‘Iam Corpus’ or ‘Non Corpus’?
On Abelard’s First Argument Against Material Essence Realism in the Logica ‘Ingredientibuis’

Caterina Tarlazzi
St. John’s College, University of Cambridge

Abstract

This paper investigates Abelard’s first argument against the ‘material essence’ realist view on universals in the Logica ‘Ingredientibus’. It analyses three different interpretations of the argument, those of Alain de Libera, Peter King and Martin Tweedale. Much depends on the (for this section, single) manuscript reading ‘iam corpus’ in a crucial passage. The paper argues against the manuscript reading (endorsed by some scholars) and in favour of the emendation ‘non corpus’ suggested by the editor, Bernhard Geyer. The emended reading is supported by comparison with similar arguments of Abelard and his school found in published and unpublished sources.

Keywords


The topic of this paper is tiny. The whole paper is concerned with one word, a three-letter word, in one line of Abelard’s Logica ‘Ingredientibus’.¹ The question

¹ In the article, reference is made to the following sources and abbreviations: Petrus Abaelardus, Logica ‘Ingredientibus’, ed. B. Geyer, Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften, BGPM, XXI.1-3 (Münster, 1919-27) (= LI); a new edition of the section of LI concerning universals has been published, with French translation, in C. Lafleur and J. Carrier, ‘Abélard et les universaux: édition et traduction du début de la Logica “Ingredientibus”: Super Porphyrium’, Laval théologique et philosophique 68 (2012), 129-210—I have checked the text of this new edition against Geyer’s and have noted variant readings; Petrus Abaelardus, Logica ‘Nostrorum
I will address is the following: in a certain passage of LI, did Abelard write ‘iam’, as one reads in the only manuscript transmitting the text, or ‘non’, as some scholars have suggested? Starting from such a small question, almost a divertissement, I hope to achieve three more important objectives. First, to describe, briefly, an influential theory on universals from the first half of the twelfth century and before, usually labelled ‘material essence realism’ (MER). Second, to analyse one of Abelard’s most famous arguments against MER and several distinguished interpretations of the argument. Third, I hope to show how crucial the editor’s choice of a reading can be, as changing a three-letter word produces significantly different results in interpreting the same argument. The word I am interested in belongs to the last sentence of Abelard’s first argument against MER in LI, which reads:

Quod uerum sit autem id quod supra assumpsimus, scilicet quicquid est in Burnello aliud a formis Burnelli, est Burnellus, inde manifestum est, quia neque formae Burnelli sunt Burnellus, cum iam accidentia essent

---

substantia, neque materia simul et formae Burnelli sunt Burnellus, cum iam corpus et iam (iam ms.] non Geyer, Lafleur-Carrier) corpus esse corpus necesse esset confiteri. (LI 12.9-14)

So, I shall first consider what MER is, at least in very general terms, then Abelard's argument against it, and finally this sentence itself.

1 Material Essence Realism

MER is accepted as William of Champeaux's first view on universals. As Christophe Erismann has shown, the theory springs from a traditional ontological realism that was predominant during the High Middle Ages. The description that follows is based especially on the account of LI, where Abelard first describes MER and then criticises it.4

---

2 Descriptions of MER are: HC 65.80-91; LI 10.17-13.17 (fully quoted below); LNPS 515.14-518.8; GS 151*-155* (§§ 32-49); QG 93-103 (§§ 2-25); P7 ff. 123va and 125va. None of these sources, however, positively endorses the theory: they all describe MER in order to criticise it. Commentary on the Isagoge P3 was once believed to champion MER, but Julie Brumberg has argued convincingly that this is not the case: cf. J. Brumberg, 'Les universaux dans le commentaire du Pseudo-Raban à l'Isagoge (P3): entre Boèce et la théorie de l'essence matérielle', in Arts du langage et théologie aux confins des XIe-XIIe siècles. Textes, maîtres, débats, ed. I. Rosier (Turnhout, 2011), 417-453. Views similar to MER have been identified by Irène Rosier-Catach in grammatical discussions that parallel the discussions on universals: cf. I. Rosier-Catach, 'Les Glosulae in Priscianum: sémantique et universaux', Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 19 (2008), 123-177 (see especially 144, 154-155, 170-172).

3 C. Erismann, L'homme commun. La genèse du réalisme ontologique durant le haut Moyen Âge (Paris, 2011); William of Champeaux’s realism is described at 363-379. See also C. Erismann, ‘Penser le commun. Le problème de l’universalité métaphysique aux XIe et XIIe siècles’, in Rosier, Arts du langage et théologie, 373-392.

MER can be described from different starting points. From one perspective, that of universals, MER is characterised by the claim that not only individual things exist, but also other kinds of things, namely, universals, which are things common to many spatio-temporal distinct items. A universal, such as the Man or the Animal, is a thing (res), which is: (a) entirely and (b) at the same time in different individuals, and (c) in such a way as to constitute the substance of each individual thing it is in.\(^5\)

From another perspective, that of individual things, MER maintains two individuals belonging to the same species/genus—such as Socrates and Plato, or Socrates and Burnellus the donkey—to be ‘the same in essence’ (idem essentialiter or idem in essentia).

As is well known, and following Boethius (De trinitate 1), twelfth-century authors (including Abelard) list several meanings of idem.\(^6\) In Abelard's several accounts, being idem in essentia or essentialiter is a very strong form of identity (though a stronger one is being the same both in essence and in definition). When we say ‘the same in essence’, we should not think of thirteenth-century ‘essence’ (what is signified by the definition of a thing, distinct from its existence). In this context, essentia has its twelfth-century well-attested meaning of

---


'a concrete existing thing'. Abelard’s examples of items that are *idem in essentia* are: what is signified by two synonyms, such as *ensis* and *mucro*, when they refer to one and the same thing (an example of identity both in essence and in definition); what is signified by two expressions that both refer to the same thing, but pick it out by different accidents, such as ‘this white [thing]’ and ‘this hard [thing]’ when they both refer to the same piece of marble (an example of identity in essence, but not in definition). According to John Marenbon’s analysis, Abelard claims two items to be the same in essence when they have all their parts in common.

Abelard’s sense of sameness in essence, one might want to argue, is not the same as MER’s sameness in essence. Abelard believes concrete existing things to be just individual things, whereas MER believes that universal things exist, too. However, there are also similarities: MER agrees that two things are the same in essence when they are, indeed, the same thing—not, however, the same individual thing, but the same universal thing. In other words, MER states that two individuals belonging to the same genus or the same species are the same in essence because the same thing (a universal, common thing) is in both of them.

In addition, MER states that the *essentia* (the universal thing, thanks to which individuals belonging to the same species, and species belonging to the same genus, are the same in essence) is their matter (whence ‘material essence’ realism). In other words, MER takes Porphyry’s tree to be an actual structure for reality, and (following other passages from the *Isagoge*, especially iii, 10, and viii, 7) interprets it through the concepts of form and matter. The genus Substance is a matter to which forms are added, the differentiae: when receiving the differentia Bodily, Substance becomes Body. Body, too, is a matter for other differentiae-forms, thanks to which Body becomes Animal, etc., until the last species is reached, e.g., Man. This one, too, is considered to be matter for receiving forms: in this case, however, forms are not differentiae, but accidents. As a result, MER claims the individual Socrates to be: the species Man, which acts as matter, plus certain accidents (having a beard; being

---

in a certain place . . .), which act as forms; Plato is the same matter as Socrates, plus another set of accidents, and Plato and Socrates are the same in essence. In this way, MER also inherits the principle that individuals are individuated by their accidents.8

Alain de Libera very aptly described material essence realism as a realisation of Porphyry’s tree.9 Porphyry’s tree can be either run downwards, from Substance to individuals, thus adding forms (first differentiae, then accidents) to the matter Substance and then to each of the following genera and to the last species, which all act as matters; or it can be run upwards, from individuals to Substance, stripping forms (first accidents, then differentiae) away from the individuals first, and then from each species, until the most general genus of Substance is reached. In the secondary literature, this second path has sometimes been called a ‘stripping-away thought-experiment’.10

When describing MER in LI (10.17-11.9), Abelard makes use of an image for the common matter (that is, the materialis essentia, cf. LI 10.19) thanks to which individuals belonging to the same species are the same, and species belonging to the same genus are the same. Such common matter should be imagined, he says, as a piece of wax (LI 10.29-11.9). A certain piece of wax first receives the form of a statue and becomes that statue (e.g., of a man), producing such a statue; later on, that very piece of wax receives another form, and produces another statue (e.g., of an ox). According to MER, however, Abelard adds, one should imagine that the same piece of wax is receiving the forms thanks to which it produces a certain statue, and the forms thanks to which it produces any other statue, at the same time.11

8 Whether individuation through accidents was endorsed by Boethius in De trinitate 1, ed. C. Moreschini (München-Leipzig, 2005), 167.51-168.63, is a matter for debate. See Gracia, Introduction, 97-107, and, for two recent assessments, J. Marenbon, Boethius (Oxford, 2003), 82 (against the notion that Boethius championed individuation through accidents) and A. Arlig, ‘The metaphysics of individuals in the Opuscula sacra’, in The Cambridge Companion to Boethius, ed. J. Marenbon (Cambridge, 2009), 129-154, esp. 139-141 (in favour of such an interpretation).
9 De Libera, L’Art des généralités, 311.
11 LI 10.17-11.9 (Lafleur-Carrier, ‘Abélard et les universaux’, 152-153. § 25): ‘Quidam enim ita rem uniuersalem accipiunt, ut in rebus diuersis ab inuicem per formas eandem essentialiter substantiam collocent, quae singularium, in quibus est, materialis sit essentia et in se ipsa una, tantum per formas inferiorum sit diuersa. Quas quidem formas si separari contingeret, nulla penitus differentia rerum esset, quae formarum tantum diuersitate ab inuicem distant, cum sit penitus eadem essentialiter materia. Verbi gratia in singulis hominibus numero differentibus eadem est hominis substantia, quae hic Plato per haec
Abelard’s First Argument against Material Essence Realism

In *LI*, several powerful arguments against MER are advanced. We shall here focus specifically on the first argument, which is found in *LI* 11.10-12.14. This section is comprised of three parts: first, the argument itself (*LI* 11.10-24);


second, a counter-objection by material essence realists (LI 11.25-28); then Abelard's reply to the counter-objection (LI 11.28-12.14).

Abelard's first argument is a famous objection against MER and it can be found (in various forms) in several other logical texts from this period that describe and criticise MER. One might call it ‘the argument of contraries'. If MER is accepted, Abelard says, contraries inhere in the same thing at the same time, which is impossible. Abelard, however, does not choose an Aristotelian example for contraries to prove his point—he chooses ‘rational' and ‘irrational' (perhaps on the basis of Isagoge, iii, 9). More Aristotelian contraries would be ‘black' and ‘white', or ‘in good health' and ‘ill', which are used in other texts describing the same argument. In any case, Abelard's argument says that, if material essence realism is followed, then rationality and irrationality inhere in the same thing, for instance the matter Animal. But according to Aristotle contraries cannot inhere in the same subject at the same time (indeed, this is what differentiates contraries from other couples of accidents such as whiteness and hardness, which can inhere in the same subject). So, if we follow MER, we either violate the standard definition of contraries and claim that contraries do inhere in the same thing at the same time, or we are forced to admit that rationality and irrationality are not contraries.

---

13 Cf. LNPS 517.25-41; GS 152*-154* (§§ 35-41); QG, 97-98 (§§ 12-13). Cf. also Porphyrius, Isagoge, ed. A. Busse (Berlin, 1887), 10.26-11.6 (iii, 9); Boethius, In Isagogen ed. secunda, 262-265, where Boethius talks of rational and irrational as contraries.

14 One could object that rational and irrational are not contraries, but opposite by privation: cf. Aristoteles, Categoriae 10: 11b34-12a26, and Boethius, In Categorias II, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1891, PL 64), 211C-D. Aristotelian examples of contraries are used in GS 152*-154* (§§ 35-41); QG, 97-98 (§§ 12-13).

15 Cf. Aristoteles, Categoriae 6: 5b30-6a5.

Against Abelard’s argument, MERealists have (or could have, as Abelard says ‘fortassis dicetur’) a counter-reply, developed in LI 11.25-28. They might say: what Aristotle says concerning contraries is right, but he refers to individuals only. It is true that rationality and irrationality are in the same species or genus, but they are not in the least in the same individual: Socrates the man is just rational, Burnellus the donkey is just irrational.

In LI 11.28-12.14 Abelard replies to this counter-argument. He aims to prove that, if MER is accepted, then contraries will not simply inhere in the same genus or species—they will also inhere in the same individual. Abelard’s argument for proving this seems at first hard to follow. The key is to know that every single step in the reasoning is mentioned, and each conclusion is put forth before the premises that justify it. If we follow Abelard’s order, the argument is as follows. First, the very last conclusion:

(1) *Rationalitas et irrationalitas sunt in eodem individuo.*

This is obtained as a generalization of (2), stating that rationality and irrationality are both in Socrates:

(2) *Rationalitas et irrationalitas simul sunt in Socrate.*

---


(2) is drawn from premises (3) and (4) (where ‘Burnellus’ is the name of a donkey):

(3) Socrates et Burnellus sunt Socrates;
(4) Rationalitas et irrationalitas simul sunt in Socrate et Burnello;


\textit{ergo} (2) Rationalitas et irrationalitas simul sunt in Socrate.

(4) is considered to be self-evident: Socrates is a man, who is rational, and Burnellus is a donkey, which is irrational. On the contrary, (3) is far from being obvious. In Abelard's text, (3) is obtained through conversion from premise (5):

\begin{align*}
(5) & \quad \text{Socrates est Socrates et Burnellus,} \\
& \quad \text{\textit{ergo} (3) Socrates et Burnellus sunt Socrates.}
\end{align*}

(5), of course, must be proved. Abelard draws conclusion (5) from premises (6) and (7):

\begin{align*}
(6) & \quad \text{Socrates est Socrates;} \\
(7) & \quad \text{Socrates est Burnellus;} \\
& \quad \text{\textit{ergo} (5) Socrates est Socrates et Burnellus.}
\end{align*}

(6) is self-evident, but (7) is where all the difficulty lies, and needs to be proven. (7) is obtained from a rather longer argument, since it is obtained from (10) and (11), and (10) is obtained from (8) and (9):

\begin{align*}
(8) & \quad \text{Quicquid est in Socrate aliud a formis Socratis est illud quod est in Burnello aliud a formis Burnelli;} \\
(9) & \quad \text{Quicquid est in Burnello aliud a formis Burnelli est Burnellus;} \\
& \quad \text{\textit{ergo} (10) Quicquid est in Socrate aliud a formis Socratis est Burnellus (from 8 and 9).} \\
(11) & \quad \text{Quicquid est in Socrate aliud a formis Socratis est Socrates,} \\
& \quad \text{\textit{ergo} (7) Socrates est Burnellus (from 10 and 11).}
\end{align*}

We now have to prove (8), (9) and (11). (8) is a premise which would be accepted by MER. According to MER, if you strip forms away from Socrates, then the underlying matter is the same as what you have in Burnellus if you strip forms away from Burnellus, given that they both belong to the same genus. What lies in Socrates and in Burnellus without their forms is indeed the genus Animal, their matter or common \textit{essentia}. MERealists, however, do not seem likely to admit that individuals are what is in individuals apart from forms, that is to say,
(9) and (11). And of course (9) and (11) are twin premises: if you prove that this is the case for Burnellus, namely that Burnellus is everything which is in Burnellus apart from the forms of Burnellus, you have also proven that this is the case for Socrates (that is to say, that Socrates is everything which is in Socrates apart from the forms of Socrates).

Abelard chooses to prove premise (9) on Burnellus (and I will suggest a possible reason for this later). Now, forms and matter are all there is in an individual. So, when we read, in premise (9), that Burnellus is ‘all that is in Burnellus apart from the forms of Burnellus’, this means that Burnellus is its matter. Indeed, given the fact that an individual is just forms and matter, there are three possibilities: (a) the individual is her forms; (b) the individual is her matter; (c) the individual is her forms plus her matter. Abelard wants to prove that, if one follows MER, (b) is the only option available (whence premise (9)), for both (a) and (c) must be ruled out. (a) must be ruled out, Abelard says, for, if one accepts (a), accidents would be substance. This looks like something MERealists would agree with. (c) looks more like what MEREalists would like to argue for, but Abelard says that this, too, must be excluded. But this is where our problematic line lies. If one accepts (c), then it will be necessary to admit that “corpus et iam corpus esse corpus” according to the only manuscript (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, M 63 sup., f. 2va); or “corpus et non corpus esse corpus” according to the editor Bernhard Geyer (and also accepted by Claude Lafleur and Joanne Carrier).

3 Alain de Libera’s Interpretation

Before considering which reading is correct, the text given by the manuscript or Geyer’s emendation (or possibly still another text), a completely different interpretation of the whole passage, which has been advanced by Alain de Libera, must be examined.19

Briefly stated, de Libera does not accept that the section of text we are analysing is comprised of three parts (Abelard’s argument, a MEREalist’s counter-objection, and Abelard’s reply). According to de Libera, what has

---

19 Cf. de Libera, *L’Art des généralités*, 321-323; also adopted by Brumberg, ‘Le problème’, 73-74. De Libera quotes Jolivet, *Abélard ou la philosophie*, 128-129, in his support (Jolivet’s translation, however, also admits the standard interpretation). De Libera notes that his subdivision of the text is different from Spade’s (which, as we shall see, follows King’s interpretation), but he does not specifically discuss the point. The standard interpretation is not discussed by Brumberg, either.
been described as Abelard’s reply to the counter-objection is in fact part of a \textit{merrealist}’s counter-objection. So, the second and third parts actually make a single one. Quite surprisingly, as de Libera himself admits, his interpretation entails that there is no reply by Abelard to the realist counter-objection.\footnote{De Libera, \textit{L’Art des généralités}, 321-323: “Une seconde objection des partisans de ThEm à [a.1.2] est plus complexe. Il s’agit de démontrer que la rationalité (=R) et la non rationalité (= ¬R) restent des contraires, bien que coexistant dans un même sujet. Pour ce faire, il suffit de démontrer que R et ¬R peuvent coexister dans un individu, Socrate (=S), en restant des contraires. […] Assez curieusement, Abélard ne répond pas à cette objection.” Brumberg, ‘Le problème’, 73-74: “En suivant les analyses de A. de Libera […] on sait en effet que les partisans de la TEM tentent notamment de montrer que l’hérédité simultanée des contraires est possible dans un individu, et donc \textit{a fortiori} dans les genres et les espèces. Sans revenir dans le détail de l’argumentation, déjà parfaitement reconstituée dans \textit{L’Art des généralités}, on peut tenter de comprendre la raison pour laquelle Abélard considère cet argument comme nul et non avenu, au point de ne pas même en donner la réfutation complète.” (‘ThEm’ and ‘TEM’ both stand for ‘material essence realism.’) Brumberg then goes on to draw the conclusion that rationality is accidental to Socrates.} \footnote{Cf. the very beginning of the passage, \textit{LI} 11.25-28 (Lafleur-Carrier, ‘Abélard et les universaux’, 154, § 27): “Sed fortassis dictetur secundum illam sententiam, quia non inde rationalitas et irrationalitas minus sunt contraria quod taliter reperiuntur in eodem, scilicet eodem genere uel in eadem specie, nisi scilicet in eodem individuo fundentur. Quod etiam sic ostenditur. Vere rationalitas et irrationalitas in eodem individuo sunt, quia in Socrate. Sed quod in Socrate simul sint, inde conuincitur quod…” If de Libera’s}

The lack of a reply by Abelard, and the fact that Abelard would report a long and detailed counter-objection of his opponents, already make de Libera’s interpretation rather weak. This, however, is not enough to rule out de Libera’s interpretation. One could argue, for instance, that the one manuscript transmitting the passage has omitted Abelard’s reply, or that Abelard has simply chosen a different style for this part. It is more interesting to consider the results de Libera’s interpretation yields, when what I first presented as Abelard’s reply acts as part of the \textit{merrealist}’s counter-objection.

As has been said, Abelard’s argument points at the fact that, if \textit{mer} is followed, then contraries come to inhere in the same subject (against Aristotle and Boethius). According to de Libera’s interpretation, \textit{merrealists} reply that Abelard is right in saying that contraries inhere in the same subject—in fact, if one considers things carefully, contraries do inhere in all subjects: not only genera and species, but also individuals. Implicitly, \textit{merrealists} would be saying that Aristotle’s way of characterizing contraries (as properties which cannot inhere in the same subject at the same time) is simply wrong. Contraries, they would be saying, inhere in each thing in the world. The text is ambiguous enough not to dismiss de Libera’s interpretation entirely.\footnote{But the plausibility}
of it all, I believe, is poor. In my opinion, no MERealist wanted to make such a claim, and positively try to demonstrate that Socrates is rational and irrational. This sounds more like an absurd consequence that an opponent might raise. On the contrary, if the standard way of interpreting the passage is followed, Aristotle’s authority on contraries which cannot inhere in the same subject is admitted—MERealists simply interpret Aristotle’s saying as applying to individuals only.

In a nutshell, if de Libera’s interpretation of this point is followed, one has a very long and detailed counter-reply by MERealists with no reply by Abelard, and a counter-reply with an extremely unlikely doctrine. On the other hand, the same text allows for the more traditional interpretation, usually followed by scholars, which indeed seems to be the right one here.

4 Peter King: *iam corpus*

Let us now come back to the problematic passage we are interested in:

> Quod uerum sit autem id quod supra assumpsimus, scilicet quicquid est in Burnellol aliud a formis Burnelli, est Burnellus, inde manifestum est, quia neque formae Burnelli sunt Burnellus, cum *iam* accidentia essent substantia, neque materia simul et formae Burnelli sunt Burnellus, cum *iam* corpus et *iam* (*iam* ms.) *non* Geyer, Lafleur-Carrier) corpus esse corpus necesse esset confiteri. (LI.12,9-14)

For a better understanding, I would suggest numbering the occurrences of ‘corpus’ in the last line. If Burnellus were matter and form, one would have to admit (“necesse esset confiteri”) that body (*corpus* 1) and—as King translates—“something already body” (*corpus* 2) are body (*corpus* 3). Peter King was the first to argue in favour of the manuscript text ‘*iam corpus*’ (2),22 and his interpretation is followed, it is not entirely clear why MERealists should be saying that “rationality and irrationality are no less contraries because they are found in this way in the same thing—that is in the same genus or in the same species—*unless* they are based in the same individual” (trans. Spade, 31, my italics).

22 King, ‘Metaphysics’, 67-68, 110 (nn. 9-12); cf. also King, *Peter Abailard*, 1: 151-161. Both in his PhD thesis and in his article, King states that Geyer’s apparatus is faulty on this point (cf. King, ‘Metaphysics’, 110 n. 9; King, *Peter Abailard*, 1: 155). In fact, Geyer’s negative apparatus is simply not faulty here and it reports exactly the same text that is supported by King.
interpretation has been accepted by Paul Vincent Spade in his well-known translation of this passage.23

Before trying to describe King’s interpretation in detail, one must note that it relies on an overall attitude towards this text, which is shared by both King and Tweedale commenting on this passage. Abelard’s argument, as has been shown, is built in a regressive way, as the conclusion is put forward before the reasoning justifying it. As a consequence, the very end is the core of the argument, from which all the rest stems. According to these scholars, it is quite easy for Abelard to get rid of hypothesis (a), that Burnellus is just its forms, whereas “the real work”24 is done by Abelard in getting rid of position (c). What is implied is that Abelard must have had a powerful argument for this crucial point, although a rather cryptic sentence is chosen to explain his point.

According to King, Burnellus cannot be forms and matter because, were this accepted, it would be necessary to admit that “body and already-body (iam corpus) are body.” In order to explain how this is supposed to be unacceptable, I will follow the same strategy King adopts in making his claim. He first develops what he calls ‘the background reasoning’ of the text, and then applies it to the text itself. The background reasoning is the following. Let us imagine that Socrates (King chooses Socrates as his example, not Burnellus) is indeed forms and matter. The forms will include not only accidents, but also the specific differentiae—for instance, rationality, thanks to which Socrates is a man. King now proves, both through reasoning and by means of historic pieces of information (according to which such a theory was attributed to William of Champeaux),25 that the differentia is not separated from matter at all. In other words, the differentia always presupposes the matter in which it inheres—one should rather understand ‘rationality’ as equivalent to ‘rational animal’.26 If

23 Cf. Spade, Five Texts, 32 (Spade based himself on King’s PhD thesis).
26 King, ‘Metaphysics’, 68: “But why not think the individual is its advening forms in combination with its material essence? Abelard’s background reasoning runs as follows. [a] Such advening forms include the specific differentia for the kind of thing the individual is, e. g. rationality in the case of Socrates. [b] The differentia cannot be merely accidental to the material essence, or it would not be part of making the thing what it is; rationality makes Socrates human, and is not just an accidental feature. Nor is the differentia merely ‘co-present’ in the individual: Socrates would be no more than an accidental union of material essence and some form(s), really two things rather than one. Yet the differentia cannot simply inhere in the material essence: it either produces something essentially different, contrary to the basic tenets of material essence realism, or, by Abelard’s main argument, contraries will simultaneously inhere in the same thing. The
Socrates, then, is matter *plus* forms (as in the hypothesis), he will be Animal *plus* forms; that is to say, Animal *plus*, e.g., the differentia rationality; that is to say, Animal *plus* rational Animal; and this is absurd. Such a background reasoning is then applied by King to understanding the phrase “corpus (1) et iam corpus (2) esse corpus (3).” Corpus (3) refers to the individual, e.g., Socrates, which is body; corpus (1) is his matter, the genus Body; corpus (2) is the matter which is already presupposed by forms such as the differentia rationality. The addition of corpus (1) with *iam corpus* (2) is absurd and unacceptable, once one considers that the two items that should be added to one another are already included, both, in one of them. This is how King explains the text in the manuscript.

All efforts to make sense of the manuscript text before emending it are, of course, extremely well worth doing. However, I think this interpretation can be challenged in three ways: first, with an argument from the context; second, with remarks on the use of ‘*iam*’; third, in itself, by claiming that the argument does not find anything absurd or contradictory, as it needs to.

The first argument is grounded in the context. Abelard has written a very detailed argument here, and every passage in the argument has been explained. Even a very easy step such as ‘A = B, therefore B = A’ has been mentioned (cf. above, from (3) to (5)). However, if Peter King’s interpretation is to be followed, the very end, on which the validity of all the rest lies, has a very different style. The last step (a) is not obviously self-contradictory and (b) refers implicitly to a theory—that of the differentia always informing a certain matter—which has not been mentioned in the description of MER. This theory was not mentioned when MER was described, but one has to presuppose it through a background reasoning in order to make sense of the sentence.

Second, it does not seem that the use of ‘*iam*’ in the expression ‘*iam corpus* (2)’ is plausible. In the same sentence, one would have two *iams*, with two

only option remaining is to hold that the differentia is not a separate quality at all but already informs the material essence—*not rationality* but *rational animal*. [c] Abelard explicitly states the consequence of this last option. Since the individual is composed of the material essence and advening forms, including the differentia, then Socrates must be composed of his material essence and differentia, i.e. his material essence in combination with his informed material essence, which is absurd.”

King, ‘Metaphysics’, 110, n. 12: “Socrates is a rational animal, that is, a rational animate body; hence he is essentially a body. But the differentia ‘rational’, by the argument given above, is not the name of a quality such as rationality but rather the name of the species, rational animate body. Since Socrates is his material essence plus his differentia, he is therefore body (his material essence *animate body*) and something already body (his differentia *rational animate body*)—an impossibility.”

\textit{Vivarium} 52 (2014) 1-22
different meanings. The first ‘iam’, meaning ‘then’ and coming just after ‘cum’, ‘because’, in the expression ‘because then’, is well attested and indeed has just been used to rule out hypothesis (a) (“cum iam accidentia essent substantia”). Afterwards, one would have a second ‘iam’, followed by a noun, forming the expression ‘something which is already a body’. One can accept that there is a uariatio in the use of ‘iam’. However, it simply does not seem that this second use of ‘iam’ is attested. In the Thesaurus Latinae Linguae, the use of ‘iam’ with a noun is attested, indeed, but it is usually with nouns indicating an age or a position such as ‘consul’ and ‘puer’. It does not seem there is any logical use of ‘iam’ such as the one King sees here. (Both points, however, can be dismissed by an appeal to the ‘cryptic’ argument.)

Third, one could ask why “corpus et iam corpus esse corpus” should be regarded as absurd and unacceptable. The matter which is already presupposed by the differentia (corpus-2), of course, must be different from the matter of the individual (corpus-1), for otherwise no problem at all would arise. But even if it is different, one could say that this system is redundant (it has two matters where one would be enough), but this does not mean it is contradictory. And finally, why should the argument say that corpus and iam corpus ‘are corpus-(3)’? If corpus-(3) simply indicates the individual, calling it corpus complicates the sentence with no apparent reason—one could simply say that ‘body and what is already a body are Socrates’. But perhaps corpus-(3) is meant to justify corpus-(1): it is because the individual is a body that one can say its matter is a body. In this case, however, Abelard would be seeing a contradiction between corpus-1 and iam corpus-(2) (body and what is already a body), while the same contradiction would exist between corpus-(1) and corpus-(3), for corpus-(1) too is ‘already body’ before receiving the forms thanks to which it becomes body (corpus-3). So, while Abelard would be highlighting a contradiction between corpus-(1) and corpus-(2), he would be failing to see the same contradiction between corpus-(1) and corpus-(3).

One can conclude, I believe, that Peter King’s interpretation of the manuscript cannot be accepted and that the manuscript is mistaken on this point. In fact, the mistake can be explained as a simple case of assimilation (the scribe wrote, erroneously, ‘iam corpus’, because of the previous expression ‘cum iam corpus’).28

28 Similar mistakes and omissions in the readings of the Milan manuscript have been detected by Klaus Jacobi and Christian Strub in their edition of Abelard’s Glossae super Peri Hermeneias, a text for which the Milan manuscript is luckily supplemented by a second, independent witness, ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin—Preussischer Kulturbesitz, lat. fol. 624. Cf. K. Jacobi and C. Strub, ‘Introduction’, in Petri Abaelardi
5 Martin Tweedale: non corpus

If the manuscript is faulty, then Geyer’s emendation of ‘iam corpus’ into ‘non corpus’ is a very plausible one indeed: first, from a paleographical point of view (the abbreviation for ‘non’ being very similar to the abbreviation for ‘iam’); second, from the point of view of the content, as Geyer’s is a text one can make sense of. According to Geyer’s text, it is impossible that Burnellus is forms and matter, for in that case we would have to admit that “corpus et non corpus esse corpus” (body and non-body are body).29

In his Abailard on Universals, Martin Tweedale spends no less than seven pages on this line, explaining the passage through an analysis of what a combination is and also raising and answering possible arguments against Abelard here.30 The core of his point, I think, is preserved in the solution that I propose below, but the attitude towards the text is different. According to Tweedale, this ending for the argument is cryptic.31 On the contrary, I would suggest that the passage where hypothesis (c) is ruled out be logically similar to the passage where hypothesis (a) is ruled out. In both cases, accepting the hypothesis leads to an unacceptable conclusion. In the case of hypothesis (a), the unacceptable conclusion is expressed by a short sentence whose unacceptability is easy to detect: accidents would be substance. The same, I believe, happens in hypothesis (c) with the claim ‘body and non-body would be body’. In my interpretation, Abelard does not want to refer to any obscure reasoning, but to an inconueniens which is both immediately perceptible as such to his reader, and immediately detectable as deriving from hypothesis (c), too.

Why would affirming that Burnellus is forms and matter (hypothesis c) imply that ‘body and non-body are body’? If both hypothesis (c) and MER are accepted, than the universal (e.g., Body) becomes both a whole (a universal whole) for the individual and a part of the individual. Since Burnellus is an individual belonging to the genus Body, Body is a universal whole, which is rightly predicated of each of its individuals—it is right to say (S) ‘Burnellus est corpus’. At the same time, however, if hypothesis (c) ‘Burnellus is matter and

29 The emendation is also accepted by Lafleur-Carrier, ‘Abélard et les universaux’, 154, § 27 and 197, n. 245. They note that their choice is against King, Spade and the manuscript but do not discuss the issue further.
30 Tweedale, Abailard on Universals, 101-107.
31 Tweedale, Abailard on Universals, 102: “It is this point Abailard is making when he cryptically remarks, ‘it would be necessary to admit that a body and a non-body are a body.”
forms’ and MER are accepted, then the matter Body is a part of Burnellus to which one needs to add something else, which is non-Body: that is to say, forms (accidents and differentiae). So if hypothesis (c) is to be accepted, it is right to say that Burnellus is Body (the matter) and non-Body (the form): ‘Burnellus est corpus et non corpus’. Substituting this predicate for ‘Burnellus’ in sentence S, one obtains “corpus et non corpus esse corpus”, which is a contradiction. A universal whole cannot be a part of its individual, as MER (at least in the interpretation linked to hypothesis c) would want to claim.

To summarise briefly, so far I have argued against the manuscript’s ‘iam corpus’ and King’s interpretation of this text, and in favour of Geyer’s emendation ‘non corpus’ in line with Tweedale’s interpretation (but moving from a different attitude). In my last section, I would like to bring some evidence in favour of my claim that “corpus et non corpus esse corpus” is an unacceptable conclusion just as immediately perceptible as “accidents would be substance” (and also in favour of ‘non corpus’ against other hypothetical solutions). I shall therefore analyse a few other texts where Abelard equally uses or is reported to have used the inconueniens “corpus et non corpus esse corpus.” In my opinion, this analysis could tell us why Abelard decided to make his point with corpus and not another genus in Porphyry’s tree, which presumably could have worked in exactly the same way (e.g., “substance and non-substance would be substance”). Besides, I believe we might also find a clue for the reason why he decided to conclude this argument by proving proposition (9), on Burnellus, rather than proposition (11), on Socrates.

6 Abelard and ‘non corpus’: Other Testimonies

The emendation ‘non corpus’ is also supported by the fact that one finds the same inconueniens, “corpus et non corpus esse corpus,” in texts closely associated with Abelard and reporting his views.32

The inconueniens is mentioned in the context of a certain doctrine of Abelard’s. The doctrine states that Porphyry is wrong in dividing substantia into corporea and incorporea in his tree. Man, indeed, acts as a counter-example against such subdivision—a man is at the same time corporeal through his body and incorporeal through his soul. Man is rather a ‘mixed substance’ and Substance should be divided into corporea, incorporea and a mixture of both. As Yukio Iwakuma has shown, a similar claim against Porphyry is found

32 Some of these passages have already been mentioned by Tweedale, Abailard on Universals, 104, and King, Peter Abailard, 1: 156, who do not, however, discuss them in detail.
in several texts in this period (not necessarily linked to Abelard), e.g., in the commentary on Boethius’ *De divisione* in ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 7094A, ff. 83ra-92ra, and in commentary *P3*. Commentaries *P20* and *P25* attribute the threefold division of substance to Peter Abelard. Commentary *P25* is particularly interesting, for the contradiction “*corpus et non corpus esse corpus*” is used in this context:

Dicit m(agister) P(etrus) quod haec diuisio non est sufficiens, quia quaedam substantia est quae neque est corporea neque incorporea sed mixta, ut homo. Quod hoc modo probat. Homo constat ex anima et corpore, ergo non est magis ratio quare dicatur corpus quam anima, ergo cum homo non dicatur anima, et non debet dici corpus. Item. Si homo dicitur corpus, oritur inconueniens, quia dicit Boethius “partes simul

---

33 Cf. Y. Iwakuma, ‘Pierre Abélard et Guillaume de Champeaux dans les premières années du XIIe siècle: une étude prélminaire’, in *Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIe siècle*, ed. J. Biard (Paris 1999), 93-123 (especially 98-101; attributions suggested in this article are, however, questionable). Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 7094A, f. 84rb, quoted in Iwakuma, ‘Pierre Abélard’, 98, claims that Substance should be divided into *corporea*, *incorporea* and *composita ex utroque*. The counter-example against the standard subdivision into *corporea* and *incorporea* is Animal—were Animal under Body (as in the standard subdivision), then the difference *corporeum* (Animal’s difference if it were under Body) would also mean the soul (*anima*), which is an *incorporeum*. A similar strain of thought is found in the Oxford-Assisi version of commentary *P3*, quoted in Iwakuma, ‘Pierre Abélard’, 99-100 (Substance is better divided into *corporea*, *incorporea* and both, and Man, because of his soul, acts as counter-example to the standard division into *corporea* and *incorporea*). The Paris version of commentary *P3*, however, rejects this reasoning and supports the standard division into *corporea* and *incorporea* claiming that a proper division must divide items into opposite things (quoted in Iwakuma, ‘Pierre Abélard’, 100-101). For this section of *P3*, see the edition in Iwakuma, ‘Pseudo-Rabanus’, 114-116.

34 Iwakuma, ‘Pierre Abélard’, 99, quoting *P20* (Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cvp. 2486, f. 50vb): “Sed de ista diuisione, scilicet ‘substantia alia corporea, alia incorporea’, quaeritur si sit sufficiens et per opposita. Quod per opposita sit apud omnes constans est. Quod autem sufficiens sit in praedicatione, scilicet ita quod diuidentium aliquid praedicetur de quocumque diuisim [diuisim Iwakuma] diuisum ms.], negat m(agister) P(etrus), quia non omnis substantia secundum eum aut est corporea aut incorporea. Concedit tamen diisionem illam hoc modo esse sufficientem quod nulla substantia sit praeter corporea et incorporea, ita scilicet quod sit illis opposita, quia omnis aut est corporea aut incorporea aut ex utrisque confecta. Quae autem ex utrisque est composita secundum eum nec est corporea nec incorporea, sed substantiam illam dicit esse mixtam substantiam, quae est homo.” On this passage, see also L.M. de Rijk, ‘Some new Evidence on twelfth century Logic: Alberic and the School of Mont Ste Geneviève’, *Vivarium* 4 (1966), 1-57, especially 24 (also identifying *m. P.* with Peter Abelard).
iunctae suscipiunt nomen totius,” ergo anima et corpus sunt homo, sed omnis homo est corpus, ergo anima et corpus sunt corpus, ergo corpus et non corpus sunt corpus.35

In LNPS the problem of the division of substance is mentioned, but the text is ambiguous on which solution should be regarded as Abelard’s.36 LI, too, tackles the issue of the division of Substance and uses the *inconueniens* “body and non-body are body.”37 The passage is rather complicated, because Abelard identifies absurd consequences at each level of the subdivision, even levels

36 LNPS, 547.12-37: “Quaeritur, an homo compositus ex anima et corpore sit corporea substantia an incorporea. Si est incorporea, tunc est spiritus, et si est corporea, tunc est corpus. Ad quod quidam dicunt quod corporeum est et non est corpus, ut scilicet corporeum sit uel corpus uel compositum a corpore, sicut incorporeum est uel spiritus uel substantia confecta ex spiritu. Secundum autem alios rationabilius dici potest, quod haec diuisio: substantia alia corporea, alia incorporea non sit sufficiens, et est apponendum tertium membrane, scilicet permixta substantia, sicut homo compositus. Si autem quaeratur, an sit rationale animal, dicunt: minime, cum non animal. Dicunt alii quod cum omnis substantia est corpus uel contra uel mixta natura,ideo est sufficiens haec diuisio, cum nulla substantia alia numero ab incorporea et corporea relinquitur, quomodo ista: domus aliud paries etc., non est insufficientis, licet quasdam partes domus non amplitudatur, ut dimidiom domum, quod tamen non est diuersum numero ab illis. Mixtam substantiam uocamus compositum ex anima et corpore, quod non est corpus, quia iam anima esset pars corporis; corpus tamen quod est pars illius substantiae, ut homo. Quod a philosophis dictur: suppositum animali et corpori, pars illius compositi, est homo et illud compositum homo est, ergo homo est pars hominis, falsum est, quia oportet, quod in eadem significacione ponetur ‘homo’ et ‘hominis’.”
37 LI, 48.10-30: “Solet hoc loco quaeri de hac diuisione substantiae <secundum> quam alia corporea, alia incorporea, quae hic solet adscribi, utrum sit sufficientis. Quod non uidetur propter hominem compositum ex anima et corpore, quippe ipse nec corporeus nec incorporeus est, alioquin corpus simul esset spiritus uel incorporeum. Sed profecto corpus et spiritus simul neque corpus sunt neque spiritus. Si enim corpus et spiritus corpus essent, item corpus et non corpus essent corpus, et ita uel animatum uel inanimatum. Quod si utrumque animatum est, simul per animam uiuificantur, quod falsum est, cum solum corpus anima uiuificet. Amplius. Si est animatum, uel sensibile uel insensibile; quod si sensibile, tunc est animal, et ita mortale uel immortale. Quod si mortale, uel tale mortale, quod quandoque moritur, uel tale mortale, quod numquam morietur. Sed si quandoque morietur, quandoque erit mortuum, et ita uel homo mortuos uel aliud. Quod si homo mortuos utrumque erunt simul corpus et anima, utrumque erit cadaver, quod aperte falsum est. Si quis autem dicat corpus et animam mori nihil aliud esse quam eam separari ab inuicem, tum utrumque separatum ab alto utrumque mortuum dictetur, et ita anima,
that his previous demonstration has already ruled out. In other words, he moves from subdividing Substance into corporeal and incorporeal and shows that, if one accepts such a subdivision, one obtains an unacceptable conclusion. However, he then goes on to assume the conclusion as if it were acceptable, and draws another unacceptable conclusion from it—and then again assumes this second unacceptable conclusion as if it were acceptable, and draws a third unacceptable conclusion from it, etc. “Corpus et non corpus esse corpus” is the second absurd conclusion that is drawn within the argument.

In more detail, the argument runs as follows. Porphyry’s subdivision of Substance into corporeal and incorporeal does not seem to be valid for Man, who is both soul and body. Were it valid, Man would be classified on the ‘corporeal’ side (as it is situated, in fact, in Porphyry’s tree) and thus several unacceptable conclusions would follow: (i) body would be at the same time spirit or incorporeal (corpus simul esset spiritus vel incorporeum); (ii) body and spirit would be body (corpus et spiritus corpus essent), that is, (iii) body and non-body would be body (corpus et non corpus essent corpus). This is the argument’s first level. Other unacceptable conclusions are drawn at higher levels. At the second level man (that is, body and non-body, somehow accepted from the first level) would be animated, that is, vivified by the soul. This means that not only body, but also non-body (that is, in fact, the soul) would be animated by the soul—a second unacceptable conclusion, for body only, not the soul itself, is animated by the soul. At a third level, man (body and not-body, both animated, as obtained from the second level) is recognised as a mortal animal. This means that, at a certain moment in time, he will be dead. This yields a third unacceptable conclusion, that the soul (non-body) is dead in this corpse, that is, that the soul itself is mortal.

These texts by Abelard or reporting Abelard’s doctrine show us that he used the contradiction “corpus et non corpus esse corpus” elsewhere in his teaching, thus making the reading ‘non corpus’ more plausible of an option for LI 12.13. They may also give us a clue for why Abelard decided to make the example with the genus Body: “corpus et non corpus esse corpus” was perhaps considered a standard inconueniens to be raised. Besides, we might also find a reason why he chose to develop stage (9) and not stage (11) of the argument, that is to say, to make his example with Burnellus and not with Socrates. According to the doctrine we have just seen, Man is a counterexample for the subdivision of Substance into corporeal and incorporeal. So, one might want to argue that “Socrates est corpus,” a necessary premise to get the conclusion “corpus et non

\[ \text{cum tamen eam immortalem omnino constituant philosophi et solum corpus mori uelint, quia nihil est aliud mori quam exstingui recedente anima, qua uiuificabatur.} \]
corpus esse corpus,” cannot be taken for granted. On the contrary, the problem is less likely to arise with Burnellus.

7 Conclusion

In a nutshell, it seems safe to admit that Abelard's text in *LI* 12.13 is 'non corpus', against the manuscript reading 'iam corpus'. Not only is Geyer's emendation paleographically acceptable, it has a plausible meaning, and it is supported by Abelard's using the same impasse elsewhere in his teaching. It can also help us in detecting a nuance in Abelard's argument against MER which otherwise might not have been perceived.