GiCheon and other similar East-Asian practices within a theoretical construction of two vectors. I propose to understand the Foucauldian conceptions of technology of self as the resistance of the first vector against the second vector, intentional subjective drive that attempts to counterbalance the external, unconsciously absorbed influences. But we have to bear in mind that according to the alternative understanding the function of the practice itself might sometimes be categorized as the second vector, and not the first. This is the case when we look at the change in motivation: the reason for practice or the intention behind practice—and sometimes the intentions behind other actions un-related to practice—are modified by the fact and reality of practice itself.

The narrative of Cho Chin-sik shows that initially he had a strong inclination to objectify himself.

"How do others see me from the outside?", "how does my training look from the outside, do I appear to perform the exercises well?" were the questions that troubled him. Cho was pre-occupied with the gaze flowing along the second vector, from outside toward inside. The intervention of the teacher Kim Hŭi-sang changed that. After his short conversation with the teacher, Cho started "practicing for himself." The direction flowing from the external toward the internal changed and began to move from the internal towards the external. The teacher was the catalyst for this change, an active carrying signal that caused the transference from the second vector to the first. The "other" thus served as a vehicle for transfer between the two vectors.[47] The ability to observe and modify his habits and his way of thinking comes about through the active and intentional interference of the first vector into the "work" of the second vector: old patterns were formed unconsciously but now they are visualized and intentionally modified.

Yi Kyŏng-won in the beginning was rather impacted upon by the realm of the external; her authoritative father and also her mother seemingly decided her life for her. Her own agency was thus rather weak. The father who brought her to GiCheon studio and the practice in which he made her engage were the catalysts that caused Yi to develop her internal self. Accordingly she developed free agency and successfully passed from a state in which she was impacted upon and controlled by externalities to one in which the internal aspect has the active impact.

Finally in the case of Pak Kyŏng-hae we see that she had a strong actualized self from the start. Pak talks a great deal about suppressing, overcoming and becoming peaceful in-spite of pain. Notwithstanding her strong agency, her internal self still seems to be troubled by life. She therefore utilizes GiCheon as a tool for developing further internal strength to cope with external conditions and uses it to advance the resistive capacity of her own agency against externalities.

Recent scholarship on self-transformation and self-knowledge is often rooted in textual analysis of ancient sources. This includes insights into the "personal", "bodily", "social", and "cosmic" selves and their co-relation in Judaism and Christianity[48] and analysis of emotional, cognitive and cosmic selves in Hebrew tradition.[49] Slave selves in ancient Rome,[50] student selves in late antiquity,[51] and a female self in Palestine in the second-first century BCE[52] also emerge out of the contemporary academic writings. The book edited in 2013 by Jörg Rüpke and Greg Woolf is wholly dedicated to the "religious dimensions of the self in the second century CE". The research on master-disciple roles in the systems of self-transformation and knowledge transmission,[53] on self-modification in Vedic sacrificial rituals,[54] on a transformative function of memory in Vedic tradition;[55] on self-transformation in Sanskrit texts[56] and in Sufism[57] relate primarily to distant past. Rare exceptions to this rule are the discussions on self-modification in Tibetan Buddhism[58] and Daoist inner alchemy (Kohn, Wang ed. 2009). These accounts include a contemporary perspective on self-transformation practices today, as does the study of Sonia

Ryang mentioned earlier in this paper.[59]

In a similar vein my own paper focuses on the present, engaging and analyzing the self-perfection performed by our contemporaries in South Korea. This research is based on real-live experiences, and is text-based only to the extent that the texts are the transcriptions of the interviews given in the years 2010–2011. The self presented here is the living self of today. There is no doubt that a vast amount of scholarship exists on contemporary self-transformation around the world in the field of anthropology of the body.[60] Nevertheless, this branch of study does not usually utilize the methodological tools developed by Foucault in his technologies of self, nor use the term "self", but the "living body".

This paper has attempted to demonstrate the usefulness of the vectors theory for the analysis of psycho-physical practices, as a tool for identification and classification of processes and influences. My vectors theory is developed on the basis of the Confucian self-cultivational model and Foucauldian technologies of self. I tried to pinpoint the position of intentional, emotional, cognitive, physical, familial and social self in the transformative progress undertaken by three GiCheon practitioners. In this context the notions of "other", of "returning to the source", of freedom, hardship and purification underlined by Foucault in his conceptualization of the technologies of self are important venues for anchoring our analysis.[61]

Looking at the inner connections of these symbolical means with each other, we notice the links between the "other" and freedom, between hardship and purification, and between purification and "returning to the source". The metaphor of the self as imprisoned within a cell is common for many self-cultivational traditions. If the self is inside the cell, she cannot get out. Only the "other" can unlock the cell from the outside and thus assist the self with gaining freedom. As to purification and hardship, the common motif is that the dirty thing is hard to clean, and a cleansing process is painful and uncomfortable for the thing, like a cloth that is being washed. The cleansing also constitute a "return" to an "originally clean" state of the self, hence its connection with the "return to the origin".

These self-transformative icons center around the notion of the "self" advanced and promoted by Foucault. However technologies of self have not been sufficiently called upon in the study of contemporary psycho-physical culture, the lacuna the current paper hopes to start filling. I have tried to achieve that through the reviewing of the notion of *suryŏn* and its meaning for GiCheon trainees.

We have seen that for GiCheon instructor Cho Chin-sik *suryŏn* is gaining a new understanding of old behavioral patterns, while university student Yi Kyŏng-won defines *suryŏn* as self-directed and

self-chosen study voluntarily continued. Bank manager Pak Kyŏng-hae believes that *suryŏn* is an effort by which you make the suffering of the body and mind-heart bearable. Three persons define *suryŏn* in three different ways, but the common element in their interpretations is the transference from the second vector to the first vector, achieved through *suryŏn*. Here, ultimately we have used a few short interview extracts to apply the two vectors theory, elaborated on the basis of Confucian rhetoric and the technologies of self. I suggest that application of vectors theory to various anthropological material related to contemporary psycho-physical culture in East-Asia might further develop our understanding of the subjective mode and subjected self, forming a link and connection with Foucault's continuing history of subjectivity.

Notes

1 See: Farquhar, Judith and Zhang, Qicheng. *Ten Thousand Things: Nurturing Life in Contemporary Beijing*. New York: Zone, 2012; Otehode, Utiraruto. "The Creation and Reemergence of Qigong in China". In *Making Religion, Making the State: the Politics of Religion in Modern China*, edited by Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, 241–265. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2009; Palmer, David A. *Qigong fever: body, science, and utopia in China*. New-York: Columbia University Press, 2007; Torchinov, E. A. *Puti filosofiyi vostoka i zapada: poznanie zapredelnogo* (Пути философии востока и запада: познание запредельного) (Philosophical Ways of East and West: the Knowledge of the Beyond). Saint Petersburg: Peterburgskoye vostokovedenie (Петербургское востоковедение), 2007; Torchinov, E. A. *Religii mira. Opit zapredelnogo. Psihotehnika yi transpersonalnye sostoyaniya* (Религии мира. Опыт запредельного. Психотехника и трансперсональные состояния) (World Religions. Experience of the "Beyond". Psycho-techniques and Transpersonal States). Saint Petersburg: Peterburgskoye vostokovedenie (Петербургское востоковедение), 1998; Kerr, Catherine. "Translating "Mind-In-Body": Two Models of Patient Experience Underlying a Randomized Controlled Trial of Qigong". *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry* 26 (2002): 419–447; Despeux, Catherine. "Le qigong, une expression de la modernité Chinoise". In *En suivant la Voie Royale. Mélanges en homage à Léon Vandermeersch*, edited by J. Gernet and M. Kalinowski, 267–281. Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1997; Despeux, Catherine. *Taiji Quan : Art martial - Technique de longue vie*. Paris: Guy Tredaniel, 1981; Ots, Thomas. "The Silenced Body—The Expressive Leib: On the Dialectic of Mind and Life in Chinese Cathartic Healing". In *Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground of Culture and Self,* edited by Thomas Csordas, 116–136. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; Ots, Thomas. "Phenomenology of the Body: The Subject-Object Problem in Psychosomatic Medicine and the Role of Traditional Medical Systems herein". In *Anthropologies of Medicine A Colloquium on West European and North American Perspectives,* edited by Beatrix Pfeiderer and Giles Bibeau, 43–58. Wiesbaden: Friedrich Vieweg & Sohn Verlag, 1991; Abayev, N. V. "Daosskie istoki kitaiskih Wu-shu" (Даосские истоки китайских у-шу) (Daoist Sources of Chinese Wu-shu). In *Dao yi Daoism v Kitae* (Дао и даосизм в Китае) (Dao and Daoism in China), edited by B. V. Menshikov, 244–257. Moscow: Nauka (Наука), 1982; and Abayev, N. V. "Chan-buddhism yi kultura psihicheskoi deyatelnosti v srednevekovom Kitae (Чань-буддизм и культура психической деятельности в средневековом Китае) (Zen-Buddhism and Psychic Culture in Mediaeval China). Novosibirsk: Nauka (Наука), 1983.

2 Baker, Don. 2007a. "The Korean God Is Not the Christian God: Taejonggyo's Challenge to Foreign Religions", in Buswell, Jr. Robert E. ed., *Religions of Korea in Practice*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 464–475; Baker, Don. 2007b. "Internal Alchemy in the Dahn World School", in Buswell, Jr. Robert E. ed., *Religions of Korea in Practice*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 508–513.

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[9] Abayey, 1983: 1.

[10] Abayey, 1982: 244.

[11] Abayey, 1983.

[12] Ots, 1994: 120.

[13] Despeaux, 1997: 267, 273–276.

[14] Samuel, Geoffrey and Johnston, Jay ed. *Religion and the Subtle Body in Asia and the West: Between Mind and Body*. New York: Routledge, 2013.

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[17] Foucault 1988: 18.

[18] Taylor, Charles. *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989.

[19] Hadot, Pierre. *What is ancient philosophy?* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002.

[20] Foucault 2001: 5–6; Epictete. *Entretiens*, III, 1, 18-19. Translated by Souilhe, J. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1963 [108 AD]: 8; Xenophon. *Memorables*, IV, II, 24. Translated by Chambry, P. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966 [371 BC]: 390.

[21] Foucault does not explicitly mention the terms "old self" and "new self". It is clear from his narrative, though, that the Delphic precept of "know yourself" relates to the "old self" (Foucault 2001: 5).

22 Laidlaw, James. "The Undefined Work of Freedom: Foucualt's Genealogy and the Anthropology of Ethics". In *Foucault Now: Current Perspectives in Foucault Studies*, edited by James Faubion, 23–37. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014a: 26–30; Laidlaw, James. *The Subject of Virtue: an Anthropology of Ethics and Freedom*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014b.

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24 Faubion, James. "Constantine Cavafy: A Parrhesiast for the Cynic of the Future". In *Foucault Now: Current Perspectives in Foucault Studies*, edited by James Faubion, 225–242. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.

25 Rüpke, Jörg and Woolf, Greg ed. *Religious Dimensions of the Self in the Second Century CE*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013; Alter, Joseph. "Sex, *askesis* and the athletic perfection of the soul: physical philosophy in the ancient Mediterranean and South Asia". In *Religion and the Subtle Body in Asia and the West: Between Mind and Body*, edited by Geoffrey Samuel and Jay Johnston, 33-47. New York: Routledge, 2013; Gill, Christopher. *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Brakke, David; Satlow, Michael; Weitzman, Steven ed. *Religion and the Self in Antiquity*. Bloomington-Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005; Shulman, David and Stroumsa, Guy ed. *Self and self-transformation in the history of religions.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

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27 Ryang, Sonia. "Technologies of the Self: Reading from North Korean Novels in the 1980s". *Acta Koreana* 5 (1) (2002): 21–32: 23, 25–26.

28 Palmer, 2007.

29 Selim, 2011.

30 Hayano, D. "Auto-ethnography: Paradigms, problems and prospects". *Human Organization*, 38(1) (1979): 99–104.: 99–100.

31 Ellis, Carolyn; Bochner, Arthur. "Autoethnography, Personal Narrative, Reflexivity", in N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln. (Eds.) *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, (2nd ed.), 733–768. CA: Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2000: 734, 740–742, 746.

32 Interview with Yi Kyŏng-won, 05.11.2010, Seoul, South Korea. Interview with Cho Chin-sik, 07.03.2011, Seoul. Yi Kyŏng-won and Cho Chin-sik gave me their explicit permissions to use their real names. Interview with Pak Kyŏng-hae (not a real name) 17.01.2010, Seoul.

33 *Daxue* (大學, The Great Learning). E-SKQS: *Electronic edition of Wenyuange Siku Quanshu* 文淵閣四庫全書 (Wenyuan Chamber, Complete Collection in Four Branches of Literature), 1999. One of the four books of "Confucian canon", The Great Learning summarizes the process of self-perfection on the levels of the intention, mind-heart, body, family, country, and the world, then proceeding towards detailed explanation of self-cultivation on each level. Cultivation of the self here includes embodying the virtue thus providing a personal example and a role-model for the others.

[34] Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. *Phénoménologie de la perception.* Paris: Gallimard, 1945. Merleau-Ponty says that the presence and existence of the body in the world is like that of a heart in an organism: it animates and nurtures from inside, forming with it a single system (Merleau-Ponty 1945: 235). I perceive and know the world through my body. Without my body, my world does not exist, like an organism, which cannot exist without a heart. This worldview, adopted and developed by the author of the present paper, almost equalizes consciousness with life itself. Deep underlying intention, first and foremost a desire to live, shapes perception, emotion and cognition, that define and direct actions and activities. This desire to live and to survive, which we share with other living beings, conditions our perception of the world and directs our existence in the world. In Confucianism and other spiritual traditions, this desire of life, or of good life, is equated with a desire to give life, or give good life, to others.

[35] Merleau-Ponty, 1945.

[36] Hahm, Chaibong. "Confucian Rituals and the Technology of the Self: A Foucauldian Interpretation". *Philosophy East and West* 51 (3) (2001): 315–324. The connection between Confucian prescript for self-cultivation and Foucauldian technologies of self has been noticed and insisted upon also by Hahm Chaibong. He dwells on the common points between Confucian practices trying for an ideal moral self expanding towards the cosmos and practices of "care of the self" originating in ancient Greece and Rome as described by Foucault. But Hahm's analysis as based on the texts of Confucian canon is purely theoretical: he does not investigate Confucian practices as applied in actuality (Hahm, 2001).

[37] Rhett, K. ed. *Survival Stories: Memoirs of Crisis.* NY, Garden City: Doubleday, 1997. Among many questions relating to self-narration addressed in autoethnography, the volume edited by Rhett pays particular attention to the question of transformation from an old self towards a new one.

[38] Judith Farquhar and Qicheng Zhang in their study on self-cultivational practices in contemporary Beijing call these practices 'nurturing life' (養生 *yangsheng*) (Farquhar, Zhang 2012).

[39] Foucault, 2001: 16, 83, 92, 123–130, 167, 476–477.

[40] Kim Hŭi-sang was a well known GiCheon leader who composed three books on GiCheon. The author of this paper had the honor of being his friend, for a short while before his death.

[41] Foucault, 2001: 123–130.

[42] Ibid: 92, 476–477.

[43] Ibid: 83, 128, 477.

[44] Ibid: 46, 146.

[45] Ibid: 16, 167.

[46] Nancy Abelman suggests this translation of *ch'amta* (Abelman 2003).

[47] However, if we consider GiCheon practice itself as an "external influence" administered on the self of Cho, then we might also categorize the change of his intention as having been impacted by the external. This is also true for the experience of Yi.

[48] Miller, 2005; Weitzman, 2005; Harvey, 2005; Frank, 2005; Schofer, 2005.

[49] Olyan, 2005.

[50] Harill, 2005.

[51] Watts, 2005.

[52] Menn, 2005.

[53] Stroumsa, 2005.

[54] Malamoud, 2002.

[55] Doniger, 2002.

[56] Shulman, 2002.

[57] Sviri, 2002.

[58] Gyatso, 2002.

[59] Ryang, 2002.

[60] Csordas, Thomas J. *Body / Meaning / Healing.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002; Csordas, Thomas J. "The Body's Career in Anthropology". In *Anthropological Theory Today,* edited by Henrietta Moore, 172-205. Cornwell: Polity Press, 1999; Lock, 1993; Ots, 1994; Ots, 1991.

[61] Foucault, 2001: 16, 83, 92, 123–130, 167, 476–477.

The Struggle For Legitimacy:
North Korea's Relations With Africa, 1965–1992

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Abstract

From the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, Seoul and Pyongyang sought to gain international recognition as the sole government on the Korean peninsula. Africa, the site of many newly independent nations during the Cold War, became the primary battleground for this inter-Korean competition. Focusing on North Korean-African relations, this article examines several African dictators who admired North Korea's alternative brand of socialist modernity, Pyongyang's exportation of its Juche (roughly defined as self-reliance) ideology to Africa, and African students who studied in North Korea as part of official diplomatic exchanges. Using archival sources from North Korea's former communist allies, North Korean newspapers, declassified documents from the U.S. Department of State, and interviews with African students who studied in North Korea in the 1980s, I explore an under-researched dimension of North Korea's diplomatic history and the North Korean leadership's efforts in Africa to depict the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a model of Third World development.

Key words: Korea-Africa relations; North Korea foreign relations; racism, Juche ideology; foreign students in Pyongyang

The Struggle For Legitimacy:
North Korea's Relations With Africa, 1965–1992

Benjamin Young

During the Cold War era, Africa occupied a unique place in the North Korean consciousness. The continent was a battleground with South Korea for votes in the United Nations, for followers of its peculiar brand of developmental ideology, and for support of the removal of American troops from South Korean soil. North Korea, officially known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) since its formation in 1948, poured financial aid and military personnel into Africa during the Cold War hoping to sway newly independent countries to take their side in the struggle with Seoul for recognition as the legitimate Korean government. However, the relationship between North Korea and decolonized African states has not been investigated in-depth. Using archival sources from North Korea's former communist allies, public North Korean newspapers, declassified documents from the US Department of State, and interviews with African students who studied in North Korea in the 1980s, I will examine the DPRK's diplomatic efforts in Africa from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s and Pyongyang's attempts to depict North Korea as a model for recently decolonized nations.[1] I argue that the North Korean leadership viewed diplomacy with African nations as an extension of the inter-Korean conflict with Seoul for sole legitimacy over the Korean peninsula. Viewing Africa as a space to gain an upper hand over Seoul in the competition for diplomatic recognition, Pyongyang offered military training and guidance to many African nations while also disseminating propaganda materials throughout the continent and offering opportunities for African students to study in the DPRK. Some African governments, if only briefly, viewed North Korea's alternative brand of socialist modernity, with its militarization, pervasive cult of personality, and postcolonial development, as a model possibly worthy of emulation.[2]

Charles Armstrong's recent book, *Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950–1992*, provides a stepping stone for scholars interested in North Korea's Third World diplomacy as he wrote a chapter on the subject.[3] Armstrong argues that despite the small size of its own economy, North Korea played an important role in African development.[4] Historian Balazs Szalontai briefly looks at North Korea's activities in Africa and concludes that nationalism, rather than internationalism, drove North Korea's foreign policy during the Cold War as Pyongyang would cooperate with any Third World leader, regardless of political ideology, who diplomatically recognized the DPRK as the legitimate Korean government in the United Nations.[5] While Armstrong and Szalontai view North Korea's foreign policy as independent-minded and nationalistic, political scientist Bruce Bechtol argues that the Soviet Union subsidized all of the DPRK's military assistance in Africa and that Pyongyang "served as a willing proxy for

implementing the USSR's foreign policy" until 1990.[6] This depiction of North Korea as a puppet of the Soviet Union was typical in American military intelligence circles during the Cold War. However, as a 1983 *New York Times* article on North Korean arms sales and military training in the Third World aptly explains, "Pyongyang acts on its own, and may even be a growing embarrassment to the Russians and Chinese."[7] In this essay, I hope to restore North Korea's agency in the history of international relations and look at North Korean-African relations as part of the Cold War in the Third World.

During the Cold War, Africa was a space of ideological competition between the world's major superpowers. The United States hoped to sway newly independent African governments away from socialism while the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union extolled the applicability of socialism to the recently decolonized Third World. In the 1960s and 1970s, Beijing was especially active in spreading Maoist ideology in Africa through the dissemination of Little Red Books. David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman explain that China's African policy from the early 1950s to mid-1970s was characterized by a need to break out of international isolation, overtake the Soviet Union as leader of the world communist movement, and a desire to gain international recognition as the legitimate Chinese government.[8] As China reformed and opened up in the late 1970s and 1980s, its relations with Africa changed as economic commerce, rather than ideology, underscored China's African policy.[9] North Korea, by contrast, never implemented Chinese-style reforms, and its relations with Africa never took on the same shape as the PRC's. Nevertheless, as a contested entity itself, North Korea shared some similarities in its Africa policy with that of the Chinese, namely the basic desire to gain international recognition from newly independent, postcolonial states. Like Beijing's struggle with Taipei for China's UN seat, Pyongyang and Seoul were locked in a fierce struggle for recognition as the legitimate Korean government in the United Nations. After the passing of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 in 1971 that recognized the PRC as the official representative of China at the UN and the normalization of relations between the United States and China during the following year, the détente between the West and the PRC created a new space for the two Koreas in which to operate diplomatically.[10] Until the joint communiqué between the two Koreas in 1972, Pyongyang and Seoul refused to allow other countries to recognize both Korean governments.[11] Even after 1972, the two Koreas still raced to establish diplomatic relations with foreign governments as Pyongyang refused to join the United Nations alongside Seoul until 1992.[12] However, despite being subject to Chinese pressure, North Korea's African policy was never dictated by Beijing.

North Korea was not the only small, socialist Third World nation active in Africa during the Cold War. Most notably, Cuba sent thousands of soldiers to Angola and Namibia in the mid-1970s and 1980s to fight against white minority rule in southern Africa. Piero Gleijeses'

groundbreaking work on this subject illustrates the fraternal, anti-apartheid internationalism of Fidel Castro's regime.[13] As the Johns Hopkins University Professor almost glibly explains, "During the Cold War, extracontinental military interventions were the preserve of the two superpowers, a few Western European countries, and Cuba."[14] However as I will illustrate, North Korea also intervened militarily in African conflicts. While North Korea did not send as many troops to Africa as the Cubans, Pyongyang did send military advisors to train the armed forces (typically the elite security forces) of African leaders who were friendly with Kim Il Sung. However, the fundamental difference between Cuba's and North Korea's African policy during the Cold War was Cuba's opposition to theories of racial supremacy. While North Korean state media routinely condemned white minority rule in southern Africa, the actions of North Koreans tell a different story, which will be described throughout this paper. Self-interests, specifically the struggle to gain diplomatic recognition as the "true" Korean government, rather than notions of racial equality or Third World solidarity, dictated North Korea's African policy.

Source materials for North Korean strategy in Africa are difficult to come by, but a surprising amount of useful data arises from the US State Department's archives and from the archives of the countries formerly in the Soviet bloc. Due to issues of access and availability, I do not use sources from African archives. In lieu of African archival documents, I use interview data taken from recent journalism, including some of my own previously published work. Clearly work which is able to delve into African archival documents will ultimately present a more accurate portrayal of North Korean-African relations, and the frustrations the Africans had with their North Korean allies. In the meantime, historical relations between North Korea and African nations remain under-researched and the materials selected for analysis here will hopefully aid in stimulating more research on the topic.

As Ko Young-hwan, the former head of the Africa section in the DPRK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1985 to 1987 who defected to South Korea in 1991, said in a recent interview: "Kim Il Sung took Africa seriously because he wanted to use votes in the United Nations for the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea. He believed that if he could get the socialist Eastern Bloc and African countries on board, then he could make the withdrawal happen."[15] Viewing the anti-imperialist struggles in the Third World as interconnected, Kim Il Sung said in a 1986 speech, "The struggles of the people to win independence and sovereignty and build a new society are linked by supporting and supplementing each other. If Africa is not free, Asia and Latin America cannot be free."[16] In other words, even if archival sources concerning North Korean-African relations remain relatively scarce, greater scholarly attention devoted to the topic might aid in explaining why Africa appeared to be such an important part of Kim Il Sung's foreign policy.

The first part of this paper will explore North Korea's military operations in Africa and right-wing African dictators' hoping to replicate the personality cult and militarization of the DPRK. I will then discuss the exportation of the Juche ideology to Africa. The paper concludes with an investigation into the lives of African students living in North Korea during the Cold War and the xenophobic, isolated nature of North Korean society.

Military Assistance and the Personality Cult

North Korea offered military assistance to a wide range of African governments in the 1960s and 1970s. While North Korea did receive financial compensation for military training and arms deals with African nations, the North Korean leadership did not pursue this policy solely for economic reasons. Rather, in offering military assistance, Pyongyang sought diplomatic recognition from these African nations. During the inter-Korean competition for UN votes, Pyongyang put strategic self-interests at the forefront of its African foreign policy. Likewise, African leaders pursued relations with North Korea for their own specific goals and interests. Often times, these leaders viewed North Korea as a less-threatening alternative to the two dominant communist powers active in Africa: China and the Soviet Union. The North Korean brand of development appealed to mostly right-wing African leaders, who admired the guerrilla warfare tactics of the North Korean military and the personality cult of the Kim family.

Zairean right-wing dictator Mobutu Sese Seko's close relations with Pyongyang further indicates that self-interests, rather than financial compensation or ideology, drove North Korea's military operations in Africa. Mobutu's anticommunist stance earned him financial support from the United States. However, ideological differences did not get in the way of Pyongyang seeking close relations with Kinshasa. Zaire (now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo) and the DPRK established official diplomatic relations in 1972 and a Zairean embassy soon opened in Pyongyang.[17] In 1973, Mobutu swapped Israeli military advisors for North Korean ones and traveled to Pyongyang in 1974 to meet with President Kim Il Sung.[18] US officials thus became increasingly concerned with North Korea's influence on Mobutu as he signed a major arms deal with Kim Il Sung in 1974.

Jean Bedel Bokassa was one of the most notable right-wing dictators in postcolonial Africa. Having nearly bankrupted his country with a ceremony making himself "emperor" of the Central African Republic (which he renamed the Central African Empire), Bokassa established close relations with Kim Il Sung.[19] In 1969, the two nations established official diplomatic relations, which surprised American officials since Bokassa had initially supported South Korea in the UN.[20] Kim Il Sung, with his own pervasive personality cult, endorsed the "domestic politics" of Bokassa's rule in a joint communique in 1978.[21] During his May 1978 visit to Pyongyang, Bokassa signed "a treaty of peace and friendship" with Kim Il Sung.[22] It was agreed that North

Korea would provide agricultural equipment to the Central African Empire in exchange for coffee, timber, and diamonds. The North Korean government had also agreed to build Bokassa a palace in the same style as Kim Il Sung's Kumsusan Palace.[23] Perhaps looking at the Kim family as a model, Bokassa attempted to create a hereditary dictatorship in order to secure the wealth and prestige of his family.[24] In 1979, the French military removed Bokassa as president amidst speculation that Bokassa personally participated in the execution of 100 schoolchildren who refused to buy expensive uniforms made in a factory owned by one of his seventeen wives.[25]

North Korea's focus on securing as many UN votes as possible from African leaders sometimes created awkward encounters on the battlefield. Erik Cornell, the head of the Swedish embassy in Pyongyang from 1975 to 1977, recalls his Zairean colleagues telling him that North Korean military instructors suddenly appeared on the Angolan side of the border during the Angolan Civil War, at which point military cooperation ended.[26] Due to this and similar instances, North Korea earned a reputation amongst African nations as being unreliable and duplicitous. An Algerian official who worked on the question of Korean reunification in a UN bilateral advisory group said that working with the North Koreans was "like talking to Martians."[27]

However, Africans also manipulated the North Koreans on many occasions, repeating the tropes of Kim Il Sung's teachings to their North Korean counterparts in return for material advantages and military assistance. The American embassy in Lagos, Nigeria, reported in 1973 that two major newspapers in Ibadan, the third largest city in Nigeria, annually published the speeches of Kim Il Sung. The embassy concluded, "It is beginning to appear that the DPRK is willing to pay for this strange, unremunerative exercise as an annual event. They will find Nigerians who are only too happy to take their money."[28] Ko Young-hwan explains, "North Korea focused too little on the pursuit of economic development, and too much on ideological development." Ko explains, "The African nations were only interested in following him [Kim Il Sung] when he could afford to provide them with aid, why would they put the Juche claims first?"[29]

One African dictator who reportedly fell in love with North Korea's propaganda and its cult of personality was Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe. After visiting Pyongyang in 1980, Mugabe wanted to recreate his own personality cult based on the one he saw in North Korea. According to a former member of his government, Mugabe "came back almost a different man" after his trip to North Korea.[30] Mugabe sought military assistance from the North Koreans in order to eliminate his rival political party, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). In 1981, Kim Il Sung obliged and sent 106 North Korean military instructors to Zimbabwe to train 3,500 members of Mugabe's elite military division, the Fifth Brigade.[31] According to a report from the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, the North Koreans also sent $18 million in small arms and ammunition to Zimbabwe.[32] In the mid-1980s, the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade

went on to kill 20,000 internal "dissidents" in the Zimbabwean region of Matabeleland, which was home to followers of Mugabe's main political rival Joshua Nkomo and the Ndebele ethnic minority.[33]

As representatives of a highly militarized society engaged in a conflict with its southern neighbor, North Korean officials set up guerrilla warfare training camps and military academies inside their own borders where they also trained revolutionaries from Latin America, Africa, and Asia. According to *Communist Nations' Military Assistance*, North Korea trained approximately 2,500 Third World guerrilla fighters from 1972 to 1981.[34] Hungarian archival documents indicate that North Korea's military prowess and training became well known amongst African nations. A Ugandan military delegation visited North Korea in 1975 and asked that 30–40 of its soldiers spend two to three years training in the DPRK and that Pyongyang provide arms to Uganda. Although Uganda's dictator Idi Amin was far from a staunch communist, Pyongyang agreed to both requests.[35] Paradoxically, North Korea also assisted the Tanzanian military in overthrowing Amin's regime. In 1979, 45,000 Tanzanian armed forces and 500 North Korean military advisors invaded Kampala and Amin had to flee to Libya. Milton Obote, the Uganda leader who was overthrown by Amin in 1971, regained his presidential position in 1980 and subsequently signed a defense treaty with Pyongyang. As part of this deal, Kim Il Sung supplied President Obote with 600 to 700 North Korean military advisors to train the anti-guerrilla forces of the Ugandan military.[36] The North Koreans earned a reputation in the Third World as opportunists that would train soldiers and sell arms to nations and non-state actors at low costs regardless of political affiliations and prior alliances.

The North Koreans clearly acted on their own accord in offering military assistance to African nations. According to a 1986 French report on "North Korea as an African power," over 2,000 North Korean military instructors were working in Africa in the 1980s. The report surmises that "Pyongyang appeared as the provider of a 'third communist way' whose 'intervention' would be less oppressive than that of the Russian or Chinese advisors."[37] The North Korean leadership could not provide large amounts of financial assistance to African leaders but they could offer small arms and guerrilla warfare training to liberation fighters. Viewing Africa as the last frontier of the inter-Korean conflict, North Korea sought to win over African leaders through military and ideological means.

Juche Evangelism in Africa

From the early 1970s to the late 1980s, the North Korean leadership actively exported the Juche ideology to Africa. Many African leaders, officials, and intellectuals briefly experimented with Juche but most became disillusioned with the ideology since it primarily consisted of humanistic bromides and was largely devoid of any practical advice for Third World development.[38] The

exportation of Juche to Africa was intended to raise the stature of Kim Il Sung internationally and domestically rather than offer guidelines to rapid, postcolonial development. The exportation of this vague, unhelpful ideology to Africa provided fodder for Pyongyang's propaganda apparatus and evidence that the rest of the developing world admired the "Great Leader" Kim Il Sung and his success in creating a postcolonial, socialist utopia. This section explores the ways in which Pyongyang viewed Africa as a land ripe for its propaganda.

Some African leaders, officials, and intellectuals who traveled to North Korea in the 1970s publicly praised Juche despite the hollowness of the ideology. Moges Wolde-Michael, the chairman of the Economic Committee of the Ethiopian Provisional Military Administrative Council, "praised the chuch'e idea that had enabled the DPRK to perform miracles, 'which is attributable to the genial guidance of President Kim Il Sung, the great and excellent leader, and to the diligent work of the Korean people.'"[39] Spotlighted in a North Korean cultural magazine, one Cameroonian professor even wrote his doctoral dissertation on Juche and its application to Africa. The professor explained that the purpose of this work "was to adopt measures to embody the Juche philosophy in Africa and thus have it disseminated widely and taught at African universities and in the African intellectual world so that intellectuals from African countries could have a deep understanding of the developed civilization of Korea in the East."[40] In 1978, the North Korean state media spotlighted Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana's trip to Pyongyang and said that similar "viewpoints" existed between the two countries based on their political ideologies of Juche and Umuganda, a Rwandan term meaning "coming together for a common purpose."[41] However, most African leaders, officials, and intellectuals were far more impressed with the DPRK's rapid, postcolonial development than the Juche ideology. During a 1976 visit to Pyongyang, the Malian head of state "called the achievements and experiences of the DPRK a model for the developing countries … [and] a section of the delegation specifically studied the structure of the Korean Workers' Party and the party's methods of operation."[42] Given the present day view of North Korea as a rogue state with a malnourished populace, it may seem absurd that the DPRK could ever have been conceived as an admirable model of development. However, up until the late 1970s, North Korea was more prosperous than South Korea.[43]

While the DPRK's economy appeared commendable in the 1970s, African leaders and officials would often complain about North Korea's aggressiveness in pushing Juche and the inapplicability of applying the North Korea's postcolonial experience to the unique conditions of Africa. Seen as a radical economic policy advocating self-reliance, Juche appeared vague, unsuitable, and even backwards to some African leaders and officials. Kenyan minister Tom Mboya said at a Pan-African Conference in the 1970s, "I accept the slogan of self-reliance. The man in the bush has always been self-reliant and that is the reason why he is still in the bush."[44]

Clearly, North Korea's efforts to position Juche alongside Maoism and Leninism as a universal revolutionary ideology did not take place. Many African leaders and officials saw the ideology as a shallow, superficial doctrine meant to bolster North Korea's domestic propaganda.

In the 1970s, North Korea set up numerous Juche study groups and research institutes across Africa. The North Korean government also published its propaganda in African newspapers, which frustrated South Korean and American embassies. According to the American embassy in Conakry, Guinea, North Korean diplomats actively disseminated propaganda materials to the Guinean news media, which frequently "echoed" North Korean propaganda.[45] On Kim Il Sung's 56th birthday, a film on his life was shown at a Chinese-built theater in Bamako, Mali where about 70 Malians, mainly children, watched the film. After the film, the Malian Minister of Justice and Labor published an article in the state-owned newspaper, *L'Essor*, which denounced American imperialism and praised the revolutionary exploits of Kim Il Sung. In addition, a large North Korean propaganda sign appeared outside a state-owned library in Bamako, which depicted Kim Il Sung as a great statesman and anti-imperialist fighter.[46] While North Korea's propaganda offensive may have been a failure, it is worthwhile to note that Juche study groups in Africa were not simply made up by the North Korean state media in order to highlight the greatness of Kim Il Sung's ideology. These groups did, in fact, exist and Pyongyang widely disseminated its propaganda across Africa in order to gain more admirers.[47] In March 1970, the American embassy in Lusaka even complained to Zambian officials that the dissemination of North Korean propaganda in the country needed to be stopped since it contained anti-American statements.[48] In that same month, five North Korean journalists traveled to Addis Ababa to distribute North Korean propaganda and possibly make plans with Ethiopian officials to open a press office in the capital city. Notified by the South Korean embassy, the American embassy worried that the North Koreans would distribute handouts and pamphlets to "students and other dissident elements."[49] In the 1960s and 1970s, South Korean and American officials worried about North Korea's ideological appeal to young Africans eager to develop their newly independent nations.

Although Juche study groups in Africa were often quite small and marginal, Pyongyang expounded that Juche was clearly taking hold in Africa. As Andrei Lankov explains, these "entrepreneurial activists" gladly took North Korea's money but lacked political clout in their home countries; their devotion to the teachings of the "Great Leader" was suspect.[50] At a 1983 conference on education and culture in the Non-Aligned Movement, the Cuban delegation complained that the North Koreans "forcefully pressured the guests to place the adulation of the 'all-encompassing wise leadership' of Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and the acceptance of the 'international applicability of the chuch'e [idea],' in the focus of their presentations and utterances."[51] According to the Hungarian archival document, many of the

African delegations obliged and spoke about the greatness of Juche and the Kim family regime. The Cubans said that the Koreans conducted "effective bribery" with the Africans.[52] When North Korea's economy collapsed in the mid-1990s, the checks from Pyongyang stopped coming and many of these "converts" in Africa abandoned the Juche ideology.

The North Korean funding of supposed African Juche adherents suggests that it was not important to the North Korean propaganda apparatus if any countries were actually applying the ideas of Kim Il Sung to their situation. For domestic propaganda, what was far more important was the notion that the outside world saw Kim Il Sung as a global leader in the anti-imperialist movement. This may explain the placement of full-page advertisements touting the exploits of "the Respected and Beloved Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung," the *Juche* ideology, and the "independent, peaceful reunification of Korea" in major Western newspapers, such as *The New York Times* and *Washington Post*, in the 1970s and 1980s.[53] Despite being paid for by the North Korean government, North Korean state-media reported these ads as evidence that even progressive people in the capitalist West followed the wise teachings of Kim Il Sung. Adrian Buzo explains that "an unsophisticated, isolated population may well have come to believe that Kim Il Sung had become a major international statesman—as perhaps did an unsophisticated, isolated leader who allowed such practices to continue."[54] North Korea's global publicity campaign was not a worthless endeavor since it supported the domestic propaganda apparatus' depiction of Kim Il Sung as a world-renowned theorist and leader.[55]

The South Korean economy eclipsed the North's in the late 1970s and went on to become the world's fifteenth strongest economy.[56] Thus, it comes as no surprise that the North Korean model of development never took off in Africa and Pyongyang never became an ideological center of the Third World. As Jon Halliday aptly explains in a 1981 article on world development, "The DPRK is hardly a model for other countries" and "volumes on Juche and the texts of Kim are not priority items in planning ministries or bibliographies on world development."[57]

African Students in North Korea

As part of North Korea's Third World diplomacy campaign in the 1980s, select African students were invited to the DPRK to study for free. In exchange for diplomatic recognition, the North Korean leadership would allow African governments to send several students to the DPRK to study medicine, agronomy, and of course Juche ideology. In the 1980s, approximately 200 students from Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, Madagascar, Zambia, Lesotho, Mali, and Ethiopia were selected by their respective governments to study in North Korea. The students were dispersed to different schools and universities depending on their field of study. Those studying medicine went to North Korea's second largest city, Hamhung, while many more

studied agronomy in the coastal city of Wonsan. Pyongyang also hosted a number of African students.[58] Through the experiences of three African students, this section investigates the lives of African students studying in the DPRK and the struggles these students endured while living in one of the most xenophobic and isolated societies on the planet. The racism that African students experienced while studying in the DPRK was based on individual experiences and interactions rather than official state policy. This echoes the racism that African students experienced while studying in other socialist countries, such as the Soviet Union and China.[59]

According to Aliou Niane, a Guinean who studied at Wonsan agricultural university from 1982 to 1987:

> I was one of the first and last 10 students to be sent to North Korea by the Guinean government in the 80s. The communist government in Guinea had a close relationship with North Korea. For one thing, North Koreans built some residential villas for the Guinean government and received the UN vote in return.[60]

Niane felt that he was a pawn in the diplomatic game between the two communist governments. Andrew Holloway, a British citizen who worked in Pyongyang from 1987 to 1988 translating articles for *The Pyongyang Times*, devoted a section in his memoir to foreign students studying in the DPRK. He wrote, "I doubt if the average Soviet dissident exiled to Siberia for a few years suffers more at the hands of his government than these good-natured, fun-loving young men who had had to sacrifice some of the best years of their lives in the interests of promoting international friendship."[61]

Another African student in North Korea, Monique Macias, came from Equatorial Guinea where her father, Francisco Macias Nguema, ruled the country with an iron fist from 1968 until he was overthrown and executed in 1979. Kim Il Sung developed a close relationship with Nguema who allowed Monique and her sister, Mary-Bell, to stay in his personal mansion and study in Pyongyang. He also offered medical care to Monique's mother who suffered from gallstones. When news reached Kim Il Sung that Nguema had been overthrown, he advised the family to stay in Pyongyang. Monique's mother refused and went back to Guinea to check on her son. Meanwhile, Monique and Mary-Bell stayed in Pyongyang and went on to study at Mangyongdae Military Boarding School. Monique would live and study in Pyongyang for the next fourteen years.[62]

The African students struggled to make friends with the North Koreans and were not allowed to date. In fact, the "liberal ways" of female African students offended North Koreans so much that they had to be recalled back to their home countries.[63] Apart from Monique and her sister, most, if not all, African students in the DPRK were male. According to Holloway, "The one thing that

really got these chaps down, though, was not the monotony of life, the hard work, the lack of cash, the surveillance or the homesickness. It was the lack of sexual opportunity."[64] North Korean society's emphasis on maintaining pure racial lineages made sexual relations or marriage with foreigners nearly impossible. As Holloway noted, "The society is also nationalistic almost to the point of xenophobia. To have sex out of wedlock is very bad. To have sex with a foreigner is unspeakable."[65] In fact, the North Korean government publicly discouraged "mixed marriages" between North Koreans and foreigners in the mid-1960s. North Korean men that married Eastern European women were often expelled from the showcase capital city of Pyongyang to the provinces.[66] According to Niane, one of the Guinean students asked their North Korean advisor during their first week in North Korea whether they could date a Korean girl. The guides responded, "No, we make only Koreans. We have pure blood. Koreans can only love Koreans. Not even Chinese can love Koreans."[67] For five years, Niane was kept isolated from North Korean girls and could only talk to them under the shadow of the night. He never learned a single North Korean girl's name. North Korean society's emphasis on maintaining pure racial bloodlines significantly influenced the lives of African students studying in the DPRK and made it much harder for these students to live "normal" lives.

The DPRK's wariness of foreigners extended into the medical field as well. North Korea prides itself on pure bloodlines and even reported during the international AIDS epidemic in the early 1990s that the disease did not exist in the DPRK due to the absence of "unsanitary treatment and decadent socio-moral life." The report proclaimed that North Korean agricultural workers who had returned from the lion's den of the AIDS epidemic, Africa, were not infected. The report added, "Our government strictly forbids the import of blood."[68] Monique Macias recalls an incident in the 1980s when a member of the Nigerian embassy in Pyongyang got the measles and the illness soon spread to many of the foreign students. The North Korean government took extreme precautions to insure that the disease would not spread to "the cleanest race": the North Korean people. Thus, the North Koreans quarantined the hotel where many of the students lived. Macias explains, "Kim Il Sung claimed he had made the DPRK a clean country without epidemics and that was true, at least after the war. So a widespread outbreak of an infectious disease was something new to the North Koreans."[69]

North Korean stereotypes of Africans as less intelligent, dirty, and sexually aggressive crept into the ways these students were treated on a daily basis. Niane recalls one of his North Korean professors berating the Korean students for not performing better than the African students. Niane explains, "The professor reminded the students that Kim Il Sung provided many advantages to them and that they were dishonoring him by doing worse than the Africans."[70] Macias remembers that racism become fully apparent during her university days when North Korean students "thought all black people were poor and smelt bad, and I was treated badly by

some students as a result."[71] African and North Korean students ate at separate dining facilities.[72] The North Korean government also worried about the perceived sexual aggressiveness of foreigners. Thus, they avoided assigning female interpreters to foreigners. As Holloway explains, "The Koreans did not like to expose their women's purity to unnecessary danger."[73] Those North Korean female students who were caught having relations with African males were often expelled from university and never seen again.[74]

North Korean university employees and Party members simply did not trust the African students. Yoseph Teklemariam, an Ethiopian student who lived in Pyongyang in the late 1980s while his mother worked as a UN official, recalls their maid spying on his family.[75] Niane remembers being "under supervision at all times by a party member and a person responsible for our daily activities and sometimes an administrative clerk of the university. We also see people coming from Pyongyang to observe us."[76] Niane said that conversations with these "spies" were often quite dull as they just repeated the same mantras about the greatness of the Kim family and the Juche ideology. After growing frustrated with the lack of clean water at Wonsan agricultural university, Niane and a group of 50 African students protested and decided to march 100 miles to Pyongyang. The North Korean military stopped them soon after the march began. The North Korean state did not want the rebellious nature of the African students to appeal to the locals. The protest was a success and the Africans were given bottled water. However, the message was clear to the North Korean people: "Don't do what the Africans did."[77]

North Korean officials clearly worried about the ideological and racial frictions represented by the African students. However, theses students were also seen as a compulsory part of diplomatic relations with African governments. In other words, the African students were a necessary nuisance to the leadership in Pyongyang who saw them as part of the broader goal of acquiring international recognition as the legitimate Korean government. Many of these African students were eager to return home at the end of their studies. Holloway recalls on New Years' Day chatting with African students who spoke about how long they had been in the DPRK and how much longer they needed to stay. Holloway said they "talked like prisoners discussing their sentences."[78]

Conclusion

In a 1993 article in the *New Left Review*, Gavan McCormack accurately sums up North Korea's diplomatic efforts in the Third World. He says, "It is ironic that a regime which adopted Chuche (or independence) as its slogan, should have devoted so much of its diplomatic effort abroad to the promotion of sycophancy and flunkeyism."[79] As McCormack explains, the "leader-exaltation principle" of the North Koreans certainly appealed to right-wing dictators, such as Jean Bedel Bokassa. On the other hand, North Korea's independent industrialization and postcolonial

reconstruction were attractive to left-leaning regimes in Africa.[80] Nonetheless, North Korea's efforts to establish itself as an "African power" ultimately failed. Kim Il Sung's works were never memorized by African schoolchildren nor did Juche become the dominant doctrine of African governments. After South Korea's economy surpassed North Korea's in the late 1970s, African nations became less interested in the North Korean model of socialist modernity.

However, North Korea's presence on the African continent can still be felt today. Pouring salt on the wound, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe hired North Korean artists in 2010 to build a statue of Joshua Nkomo in Bulawayo, the largest city in Matabeleland. The statue has North Korean features, with the body oddly resembling that of Kim Il Sung.[81] In true authoritarian fashion, Mugabe used North Korean sculptors to remind ZAPU supporters that he was still in charge and revive the grim memory of the Matabeleland Massacre. In addition to Zimbabwe, North Korean artists have built statues and monuments in seven other African countries.[82] Meghan Kirkwood explains that the use of North Korean artists in Africa represents "a decisive break with architecture and memorials associated with colonial regimes, and in doing so foregrounds the authority and modernity of the postcolonial government."[83] In another effort to earn much needed hard currency, the North Korean government has also dabbled in illegal ivory trafficking. Since the 1980s, North Korean diplomats have been caught at least nine different times carrying large amounts of ivory and rhino horn from Africa to Asia.[84] While seen as a pariah state in much of the world, Pyongyang still maintains close relations with many African nations. Recently, the DPRK's titular head of state Kim Yong-nam visited with several East African leaders, including Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni.[85] In spite of its isolation on other fronts, North Korea will most likely continue to play a role in Africa.

Acknowledgements

Notes

[1] This paper will use the term "Third World" in the sense used by historian Vijay Prashad. Prashad explains, that the Third World was not a place but a global project that advocated independence, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and an alternative model to capitalist modernity. See Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: New Press, 2008), 41.

[2] According to Suzy Kim, "socialist modernity was a direct response to the limits of capitalist modernity. It attempted to realize more fully the emancipatory potential of modernity, not by faith in the 'invisible hand" of capitalism but by purposeful planning in service of collective social need over individual profit." See Suzy Kim, *Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 4.

[3] Charles Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2013), 168-207.

[4] Using interviews with Ethiopians who worked closely with North Korean military advisors, engineers, and agricultural specialists, Armstrong briefly looks at North Korea's on-the-ground efforts to help rebuild the capital of Addis Ababa into a "socialist" city via monuments, the staging of parades, the rebuilding of the sewage system, and military assistance during the Ethiopian-Somali War of 1977–1978. See Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak*, 195–197.

[5] Balazs Szalontai, "Political and Economic Relations Between Communist States," in Stephen Anthony Smith, ed., *Oxford Handbook in the History of Communism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 317.

[6] Bruce Bechtol, *The Last Days of Kim Jong-il: The North Korean Threat in a Changing Era* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books 2013), 137.

[7] Clyde Haberman, "North Korea Reported to Step Up Arms Sales and Training Abroad," *New York Times* (November 29, 1983), A1.

[8] David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), x–xi.

[9] Howard W. French's recent book on Sino-African relations specifically looks at China's emerging economic and cultural influence on Africa and the millions of Chinese who moved there for new economic opportunities. See Howard W. French, *China's Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).

[10] "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations," United Nations General Assembly Session 26, Resolution 2758 (October 25, 1971) http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2758(XXVI).

[11] Charles K. Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the Modern World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 6.

[12] Ibid, 197.

[13] Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Cuba, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); *Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013).

[14] Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 10.

[15] "Interview: Meet Ko Young-hwan, the first diplomat who escaped North Korea," *New Focus International* (August 22, 2014), http://newfocusintl.com/ko-young-hwan-unification-preparatory-committee-member/.

[16] Kim Il Sung, *Selected Works*, vol. 40, (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1995), 117–144.

[17] Byung-Chul Koh, *The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 11; Erik Cornell, *North Korea Under Communism: Report of an Envoy to Paradise* (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 25.

[18] Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 187, 477 n.76.

[19] The ceremony was one-quarter of the country's annual budget. See Brian Titley, *Dark Age: The Political Odyssey of Emperor Bokassa* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), 91.

[20] Department of State telegram from American embassy in Bangui, Central African Republic, "GOCAR and Korea," (September 10, 1969) National Archives RG 259, Stack 150, Row 64–65, Compartment 12, General Records of the State Department, 1967–1969, Central Foreign Policy Files, Box 2263, Pol KOR N-Afr 1/1/67. I would like to thank Chuck Kraus for sharing these "Central Foreign Policy Files" with me.

[21] "Kim-Bokassa Joint Communique of May 2, 1978," *North Korea Quarterly*, vol. 5, no. 2 (1978) cited in Jon Halliday, "The North Korean Model: Gaps and Questions," *World Development*, vol. 9, no. 9/10 (1981), 899, n.65.

[22] Titley, *Dark Age*, 102.

[23] "Telegram 066.793 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs," (July 17, 1978) *North Korea International Documentation Project*, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116497.

[24] Titley, *Dark Age*, 209.

[25] Ibid, 105–126.

[26] Cornell, *North Korea Under Communism*, 44.

[27] Ibid, 79.

[28] Telegram from the American embassy in Lagos to the Department of State, "Kim Il Sung in Ibadan Press," (May 11, 1973), National Archives RG 59, Stack 150, Row 66–67, General Records of the State Department, 1970–1973, Central Foreign Policy Files, Box 2422, Folder Pol KOR N- KUW 3/4/71.

[29] "Interview: Meet Ko Young-hwan, the first diplomat who escaped North Korea," *New Focus International* (August 22, 2014), http://newfocusintl.com/ko-young-hwan-unification-preparatory-committee-member/.

[30] R.W. Johnson, "Pyongyang's man in Harare," *National Post* (August 11, 2007), http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=038f108a-cc44-4e85-a25f-c32c16736b3e.

[31] The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, *Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands*, *1980–1988*, (Harare Zimbabwe: Africa Synod House, 1997), 45.

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[33] The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, *Breaking the Silence,* 1–261.

[34] Nack An and Rose An, "North Korean Military Assistance," in John F. Cooper and Daniel S. Papp, eds., *Communist Nations' Military Assistance* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 172–173.

[35] Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK Report, "Military cooperation between Uganda and North Korea," (July 10, 1975), MOL, XIX-J-1-j Uganda, 1975, 135. doboz, 156–4, 004629/1975. Translated and obtained by Balazs Szalontai. I thank Balazs for sharing these materials with the author.

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[37] Ibid, 2–3.

[38] Post-1972 North Korean literature on Juche is "a stodgy jumble of banalities." B.R. Myers has argued that the true ideology of North Korea is race-based, paranoid nationalism. See B.R. Myers, *The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters* (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House Publishing, 2010), 45–47.

[39] Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK Report, "Visit of an Ethiopian government delegation in the DPRK," (April 28, 1976) MOL, XIX-J-1-j Ethiopia, 1976, 52. doboz, 41–1, 003195/1976. Translated and obtained by Balazs Szalontai.

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[41] "Rwanda President Speech's at Pyongyang banquet for Kim Il Sung," (June 16, 1978) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

[42] Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK Telegram, "Visit of the president of Mali in the DPRK," (June 2, 1976) MOL, XIX-J-1-j Mali, 1976, 94. doboz, 97–1, 003704/1976. Translated and obtained by Balazs Szalontai.

[43] Bruce Cumings, *North Korea: Another Country* (New York: The New Press, 2004), viii–ix, 134–135.

[44] Cornell, *North Korea Under Communism*, 45.

[45] Department of State telegram from American embassy in Conakry, Guinea, "Activities of North Korean embassy in Guinea," (July 24, 1967) National Archives RG 259, Stack 150, Row 64–65, Compartment 12, General Records of the State Department, 1967–1969, Central Foreign Policy Files, Box 2263, Pol KOR N-Afr 1/1/67.

[46] Ibid.

[47] The Preparatory Committee of the Pan-African Seminar on the Juche Idea by Comrade Kim Il Sung, *Documents and Deliberations of the Seminar* (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Talia, 1973), 1–182.

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[50] Andrei Lankov, *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 57.

[51] Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK Ciphered Telegram, "Conference of the ministers of education and culture of the Non-Aligned Movement in Pyongyang," (August 15, 1983) MOL, XIX-J-1-j Non-Aligned Movement, 1983, 130. doboz, 209–7, 005155/1983. Translated and obtained by Balazs Szalontai.

[52] "Conference of the ministers of education and culture of the Non-Aligned Movement in Pyongyang," (August 15, 1983). Translated and obtained by Balazs Szalontai.

[53] For examples of these ads, see "All Efforts to Attain The Goal of Eight Million Tons of Grain," *New York Times* (March 2, 1975), Display Ad 778; "Korea Has Given Birth to One More Great Hero," *New York Times* (October 8, 1985), Display Ad 11.

[54] Adrian Buzo, *The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 265. Chang Ki-Hong, a North Korean laborer who worked at a timber camp in Russia, said, "We are taught that the whole world worships Kim Il Sung. I met Russians who made fun of this Kim worship, and then I realized that he was not in fact worshipped by the whole world." See Bradley K. Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004), 406.

[55] Lankov, *The Real North Korea*, 57.

[56] "Korea's global GDP ranking stuck in 15th place," *Yonhap News* (September 25, 2013), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2013/09/25/47/0502000000AEN20130925001900320F.html.

[57] Halliday, "The North Korean Model," *World Development*, 899.

[58] Andrew Holloway, *A Year in Pyongyang* (2011), http://www.aidanfc.net/a_year_in_pyongyang_p.html.

[59] For an example of racism towards African students in the Soviet Union, see Julie Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the Cold War," *Cahiers Du Monde Russe*, vol. 47, no. 1–2 (January-June 2006), 33–64. For an example of racism towards African students in China, see John Emmanuel Hevi, *An African Student in China* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966); Phillip Hsiaoping Liu, "Petty Annoyances?: Revisiting John Emmanuel Hevi's An African Student in China after 50 years," *China: An International Journal*, vol. 11, no. 1 (2013), 131–145.

[60] Benjamin R. Young, "One African Man's North Korean Juche Adventure," *NK News* (March 7, 2013), http://www.nknews.org/2013/03/one-african-mans-north-korean-juche-adventure/.

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[62] Monique Macias, "How I unintentionally ended up spending 15 years of my life in North Korea," *NK News* (February 21, 2014), http://www.nknews.org/2014/02/how-i-unintentionally-ended-up-spending-15-years-of-my-life-in-north-korea/.

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[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid..

[66] Balazs Szalontai, "'You Have No Political Line of Your Own': Kim Il Sung and the Soviets, 1953-1964," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* Issue 14/15 (Winter 2003/Spring 2004), 98, 131.

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[71] Monique Macias, "Mixing with the Cleanest Race: My upbringing in North Korea," *NK News* (February 28, 2014), http://www.nknews.org/2014/02/mixing-with-the-cleanest-race-my-upbringing-in-north-korea/.

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[73] Holloway, *A Year in Pyongyang* (2011), http://www.aidanfc.net/a_year_in_pyongyang_p.html.

[74] Ibid.

[75] However, Teklemariam also remembers Pyongyang as a "safe" city which had a "small, tight knit foreigner community." See Benjamin R. Young, "Jamaican Bobsleigh? No, Ethiopian Ski Team!" *Reuters* (February 15, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/15/us-olympics-alpineskiing-ethiopia-idUSBREA1E06T20140215.

[76] Benjamin R. Young, "One African Man's North Korean Juche Adventure," *NK News* (March 7, 2013), http://www.nknews.org/2013/03/one-african-mans-north-korean-juche-adventure/.

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[78] Holloway, *A Year in Pyongyang* (2011), http://www.aidanfc.net/a_year_in_pyongyang_p.html.

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[82] Meghan Laurel Elizabeth Kirkwood, *Postcolonial Architecture Through North Korean Modes: Namibian Commissions of the Mansudae Overseas Project* (University of Kansas Master's Thesis in the History of Art, 2011), iii.

[83] Kirkwood, *Postcolonial Architecture Through North Korean Modes*, iii.

[84] Sheena Chestnut Greitens, *Illicit: North Korea's Evolving Operations to Earn Hard Currency* (Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2014), 31-32.

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North Korean Pomiculture 1958–1967:
Pragmatism And Revolution

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animal/creaturely geographies of North Korea.

Abstract

Building on past analysis by its author of North Korea's history of developmental approach and
environmental engagement, this paper encounters the field of pomiculture (or orchard
development and apple farming) in the light of another key text authored by Kim Il-sung, 1963's
"Let Us Make Better Use of Mountains and Rivers." At this time North Korea had left the tasks
of immediate agricultural and industrial reconstruction following the Korean War (1950–1953)
behind and was engaged in an intense period of political and ideological triangulation with the
great powers of the Communist/Socialist bloc. With relations between the People's Republic of
China and the Soviet Union in flux and Chairman Mao's development and articulation of the
"Great Leap Forward," North Korea was caught in difficult ideological, developmental and
diplomatic crosswinds. Utilising narratives of development in the pomicultural sector and
accompanying political literature as exemplars, this paper considers Pyongyang's negotiation of
this flux as expressed in these developmental terms. Amongst the orchards of Chagang province,
ultimately the paper uncovers elements of reflexivity, pragmatism and charismatic political
articulation that will be familiar to the contemporary analyst of North Korean matters.

Key words: North Korea, Kim Il-sung, Agriculture, Development Narratives, Pomiculture,
               Pragmatism, Political Charisma

North Korean Pomiculture 1958–1967:
Pragmatism and Revolution

Robert Winstanley-Chesters

The apple orchards at the foot of Chol Pass clearly prove before the world and history the validity of Songun and truth that it is quite possible to bring the people a happy life if the capability for self-defence is bolstered up, no matter how undisguised the imperialists may become in their moves for aggression.
—Rodong Sinmun, 2 January 2015[1]

In his 2015 New Year's Speech, the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un laid out a typically broad and extensive agenda for institutional, economic, and ideological development. Kim touched upon many of the country's licit economic methods and strategies, including heavy industry, the role of the military in construction, and a focus on agricultural production. There was also a discernible emphasis on fruit: specifically, the speech indicated that the production of fruits, nuts, and fungus are important to the North Korea of Kim Jong-un for other reasons than simple supply of internal food demand; there exists a potential for economic exchange and export.

In our contemporary era in which North Korea is devoid of Cold War-era support and is forced for much of its economic and financial capacity to engage, even unwillingly, with external and capital-focused markets, it is vital to pay heed to the country's attempts to create products for possible export. However as is the case with much of North Korea's developmental approach, there is little new under the Sun, and the development of fruit production and resource has a very long history, deeply connected to Pyongyang's institutional structures and political focus. Within this paper I will present a historical narrative and analysis of the development of projects within the realm of forest-sited pomiculture between 1961 and 1967, a period situated after the immediate postwar efforts at agricultural and industrial reconstruction of the prior decade.

The new era of the 1960s found North Korea engaged in an intense period of political and ideological triangulation, with relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union in flux, and the development of Chairman Mao's policy of rapid revolutionary industrialisation through the "Great Leap Forward" posing myriad challenges.

Pyongyang was caught in an ideological and diplomatic fix. Having initially sided politically with Mao and the PRC, it was then forced to "tack" ideologically into the wind of Maoist ideological development, but to do so at far enough remove to witness the developing policy failures which would result in wide-scale famine within China.[2] North Korea's response to the ensuing difficulties in Chinese agricultural and forestry policy was one which re-imagined the productive

potential of forest resources and developed a more practical policy strategy focusing on the economic potential of non-timber resources in forest spaces.

Specifically, North Korea developed projects and produced strategies which revolved around what was called "revolutionary pomiculture" and "revolutionary silviculture." These strategies envisaged forests and wooded areas as areas whose focus was the development of agricultural and economic capacity through the husbandry of a multiplicity of plant and tree species. These projects, while anticipating later arable agricultural practice within North Korea of double- or triple-cropping, also mirrored North Korea's post-Cold War tendency to exploit any opportunity for potential foreign exchange earning, through the tailoring of forestry development towards the production of exportable, saleable goods. North Korean policy and ideology surrounding this distinct period and policy area is in need of deeper investigation for historical reasons, but it is also important to recognize the salience of the data for themes and issues relating to North Korea's contemporary industrial or agricultural development.

For institutions within North Korea, the 1950s had been an decade of enormous destruction followed by rapid and wide-ranging (re)construction. As has been widely remarked, the war of 1950 to 1953 reduced much of the urban and industrial infrastructure of the Korean peninsula to rubble. The war had also devastated much of North Korea's rural environment. Thus a requirement for rehabilitative forestry was a key element of the immediate period of post-war reconstruction, roughly corresponding to the years between 1953 and 1957. Classical centrally organised economic planning of the type seen in the Soviet Union and the PRC was not revived until 1957 with the First Five Year Plan. This planning period, which was to have run from 1957 to 1961, focused primarily on rapid economic development and the mechanisation of the industrial sector, influenced heavily by developing Maoist industrial ideology.

Within the forestry sector much of the focus and drive of reconstruction dissipated during the period. That is not to say that we can decipher no forestry or pomicultural progress then *per se*, but rather that much of the policy direction during this time dictated by central government institutions was focused within two areas.

Firstly the need for institutional capacity building in order to control and structure project development was addressed and by the incorporation of "tree planting teams" into the structure of local industrial or agricultural organisations.[3] These on-the-ground teams would be governed and directed by a Forestry Development Department which was itself embedded within the key local political institution, the People's Committee. These Forestry Development Departments would then "appoint forestry instructors to the county people's committees" as well as move to establish a system of what were termed "officially commending institutions, enterprises and individuals who are exemplary in this work."[4]

Secondly, forestry (or pomiculture) was to be regarded as existing within the wider umbrella of ideological development, also including the incorporation of Maoist "mass-line" strategies into forestry and afforestation practice. However, unlike Maoist China, Kim Il-sung and North Korea regarded at this time some elements of institutional policy practice as exempt from such urgent ideology. For example, while tree planting "should be carried out as a mass movement," there were spaces in which it was simply not practical to undertake work inspired by the mass line. Wild or remote environs were in the forestry sector to be the responsibility of "afforestation stations," within which workers were to "assume responsibility for planting trees mainly in uninhabited mountain areas, located beyond the reach of agricultural cooperatives."[5] Whereas Mao was reliant on massive mobilized unskilled labor to move his proverbial mountain, in North Korea there was more skepticism about the powers of the non-mechanized masses.

It must not be forgotten however, that some of the policy directions later followed by North Korea within the pomicultural sector are also first mentioned and theorised within this era. The development of some hundred thousand hectares of orchards, and trees from which nuts and fruits could be harvested and oil or other products could be extracted.[6] These examples were referenced as the focus of a key policy document of the time, 1959's "On Some Immediate Tasks in Socialist Economic Construction," a text which points to a future in which this simple reconstructive developmental paradigm in the forestry project is superseded by a multifunctional strategy with a wider repertoire of policy output.

Although North Korean texts and sources insist that the result of such planned output was the completion of the First Five Year Plan one year early, analysts such as Kim[7] hold that in fact the rapid and wide scale goal setting, along with the action of the Chollima Movement (천리마운동 / 千里馬運動) and other influences from Great Leap Forward era Maoism, destabilised industrial sectors. North Korean industry thus experienced extenuating differences in supply and output, as well as labour shortages. Perhaps hinting at some of this disruption and in order to address imbalances springing from them, 1960 was described within North Korea as a "year of adjustment." This adjustment however, was either successful or overtaken by events as it was followed at the end of 1960 by a new Seven Year Plan slated to run from 1961 to 1967.[8] This plan focused heavily on the development of heavy industry, especially the production of machine tools and on the embedding of the Chollima movement within the industrial economic framework. Forestry management and the place of pomiculture within that management is regarded as key to the agricultural elements of the plan.

Within the 1960 document introducing the plan, Kim Il-sung used projects within South Pyong'an province as exemplars, especially those projects related to the development of orchards

and their place in the achievement of new production capacity. Noting that North Koreans were "struggling for the future," endeavouring to build communist society which would be "handed down to the coming generations," Kim linked the production of orchards to the new historical moment:

> We are creating everything from scratch in our time … This is the only way
> we can be as well off as other peoples and hand over a rich and powerful
> country to the new generation. If we plant many orchards, our people will
> become happier in seven or eight years…[9]

South Pyong'an was set heavy targets for orchard development and apple production. As he tended to do, Kim Il-sung set a high explicit target, as well as the expectation that it would soon be overtaken. "I think that South Pyongan Province will be able to plant some 50,000 chongbo of new apple orchards. If this province creates 30,000 chongbo of orchards, and this at a moderate estimate, it will harvest 300,000 tonnes of apples in seven to eight years..."[10] South Hamgyong Province was similarly instructed to created 30,000 chongbo of orchards, but not only of apples. Instead, in South Hamgyong, apples were recommended to be cultivated along with pears, peaches, apricots, and grapes. Kim Il-sung further recommended that "many forests of economic value" be planted in the industrial province, which would be "in keeping with the Party policy on making good use of mountains."[11]

These initial statements from Kim Il-sung on the place of pomiculture within the field of forestry and agricultural development set the scene and the nature of future policy and ideological development so far as forestry is concerned. Forestry and timber policy as is recognisable from North Korean political literature in our current era, was to connect to Pyongyang's wider economic rational. Forestry would have to be embedded within revolutionary politics and institutional structures, as multi-faceted and flexible in development as possible and ultimately as economically useful and productive as could be asserted or hoped for . However, these statements precede what can be regarded as the foundational event for pomiculture. Before analysing the key document of 1961, it is perhaps worth pausing to note the importance of pomicultural events within North Korea and within its more general ideological structures and conceptions.

Scholars of the economic development of either the Maoist era of the PRC or the Stalinist era of the Soviet Union will be familiar with the concept of revolutionary models. Within the Soviet context, revolutionary modelling tended to settle on the personage of a designated heroic individual, such as Alexey Stakhanov, whereas within the Chinese context productive heroism was often achieved on a geographic locale such as Dazhai village in Xiyang county (famed as the collective progenitor of "Dazhai speed" and described by Shapiro).[12] However, within the North

Korean context, revolutionary models take the form of what I have termed "foundational events."[13]

In the reclamation of tidal land for agricultural or industrial purposes, it is possible to identify foundational events as being respectively, the "Potong River Improvement Project" from 1946, and in general afforestation activity the climbing of Munsu Hill in 1947 by Kim Il-sung.[14] Such events serve to crystallize the importance of a given sector, ratifying the continuation of certain practices (in some cases dating back to the colonial period) and the beginning of others.[15] However, they also incorporate aspects of leadership (i.e. the more esoterically-located charismatic authority of the Great Leader), as well as practically marking the first instance of Kim Il-sung's attendance of a project within a particular industrial or agricultural sector. [16] Such instances include Kim's initial moment of "on the spot guidance" surrounding both the individual project and the wider sector in general (although not necessarily the initiation of the project itself, which may have been undertaken some time earlier). These projects, the event of Kim Il-sung's visitation of them, and the guidance given by him at the time, serve to establish a benchmark through which future examples of productive activity can be measured or judged, as well as encouragement to those involved given.

The fields of pomicuture and forestry received a foundational event in April 1961, with Kim Il-sung's essay "On Planting Orchards Through an All-People Movement," in which the experience of pomicultural development within Pukchong county (북청군/北靑郡) is recounted. At its core, the text is a recounting of a meeting at which successes in the county are discussed and their implications for nationwide institutional and policy development considered. However, at the meeting, many differing strands of policy development as well as revolutionary modelling are brought together and, as such, the meeting itself is the foundational event within the pomicultural sector. The meeting and the text recounting it served to shift the focus within the wider forestry sector towards a paradigm of maximum potential economic exploitability; they also asserted that forestry and pomiculture should be incorporated into both agricultural and industrial policy. Looking toward the future, the meeting and document indicated that forestry and pomiculture were key strands of food production and also regarded as an exercise themselves in the utilisation of North Korea's appropriation of Maoist "mass line" principles.

However two interesting and as yet unseen developments within this utilisation surround issues that are normally quite opaque within North Korean texts. Firstly within "On Planting Orchards," Kim acknowledges a limited policy failure surrounding the development of apple orchards, calling attention to "the error of laying exaggerated stress on apple growing alone."[17] The text then goes on to recount particular (though unnamed), examples, stating that "Quite a few counties...planted orchards on fertile fields and, worse still, some localities on the west coast

planted orchards in the flat land suitable for rice paddies."[18] Given the mountainous topography of North Korea, pomiculture and those tasked with its development could not rely on support and resources for its extension into into new and previously uncultivated areas. Quite often pomiculture in common with other elements of forest and timber resource would have to to compete with other agricultural needs.

In these difficulties we can find echoes of the chaos engendered across the Tumen river by the "backyard furnaces" policy, a Maoist contrivance which had spread throughout China and produced enormous amounts of unusable pig iron ore at very large environmental cost.[19] The ability to correct excesses was absolutely vital. However, interestingly, in 1961 Kim Il-sung negotiated the difficult terrain of potential policy failure by utilising the notion of the "revolutionary model" in order to demonstrate the change in policy direction necessary to correct unsuccessful elements. Identifying the county of Pukchong as the model and the site of the solution to the policy problem, Kim praised the locals as meritorious, "precisely [due to] the fact that they have put good orchards on the hillside unsuited to other crops." Having endorsed the local effect, Kim Il-sung took on the royal pronoun in expressing his desire that "the experience of Pukchong county in planting fine orchards on hillsides" should be imitated nationwide, or, as he put it, "by all the other counties of our country."[20]

The second fairly rare occurrence within this text arrives with Kim Il-sung's reference to another country's apparent success in following a policy similar to that of North Korea. Naturally, the success being enjoyed elsewhere in the socialist bloc was used as impetus to generate a level of urgency within Korea to drive further policy change. Kim Il-sung praised the planting some 80,000 chongbo of orchards on hillsides, saying that the country had accomplished much. However, he goes on to say that "80,000 chongbo is not so much when compared with Romania", which "not only has much more agricultural land than we do, but some 400,000 chongbo planted in fruit trees" and because North Korea has less rice paddies and dry fields, it should therefore endeavor to have "at least 300,000 to 400,000 chongbo planted in fruit trees."[21] Pukchong is recalled to this day as a foundational moment within DPRK economic development, the KCNA reported in April of 2011 the narrative line, reflecting the his place within North Korea's charismatic political mythology, that Kim Il Sung's acting as a result of this meeting "took measures to bring into full play the zeal of the agricultural working people, strengthen nationwide assistance to fruit farming and introduce machines and chemicals in fruit culture on a modern basis."[22]

With the Pukchong meeting established as the foundational event for pomicultural development during this period, goal orientated targets for production established and its incorporation into the wider agenda for multifunctional and economically generative forestry, the sector is firmly

connected within the continual ideological development which distinguishes North Korean ideological approaches of this period. Demands for quantitative achievement are soon coupled with demands for infrastructural and technical improvement so as to promote higher levels of future achievement. This can be seen within the 1963 document "On Developing the Successes Achieved in the Rural Economy." Here Kim Il-sung states that although "we have planted 120,000 chongbo of orchards in different parts of the country," those involved in pomicultural development still had to "establish an effective system of orchard management so as to improve fertilization and cultivation."[23] Within this document it is possible to distinguish a further widening of the multifunctional paradigm in the context of pomiculture, so as to extract or generate further productive gains from the land under cultivation:

> Different crops are cultivated in orchards so as to utilize the land more effectively … you should confine yourselves to cultivating beans or sweet potatoes in those orchards in which the trees are still young [and] radish, mustard, cabbage or other autumn vegetables in the orchards with mature trees…[24]

Moving beyond those local orchard spaces of Pukchong, this conception of multifunctional agricultural production would require greater and more extensive theoretical and practical articulation. In order to avoid tendencies among bureaucrats, technical specialists, arborealists and other connected workers to cultivate other productive crops randomly in order to increase production, further structures of institutional and political review would also be required. The arrival of such articulation and structures would, in retrospect, not be far away.

Famously the "Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country," published in *Rodong Sinmun* in February of 1964 and subject to extensive narrative focus in North Korea during their fiftieth anniversary in 2014, underpin much of North Korea's developmental approach within its Cold War history. The Theses certainly serve as an ideological benchmark for the wider agricultural sector during the planning period of the First Seven Year Plan. Although governing much of agricultural theory at the time and utilised much in the future ideological development of North Korea, as a sort of ideological foundational event, the Theses do not directly address the forestry or pomicultural sectors. Instead these sectors are regarded as part of the light industrial sector and not the agricultural.

However, the "Theses" do call for an agricultural and rural sector entirely centred on the three "Technological, Cultural and Ideological" revolutions. This call also echoes the drive for development and progressive movement in production capacity within the forestry and pomicultural sectors in "Let us Make Effective Use of Mountains and Rivers," a paper delivered in Chagang province some three months after the pronouncement of the Theses. This text heralds the development of a secondary strand of pomicultural development and is in a sense

another more abstract, foundational event in the policy field. Again the text separates forestry as a productive and agricultural practice from that of wider agricultural development: "Chagang Province has neither nor tideland to be reclaimed, and has only a small area of paddy fields … It would be very narrow and short sighted for Chagang Province to try to make its people well-off by relying on agriculture alone."[25] Afforestation and pomiculture themselves are not regarded by Kim Il-sung as having derived from a paradigm of conservation but from one intricately connected to economic and infrastructural productivity. As he states: "Using mountains does not mean only living by them. In order to use them fully it is necessary to create good forests of economic value before anything else."[26] This is something of a developmental challenge and one which will be achieved through a paradigm of multifunctional production. Although for Pukchong County the solution was centered around the development of orchards, for Chagang Province it is on the production of edible oils and other economically useful fruit. Noting the national difficulty of having limited acreage for planting, Kim Il-sung nevertheless called for "creating plantations of oil-bearing timbers" as a task which was "of great importance."[27]Accordingly those in working in the sector in Chagang are encouraged to plant black walnut trees, Korean pepper bushes, pine-nut trees, and apricots to enable the extraction of oils both edible and industrial, as well as the planting of vines, pears, and trees from which medicinal value might be extracted, extending economic productivity within forestry policy to a multiplicity of foci. North Korean pronouncements again up to relatively recent times denote a continued interest in developments recounted by this document, the Economic Forest Institute of North Korea for instance reporting in 2006 that "new species of oil-bearing trees" had recently been developed.[28]

This paper has been focused on a short period of time within the era of North Korea's First Seven Year Plan, one which was to come to an end in as difficult a set of circumstances as the First Five Plan had done in 1960. Although the plan was due for completion in 1967, it was extended by three years until 1970, and according to Chung [1972] its core goals were never reached. Despite North Korea's apparent difficulty in achieving the aims set by its planning and developmental system, the fields of forestry and pomiculture serve as, in this instance, a useful exemplar for the examination of specific elements of policy development within its institutions and bureaucratic structures. The paper has been able to introduce North Korea's historical approach to revolutionary modelling and the use of foundational events in the exposition and explanation of change within its developmental policy and ideology. The paper has also recounted examples of projects which demonstrate something of the reflexivity which appeared common within internal North Korea policy development of this period. This reflexivity is marked by an ability to apply particular, distinct, and local solutions and directions within a policy framework which still connects to wider ideological structures, in particular those connected to it charismatic political form. Hopefully the pragmatism which existed within North

Korean productive policy has been suggested, and in this context such a pragmatic sense is demonstrated by a possibly surprising focus on the maximisation of productive or economic capacity within the realm of pomiculture.

It has also been interesting to the note acknowledgements within contemporary internal North Korean documentation of difficulties in the application of policy direction and of the acknowledgement of success in foreign nations in particular policy fields: not something of which North Korea is widely understood as being capable. In the author's wider research on environmental management within North Korea, especially in the realms of hydrological engineering and forestry such themes of pragmatism, reflexivity and an approach towards policy and ideological direction and development that can be regarded as multi-functional are often encountered. These do not sit lightly with the classical academic narrative of North Korea as having been historically an ideological and developmental "basket-case," but perhaps in small way begin to explain why nearly 25 years after the collapse of its wider trading and supportive political bloc in 1991, North Korea has failed to collapse or implode as many assume.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

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[13] Winstanley-Chesters, Robert, *Environment, Politics and Ideology in North Korea: Landscape as Political Project*, (Lexington Pressm Lanham, MD, 2015), p.64.

[12] Recounted in the texts Kim Il-sung, **"**Encouraging address delivered at the ceremony for starting the Potong River Improvement Project", *Works*, Vol 2. (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, 1946); and Kim Il-sung, "Let Us Launch a Vigorous Tree Planting Movement Involving All the Masses", *Works*, Vol 3. (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, 1947).

[15] Record Group 242, the Captured North Korean Documents collection at the United States' National Archives and Public Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland contains a number of sources and documents which address forestry practice and resource in 1947. This collection, especially as it was collected from facilities external to Pyongyang could be utilized in the future to explore internal narratives at both ministerial levels and in other institutions and agencies.

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[18] Ibid.

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[22] KCNA.2011. Anniversary of Pukchong Enlarged Meeting Marked, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201104/news01/20110401-14ee.html.

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Book Reviews

Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism In Korea, 1876–1945. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. 500 pp. ISBN: 978-0674492028. £22.95.

Book review by Steven Denney, PhD Candidate at University of Toronto.

Jun Uchida's Brokers of Empire opens the discourse on a long forgotten or purposefully ignored group of individuals: Japanese colonial settlers. Uchida's focus on Japanese colonial settlers shines light on a world until now consigned to the archives. Her historical analysis looks past the (imperial) state to the cohort of Japanese who acted as interlocutors between metropole and colony. Uchida opens within the historical discourse on Japanese imperialism a concept normally reserved for postcolonial writers and critics such as Homi K. Bhabha and Samuel Rushdie: the "liminal space."

A liminal space is a space in-between; a grey zone where cultures, peoples, and ideas interact to create new, hybrid forms. By illuminating the liminality between metropole and colony, Uchida identifies the colonial space wherein Japanese and Korean cultures clashed and interacted to form unique composite identities and ideologies. The Japanese colonial settlers—a ragtag group of entrepreneurs, journalists, and the occasional vagabond—represented a group who were neither fully Japanese nor ethnic Korean, their collective identity falling somewhere between Tokyo and the Governor-General on one side and Koreans (both aristocrats and common person) on the other. As the bridge that connected metropole to colony, Japanese settlers are depicted by Uchida as the medium through which the interaction of culture and ideas took place. Uchida describes the Japanese settlers in Korea as "brokers" of the imperial mission. Through a combination of capitalist drive and Japanese nationalism, settlers sought to both advance their own cause and that of the Empire's. More importantly though, in their capacity as interpellators of colonial/imperial subjects [instruments of the imperial/state institution(s)], the brokers of empire produced in the colonial subjects an example of the hybrid ideology, par excellence. The confluence of traditional Korean roots with Japanese modernity produced the always-controversial "collaborator," the ghosts and children of who haunt Korean politics today.

Moreover, the hybrid ideology of the collaborator highlights the failure of doka sesaku (making Koreans like Japanese, i.e. assimilation) and isshi doujin (impartiality and equality for all)—two "official" policies of the Japanese empire towards its colonies (though, and as Uchida indicates throughout the book, invocations of these policies, by colonial authorities and influential settlers, was more political boilerplate than a reflection of genuine policy-advocacy).

The interaction between broker and colonial subject is best captured by Uchida in her retelling of the "compromise" between nationalists and doka seisaku (referred to in short as doka) supporters, the former represented by Song Chin-u and the latter by Shakuo Shunjo, both journalists writing during the colonial period. Through the medium of print journalism, one can see the emergence of an imagined (Korean) community, à la Benedict Anderson, and an answer to the question "can nationalism exist without a newspaper?"

In Chapter 4, "The Discourse on Korea and Koreans," Uchida identifies the liminal space between the brokers' mission to objectify the colonial other as imperial subject and the revulsion felt by many Koreans towards feelings of foreign subjugation. Though both were ardent defenders of one of two extremes [assimilation into the empire (Shunjo) or Korean national liberation (Song)], by way of an unexpected meeting and one-to-one conversation, both were able to reach, according to Uchida, some form of compromise. In other words: a colonial space was created through which pragmatic thinking could occur. Though several are identified by Uchida, one such collaborator that stands out is Korean aristocrat Pak Young-hyo.

Pak Young-ho (1861–1939) comes to the forefront at multiple points throughout the book. Appearing first in chapter four, Pak is associated with those intellectuals who view doka as both an impossible and degrading policy. Assimilation, according to Pak and his compatriots, was "'impossible,' given that the Korean people possessed an 'ineffaceable ethnic consciousness…' nurtured through 4,000 years of history" (p. 223)—a consciousness that was acutely realized in response to the imposition of an entirely different one.

Yet, this ineffaceable ethnic consciousness did not prevent figures like Pak from passing up an opportunity for profit and, in the process, pushing along a nascent industrialization in Korea. If the postcolonial-cum-deconstruction critique holds its weight here, then the colonial "liminal space" through which the settler-colonial subject "rapport" emerged can be interpreted as paving a genuine "third way." As has been noted elsewhere by scholars like political scientist Atuhl Kholi and Korean historian Carl Eckert, this third way was largely forged by business cooperation amongst the elite—a group to which Pak certainly belonged.

The point at which Pak, a dedicated pro-West and Japanophile enlightenment thinker, distinctively enters the scene is in the chapter "Industrializing The Peninsula" (Chapter 5). This chapter describes Japanese-Korean cooperation for means of economic development and industrialization, an effort which culminated in the Industrial Commission of 1921 under the guise of Governor-General Saito's pro-cooperation agenda.

Through Pak and other collaborators' efforts to push for cooperative development (albeit with a "Korean centeredness" approach), they were able to foment an "uneasy partnership between Korean and Japanese businessmen" from the metropole and within the settler community. Through "cooperative capitalist development," so-called settler lobbyist would work together with local Korean businessmen to foster what Uchida portrays as Korea's first industrial revolution, albeit limited and executed under the gaze of the Governor-General and the imperial government in Tokyo. (pp. 223–226)

Using Pak as a key figure in her colonial history, Uchida fails to portray him as the embodiment of the ultimate contradiction (i.e. utilizing cooperation with Japanese as a means of Korean advancement). Though it is certainly implied—Uchida recounts Pak's ascension to the Japanese House of Peers (p. 296) during the height of the Korean suffrage and self-rule movement—nowhere is it stated explicitly. In fact, much of Pak's history goes unmentioned, such as his central role in the Kapshin rebellion and other "progressive" efforts. Given Uchida's primary focus, that of colonial settlers, the omission was likely a conscious decision. More detailed histories of Pak were left for others to explore.

Sandra Fahy, Marching Through Suffering: Loss And Survival In North Korea. New York: Columbia University Press (2015). 240pps. ISBN: 978-0231171342. £27.50.

Reviewed by Darcie Draudt, research associate for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (US).

Of late, there has been an upsurge in popular monographs that detail North Korean defector narratives. The proliferation of these accounts, biographical and fictional, has fortunately led to increased awareness of the human rights plight facing North Koreans, but it has also noticeably enflamed naysayers who doubt the veracity of defector testimony. While the intent of anthropologist Sandra Fahy may not have been to combat these critiques per se, her rigorous qualitative study of defector narratives of the North Korean famine (or Arduous March, Gonan-ui haenggun) in the 1990s may serve to reinforce the import of defector narratives to better understand the lived experiences of North Koreans, or at least those who chose to leave the North and survived.

There is a dearth of ethnographic work about the North Korean famine experience. While there has been some work done in Korean-language academic literature, particularly on adaptation and North-South cultural tensions, English-language literature on the famine tends to be historical or policy-oriented. Now, a growing community of anthropologists and sociologists select those who have left North Korea (defectors or refugees) as either target population or proxy for studying North Korean society. With careful matching of topic, subject, and source, anthropological literature may help deepen understanding of social experience in North Korea. Fahy's account is one such successful example.

Marching Through Suffering assembles the oral accounts provided by thirty defectors interviewed in 2005–2006 in South Korea and Japan, and collates the information chronologically based on the social experience of the famine, each of which Fahy connects to a particular theme. Fahy's monograph draws an arc from initial coping strategies and denial; to social cohesion, disintegration and power; to heightened awareness and alarm to the increased deaths; and to finally the decision to leave or stay, and final settlement in South Korea or Japan and the host countries' relationship to the Peninsula's geopolitical history.

A central theme underlining the entirety of Fahy's monograph is language use: language and power, language and the state, language and experience, proscription from language. "Here we can see that speech in North Korea is performative speech par excellence," writes Fahy (88), and the rich details of her interviewees' descriptions bolster how the famine was performed through everyday dialogue, language which is both "concealing and revealing" (91). Students of North

Korea know very well the censorship applied to the topic of the famine and the state media's manipulation of such events, but this monograph goes one step further to map out the social and psychological impact of such stringent obstruction to talking about the years of suffering from hunger. Employing North Korean socialist texts as well as literary theory and psychology, Fahy's exegesis of defector narratives lays out the inner and social reasons and impacts of experiencing the famine.

The topic of this monograph truly is the power of language. Fahy paints a broad landscape of diverse experiences of the famine, but for this rich tableau of subjective experience what is sacrificed is explicit reference to the position of each interviewee within society or each interviewee's representativeness of the experience. Indeed, in Chapter 5, "Breaking Points," the author makes reference to the exceptional nature of the interviewees; those who settled in South Korea, for example, number about 26,000 of a country of 24 million North Koreans. But because of the complex relationship between language, collective narrative (a particularly sensitive issue in the case of North Korean defector testimony), and veracity, a hasty reader may be led to infer causal relationships about the famine and North Koreans' response that are unwarranted.

However, the value of ethnography is in delving into local experiences and tying them to wider socio-political themes. Fahy's work fleshes out several contradictions simultaneous within the experiences reported by the North Korean interviewees: of communalism and alienation, of loyalty and distrust, of belief and doubt. The ethnographic mode seems a fitting place to unpack these complex experiences, and certainly Fahy's work contributes not only to the study of the social life and state-society relations in North Korea, but also to wider studies of trauma, of society's coping mechanisms under restrictive authoritarian regimes, and of language as one such coping strategy. With its nuanced understanding of North Koreans and elegant prose, Fahy's work will certainly find a place on the syllabi of many future courses on North Korea.

Yeonok Jang: Korean P'ansori Singing Tradition: Development, Authenticity, and Performance History. Lanham MD: Scarecrow Press, 2014. ISBN 978-0-8108-8461-8 (cloth), 978-0-8108-8462-5 (ebook).
Reviewed by Keith Howard, SOAS, University of London

Not so long ago, Korean music was the preserve of a few little known scholars, with the non-Koreans by some curious twist of fate concentrated in Britain (Jonathan Condit, Keith Pratt, Robert C. Provine); today, the concentration in Britain continues, with our Japanese and Chinese musicology friends feeling somewhat overwhelmed. It is splendid to be able to report just how well Korean music is now represented in publications, indicative of the visibility that Korean music now has. Indeed, Yeonok Jang's volume on p'ansori is, so far as this reviewer is aware, the sixth title to have been published since 2012. Dr Jang completed her PhD at SOAS in 2000, and this volume is a revised and updated version of that thesis. Where once p'ansori was a challenge to find out about, we now have a very reasonable choice of titles, running chronologically according to their dates of publication from Marshall Pihl (1984), through his student Chan E. Park's idiosyncratic account (2003), the volume edited by Lee Yong-shik (2008), and Andrew Killick's thorough exploration of Korean opera (2010), to the new volumes by Um Haekyung (2013) and Yeonok Jang. Back in the early 1980s, I glossed p'ansori somewhat contentiously as 'epic storytelling through song' for my audience that was largely unfamiliar with it; the familiarity that the genre now has, as a Korean Important Intangible Cultural Property (No.5) and as a UNESCO 'Masterpiece in the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity' (these days subsumed within the UNESCO representative list of intangible heritage), means that Jang needs no gloss but can simply refer to 'p'ansori'.

Each of the English-language accounts we have is distinctive in one or more ways. Jang is particularly good at exploring the Korean literature, addressing its shortcomings and arguing the merits of particular perspectives about history, repertory, and performers. This mirrors how p'ansori is perceived and taught in Korea, except that Jang supplements her account with references to ethnomusicology, literary theory, and points about oral epic poetry. Occasionally, she is challenged as she attempts to find alternatives to dominant theories, since she has to work with the same historical documentation as others. In Chapters 1 and 2, she explores the development of p'ansori. The different theories, based on source materials, terminology, and oral history, are given in the first chapter, while the second zooms in on the genre's musical development, using the scholarship of the late Paek Taeung as its starting point and developing an argument about changing vocal style over time—her comment that p'ansori was sung using 'vocal cords' in the eighteenth century but came to use the 'throat to produce sounds' (page 57) begs the question of how else one can sing except using both cords and throat, and there is a somewhat strange use of 'ordinary people' and 'dominant group' to stand for Korea's

hierarchical society (presumably for sangmin and yangban; page 56), but otherwise her exploration of techniques and styles works well.

Chapters 3 and 4 take the chronological account forward. She considers what was actually performed by the late nineteenth century, around the time that the lyrics for 12 repertories were written down, and how performance contexts began to change with the growth of urban society and the beginnings of theatres. In the early twentieth century, p'ansori began to be reinterpreted as a staged form, leading to groups of singers, each giving performances of excerpts and episodes —which Jang terms t'omak sori. This was exemplified in the rise of what later became known as ch'anggŭk, which was destined in post-liberation times to abandon narration, one of the three integral performance aspects of p'ansori proper. It was also encouraged by the rise of the recording industry. Jang's discussion sets up a specific argument about decline, which is developed in Chapter 5 with a consideration of how p'ansori has come to be revived and valued in recent decades. In discussing ch'anggŭk, Jang does not reference Killick's 2010 book (in fact, throughout the volume she omits much that has been published in Korea or abroad in the last decade, the most notable omissions concerning the development of theatres, concert culture, and the recording industry) but has in mind Killick's earlier articles in which he challenged the dominant Korean account of its development. He asked, in what remains no-go territory for most Korean scholars, whether Japanese theatrical forms influenced the development of staged versions of p'ansori. Jang concludes that, since the first mention of Japanese theatre she can find in a Korean newspaper dates from 1907, that Japan was a later influence rather than the initial stimulus for the transformation of p'ansori.

Chapter 5 moves into the contemporary, considering p'ansori since the 1970s. Here, Jang makes considerable use of personal interview material with scholars, aficionados and performers, and provides detailed discussions of Korea's intangible cultural property system and of the landmark film, Sŏp'yŏnje. Both, though in different ways, have made p'ansori familiar to the Korean public in recent decades. Linking to her discussion of mode in Chapter 2, she looks at how the so- called 'Western' style of p'ansori was initially preferred, but that the rise of nostalgia was accompanied by a revival of interest in the so-called 'Eastern' style. She notes how today's urban audiences no longer discriminate quality, but that connoisseurs remain, congregating for the annual Chŏnju p'ansori festival. The result is that while many she has talked with feel p'ansori is still declining, it is actually thriving, though not always in ways that traditionalists will celebrate. Intriguingly, in her exploration of how scholars and performers see the present and future of the genre, one Kim Myŏnggon is quoted, who Jang describes as a 'young singer'—I note that his recent forays into politics have given him a rather different reputation.

Chapter 6 offers a comparison between two particular p'ansori styles of performance, each related to a lineage: Tongch'oje, developed by Kim Yŏnsu and analysed through a performance by Kim's disciple O Chŏngsuk, and Posŏng, from Chŏng Ŭngmin, as performed by Sŏng Ch'angsun. The comparison shows distinctiveness as well as variety; O and Sŏng are today 'holders' of p'ansori as an Intangible Cultural Property. The extensive notations appear to be accurate, but, and as with all the illustrative material, they have been produced at a low resolution that significantly reduces their clarity. Biographies for the main singers considered are outlined in a useful appendix. Overall, then, this is a highly informative book that mixes interview data with a thorough account of the existing literature. It explores in detail the decline and revival of p'ansori during the twentieth century, and offers a nuanced take on the specific schools and styles of performance that together go to make up the genre as it is celebrated today.

Andrew Killick: Hwang Byungki: Traditional Music and the Contemporary Composer in the Republic of Korea. xi + 237pp. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2013. ISBN 978-1-4094-2030-9.
Reviewed by Hyelim Kim, SOAS, University of London

Aiming for a confluence between East and West, as Chou Wen-chung (Chang 2006; Lai 2009) argues, Andrew Killick's book on Hwang Byungki attempts to show how the two regions could be merged while at the same time being adapted by both sides. Killick teaches at the University of Sheffield. Taking advantage of his close friendship with Hwang, Killick introduces a panorama of Hwang's rich life as a kayagŭm master, acclaimed composer and cultural ambassador for Korea. His focus on this Korean composer, who has always worked in the field of traditional music, brings up the question of how East Asian traditional music, while obviously having a fixed form of cultural aesthetic, could submissively affect new trends in Western contemporary music. This question permeates the 'macro' contextual background as well as the 'micro' analysis of Hwang's compositions, although at the same time a chronology of his music naturally touches on significant phases of recent Korean history. Instead of using a chronological order, each chapter illustrates a different strand of Hwang's compositional method, accompanied by in-depth analyses and recorded examples on an accompanying 18-track CD. Killick bravely takes on the challenge of studying a musician's life through an intimate encounter with the subject. However, the question of how to observe a familiar subject while being objective lingers.

The opening chapter explores the basis of Hwang Byungki's inspiration—the folk genre, sanjo. Killick chose to start by using Hwang's creations on sanjo to explain his perception of the process of composing. The traditional process of creation is referred to as 'tchada' (to weave), which infers that traditional composing is in fact a rearrangement of pre-existing materials rather than the creation of something new. This is certainly inherent in the principles of sanjo, which is mainly led by structure rather than melodies or rhythms. Hwang first learned sanjo from the changgo player Kim Yundŏk, who was later appointed as the first holder of the Intangible Cultural Property as a sanjo player. Kim Yundŏk's interpretation of sanjo derived heavily from the style of Chŏng Namhŭi, who had migrated to North Korea. This connection led Hwang to establish the concept of 'ryu' (school) and to call his own sanjo school the 'Chŏng Namhŭi-je Hwang Pyŏnggi-ryu kayagŭm sanjo'. One feels that there is more room for critical review of the sanjo recordings of Chŏng Namhŭirelied on by Hwang, and how these led to the formation of Hwang's school.

Chapter 2 highlights Hwang as a composer. Killick reminds the readers of Hwang's distinctive techniques regarding syncretism, not only between court and folk styles but also between Korean and Western ideologies. Killick uses the piece 'Kukhwa-yŏp'esŏ' (Beside a Chrysanthemum,

1962) to show the reconciliation of traditional Korean and contemporary Western styles, and finds in 'Sup' (The Forest, 1962) an example of the amalgamation of Korean court and folk music. In comparing Hwang's pieces with the timbral music of Edward MacDowell (after Howard, 2002: 955), Killick efficiently identifies the apparent influence of twentieth-century Western art music on Hwang's compositions. He argues that Hwang expanded his stylistic techniques through friendships with contemporary composers from both the West and Korea, including Lou Harrison, Paik Byung-dong and Kang Sukhi, all of whom are heavily influenced by European contemporary music as experienced in academia. Curiously, almost no Korean composer working within the traditional genre is mentioned as being among his circle of friends. Chapter 3 explores Hwang's approach based on Buddhism and Taoism. Mainly inspired by the Buddhist culture of the Shilla dynasty(57BCE–935CE), he distinguishes it from the majority of compositions for Korean traditional music, which are predominantly influenced by Confucian ideas from the much later Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910).Killick emphasises this when he analyses the piece 'Ch'imhyangmu' (Dance in the Perfume of Aloes, 1974), alluding to the influence of pŏmp'ae, a style of Buddhist chant imported from China during the Shilla dynasty. He also touches on the other ideological background in Hwang's music, Taoism, mainly dealing with the aesthetic notions associated with literati instruments such as the Korean kŏmun'go and Chinese qin.It is interesting to assess the qualitative development of the composer, but the discussion on the technical ideas of Buddhism and the ideological aesthetics of Taoism needs more methodological consistency.

Hwang's soundworld is further explored in Chapter 4, dividing into three categories, each being ideological extensions from West Asian, avant-garde, and Western art music. Unlike his earlier attempt to detach the composer's works from the social and historical context of the mid- to late-1970s Korea, Killick emphasises in Chapter 5 Hwang's contribution to South and North Korean relations in the 1990s. He first discusses Hwang's role as a representative of Korean music and as a cultural ambassador organising cultural events for exchange between the two Koreas. He points out that the exchange affected Hwang's style in the compositions'Uri-nŭn Hana'(We Are One: 1990)and 'T'ongil-ŭi kil'(The Road of Unification: 1990); bothwere composedfor the 1990 Pan-Korean Unification Concerts. These two pieces are characterised by harmonic progressions, regular rhythms and repetitive patterns— stylistic characteristics rarely found in Hwang's compositions. Secondly, Killick examines Hwang's use of the modified kayagŭm, which is a modernised version of the instrument with nylon strings as preferred by the North Koreans. Interestingly, harmonic progressions and recursive melodic patterns on the modified instrument are also part of the kugak fusion wave of the 1990s, as "music that combines identifiably Korean and non-Korean elements in pieces generally aimed at a wider public" (R. Anderson Sutton 2008: 2). Despite Hwang's well-known dislike of the populist and Westernised

kugak fusion, Killick notes how the modified kayagŭm was actively employed in Hwang's later pieces such as 'Ch'unsŏl' (Spring Snow, 1991) and 'Tarha nop'igom' (1996).

Lastly, detailing Hwang's recent experiments as an artistic director organising cultural events with Western chamber ensembles and modern dance companies, Killick reassures readers that Hwang's contributions to date are interwoven with other inputs into contemporary interpretations of Korean traditional music. Killick approaches this by scrutinising the firmly rooted tradition, and with his substantial analyses of the various musical strands manages to avoid partiality in respect to Hwang's life. At the same time, through his intimate communication with Hwang, Killick presents a personal tribute to the composer. The selective fragments of tradition transformed the composer's life into a creative artist, communicating with his contemporaries, forming a living culture that preserves the tradition—much as Chou Wen-chung earlier noted (1983: 224). Killick, in this book, successfully explores the structure of Korean music, built on processes of rearranging and reworking the past, in the creation of the living cultural legacy of Hwang Byungki.

Haekyung Um: Korean Musical Drama: P'ansori and the Making of Tradition in Modernity. SOAS Musicological Series. Farnham: Ashgate 2013. 254pp. ISBN 978-0-7546-6276-1.
Reviewed by Hyunseok Kwon, SOAS, University of London

This volume explores how a variety of facets of modernity have produced today's p'ansori, an art genre classified as 'traditional'. Through considering its development, Um aims to illuminate the presence of tradition, overcoming the old dichotomy between tradition and modernity. Dr Um completed her PhD at Queen's University of Belfast and is now a lecturer at the University of Liverpool. Based on Bauman's definition of performance (1977), Chapter One first provides detailed description of p'ansori performance, one delivered through the complete singing of a repertory, the wanch'ang, in contemporary Korea. Um captures important scenes, constructed before and during the performance, in and out of the concert hall, with a detached but sensitive approach. She then selectively outlines musical and social elements of performance and facets of related genres that have been relatively less highlighted.

Chapter Two explores the historical context of p'ansori, broadly covering the period from before the eighteenth century to the post-preservation era. Based on rich resources, Um details a variety of noteworthy elements that have shaped the creative processes of p'ansori, including p'annorŭm as its original form, the practical learning of Shilhak as a school of thought, sponsorship of the middle class (the chungin), recording technology, Japan's censorship, and the Korean preservation system. In doing this, she demonstrates how p'ansori has been (trans)formed, in terms of text, length, and repertory.

In Chapter Three, Um analyses textual and musical aspects, taking a comparative approach to different versions of the p'ansori piece, Ch'unhyangga. She reveals subtle differences in texts amongst schools, concentrating on the tense relationship between narrative and performance contexts. Then, she sheds light on a variety of rhetorical techniques, for instance, for creating an onomatopoeia and mimesis, through the word 'padŭdŭdŭdŭk'(page 67). Concerning music, she scrutinizes the interrelationships between mode (cho), rhythmic cycle (changdan), a certain mood, vocal techniques, and influential overarching genres, be they folk or classical. Finally, she demonstrates how textual and musical devices are utilized to generate dramatic effect. However, she does not consider tautological words whose explanatory or rhythmic function, beyond pleonastic uselessness, could be important.

Chapter Four looks into the relevance of schools to textual and musical styles, paying attention to the inclusive features of the notion che, a notion that now encompasses both school and style. Based on Bourdieu's concept of habitus (1980, 1984), Um specifies the p'ansori habitus as an

imagined space where p'ansori is created through social interaction. She minutely examines how many songs are used in each scene, taking a comparative approach to six different versions of Ch'unhyangga. Further, she highlights the focus of schools for modes, interchanges amongst schools, and the combination or creation of styles. She explores performance contexts, gender, and audience expectation as the main motives for social interaction. As for context, she captures how, even in a situation in which text and music has been altered, performance has continued. In Chapter Five, developing from Blacking's ideas on transmission (1987), Um looks at how individual musicians contribute to the creation of p'ansori in their own ways. She explores the teaching methods and singing styles of two masters, Sŏng Uhyang and Cho Sanghyŏn, through detailed transcriptions. She provides a fresh illustration of their verbal instructions and voice colours, furthermore offering a useful comparison of their different versions. However, it would be possible to discuss the motives behind their individual styles further, particularly concerning Cho Sanghyon's 'unalterable' part, tŏnŭm. This is because, within the Korean preservation system, musicians often transmit music with an emphasis on functional intention rather than external form. Thus, I wonder if such an emphasis may have existed when he was developing his versions.

Chapter Six provides discussion of the construction of aesthetics within the historical context of p'ansori, taking further perspectives of Blacking and Merriam (1971) on musical systems. Particularly, Um carefully observes how prominent patrons such as Shin Chaehyo establish Confucian values as central by revising texts, how these values influence the settlement of repertoires and the selection of texts by musicians, including Pak Yujŏn, how han is emphasized as a dominant sentiment framed by Japanese oppression and the people's minjung cultural movement, how p'ansori pieces are shaped by the preferences of regions and their audiences, and how shouts of encouragement (ch'uimsae)evolve amongst the audience.

In Chapter Seven, Um shifts her focus to a cross-national level, in order to observe how p'ansori has been adapted and created within diasporic communities in the former Soviet Union and China. In her description of the historical context, Um explores how prominent theatres, new hybrid sub-genres, and aesthetics of voice quality evolved under political influence. Further, she provides discussions about the dual social function of p'ansori in the diasporas as a medium for invoking nostalgia and for confirming distance from the homeland. Extending Bakhtin's discussions (1982), she offers the prospect of how hybrid identities of diasporas are able to harmonise within these.

Chapter Eight discusses how new p'ansori has evolved under the processes of colonization, modernization, and globalization. Dividing new p'ansori into the patriotic, religious, and socio-political, she explores how goals were formed within political and religious contexts. Then, she

examines an aspect hitherto not illuminated—how new post-millennium p'ansori has been maintained and diversified with respect to textual and musical techniques, sources, themes, speech style, costumes, and intertextuality, based on her study of young artists. The young artists assume the title of small time entertainers, as ttorang kwangdae, with a view to realizing a revival of p'ansori against its fossilization. She explores their shared view on p'ansori's authenticity 'as a communicative performance' (page 200).

In her Conclusion, Um proposes a theoretical model for understanding the dynamic creative process of p'ansori, pointing out the fallacy of the dichotomy between tradition and modernity. Her model seems appropriate. However, I would suggest that the comprehensive category 'wider society' needs more elaboration, for instance, into national and cross-national (diasporic) spheres, because, as suggested in Chapter Seven, these sometimes operate with different motives, namely, national and hybrid identities. In addition, it would have been useful had she clarified, in her own terms, what processes are involved. However, these are minor points. Showing great expertise in Korean music and a deep sensitivity as an ethnomusicologist, Um successfully presents the factors that influence the creation of p'ansori. Therefore, this book will be indispensable for anyone interested in p'ansori as living Korean traditional music drama.

Wada Haruki. The Korean War: An International History. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013. 410 pp. ISBN: 978-1442223295. £26.95.
Reviewed by Steven Denney, PhD candidate at University of Toronto.

There is much to be said about the potential an interdisciplinary approach holds for helping Koreanists go beyond the "origins" debate: a debate on the origins of the Korean War—a question of "Who Started the Korean War?"—finds its roots in I.F. Stone's 1952 The Hidden History of the Koran War. It was later expanded upon by Allen Whiting, popularized by Bruce Cumings' Origins volumes, and "corrected" by Park Myung-lim and the researchers affiliated with the Cold War International History Project (Kathryn Weathersby, Alexandre Mansourov et al.). This debate was important. Who started the Korean War—even if the "wrong" question to ask—is emotionally, historically, and heuristically valuable. The debate has, however, run its course and a continued fixation on the origins is analytically counterproductive.

War origins are like critical junctures, an event defined ex post as the starting point for a "path dependent" process. Comparative historical analyses in political science define critical junctures as exogenous shocks of some sort (e.g. war, revolution, colonization). Critical junctures are helpful, analytically speaking, because they give researchers a point upon which to concentrate their analytical gaze. Indeed, "Critical junctures are characterized by a situation in which the 'structural' (that is, economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period," write Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen in their 2007 World Politics article "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism." These are those moments in history when big things happen very quickly and are often agent-driven.

However, where critical junctures are valuable for helping researchers find a "starting point" for a path-dependent process, they are not good for "illuminating continuity and change in other important aspects of the [economic, cultural, ideological, organizational] context that may have an important effect on the outcome of interest," find Tulia G. Falleti and Julia F. Lynch in their 2009 Comparative Political Studies article, "Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis." As it goes in political science regarding critical junctures, so it goes for Koreanists and the study of post-colonial Korean history. Continued fixation on the origins has the effect of obfuscating or glossing over other contextual factors that have great explanatory significance. Wada Haruki in his 2014 study, The Korean War: An International History, does justice to other international factors and helps moves scholars beyond.

The book, as the title suggests, is primarily concerned with the Korean War from an international perspective. Wada's nuggets of new information include a new interpretation of

Stalin's relationship with Kim Il-sung and the war-time North Korean leadership (including Stalin's approval to purge the Pak Hon-yong faction) based on Soviet documents (Chapter 6). Contrary to previous findings, Wada concludes that Stalin had indeed approved an end to the conflict in 1952. He also adds context to Japan's wartime participation (pp. 138–139), and the activities of the Japanese Communist Party. Wada also draws significant attention to the destruction wrought by US air power—something Bruce Cumings has sought to draw attention to in the United States.

The layer-upon-layer of facts presented in the book are, of course, interesting, and the elite-centered narrative constructed using telegrams and other communiqués has the impressive effect of giving voice to individuals like Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee. However, Wada's greatest achievement is expanding the remit of the scholars analytical gaze beyond the peninsula and the war's origins and to the international level, where aspects of the international "context" can be better appreciated. Wada does this in at least three ways.

First, he splits the Korean War into "two" distinct wars: a civil war and a Sino-American war. This may seem a rather minor point, but it is worth noting. Before and after the People's Volunteer Army (PVA) entered Korea were two entirely different geopolitical contexts (pp. 180–189). The civil war is depicted primarily as early state-building efforts lead by Kim Il-sung and Pak Hon-yong in the north and Rhee in the south. By the time the PVA entered the fighting, Kim Il-sung and Rhee were effectively non-actors (p. 194).

Second, Wada elucidates, within the context of the Korean conflict, the establishment of the Yoshida Doctrine and the conclusion of the US-Japan Security Treaty (signed in San Francisco in 1951), an enormously important (arguably most important) development in the early Cold War era (pp. 172–175). Wada's analysis here is particularly insightful. As Chalmers Johnson in his work on post-war Japan found, Shigeru deftly out-politicked his US compatriot charged with working with him, John Foster Dulles. By getting the US to provide a security guarantee without having to rearm, Shigeru, Kishi Nobusuke, and others could get busy with economic development. In return, the US got its garrison at Okinawa. Thus was born the "hub-and-spokes" system, based on America's "unsinkable aircraft carrier" (i.e. Japan).

Lastly, Wada gives recognition to the large processes working in the geopolitical background. He identifies the Chinese Revolution as giving impetus to the breakout of war and inspiring "red scares" on the peninsula and discusses (pp. 83–90; p. 230), throughout the book, the policies which built the foundation of America's expansionist foreign policy and the early establishment of the "archipelago of empire" (Cumings 2009); Wada's use of National Security Council documents (e.g. NSC 48, NSC 68, NSC 154) as signposts helps the reader follow the slow

unfolding of events taking place on the backdrop of war and understand how America became a global power and presence via the Korean War.

Notes for Submission of Manuscripts to Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies

Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies is a fully peer-reviewed, online journal.

The journal has been published in hard-copy format since 1991 containing both conference and symposium papers, and submitted manuscripts. From Volume 14 (2012), Papers has become an on-line journal available only by password through the Association's website.

The journal accepts manuscripts for articles within any area of the arts, humanities and social sciences which examine Korea in either contemporary or historical times. Submissions which include a comparative discussion of issues in other East Asian nations are welcome.

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2) The body of the manuscript should normally be around 5,000 words in length. Endnotes, bibliography, and other additional material are excluded from this word count.

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4) Romanisation of East Asian names, placenames and terms should follow the McCune-Reischauer system for Korean, Hepburn for Japanese, and pinyin for Chinese. Terms not given in one of these standard Romanisations should be followed by the standard Romanisation enclosed in square brackets [ ] at the initial occurrence.

5) Where appropriate, the use of Chinese characters and indigenous scripts following the initial occurrence of a term is encouraged.

6) The manuscript must be submitted as a Microsoft Word file attachment, and must be written in double-spaced Times Roman 12 point font. This rule applies to both the text of the article and its section headings, and the title. Do not use bold face fonts.

7) The page format should be set for A4 size with left-hand justification only.

8) The manuscript should have a separate cover page which gives the full name of the author(s), academic affiliation(s), and full postal and email contact details. The cover page should also have a one-paragraph abstract of the contents of the article, and 5 key words.

9) The first page of the text of the manuscript should have only the title of the article at top. The name of the author(s) should NOT be included.

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