Anglophilia in crisis: Italian liberals, the 'English model' and democracy in the Giolititan era

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Summary
The image of England was very important to the political culture of Italian liberals during the Risorgimento and the post-unification period. Even if it was viewed as unreachable, it still constituted an example of progress that Italy could strive towards. This article reconstructs the stages of the process that saw a section of Italian political culture become alienated from this image, just at a time when a more complete form of industrial democracy was becoming established in Britain. This alienation is interpreted here as having its roots in attitudes to the issues raised by the workers’ movement: Italian liberals were reluctant to give it full legitimacy and engage it on the open terrain of social and political competition. The first two sections of the article go over the traits of Italian Anglophilia up to the end of the nineteenth century and single out the earliest reasons for alienation. The third section identifies the Boer War, the figure of Chamberlain and the cluster of issues linking democracy, imperialism and protectionism as key factors in the change of direction. The fourth section shows that the constitutional conflict in Britain and the Parliament Act were a further, decisive, step in Italian liberals’ disaffection with the ‘English model’.

The problem
We Italian constitutionalists have often had to take England as an example. Today we can take comfort from the fact that our constitutional law is working in a more orderly way, with full respect for the concerns proper to all the powers involved. There is no doubt that England was our teacher. But it is not unusual for students to overtake their teachers. And we can truly say that Italy has now overtaken its tutor in many respects.1

These reflections by Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz were occasioned by the 1911 Parliament Act and the end of the constitutional conflict that had set the Asquith government (1908–14) against the House of Lords. But we should not be misled by Arangio-Ruiz’s satisfaction. For it was accompanied by a marked concern about the ‘exceptionally serious’ changes he foresaw in Britain. The Sicilian

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jurist was genuinely afraid—for both technical and political reasons—that 'severing the nerve-endings' of the Upper House would introduce an unprecedented and substantial shift towards monomeralism within the very system that had traditionally been based on a balance of power between the two Houses. Indeed the Commons could become 'a new authority with supreme power' at the very moment when its powers should have been reduced because 'the more democratic a regime is ... the more limits need to be placed on the action of its fundamental organs, and the more the various bodies need to keep each other in check'. Arangio-Ruiz's concern was due not only to the expectation that there would be a constitutional overhaul, but also to his awareness that this reform was the result of a political alliance between the Liberals and Labour. The political implications of this lay in the relationship between attempts at tax reform and constitutional reform. In 1909 the Lords had rejected Chancellor of the Exchequer Lloyd George's so-called People's Budget which aimed to gather the funds needed for the navy and old-age pensions by shifting the tax burden heavily towards landed property. The Parliament Act that Asquith so badly wanted was an effect of this rejection.5

Circumstances favoured the drawing of parallels between England and Italy. During Luzzatti's brief government (he was Prime Minister between March 1910 and March 1911), a plan to reform the Senate had been put forward. Given the prospect of a further widening of the suffrage, the idea was to reinforce the Senate by recruiting senators through a corporate system, according to professional categories. But the proposal fell by the wayside: the Giolittian compromise between social reform and centrist alliances was increasingly breaking down. Giolitti's fourth government, set up in April 1911 after the Luzzatti interlude, largely failed to achieve its aim of financing a pension system by nationalizing life insurance. Giolitti lost the support of the Socialist Party and there was an increase in the influence of alliances with clerico-moderates as a counterweight to the introduction of universal suffrage. Contrary to what Arangio-Ruiz was arguing, the 1909–11 constitutional dispute in Britain was the result of developments that were similar to the critical stage that Giolitti's government was going through. There was, in some respects, good reason to think that the English model was nearer than Arangio-Ruiz believed.

Nevertheless, what these circumstances allow us to grasp is the extent of the difficulties that Italian liberals had in coming to terms with the more democratic measures exemplified by the British experience. The result was that the English model tended to be treated as if it were further removed from Italy than was really the case. Italian liberals invoked the peculiarities of the British context at a time when, after decades in which traditional aristocratic self-government had been eroded, those peculiarities had been markedly reduced. This article aims to reconstruct the final stages, during the Giolittian era, of the process in which Italian liberals changed their attitude to the English model: the old perception that Britain was a close parallel gave way to a growing desire to push it further away. These were years in which Italy too was facing the issues raised by the development of industrial society, issues that attracted attention towards British affairs. But the specific solutions that British political leaders adopted severely undermined Italian liberals' Anglophilia. The factors that contributed to the way liberals in the peninsula dissociated themselves from the British example were
institutional, political and social. And it is precisely this combination of factors that indicated how crucial the change was, and foreshadowed the problems that would undermine the Giolittian system and Liberal Italy as a whole.

**Getting closer; moving away (1861–98)**

In the early years after Italian unification a marked Anglophilia was part of the common culture of the liberal political and ruling classes. The country that had been the first to give itself a system of representative institutions, and that had so sagely managed to remain immune from the revolutions which had accompanied the introduction of liberal regimes elsewhere, was certainly a model for the Italian political elites both before and after the construction of the newly unified state. But precisely because it was paradigmatic, the English model seemed to be very distant from Italy. When the post-unification Italian ruling class referred to Great Britain, their comparisons lacked the sense of urgency that drove their interest in the examples offered by France and Germany, whose proximity and appropriateness were felt to be more immediate. The fact that the British case was widely recognized as being unapproachable made it into something more like a mirror of ideology, or a screen onto which ideal plans for society and its institutions could be projected. In general terms, in the climate of practically minded optimism during the post-unification years, references to the English model expressed a desire to speed up the new state’s development and bring it closer to more advanced countries.

On closer analysis, however, this Anglophilia reveals itself as being shot through with the most pressing political concerns of the moment. Italian admiration for self-government constituted more than an institutional option (which, as we know, was never taken). It reflected the Italian ruling classes’ high regard for an aristocracy able to govern public affairs responsibly by taking on the burden of the whole social community’s interests, offering the lower classes an example of appropriate political conduct, and using preventive social reform to make itself immune from the socialist ‘threat’. Hence even the most Germanophile Italian positivist intellectuals—Angelo Messedaglia, Carlo Francesco Ferraris, Fedele Lampertico, Luigi Luzzatti, Attilio Bruni—showed a constant interest in these aspects of the English example.

The conservative reformist features of this Lombard–Venetian group’s brand of Anglophilia were indicative of a broader change of emphasis in what Italian liberals, particularly moderates, drew from the example of England. During the 1880s, what Italian liberals began to stress was the guarantee of preserving social hierarchies rather than an ability to take a guiding role in progress and civilization.

On this score Italian liberals were in tune with a crucial change in European political culture as a whole. It has been pointed out that the conservative version of Italian Anglophilia was a ‘perfectly symmetrical’ reflection of the ideas developed in France at the same time by the ‘English party’ of positivist intellectuals—Prévost-Paradol, Renan and above all Hippolyte Taine. These men produced a reading of the British constitution anchored in the peculiarities of the British social system and its history. In Italy, this vision of the local historical roots of the British constitution needs to be set in
the political and cultural climate of the age of the Left. The pragmatic optimism of the post-unification years had been left behind. There was now a concrete awareness of how weak was the civic fabric of the new Italian state, burdened in particular by the 'southern question'. (Paradoxically, this change was partly a result of the great parliamentary inquiries that were themselves inspired by British precedents.) The weight of history now seemed to stand in the way of the country’s development. And an eminently historical constitution like Britain’s, produced in specific and very different conditions, did not seem to offer a model that could be imitated elsewhere.7

It was Taine’s influence that spread notions of the British constitution’s historical nature. Taine set the ‘spontaneous’ and ‘concrete’ character of British institutional forms against the ‘mechanical’ abstractness of the French institutional model. The former was the product of the traditions and customs of a people who had evolved with it in a ‘continuous’ and ‘organic’ fashion. And because the French system was the result of ideological rationalism rather than tradition, it was periodically—and violently—refounded as circumstances, and the people in the streets, dictated.

It is significant that this dualism gained a hold in Italian culture after the events of 1870–71. The Second Empire had collapsed following military defeat at the hands of Prussia. And French liberal culture, further shaken by the experience of the Paris Commune, was in the process of cutting itself off from its own democratic, revolutionary roots and beginning to reassess the Ancien Régime as part of a traditionalist response to the crisis of democracy under the Third Republic. Indeed, it was only at this moment that Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the French Revolution fully entered French political thought.8 It was at this time too that a traditionalist, elitist, anti-egalitarian and distinctly anti-democratic colouring was given to the Burke-influenced image of the British liberal constitution as a ‘spontaneous’ product of history and as a ‘natural’ evolution of the old régime’s institutions and social structure. This colouring was very different from the Anglophilia shown by Italian liberals in the first half of the century and in the period immediately following unification. The ‘English model’ came to be constructed as the antithesis of the ‘principles of ’89’, and as such it had an important place in the ideological toolkit of conservative liberalism.

From the 1880s, then, Anglophilia in Italy and beyond acquired anti-democratic inflexions. This helps us to explain the way liberals gradually became estranged from the British political and institutional example as it became associated with a greater degree of democratic openness, especially after the electoral reforms of 1884 and 1885.9 Attilio Brunialdi offers a concise example of this disaffection:

While we were admiring English self-government, the ruling classes’ active involvement in government and administration, and all of those specific features associated with a long process of historical evolution rather than with theoretical concepts created by intellectuals, England was reforming its system: it was removing its own ancient foundations, the aristocratic nature of the constitution and administration; it was giving way to the dominance of democracy; it was becoming more like continental institutions with new moves to centralize power, to continuously simplify things and level them out by replacing honorary functionaries with paid ones on a vast scale—resulting in a huge increase in public expenditure.10
The closer the increasingly democratic English model got to ‘continental’ polities, and particularly to the centralization associated with the French revolutionary tradition, the more it lost its status as a point of reference. The common ground between Italian and French culture is evident in this respect, too. Brunialti’s comments about the ‘continentalization’ of the English constitution in good measure echoed Emile Boutmy’s *Etudes sur les sources de la constitution anglaise*. Boutmy was director of the Ecole Libre de Sciences Politiques which had been founded under the inspiration of Taine himself; the research carried out there also influenced Brunialti. As he had done in some of his previous work, Brunialti turned to Taine to underscore the conservative nature of the English revolution, and even to Frédéric Le Play’s *La constitution de l’Angleterre* to demonstrate the virtues of self-government. So from the 1880s, Italian perspectives on Britain became coloured by the difficulties entailed by the process of widening democracy. These concerns led to a conservative emphasis, a concern to preserve social hierarchies.

An integral component of this outlook was a tendency to follow Taine in interpreting the constitution as the result of a specific historical tradition and a specific society. In this sense, pointing to the moderates’ supposed failure to understand the reality of the British constitution in the way that some historians have done does not help us to grasp the essence of their concerns. What interested the moderates was learning to control the impact of social change through a historical and social interpretation of British institutions.

When, at the turn of the century, Luigi Luzzatti again cited the English example, he did so to highlight the reforming wisdom of the ruling classes. They had been able to prevent the most serious symptoms of class conflict by using social legislation as and when necessary to pre-empt popular demands for safety at work and political participation. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that while Luzzatti argued that the English constitution had had the virtue of making sure that the ‘advent of the popular classes’ would be painless, he did not regard that advent as a positive development. Luzzatti transmitted an image in which the world of work was entirely under the control of prudent initiatives taken by the ruling classes.

This was a picture that was now far removed from a reality in which British working-class political organizations and unions had gained considerable autonomy. British politics was coming to terms with the strengthening of trade unionism and its entry into parliament. The social and political influence of the working classes shaped the background to the way the state’s administrative functions, along with the machinery of political parties, were spreading.

These developments perplexed the best-informed Italian scholars, such as Brunialti. Thus, at the turn of the century, the moderates could not grasp the way social issues were being transformed into political issues, and they refused to recognize unions and working-class parties as legitimate political interlocutors. Their unease was what was pulling them further away—in substance, if not in form—from the English model.

However, the fact that the moderates did cite the English example in itself indicated that they were taking their distance from reactionary policies at home. In the text just quoted, Luzzatti came out with a vigorous defence of the parliamentary system at a significant time. The social and political crisis that began with the disturbances in Milan in May 1898 was coming to a head. In
February 1899 Pelloux as Prime Minister had presented parliament with restrictive measures aimed at curtailing individual liberties and freedom of association, and at restoring royal prerogatives over and against the Chamber of Deputies. Against the background of these authoritarian initiatives, for Luzzatti to argue that the ruling class had to be politically responsible and that legislation had to have a pedagogical role meant that he was making a statement of principle in favour of reformist, conservative paternalism rather than hard-line authoritarianism.¹⁶

Recent developments in Britain were the cause for some worry among moderates. But now that their version of Anglophilia had conservative meanings, the English model still had to be represented with the emphasis on aristocratic self-government. In other words, it had still to seem as if it were rather far away from the reality of Italy. As the example of Luzzatti shows, the moderates’ picture of Britain also had to exclude the most important political development: the growth in social conflict and in Labour’s role. The substantive issue of democracy, rather than the institutional mechanisms created to respond to it, was a crucial dimension of the British scene that embarrassed Italian liberals with their conservative agenda.

**Democracy, imperialism, protectionism (1898–1909)**

There were other aspects to the ‘continentalization’ of the English example. At the turn of the century, British expansionism no longer looked as if it was the result of a ‘spontaneous’ and ‘natural’ superiority based on more advanced wealth and civilization. The Boer War, fought between 1899 and 1902, instead made Britain seem aggressive and overweening. And if Britain’s supremacy derived from military might, then that placed it on a par with the other great powers involved in imperialistic competition; it was just one country among many engaged in an international version of social Darwinism.¹⁷

To the extent that it was due to the influence of the Colonies Minister Joseph Chamberlain, the Boer War also seemed to be a further illustration of the advances made by democracy, or even by the kind of Caesaristic demagoguery that the Birmingham politician emblematized. Boutmy even argued that the link between democracy and imperialism was now inextricable, and could end up being fatal for English civilization. Chamberlain’s ability to understand the popular mood and give it political expression overturned the traditions of the old parties and dragged politicians into demagogic support for popular aggression, as evinced by the adventures in Fashoda (which had almost led the country into a conflict with France) and the Transvaal.¹⁸

Views of this kind were widespread. Shortly before the outbreak of the Boer War, Guglielmo Ferrero’s much-read *L’Europa Giovane* had argued that ‘Anglo-Saxon’ superiority was based on the way the country had replaced a disorderly, primitive, warlike instinct to dominate with a tendency for individual energies to find orderly expression in industry and commerce: industrial capitalism was the keystone of England’s primacy.¹⁹ However, shortly afterwards, the brutality of military operations in the Transvaal had undermined this assumption and displayed a more elementary form of aggression: ‘In the Transvaal, Sudan, India, indeed anywhere where there is competition for territory,’ British behaviour seemed driven by a ‘thirst for gold and conquest.’²⁰
The more measured Nuova Antologia can certainly not be charged with being hostile to Britain. Nevertheless, in the run-up to the war, it ran through the reasons for the tension between the Boers and the British government and underlined the imbalance between the forces on either side, comparing the Boers to the Greeks at Thermopylae and describing their challenge to the foremost colonial empire on earth as ‘heroic’. However, the Nuova Antologia did argue that the war was ‘a deplorable thing for civilization’ in that it was ‘a civil war between ruling groups’ which would be ‘harsh and probably pitiless’ and therefore endanger the whole civilizing mission so far accomplished.\textsuperscript{21} If we put aside economic reasons for Italian hostility to the war, like those formulated by Luigi Einaudi, then Italian disapproval of British policy was entirely linked to opinions on Chamberlain, the man who had prepared the ground for it politically.\textsuperscript{22} Chamberlain ‘has induced and pushed the nation into this war against the Transvaal. He can call it his war in the same way that the Empress Eugenia called the 1870 war “Ma guerre à moi.”’ And if the conflict were to end with ‘the delirious celebration of victory in an unjust war and the apotheosis of Chamberlain’, then it would be ‘a dishonourable episode’ because ‘when, for reasons of greed, an enormously wealthy and domineering nation, which is able to avail itself of huge loans, takes on a small and comparatively poor people that does not have external support, then no victory the powerful nation achieves can be noble and worthy’.\textsuperscript{23}

Chamberlain embodied the connection between imperialism and democracy and the resultant entry of demagoguery and populism into politics which perverted the original characteristics of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model. ‘What satisfies him is dominating and leading men. If he had been born fifty years earlier would he have managed to do it? I do not think so. During the first half of this century men admired qualities very different from his. But in our time it is precisely his kind of attributes that have most success. In saying this my intention is certainly not to pay a compliment either to him or his era.’\textsuperscript{24}

So, as democracy veered towards demagoguery through the figure of Chamberlain, a new element was added to the widespread concern that there was less distance between the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model and Italy: native English individualism did not seem able to counteract the effects of democracy, and was therefore no longer up to the task of defending the country from the dangers of Caesarism that were so strong in the ‘Latin nations’. England seemed close to sharing the fate of other European civilizations and slipping into ‘decadence’.\textsuperscript{25}

The politics of Italian Anglophilia were being turned upside down. From being traditionally liberal, they were now, albeit to a limited extent, one of the components of a nascent Italian Nationalism. Indeed it should hardly surprise us that Chamberlain’s ability to turn democracy towards demagoguery and direct the popular mood outwards in the form of support for imperialism attracted the sympathy of Enrico Corradini, one of Nationalism’s founders. Warm admiration for the unionist leader was expressed in Corradini’s Il Regno, despite some puzzlement caused by his campaign to adopt ‘imperial preferences’.\textsuperscript{26} Vilfredo Pareto, on the other hand, did not see protectionism as a problem, despite his well-known support for free trade. At that time Pareto was a supporter of Corradini’s brand of nationalism, and he defended Chamberlain in spite of his protectionism. Above all, Pareto criticized British Liberals, for all their belief in
free trade, on the grounds that their programme of regulatory legislation did more damage to freedom than did ‘imperial preferences’:

It is said that English Liberals are getting ready to defend the cause of free trade. But this contradicts the rest of their actions. For at least a decade now they have been doing their best to restrict freedom in their own country. If reasons of hygiene or temperance offer the slightest pretext they introduce legislation—the perfect example of oppressive tyranny. If it is the state’s job to regulate what we eat and drink, why should it not also tell us where to buy the goods we consume? They say that protectionism will increase the cost of living. But these apostles of free trade are forgetting the equally serious cost increases produced by the workers’ leagues that they protect.27

In his usual curt way, Pareto had grasped the crucial point: the British Liberal Party was now too compromised by the trade unions and their political representatives to offer a point of reference for Italy. Indeed, when the goal was to reject Labour influence, even protectionism became acceptable. Pareto could hardly have been clearer on this point:

In England the Liberal Party has become the slave of the Fabian socialists. And if it still defends free trade, this is not in the slightest because it loves economic freedom or wants to get the maximum benefit for society. Rather it is only because it is in the interests of the poor sections of the population.28

The new direction taken by the Liberal Party presented a serious problem to anyone who still wanted to refer to the Liberal model but not the Liberal–Labour alliance. To this end another liberal Italian economist, Riccardo Dalla Volta, cited the sacred scriptures of free trade.29 Searching for arguments against the policy of imperial preference, Dalla Volta returned to Adam Smith and invoked the authority of the man who abolished the corn laws in 1846, Robert Peel.30

An abstract and doctrinaire attitude like this was certainly a symptom of Dalla Volta’s ideological predicament, as is demonstrated by the fact that he did not go into detail on the issue that lay at the heart of the debate on protectionism, namely the slowdown in British industry and the loss of its lead position to German and American competition.31 In the same way, his reference to the golden age of British liberalism failed to take on board the fact that since early in the century liberal policies had included a wide-ranging programme of social reforms that had increased the state’s role and increased its budget. Which is not to say that a man as scrupulous and well informed as Dalla Volta was ignorant of these points. For example, the source for his account of Chamberlain’s position was Sydney Buxton’s register of the opposing parties’ policies that set out in abundant detail the Liberals’ proposals on old-age pensions, the eight-hour day, tax reform, reform of the House of Lords, reform of electoral constituencies, abolition of multiple voting, votes for women and universal suffrage.32 In other words, the significant gaps in Dalla Volta’s picture of the situation in Britain show how difficult it was for him to understand the plan to govern an industrial society that the Liberal Party showed they wanted to put into effect by engaging in political dialogue with the representatives of working-class organizations. The form of liberalism that Dalla Volta was citing as a positive example was still drawn from the golden age. He completely expunged the radical contemporary version, with its relationship to the political role that trade unions were increasingly adopting on the basis of their freedom of action in industrial disputes.
In a sense it was the harsh reality of social conflict that was being rejected by Italian admirers of British civilization. Italian observers did not take account of the problems created by a more mature form of industrial democracy, and therefore did not address the forms of open conflict or the mediation strategies that the workings of industrial democracy inevitably involved. For that reason the Italians’ perspective on Britain was clouded by a central ideological preconception: whether it was the institutions, politics, or the economy that was at issue, they strove to stick to a version of the English model that was still frozen in the golden age.

**Distance and separation (1909–11)**

But the manifest changes occurring in British political life were making it more and more difficult to hark back to classical British liberalism in the doctrinaire way that Dalla Volta did. So there was once again a drive to argue that the British experience had no parallels elsewhere. Dalla Volta turned to sociology, collective psychology and reports on customs to explain the development of British society. (It is worth recalling that Dalla Volta taught in Florence at the Cesare Alieri Institute which had been founded on the model of the Ecole Libre.) He made heavy use of a long essay by Jacques Bardoux which, following the example set by Boutmy and Taine, interpreted every change in British society by reference in the first instance to the national character, shaped by environment and history. From this perspective, recent changes were set in a less worrying context. For Bardoux, the new bellicose and aggressive phase in Britain’s international relations that had begun with the Boer war was certainly in part a result of industrial stagnation. But it was due above all to the ‘permanent’ traits of British patriotism. Classical liberalism had been discredited by economic stagnation, regulatory legislation, the Boer war, the imperialist drive and the campaign for protectionism. The Liberal Party could regain its vitality only by moving closer to Labour.

But for Dalla Volta all of this became an internal matter and no longer constituted a problem from the Italian perspective. An emphasis on the British people’s inherent peculiarities, and on the country’s specific political and economic characteristics, helped once again to keep the English model isolated. No longer was England an ideal that was out of reach. It was now grappling with the problems brought about by its distinctiveness vis-à-vis other countries. Other sources used by Dalla Volta served the same purpose of pushing the English experience beyond the point where it could be compared to anywhere else: either by underlining the great influence that workers’ organizations now had, and expressing regret at the way the tax system had developed and state expenditure had grown; or, alternatively, by offering reassurances about the stability of the British political situation and asserting that moves for more democracy would not weaken the country.

Dalla Volta pulled together a collection of his writings at the time of the constitutional conflict in Britain. In the introduction he stated his aim of ‘concentrating on tendencies in England today—troubled as it is by a persistent crisis’, while making clear his lack of sympathy for those tendencies as evinced by the way the constitutional crisis had been resolved. The Florentine economist expressed his hope that ‘the new advances of industrial democracy in England
will constitute in the future what they were in the past: a victory for the cause of freedom and justice'. However he viewed with alarm the extension of the state’s responsibilities, the radical nature of the reform of the Lords and the way the Lloyd George budget intervened to change the social hierarchy. Most of all he feared the ‘growing influence of democratic principles’ that inflated the state’s spending. These costs—adding social expenditure on top of the cost of the navy—were borne not by the lower classes but by upper-class incomes and particularly income from land.

Dalla Volta remained an unconditional Anglophile for a long time. But his writing evinces a more general tendency to push the English model further away at a time when the reality of Britain was becoming a more likely source of possible solutions to shared contemporary problems (solutions that were, of course, rejected). In contrast to the United Kingdom, Italy saw the gradual weakening of the reformist momentum that had characterized the earliest years of the century. As is well known, the growing influence of clerical moderates within the peninsula’s complex political equilibria was to obstruct attempts at reform in the later years of the Giolittian era. More radical forms of social conflict in response to the signs of economic crisis were to alienate industrialists (who were already very lukewarm in their support for social reform), and make them more receptive to the Nationalists’ policy of head-on confrontation.

Dalla Volta was an economist. We should not be surprised that his explanation of the meaning of the constitutional dispute in Britain had the People’s Budget as its basis. Nevertheless, his verdict chimed with other views based on political and institutional considerations. This interest in the implications of institutional processes originally derived, as we have seen, from the attitude of Italian constitutionalists like Brunialti and Luzzatti who looked at Britain from a conservative reformist perspective. The same interest marked the debate between Italian jurists on the British constitutional crisis of 1909–11. As I pointed out at the beginning of this article, Italian liberals were aware of the causal link between the proposals for tax redistribution in Lloyd George’s People’s Budget and the reform of the House of Lords. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz initially expressed consternation about the dispute: he even argued that it was ‘impossible’ for a resolution to be achieved by going in the ‘excessively revolutionary’ direction set out in the King’s speech (i.e. for the Commons to have unchallenged authority over financial matters and the dominant influence on legislation).

Arangio-Ruiz was chiefly concerned about the dispute’s political consequences. Reform of the Upper House was indispensable, in his view, because the second chamber was needed, first, to check and revise legislation and, just as importantly, to guarantee that society would be represented in a different way to the Lower House. In other words, the make-up of the House of Lords had to reflect a different distribution of social groups than was derived from ‘wide-based popular suffrage’. However, the Lords’ defeat now opened the way for the political power of the upper classes to be reduced. Thus the issue underlying the dispute, in his eyes, was the need for the Upper House to be a counterweight to two dimensions of democracy: the institutional dimension, in the sense of wider access to political representation; and the political, in the sense of laws that expressed the interests of the different social classes.
Where Italians put forward interpretations of British political developments from a political and social rather than an economic point of view, they strongly emphasized the way constitutional changes were linked to the growth of industrial democracy. Indeed some, like Guido Pardo, even viewed all the most prominent political and institutional changes under way in Britain as the extreme consequences of the industrial revolution of the 1700s: from the strengthening of party machines, to consolidated links with the colonies, to the legal regulation of the relationship between the two Houses of Parliament. Pardo approved of the constitutional changes, placing great stress on their range and on the fact that they were not in continuity with earlier developments. However he pointed particularly clearly to the connection between these constitutional reforms and Britain’s closer ties to the Empire, which he saw as a necessary consequence of democracy’s advance:

The old House of Lords has now ceased to exist. The ancient balance of power between the two chambers is broken and can never be restored. The old England is completely dead. The new England is taking shape. Democracy is making rapid progress. It is supported by the growing political influence of the democratic, autonomous colonies, especially Australia. England understands that its salvation lies in federation with the colonies. But this is impossible to achieve if the colonies’ democratic institutions are not matched at home, and if antiquated English public institutions are allowed to survive. The House of Lords is one of a kind in Europe. It is the only chamber to represent one single class: landed property set against labour. That is why it has to disappear in the new industrial democracy that has now become established in England.

Pardo’s enthusiastic vision of the future of industrial and imperial democracy led him to project an almost palingenetic solution to the constitutional dispute of 1909–11. Nevertheless, precisely because liberal constitutionalists generally did not share his enthusiasm, Pardo’s comments help us to identify the nub of their attitude to the English example. This was the point at which even those, like Luigi Luzzatti, who had carried on trying to propose the English model as a positive example longer than others did, set themselves off from Britain. (And this even when what was at issue were more technical questions related to the proposed reform of the Lords.)

At first Luzzatti had shown great involvement in this ‘stupendous moment’ of British political and institutional life. His reaction did not, of course, derive from the Asquith government’s ‘revolutionary’ plans, but rather from the House of Lords’ own proposals to reform itself, and from the chance that these might encompass some electoral basis. Luzzatti asked, ‘Is it not true that upper chambers which are elected, and which are therefore more competent to deal with financial matters (as is the case in France), have often cooperated in protecting sound finances and in better protecting taxpayers?’

The reference to what Luzzatti was really interested in is transparent here. His policy platform as Prime Minister envisaged not only a moderate widening of the suffrage (it was on this issue that his government fell), but also a plan to get the Senate to reform itself that had been prepared by the Finali–Arcoleo commission. According to this plan, which was never carried through by Luzzatti’s successor, Giolitti, Senators would no longer have been nominated by the Crown—royal nomination being the only principle set out in the Statuto. Instead they would have been elected. But the elections would have taken place
on a basis different to general elections. Indeed the membership of Senate, as a counterweight to democracy, was to have been drawn from bodies and social groups in such a way as to guarantee greater influence for sectors of the nation considered to be ‘eminent’.  

It is for this reason that the idea of changing the House of Lords into an elective chamber had drawn such an enthusiastic response from Luzzatti. But the resistance met by these proposals for self-reform proved a disappointment to him. He began an interview with the Daily Telegraph as follows: ‘At the beginning of the constitutional dispute between the two Houses of Parliament, the Lords lost an opportunity that it will never get again.’ A longer version of the interview was published in the Rivista di Diritto Pubblico; it made it clear that Luzzatti had finally broken with the English model. So, although his argument in this instance has been viewed as lacking a grasp of what the constitutional changes in Britain really meant, it is worth tracing out his argument more fully because it contains a wealth of hints at the political concerns underlying his position.

Luzzatti’s interview picked up on some familiar themes. His argument had two, closely related central pillars: the issue of the Upper House’s involvement in tax matters, and the need for a constitutional counterweight to democracy. Both of these themes were a negative reflection of the Parliament Act which had temporarily deprived the Lords of any power over tax policy and handed power over political decision-making entirely to the elected chamber. Luzzatti put forward the traditional Conservative reasons for the need to maintain the Upper House’s power to review legislation: in other words (and tendentiously not taking account of indirect taxation) so only those who paid most tax should hold power over decisions relating to government spending.

Luzzatti then cites examples that were a rather crude expression of his position—now distinctly hostile to social policy in any form. The French Senate, he observed, had recently refused to ratify the government’s plans for worker and peasant pensions, and in so doing it had done nothing less than ‘saved the state’ from the ‘insanity’ of ‘a burden so oppressive’ that it had risked leading France into bankruptcy. The Italian Senate had had the same lofty motive in 1876, at the time of the Left’s arrival in power, when it opposed efforts to abolish the grist tax which was ‘unpopular’, but which ‘brought in about 80 million a year, and was therefore one of the treasury’s main income sources’; thus it was that the Senate ‘saved the nation’s finances from chaos’.

Luzzatti’s drastic reduction of such (conservative) reformist features as there were in his policy programme shaped his perspective on British affairs. Rather than failing to appreciate the situation in Britain, he was interpreting it as he had done in the past, as a function of his domestic political concerns. His rejection of social policies lay behind his firm criticisms of the reform of the Lords and its close links to tax reform and to the gradual redistribution of the fiscal burden. The wider electoral base in Britain had increased the number of representatives of the lower classes in the Commons. These were people who had an interest in the state’s taking on social expenditure and making the upper tiers of taxpayers carry the cost. In this way, according to Luzzatti, the traditional distribution of roles between the Houses had been overturned: ‘the House of Commons, which has historically defended taxpayers against the government … is now pushing towards ever higher spending, thus preparing the ground for inevitable tax
increases. In this situation the upper chamber had to take on the defensive role which was 'today even more necessary than it was in the past: it is so indispensable that if it did not exist, it would have to be created' for the reason that 'the more democratic the lower chamber becomes as a result of the extension of the suffrage, the more the authority of the Senate has to be reinforced'. So Britain had just missed a historical opportunity to confer the necessary increase in power on the upper chamber by adapting to the demands of the time and adopting the principle of being elected. And at the same time, Britain had lost the inestimable benefit of being able to draw on a unique 'patriotic aristocracy, which offers the basis for a legislative chamber'. The country had given in to 'democracy's untamed passions' and had suffered 'the unconditional capitulation of the Lords'.

Here Luzzatti was not concerned with the political aspects of the rapprochement between Labour and the Liberal Party. It was rather that he rejected its substance—the combined programme of social and constitutional reform. The House of Lords' own proposals to reform itself interested him because they would have meant going in the opposite direction to that outlined by the Asquith government, but in the same direction as that suggested for Italy by the Finali–Arcoleo commission which Luzzatti had himself promoted. The commission sought, first, to find ways to give the Senate more authority as a 'centre of healthy vigilance, scrutiny, and resistance' to be exercised over the effects of widening the franchise; and secondly to bring the Senate's power over financial matters closer to the level enjoyed by the Chamber of Deputies. 'This is the direct opposite of Great Britain where the tendency is to cancel out the Upper House's ability to carry out effective supervision over government financial measures approved by the Commons.'

As explained above, the kind of reform of the Senate that Luzzatti envisaged would have meant the introduction of elections according to professional categories in such a way as to make the upper chamber representative of corporate interests (albeit limited to categories of people chosen from the higher income brackets and the professions). This is not the place to investigate the reasons why these reforms failed. (Most historians agree that it was because Giolitti had an interest in keeping the Senate weak and dependent on the executive.) My concern here, by way of conclusion, is to sketch the wider correspondences between Italian liberals' disaffection with the Britain of Asquith and Lloyd George, and the decline of the Giolittian system.

Concern in Italy about constitutional reform in Britain did not only have its roots in the way the Finali–Arcoleo commission's proposals were seen as an inverted reflection of the Parliament Bill. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz was against the Arcoleo proposals, arguing that the Italian Senate was 'well adapted to the goals of a bicameral system', and 'knew what the right measure of its actions was'. He claimed that 'relations between our two assemblies are clear, explicit and juridically defined'. But all the same Arangio-Ruiz did not approve of the Asquith government's democratic reforms. His view was that these reforms gave unopposed pre-eminence to the elected chamber, they permitted 'the most extreme abuses of power that a parliamentary majority can carry out with the help of the law itself'. Thus the Asquith constitutional reforms 'very much had the look of a Jacobin diktat'.
Nothing better demonstrated the collapse of the old dualism between English concreteness and balance on the one hand, and abstract, rationalist, indeed Jacobin extremism on the other:

In England ..., rather than requiring more careful consideration and re-examination, together perhaps with further guarantees, they are concentrating power in an assembly that is usually in a rush to abuse its power, and guarantees are being abolished. The triple process of examining legislation comes down to triple act of stubbornness by the Commons, a way for the lower house to test its strength, a new form of tyranny. What with the battle between the parties, the growth of the Labour Party and radicals, their arrogance ... I do not know what results all this will have—simply because I am not up on the intimate detail of each policy position in England. Nevertheless, I am inclined to believe that the results may well be bad.57

Arangio-Ruiz also added something else: 'comparisons between Britain and home come naturally when one is talking about a struggle that will be a memorable passage of English constitutional history. And these comparisons are also useful in that they allow us to give ourselves the praise we deserve.' Hence Arangio-Ruiz felt he could take pride in the calmer nature of political struggle in Italy, as in the 'substantially shared basis' that the ideas of the government parties had: 'they are all lovers of liberal progress, albeit at varying speeds and across a wider or narrower front.'58

This harmonious picture of Italian politics was the justification for the satisfaction expressed by Arangio-Ruiz in the quotation with which I began this article. But it was a long way from reflecting reality. Conflict in the political domain, and more so in society, was no longer at a subdued level in Italy. And it was becoming more and more difficult to translate that conflict into stable parliamentary alliances and concrete policy programmes.

Arangio-Ruiz made his comments on the eve of the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1912. This change was to increase the political and parliamentary weight of the Socialist Party, which was moving away for good from collaboration with the government. It is worth recalling that Giolitti's fourth cabinet in 1911 had had initial support from the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) based on the prospect of social reforms—like the state monopoly on life insurance—which were never put into effect. When it chose expansionism in Libya and the alliances with the clerico-moderates sanctioned in the Gentiloni pact, Giolitti's government lost that support. In the first half of the Giolittian era there had been an attempt to manage social tensions by open dialogue with unions and the working-class movement’s political representatives. In the second half, the administration had taken over this task.59 Moreover, conservative proposals to bring together parliamentary representation and the institutions that represented social interest groups had begun to be put forward—the Finali–Arcoleo commission’s recommendations were an aspect of this development.59

Proposals of this kind were part of a bigger pattern of efforts to stabilize the relationship between the state and society through corporate bodies. An exemplary formulation of these concerns was jurist Santi Romano’s famous inaugural lecture to his course at the University of Pisa in 1909: in it, Romano highlighted the inadequacy of the state system when faced with the complexity of the way society was now organized.

Thus the sense that Italian liberals had completely detached themselves from the English model went beyond reflections about the constitutional balance—
albeit this issue was fundamental. The interaction in Britain between tax reform, the political role of the Labour Party and the reduction in the powers of the House of Lords came together to trace out a path for the future evolution of British industrial democracy. Open confrontation between social groups and their political representatives would not be avoided. Instead it would be transferred to the highest levels of the state institutions. This was what was unacceptable, not to say incomprehensible, in Italy. During the latter years of the Giolittian era the state was increasingly closing off access to demands from below on social issues, and opting instead to manage them through the administration. Mediating social conflict through the dynamics of parliamentary alliances had now shown itself to be impracticable. There was increasingly less room for Giolitti to mediate, given the radicalization and polarization happening on all sides. Efforts to adopt reform measures through the administration—thus removing them from the risks of failure that they would have run if they had been exposed in the arena of political dispute—were starting indirectly to threaten the legitimacy of the reformists precisely because they had not been put under the necessary parliamentary spotlight. The demise of Anglophilia, just at a time when British politics was developing measures with a substantive democratic content to them, was a sign that Italian liberals were having great difficulties in operating on the terrain of democracy.

Notes

* Translated by John Dickie.
1. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, ‘L’odierna questione costituzionale inglese. Note di cronaca e raffronti’, Rivista di Diritto Pubblico e della Pubblica Amministrazione in Italia, 3, I, 1911, pp. 447–459. Here, as elsewhere in the debate I analyse, ‘England’ was used to mean ‘Great Britain’. I have decided to retain that use where I am quoting or summarizing Italian sources.
2. Ibid., p. 453.
3. That the Lords failed to endorse Lloyd George’s measures was interpreted by the government in two ways: first as an attempt to defend the class interests of the landed aristocracy from which the vast majority of the members of the Lords came; and secondly as a political move, given that the Lords was largely made up of Conservatives hostile to the Liberal government (they had obstructed other important measures in the past). It was at that point that the government resolved to get long-planned measures for a radical reform of the Lords under way. The Parliament Act was approved by the Lords under the royal threat to create a crop of new Liberal peers to counter the overwhelming in-built Tory majority. It removed the Upper House’s veto, gave the Commons the last word in passing ‘money bills’—by which was meant both spending and taxation measures—and sketched out a future reform of the composition of the Lords. That there was widely perceived to be a connection between tax reform and constitutional reform is confirmed in Alberto Ferraboschi’s reconstruction of the Italian debate at the time: ‘La crisi costituzionale britannica del 1909–1911 e la sua recezione in Italia’, Storia Amministrazione Costituzione, Annuale Isap, 2, 1994, pp. 129–150. However Ferraboschi considers this political reading of the clash in Britain to have been due to a failure in Italy to grasp the constitutional implications of the issue. For a different perspective, uniting a concern for the institutions and the social role of the aristocracy, see Pinella Di Gregorio, ‘I ’Campi Elisi’ del potere. Le Camere Alte e i Senati nell’Ottocento europeo’, Meridiana, 30, 1997, pp. 73–106.


11. The Ecole Libre, like the complex figure of Hippolyte Taine himself, certainly cannot be assimilated into the anti-democratic element of French political culture. The Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques had been founded in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war with the aim of contributing to the "intellectual and moral reform" of the country, in Renan’s phrase, through the restructuring of teaching in secondary education which was deemed to have been a decisive factor in Germany’s drive for expansion. Nonetheless the model the Ecole Libre adopted, in terms of educational systems too, was Britain. Thus the institution’s aim was not to oppose, but to give technocratic backing to democracy in the Third Republic by promoting the selection of new elites. See Pierre Favre, *Naissances de la science politique en France, 1870–1914*, Fayard, Paris, 1989, pp. 21 ff.; Giuliana Gemelli, *Le eliiti della competenza. Scienziati sociali, istituzioni e cultura della democrazia industriale in Francia (1880–1945)*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1997, pp. 130–138. In this regard, Pierre Rossouw underlines Boutmy’s role in his *La Révolution d’llugosha. Storia del suffragio universale in Francia*, Abatè, Milan, 1994, pp. 385–396.


14. Luigi Luzzatti’s repeated references to the English constitution have been interpreted in this way. Luzzatti was more concerned to emphasize the constitution’s economic and social aspects with the aim of preventing conflict and managing democraticization processes than he was to follow its historical development closely. See Paolo Pomboni, "Luigi Luzzatti e il modello liberali inglese", in Pier Luigi Ballini and Paolo Pecorari (eds), *Luigi Luzzatti e il suo tempo*, Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere e Arti, Venice, 1994, pp. 29–56, esp. pp. 34–35. Quagliariello also argues that the Italian moderates’ Anglophilia was overwhelmingly focused on social issues and not interested in an exact understanding of the institutions (‘L’isola che non c’è più’, p. 63).


16. Bruniali argued along the same lines. He had clearly set himself against Sonnino’s call to ‘return to the Statuto’ by restoring royal prerogatives (see Porciani, ‘Attilio Bruniali e la “Biblioteca”’, p. 223). To some extent this is also true of Carlo Francesco Ferraris who was in favour of a return to the letter of the Statuto on condition that concrete social and political reforms based on the English model were set in place. (Indeed this had been the position adopted originally by Sonnino himself.) See Romani, ‘Anglofilia degli economisti’, p. 218. On the Italian moderates’ opposition to Crispi that was informed by the British model, see Fulvio Cammarano, *Il progresso moderato. Un’opposizione liberale alla svolta dell’Italia cristiana* (1887–1892), Il Mulino, Bologna, 1990.

17. Edmonde Demolins (in *Boers et Anglais: où est le droit?*, extract from *La Science Sociale*, Firmin-Didot, Paris (no date)), interprets British imperialism in this way.


19. See Giuseppe Ferro, *L’Europa giovane*, Treves, Milan, 1897. Nevertheless it should be pointed out that
Ferrero put Germanic and Anglo-Saxon peoples in the same category. Noting the unbridgeable gap between English industrial capitalism and the economies of the Latin countries, he proposed adopting the German model which had the advantage of still having to catch up on the Anglo-Saxon world—thus making it a more realistic target to aim for.

20. Thomas Neal [pseud. of Angelo Cecconi], ‘Sempre le solite razze’, Il Marzocco, 4, 46, 17 December, 1899, p. 3.
22. Einaudi was annoyed by British proposals to raise the price of coal, ‘a tax of five million a year that Italy has to shoulder because of the war that the English want to fight against the Boer republics’ (L’Igiturazione inglese contro il dazio di uscita del carbone’ (29 April 1901), in Cronache economiche e politiche di un trentennio, I, Einaudi, Turin, 1964, p. 345).
24. Ibid., pp. 577–578.
25. Gaetano Mosca argued that one small group of Europeans who had managed to adapt to ‘savage’ living conditions and draw new vitality from them did not seem likely to share this fate: the Boers. See Mangoni, Una crisi fina secolo, p. 226.
26. Il Regno proposed that Chamberlain the man be treated separately from his economic policy because of a fear that ‘the new protectionism could be harmful to English interests, that is to say from the point of view of English nationalism’ (Mario Calderoni, ‘Nazionalismo antiprotezionista?’, Il Regno (1904), in Della Costellazionegno Frigessi (ed.), La cultura italiana del ‘900 attraverso le riviste ‘Leonardo’; ‘Hermes’; ‘Il Regno’, Einaudi, Turin, 1979, pp. 472–476.
30. ‘Adam Smith has already provided a complete and clear demonstration ... of the fact that the colonial system was a long way from contributing to the wealth and prosperity of Great Britain, and many of his arguments can be directly applied to today’s debate’, Riccardo Dalla Volta, ‘Protezionismo, imperialismo e libero scambio, memoria presentata all’Accademia dei Georgoffi’, 3 January 1904, in Saggi economici e finanziari sull’Inghilterra, Sandron, Milan, 1912, p. 75. On other occasions he cut the argument short by saying that the protectionist campaign was the result of ‘mistakes’ due to ‘ignorance’ and a failure to recognize the benefits of the sixty years of liberalism that had been heralded by the work of Richard Cobden: ‘Per il centro’ di Riccardo Cobden, discorso all’ ‘Accademia dei Georgoffi’, 5 June 1904, in Saggi economici e finanziari, pp. 191–208. In comparable terms he had re-echoed John Bright’s beneficial campaign for free trade, ‘Commemorazione di John Bright, memoria presentata all’ ‘Accademia dei Georgoffi’, 2 June 1889, in Saggi economici e finanziari, pp. 163–190.
33. On the two educational institutions and their basis in the English model, see Gaetano Quagliairello, ‘I rapporti tra il “Cesare Alfieri” e l’Ecole libre des sciences politiques attraverso sette documenti inediti’, Il Pensiero Politico, 25, 2, 1992, pp. 239–251. More generally, see Giovanni Spadolini, Il “Cesare Alfieri” nella storia d’Italia. Nasconde e primo passi della scuola fiorentina di scienze sociali, Le Monnier, Florence, 1975; Luigi Lotti, ‘Gli studi politici e sociali: il “Cesare Alfieri” di Istituto a Facoltà’, in Lotti et al., Storia dell’Ateo fiorentino. Contributi di studio, Piteretti, Florence, 1986, pp. 523–542; and Sandro Rogari, ‘L’Istituto di Studi superiori e la Scuola di scienze sociali’, Ibid., pp. 961–1030. However it should be pointed out that despite the fact that the founders’ aim had been to select a new elite that could serve as a political class with the intellectual skills needed to address the new unified state’s problems, for a long time the Cesare Alfieri Institute had the role of preparing the sons of the aristocracy for careers in politics and diplomacy.
34. Jacques Bardoux, Essai d’une psychologie de l’Angleterre contemporaine. Le crises bellicouseuses, Alcan, Paris, 1906, p. 12. For example, in order to explain the outbreak of aggression at the time of the Boer War, Bardoux recapitulated Bourne’s basic argument in Essai d’une psychologie politique du peuple anglais: the effect of the climate on the English temperatment as the key to understanding the population’s political behaviour (pp. 23, 333).
42. Ferraboschi’s detailed examination in ‘La crisi costituzionale britannica del 1909–1911’ reaches the same conclusion. However he also argues, with reference to Pombeni, that this emphasis constituted ‘a reductive and superficial reading of the changes going on in the British context’ (p. 149).