Journal of Mediterranean Studies

The Journal of Mediterranean Studies is an interdisciplinary journal published twice yearly. It is specifically aimed at scholars whose professional academic interests are concerned with Mediterranean societies and cultures within the fields of Social Anthropology, Classics, Archaeology, History, Popular Art, and Literature. The journal intends to provide a forum whereby scholars working in academically and geographically contiguous areas can explore, and be exposed to, parallel and related theoretical issues. It sets out to establish a framework for interdisciplinary discussion, particularly important when studying Mediterranean societies and cultures, and to encourage dialogue between academics based in North American and North European Universities and in Mediterranean ones.

The journal series consists of special issues devoted to particular topics/disciplines, and general issues consisting of articles submitted for publication. Some issues also contain a discussion section where particularly notable or theoretically innovative publications are extensively reviewed and placed within the overall context of the author's work. To encourage dialogue, the author is given the opportunity to reply to the reviewer's comments in the same issue. The primary language of publication is English, but consideration will be given to the inclusion of a restricted number of articles in French and Italian. Particularly notable articles submitted in other languages may also be translated into English.

The Journal of Mediterranean Studies welcomes the submission of papers dealing with the history, cultures and societies of the Mediterranean world. All papers are refereed by specialists in the field. e-mail: editor-jms@um.edu.mt

Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in Anthropological Index Online, Historical Abstracts and Sociological Abstracts (SA). The latter is available to researchers in print, on line, and on CD-ROM. The Journal of Mediterranean Studies also appears in International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, Current Contents/Arts and Humanities, and the Arts & Humanities Citation Index.

Single copies of articles in the Journal of Mediterranean Studies by bona fide academic researchers for personal study purposes may be effected free of copyright charges provided that (i) no more than 25% of the text of an issue of the Journal or (ii) no more than two articles from such an issue are copied. For, and prior to, photocopying items for educational classroom use, please contact the Copyright Clearance Centre, Customer Service, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers MA 01923, USA. (508)750-8400. Fax (508)750-4470.

Typesetting by Malta University Publishing
Printed in Malta by Progress Press Ltd.
Copyright © Mediterranean Institute, University of Malta  ISSN: 1016-3476
CONTENTS

Reflecting Anthropology in the Mediterranean

Foreword........................................................................... Paul Clough 207
William Kavanagh: An Appreciation ....................... Jutta Lauth Bacas 209
Introduction – New Reflections on
Anthropology in the Mediterranean ....................... Jutta Lauth Bacas 215

PART ONE: Reflecting on Anthropology in the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean: Topos or Mirage?............. Lidia Dina Sciama 229
‘The Mediterranean: A Wall’.
Comment on Lidia Dina Sciama’s paper –
‘The Mediterranean: Topos or Mirage?’ .......... João de Pina Cabral 245

Two Countries, Three Decades, One Anthropologists:
Reflections on Fieldwork in
Spain and Portugal............................................... William Kavanagh 253

Honour, History and the History of
Mediterranean Anthropology .......................... Paola Sacchi &
Pier Paolo Viazzo 275

Power, Corruption and Reflexive Truths:
A Reprise of ‘Mediterranean Corruption’ ...... Dorothy Louise Zinn 293

PART TWO: Reflecting on Changes in the Mediterranean

Perceiving Fences and Experiencing Borders in Greece:
A Discourse on Irregular Migration across
European Borders .................................................. Jutta Lauth Bacas 319
FOREWORD

Dear Readers,

This issue is my last as Chairman of the Editorial Working Group of the Journal of Mediterranean Studies. As Chairman, I was responsible for editing all General issues, and for commissioning Special issues and facilitating their production at Malta University Publishing. I chaired the Editorial Working Group from its formation in November 1998. I have resigned as Chair, and from the next issue, Volume 23, Number 1, 2014, JMS will be edited by Dr. Jean-Paul Baldacchino, as sole Editor responsible to a new Editorial Board appointed by the Mediterranean Institute. Thus, an era comes to a close at JMS, which began with Volume 9, Number 2, 1999, and ends with this issue, Volume 22, Number 2, 2013. It has been marked by the truly international nature of JMS publication on the Mediterranean region.

On leaving the journal, I wish to thank all those who have given important help in editing the journal since 1998. I particularly wish to thank those other members of the Editorial Working Group who edited issues, including Anthony Spiteri (Volume 11, Number 1), David Zammit (Volume 17, Number 2), and Anthony Bonanno (who co-edited the first issue of 1999 and helped me with Volume 17, Number 1). Above all, my thanks go to my colleague on the Working Group, Carmel Vassallo, for editing six issues of maritime history—Volume 10, Numbers 1/2; Volume 12, Number 2; Volume 16, Numbers 1/2; and Volume 19, Number 2. Carmel brought to JMS his work as convenor of the Mediterranean Maritime History Network (MMHN), where he chose a selection of papers from its periodic conferences for peer review by an international group of historians, establishing JMS as a central site of maritime research. Lastly, very special thanks go to three members of the International Editorial Advisory Board—Jon Mitchell, Jeremy Boissevain and Michael Herzfeld. Jeremy and Michael were generous in answering my calls for advice and taking on work as peer reviewers. Jon was the editor of a seminal Special issue (Volume 12, Number 1), Modernities in the Mediterranean. He has been selfless in giving JMS his time to peer review submitted papers and to seek out potential papers for submission to JMS.

I take this opportunity to express my gratitude for the work of two of our guest editors, Jutta Lauth Bacas and the late William Kavanagh. As co-convenors of the Mediterraneanist Network (Mednet) of the European Association of Social Anthropologists (EASA), Jutta and William edited two Special issues—a selection of papers from Mednet conferences at Catania.
FENCING IN THE SOUTH: THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR AS A PARADIGM OF THE NEW BORDER REGIME IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

FRANCESCO VACCHIANO

Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon

Over the last years the Mediterranean has turned into one of the main sites of implementation of the new European ‘border regime’. The manufacture of the new ‘southern frontier’ in Europe is shaping economic, social and political processes in new ways for the area. Through the ethnography of the transformations in the social and physical landscape around the Strait of Gibraltar (particularly at the Moroccan-Spanish border), this contribution puts forward a reflection upon the multiple levels of action of the contemporary border. Building on the debate on the new European ‘border regime’ and its fallouts, I propose a framework to analyse the different devices (legislative, bureaucratic, securitarian and conceptual) that compose the ‘border apparatus’ and how they are functioning in the area of Gibraltar. My aim is to give an anthropological contribution to reflect on the ways the Mediterranean is currently being set up as a new borderland, but also to propose a framework to study bordering processes in other sites.

Introduction: A Growing Fence

Although it has always been a context of movement and trade, in recent years the Mediterranean has taken on a new centrality for understanding the global processes of mobility, transformation and social change. The Mediterranean is today one of the ‘contact zones’ where the historically-determined socio-economic differences between Global North and South are more acute (Jordan Galduf and Antuñano Maruri 2001; Le Boedec 2008; Caruso and Venditto 2008; Moré 2011), but also a site of experimentation of new policies and practices regarding mobility and control. Throughout
this area, an intense movement of goods and services is being propelled, not only by way of free trade agreements, but also through initiatives which, by attracting capital and investments, encourage the transfer southwards of broad sectors of the European production. Concurrently, through the use of the new media, a new transnational audience elaborates and shares images of oneself and the others, life aspirations and political representations, building new forms of participation at a distance. To these flows correspond a major movement of people, who look—as in the case of tourism—for zones of domesticated otherness, or travel—as in the case of migrants—in search of different possibilities of life. Nonetheless, following new and controversial demands of migration ‘management’, the Mediterranean is now regarded as one of the most emblematic sites where the government of human mobility is being organized. The ‘middle sea’ (in Arabic al-Bahr al-Abyad al-Mutawassit), a historical place of exchanges, clashes, creolizations and divides, is today the core of a new process of ‘rebordering’ (Suárez-Navaz, 2005), whose consequences are manifold and often problematic.

In order to account for the growing impact of such dynamics, several authors have proposed the notion of ‘border regime’ as a comprehensive definition of the system of regulations and procedures that are being implemented in order to direct movement and influence its outcomes. While John Bornemann initially introduced the notion of ‘Grenzregime’ in a reflection on the historical case of the Berlin Wall (Borneman, 1998), its application to the changing function of the European frontier was sketched by Brown, in a discussion on the implications of the European eastward enlargement (Brown, 2002). In a later contribution, Berg and Ehin defined ‘border regime’ as ‘a system of control, regulating behaviour at the borders’ (2006, p. 54). Besides this general meaning, the concept has recently seemed appropriate to describe a more complex set of processes related to border enforcement and their effects for transforming the relations between territory, state and sovereignty in contemporary Europe (Balibar 2009; Vaughan-Williams 2009b). As Étienne Balibar as early as in 2002 remarked, ‘some borders are no longer situated at the borders at all’ (Balibar, 2002, p. 84). In keeping with such thinking, Sandro Mezzadra has drawn the attention to the deterritorialization of the borders and their attitude to produce a ‘selective and differential inclusion of migrants’ (Mezzadra, 2006, p. 39), while Euskirchen, Lebuhn and Ray have argued that the European standards for external border tightening from Schengen onwards have transformed Europe into a borderland, through mechanisms of ‘re-categorization of spaces and territories, […] expansion and diversification of the modes of border control
and enforcement, and a public discourse shaped by distorting representations of migrants’ (2007, p. 47). Following this line of reflection, Friese and Mezzadra argue that ‘borders are projected to the outside and stretch their shadow hundreds of miles further from the geographical lines that delineate an area such as Europe’ (2010, p. 304).

Against the backdrop of these studies, the frontier is being conceptualized as a powerful biopolitical tool for selecting and controlling specific classes of people according to a series of ‘porocratic’ mechanisms combining obstruction and movement (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008). Though for Euskirchen, Lebuhn and Ray, their aim is functionally directed at producing a ‘very flexible and highly disposable transnational labour force’ (2007, p. 47), Tsianos and Karakayali insist on the broader effects related to the influences on the ‘cultural self-images and concepts of citizenship in the new Europe’ (2010, p. 375).  

Although a single rationality or linear causality between purposes and outcomes is not always clear, we may easily acknowledge that a pervasive border discipline is influencing not merely the forms of ‘socially produced motion’ (Cresswell and Merriman, 2011) in the Mediterranean, but also the ways of wielding sovereignty, perceiving membership and producing citizenship in Europe and beyond (Suárez-Navaz, 2005). Indeed, the progression of measures fuelled by the EU in order to direct movement through borders is impressive. Ever since the first subscribers of the Schengen Agreement committed themselves to ‘abolish checks at common borders and transfer them to their external borders’ (art. 17), a sheer border policy has been undertaken from the Amsterdam Treaty onwards (1997), being consolidated through the European Councils of Tampere (1999), Seville (2002) and The Hague (2004). At the same time that the project for an internal space of ‘freedom, security and justice’—according to the Amsterdam Treaty prominent formula—was established, ‘the need for a more efficient management of migration flows at all their stages’ (Tampere Programme, art. 22, emphasis mine) was acknowledged. As a consequence, The Hague Programme emphasised the need to ‘tackle at its source illegal immigration’ (art. 23), insisting on the ‘importance of the effective control of the Union’s future external borders by specialised trained professionals’ (art. 25) and on ‘fighting illegal immigration and the trafficking of human beings’ (The Hague Programme, 2004). The principle of ‘efficient management’ was initially sketched throughout some scattered Commission documents (European Commission 2003; European Commission 2005), and then more clearly specified in the EU Commission communication ‘Towards a Common Immigration Policy’ (European Commission 2007), as well as in the so-
called ‘return directive’ (European Parliament 2008; for an analysis see Jiménez Alvarez 2011).

In these documents, a twofold strategy is put forward: on the one hand, the regular migration of low-, middle- and highly-skilled workers from ‘third countries’ is promoted, in order to compensate labour shortages due to European demographic and employment trends; on the other, measures of removal—by means of detention, expulsion or deportation of any ‘third country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry’ (European Parliament 2008)—are implemented. Consequently, European policy comes forward as strategically oriented at making the most of the migrant workforce and its multiple contributions—‘legal immigrants contribute to the economic development of Member States because they are tax payers and consumers of goods and services’ (European Commission 2007: 8)—regulating, at the same time, the surplus in the labour market through removal. As Van Houtum and Pijpers have pointed out, the two main manifestations of European migration policy are ‘the simultaneous attraction of economically required and rejection of allegedly market-redundant immigrants’ (2008, p. 2).

In a time of neoliberal transformation (Harvey 2007, Wacquant 2012), a regime based on mechanisms of selection and ‘deportability’ (De Genova 2002; 2004) is coherent with the double necessity of providing the market with flexible, ready-to-use labour force and preventing the long-standing state engagement for their maintenance. In this sense, the model of the so-called ‘circular migration’ — moulded on the prototype of the ‘Gastarbeiter’ or on the pattern of seasonal migration—seems to constitute the ultimate reference. As a result, a complex system of surveillance technologies and biometrical techniques, visas and stamps, fences and walls, categories for classifying people and facilities for grouping them together, as well as a new set of procedures for their deportation and a new European border agency has been deployed over the last years. Concurrently, ‘third countries’ have been progressively encouraged to enforce regulations which restrict overall mobility within and from their territories, joining the European effort to ‘manage’ its external frontier.

The southern shore of the Mediterranean represents a prime spot to observe such developments and their outcomes, since it is mainly on the European ‘southern frontier’ that some of the most critical dynamics related to mobility and control are being moulded. They consist of a series of concomitant events that an ethnographic analysis may contribute to dig out and discuss. Although the European frontier is far from being a new field of inquiry in the interdisciplinary area of border studies, the ethnography of
specific border zones still remains a fairly isolated exercise. Through an anthropological analysis of movement and surveillance in the Gibraltar area (and namely across the Spanish-Moroccan border), this article aims at offering a contribution to understand mechanisms and effects of the new frontier. The importance of fluxes and exchanges around this area, but also the intense vigilance and the resulting dramatic consequences over the transiting people, make this place a paradigmatic case of the ongoing transformations of sovereignty and citizenship in Europe and beyond.

Joining ethnographic vignettes and the study of some specific cases, I illustrate the articulated system of regulations, procedures and categories that operate to transform the Strait of Gibraltar (and by extension the whole Mediterranean) into an ‘apparatus’ aimed at manufacturing forms of prescribed movement and differential inclusion. With this scope in mind, I describe the structure of the different devices which compose the contemporary border regime in the area on the basis of their specific fields of production and application. Particularly, I propose to analyse the initiatives put in place through a framework focused on four main domains: legislative (treaties, agreements, policies, and their consequences); bureaucratic-administrative (procedures, papers and the actors of the bureaucratic performances); securitarian (controls, patrols, walls and fences, retention and expulsion centres and technologies of surveillance), and conceptual (categories, taxonomies, forms of classification of people and movement, as well as the constructed evidence they provide). This framework is useful to draw together different facts and situations—political choices, diplomatic initiatives, administrative procedures, technical operations, mental representations, bureaucratic categories, and so forth—carried out by different actors in very diverse positions, which concur to bring about the actual conditions that people experience on the ground.

As I will try to show, the deployment of this range of widely diverse border devices is deeply affecting the social life, the interactions among people and the human landscape in the area of the Strait of Gibraltar.

Postcards from the Southern Frontier

If we imagine embarking on a ship for a hypothetical coastal trip between Tangier and Ceuta, the scenery would appear as an extraordinary sequence of emblematic images, which well portray the social, political and economical transformations in the area.

Leaving Tangier’s old port, now cleared of trucks and warehouses according to the pro-tourism renovation plan, we might observe the ‘municipal beach’
Francesco Vacchiano

and its coastline, studded with modern clubs and restaurants frequented by the new rich and the emerging middle class of the city. Cutting across the bay, cranes and scaffolds point out the intense ongoing building activity around the Malabata area: rumours correlate the constant flourishing of new complexes around the city to the laundering of the blooming hashish-related profits.

Sailing west, after the Cape of Malabata, following a succession of beautiful cliffs and the two beaches of Sidi Kankouche and Oued Aliane, the impressive bulk of the new Tanger-Med Port would appear as in a strange dream, clashing sharply with the fishing village (and ancient Portuguese outpost) of Ksar Sghir.

The new port is a giant that has grown up recently and quickly. Built up in a few years in an area that was previously inhabited by mostly small scale fishermen and peasants, it consists today of two terminals, dedicated to the storage of containers, passenger traffic and intermodal activities. Its hinterland is constituted by a series of free-trade zones, which are meant to attract multinational logistics, manufacturing and distribution firms counting on duty-free advantages and low-cost workforce. It is in this area—in the free-zone of Melloussa I—that Renault has recently inaugurated its new Northern African main plant, expected to produce 400,000 vehicles per year.

After a tall hill and the startling revelation of the beach of Daliya, the shore becomes harsh and green, due to the Forest of Jebel Moussa. The area, where the small Perejil Island is located, is well known for two different stories: first, the territorial conflict between Morocco and Spain, which caused a diplomatic incident in 2002, when a handful of Moroccan soldiers occupied the island (and eventually retreated after the Spanish intervention); second, the fact that the Forest has been at various times the refuge and the hideaway of Western and Central Africa (but also Indian and Pakistani) migrants who tried to make it to the neighbouring Spanish enclave of Ceuta.

The border-fence which wraps the enclave is close to the Moroccan village of Belyounech and is watched over constantly by Moroccan soldiers and Spanish officers. It consists of two three to six meter parallel fences topped with barbed wire and interspersed with watchtowers. The fence stretches into the sea for about a hundred meters, prolonging the border in the direction of Gibraltar, which appears neatly on the opposite side of the Strait. Patrol boats and Coastguard vessels check the maritime space, while the Guardia Civil look after the Spanish side of the border. After the September 2005 assault, in which hundreds of people tried to cross the barrier and five of them were shot dead, this is
one of the most heavily guarded areas of the European border (Ferrer-Gallardo and Planet Contreras, 2012).

Our imaginary journey ends in Benzú, inside the enclave, where the final image of the CETI, the reception centre for immigrants on the top of the hill, reminds us of the story of the 72 migrants from India who spent between two and three years in the woods surrounding the Centre for the fear of being deported, as had previously happened to their compatriots. After their resistance, and as a consequence of the pressures of public opinion, NGOs and even the Council of Europe, they ended up being transferred in small groups to Spain, although without documents or legal status.

We stop imagining here and enter reality, in this emblematic exclave of European territory which lies just opposite the other famous dominion that gives name to the entire area. Evoking the long history of circulation between the two shores of the Strait, Gibraltar—the Arab ‘Jabal At-Tāriq’—represents today one of the most exemplary cases of the current process of (re)shaping sovereignty and movement across the Mediterranean space.

According to the Spanish economist Iñigo Moré, ‘the border between Spain and Morocco is the more unequal—in economic terms—than the one between any other EU country or OECD country’ (Moré 2005). For Moré, this wide disparity ‘sharpen[s] the frontier between the two countries. Le Boedec defines the Strait of Gibraltar as ‘one of the most unequal frontiers in the world’ (Le Boedec 2008: 2), highlighting—before the recent European economic crisis—the growing lag between the two shores. Though acknowledging this divide, Ferrer-Gallardo has also emphasized the multiple components of this unifying and dividing space, describing the geopolitical, functional and symbolic dimensions which make of this territory a controversial place ‘of clashes and alliances’ (Ferrer-Gallardo 2008: 302).

Much more than the designed barrier between Morocco and Spain, Africa and Europe, South and North, Islam and Christianity, this contested space is made up by the multiplicity of practices and imaginaries produced along its contours. The boundary shows here all its ambiguous potentialities, being a site of separation and production at once. In the following section, I claim that separation is here a specific mechanism for new forms of production obtained by way of the border, in many different ways.

**A Crossroad of Mobility**

The Strait of Gibraltar is traversed by conflicting streams and processes, which ‘make it an original observation point of the globalisation and its
effects on the territories’ (Marei 2012). Every year almost 40,000 freight trucks and five million people cross the Strait in any direction and for multiple purposes: from the Spanish ports of Tarifa, Algeciras, Malaga, Almeria, Motril and Alicante to the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla and to the Algerian and Moroccan ports of Ghazauoet, Oran, Algiers, Nador, Al-Hoceima, Tanger and, now, Ksar Sghir, migrants, tourists, businesspeople, volunteers, transporters, institutions and international agencies officers transit across the border with relatively low restrictions.

According to the figures provided by the Spanish Dirección General de Protección Civil y Emergencia, almost two million people and half a million vehicles went in both directions across the Strait of Gibraltar during the summer of 2012 alone. Among them, Moroccan and Algerian emigrants returning for holidays constituted the bulk. The impact is so relevant that the Spanish Ministry of Interior has set up since 1983 a specific assistance plan named ‘Operación Paso del Estrecho’, primarily oriented to avoid a massive concentration of passengers and long waiting times (Sempere Souvannavong, 2011). This goal is pursued by providing an increased number of circulating ferries and through a better organisation of boarding and disembarking. Rapidity is thus the best way to organise and prompt further movement.

Emigrant workers share with tourists the means of transportation across the Strait: the Mediterranean ports, especially those located in northern Morocco and in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, are the main points of entrance of tourists travelling by sea from Europe to the Maghreb. Tangier is one of the main gateways of the country, being its port the first passengers’ transit area in Morocco (Silva, Martin, and Salem 2010) and the primary access point for Moroccan nationals residing abroad (Chattou 2011).

According to statistics made available by the Moroccan Administration du Tourisme, tourism represents the third source of income for the Moroccan economy and several national programmes have tried to step up the reception capacity of the national infrastructures. The littoral strip between Tétouan and Ceuta (from the villages of Mdiq to Fnideq through the new urbanization of Marina Smir) has been specifically targeted by large investments in this field, with the purpose of achieving 42,000 hotel places in 2012. As a consequence, the transformation of the previously agricultural landscape has been dramatic over the last few years. Tourist circulation has been encouraged by promoting the historical and the new tourist sites through intense marketing in Morocco and abroad, and by making it easier to access the country in organized tours (for example, by allowing entrance without a passport).
Nevertheless, the most ambitious plan for furthering the exchanges around the area is the Tanger-Med investment, which, as I have already pointed out, constitutes much more than a port. The Moroccan king Mohammed VI personally promoted the project in 2002, as a core initiative for propping up the development of a long-neglected area, in accordance with an aggressive strategy of attraction of foreign capital. He endorsed the creation of a public agency, the Agence Spéciale Tanger Méditerranée (TMSA), and appointed one of his senior personal advisors, Mr. Abdelaziz Meziane Belfqih, to lead the TMSA’s supervisory board (Piermay, 2009). The agency, provided with an extraordinary autonomous power, is responsible for planning, developing and the managing the Tangier-Med port complex, but also the wide industrial platform that lies behind it. The construction was entrusted to the French group Bouygues and started in 2003. Port 1, with a capacity for three million containers per year, was completed in 2007, while the second unit, qualified for five million containers, was put into activity in 2012. Once fully operational, Tanger Med will be the biggest commercial port both in Africa and in the Mediterranean. The passenger port is located between the two terminals of Tangier I and Tangier II and started its operations in July 2010, with a traffic forecast of seven million passengers and two million vehicles on a yearly basis (Ducruet, Mohamed-Chérif, and Cherfaoui 2011).

Behind the port area lies the Zone Spéciale de Développement, which consists of several free-trade zones, dedicated to logistics, manufacturing and distribution. According to Zemni and Bogaert, in 2011 more than 475 foreign and domestic companies were already settled in the area, not far from the new ‘Tanger Automotive City’, the complex meant to host the satellite activities related to the new Renault plant opened in 2012 (Zemni and Bogaert 2011). A new province, Fahs-Anjra—basically coinciding with the ‘special development area’—has been created, and it is served by 96 kilometres of new highways, a new expressway connecting the port to the free-zone of Oued Negro, and a 45-kilometre-long new railway line. In order to respond to the foreseen demand for housing, probably spawned by the rapid influx of new workers and their families to the area, an entire new city has been conceived. Built inland between Tangier and Tétouan, ‘Charfate’ is ‘planned to spread over 1,300 hectares and to host more than 150,000 inhabitants with a potential of 30,000 housing units’ (Ducruet, Mohamed-Chérif and Cherfaoui 2011: 9).

The project calls for a heavy financial commitment, around 11 billion dirhams (around 1 billion euros), and was expected to be taken on by private stakeholders and by the state. However, capital has been so far
provided by the Moroccan government (3.5 billion dirhams) and by the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (300,000 million) (Piermay 2009). The initiative is conceived as an ambitious strategy to attract foreign investments by providing a ‘hard’ infrastructure paired with a ‘soft’ regime of tax facilities and low labour cost.

The proximity of the free-zones to the national borders is a good example of the relation between quick access of commodities to the international flows—in the case of the Tanger-Med provided by some of the main world handlers of maritime transport such as Maersk, CMA-CGM and Hanjin Shipping (Mareï, 2012)—and the need to constitute a base of workers which is ‘local’, that is to say, spatially fixed and available to serve as a workforce under profitable conditions.

As a matter of fact, local people seem to have traditionally interpreted mobility and border as an extraordinary way to make profit from the historical ‘territorial discontinuities’ (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011; Ferrer-Gallardo and Planet Contreras, 2012) of the region.

Fnideq, November 2011:

At the frontier called ‘Tarahal’, in the place that Moroccans name familiarly ‘Bāb Sebt’ (Ceuta’s door), the quantity of grand-taxi which literally fill the clearing in front of the border is surprising. On the Moroccan side, cars marshal in a rather unruly queue, prepared to wait for unpredictable lengths of time. The first time that I went through this place, in 2002, the perimeter of the double fence encompassing the city had not been completed yet, and many people got to Spain by crossing the hill above the border gate.

The intense comings and goings echo the geopolitical weight of the place, not just a boundary between two countries, but an important access point to the so-called Schengen-Space, although in a still incomplete way: indeed, according to the convention regulating the entrance of Spain into the Schengen system (14 June 1985), Moroccans residing in Tétouan are allowed to get into the city without a visa requirement—if remaining for up to 24 hours—but not to step onto the Peninsula. This opportunity has facilitated, on the one hand, the daily entrance of Moroccan workers employed in construction (men) and in domestic assistance (women), and, on the other, a form of circulation of goods that in Ceuta (and in the other Spanish exclave Melilla) is chasteely referred as ‘comercio atipico’ (atypical commerce). In Morocco, this same activity is defined as trabando, clear transposition of the Spanish ‘contrabando’ (smuggling), an occupation which turned into a prevalently female occupation.
To the left of the waiting cars, our gaze is soon attracted by the agglomerations of women, some wearing the traditional jiblī dress, others muṭḥajīḥāt (wearing veil and Moroccan jellāba). They walk hunched over, with their back bent under huge loads tied to the body with ropes and adhesive tape. They are the ones who the press likes to call ‘femmes-mulets’ (‘mulewomen’), and who in Morocco are called, in a hardly less disrespectful tone, braghdiyāt, a word that some sources attribute to the Italian ‘brigante’ (‘bandit’). They are women of all ages, unemployed or with occasional jobs, often widows or divorced breadwinners, but also women that, facing the perspective of misery of their household, decide to employ their body capital to make ends meet. They arrive at the gate early in the morning, and make for the warehouses of Ceuta’s commercial zone. They buy and carry almost everything: food, drinks, clothes, perfumes, shoes, blankets and sheets, soap and washing products, car spare parts and electronic products, but also various used materials which may be sold in Morocco. They sometimes tie huge loads to their body, so as to keep their hands free to carry more bags. They transport the goods across the frontier, from Ceuta to Morocco, delivering them to traders who pay them between 50 and 100 dirhams (5 to 10 euros), depending on the weight. They collect money for a new order and leave again, for two-three times per day, from Monday to Thursday.

From a legal point of view this is not smuggling. Even if Ceuta is a duty-free area, Morocco does not recognize an official commercial custom with the city (that would mean to admit Spanish legitimacy over the territory). Ceuta’s traders duly sell untaxed and VAT-exempt products ‘for personal use’ and in accordance with the individual capacity to carry them. The profit is remarkable for all, except maybe for the carriers: it is estimated that products for a value that exceeds 1,400 million Euros are traded across the borders between Morocco and the two territories of Ceuta and Melilla every year (Cembrero 2009).

The products can be found in āswāq (popular markets) and shops around the north of Morocco. According to a ballpark estimate of the Casablanca’s American Chamber of Commerce—originally cited by the journalist Ignacio Cembrero and then taken up by numerous authors—around 45,000 people make a living directly from smuggling, while 400,000 would be involved in the business through distribution and sale (Cembrero 2009, Castan Pinos 2009, Soto Bermant 2011). Although the figures seem slightly overestimate, it is however a very important business for many Moroccan families and a fundamental source of income for the two isolated cities of Ceuta and Melilla.
International transportation, delocalisation of production, transit of people and commodities are examples of the productive relation between circulation and border in the area. In formal and informal exchanges, the boundary works towards creating a ‘gradient of opportunities’, which is exploited by the different actors according to their interests and possibilities. The border operates by producing and keeping the divide which allows goods to be competitive and manpower to be available. This process implies the necessity to regulate the exchanges across the frontier in order to define preferential lines and ‘useful’ fluxes. Separation nourishes flows, according to a fundamental mechanism of selection.

A Barrier for People

The fortress of Dār al-Barūd is the extreme north-eastern corner of the ancient medina of Tangier. An old bastion overlooking the sea, today the tower watches over the vast clearing of the old port. The site is now subject to a major remodelling, which aims to transform the old commercial port area into a recreational and docking point for cruise ships. The main transport lines to Spain have been moved to the Tanger-Med, but an hourly connection to Tarifa still survives. The place is almost unrecognisable from the one of just two years ago, when trucks crowded the clearing below among the comings and goings of workers employed in industries of the free zone (also located within the port).9

However, not everything has completely changed. Looking closely towards Dār Barūd, it is still possible to notice small groups of teenagers who hang around the area to take advantage of the distraction of the watchmen and hide in vehicles, usually trucks, while waiting to board on the ferry to Tarifa. They come mainly from the poorest neighbourhoods of Tangier and live on the streets occasionally or permanently.10 Their presence has decreased since the transit of vehicles and people moved to the new port, bringing with it the ḥarrāga.11 Nonetheless, their presence reminds that this place has long been the gateway to Europe for hundreds of young—at times very young—people, who defied the dogs of the guards and the blows of the police to take a chance in Spain or further (Jiménez Alvarez 2004, Vacchiano 2014). Their transit indeed has not stopped. In some cases, they have moved near the Tanger-Med or have invented other ways: the big machine which scans cars to detect hidden ‘illegal’ passengers before boarding suggests one of the numerous possible ways.

The Moroccan ḥarrāga, however, are not alone. In areas not far away, in popular neighbourhoods like Mesnana or in the woods surrounding Ceuta
(or the more distant Melilla), men, women and children from Nigeria, Senegal, Congo, Mali, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Guinea, etc., prepare themselves to cross the border, represented by the fence or by the body of water of Gibraltar. Some of them are refugees, but in Morocco, which has not implemented formal procedures for their recognition, they are not regarded as such. UNHCR provides an identification paper, sometimes useful to prevent deportation, but no means of support. Many of them may even consider settling in Morocco (as other compatriots did) if the conditions of living were less difficult: the discrimination against ‘Africans’ is high and their wages reduced. Moreover, due to their ‘irregular’ condition, they have lacked access to health care, education for children and other basic provision until now (GADEM, 2009; Women’s Link Worldwide, 2010). In addition, the Moroccan police carry out frequent raids, gathering the ‘clandestins’ in police stations and deporting them by bus to the Algerian border, often regardless of their age, gender or health conditions (Collyer, 2006; Elmadmad, 2008). Some of them have experienced many deportations and the subsequent walk back to Morocco, and now live semi-hidden in overcrowded houses, trying to avoid being noticed (Alami, 2012).

Tangier, November 2011.

I was given Pastor Steven’s phone number by a friend who works at Caritas, one of the few organisations which provide assistance to the ‘subsahariens’ in Morocco. The appointment is at the Tangier’s catholic cathedral, where people go every week to receive the support of the volunteers. Pastor Steven arrives smiling, accompanied by Luis, ‘his pupil’, as he introduces himself. We head to a nearby cafe, where we can talk easier. Luis is bamileke, from Cameroon, and he ‘helps’ Pastor Steven at the church. He says that a francophone is useful for their interactions with Moroccans and authorities. Pastor Steven is Nigerian, from the Ebony State—‘the Ibo tribe’, he specifies—from a village in the countryside. His father died shortly after his birth and he grew up with his mother. He attended the Assembly of God in Nigeria and became pastor in 2003, but then the ‘hardships of life’ led him to leave, along with other acquaintances. He has lived in Morocco for nearly five years, first in Rabat and now in Tangier, where he leads the Redeemed Church of God, the local branch of the homonymous Nigerian congregation. The church in Tangier has almost sixty attendants, mostly Nigerians of the Edo group.

The space dedicated to worship is located in the popular district of Mesnana (I would visit it in January 2012), where people gather to celebrate and pray, mostly on Sundays. Pastor Steven tells of the difficulties
of the people, who are unemployed and live mainly by begging on the street. Sometimes Moroccans throw stones at them and many have been deported to the Algerian border, especially from Rabat. They try not to stand out too much and wait to have enough money to buy the services of Moroccan smugglers to get into Spain.

I ask him directly about the condition of women and he confirms that almost all have a ‘madame’ in Italy, Spain or The Netherlands who sends money to the ‘connections’—generally men who organise the transit—for their maintenance. He does not mention prostitution in Morocco, even though I know that, either done independently or by force, it is not an uncommon resource to survive. ‘Many women suffer—he says—because they did the juju and the rituals at the shrines in Nigeria’. According to him, they accepted it voluntarily, as a sacrifice for the family. He prays for them and tries to help them in some way, invoking the grace of God and the conversion, but also the success in their common migratory endeavour.

With the passing of time, waiting becomes unbearable and the dramatic situations of lone minors, pregnant women or women with children, people with chronic illnesses or injured in police or neighbours’ raids become unsustainable. Some turn to international organizations asking to return home (IOM runs a program of assisted return that has arisen many controversies), while others attempt to cross the border in more dangerous ways: swimming at night to enter Ceuta or Melilla, assaulting the fence in group, and even settling on the islands under Spanish sovereignty off the Moroccan coast. For them, the border is a physical limit and a social boundary, experienced and embodied in its everyday dimensions. A border that ends up producing some of the phenomena which it is supposedly meant to prevent, as it emerges from Pastor Steven’s testimony about human trafficking, in which smugglers sell at a heavy price—one’s own body capital—that same mobility that by others travellers is taken for granted.

These different examples of conditioned mobility (capital, commodities, people and services) describe how the Mediterranean frontier, for its role in structuring movement and the lines of its control, represents today one of the most important sites of production and negotiation of power: an ‘heterotopic’ place par excellence (Nair 2008, Vaughan-Williams 2009), in which border rules stretch their effects far and wide.

The Border Apparatus in the Area of Gibraltar

The area of Gibraltar (the Strait and its multiple borders) constitutes a privileged space to observe the forms through which movement is currently
directed, controlled and, therefore, produced in specific forms. In this section, I propose to observe the construction of the ‘border regime’ in this specific site as a particular case of a wider process which concerns the European frontier at large. To this end, I propose to analyse the border ‘dispositif’ through the combination of the different devices that constitute it. I use the foucaultian concept of dispositif (commonly translated into English as ‘apparatus’) as a handy tool for defining a heterogeneous set of instruments and actions that, while not necessarily operating in a coherent way, converge with a direction and produce a specific effect. Although it is literally at the heart of foucaultian philosophical theorisation—Raffnsøe defines it as a ‘primordial category’ and reminds how in the 1978 seminars at the Collège de France (Foucault 2004) Foucault himself suggested the reading of all his work as a story of the apparatus (Raffnsøe, 2008)—the concept has been somewhat scantily defined by Foucault himself (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983).

In the interview ‘The Confession of the Flesh’, Foucault alludes to the ‘apparatus’ as ‘a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid’ (Foucault 1980: 194). Accordingly, the ‘dispositif’ is ‘the system of relations that can be established between these elements’ (ibidem).

In a well-known essay, Gilles Deleuze defines the ‘dispositif’ as ‘a tangle, a multilinear ensemble [...] composed of lines, each having a different nature’: lines that ‘do not outline or surround systems which are each homogeneous in their own right, object, subject, language, and so on, but follow directions, trace balances which are always off balance, now drawing together and then distancing themselves from one another’ (Deleuze 1991: 159). Although Deleuze pointed out not only the manifold, but also the multipolar and multilinear quality of the apparatus, Agamben has recently contented that: ‘the apparatus always has a concrete strategic function and is always located in a power relation’ (Agamben 2009: 3).

As for me, the concept is useful to examine the interaction and the convergence of a heterogeneous array of initiatives—elaborated in diverse contexts and for different aims—having at their core the control of movement and the classification of people according to their possibility to move. On the basis of their field of production and application—and with the scope of discussing their assemblages—I propose to classify such initiatives within four main areas: legislative, bureaucratic-administrative, securitarian and conceptual. For the general effect that they jointly produce, we may consider each of these areas as defining a specific set of ‘border devices’.
Legislative devices consist of the policies, treaties and agreements by which either single states or the European Union as a whole aim at regulating the movement of goods and people. Through them Europe targets not only the circulation of merchandises, but also the delocalisation of manufacture and services as well as human mobility. Accordingly, legislative initiatives are not merely aimed at reinforcing border procedures, but also at involving the so-called ‘third-countries’ in the management of movement towards Europe. In Morocco, this process is particularly conspicuous (Barros et al. 2002, Collyer 2007): on the one hand, single European countries established bilateral agreements with the Kingdom—it is the case, for example, of the memorandum signed by Spain with Morocco on the ‘circulation, transit and readmission of aliens who have entered illegally’ or the treaties and executive readmission protocols between Italy and Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Libya (Cutitta 2010); on the other hand, the European Neighbouring Policy fuelled cooperation in border management in the wider framework of the Neighbourhood Policy.

In this initiative, launched in 2003 and designed to bring closer the neighbouring countries of the new ‘enlarged European Union’ (Jordan Galduf 2004, European Commission 2003a), the actions of ‘economic integration’ (mainly directed to the liberalisation of capital flows and trades) are accompanied by a close collaboration in the area of ‘justice and home affairs’, the domain in which border management is framed. Through ‘action plans’ established bilaterally between the EU and the single targeted countries, specific objectives as well as cooperation initiatives are defined. In the case of the action plan concerning Morocco—along with the insistence on the ‘protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms according to international standards’ (objective 4)—other priorities surface, such as ‘prevent and combat illegal migration to and via Morocco’ and ‘strengthening border management’ (objectives 48 and 51).

As a result of this pressure, many countries adopted stricter regulations concerning immigration and emigration: Morocco in 2003, Tunisia in 2004 and Algeria in 2009 and 2011. In Morocco, the Law 02, approved on 11th November 2003, revoked all previous norms in the area of migration, and introduced—something entirely new for the country—sanctions for Moroccan nationals and foreigners leaving the country without permission. The foreign citizens ‘irregularly’ present on the Moroccan territory may be expelled and deported, while mention is made neither about their rights—such as those against the abuses of the administration—nor about their possibilities of regularisation. The effects of the European demands are also reflected in the way Morocco accepts the principle of readmission of foreign
nationals rejected by European countries, who, according to Art. 38 of the same regulation, may be retained in expressly defined ‘waiting zones’ (a sort of prelude to the internment centres). This way, evoking the principle of the ‘burden sharing of border control’, Europe carries out a veritable ‘externalisation’ of the surveillance on mobility to the so-called ‘third countries’ (Doukouré and Oger 2007).

The purpose of the instruments elaborated in the legislative field is further evident in the bureaucratic-administrative initiatives, aimed at making border management effective and operational. I use the concept of ‘bureaucracy’ to refer to a wide and varied range of facts, which include organizational, technical and administrative competences: among others, visas, identity documents, biometric procedures and databases, commissions of experts and evaluating panels (as in the asylum procedures), reception facilities and social working, cooperation programmes and so forth. Relevant to our specific area is one of the most emblematic cooperation programmes on ‘seasonal recruitment’ for agriculture, which represents an exemplary application of the utilitarian logic of the so-called ‘useful migration’. The programme, today known as M@res, was originally conceived and promoted by the local administration of Cartaya in association with the producers of the Huelva province (Andalusia, Spain) and has been funded since 2005 in the framework of the Aeneas and MEDA II European initiatives (Moreno Nieto, 2012).

Whereas seasonal work in the province of Huelva—which is the main area of strawberry-farming in Europe—has certainly a long history, the forms of recruitment carried out in the programme are paradigmatic of how mobility management is functional to the requirements of the European labour market, not differently from what happened in the colonial past (Lemberg-Pedersen 2010). Indeed, the new model (now defined as ‘circular migration’) bears many similarities with the past forms of seasonal recruitment based on specific schemes of workers’ selection. Specifically, in the M@res programme workers are sorted out among Moroccan women between 18 and 40, living in rural areas and having family burdens in their country of origin. The rationale for these criteria is defined according to the assumed female attitudes to the work—delicate, with sensitive handling of the fruit, docile and reliable—as well as to a greater probably of women with family responsibilities, particularly children, accepting to return to Morocco at the end of the season (Moreno Nieto, 2009).

The programme is designed to maximize the productivity of the migrant, reducing the associated social burden. Moreover, the advantage in productive terms increases since women generally have almost no experience of formalised employment and possess little or no union culture. In addition, the contract
binds the residence permit to a specific geographic area, to a specific type of activity and to an established employer in Spain.

The conditions under which this model of ‘circular migration’ may be effective are explained by one of the main promoters of the programme, the former Cartaya’s mayor, and seem particularly consistent with the wider logic of mobility management: ‘in order to normalise the situation of foreigners in Spain—he writes—the repatriation of people under a removal order, as well as the voluntary return, with the engagement of a further recruitment, should be promoted. In no case should regularisation be encouraged’ (Millán Jaldón 2009: 149).

The unscrupulous reference to removal as a form of ‘normalisation’ suggests the continuity between the bureaucratic-administrative and the securitarian field, which constitutes the third axis of my analysis. The securitarian approach represents one of the most visible features of the current way of dealing with migration: the proliferation of walls, fences, cameras and watchtowers, control devices in ports and airports, detention and deportation centres and street patrols to check foreigners, is a fact whose evidence does not need to be argued. Nonetheless, these are relatively recent inventions, as illustrated through the mentioned case of the Ceuta-Fnideq border.

In this sense the Strait of Gibraltar is, once again, a paradigmatic case. Its securitisation is carried out through the SIVE (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior), a complex technological apparatus which was established by the Spanish government from 1998 onwards with an overall final cost of 260 million Euros (Le Boedec 2008). It consists of a net of 25 monitoring stations—equipped with radar, regular and infrared cameras—that send information about the transiting boats to the coordination centres of the Guardia Civil in Algeciras (Gibraltar) and Fuerteventura (Canary Islands).

The effect of deterrence is limited, but it produces a displacement of transits to longer and more dangerous routes, creating therefore the need to an even more widespread control.

To this scope, the European agency ‘Frontex’ has been specifically created in 2004 to assist single states in border control and actions against irregular migration. In the Gibraltar area, the agency has implemented regular joint operations from 2007 on (the operations ‘Indalo’, ‘Minerva’ and their subsequent editions), aimed at reinforcing control on the main ports during the periods of greater transit. Frontex provides trained staff, means of transportation, canine units and special materials (carbon dioxide and metal detectors, car scanners, etc.), and coordinates the implementation of the new ‘EUROSUR’ monitoring programme of the Mediterranean, approved by the European Commission (European Commission 2008).
In the area of Gibraltar, the agency works in association with the Spanish authorities, relying on infrastructures located in Andalusia, which include the two detention centres (‘CIE’) of Malaga and Algeciras, the two reception centres (‘CETI’) of Ceuta and Melilla, plus some informal spaces used as an extension of Algeciras’ detention centre (the two old military quarters of Las Heras, near Algeciras, and Isla de las Palomas, in Tarifa, as well as a former industrial warehouse in the port of Algeciras).

The complex deployment of forces and means in the area constitutes the application on the ground of the tools developed within the legislative and the bureaucratic-administrative apparatuses. Nonetheless, as Giorgio Agamben has recently contended, the strength of an apparatus ‘appears at the intersection of power relations and relations of knowledge’ (Agamben 2009: 3). In this sense we may explore foundations and results of these operations in their recursive interaction with the ideological sphere: on the one hand, in the idea of an impending invasion of desperate people, ready to do anything to take over the scarce and declining European welfare (de Haas 2008); on the other, in a new ontology of belonging, in which the categories of ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ turn into discrete and discernible entities, ‘natural’ objects with their own reality rather than artificial constructs of law and practice (Vacchiano 2011). It is therefore worth analysing how the border reinforcement is paralleled with a transformation of the interpretive categories related to migration—and to mobility at large—, which make of repression a plausible necessity.

As a consequence of this general process, a gradual semantic shift is observed on both sides of the border, in categories related to movement and transgression, which take on connotations of danger and deviance. In Morocco, this process surfaces in the transformation of the common use of the notion of ‘ḥregs’ (‘burning’), perhaps the most widespread definition of illegal migration in the whole Maghreb: the quasi-heroic dimensions of challenge and adventure implicit in the idea of ‘burning’ documents to avoid being returned—and the metaphorical breaking of limits, prohibitions, interdictions and margins that this idea entails—overlap nowadays with images of risk and despair, destruction and deathly game bordering on the illicit and the sin (Pandolfo, 2007). The category of ‘aventurier’—a commonly used (and powerful) definition to qualify the traveller-migrant in West Africa (Sarró, 2009)—meets a similar fate, due to the criminalisation of the transits in the Maghreb and beyond (Timera, 2009).

The cover of an early November’s issue of the Moroccan weekly magazine MarocHebdo shows the image of a West African immigrant commented by
the title ‘Le peril noir’ (‘the black danger’). The editorial insists on the threat represented by the ‘thousands of clandestine sub-Saharan in Morocco’, who ‘give themselves over to drug trafficking and prostitution’, that ‘are object of racism and xenophobia’ and ‘constitute a human and security problem for the country’ (MarocHebdo, n. 998, 2–8 November 2012). In September 2005 the title ‘the black locusts invade the North of Morocco’ stood out on the cover of the Tangerine weekly magazine Ash-Shamal.29 The number was withdrawn by the authorities, but a debate arose in the press on how these ‘new’ immigrants should be regarded.

As a matter of fact, the association between irregular migration, human trafficking and economic exploitation is suggested in several documents of the European Union (among them the already cited The Hague Programme), which call on a stronger support for the so-called ‘transit countries’ and the training of their officers. The language of the documents and official reports is aseptic and formal, but its fulfilment on the ground often takes on the contours of a violence which is often not just categorical. The frontier is actively constructed, planned and reinforced through the combination of such set of converging devices. The analysis of this process, of its forms and consequences constitutes a compelling theoretical commitment aimed to shed light on one of the most pervasive dimensions of the contemporary governmentality: the definition of status and rights in relation to the differential access to mobility. As the case of the Gibraltar area helps to elucidate, that same mobility represents one of the main instruments of production of and accession to power of the present time.

Conclusions

The contemporary ‘border regime’ may be defined as an apparatus that, through the combined use of different devices, operates to establish differential forms of accessing to citizenship. As Mezzadra has argued, ‘the effect of this border regime is to produce a movement of selective and differential inclusion of migrants, which corresponds to the permanent production of a plurality of statuses […], [and] which tends to disrupt the universal and unitary figure of modern citizenship’ (Mezzadra 2006: 39). At the same time, through its diffused, microphysical and biopolitical projections, it promotes a capillary deployment of sovereignty which spreads its ‘productive’ mechanisms into the interstices of the everyday life. This process does not target only migrants, but affects also the common ways of regarding space, membership, rights, labour, security, identity, ‘us’ and ‘the others’. Said in a synthetic way, the contemporary border regime is the result of a series of
initiatives designed to produce power from movement: a way of ‘governing through movement’.26

As Fassin has recently contended, ‘immigration is a crucial issue in contemporary societies as well as a major object of modern governmentality’ (Fassin 2011: 221). Particularly, the form of government performed by the different devices (legislative, bureaucratic, securitarian and conceptual) which compose the border apparatus today, is consistent with the blueprint of the contemporary hegemonic politico-economic model commonly defined as ‘neoliberalism’, ‘late-capitalism’ or ‘flexible accumulation’, in which the state takes on the task of providing private industry and the market with a business-friendly climate, free trade and available manpower (Harvey, 2007). This tendency has been recently described by Wacquant as ‘an articulation of state, market, and citizenship that harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the third’ (Wacquant 2012: 71).

As I have argued, the Strait of Gibraltar represents a privileged spot to observe ‘from the margins’ the multiple levels across which this process is currently being implemented. Besides its relevant consequences on the social life and the human landscape at the southern frontier of Europe, ‘border regime’ is influencing the practice of citizenship and the relations between the state and the people not only in Europe. I claim that this process constitutes one of the most significant phenomena which influence social, political and economic dynamics in the Mediterranean today. From the Strait, a paradigmatic hub of movement and control, we may draw together its scattered elements and join them into a wider frame: looking, as Foucault suggested, to the centre from its constituent edges.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Mercedes Jiménez Alvarez who introduced me to the Strait of Gibraltar and accompanied much of my fieldwork in the area. This article is the result of many common reflections and ideas. I also thank Simo Bouchammir and the other friends of the Association Al Khaima in Tangier for their help and their unwavering coherence. This research has been funded through a post-doc grant awarded by the Portuguese Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia. I thank the many friends and colleagues who supported this work. This article is dedicated to William Kavannagh.

Notes
1. University of Lisbon, Institute of Social Sciences, Av. Prof. Aníbal de Bettencourt, n.º9, 1600–189 Lisbon, Portugal. Email: francesco.vacchiano@ics.ulisboa.pt.
2. A first draft of this analysis was proposed with Mercedes Jiménez Alvarez at the III World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies in the joint presentation ‘Forteresses délocalisées’ (WOCMES 2010, Barcelona, 19–24 July 2010) and, in form of a photo-presentation, at the 1st International Congress on Immigration in Andalusia (Granada, 17 February 2011) and the 4th EASA MedNet Scientific Workshop (Venice, 29 October 2011). A similar analysis has been further developed by Mercedes Jiménez in Jiménez Alvarez 2011 and 2014.

3. I transcribe the words in Arabic in a simplified form, entering information on long vowels (transcribed as ā, ĩ, w or ě), emphatic consonants (t and d), and pharyngeal fricative h (transcribed as ḥ). Moroccan toponyms respect the local administrative transcription.

4. See also Mezzadra 2007 and Rygiel 2010.

5. To my purpose it is not useless to note here that these two rather different phenomena (illegal immigration and the trafficking of human beings) are frequently associated throughout the EU Commission documents, creating an effect of assimilation of the first to the second.

6. For a discussion see further in this article.

7. See: «72 inmigrantes indios huyen en Ceuta por temor a la expulsión» (El País, 10/04/2008); «Resistir en el monte del Renegado» (El País, 22/03/2009); «Un año en el limbo salvaje del monte de Ceuta» (El Mundo, 6/04/2009); «La UE pide a España que acuda a los indios de Ceuta» (El Mundo, 01/03/2011); «El primer indio del monte ceutí ya es ‘español’», (ABC, 08/10/2012).

8. Data are calculated from the 15th of June and the 15th of September in the framework of the ‘Operación Paso del Estrecho’, managed by the Spanish Civil Protection Service.

9. For a thorough description see Vacchiano and Jiménez 2012.

10. For further details, see INAS 2007, Unicef Maroc 2005, Vacchiano and Jiménez 2012.

11. In the whole Maghreb, ḥārig (plur. ḥarrāga) is the most common term to define the paperless migrant (for a discussion see further).

12. Promoted by the King of Morocco, a wide regularization programme of ‘Sub-Saharan’ immigrants has been launched in January 2014 and it is still underway while I am drafting these notes. Although just a minor number of cases have been recognized hitherto, it seems too early to take stock of this initiative.


14. See for instance ‘IOM’s dubious mission in Morocco’ (heindehaas.blogspot.com/)


16. ‘Más de 450 subsaharianos intentan entrar en Melilla y Ceuta al finalizar el
Ramadán’ (ElMundo.es, 19/08/2012); Medina M.A., ‘Cien inmigrantes saltan a Melilla durante una incursión en masa a plena luz del día’ (El País, 16/11/2012); Ramos T., ‘Casi un millar de personas protagonizan tres intentos de saltar la valla de Melilla’ (El País, 17/05/2014).


18. After its early joint presentations (see note 2) this part of the analysis was developed by Mercedes Jiménez in a slightly different direction see: Jiménez Alvarez 2011 and 2014).


22. See also Figueiredo 2012.


24. Reports from these operations are found in the website of the Frontex Agency: http://www.frontex.europa.eu

25. I thank Mercedez Jiménez for pointing me at this issue.

26. I am clearly inspired by the reflection of Jonathan Inda on the criminalisation of the immigrants in the United States as a way of ‘governing through crime’ (Inda 2005).

References


Fencing in the South: The Gibraltar area as a Paradigm

Francesco Vacchiano


Francesco Vacchiano
