HISTORY AT STAKE IN EAST ASIA

edited by
Rosa Caroli and Pierre-François Souyri
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FOREWORD

Instead of applying one-size-fits-all theories to the diverse shapes of modern experience, we might equally well begin from that diversity in order to build a more expansive definition of what it means to be modern.
This is what I mean by moving from history to theory.

Carol Gluck

This book was born as a consequence of the international conference “Historiography on Japan and East Asia: State, Trends and Perspectives” which was held in Venice in November 2010. The main purpose of the conference was to evaluate the present state and trends of historical research on East Asia.

*History at stake in East Asia* deals mainly with relevant issues concerning East Asian history by adopting an inside perspective and comparing different views now prevailing in Japan, China and Korea. Actually, in the last decades many scholars explored some crucial phenomena of the historical process in Japan, China and Korea, acquiring a new methodology in investigating East Asia history and carrying out fresh research which changed the framework of traditional approaches. A deeper understanding of significant historical issues in these countries is highly important in improving the comprehension of the cultural and political interactions among the countries of a region which has strategic importance in the global geopolitical equilibrium as well as in its change.

We should also rethink the interaction between the ‘universal’ and the ‘local’ by overcoming the traditional view of East Asian history which prevails in the so-called Orientalism, and that is still prevalent in the Eurocentric historical narrative. Actually, an analysis of the real significance of the histories and micro histories of East Asia for global history is essential in overturning the conventional approach moving from the ‘universal’ to the ‘local’. In fact, by travelling in the opposite direction (i.e. from the ‘local’ to the ‘universal’) it would also be possible to highlight the various meanings and historical inflections that some global phenomena have in national, local or transnational space of East Asia. The analysis of the interaction between East Asian histories and global history from this perspective could also be helpful in examining processes of encounters, connections, integrations and assimilations as well as historicising globalization.
We express our sincere gratitude to Ca’ Foscari University and Geneva University for helping us produce this volume. And to the Toshiba International Foundation for its generous support.

The editors
HISTORY AT STAKE IN EAST ASIA
RELIGION AND MODERNITY IN MEIJI JAPAN: STRENGTHENING THE PEOPLE

Brij Tankha*

Introduction

The transformation of Buddhism under the impact of Christianity and the opening of Japan to Western influence frames the role of religious ideas and groups in a simple binary. It places a calcified Buddhism tied to Tokugawa power and divorced from the needs of the people and this moribund Buddhism is transformed by the liberating power of western ideas. This marginalizes, or rather compartmentalizes, the role of religion in social and intellectual debates and accepts the reading of those who sought to develop Japanese modernity on the assumption that religion never played a major role in Japan. In fact religion has always been important and was an integral element in shaping the debates in the late Tokugawa and post Meiji period as well. Religion, as part of a larger cultural system with a long history deeply imbedded in the social and political structure, shaped this discourse. The Meiji Restoration (ishin) and the changes that followed were made within this system. In contrast to Europe, religious wars had ended by the sixteenth century and the Tokugawa enforced sectarian boundaries. Thus, rivalries were muted, which perhaps helps to explain the relative ease with which Buddhists sects came together after the Meiji period. This is in contrast to the continued sectarian rivalries within Christianity or Islam.

* I would like to thank professor Rosa Caroli and professor Pierre Souyri, the organisers of the conference “Historiography on Japan and East Asia: State, Trends and Perspectives”, for inviting me to participate in what was a very intellectually stimulating and friendly environment. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a seminar organised by professor Iwasaki Minoru and professor Narita Ryūichi under the Workshop in Critical Theory (WINC), Tōkyō July 31, 2010. I would like to thank them and professor Shimazono Susumu, who was the discussant, for their very helpful comments and suggestions.
There was also a marked movement of priests leaving their sects and becoming “lay preachers”, to expand their ministry beyond their sects’ members and address issues of wider social concern. They were moving beyond the individual and family to see their constituency as the emerging nation. Their ideas provided the theoretical foundation for the institutions and practices that were created.

In this essay I take the life of the Nishi Honganji monk Kitabatake Dōryū (1820-1907) to demonstrate the importance of religion in social and political debates, the expanding role of the clergy and to argue that there was a diversity of opinion among these groups. Religious groups did not all work to support the Meiji project of an “emperor system” nation-state. Kitabatake’s life demonstrates one way that Buddhists responded to the challenges of rethinking the role of the clergy, the place of religion and the nature of the state. Kitabatake’s public activities also point to the role of domains (han) such as Kii in the Meiji ishin, a role that has been largely obscured by the focus on Satsuma and Chōshū. Finally, I would suggest that these new developments, first at the han level and then later at the national level, were not driven only by the initiative of enlightened elites but rather it by the demands and pressures from below, by those excluded in a way or another, that forced those in power to change and adapt to ensure their own survival.

The Question of Religion

Religion, long denied a place within the modernist framework, has come to be acknowledged as a major force that shaped nationalism and inspired social and political thinkers across a range of intellectual positions. The old dichotomies of Western secularism and Eastern spirituality have given way to recognition that religion and religious movements have come to play an even greater role in shaping the public and private spheres of the modern world. The modern state and its relationship with religious groups and their exclusion from public affairs are questions now being thought afresh. Talal Asad has questioned the universal definition of religion and secularism and shown many varieties of secularism within the Western world.¹ He has argued that religion, as it is generally defined, is a modern Western invention, and so, underlined the need to rethink the religious-secular dichotomy. He argues that secularism is not just when human life emancipates itself from religion. Rather, in early modern Europe, it was a political strategy to build a

particular conception of the world which was used to control the mobile poor, govern hostile sects and regulate colonial expansion.²

David Bell, on the other hand has argued that it was the religious debates in Europe that created the intellectual conditions for the events that led to the French revolution and the “modern” world. He argues that it was the notion of the hidden god which placed the onus of responsibility and action on people who undermined the existing hierarchies of power.³ Martin Riesebrodt addresses this question through the notion of “referential legitimation” as a way of defining a common ground of shared premises that make dialogue and debate possible.⁴ Following these attempts to re-define religion, the question of the relationship between the “secular” and the “religious” world has been opened to exploration and explanation in a variety of ways. The common theme that emerges is that there is little evidence of a clean division between the religious and the secular, even within the so-called Western world. Across the board we find secular thinkers incorporating and using religious symbols, or religious leaders using secular symbols to shape and unify religious traditions. This was clear in the beginning of the French Revolution as the debates within the National Assembly reveal that French revolutionaries saw the Catholic Church as a model to emulate in their project of forming a republican citizenry.

Instead of seeing the two, the religious and the secular, as static concepts in opposition, it is far more productive to understand the relationship and, what Prasenjit Duara calls the “traffic” between the two, as cross flows that co-constitute notions of religion and nation.⁵ The state far from abdicating the sphere of religion plays an active role in demarcating and controlling the area of religious activity, the role of religious institutions and the dissemination of their ideas. It is because of this that by asking the question that Talal Asad asks, who defines religion and what assumptions are made, we can understand the relationship between religion and the state in Japan.⁶

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⁵ Prasenjit Duara, “A Comparative Perspective on Religion and Secularism in Modern China”, Nichols Distinguished Lecture, Duke University, February 18, 2005.

Buddhism in Late Tokugawa

The world of Buddhism in the late Tokugawa period was a complex and diverse universe which I will not explore here, except to indicate some crucial features to show that Buddhism, far from being ossified, was developing and changing even during the Tokugawa period. The bakufu’s policies towards religious groups and ideas based on the principle of control and isolation were closely regulated and sectarian boundaries enforced. Heretical ideas were controlled and sects that were seen as disruptive, banned. For instance, Christianity, as is well known, was banned, but so were others when they posed a threat to the social order. The Nichiren Buddhist sect “neither giving nor receiving” (fuju fuse) was banned in 1669. The temple registration (danka) system of compulsory temple registration along with measures that clearly defined sectarian boundaries actively prevented interaction and debate. However, this control was not always effective and these policies produced unintended consequences. These policies isolated and strengthened sectarian positions but they also led to developments that invigorated Buddhism. Sects established a system of schools, from the mid-Tokugawa period, to train priests and provide systematic religious instruction. The students were tested for advancement and qualification, standards were laid down. The body of religious teaching and ideas that developed within the sects was not always within politically acceptable limits and led to conflict with the authorities.7

Two examples, one from the early and the other from the later Tokugawa period, illustrate the way Buddhist groups were developing strategies to meet the criticism leveled against them. First the case of the priest Taichū Ryōjō (1552-1639). He was a Kyōto Buddhist scholar of the Jōdō school, but also trained in geography, astronomy, Shintoism, and military affairs. He traveled widely in Japan building over twenty temples and had even planned to go to China. In 1604 he went to the Ryūkyū Islands and wrote of his stay there. The second is that of Jūen (1716-1804), a Shingon priest who worked among the common people and studied Sanskrit to learn the roots of Buddhism, propounded a theory of Shinto that united the people and the emperor (kunshinron) arguing that these links can only be understood within esoteric Buddhism. There are many similar examples of Buddhists preaching to householders and ordinary people, and writings that addressed the general population.8

In short the monks studied and codified the foundational texts, brought out authoritative collections and developed a scholarly tradition with all its intellectual benefits. Priests were also taking their teachings to the people and working outside the temples. The nenbutsu priests carried on the medieval tradition of wandering priests and built wide ranging networks between the people and the temples, those around Zenkōji or Kōyasan, for instance. The Meiji government, fearing the potential for social activism that these living connections with the people carried, banned these groups in 1871.

Buddhists responded not just to the bakufu’s policies but to the anti-Buddhist criticism directed against them by scholars such as Kumazawa Banzan (1619-1691), the Neo Confucian scholar of the Wang Yang Ming school, the National Studies scholars Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843) and others. This influential tradition was critical of the Buddhist preoccupation with transcendental and otherworldly matters to the exclusion of social relations. The Confucianists and National Studies scholars saw the monks as an unproductive group and called for the abolishment of temple schools, reducing the number of parishes, and the end to both the privileges enjoyed by temples and the temple registration as well. But even more importantly the criticism of Buddhism on scientific grounds begun after the introduction of the heliocentric view forced them to rethink their ideas. For instance, during the genroku period Mori Shōken of Mito (1653-1746) criticized the Buddhist cosmology that placed the centre of the world on the mythical mountain Sumer as unscientific and this line of criticism was reiterated later by kokugakusha and the Dutch scholars (rangakusha) as well. Hakuhara points out that it was Tominaga Kakamoto (1715-1746) who put forward a “modern” critique of Confucian, Buddhist and Shinto ideas and argued for them to be seen as part of one whole, a view that influenced Hirata Atsutane who used these ideas to build a conception of Shinto as the true religion of Japan.

The Buddhists reacted to these criticisms by advancing a syncretic view of Buddhism, Shintoism and Confucian ideas. The Shinshū stress on marriage, eating meat and the importance of self-discipline are a reflection of this line of thinking. Buddhists were developing intellectually and alive to the world around them. Signs emerged that they were responding, as other sections of society were, to the new challenges. The story of a “funeral religion” unresponsive to the people is part of the imagery of the post Meiji view of the Tokugawa as the “long night of darkness”, to use Okakura Tenshin’s description. This view also works to support the view of the

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marginality of religion in Japan. So the policies that regulated religion and restricted debate worked to strengthen the intellectual and institutional foundations of the sects sustaining links with the people and making the changes in the post Meiji world possible.

Arming the People

In this section I would like to look at the changes in the han of Kii as they provide one example of how social and political changes were carried out within an existing religious framework. The han of Kii is seen as marginal and its activities rarely mentioned in histories of this period. Yet the changes that occurred in the last few decades of the Tokugawa regime show the crucial role that the han and the domainal leaders played in the Meiji transformation. The reform programme carried out in the han grew out of the influence both of the long tradition of kokugaku teachings as well as the rangaku or tradition of Western scholarship. The social and economic changes that convulsed the han created a politically unstable climate and the reforming elites were forced to concede the need to be inclusive to strengthen the ability of the han to retain its control. The creation of militias, the spread of education, the appeal to the people to unite and defend the han were a product of the new claims on power that were being made. The ruling elites aimed to strengthen defence in the widest sense and for this a new militia was obviously necessary, but far more importantly, they saw that by uniting the people they could reduce social discontent and strengthen the political structure to meet the threat of the foreign powers.

Kitabatake Dōrū, as a Honganji monk in the temple of Waka no Ura, was close to these newly emerging classes as well as tied to the ruling elites through the Honganji. His understanding that the han could strengthen itself by expanding its power provides the basis for his activities. His early years are bound up with reforms at the domainal level, establishing a peasant-monk militia to protect the han and country from foreign threat as well as against han threatening the bakufu through these reforms. The second period from the Meiji Restoration revolves around how to reform the Honganji, and here his ideas are at odds with the dominant groups in the temple establishment, such as Shimaji Mokurai (1838-1911) and others associated with Western inspired reform. His failure leads to the third period of his life where he first establishes a law school, and then later, together with Nishimaki Sakuya (1866-1908), a former people’s rights (jiyū minken) activist, preaches religious reform and gender equality.

After the failure of the Honganji reform attempt, he journeys to Europe and on his return travels to the Buddhist sites in India. This trip, taken when he was seventy, interesting as it is, is really a side show to the main concerns
of his life. I would suggest that the life of Dōryū is an example of how a new concept of the nation under an emperor was based on popular rights, gender equality and a vision that saw the unity of the religious and secular. The reforms that the Buddhist carried out grew, not just from the influence of European ideas but from the changes that took place during the so-called “opening of Japan”. The arrival of the United States’ fleet under Commodore Perry was not just a peaceful port call: the threat of invasion and danger set in motion internal debates and reforms within the country that provided the impetus to rethink the contours of the political system.

Kitabatake Dōryū was born in Waka no Ura in the han of Kii and distinguished himself as a sharp and perceptive student studying Tendai and Shingon as well as Confucianism and jūjutsu. He rose to the rank of what is in today’s terms an “associate professor”, a qualification that few priests managed to secure. He was 34 when Commodore Perry landed in Uraga Bay and a priest at the temple of Hōfukuji. Kitabatake saw that the general clergy were ill-educated and unconcerned with the affairs of the country. The appeal to support secular power was not a problematic one as the Buddhist sects all had worked out explanations to justify their support of the current political authority.

The han of the late Tokugawa exercised a degree of autonomy but there were layers of trans-han links and these dense networks laid the foundations of the Meiji policies. In Kii, the reforms were inspired by the influence of kokugaku teachings, the Dutch scholarship (rangaku) that transformed into an interest in Western scholarship, the concern of local officials with improving the state of affairs, and the demands of the people for change. The reforms cannot be seen as only carried out by the elites responding to the foreign threat to save the country, rather they were responding to two threats, the external presence of the Western powers but also the claims being made from below for a share in the system.

A detailed discussion of the reforms in the han are not germane to the argument but the general context shows the depth and scale of the changes taking place. Commodore Perry landed in Uraga Bay in June 1853 and stayed till December of that year. This was the period when the han reformists led by Tsuda Izuru (1832-1905) and Hamaguchi Goryō (1820-1885) and other such as Kitabatake, carried out a series of reforms. Many of those involved had already been working in their private capacities to spread education and train the people to fight a possible foreign invasion or suppress internal revolts. The factional politics and demands on Kii for troops by the bakufu when it launched two expeditions against Chōshū, helped to further military reforms and increased the urgency to break status and sectional interests.
Hamaguchi Goryō for instance, established a school to train the young peasants and fisher folk to read and write.12 The school predates by three years the better known Shōka Sonjuku school started in 1856 by Yoshida Shōin (1830-1859). At Hamaguchi’s school ending status differences went hand in hand with strengthening the han as he also set about acquiring arms to train the villagers and form a local militia.13 Similarly, Kitabatake Dōryū also turned his attention to strengthening the village through a revitalised education and a militia trained in modern methods. The militia of monks and peasants broke the monopoly of the samurai and pointed to a new political imagination that put the defence of the country in the hands of the people. It probably drew inspiration from the tradition of warrior monks (sōhei) such as those of Mount Hiei, whose power was famously destroyed by Nobunaga in 1571. Kitabatake provided the funds to train and maintain the militia even pawning a family heirloom that had been in the family for six hundred years.14

The militia was formed before the Kiheitai raised by Chōshū, under the banner of “justice and patriotism” (seigi aikoku). This militia was used to suppress a rebellion in Kōyasan, to put down the Yamato ikki, and along with other bakufu troops, and in two expeditions against Chōshū. It was in August 1863 the battle against the Heavenly Avenging Force (Tenchūgumi), a jōi group of Tosa defeated by bakufu troops, that the image of Kitabatake, a headscarf tied around his head, firing a cannon at Sawada Monosuke, the leader of the Heavenly Avenging Force, became a popular image of the war and defined him as a fearless monk.

In 1868, as the political climate changed, Tsuda and his group employed the two German soldiers Julius F.W. Helm (1840-1922) and Carl J.W. Koppen (1833-1907) to train the han militias.15 These military reforms provided a model for the Meiji government and Tsuda Izuru, on the invitation of the imperial court, joined the newly established Meiji army and Kitabatake was made the head of a military school.16 In the course of the han reforms Dōryū came into contact with other han officials and reformers. One of these was Mutsu Munemitsu, a younger man who looked at Kitabatake as a father figure. Kitabatake’s relationship with reformers and political activists also led to trouble. He closely escaped being imprisoned when members of the

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12 Sugimura Hirotarō (ed.), Hamaguchi Goryō den, Hamaguchi Goryō Dōzō Kensetsu linkai, Wakayama 1920, pp. 75-77.
13 Ibidem, pp. 81-84.
Self Help Society (*Risshisha*), with whom he was associated, were caught, in 1874, in an anti-government plot and imprisoned.17

**Strengthening the Priests**

The reforms within the *han* of Kii had brought Kitabatake a certain prominence and set the stage for his role in the abortive and brief attempt to reform of the Nishi Honganji between April-June 1879. The changes in society also meant that the religious groups such as the Honganji, mostly run by small elites, had to face demands from the temple priests clamouring for changes in the way that temples were administered as well as their system of teaching and their relationship to society.

The Nishi Honganji had begun to make changes in 1868 when the then head of the order was replaced by the young Myōnyo. These reforms saw the temple changing the teaching curriculum, opening its schools to the laity, sending priests out to study in England and Europe to gain degrees and study the religious situation abroad. These priests came back to revamp the whole system and adapt it to the challenges posed by Christianity and Western ideas. Myōnyo was concerned with the reform agenda of Shimaji Mokurai and other monks who had returned inspired by the European experience. Kitabatake writes that Myōnyo feared that in their zeal they would destroy the whole edifice of Buddhism. Myōnyo is quoted as having written in the newspaper, *Kyōgi shinbun*, that “what they are doing to our religion is a great sin against our ancestors”.18 Kitabatake’s relationship with Myōnyo and the exact role that Kitabatake played in the reform attempt are not clear and the source of the information is mostly Kitabatake so these questions cannot be answered. Kitabatake reportedly played a role in helping to arrange Myōnyo’s marriage and this may have given him access to the head of the order but Kitabatake had also developed a network of contacts and was widely known and respected.19 It was decided that the reforms would be carried out not from Kyōto, the centre of the temple administration, because of the restrictive environment, but from the Tōkyō branch of the Nishi Honganji, the Tsukiji Honganji.

It is not clear who was the main architect of the reform plan but regardless of the individual contributions it is clear that Dōryū played an important role, especially considering his later exclusion. It was because he was considered a threat by the Shimaji group that, after the reforms were

17 The *Risshisha* was a society founded in 1874 in Tosa. Some of its leaders sympathised with the Satsuma Uprising but others such as Ueki Emori opposed them. *Ibidem*, pp. 43-45.
19 *Ibidem*, p. 38.
aborted, he was given a large sum of money to go to Europe to study the religious situation, an excuse to get him out of the country.

Kitabatake’s thinking, according to his biographer, was based on his understanding of shinzoku nittai and on that basis he felt that Honganji must work to build a citizen’s state, a “kokka kokumin”. Kitabatake learned German during the period of the han reforms and had spent five years, beginning in 1868, in Kyōto studying German legal texts with the help of a German. He developed an understanding of Western law which he later incorporated into his ideas. The crux of the reforms was the idea that the Honganji was a public body inextricably linked to the nation and so it should be returned to the country. The role of the Ōtani family, direct descendants of the founder Shinran who had ruled the temple, must be separated from the daily management of the Honganji and its temples. The Ōtani family would continue to be religious heads of the temple but would no longer exercise any power in the daily administration of the Honganji temples. The family would continue to live in Kyoto and carry out all ceremonial and religious functions and would receive 3.000.000 yen to support themselves and their establishment. The temple head had exercised absolute power and this represented a major change.

The separation from daily politics would in fact, according to Myōnyo and Kitabatake, underline their sacred nature. The temples and priests would elect representatives and manage the temple affairs. The sects’ administrative headquarters would be moved to Tōkyō ensuring space for building a democratic management structure and give all temples and priests would have equal authority. The reforms echo the later reforms of the imperial court and the role of the emperor in the Meiji constitution. Kitabatake writes that the reforms were supported by members of the government and Okuma Shigenobu donated 100.000 yen in support of the Hongaji reforms. It is possible as Kitabatake, it is known, had close links with many political leaders.

The Kii han reforms had worked because of the wide network of support from the elites. The social forces pressing for changes in the Honganji reforms faced opposition from both conservative monks, who were opposed to any change, as well as from Shimaji and those of the Yamaguchi group (the former Chōshū han), who had a different reform agenda and were able to stop these reforms and sideline Kitabatake. Myōnyo was brought back to Kyōto and this reform effort ended. The political situation in the post Seinan war was also unsettled and not conducive to realising deeply contested and divisive changes. Iwakura asked Kitabatake not to press on with his plans.

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20 Ibidem, p. 57.
21 Ibidem, p. 57.
22 Ibidem, p. 54.
and so in a matter of some two months—in April 1879 Kitabatake had been given an official letter asking him to proceed—in June he was asked to stop the reforms. Myōnyō was whisked away to Kyōto and not allowed to communicate with Kitabatake.

Teaching the Law

Dōryū was sidelined after the reforms, persuaded to go out on a long foreign tour and sidelined once he returned. Dōryū rather than go back to his temple in Waka no Ura went to Tōkyō and established a law university and wrote a widely read account of his travels. These activities built on and developed his earlier ideas and widened their scope to go beyond sectarian and religious boundaries to address the citizenry. His ideas were still grounded in the basic approach that widespread and equal participation would strengthen the country.

To this end he established the Kitabatake Law Centre (Kitabatake hōwajo). The educational philosophy and objectives of this institution were based on Kitabatake’s concept of “improving the priest”. This would be done through an education system that stressed the principles of the empire and support for “national principles and national strength” (kokutai kokuryoku). The university curriculum was based on spiritual education (seishingaku) and offered history and other subjects. Kitabatake wrote his own textbooks based on teaching material from Austria and Germany. He was helped by his wife, and was successful in raising funds for the school but religious groups were lukewarm to his approaches.23 The law school was established with teachers such as Ōi Kentarō and bureaucrats from the Law Ministry also came to lecture.

Kitabatake had developed an early interest in law. Perhaps a life devoted to upholding the law quickly saw that the law provided another way to organize a community on principles of equality. He had, as stated earlier, spent five years studying German legal texts and during his European tour met with legal scholars and written a book on law. He now used this learning to train a new generation but the German legal ideas he learnt were used very differently from Itō Hirobumi and other Meiji leaders who sought constitutional models when pressed by the demands of foreign powers to “civilize” and the need to contain the rising protests around the demand for constitutional government. The experience of Bismarckian Germany provided a model for the Meiji leaders to develop a political structure around a new type of emperor, the so called tennōset system.

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23 Ibidem, p. 81-89.
Kitabatake uses the language of strengthening the country under the imperial house but the meaning these words carry is not the same. The emperor, a political institution with a long history, was the natural source of legitimacy and continuity and could be imbued with modern meanings. The imperial house was an institution central to Japanese culture and history and it resonated with the people even when they perceived it dimly. Kitabatake and many of his contemporaries saw this as the natural base on which to build a more democratic political structure. The imperial links with Buddhism have a long history, as well as the traditions of the religious uprisings of the Jōdo shinshū followers, known as the ikkōshū uprisings, of the fifteenth and sixteenth century should not be ignored. These traditions allowed monks to turn to the people even as they extolled the emperor.

Kitabatake did not last long in the university before there were differences, possibly over financial management but the break-away group was composed of former bureaucrats of the newly formed Law Ministry and there may have been a split over approach and objectives. The university under Kitabatake had brought those within the peoples rights movement, such as Ōi Kentarō and the Law Ministry bureaucrats who had studied law under the French jurist Boissonade.24

Preaching Gender Equality

Kitabatake was a popular preacher and during one of his talks he came in contact with Nishimaki Sakuya, an early jiyū minken activist, a teacher and a journalist. She was drawn to his thinking and became his disciple and then his wife. Little is known about her life but as a pioneer political activist her life shows that the “traditional” educational system was producing critically conscious people. Nishimaki’s work as a people’s rights activist and her life with Kitabatake provide two crucial windows into the forces that shaped her ideas and brought these two people, separated by age and education, together in a common quest.

Nishimaki’s father had established a temple school or terakoya and taught his daughter in the traditional manner emphasizing Chinese poetry. Nishimaki studied Chinese poetry and English in Tōkyō and in 1880 became a teacher at Kashiwazaki Normal High and Primary School. It is reported that she was often late for school because of her work in the political study meetings of the people’s rights movement. In September 18, 1881 Baba

24 The history of the Meiji University on the website says that it was found in January 1888 by a group of young lawyers, Kishimoto Tatsuo, Miyagi Kōzō and Yashiro Misao. It does say that they had lectured in Dōryū’s academy but when students who were dissatisfied with Dōryū’s policies turned to them they established a new school. http://www.meiji.ac.jp/cip/english/about/history.html
Tatsui and other leaders were touring the area giving speeches about the need for a constitutional government. They spoke at the Nishi Fukuji temple, where she was also a speaker. Nishimaki spoke on the importance of education as a way to ensure equality for women. Baba was reportedly impressed with her ideas and publicly supported her views. The next year she wrote an article on the subject.

However, her political activities were brought to an end by the public assembly law passed in April 1880. The law severely curtailed political activity and meetings, particularly restricting teachers and women, amongst other groups, from taking part in public meetings. Nishimaki debated the new law arguing against restrictions on public assembly because they would, she felt, restrict debate and further increase inequalities. Nishimaki argued, like other people’s rights advocates, that in the struggle for existence national unity was vital to meeting the threat of western countries, such as England, Russia and France and that political equality and democracy and the establishment of a parliament was the best way to unite the people and build national strength. She noted that it was often pointed out that the English became stronger after the Magna Charta.

Nishimaki joined the Freedom Party of the Youth (Seinen jiyūto) in November 1881 and this was a violation of the law. She was arrested, as were other members, under Article 14 of the People’s Assembly Law and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a year and also a fine of 1.50 yen (the party was subsequently dissolved and its members absorbed in the Jiyūto). It is not clear what she did after her release but it seems that at some point in time she went to Tōkyō, studied and then taught in a school run by an American priest in Yokohama. In September 1885 she heard Kitabatake give a talk, by the following year she had become his disciple. Her emphasis on the need for education and equality from the perspective of democracy as a way of strengthening the nation resonated with Kitabatake’s ideas of creating the basis of national strength on spiritual autonomy and constitutional government. Kitabatake had also come to see that the social progress of women was also an important component of progress. Strengthening the citizenry by removing status differences and reducing economic disparities also required removing gender differences.

It is possible that Kitabatake had come to see the importance of women in national development and therefore the need to address gender inequality to create not just politically and economically but also spiritually independent individuals. This led the two of them to establish the Nonnen Society (the name was written in phonetics), modeled on a women’s reform association in Germany. They gave a lecture to bring in members and raise money to establish a school for women. The two began lecturing mainly in northern Japan, where the Honganji was not so active, and branches of the society were quickly formed in Yamagata and Akita (August-December 1886) and
then in Fukushima, Aomori, Ishimaki, Sendai, and Hakodate (between May 1886-May 1887). The idea behind establishing the Nonnen Society was to address the women, as they were seen as crucial to initiating change. The woman was regarded as the mother of civilization as her role as a mother in raising children gave her a powerful position in shaping the religious life of the young. However, to meet the demands of modern life women needed to develop autonomy, knowledge and economic independence so that they could contribute to the national effort. Women, they argued, also needed to have an international perspective and this led them to encourage the learning of English as necessary to gain a wider world view. Government policy was taking a different route. In 1889 English had been replaced by sewing as a subject in Women’s Normal Schools. The Meiji Civil Code, based on patriarchal ideas would place them in a subordinate and dependent legal position. In contrast Kitabatake and Nishimaki were arguing that “spiritual autonomy”, combined with education would give women the possibility of economic independence and allow them to be self-reliant.

This is a theme that had begun to interest other thinkers and social activists, including Buddhists, as well. Tanaka Chigaku (1861-1939), a Nichiren monk who left the order and became an influential lay speaker emphasized the importance of the family and particularly the role of the wife/mother. In a significant essay, *Bukkyō fūfurōn* (On Buddhist marriage) initially given as a lecture in 1886 and presented to the Emperor Meiji and his consort on their twenty-fifth wedding anniversary in 1894, Tanaka argued that since Buddhism had been transformed from a religion of the house (ie) to that of the individual, the husband-wife relationship had to be reformulated as the major axis of the family and consequently of the state.

The nature and function of the family became an important area of examination in books and periodicals and a new sense of family and home

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emerged in the late Meiji period. This differed from the early Meiji years when the traditional forms were being criticized and a family based on equal relations was advocated. These new debates defined the principles on which the drafting of the Meiji Civil Code began in 1890. So, this was not only a “religious debate”, but had wide social and political implications. The new family (katei) lost this idea of equality and made the home the domain of the woman. Buddhist debates, according to Fukushima Eiju, who has discussed the notion of woman, man-woman relations and the concept of the family in Buddhism, argues that Buddhists too began to think along these lines. He shows that the magazine Katei (Family) brought out from 1901 depicts the family as a “small paradise” where each member gave up his ego to become a part of the whole but it was the woman who would manage and run this little paradise while the man worked outside in society.28

Significantly, the central argument that Kitabatake and Nishimaki put forward is that marriage is a partnership of equals, and the two can only be equal if both of them are politically, economically and spiritually equal. Such a family based on the principle of equality will support an independent and strong nation. They are not putting forward a set of essentialised traditions that the woman will transmit to the future generations but there is also no clear statement about the nature of political activity and how women could play a political role but the tenor of the arguments they advance supports a reading that they view citizenship as based on equality, the family as the nation writ small, and that in both equality would nurture and sustain strength. This is the major motif and it defines his conception of social and political relationships and family and places them within the broad contours of the advocates for civil rights.

Conclusion

The examination of Kitabatake and Nishimaki’s life and their ideas was used to point out the interplay between “religious” and “secular” ideas, bracketed because, in the case of Japan as shown here, they were not clearly demarcated nor seen to be. The demarcation was itself a product of the post Meiji changes and this view of a society where religion was marginal gradually gained dominance. To read it back distorts, marginalizes and hides the activities of religious and religious-minded people that continue to play a role in shaping the social discourse. Kitabatake, both as a Honganji monk and as a lay preacher took an active role in contemporary debates and was as much shaped by them as he contributed to them. The idea of the imperial

28 Fukujima Eiju 福島栄寿, Shisō to shite no "seishinshugi" 思想としての‘精神主義’ ('Spiritualism' as thought), Hōzokan, Kyōto 2003, pp. 190-200.
house and the role of the emperor had yet to solidify into the “emperor system” and Kitabatake and others like him used this ancient symbol in new ways to build a stronger han and later a stronger nation. There is no mention in Kitabatake’s writings that would suggest that he saw the emperor as anything that resembles the emperor of the Meiji leaders.

The role of Mito in the intellectual debates has been studied but the role of Kii has been neglected. Kitabatake’s political agenda matured in the period of the han reforms and that was when he began to study German as well, so the movements in Kii and their relationship with the imperial house and the bakufu need to be explored. Nishimaki’s political learning began through her participation in the people’s rights movement and developed through her exposure to Christianity in the same direction as Kitabatake, so the two had many shared concerns that brought them together. Their emphasis on the idea that national strength can only be built on the basis of an equal citizenry and the need to develop autonomous individuals brought them in conflict with both the authorities of the temples as well as the state. This underlying objective of their thinking differentiates them from the Meiji leaders and the project of “enlightenment and modernity” as represented by Fukuzawa Yukichi and the Westernisers. They and others like them were articulating a political and social programme to strengthen the rights of the people and would provide an alternative to fracture the secular and the spiritual that European modernity had created. Their history shows the limits of Meiji success and points to the unfinished agenda of modern Japan.

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During the period from 1800 to 2000 China endured many serious crises and changes. The common root of changes in China can be traced to the state and state-building, something that has been overlooked so far. The failure of the Qing Confucian state opened many doors for non-Confucian state-builders to impose a different type of state on Chinese society. They had three things in common: they were all Social Darwinists; they formed a tiny minority in society; and their institutions often had no “Chinese characteristics”.

In this context, not all changes were necessary. Not only that, many crimes against ordinary people were committed in the name of the state. This is justifiable given that with the changes, the living standards of ordinary Chinese citizens declined. By the end of Mao’s rule, for example, about half of the population were under the official poverty line. China did not become a better place to live until 1978.

This chapter probes into the issue of the role of state-building and a new state and its impact on the well-being of the general public.

Overview

From 1800 to 2000 China endured a great many serious crises often on a huge scale: opium abuse; society-wide uprisings; the political movements of the Republicans and Communists; civil wars; political purges; and the unparalleled 1959-62 man-made famine. Meanwhile, China had been defeated five times by foreign powers: two opium wars, one Sino-Japanese war, one Sino-French war and one war with Eight-Power Allied Forces and signed treaties with 12 foreign powers. A third of China’s territory was also placed under control of the Japanese during the Second World War. Peace
became a rare luxury in China, a country which had more than its fair share of havocs in the world.¹

Interpretations of changes in China

Coupled with the messiness of China’s experiences, narratives of this period are full of contrasts and contradictions. Some emphasise China’s success; others, China’s failure, much depending on one’s taste.

China’s success and failure

There has been a long European tradition of respect for China. From the early sixteenth century onwards a string of Jesuit missionaries followed in the footsteps of Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) and managed to enter the heartland of the Empire. They created a notion of ‘Sinophilism’ and viewed Qing China as an orderly, efficient and sophisticated society and a land of plenty where ordinary people had a decent material standard of living.

Such a view influenced an array of European elite, including the philosophers Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and Voltaire (or François-Marie Arouet, 1694-1778),² the economic thinkers François Quesnay (1694-1774) and Adam Smith (1723-90),³ as well as driving the European fashion movement chinoiserie. Prior to the British Industrial Revolution, China was recognised, at least implicitly, as a model for Europe.⁴ In circa 1800, Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), the most powerful man in Europe, famously warned the world to take China seriously: “When

² Voltaire openly advocated the Qing Empire as the best in the world; see Geoffrey F. Hudson, Europe and China, Beacon Press, Boston 1961, p. 322. Leibniz went as far as suggesting that missionaries from Qing China were needed to teach Europeans natural religion; see Donald F. Lach, The Preface to Leibniz’s Novissima Sinica, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1957, p. 75.
³ Quesnay, nicknamed “the Confucius of Europe”, was inspired by China and established physiocracy or agricultural fundamentalism. He also favoured Mencius’ view on market laissez-faire. Smith’s notion of laissez-faire came from China, even if indirectly.
China wakes, she will shake the world”. Such a tradition continued after the Second World War, as evidenced by the lifetime works on Chinese science and technology by Joseph Needham (1900-1995) and, more recently, by the current debate over China’s economic power led by the California School.

The comparative advantage of the sinophiles lies in their expertise in Chinese studies. Most are fluent in the Chinese language with a good knowledge of history. Their problem is explaining how and why a vibrant civilisation failed so suddenly and so badly after 1800. Foreign interference, such as opening China for trade in the wake of the 1840 Opium War, has become imperative for this group. But foreign trade accounted for only a tiny share in China’s total GDP of the 1840s. This is their impasse.

In opposition to this is “sinophobia” which seems to have begun with Montesquieu (or Charles-Louis de Secondat, 1689-1755). In his bid to promote democracy, Montesquieu attacked Qing China as despotic. 5 His commitment to the idea of liberty was followed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and David Hume (1711-1776), while his critique of China was picked up by Karl Marx (1818-1883), Max Weber (1864-1920) and Karl A. Wittfogel (1896-1988) who viewed China as a civilisation of stagnation, incompetence, and misery.

Sinophobes usually do not read Chinese and their knowledge of China is often limited. Their works depend heavily on guesses and speculations from a Eurocentric norm. Typically, they ignore China’s relative egalitarian landholding (freehold and leasehold) and easy access to markets, which guaranteed some economic freedom for all. They can hypothesize China’s alleged despotism-cum-failure after 1800 but cannot elucidate China’s success under the alleged despotism before 1800. This is an impasse of another kind.

So far, there is no reconciliation between the two camps. This book aims to surmount these impasses with a consistent and convergent argument to show how China’s great success during the Qing prepared the ground for its own downturn with all the aforementioned troubles.

Myths of China’s modern history

There are a wide range of myths in circulation about Sino-foreign relationships, Chinese nationalism, industrialisation and modernisation. The standard view and normative has been that the Opium War, a small event with a total of a few thousand casualties, awoke the Chinese general public who then supported the Nationalist Movement. This Nationalist Movement, 5 See chapter 21 (“Of the Empire of China”) of book 8 (“Of the Corruption of the Principles of the Three Governments”) in his 1743 monograph The Spirit of Laws, reprinted, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge 1989.
in turn, ushered in China’s industrialisation and modernisation. This is a very neat and linear narrative.

But neatness is not automatically accurate. During my decade-long research, time and again evidence confronts such a narrative. For example, until the 1930s, ending China’s “unequal treaties” was not on the agenda of most political parties. Instead, China’s movers and shakers were overwhelmingly pro-foreigners and pro-foreign powers. They included the Taipings, “Westernisers” (yangwu pai), Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his fellow Republicans, and the Communists.

Then, there is the issue of foreign powers carving up China. Most writers tend to ignore the fact that after the 1850s the majority of provinces in China were heavily armed and no foreigner could stroll in without permission. China was in effect carved up first by Chinese officials themselves to attract foreign powers in exchange for capital and technology. These officials even disobeyed Beijing when the Qing Court declared war in 1900 against the invading powers. Maintaining neutrality all the way, not a single bullet was fired upon the invaders.

The next issue regards revolutions. So far there is no evidence that the Taipings did anything remotely revolutionary, ideologically, politically, or economically. The commonly cited Tianchao Tianmu Zhidu (Land System of the Heavenly Dynasty) dealt predominantly with how to subjugate the captured population by coercion. There is no indication that Sun Yat-sen was involved in the 1911 Mutiny in Wuhan, or played any decisive role in ending the Qing monarchy in 1912. The following 1927 Northern Expedition was a proxy war between the Soviet Union (backing the Republicans and Communists) and Japan (supporting the northern warlords). The Soviet Union did not care about whether its protégés were revolutionary or not, as long as they were pro-Soviet Russia. Then, there is the question of Mao’s movement. The fact that Mao carefully plotted and ferociously fought eleven rounds against his fellow party members and communist sympathisers, often in large numbers, means that his victims were not unintended or incidental “collateral damage” by friendly fire. Either large numbers of Mao’s victims or Mao himself was an enemy of the revolutionary. Politically, Mao’s victims and Mao himself were mutually exclusive.

Finally, there is the question of modernisation. From 1860 to 1937, China’s state-run industrial schemes, foreign investment projects and growth in treaty ports, including Shanghai, were too small to upset China’s traditional economy and its growth trajectory. Industrial expansion in Manchuria under the Japanese colonial rule did not offset the extensive damage caused by the Japanese invasion and conquest, not to mention the fact that most industrial assets were eventually lost to the looting of Stalin’s Red Army in Manchuria during 1945-1946. After 1949, according to Maoist official statistics, China was still characterised as an agrarian economy
although with a nuclear arsenal. Ordinary people’s daily calorie intake was noticeably lower than in the 1930s, not to mention the largest peacetime man-made famine which cost 30-40 million lives. Such a thing had never occurred during the Qing.

Old narratives and new debate

Historians often claim that under the Marxist Eurocentric doctrine that before 1800 China had already been infected with a wide range of social ills. China’s alleged “feudal system” comprehensively stifled the growth of progressive capitalism, holding China back in the grip of an agrarian deadlock with perpetual poverty and military weakness. China managed to survive only because it was isolated from the rest of the world. This has been seriously challenged by a non-Eurocentric view which sees no harm in the isolation of China: after all, most of Chinese premodern inventions and innovations were made largely independent in China. Even so, changes were unanimously viewed as good for China, regardless. The term ‘revolution’ has been particularly favoured by writers on China. In their


eyes, a revolution justified almost everything the state and state-builders did in China.

As a result, the history of modern China has often been portrayed as having six neatly constructed causalities: (1) By 1800, Chinese civilisation had become inward-looking, complacent, decadent and lethargic. People were universally poor. The Manchu Qing government was corrupt and despotic. China was doomed. (2) Qing weakness was ruthlessly exploited by predatory powers that spared no effort to make a kill in China, ranging from opium trafficking to invasion to foreign privileges on China’s soil. China became a “semi-colony” of foreign powers. (3) Copied from Western and Japanese patriotism, Republicans emerged from the sovereignty crisis to modernise China’s politics, economy and culture under a republic. (4) However, the Republicans soon ran out of steam after being infected by vested interests. They fell into the same trap of corruption and despotism as the Qing elite. (5) The left-wing elite finally selected communism from Russia. Mao led China to independence, fast development and a better material life marked by China’s nuclear arsenal. (6) Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms were the icing on the cake to improve the Maoist system. China’s miraculous growth soon followed and stunned the world in recent decades. Since the 1960s, the field of Chinese studies in the United States has moved towards a China-centred and sinophile interpretation. This narrative has formed the normative and mainstream interpretation of China’s modern history.\(^9\) If true, step by step, China has become a better place to live, the most reliable yardstick that cannot be compromised either in the short run or in the long run. In other words, if people’s living standards did not improve monthly and yearly, any change, no matter how much the state-builders promised, was not worth having. This should be valid for all liberal utilitarianists and those who believe in Marxian historic materialism.

Changes inevitably involve what is commonly labelled as “moral judgment”. Indeed, it is politically correct to condemn the excessive exploitation of the working class either during the early stages of the British Industrial Revolution and during Stalin’s super-industrialisation drive, or the brutal slavery and massacre of millions by the Nazis and the Japanese during the Second World War. The same standard should apply here.

The revisionists have however argued the opposite. They tell us that by c. 1830, China’s economy was strong. Qing China matched the West reasonably

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well in manufacturing outputs.\(^\text{10}\) It remained a major exporter of consumer goods and a major importer of silver.\(^\text{11}\) It is estimated that a total of some seven thousands metric tons of the metal was imported by China by 1815 (if counting the “Manila Galleon Trade”). It has been argued that China’s lasting demand sustained for centuries a high relative price for silver and hence facilitated world trade and the Spanish Empire. The Qings maintained a respectable living standard despite little modern input.\(^\text{12}\) Undeniably also, the large quantities of opium imports suggest high disposable income (although for the wrong reason).\(^\text{13}\) With China’s high yield agriculture and regular surpluses, the wealth was spread among ordinary citizens, not just the upper classes.\(^\text{14}\) All of this challenges the notion of socio-economic malfunction under the Qing.\(^\text{15}\) The California School suggests that China’s indigenous economy could have continued indefinitely if it were free from external shocks.\(^\text{16}\) Revisionists have also indicated that the Qing Confucian state was anything but despotic.\(^\text{17}\) It was not the oriental version of the


\(^{15}\) The term they use is dongya bingfu, or “the Sick Man of East Asia”, to portray their own civilisation under the Qing.

\(^{16}\) E.g. R.B. Wong, China Transformed.


French *ancien régime*. Despotism was in fact systematically introduced from Soviet Russia to China together with the party-state. So, Maoism (or Stalinism with a Chinese face) marked a major discontinuity in Chinese history.

The revisionist insight raises three doubts about China’s changes that “teleologists” take for granted. First, these changes often took place randomly with various motives. The players had very different mindsets and approaches, ranging from top-down to bottom-up, from liberal to radical, from pro-foreign to xenophobic, from pro-growth to anti-growth, and so forth. One wonders whether such changes can ever be justified as necessary. Second, most changes were driven by imported ideologies. There is an inevitable issue of how relevant these ideologies were and hence, the changes affected ordinary people’s needs in China because their application in the country was often counterproductive. Third, China’s political systems shifted persistently away from people’s need and/or people’s power: from a bureaucratic monarchy to a constitutional monarchy then to a dictatorship. With political centralisation, choices were routinely made by a tiny minority in society. Opportunities were seized by a few careerists and rent-seekers. This begs the question of who truly benefited from those changes. Logically, if the economy went well, the problem could only be the state.

The point is that if changes in China were not all that necessary why should they have ever occurred? This tough question cannot be answered by the Hegelian-Marxian circular argument that “all that is real is rational and all that is rational is real”.

**The role of the state seen by different groups**

Scholars have sensed the role of state-building in modern China, but only touched on it lightly. Others have either considered one-off changes or

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19 J.D. Spence, *Modern China*.


have had no reference to state-building at all. Equally surprising, many took a static view as if the state was frozen.

The modern economics’ view on the state is technical. It shuns the issue of “who serves whom” between the state and society. Power hierarchy has no special bearing. In macroeconomics, the state can be considered as one of the many variables which jointly contribute to the total output of the economy in the form of a production function $Q = f(K, L, M, S, \ldots)$, where $Q$ stands for the total output which depends on inputs of capital investment including land ($K$), labour ($L$), market ($M$), state or government ($S$), and so forth. Each variable often has a weight ($a, b, c, d$ and $e$, called parameters), as in a linear function $Q = a + bK + cL + dM + eS$. Whether these variables are endogenous or exogenous, or how weights are granted is a matter of personal taste. Needless to say, there are highly simplified Cobb-Douglas production functions, based on $Q = FL^\alpha K^{1-\alpha}$; where $F$ is the total factor productivity; $\alpha$ is the output elasticity of labor; $(1-\alpha)$ is the output elasticity of capital. Admitted, state policy alters labour and capital inputs and the visible hand of the state no longer shows.

Political sciences however, see the state differently. As the antonym of anarchy, conventional wisdom on the definition and the raison d’être of the state is threefold. First, the state is an organisation which exercises the exclusive power to maintain social order among a population living within a territory, or area of governance. Second, the state has exclusive power to shield against foreign interference and take-over. In other words it has sovereignty. Third, the state also controls certain information not available to the general public, typically in the name of national interests or national security.

But the problem is that there are always multiple ways to establish and maintain a social order and hence to fulfil the basic duty of the state. In this context, the state can be autonomous from the economy per se, and may or may not build and maintain rapport with society. It may support economic growth or ruin it. In history, any chosen way was often personal, accidental, imperfect and inefficient. National interests or national security were always subject to manipulation by the few. The reason is that state-builders and state-minders are primarily selfish beings and often pursue their own

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interests in the face of the majority. Sadly, there is no single case in human history where a state has been completely free from the influence of vested interest. This phenomenon is well captured in what is known as “Olson’s Thesis”. In this regard, the notion that the state acts on behalf of public interest is too often untrue even in a modern democracy.

What grants a state such special ability to act independently from public interest is its unique power or authority over individuals and over other lesser organisations. By definition, the state is always at the top of the social hierarchy. To view the state as an open and enlightened body bargaining with the masses on the basis of equality is no more than a fantasy. Usually, the state does not respond to a popular opinion unless its legitimacy is seriously challenged.

On the other side of the equation is the relative powerlessness of the general public for whom collective action is a risky undertaking, a problem deep-seated in what is called the “prisoner’s dilemma.” In this case individual choices are constantly under pressure by the authority that actively blocks inter-personal communication (hence the term prisoners). Paradoxically, the risk of collective action often functions as a stabilising factor in society even when public resentment is apparent. So powerful, it can offset disability caused by the state’s excessive coercion. A good example was the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. The risk of collective action stabilised China because of the brutality of Mao’s regime.

In this context, the state-society relationship is always power-asymmetrical and information-asymmetrical. The general population as a whole is constantly at a disadvantage when bargaining with the state. As a result, the state is always in the right, regardless of whether it falls into the wrong hands. As it often happens, a regime can be very unpopular but still politically invulnerable. Of course, in the long run, history gives the final verdict on a state and a state-builder. However, the verdict always comes too late as damages have been long before done to the people. So, the verdict is often cold comfort. Cases from the twentieth century alone include the Holocaust, the Cultural Revolution, the Khmer Rouge and Somalia genocide.

Nevertheless, there is a tendency to downgrade the role of the state in society. The state is or should be a docile pussy cat, not a blood-thirsty beast. In classical and neo-classical economics (here they are being taken as a

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branch of social sciences), human society is considered a collection of atomised individuals who act universally independently and rationally. In a functional market an optimum in resource allocation will be achieved for all, that is the Pareto optimum. Any meddling with the market by the state only distorts the process and creates losers. Admittedly, the market model (or free market model) has some tough conditions attached: e.g. a free flow of complete knowledge of demand and supply, voluntary and autonomous market participants, and perfect competition amongst all producers and consumers. A vast body of literature has pointed out how impossible it is for such a market economy to function when one considers in reality the perpetual existence of asymmetrical information, transaction costs, price distortion, imperfect competition and economic rent, not to mention the possibility of market failures with negative externalities from seemingly harmless market activities. Likewise, changes in politics and the state will have little bearing on economic performance so long as the market still functions democratically. To classical and neo-classical economics, the best state is a servo system that Adam Smith called “night watchmen”. So far, this has remained wishful thinking apart from a few rare cases. Post-war Hong Kong may be the closest case but even there, the state showed its visible hand daily in terms of governance of law, public housing, and regulated food prices.

The Marxist School arrives at a similar conclusion via a very different route. From the viewpoint of historical materialism, individuals are not atomised but socialised in a web of relations with the rest of the population. Amongst all such relations, the economic ones are given paramount importance and hence are believed to determine the nature of ownership, production, exchange and consumption. The economy or the material basis dictates politics and the state the superstructure which are meant to submit and serve the economy, although ironically in all communist countries the superstructure routinely determined the material basis and the economy always served the state. Lenin argued that during the stage of imperialism the communists could only pin their hopes on the weakest link in the capitalist world. This is a total violation of Marx’s historical materialism. The fact that so many communist states were artificially established after World War Two, involving at best limitedly industrialised societies (East Germany and Czech Slovakia) and at worst nomadic economies (Mongolia),

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clearly tells us that communist state-building was purely an ideological phenomenon.

In Western Europe, there was indeed a case when the newly emerged bourgeoisie won over the state support for capitalism, which may prove Marx right. One often forgets, however, that even with their wealth it took the European bourgeoisie decades if not centuries to raise their voice and that the final outcome of their struggle was not guaranteed. Otherwise, a capitalist industrial revolution should have occurred simultaneously across Western Europe (as Karl Marx famously predicted). It did not happen. The British bourgeoisie proved an exception. Even so, it took the new class in Britain a long revolution in 1640-60 (the English Revolution) with Cromwell’s Dictatorship (1649-60) to seal their victory. For the non-British bourgeoisie, the outcome of their bargaining with their states was very bleak. Here, the exception of the British only demonstrates the power asymmetry when bargaining with the state.

On this note, there is a tradition of liberal thought, known as public choice, in favour of a market-like exchange of views in political life. It assumes that all players—be they state-builders or interest groups—can bargain more or less equally and peacefully. The state is viewed merely as a service provider in terms of law and order and national security; and the public, service users or clients. So, the relationship is all but equal between demand, supply, prices (tax revenue) and quantities (amount of law and order and national defence).

Although plausible, what is often overlooked is that this is no ordinary market and that the state is no ordinary service provider. It is a market with a monopoly. Any standard textbook of economics will tell us that monopoly distorts the market for economic rent. This is because the state and state-builder always have more than their fair share of bargaining power unless there is a third force to check them. So, the romanticised public choice is incompatible with the harsh reality. The common notion of state-society reciprocity is a rarity, especially in a non-democratic society. There is simply no guarantee that the state serves the public. The timeless problem of “who watches the watchmen” (Latin: “Quis custodiet ipsos custodies”) is still fully valid. According to Confucius’s metaphor, the un-restricted state is more ferocious than a man-eating tiger (“Kezheng mengyu hu ye”).

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history from 1800 to 2000 has demonstrated that an unchecked state is by far the most dangerous organisation for society.

So far, the most accurate account of the nature of the state is probably still that made by Max Weber. In his 1918 speech entitled “Politik als Beruf” (Politics as a Vocation), Weber described the state as an organisation that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence against a population within a given territory. Weber’s simplified version is that the state means a small group dominating the rest of the population by means of unilateral force.31 Charles Tilly simply called this “state coercion”.32

Of course, the execution of this monopoly of violence does not have to be present all the time. Often, it is just a threat in the background, similar to controlling drivers’ speed on public roads. A parked police patrol car without a policeman often does the same job as one with a policeman. Also, the power of the state does not have to be top-down all of the time. Sometimes, a degree of cooperation, voluntary or not, or even sheer passivity and tolerance amongst the general public will be enough to re-assure the state power. After all, there is the “Stockholm Syndrome” where captives fall in love with their torturers.

All of this signals caution against the common misconception of mass movement. Most of these often involve only a tiny fraction of the total population despite the impressive absolute numbers of participants. In the case of Maoism, the most outrageous state orchestrated “mass movement”, the Red Guards in the 1960s, counted for at most a mere 1.5 percent of China’s eight hundred million population of the time.33 So, Weber’s idea of minority rule by violence is highly valid.

In essence, in Weber’s asymmetrical relationship the state is necessarily arbitrary, intrusive, compulsory and coercive. It is a force majeure to overrule choices by individuals who are at the receiving end of the power, dominance, and violence. By analogy, the state can, and often does, force the horse to drink, especially if democracy is absent. It means that moral persuasion for the support of the masses is not even a necessary condition for the state-builder to rule a country. In this regard, the power of the state-builder is the same as the state itself. The only difference is that the latter is an established monopolist while rival state-builders are oligopolists heading for that monopoly.

The state or the state-builder is autonomously and unilaterally capable of imposing changes on society by force. They are able to end what is commonly known as the “Nash equilibrium”, under which no player can

gain by an unilateral change. Again, under a monopoly, unilateral changes yield monopolistic gains.

As with Weber, the New Institutional School argues that throughout history the relationship between the market and the state has been demonstrably asymmetrical: the market almost always needs the state, while the state can live without the market, at least in the short run. Empirically, a state can correct a bad market, but a bad state cannot easily be corrected by the market alone. One can mention the New Deal during the Great Depression and the Stimulus Packages after the 2008 Credit Crunch. In other words, it is the institutions (including the state) that determine the shape, size, health and growth potential of the market, not *vice versa*. This idea came from Hegel who believed that the “absolute spirit” determines the developmental status of the economy and society. It is fair to include Alexander Gerschenkron who implicitly indicated that exogenous factors should be brought in to modernise a backward economy. Of all relationships in human society, the state undoubtedly rules the roost.

Accordingly, Gerschenkronism and Neo Gerschenkronism no longer enshrine a state-less market. The state is able to correct the market when the market becomes faulty and substitute the market when the market fails. In particular, a pro-growth state is imperative for a society to catch up in modernisation. Such a state is generally the only hope for a developing country to vault over growth stages which hold the economy back. So much so, that the term “developmental state” was coined. The new doctrine of

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“getting market prices wrong” indicates that the state is fully capable of overruling the market to achieve pre-determined developmental goals. A few countries certainly have had such a state, e.g. Germany before the First World War and the “Asian Tigers” after the Second World War. But overall, they are rather rare.

On balance, Weber, the New Institutional School and Neo Gerschenkronism see the state as the engine for change. Indeed, the state has the resources, power and freedom to make changes. On the other face of the same coin, when changes take place, institutions, especially the state, bear the bulk of responsibility.

The role of the state and state-building

The nature of state-building and state rebuilding in China

Strictly speaking, state-building means the construction of a functional organisation to govern a nation. Modern state-building in Europe was a bloody process with a cycle of extraction of resources from the economy to make wars. These wars were all about handling internal resistance and external rivals. The gain was then made from the economies of scale in an enlarged territory and revenue. This was because the pre-condition for governing a nation is always the monopoly over violence. Monopoly by definition means a minority activity.

State-building also includes state-rebuilding when the preceding state has collapsed. We see many events of this sort in China after 1800. To the state-builder, revolutions usually signalled liberation in the form of freedom from an old regime. But they did not automatically free the general population from coercion by the new one unless there was a democracy. In modern China, genuine political freedom for individuals only occurred under short-lived anarchy.

State-building therefore differs from changes in bureaucracy. Different states may adopt similar types of government administration (e.g. economic


39 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States.


planning in the Soviet Bloc and in the West); and different types of government administration may serve the same type of state (administrative reforms without change in a country’s constitution and laws). State-building is not the same as community-building, society-building, nation-building, or empire-building. Community-building and society-building refer to the creation or enhancement of interpersonal bonds among individuals within a location. It is relevant, for example, for a cluster of unrelated migrants among whom a code of conduct or communal ethos needs to be established in order to hold them together. By 1800 China had long passed this phase. Nation-building is the creation or enhancement of a trans-tribal and trans-regional entity; while empire-building means the creation or enhancement of a trans-national entity. Often, a common language and a set of universally applicable laws have to be introduced. By 1800, China had long passed this phase, too. Conceptually, community, society, nation and empire-building may to some extent overlap with state-building. However, state-building and state rebuilding can take place independently from these.

For our purposes, state-building and state rebuilding can be defined as a radical regime change in both the structure and nature of the body politic. It involves a constitutional change to say the least. China experienced many such changes and shifted from a bureaucratic empire to provincial federalism, from a benevolent Confucian state to despotism, from civilian rule to military dictatorship and so forth.

State-building has a few distinctive characteristics. Firstly, conditions for state-building are almost always opportune when a regime encounters difficulties and the state monopoly of violence begins to slip away. It is then that dormant, armchair revolutionaries become active, armed revolutionaries. Therefore, state-building is a highly conditional and transient affair. Nothing is historically pre-programmed.

Secondly, in a regime change, one monopolist of violence has to be replaced by another. War is thus the prerequisite for state replacement.42 “War made the state, and the state made war”, as Tilly wittily put it.43 He even treated state-building as an organised crime,44 for it is fully possible that the state-builder behaves like a mafia member who first bullies society to create a need for protection, and then offers that very protection for a fee that society did not originally require. Moreover, as state-building is necessarily destructive and always produces losers, it is therefore seldom Pareto-efficient.

43 Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National State, p. 73.
Thirdly, state-building is seldom conducted by the majority. Rather, it is always an arbitrary move by the minority. Of course, in an ideal world, the state should be built by society-wide negotiations, culminating in a state “of the people, by the people and for the people”.\textsuperscript{45} In turn, the state would have a much easier task in maintaining social order via general consensus.\textsuperscript{46} In reality, however, such an ideal is not always guaranteed even in a modern democracy. In a non-democratic society, state-building is often done by the minority and for the minority. This notion of arbitrary imposition by the state clashes with the notion of rational choices by individuals (and hence democracy) advocated by political liberalism and classical and neo-classical economics; but it can be well explained by the “patron-client relationship” in the moral economy.\textsuperscript{47} For the lay person, neo-classical economics suggests that, as long as a bigger cake is baked, the economy as a whole is doing better than before (i.e. “output maximisation”), while the moral economy and political economy insist that what matters is who gets what share of the cake after negotiations and compromises (i.e. “return optimisation”).

Fourthly, state-building seldom operates according to the principles of market efficiency (i.e. the lowest marginal cost option), nor through market freedom (voluntary entry and exit) or market fair play (equal and reciprocal rights). State-builders aim to set up a social order on their terms and often pursue their goal \textit{coûte que coûte}. A new state is not always a better one. Once a new regime is established, individuals in society usually have no freedom to exit unless they migrate, often illegally, to another country.

Fifthly, in state-building, “heroes” make history. This is determined by the aforementioned asymmetrical power relationship between the state and society. Thus, personal qualities rather than public opinion influence the direction which state-building takes. State-builders vary greatly from reformers to evildoers. It is a lottery for the general public. For example, George Washington could have agreed to be crowned as the King of the United States. His refusal (contrary to certain public opinion) safeguarded America as a republic. Mao Zedong might have shared power with the other parties after the Second World War. His rejection (again contrary to public opinion) led China to a dictatorship.

Finally, the powerlessness and helplessness of the general public only reflect the absolute power of the state and state-builder. In this context, a state failure is often a failure by the state or the state-builder himself. The demise of a state almost always begins inside the state. This phenomenon

\textsuperscript{46} V.T. Hui, \textit{War and State}, pp. 41-42.
\textsuperscript{47} For an Asian case, see James Scott, \textit{The Moral Economy of the Peasant Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia}, Yale University Press, New Haven 1976.
was well understood by early Confucians in the fourth century B.C.: as Mencius put it, “a state injures itself before being overthrown by others”.

State-builders as prime movers

The question that is raised here is, what mechanisms are necessary for changes to occur? It is common for theorists to envisage some sort of social force that always acts rationally: society changes only when it feels ready to do so. That is the view of a painless, modern democracy-centricism. According to Douglass North, an increase in population pressure is the ultimate driving force for institutional changes to take place (including in the state itself) because the population pressure changes the relative prices of factors of production which makes protection of ownership of these factors necessary. This hypothesis is not borne in Chinese history, to say the least. Given that China faced greater population pressure than Europe after 1000 A.D., it is puzzling why China did not have more advanced institutions than the less densely populated Europe. Later, when China had unprecedented population growth during the eighteenth century, its institutions remained rather stable. But when aggressive institutional changes did take place during post-1800, China lost a large share of its population. Marx’s historical materialism is even less explanatory because China’s traditional agrarian material basis fundamentally disagreed with capitalist and communist superstructures. But state-builders sought them anyway. To justify that, state-builders have tried very hard to make us believe that China was already a proto-capitalist society under the Qing where anti-Qing revolutions worked as a midwife for a new society.

If population pressure and the material basis of the economy were not the determinants of state-building in China, a possible factor was ideology. Ideology is about the establishment and reinforcement of a specific outlook, propensity and rationality in choices, rules of engagement and the code of conduct. In human history, an ideology chosen by the elite was often backed by the law or law-like sanctions. Thus, an ideology chosen by a minority was able to marginalise and overrule unilaterally popular choices based on the common sense of the local cultures. Likewise, the elite were able to abandon unilaterally an old ideology. In this context, introducing a new ideology can never be cost-free. It produces losers.

But there was a problem even more serious here: in the beginning, only a tiny minority knew about those alien ideas. In effect, most political ideas and

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ROLE OF THE STATE AND STATE-BUILDING IN MODERN CHINA

economic models adopted or adapted in post-1800 China started this way; although the outcome of their implementation was often disastrous (e.g. Taipings’ second-hand Christianity and Mao’s second-hand Stalinism), the general population often had to put up with it. There was therefore a real danger that an alien ideology was a Trojan Horse for society.

The point here is that unlike what has been claimed by Marx’s historical materialism, in a non-democratic society, a chosen ideology by elite can be independent from mundane life of the masses and the local culture and yet change vital institutions (including the state) and alter economic growth trajectories in society.50

This phenomenon turns our attention to the human agent who imposes alien ideologies on society. State-builders are in a unique position to impose changes because they possess more power and more choices than the rest of society. The readiness to resort to violence makes that imposition easy.51

Still, there is a question of incentives. We can now turn the problem on its head by questioning whether it is possible for state-builders to maintain the status quo ante. The answer is negative. The status quo ante means no change; but no change means no rent. So, all state-builders are impulsive change-makers because there is always some gain for themselves.52

Therefore, all changes must be made on state-builders’ terms. To do that, the alien ideology has to be altered to suit their agendas and interests. Such alteration is commonly viewed as evidence of flexibility and enlightenment on state-builders’ part. But for whom? According to Weber’s observation, state power yields monetary returns for the power-holders;53 and so state-builders are keen on “fighting for power, for power’s sake”.54 Weber’s view is echoed by Douglass North, who called the state a predator, and Mancur Olson, who viewed state-builders as professional rent-seekers, or simply bandits.55 Indeed, in history very few state-builders were angels and saints.


51 J. Harriss, J. Hunter and C. Lewis, New Institutional Economics, p. 34.


54 Ibidem.

On the contrary, the history of state-building has been littered with thugs.\textsuperscript{56} This reminds us of Lord John Dalberg-Acton’s (1834-1902) famous pronouncement that: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men”.\textsuperscript{57} We can no longer dissociate the vigour of human greed from state-builders. The motive of state-builders cannot be as noble, altruistic and innocent as it is said to be.\textsuperscript{58} A state-builder may originally come from a humble section of society, but there is no guarantee that he represents and helps that part of society.

Now, regarding changes, not only do we have the agent (state-builders), but also the motive (rent), the framework (ideology) and the physical means (violence). The package is complete. State-builders make changes, and changes make state-builders who they are. State-builders can thus be regarded as prime movers for change, independent from the rest of society.

\textit{The effectiveness of the call from the state and state-builder}

The recognition of the state-builder as a prime mover does not mean that the general population is completely powerless all of the time. Popular support, voluntary or involuntary, often changes the outcome when different state-builders compete for the same power. Under the pressure of such competition, a state-builder will inevitably promise the public a paradise in exchange for resources. It is quite another matter, however, whether the promise actually materialises in due course considering the powerful asymmetry in favour of the state-builder. Even under a modern democracy, politicians’ promises during their election campaigns have to be taken with several large pinches of salt. In a non-democratic society, it is only too common for state-builders to have complete freedom to betray their supporters.

Overall, the cheapest way for state-builders to get what they want is to make the population cooperate willingly. Apart from selling promises, hopes and dreams, brain-washing serves the same purpose of disarming public resistance. But in the long run, unless these promises, hopes and dreams in


\textsuperscript{56} There is a direct link between vested interests and economic recessions; see M. Olson, \textit{Rise and Decline of Nations}.


some way materialise, state-builders cannot realistically expect quiescent collaboration. One simply cannot fool all the people all the time. A reliable sign of public non-cooperation is an ever-increasing web of surveillance by the state. Higher pressure from the state can only mean lower support from the population.

But, here is the Achilles’ heel: no state or state-builder in human history is able to become self-sufficient. This is where agents come in. State-builders always rely on their agents. In turn these may rely on yet other agents in a chain. One can expect that each time as the chain expands the control by the state-builder at the centre weakens due to the principle-agent problem. In the long run, this principle-agent problem defeats the state and the state-builder, because some agents may decide to become state-builders themselves. Alternatively, state-builders resort to brutality, as all slave-drivers do, to force the public to serve the state. But this sharply increases the monitoring costs. Populous passive resistance is often enough to drag state-builders down.

There is, of course, the third and more dangerous way. State-builders can and often do substitute foreigners (including diasporas) and foreign powers for domestic supporters. A great many of the external alliances, treaties and loans serve such a purpose. In the process, a country’s sovereignty is sacrificed. China has had more than its fair share in the world from 1800 onwards.

State-builders often combine all the three ways to optimise returns. Even so, there is always a gap between what they wish the population to provide and what the population actually delivers.

Was modern China exceptional?

Despite so many political troubles, modern China has been viewed as having a very different state-building process. In P. M. Thornton’s phrase,

Chinese state-making has not centered on the mobilization of troops and material resources for war. Rather, the geopolitical challenges associated with governing the imperium over the longue durée produced a trajectory of state-building shaped in large part by the increasing elaborated drive for moral regulation and social control.59

She went on to argue that the Yongzheng Emperor, President Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Zedong were all normative moral beings and

that China’s state-building was a journey towards the moralisation of society.\textsuperscript{60} We shall see whether such a view holds water.\textsuperscript{61}

**State-building as a missing link**

So far there has been a lack of systematic assessment of the impact of state-building in China. So far, the most systematic attempts have been made by Philip A. Kuhn and Victoria Tin-bor Hui. To Kuhn, the key to China’s state rebuilding was restoring China’s sovereignty. This required some cooperation from society (hence political participation of the population and legitimacy of the government) in the late Qing.\textsuperscript{62} This is no doubt very relevant but too narrow. Hui’s work is on war and state formation two millennia ago when the country was united for the first time.\textsuperscript{63}

**New insight for China’s recent history**

Following the Weber-Olson tradition, a new insight offers three aspects: (1) There are a great many ways to establish and maintain social order and national security by a state. Hence, the state-builder has many choices which are not predetermined by a single Hegelian teleological destination but by multiple opportunistic improvisations. In other words, there is a high degree of randomness in forming a new state. (2) Due to power asymmetry and unilateral violence, the state and state-builder have a high degree of freedom to choose \textit{ex ante} ideologies and political and economic systems that suit themselves the best. Their choices are often in the name of the general public but on the state-builders’ terms. Whether public goods are truly public and whether the general public are deservedly served can only be judged \textit{ex post}. In other words, public goods can and do become the state-builder’s own private goods because of his selfishness and greed. State-building is thus not value-free. (3) Material life is where the public interest really lies, because simply making a better living is by far the key concern of ordinary people. Changes imposed by the state and state-builder mean little if the people’s material life is not improved. Thus, the quality of the state makes a great

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Ibidem}, pp. 4-5.


\textsuperscript{63} V.T. Hui, \textit{War and State}. 
difference in the growth performance and growth trajectory in a society, \textit{ceteris paribus}.

There is, however, a common zero-sum misconception. State-builders are often keen on lecturing the public that national security and a good material life are mutually exclusive and that a society cannot have both at the same time. Prime examples of this are Stalin’s Soviet Union and Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea where a state-of-the-art military stands side by side with widespread poverty. From the view point of welfare economics, there is no such unavoidable trade-off between economic health and national security: a country with military strength (as a symbol of national security) does not have to deplete a country’s living standards. A good material life can underpin a country’s national security. Similarly, there is no unavoidable trade-off between economic growth and people’s living standards: a country of fast growth is not always a country of low living standards. In principle, a high level mass consumption should come spontaneously and synchronously with growth, industrialisation and modernisation.\textsuperscript{64} Society should be persuaded and incentivised to partake in economic growth, not bullied to sacrifice in the name of them: this was known as “forced industrialisation” or “industrial dictatorship” under Stalin, and “the Great Leap Forward” under Mao. And, no one should be worse off in the process.

If economic growth is forced upon society and achieved at the expense of ordinary people’s living standards, such growth does not qualify as public goods. So, conceptually, strong national security and fast economic growth without higher living standards for ordinary people only mean excessive rent-seeking by the state and state-builder. As a result, public goods become private goods of the ruling clique. Such transition is unfortunately common especially in a non-democratic society. Like state-building, national security and economic growth are not value-free.

In terms of the actual mechanisms, the state and state-builder can influence two sets of factors that affect people’s material life: (1) physical factors of production in the forms of certain quality and quantity of capital, labour and natural resources (including land) which determine a country’s gross total output, and (2) institutional factors in terms of specific type and quality of law and order (including tax regimes and the tax burden), property rights and market opportunities for different economic agents.

The current assumption is that the state-building process can alter the supply and distribution of the physical factors of production and hence alter

the final total stock available for people to live on. Likewise, the state-building process can change institutional relationships in society to shape their incentives to invest and produce. The consequent redistributive arrangement determines what ordinary people actually live on.

Understandably, if the economy is privately operated, the impact of the state and state-builder is often limited to what are called externalities. What the state and state-builder can achieve is to reorganise the previous rent-seeking arrangement (taxes) via institutional factors. But if those physical factors of production are directly owned and operated by the state per se, the impact of the prime mover is far more extensive in all areas of production, distribution and consumption. In China, the watershed was the year 1950, after which the economy was at the mercy of the state’s control. The impact on people’s material life was direct and sometimes devastating.

There is an issue of state strength and efficiency. People often talk about a strong state and a weak state, metaphors for whether a state is masculine enough to accomplish certain missions such as imposing policies ruthlessly and swiftly, keeping society in a tight grip, and cracking down on resistance. A weak and feminine state does the opposite. Empirically, however, a weak state is not necessarily malignant and malevolent (like a withering state) while a strong one is not always benign and benevolent (like a totalitarian state). Therefore, this strong-weak dichotomy is irrelevant unless one knows how ordinary people actually live in material terms. A weak but benevolent state may well be enough for the market to flourish and for ordinary people’s life to improve while a strong but malevolent state may enslave its population to death.

Equally, people talk about state efficiency. In economics, efficiency essentially means productivity, which is not always relevant to the performance of a state. So far, the term state efficiency, or what qualifies as an efficient state, has remained unclear. It can mean economies of scale by using fewer resources to govern an enlarged territory. It can also mean extraction maximisation in manpower, products and taxes. It can also refer to the capacity of securing people’s entitlement via wealth creation (with state investment and management) and income redistribution (through social security services). There have been no agreed criteria.

Still, as a whole, we can identify two types of state efficiencies: (1) self-serving efficiency solely in terms of extracting resources from the general public to strengthen the state itself (including the military), and (2) service efficiency regarding the protection of wealth and entitlement of the general public. These two types are not always compatible with each other. For example, a war-making state may be able to extract large quantities of resources but be useless in wealth protection, while a useless state in warfare may provide the population with material aid. For our purpose, the main concern is service efficiency.
Then, there is the issue of how to measure such service efficiency. Although it is convenient and effective to use GDP (total and per capita) to map out a country’s growth performance, GDP does not come without problems. First of all, China’s GDP figures in circulation are not necessarily the real data. For the period prior to 1980, most GDP figures for China have been a product of back-dating estimates. For the period of 1949-1976, there is no independent source of information inside China. It is not uncommon for figures to contradict each other. Therefore, caution is necessary and some commonly cited figures, typically the alleged near two-digit annual growth rate under Mao (as high as the Asian Tigers’ miracle growth record), are not blindly accepted. Related to the GDP approach, people often use food output per head to show that more food became available for everyone and thence a better life. Very few have asked whether ordinary people were permitted to consume more after more food was produced, as food ration did not increase under Mao’s rule.

Secondly, there is a problem with the base year for calculating GDP. Choices of the base year are known to be ideologically charged. The base year for pre-1949 China is typically set at a high point (often in the early 1930s) to demonstrate how badly the Republican government (Kuomintang or Guomindang) performed. A different base year is then chosen at a low point (often 1946 or 1948) to show what Mao’s government achieved. Economic recovery after 1949 is routinely counted as growth. Growth-counting practitioners often forget that by including recovery as growth they are guilty of double-counting. One way to avoid these problems is to abandon the base year approach altogether. Instead, we can establish three long-term benchmarks for GDP, population and per capita GDP, all based on the real growth in China’s past. Population is used not only for per capita calculation but also as an alternative proxy for the size of the economy. According to these benchmarks, by 1977 when Mao’s rule ended the Chinese economy should have been 3.6 times larger than the level of 1830; China’s population should have grown over three times; and China’s per capita income should have increased over 90 percent. The reality was very different even according to the optimistic official data.

Thirdly, there is the GDP fallacy, owed to the fact that GDP is merely the aggregate price of a country’s total output of goods and services in a given year. GDP growth means only a comparison of that aggregate price between the base year and the chosen year. Although GDP indicates the size and momentum of an economy, it tells us nothing about what goods and services were produced, or for whom the goods and services were produced. Likewise, per capita GDP is the total GDP divided by the population. It says very little about people’s actual living standards, e.g. what was in people’s food baskets, especially if resource allocation by the market is absent. The real danger is that one regards junk capital assets (shoddy buildings and
broken machines) and manufactured waste (outputs with no market) as goods with real utility and value.

As GDP-counting conveniently blurs the true intention of the state, it is commonly used by regimes that deliberately avoid the issue of those who are the true beneficiaries of growth. If two countries have the same per capital GDP and the same GDP growth rate, they are conventionally viewed as the same. But one country may build overwhelmingly weapons to benefit the state and the other may manufacture consumer goods to improve ordinary people’s material life. They are poles apart.

Furthermore, there is the issue of national security and sovereignty which have been commonly hailed as an undisputable public good under Mao. Before jumping to that conclusion, one has to consider the fact that national independence was a world-wide trend for all developing countries after the Second World War, Maoist China was not alone. In addition, there is the indivisible nature of national security and sovereignty. The despot must feel safe in his own country and hence he needs national security and sovereignty as his own first priority. As a result, national security and sovereignty routinely shelter dictators and despots, a phenomenon which has been clearly revealed during the recent changes in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Often, in the name of national sovereignty ordinary people’s rights and freedom are restricted and other countries are not allowed to interfere with a country’s internal affairs even if that country’s population are grossly abused. In Mao’s China, we can name the cases of the Great Leap Famine and the Cultural Revolution. More importantly, our evidence has shown that the autocrat did not hesitate to sacrifice national security and sovereignty to benefit himself. In this sense, national security and sovereignty are the autocrat’s private goods. Only as externalities, national security and sovereignty may benefit the ordinary people. In other words, national security and sovereignty as state power-holders’ private goods may spill over to benefit the masses, not vice versa.

The bottom line is that in history law and order, fast GDP growth rate with rapid industrialisation/modernisation, decent provision of public health, and effective protection of national security and sovereignty have all been achieved under capitalism and democracy. The Leninist party-state had no monopoly over any of them.

In this context, all the changes, together with the state-builders who made them, are guilty unless they are proved innocent by hard evidence of generating a tangible increase in mundane consumption for the ordinary people. With this new insight, the aforementioned six neat causalities become highly questionable.
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If it is considered a phenomenon to draw the world into a state of greater connectedness and interdependence, then globalisation is not an unprecedented historical event. Modernisation, industrialisation or colonialism testify how various forms of worldwide connectedness and interdependence were developed in the past. One feature characterising both the present and the past global phenomena, is represented by the threat they pose to culture and identity in being dramatically different from past human experiences.

Not unlike what happened to those living in such processes of modernisation, industrialisation or colonialism, historians today are called upon to look at the different responses that formulate this new global phenomenon in terms of culture and identity, as well as re-examining the past in light of current events. Thus, even if the globalisation phenomenon is yet to loom completely, historiography has provided some different tools to both interpret the present and re-examine the past.

Global history or (as Patrick O’Brien calls it) the “restoration of global history” is considered one result of such activity. When possible, it offers a method and a framework that allows one to “construct negotiable meta-narratives”. In the essay he wrote as a prolegomenon to the first issue of the Journal of Global History in 2006, O’Brien states that:

[...] recommendations that historians concentrate attention upon micro-histories of difference, diversity, locality, biography [seem] to have produced some of the best and most provocative historiographical writing in recent years.

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2 Ibidem, p. 35.
The prospect of reconsidering the value and the meaning of micro-histories in terms of “negotiable meta-narratives” seems to have a relevant significance for historians on East Asia who, in exploring the various micro-histories which are inside and across the histories of East Asian societies, face many problems and challenges, starting with the continuous reformulation of a vocabulary to both interpret and narrate these histories.

In fact, many of the words we use when speaking or writing about East Asian societies are not always adequate to both interpret and narrate them, as they do not belong to these societies. On the other hand, many of the words used by East Asian historians when discussing or writing about their own societies do not belong to them. This is mostly because the terms they use are simply a translation of words which have been coined elsewhere. This creates many difficulties, yet at the same time, provides opportunities for historians dealing with East Asia who must adopt a philological approach to their research. Focusing on reading the language that East Asian people write and have written regarding themselves and the outside world (particularly when they interacted with global phenomena), can reveal a variety of different meanings and inflections of both the present and the past global phenomena.

In dealing with the subject of Japan’s modernisation, I will take into consideration both Japan’s interaction with an overpowering modernity coming from the West and its reverberation at Japan’s peripheries, especially Okinawa. I will adopt three different points of view: firstly, I will delineate how some Japanese scholars interpreted Okinawa from the perspective of Japan’s interaction with modernity. Secondly, I will try to illustrate how Okinawa’s interaction with modernity was perceived by local scholars of the so-called Okinawa gaku 沖縄学 (namely the research on Okinawa carried out by Okinawans since the beginning of the twentieth century), with specific regard to Iha Fuyū 伊波普猷 (1876-1947), who is considered the father of modern Okinawanology. Finally, I will consider how attempts by both Japan and its periphery to construct their own version of modernity was deeply thwarted by an adamant idea of modernity as well as by its assumption of universality.

The historical framework

A brief summary of the major events regarding Japan’s modernisation, as well as the premises and the consequences of the transformation of the former Kingdom of Ryūkyū 琉球 into a Japanese prefecture, can be helpful in contextualising this issue.

This region had been historically external to the Japanese empire, despite the fact that after 1611 the kingdom had become a vassal of the Japanese fief
of Satsuma while maintaining its tributary relations with China. People living in Ryūkyū were in many respects behind Japan’s cultural and jurisdictional orbit; also, the culture and the socio-economic organisation of this region were quite different from those prevailing in Japan proper. Such a difference is clearly demonstrated by the fact that after it was incorporated into Japan in 1879 as Okinawa prefecture, the Meiji government progressively adopted drastic measures aiming at Japanising the Okinawans.

Assimilation policy focused on the primacy of the civilisation that Japan claimed to embody by virtue of being the sole Asian country to have taken the road of modernisation and industrialisation. In the early Meiji era (1868-1912), such an idea was enforced by the diffusion of social Darwinism. The latter proved helpful “to demonstrate ‘scientifically’ that some cultures were advanced and civilized while others remained backward and uncivilized”. Therefore, the idea of civilisation (bunmei 文明) prevailing after 1868 was based on a vision equating geographic remoteness with lower stage of progress and modernity.

Since Japan was involved in the global phenomena with its re-opening and stipulation of unequal treaties with Western powers in the 1850s, a growing sense of crisis had obviously emerged among intellectual and political elites. They acutely perceived the problem of how Japan could preserve its independence. Such a sense of crisis did not decline even after Japan chose to follow the Western model of industrialisation and modernisation as a unified nation state; rather it became particularly intense in the wake of a new Western colonisation wave which, starting in the 1880s, not only crashed over Africa but also headed towards Asia. And, even if modernisation and industrialisation seemed to lead Japan away from Asia and closer to the West, it nevertheless seemed to be insufficient in persuading Western powers to revise unequal treaties which limited Japan’s tariff autonomy and granted extraterritoriality to Western nationals in Japan. The threat that these dramatic events posed in identitarian terms can be summarized by borrowing the words of Oguma Eiji, who states that after 1868 “Japan was not only interacting with the new ideologies imported from the West but also facing two distinct Others—the West and the East”.


With regard to the East, the idea of a “dissociation from Asia” (datsu A 脱亜) was formulated in the famous editorial written in 1885 by Fukuzawa Yukichi, who stated: “[since] those [who] are intimate with bad friends are also regarded bad, I will deny those bad Asian friends from my heart”. Indeed, a dissociation from Asia—which would have had its epilogue in the war against China a decade later—seemed to be essential for both persuading Western power to change their prejudicial attitude and getting Japan out from under “the Orientalist framework of the West”.

The deep sense of crisis generated by Japan’s tortuous relationship with both the bearer of modernity West and the “bad Asian friends” was also perceived in identitarian terms, as the debate regarding the origin of the Japanese can well attest. Actually, since the first decades of the Meiji period, this debate developed around two main hypotheses—a homogeneous nation theory claiming that the bloodline of Japanese people had continued from time immemorial, and a mixed nation theory arguing that they consisted of a mixture between a previous aboriginal people and a conquering people who arrived afterward—which “were linked directly to the issue of whether Japan’s independence could best protected by returning to native traditions or by assimilating modern civilization”. Most Japanese scholars, especially anthropologists, accepted the mixed nation theory not only because it was the sole theory based on a modern scientific discourse, but also because it could serve the purpose of transforming the newly unified Japanese state into a multi-ethnic colonial empire.

Such a debate first concerned the people of the newly incorporated peripheries, namely the Okinawans in the south and the ainu living in the northern island, which had been taken over by Japanese control in 1869 and renamed Hokkaidō. Indeed, for those supporting both the mixed and the homogeneous nation theory, these less economically dominant peripheries were functional in creating the idea of a modern and civilised Japan, as well as defining “the power relationship implicit in [the] taxonomies of differences”.

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8 Ibidem, p. 7.
9 Ibidem, p. 7.
Okinawa in Japan’s view as the “bearer of modernity” and the birth of Okinawa gaku

The first inquiries regarding Okinawa started soon after the establishment of the prefecture in 1879, and were carried out by Japanese bureaucrats and scholars who were generally commissioned by the central or prefectural government mainly in order to collect data and supply information about this newly incorporated territory. Surveys on Okinawans were also conducted by Japanese anthropologists, as in the case of Torii Ryūzō (1870-1953), who travelled there in 1896 and again in 1904. We should remember that, during his long career, Torii conducted ethnological research on Sakhalin, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Kuriles, Korea, Manchuria, China and Mongolia, following the entire arc of Japanese imperial expansion. Also worth remembering is—not differently from those carried out by his mainland’s colleagues—his inquiries on Okinawa examined both the local customs or cultural conditions and the racial characteristics of Okinawans. He tried to both individualize their characteristics and categorise them based on their affinity with or their contrast to Japanese in order to determine their similarities to the latter, as well as the stage of civilisation of Okinawans. These methods and approaches seem to forerun the “regional research” or the “imperial anthropology” which went along with Japan’s colonial policy in East Asia.

Torii’s investigation of Okinawa was carried out in conjunction with his survey on the natives or “savage” (seiban 生蕃) of Taiwan—which had just become a Japanese colony—and he used the same methodology in his


13 According to the Japanese dictionary Kögen 広辞苑(第五版), seiban are “different people who do not conform to civilisation. Qing dynasty called [seiban] the people among the Taiwan’s aboriginal Kōzan tribe (Takasago) who did not assimilated with the Han people [Chinese] to distinguish them from the acculturated aborigines”.

survey of both the seiban and the Okinawans. By discovering “Japanese” signs within the Okinawans, he distinguished the latter from the seiban, and finally classified the Okinawans as “Japanese”. In doing so, he supported the theory of the common origins of Japanese and Ryukyuan (Nichi Ryū dōsoron 日琉同祖論) and thus confirmed the theory of the Japanese as a mixed nation. Yet, even if this theory placed the latter “on the evolutionary ladder of becoming ‘Japanese’”, when compared to the “bearer of modernity” Japan, Okinawa society appeared to be backward, uncultured and uncivilized, and these differences were helpful in justifying the unequal economic, political and social relationship between Okinawa and Japan proper.

In Okinawa, among those who looked forward to a future as Japanese as well as those who resisted assimilation to Japan, there were attempts to react to these developments on a political field. In the last decades of nineteenth century, some political experiments (in the shape of resistance to assimilation or suffrage movements) were attempted. Nevertheless, they were silenced by Japanese authorities immediately.

This is the context in which Okinawa gaku was born at the beginning of twentieth century. Similarly to the members of those local political organizations which were banned soon after their beginning, the scholars of Okinawa gaku did not have a common attitude toward either the past and the future. Yet, even if some of them supported assimilation to Japan while others defended the local culture, all of them assumed a common stance in placing Okinawans in the centre of their research. In other words, much like the mainland scholars who started to theorize about Japanese, they shared a consciousness of the problem of how Okinawa could face the challenges generated by the epochal changes that were happening inside and outside their world. And, like those who were speculating about the Japanese and their origins, the scholars of Okinawa gaku formulated an identity discourse that transcended the actual economic, social, geographical and linguistic heterogeneity existing inside Okinawan space. Thus, while the

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15 In this regard, Tomiyama notes: “Ultimately, Torii was unable to establish decisive anthropological difference between the ‘Seiban’ and the Ryukuyans, and as a result his classification system frequently fell into a state of confusion […] This confusion, however, would not in the least shake Torii’s basic conviction that ‘the Ryukyuan’ was essentially ‘Japanese’”. Ibidem, p. 171.
17 For example, in 1896 the Kōdōkai (Society for public unity) was founded by former prince Shō En together with other former members of the aristocracy of the Ryūkyū Kingdom who, in order to resist the loss of their power and privilege, argued against assimilation. Two years later, the birth of Okinawa kurabu (Okinawa club) marked the beginning of a suffrage movement in Okinawa.
discourse over the Japanese developed vis-à-vis both the “bearer of modernity” West and the “bad Asian friends”, those coined by the Okinawan scholars on the Okinawans developed vis-à-vis both the “bearer of modernity” Japan and the natives—or the ‘savages’—who lived in the colonized or depressed Asian regions. And, to some extent, they both recall what Mary Louise Pratt calls autoethnography, referring to an “instance in which colonized subjects undertake to represent themselves in ways that engage with the colonizer’s own terms”.

Okinawa’s interaction with modernity: Iha Fuyū’s pathway

The decision to consider Iha Fuyū here is not only due to his reputation as the father of Okinawa gaku or to the fact that his large literary production has been investigated on a deeper level than that of his colleagues of Okinawa gaku. Rather, his tortuous intellectual route—which initially led him to exalt Okinawan peculiarities and then to consider such peculiarities as an increasing burden, dragging the Okinawans towards the uncivilised, savage and colonised world—seems to be emblematic of the transformations happening in Okinawa in the wake of those occurring inside Japan as well as outside of the country.

19 Even if research on Okinawa gaku is mostly dedicated to Iha Fuyū, relevant works on other modern Okinawan intellectual and political figures are worth remembering; among them, Ryūkyū shinpōsha 琉球新報社編 (ed.), Higashionna Kanjunzenshū 東恩納覚悟全集 (The complete works of Higashionna Kanjun), 10 vols., Daiichi Shobō, Tōkyō 1978-1982; Hiya Teruo 比屋根照夫 and Isa Shin’ichi 伊佐眞一 (eds.), Ōta Chōfu senshū 太田朝敷選集 (Selected works of Ōta Chōfu), 3 vols., Daiichi Shobō, Tōkyō 1993-96; Ishida Masaru 石田正治, Okinawa no genronjin Ōta Chōfu – その愛郷主義とナショナリズム (Okinawa’s abyss. Iha Fuyū and his love for his native place and nationalism), Saiyūsha, Tōkyō 2001; Majikina Ankō 真境名安興, Shimabukuro Zenpatsu no kiseki 〈近代沖縄〉の知識人 – 島袋全発の軌跡 (An intellectual of “Modern Okinawa”. The trajectory of Shimabukuro Zenpatsu), Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, Tōkyō 2010.
20 Among the works on Iha’s thought it is worth mentioning: Hiya Teruo 比屋根照夫, Kindai Okinawa to Iha Fuyū 近代日本と伊波普猷 (Modern Okinawa and Iha Fuyū), San’ichi Shobō, Tōkyō 1981; Kano Masanao 華野政道, Okinawa no fuchi. Iha Fuyū to sono judai 沖縄の淵 — 伊波普猷とその時代 (Okinawa’s abyss. Iha Fuyū and his epoch), Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1993; Tomiyama Ichirō 富山一朗, Bōryoku no yukan. Iha Fuyū ni okeru kiki no mondai 暴力の予感 – 伊波普猷における危機の問題 (Presentiments of violence. Iha Fuyū and Okinawa’s crisis), Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 2002; Isa Ken’ichi 伊佐眞一,}
Born three years before the annexation of Okinawa to Japan, Iha moved to Kyoto in 1896 and then to Tōkyō, where he studied at the Imperial University specialising in the Ryukyuan language. He also devoted himself through the philological study of the Omorososhi (おもろうし), the famous anthology of Ryukyuan ancient songs and poems which were first formally written in 1532 using early records of ancient traditions that had been transmitted orally from generation to generation. If the period he spent in mainland Japan is considered crucial for his self-perception as an Okinawan, his encounter with Torii Ryūzō on the second trip that the Japanese anthropologist made to Okinawa in 1904, was decisive for Iha’s early works as well as the formulation of the theory of the common origins of Japanese and Ryukyuans. In fact, Iha assisted Torii during his field work across Okinawa and adopted Torii’s conclusion that Okinawans were essentially related to the Japanese. Nevertheless, Iha “worked in the opposite direction” to Torii’s one, since he discovered not only Japanese signs within the Ryukyuan, but also Ryukyuan similarities among the Japanese. In other words, in his searching for a common ancestry, he drew a comparison between Japanese and Okinawans on a neutral ground by resorting what Tomiyama Ichirō calls a “third category […] that [was] neither ‘Japanese’ nor ‘Ryukyuan’”.

However, for Iha the aborigines of Taiwan did not represent something apparently different from the Ryukyuan, and it led him to re-examine those elements that were considered by Torii as deficiencies preventing natives of Taiwan from being considered Japanese. Yet, instead of considering them defects, he interpreted them as dissimilarities in order to give them a new meaning and ascribe them to the realm of “individuality”, “distinctiveness” or “uniqueness” (kosei 個性). In his first major work published in 1911, Ko Ryūkyū 古琉球 (Ancient Ryūkyū), Iha wrote:

In Japan there are innumerable individualities (個性) […] A nation that can afford to embrace people with so many different kind of individualities is actually a great nation.

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1. Iha Fuyū kihon jōsetsu 伊波普猷批判序説 (A critical introduction to Iha Fuyū), Kage Shobō, Tōkyō 2007.
21 The original manuscript of Iha’s degree thesis was recently found in the Library of the Faculty of Literature at The University of Tōkyō. Iha Fuyū, Ryūkyū shinpo 琉球新報, 25th July 2010.
23 Ibidem.
25 Iha Fuyū, “Ryūkyūshō no sūsei” 琉球史の趨勢 (Trends of Ryūkyū’s history), in Ko Ryūkyū 古琉球 (Ancient Ryūkyū), Okinawa Kōronsha, 1911, p. 102. This assertion as well as the part that Iha dedicates to “Ryukyuans’ distinctiveness” are omitted in the editions that
Hence in Iha’s view, more than a peril endangering Japan nation, distinctiveness served as an ingredient to enrich it. Despite their link to both Japan and the Japanese, Okinawans had their own historical and spiritual existence embodying their unique nature by virtue of which they were considered not only the object of observation, but also as a historical subject. For him the dissolution of Okinawan distinctiveness would have been not only a “loss for the nation” but also a “spiritual” or “inner suicide” (*seishinteki ni jisatsu* 精神的に自殺). Hence, Iha transcended the actual social, economic and cultural differences and inequalities existing among Okinawans themselves in order to formulate an indentitary discourse. At the same time, he expressed an implicit political critique of assimilation (*dōka* 同化) which, while assuring Okinawans that they could “become the same” as the Japanese, enforced a *a priori* image of Okinawans as backward, uncivilised or unmodern and discriminated equally against them. Such a critic seems to be quite evident if we consider the following passage that he wrote in 1922:

> Until half a century ago, the Japanese state was a blood state […] But with the advent of Meiji the Ryukyuans, who had moved to the southern islands and become a variant race, entered this group […] a little before this the completely different race of the Ainu also entered […] in recent years Malaysians, Chinese, and Koreans have also entered. Now is the time for Japanese politicians to be tolerant of these different nations of completely differing origins and attempt to create one great citizenry.

Yet, in that same period, a crucial change was taking place in his perception of Okinawans. For example, in a short essay published in 1924 and written in the form of a monologue, he stated: “You [Okinawans] have no language of your own to express Okinawan uniqueness. What you have appeared in the following decades; cf. for example the edition published by Seijisha in 1942, pp. 37-52.

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28 Tomiyama I. (“The Critical Limits”, p. 171) states: “One might also argue that Iha’s conceptualization of Ryukyuan ‘uniqueness’ and ‘the great nation’ represents a critique of colonialism”; however, even if his approach to the problem of the common origins of Japanese and Okinawans had apparent political implications, namely a new perception of assimilation policy where Japanisation did not necessarily correspond to an acculturation of Ryukyuans, it seems to be difficult to ascertain if, at that time, Iha clearly perceived assimilation policy as a kind of internal colonialism.
29 Iha Fuyū, *Ko Ryūkyū no seijī* 古琉球の政治, cit. in R. Siddle, “Colonialism and Identity”, p. 126 (emphasis added). Iha also conceived the coexistence of a wide variety of national cultures as a means to construct a new culture and a peaceful order among world’s countries. Hiyane Teruo, *Sengo Okinawa no seishin to shisō* 戦後沖縄の精神と思想 (Spirit and thought in postwar Okinawa), Akashi Shoten, Tōkyō 2009, pp. 54-55.
been raised on belongs to another [lit.: are borrowed things, 借り物]” ⑳.

Two years later, in a work significantly entitled Ku no shima 苦の島 (Islands of pain), he expressed his concern with a more tormented tone:

It is unbearable that a people that has exhibited ‘uniqueness’ in such areas as poetry and architecture should be linked in terms of destiny to the primitive aborigines of the South Seas (nantōjin 南島人). ㉑

Apparently, what he had considered as a people with a unique history and culture now took the form of an exotic and primitive people of South Seas, or a backward people living from Okinawa down to the South Pacific islands.

Scholars are quite unanimous in the opinion that his intellectual shift can be understood in the light of the ruin of the Okinawan economy during 1920s. At this point, the dramatic effects of the postwar economic crisis had reached the region causing a profound economic depression. ㉒ The poverty generated by the harsh economic conditions of the prefecture made prejudice and discrimination against Okinawans even deeper and more widespread. Thousands of Okinawans moved abroad, mainly as farmworkers in the southern Pacific islands recently sized by Japan or to the mainland industrial areas as migrant workers. Here they generally received a lower wage and were looked down on by the Japanese, and occasionally portrayed by newspapers "as backward country bumpkins bewildered by the big city". ㉓

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㉒ Since the bad economic condition induced local population to survive on a diet of palm seeds, the decade is generally known as the “sago palm hell” (sotetsu jigoku ソテツ地獄).

㉓ R. Siddle, “Colonialism and Identity”, p. 128. More details about the socioeconomic conditions of Okinawans who migrated in mainland Japan in Tomiyama Ichirō 冨山一郎, “Senzenki, Okinawa dekasegimin no kessha to ‘Okinawa sabetsu’. Kansai Okinawa kenjinkai no bunseki wo chūshin ni” 戦前期、沖縄出稼民の結社と「沖縄差別」-関西沖縄県人会の分析を中心に (The associations of Okinawan migrants and ‘Okinawa discrimination’ in the prewar period. An analysis of the Kansai Association of Okinawans), in Rekishigaku kenkyū, n. 570, vol. 8, 1987, pp. 14-29 and Id., Kindai Nihon shakai to Okinawajin. “Nihonjin” ni naru to in koto (Modern Japan’s society and Okinawans. Becoming ‘Japanese’), Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, Tōkyō 1990. “The sign of a developing Taiwan next to a stagnating Okinawa led many Okinawans to look for ways to tie the development of Taiwan to Okinawa, making the island a major labour market for Okinawans from all classes […] In general, many from the educated elite classes sought participation in the development of Taiwan in administrative or professional positions. Unfortunately, in what became a pattern throughout the empire, many found job listing accompanied by the restriction ‘Ryukyuan and Taiwanese need not apply’”. Alan S. Christy, “The Making of Imperial Subjects in Okinawa”, positions: east asia cultures critiques, vol. 1, n. 3, Winter 1993, p. 617.
Iha might have become aware that exhibiting Okinawans’ “uniqueness” was tantamount to condemn them to be even more marginalised from progress, civilisation and modernity. And in admitting that Okinawans had no language of their own to express their uniqueness, he apparently recognised that, when translated in the bearer of modernity’s idiom, the meaning of this uniqueness was also translated, rather evoking an image of deficiency among Japanese. The neutral ground or “third category” that Iha had tried to use in order to build an intersubjective representation of Okinawans suddenly revealed to be inefficacious and illusory. Thus, Okinawans’ self-representation he had constructed earlier gave in to a new theoretical reformulation. Nevertheless, Iha’s intellectual shift also reflects new discourses that in the meanwhile some Japanese metropolitan scholars were enunciating.

The neonativists’ discovery of Okinawa

It was in the background of these dramatic conditions that some mainland Japan scholars turned their attention to Okinawa. Among them, the famous folklorist Yanagita Kunio 柳田国男 (1875-1962), the ethnologist, theorist of literature and poet Orikuchi Shinobu 折口信夫 (1887-1953), and the philosopher and founders of folk craft (mingei 民芸) Yanagi Sōetsu 柳宗悦 (1889-1961). Their studies on Japan’s folklore and rural customs were later defined by Yanagita as “neonativism” (shinkokugaku 新国学), or a “science of the native place”, which aimed at preserving Japan’s real culture against the devastating effects caused by the fast modernisation and industrialisation both in urban and rural areas. The object of their research was not only material culture but also the inner, spiritual life of the native. Yanagita himself claimed: “Our collecting is also […] a consideration of the inner life

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of the native”. And as it has been noted, with “this move [he] supplied native ethnology […] with a structure of desire for an origin that could never be reached and opened the way for a nostalgia driven by irretrievable loss”.  

Their research gained new momentum with the “discovery of Okinawa” as a place where what had been lost in modernised and industrialised mainland Japan (naichi 内地) was still preserved. Yanagita, who travelled to Okinawa in 1921, later described it as an “epoch-making event in our studies”. Actually, during his trip, Yanagita was persuaded to believe that Okinawa offered a treasure trove of unchanging religious beliefs and practices, which were fundamental to the figure of an enduring Japanese daily life. Yanagita viewed Okinawa as a surviving reminder of what Japanese life must have looked like in archaic times.  

And when he arrived in the remotest Yaeyama islands, he found a population who were “just starting to forget what [Japanese had] forgot since a long time”.  

Nevertheless, at the end of his trip he wrote a work with an emblematic title, Kainan shōki 海南小記 (A short record of the South Seas), where the term kainan (South Seas) seemed to evoke a wild and exotic region, which was distant from the civilized and modern metropolis. Not differently from the nineteenth century evolutionists who considered people living in distant places as their primitive ancestors living in earlier times, Yanagita seems to perceive Okinawa’s remoteness both in geographical and temporal implications, suggesting a representation of Okinawa as both a far and a backward land. Also, it seems as if by situating Okinawa in a space where

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35 Yanagita himself claimed: “Our collecting is also […] a consideration of the inner life of the native”. H. Harootunian, “Figuring the Folk”, p. 155.  
36 Ibidem.  
38 H. Harootunian, “Figuring the Folk”, p. 155.  
39 Yanagita K., Kainan shōki, p. 402.  
40 Regarding this, Alan Christy notes: “As the trip continues south, [he] records fewer and fewer description of the present, longer meditations on the ancient past, and imaginings of past common life and gruesome deaths. In particular, Yanagita’s tale of his trip is littered with the narrative bodies of the dead, […] as to suggest a descent into the past (the land of the dead). By the time he has reached the southern end of his journey, he has not only covered great distance, but also great time”. A.S. Christy, “The Making of Imperial Subjects”, p. 626 (emphasis added).
modernity had yet to reach, Yanagita projected onto Okinawa the tensions arising from the contradictory interaction between Japan and the West.

Actually, in the same year he travelled to Okinawa, Yanagita had another decisive experience in Geneva. He was invited to be a member of the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations which had to determinate the form of rule to be adopted in the Ottoman Empire’s non-Turkish provinces and the former German colonies, including the islands situated in the Pacific Ocean and lying north of the equator that Japan had seized in 1914.\(^{41}\) When Yanagita was asked to join the Mandate Commission in Geneva as a committee member in 1921, he had already resigned from his government position. In fact, he had been working as a high official in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce and other government agencies (including the Imperial Household Agency) until 1920, when he became a writer for the newspaper *Asahi shinbun*. His first activity had given him an occasion to travel widely in Japan and in some East Asian countries “in white socks (*tabi*) in the manner of a feudal lord”.\(^{42}\) Both as an elite member of Tōkyō’s government and a representative of a modernised country, he had received “VIP treatment during these trips”.\(^{43}\) Nevertheless, according to his memoirs he

was so nervous and reluctant to travel to Europe that, on seeing a child innocently playing on a railway platform, ‘thought how lucky that child is not to have to go to the West’.\(^{44}\)

And when he arrived in Geneva, he found that “Britain and France odiously lorded it over everyone else [and he] understood, for the first time, the true meaning of *yamadashi* [mountain bumpkin]”.\(^{45}\)

Once back from Switzerland, Yanagita wrote a short essay where he stated:

> The Peace Conference was held in Versailles and the League of Nations is based in Geneva. As much as two months before [Japan] has to equip and send over a great distance its delegates, delegates *who cannot even put their point of view adequately*.\(^{46}\)


\(^{44}\) Cit. in *ibidem*.

\(^{45}\) *Ibidem*, pp. 182-183.

\(^{46}\) Yanagita Kunio, *Shima no jinsei* 島の人生 (Island life), Sōgensha, Tōkyō 1951, p. 120 (emphasis added).
And addressing Okinawans, he also wrote:

Even what you call the ‘centre’ is definitively not the real centre even in this small globe […] This is now the anguish of our Japan, and at the same time it is very similar to Okinawans’ lonely island ordeal (kotōku 孤島苦). 47

Apparently the experience in Geneva, where he received quite different treatment than that of his former trips to Japan and Asia, deeply affected Yanagita.

In fact, in Geneva he first met the discriminatory universalism of a West that assumed to embody the universal paradigm for modernity and civilisation, and categorised the other societies and people of the world. Here he did not likely perceive himself as a representative of a modernised and civilised country, but as a provincial coming from a remote place who was unable to express his point of view adequately. And this conflicting experience with the West—which he perceived in the light of “broad geocultural notions of territoriality”, 48 namely shima (island) and tairiku (continent)—evidently influenced his concomitant “discovery of Okinawa”.

Undoubtedly, Yanagita was sympathetic toward Okinawans not only because they lived in a place where the “true” Japan could be unearthed or because of their uncorrupted and uncontaminated inner life, which he associated with island’s unique culture and environment. He also felt that he shared with them a sense of “loneliness that has no meaning for those who are not islanders”. 49

In other words, within the dichotomy between shima (which could be associated with both Okinawa and Japan) and tairiku (primarily referring to a West that viewed islands peripheries as remote and exotic regions), 50 Yanagita identified himself as an islander who lived in a culturally, spatially and psychologically distant place. 51

47 Ibidem. The term kotōku also appears in the title of Iha’s Kotōku no Ryūkyūshi 孤島苦の琉球史 (The history of the ordeal of the lonely islands of Ryūkyū), published in 1926.


49 Yanagita K., Shima no jinsei, p. 119

50 For example, in Shima no jinsei he wrote: “In August and September of 1919, a dreadful influenza epidemic greatly devastated Tahiti, Samoa and other islands. While many [Western] civilised persons persevere in imagining South Seas’ palm leaves by seeing Gauguin’s paintings or reading Stevenson’s letters, young natives are tamed by illness and countlessly die”. Ibidem, p. 118.

51 “The shima/tairiku dichotomy, has yet another overlooked function, however. That is, Yanagita’s focus on shima made it possible for him to hypothesize the origin of the Japanese people from the southern sea, while suppressing by default the issues related to Japan’s colonization of another tairiku, i.e., the Asian continent to the north (northeastern China and Korea particularly)”. M.S. Inoue, Okinawa and the U. S., p. 75.
Nevertheless, instead of his effort to enhance the value of Okinawan culture, he failed to represent and explain it by translating the language, the idioms and the paradigms of the centre into those of this periphery. Thus, Okinawan discourse about themselves continued to be formulated “in response to or in dialogue with” a representation and an explanation constructed by metropolitan Japan.\textsuperscript{52} It seems to be attested by the fact that, in conjunction with both the “discovery of Okinawa” by Yanagita and his recreation of Okinawa as a primitive version of Japan, Iha started to use the term *nantōjīn* (South Seas aborigines).\textsuperscript{53}

**In search for a negotiable modernity**

If considered within the framework of both Japan and Okinawa’s interaction with an overwhelming modernity, then Yanagita and Iha’s discourses appear to be pervaded by a common anxiety and characterised by a common effort, namely a search for a “better modernity” or a “different inflection” of modernity.\textsuperscript{54} It reveals that both Japan and Okinawa’s interaction with modernity was not quite so simple, as the debate on the origins of the *Japanese* and the *Okinawans* can well attest. Such a debate developed in conjunction with Japan’s self-emancipation from an Asian country to the “bearer of modernity” in East Asia. And, in order to construct *Japanese* as a modern subject, Japan employed the Occident/Orient, civilised/uncivilised, developed/underdeveloped dichotomy to identify and classify the multiplicity of others living along and behind the national border. Japanese anthropologists themselves borrowed the theories, methods and language of Western Orientalism and employed them to create Japan’s Orient.\textsuperscript{55}

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\textsuperscript{52} “[…] if ethnographic texts are a means by which Europeans represent to themselves their (usually subjugated) other, autoethnographic texts are those *the others construct in response to or in dialogue with those metropolitan representations*”. M.L. Pratt, *Imperial eyes*, p. 7 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{53} According to Murai, even if the term *nantō* existed since earlier times, it were Yanagita, Origuchi and their colleagues who gave a specific meaning to it. Murai Osamu 村井紀, *Nantō ideorogyō no hassei. Yanagita Kunio to shokuminchishugi* 南島イデオロギーの発生−柳田国男と植民地主義 (The birth of south island ideology: Yanagita Kunio and colonialism), Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 2004 (first edition Fukutake Shoten, Tōkyō 1992), pp. 24-60.


\textsuperscript{55} Such an attitude prevailing among Japanese anthropologists was clearly revealed at the fifth International Exhibition in Osaka in 1903, where Tsuboi Shōgorō supervised the “Pavilion of Academic Anthropology”, which ‘displayed’ several groups of “Orientals”, including Okinawans, *ainu*, Taiwanese aborigines, Malay, Javanese and some other groups of people who wore their traditional costumes. Engeki “Jiruikan” jōen wo jitsugen sareta kai 演劇「人類館」上演を実現させたい会 (ed.), *Jiruikan. Fuin sareta tobira* 人類館 — 封印された扉 (The
Nevertheless, neither Japan’s modernisation of its political, economic and social institutions nor the dominant position that it went to consolidate in East Asia was fully successful in either altering Japan’s subordination to the West or escaping from the Orientalist framework of the West. Similarly to Iha, in Geneva Yanagita experienced the question of self-representation from the remote periphery of a centre that refused to lend an ear to someone speaking another language than his own. This question reflected his inability to develop his arguments adequately by using the language of another; the implications of remoteness, where a spatial distance corresponding to “the denial of coevaleness”\(^{56}\) determines the stage of progress and civilisation; a new meaning of the word \textit{shima}, which was not only related to an ancient purity or a spiritual life, but also to the signification of insularity, loneliness and separateness. Thus, the anxiety that Yanagita felt in discerning his image as an inlander or a “mountain bumpkin” may have not been too different from that of Iha.

If Iha’s intellectual shift is generally linked to the dramatic conditions of the Okinawan economy during 1920s, Yanagita’s “discovery of Okinawa” appears to be one response to the effects of the fast industrialisation and modernisation which deeply altered Japanese society, particularly after the huge increment of industrial production during the First World War and the sudden decline it had soon after the end of the conflict. Yanagita felt that the modernity coming from the West menaced the “true” Japan and he came to identify Okinawa as a place where the “true Japan” could be unearthed; however “despite a rhetorical opposition, native ethnology actually worked to stabilize capitalism by offering the \textit{appearance} of an alternative to capitalist modernity.”\(^{57}\) Besides, behind his escape from \textit{tairiku} (the continent) as well as his self-identification as an islander, one could also discern a response to what not only industrialisation and modernisation but also Japan’s colonialism were producing.\(^{58}\) And even if he had experimented...
Western linguistic universalism that refused to speak in a language other than his own, Yanagita did not renounce to represent and explain Okinawans in his stead by employing the language of the “bearer of modernity” in Asia. Thus, while recognizing a common “lonely island ordeal” for both Japan and Okinawa, he relegated Okinawa to an Oriental or Asian realm named *kainan* (South Seas).

In this same period Iha realised that Okinawans had been “crushed by [their] own unique history” and started to designate them as *nantōjin* (South Seas aborigines), a term which was employed by colonial anthropologists since the end of nineteenth century. Until then, Iha appears to have been searching for a different inflection of modernity or a better modernity for Okinawans by emphasizing their uniqueness. Yet, by facing a modernity that did not leave any space for negotiable meta-narratives, he finally recognised that Okinawans were required to play the role that had assigned them to the Orientalist framework that Japan had borrowed from the West. Indeed, by both recognising the inexistence of a language that could express the uniqueness of Okinawans and admitting that he could no longer carry on his discourse in the *language of another*, Iha seemed to be aware of both the realm residing behind the use of language and the danger of drowning the indigenous, native centrality in a kind of self-Orientalism or an autoethnographic representation.

In conclusion, the discourses of Iha and Yanagita were deeply affected by a coeval context dominated by a modernity that was ambiguous and contradictory. Indeed, just as it happened—and still happens—elsewhere, if many elements render modernity appealing and alluring, others makes it menacing and destructive. What was important for them both was to find a way to cope with it. Hence, their representation and narration of the Japanese and the Okinawans can be read in the light of the different

the uneasiness he felt about his previous involvement in colonial policy. Murai O., *Nantō ideorogi*, pp. 24-60.

59 The phrase is taken from *Sekihō no tameni* (p. 314), which was published in 1924; in the same year the term *nantōjin* began to appear in Iha’s work.

60 Here Iha seems to become disillusioned with the possibility of building an intersubjective representation of Okinawans, at least on the basis of what David Butz writes: “dominant outsiders […] have conventionally assumed the prerogative to represent and explain the subordinate group in their stead. The latter definition […] foregrounds subordinate groups’ occasional reliance on the ideal of intersubjectivity as a tactic for resisting subordination. Autoethnographic expressions are likely to be aimed at quite specific audiences; those from which subordinate groups have some reason to expect a sincere effort at communications. To the extent that subordinate groups realize such audiences are rare, autoethnographic expression—and the search for intersubjective understanding more generally—is likely to be only a small part of a larger repertoire of everyday resistance to domination”. David Butz, “Autobiography, autoethnography and intersubjectivity: analyzing communication in northern Pakistan”, in Pamela J. Moss (ed), *Placing Autobiography in Geography: History, Method and Analysis*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse 2001, p. 161.
interactions that Japan and Okinawa had with an alluring and menacing modernity which contained both creative and destructive potentials. They reflect identitary discourses molded around the political aim of searching for a different meaning of modernity, and reveals the dilemma that the interaction with modernity raised in Japan as well as in its margins.

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Yanagita Kunio, *Shima no jinsei* (Island life), Sogensha, Tōkyō 1951.
This presentation concentrates on Japan during the Meiji era between the years 1868 and 1912. It was during these years that Japanese society extended itself to external trade and modernization. In order to tackle the issue of representations in history, I will focus on two moments: the first period is between the years 1868 and 1872. At the time, the new government implemented numerous institutional reforms and finally ended the Japanese old order, known as the Tokugawa regime. The second period I will concentrate on is between the years 1905 and 1910. It was during this time that Japan, who had been victorious over China and Russia, began to see itself as an imperialistic power and launched a policy of colonial expansion and became increasingly nationalistic.

My goal is to prove how the representations of people influence their political practices. Our visions of the past therefore mold our practices in the present. Ideological representations are always more complex than one would expect. The nature of the Meiji regime and the reforms that were implemented have been a subject to historiographical debate in Japan and elsewhere. These reforms pushed the country down a road to economic, political and cultural modernization. It was often thought that the arrival of Americans and Europeans in 1853-1854 was an element that triggered the process of change leading to a putsch in favor of the emperor in 1867-1868. Japanese modernization was thus conceived as an outcome of a meeting with the Western world. This meeting did not actually happen in 1853, but took place earlier. Many historians insist—often rightly—on the role of the “Dutch Studies“, the so-called rangaku. Japanese people were aware of main technological and scientific breakthroughs since the early eighteenth century thanks to the presence of the Dutch trading post in Nagasaki. The Dutch studies elevated the country to a new intellectual level before the Americans did so on a political and economic level.
Other historians, on the contrary, insisted on the fundamental importance of the incubation process of modernity during the Edo period during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Before the industrial revolution, that began at the end of nineteenth century after the opening of the country, there was a so-called “industrious revolution” which produced major changes in the economic and industrial sphere as of the end of eighteenth century. Some of these historians also showed how the kokugaku, “national studies” or nativist movement, played a major part in the criticism of old traditional ideologies. This form of thought paved the way for a modernization of knowledge.

Thus a debate began between those who insist on exogenous factors as an explanation for the speed of the modernization process (but then, why would Western countries modernize Japan while they were colonizing the rest of the world?) and those who insist on endogenous factors. According to the latter, there would be a Japanese pre- or early modernity before the actual westernization and, for certain people, this is to be accounted to some form of national genius itself.

However, the paradox comes from elsewhere.

The Edo period corresponds to the period when Chinese thought, Confucianism or rather the new Confucianism of Zhu Xi deeply penetrate the social fabric. Japan had never been as “Chinese” as it was until right before the arrival of the Westerners. It is the very receptivity to Chinese thought that paradoxically prepared the subversion of old order, as much of “Dutch studies” or “national studies”. And to prove it, I will focus on a single aspect of this thought, namely the vision of History itself.

The Japanese leaders who caused Meiji Restoration were not ideologues full of political and religious certainties. They were pragmatists. They had no clear-cut ideas, but that does not mean that they had no ideas at all. In spite of Western influences and the nativist movement, most of the men who created Meiji were raised with Confucianist tradition and even some of them partly reject it. This tradition constructed them intellectually speaking, and influenced their political reflection, a part that would be wrong to overlook. All of them, however, shared a view of history that is quite commonly spread in nineteenth century.

Chinese thinkers had noticed that Chinese history seemed to be going through cycles. Chinese history went through periods when the government was centralized and leaned on an efficient bureaucracy; the country being at that time divided into counties and districts run by governors, commissioners, regional and local civil servants. In order to describe these historical phases, they used the expression junxian 郡県 (in Japanese gunken or gunken sei), that is to say, a “system in which the country is divided in counties and districts”. The Han empire from the second century B.C. until the second century A.C., or the Tang empire during seventh and eighth
centuries, were typically considered junxian phases in history. At other times, however, the emperor gave away land and fiefs for powerful ones to govern in his name. Chinese people then referred to this using the expression fengjian 封建 (in Japanese hōken). The Zhou era—from the tenth to the eleventh century B.C., or the period of warfare kingdoms, were described as the fengjian periods. These Chinese concepts had been appearing in classical Chinese works for at least two thousand years. And indeed Hegel used them to build up his conception of Oriental despotism, based on the idea that in China, history continues to repeat itself. This is by the way, an idea that Marx would later use too. During nineteenth and twentieth century, these beliefs contributed to the representation of Europe by Western thinkers as a progressive history, while Asia and more particularly China, were locked into a stagnant evolution thanks to these cyclical phases of history.

In Japan, these concepts were known and especially re-used from the middle of the Edo period on, toward the beginning of the eighteenth century. Japanese thinkers have always been obsessed by the idea of making Chinese and Japanese History coincide. Hence, the great Neo Confucian scholar Arai Hakuseki explains in Dokushi yoron 読史余論 (My thoughts on the perception of History, 1712) that buke no yo 武家の世 (the warrior times) corresponds to a hōken phase of Japanese history, whereas the kuge era, that is a time when imperial court aristocracy prevailed, corresponded without a doubt to a gunken phase. From 646 and the Great Taika Reform, up until the end of twelfth century, Japan goes through a gunken phase: it imitates the codes of Tang’s China. This period corresponds to the ancient period of Japanese History or to Ancient Times. Then, the government of warriors was funded in Kamakura, in the East of Japan, at the end of twelfth century and the country thus entered a hōken phase: the authority of the state was delegated. The emperor allowed the shōgun to use the military force in his name, the warrior lords possessed the land and Japan’s government was decentralized.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Rai San’yo wrote a Nihon gaishi 日本外史 (An unofficial history of Japan) in which he stated that Japan officially entered a hōken period in 1185 when Minamoto no Yoritomo, the first future shōgun, appointed his vassals in the provinces as military stewards in smaller lands (jūtō 地頭) and military governors in provinces (shugo 守護). There the centralized period gave way to a decentralized government of warriors.

Japanese thought gradually distanced itself from Chinese concepts. The words junxian and fengjian were not morally connoted. Chinese people did not morally judge the two kinds of periods. According to Chinese classics, moral qualities of the sovereign and his vassals were the only two things that allowed one to define the ideal nature of regime. The Prince—centralized
emperor or local lord—had to be inspired by the ideal of a good government, by wisdom and virtue. The junxian regime could lead to a bloody tyranny if the Prince turned into a despot. This, for example, explains the reason for the fall of the first Qin empire. On the contrary, the fengjian regime could sink into chaos or anarchy if all central authority disappears. Local lords fight each other and the result is that the government collapses.

In Japan, historians who are the heirs of another tradition tend to deform Chinese concepts by introducing a notion of moral virtue. Höken periods—as they are presented by Rai San’yō, a well-known influence on Meiji reformers—are thus seen as moments when the government was drifting away from the Imperial Court and looking for a lost legitimacy. It was searching for the legitimacy of a period when the emperors were undoubtedly in charge, namely the gunken period. In moral terms, the gunken system has a greater legitimacy because the emperor of Japan is more powerful and respected. The decentralized hōken regime—like that of the Tokugawas—is thus less good for the country than the traditional gunken regime.

Furthermore, Chinese thinkers evoked those concepts to explain their own history. They surely did not imagine that these very concepts would account for an entire other country’s reality. Nonetheless, from the 1840s on, a new idea appeared in Japan. The intellectual élite started to believe that Chinese concepts could be applied to the history of the rest of the world. The Roman Empire became a gunken period. The European medieval era was seen as a hōken period and the absolute monarchies were regarded as gunken. The Western world was now understood in a gunken phase. In the early 1860s, Itō Hirobumi, future Prime Minister, was a young loyalist and xenophobic samurai from the fief of Chōshū. He was sent to study in England and when he returned he was convinced to have witnessed a particularly efficient gunken system in England. He gave up his xenophobia and dedicated himself to helping Japan come back from a hōken to a gunken system.

For the men who were going to put the emperor back into power, legitimizing the regime that they were about to create and making it efficient was a major issue at stake. There is no contradiction between putting back into office a monarch in order to recreate a gunken—a centralized state—and opening the country to Western modernity. Modernization implies the destruction of the hōken/decentralized system in force during the Tokugawa period.

In 1872, after a new policy of conscription had been put in place, the leaders of the new Meiji era wrote down an imperial rescript targeting the new conscripts. This text is a political manifest of the new regime. Here is what the emperor said in the preamble:
We believe that in the past a centralized/\textit{gunken} system prevailed in the empire. The army enlisted young men to protect the state. There was no separation between soldiers and peasants. With the separation between those who fought and the others a \textit{hōken} system was born. The process of renewal, which started in Bōshin year (1868), is the most important event of the past millennium. And now we need to create a system of conscription for the navy and the land forces adapted to these new times. We wish for this change to rely on the system formerly prevailing in our country, for the habits of foreign countries to be taken into account and for a national conscription act to be passed in order to lay the basis of the protection of the state.

And further on, the rescript indicates that:

Thanks to the restoration and to the abolition of seigneurial fiefs, we went back to the situation prevailing originally, that is to say to a \textit{gunken} system. Warriors who by hereditary right did not work, saw their incomes diminish and we allowed them to stop wearing the sword [i.e. relieved them from war duty].\textsuperscript{1}

This text makes clear why the regime is a restoration. It is a restoration of the power of the emperor and is hence connected to national studies thinkers who actively encouraged the restoration of the emperor into his theoretical political functions. However, this is also connected to a Chinese-like vision of history, centralized with a mythified imperial system. The creation of a civil state, the suppression of fiefs replaced by prefectures lead by civil servants and the military draft were all reforms that we now spontaneously see as measures leading to the construction of a modern nation-state. But for the political leaders who implemented them, those reforms were perceived as a going back to an over-rated ancient order. Meiji is first and foremost a restoration: it was not only the emperor who came back to power, it was the ancient order as the Japanese then perceived it.

Were Meiji leaders really convinced that they were coming back to an old order like the ones prevailing during the Nara (710-784) and Heian (794-1185) periods? It is hard to tell. Nevertheless, we can recall that from the end of eighteenth century French revolutionaries perceived their movement as a return to the virtues of the Roman Republic and that Russian Bolcheviks attempted to mimic their own French revolution. But in the Japanese case, the abolition of the feudal order was conceived as a return to former freedom. It was probably a necessary step in shattering the structures and ideologies of feudal power.

\textsuperscript{1} Kodama Kōta, \textit{et al.}, \textit{Shiryō ni yoru Nihon no ayumi. Kindaihen} (Japanese history through documents. Modern times), Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, Tōkyō 1951, p. 50.
Let’s skip a couple of decades.

In 1906, a young historian named Hara Katsurō publishes a *Nihon chūseishi* 日本中世史 (History of medieval Japan). He graduated ten years earlier from the Imperial University of Tōkyō and he would eventually be appointed to the Imperial University of Kyōto two years later in 1908. Here is what he wrote in the introduction of his book:

We are indeed trapped into the too frequent idea of a “dark age” to designate the Kamakura and Ashikaga periods until the restoration of classical studies in the early Edo period. This is not my personal opinion. The Middle Ages are not a “dark age”. Such an idea is linked to the over-rating of Chinese civilization imported during Antiquity. At that moment, an imported culture was never assimilated or even used. [...] In other words, this period [the Kamakura period], precisely because of the way Japanese society developed, constituted a healthy return to an authentic Japan, a coming back to the origins. It erased this adulterated civilization and thus helped Japan redirect themselves on a more genuine path. Japanese people have managed to recognize themselves as an independent nation. There is no doubt about it, this period was a great moment in Japanese history.\(^2\)

In his book, Hara Katsurō emphasizes what he calls the social diffusion of cultural forms, what he considers a certain indicator of “the progress of civilization”. The idea of cultural forms progressing throughout history had first been coined by Taguchi Ukichi in 1877 in *Nihon kaika shōshi* 日本開花小史 (A brief history of Japanese civilization). This idea was to be re-used in the 1920s by the rather nationalistic literary historian Tsuda Sōkichi in his book *Bungaku ni arawareru waga kokumin shisō no kenkyū* 文学にあらわれる我が国民思想の研究 (Inquiry on Japanese national thought as it appears in literature) and then again in 1975 in *Nihon bungakushi josetsu* 日本文学史序説 (An introduction to the history of Japanese literature) by Katō Shūichi who was closed to Marxist thought. The idea developed by Hara is very important and is found throughout the twentieth century in various intellectual circles.

Hara’s main idea was that the new civilization emerging during medieval times was not the servile reproduction of Chinese Civilization but the creation of an original culture. Japan is not to be seen as a cultural extension of China. The medieval period is thus rehabilitated and now perceived as a period of independency and of Japanization of culture. According to Hara, the Middle Ages, or to be more precise, the Kamakura period (1185-1333), seals the actual birth of Japan. There is obviously a double displacement of paradigm here. The crucial moment in history is not Antiquity anymore but

clearly the medieval times. And the criteria to measure the importance of the period is not the forms of the state anymore but the diffusion of the culture. This importance is linked to a notion of autonomy and independence from Chinese civilization. It shows the reliance on a *kenzenna chūkan shakai* 健全な中間社会, the “intermediate and healthy society”, a real middle class, or in other words warriors. This old period pervaded by a Chinese culture considered to be refined but in reality adulterated (*hisōteki* 皮相的), dominated by the court nobility, opposes a medieval period where a genuine rough but healthy Japanese culture dominated by warriors is born. Thus, the vision of History presented by Hara differs very greatly from the one presented in the imperial rescript of 1872 mentioned above. The warriors’ government is no longer seen as a factor of stagnation but as historical progress.

It is true that in the meantime the general context changed a lot. The Japanese military won over China in 1895 and obtained the cancellation of unequal treaties from 1899 on. In 1905, the Japanese military defeated Russia. In less than a decade, the international position of Japan had completely changed. Obviously, new foundations were necessary. The national traditional thought granted much veneration to tradition and the idea of legitimacy was overly pervaded by Confucianism. Claiming that Heian culture was effeminated and adulterated, Hara developed a vision of history that denied the central link between Japan and China. Here we can measure the impact of such an approach, such a mental process. Seeing that Japan gradually constructed its independence from Chinese culture, claiming that Chinese culture was itself adulterated and effeminated, we can expect despising speeches and ideas against China to be echoed in a nationalistic discourse of a new style.

By insisting on the role played by warriors and what he calls a middle class, Hara also displaced the frame of the discourse from State to society. The *hōken* aspect of Japanese society becomes a source of progress. And it is precisely at that time that the word *hōken* develops in Japan as the equivalent to the Western word, feudality, *feudalesimo*, *féodalité*, *Lehnwesen*. The word thus acquires a slightly different meaning. The old concept of decentralized society is replaced by the notion of feudal society. Feudal society implies the emergence of an armed middle class in the countryside, which sets itself between a refined but isolated imperial capital and a provincial world away from civilization.

Furthermore, Hara Katsurō insists on his new narrative on the opposition Kansai vs Kantō, East vs West. If the Meiji era started because of a coup in 1868 lead by samurai of the South West Japan, the “true Japan” as for himself came from the East. It is probably interesting to remember that Hara came from Morioka, one of the last fiefs from the Tōhoku (North-East), which resisted the new imperial power out of faithfulness to the *shōgun*.
The idea of regional opposition is connected to a particular German historiography, which right at the same time, attributed a regenerating and progressive role in the Germanic people invading the corrupted and adulterated Roman empire. Hara Katsurō clearly parallels the Roman Empire and the Nara and Heian courts and he regards the Chinese-Korean culture, the way Greco-Latin culture could be regarded in Europe. In the same way, he assimilates the Germanic people’s values to the culture of warriors coming from Eastern Japan at the beginning of Kamakura period. He sites the link between both societies as being born a warrior class and a feudal regime. Japan was born as a nation as a result of the social rising of warriors and because of the country’s unification in the thirteenth century under the rule of the shoguns of Kamakura.

Now if we come back to 1885, there is an important text by the intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi entitled Datsu A nyū Ō 脱亜入欧 (Good bye Asia, hello Western world). Here he explains that since the Opening Policy was implemented in Japan, the country’s values grew more and more connected to Western values and less and less to Asian values, noting this as a good thing for Japan. The Asian Japanese culture is superficial. Japan has to assert its purity and strangely so, Hara develops a theory of the frontier in the same way that Turner did in the United States. The more East and North you go, the closer you get to wild regions that are independent from a too “sinized” West, the more asserted Japanese culture becomes. Since 1868 the power was in the hands of the old southern and western fiefs and Hara became the first historian to rehabilitate the role of the eastern and northern provinces.

You will also find in Hara’s writings the idea that there are rhythms that are common in both Europe and Japan. He demonstrates that two medieval periods seal the emergence of modern nations, which culturally assert themselves at that moment.

Hara and a number of Japanese historians who will follow his lead in the twentieth century, obviously try to restore the historical role of the warrior class thirty years after Meiji. But this is not related to a reactionary narrative calling for the return of the old order. It sounds like a hymn to the middle class, to Japanese cultural autonomy, a struggle against the “old” Chinese influence and a step towards the idea of a common and eventually shared history with the Western world. On a more anecdotical level, we can highlight the fact that the Chinese concept of gunken periods completely vanished at that time. It was no longer of any use. On the other hand, we can underline the fact that the hōken concept entered the modern historical vocabulary meaning no longer decentralization of power but feudalism.

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1 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, Chicago 1893.
The texts that I have briefly analyzed here are of significantly different nature. The first one has an official motive and represents a sort of intellectual and political compromise. It provides a rather good summary of mainstream representations of history among those who initiated the Meiji Restoration. The second one is the work of an historian. But this text was read and often commented on in the early twentieth century and it eventually became a sort of historical vulgate that spread through the country. I could have quoted other historians or Japanese thinkers who in the early twentieth century share the same views, such as Fukuda Tokuzō. Around 1910, he stated that he was studying German history with great pleasure because deep down it was the same history as his country’s. There is thus a narrative set around 1906-1910 that dominates the representations of Japanese history for a very long time.

Nonetheless, what we saw in the 1870s was the influence of Chinese thought which was very revealing at the time. Today it tends to be belittled by historians who are always too prone to give way to ideologies and working trends of representation. But in 1868, it was the Chinese historical vision—at least the Chinese vision as it was understood by Japanese people—that prevailed and allowed the new regime to develop a new legitimacy.

From a problematic vision of history dominated by “Chinese-like” thought, to the one Hara Katsurō establishes, we witness a displacement of agenda and paradigms as a result of the evolution of the political stakes. In 1868, the imperative is to put an end to the Tokugawa regime. In the early twentieth century, it is necessary to be seen on the same level as Western powers. Obviously, here is what Francois Hartog calls a change in the “régime d’historicité” with a complete overturning of perspectives. The concept of feudalism appears as a pivotal concept and it becomes possible to connect and compare Japanese and European history, defending the idea of similar history on both ends of Eurasia. Finally, this notion paves the way for the idea of History as a progressive front in regards to the Ancient Times, the Medieval period and all the way to today’s world.

Hara’s representations of history are obviously influenced by a sort of slightly romantic nationalism but they work on the basis of an explicit comparison between Europe and Japan. The idea that History is walking towards a beautiful future will also be used by Marxist thinkers when they explain how Japanese feudalism carried the seed of capitalism. Again, another way to assert the similarity between Japan and Europe.

It will take the emergence of a new history in the 1980s and 1990s (with post modern theories) for historians to be able to break free from the paradigm defined by Hara and to build up a new one based on other notions such as those of networks, conflicting plurality of spaces, multiplicity of social agents and the perception of History beyond the framework of the nation-state. But this is precisely another history.
References


Zhang Xiang and Sonoda Hidehiro (eds.), “*Hōken*, “gunken” saikō. Higashi Ajia shakai taisei ron no shinsō” (Feudalism or centralized bureaucracy. The discourse on East Asia’s social system), Shibunkaku Shuppan, Kyōto 2006.
The Japanese colonial empire was built on two distinct temporalities and two distinct dynamics. This makes the Japanese colonial empire similar to Western European empires. An Ancient Regime colonization, several centuries old, dating back to the end of the sixteenth century in Ezo (Hokkaidō) and after 1609 in the Ryūkyū (Okinawa), and later at the end of the seventeenth century in Karafuto (Sakhalin), was followed by a “modern” colonization, a State colonization, during the last third of the nineteenth century and during the twentieth century. The relevant territories are in this case Taiwan, Korea, Micronesia, the South of Manchuria and Karafuto, a generally ambiguous territory. Korea, conquered in 1905, was the “pearl” of this modern colonial empire.¹

This is where the question of colonial knowledges arises. Here, we mention an adjective that must be used with caution. We are referring to the knowledges that were used in studying the history of Korea, in the broad sense of the word (every historical era), during the first half of the twentieth century. Ancient history, philology and archaeology, all closely linked, had a

central position within those knowledges, as did of course anthropology. Although many Japanese and American writers have referenced appraisals of post-1945 historiography\(^2\) after decolonization, very few have studied colonial historiography in Korea, which is to say history written during colonization. The kind of historiography we are interested in is an object of history. Yet, is the border between colonial historiography and post-colonial historiography so obvious and well delimitated? It is worth noting, incidentally, that most contributions to this subject come from Korean historians.\(^3\)

We shall also mention the discourses that dealt with the history of modern Korea or the history of colonization during the same period. Although it cannot be discussed further here, there were a plurality of historian discourses on Korea: as early as the 1910s and 1920s, English-speaking historians such as Peason J. Treat or Paul H. Clyde,\(^4\) amongst others, analyzed modern Korea and colonization, and found Japanese presence in a Korea that was “incapable of ruling itself” perfectly legitimate. At the same time, Korean historiography of Japanese colonization was beginning with Pak Ûn-sik’s

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\(^2\) See conclusion.


朴殷植 (1859-1925) famous 1920 work. In other words, there was a historiography of the contemporary and therefore colonial period a long time before decolonization and synchronously with the “general” history of Korea.

We will limit ourselves to clarifying temporalities, drawing on an institutional overview and recalling a few important characters. Firstly, we will see the links between history and colonialism—the discourses supporting colonization—at the beginning of the twentieth century. Then, colonial history during the years 1905 to 1921 will be introduced, as well as the various operative networks from Korea and from the metropole. Lastly, we will examine the links between the institutions of colonial Korea and the Imperial University and some of the greatest figures of the 1930s. In conclusion, we shall give an overview of post-colonial studies and their timeline.

Historiography and colonialism: Korea as seen from Japan at the turn of the century

Historical works on the Korean peninsula published around the middle and the end of the Meiji era (1868-1912), well before annexation, have been analyzed by Japanese, American and French historians. Those writings, derived directly from Japan, were particular in that their authors were not specialists on the peninsula: they emanated either from specialists on Asia, or historians focused on other projects but with an opinion on Korea. Stefan Tanaka studied the development of the Tōyōshi 東洋史 which is to say, as he explained, the history of the Orient (in particular of North-East Asia), as opposed to Western or European history.

The specialists on Asia were mostly sinologists, such as famous philologist Shiratori Kurakichi 白鳥庫吉 (1865-1942) from the Tōkyō Imperial University. He provides a perfect example of the early discourses that we mentioned. Stefan Tanaka writes about him:

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5 A journalist and member of the Provisional Government, in exile in Shanghai (one of the two main branches of the resistance), Pak ini tiated the beginnings of Korean historiography on colonization, which remained for a long time centred on resistance movements. Pak Un-sik, Han’guk tongnip undong ji hyölsa 韓國獨立運動之血史 (The bloody history of Korean independence movements), originally in Chinese (Shanghai 1920), many translations and reprints both in Korean and in Japanese.

According to Shiratori, Japan’s activities were not imperialistic, for the past shows that Korea ‘has returned [kaeru] to our protection’ [...] History provided the precedent for this return: protohistoric Japan, after all, had been asked for aid from the ancient Korean kingdoms of Paekche, Kaya, and Silla in their fight against Koguryŏ. It was only thanks to this request, Shiratori continued, that Japan established its rule in Kaya, turned Paekche into a protectorate, and made a tributary state of Silla. Moreover, he expressed no doubt that he considered the Sei-kan [conquer Korea] movement of the early Meiji period to ‘open Korea’ and impose Japanese ‘aid’ during the twentieth century in a similar vein.7

However, those discourses, expounded by the annexation of Korea, did not simply fall under a straight “legitimization of imperialism”. Equally academic research as constitutive of a wider discourse on Korea, these discourses that supported colonization were also reflected in newspapers and by popular images stimulated by the discovery of the Kwanggaeto daewang 廣開土大王 stone in 1883. This stone was said to have proven the historical truth of military victories on Korea by Empress Jingū 神功皇后 (r. 201-269), as told in the Nihon shoki 日本書紀, the Japanese annals dating back from 720.

These works and discourses show how the historical narrative on Korea, and human sciences in general, were shaped during the twenty years before the August 22nd, 1910 annexation. The weight of the Past and the study of the Past should therefore not be underestimated. Their primary goal was not to be “exploited”, but rather, they acted as a powerful motivator by having, at the time, a legitimizing effect. In other words, this period saw Japanese historians, without necessarily being conscious of it, taking part in the colonial effort by initially supporting the discourse of ethnic, racial or cultural proximity between Japanese and Koreans (NisSen dōsoron 日鮮同祖論); then, in a second phase, by constituting the concepts (which were relatively commonplace at the time of colonial empires)8 of “stagnation” and “dependency on the outside world”. Those ideas were expressed in the Japanese case by the words teitai 停滞 and jidai 事大 or taritsusei 他律性. These concepts would then be brought back to colonial Korea, further completed by that of “dualism” (nijū kōzō shakai 二重構造社会) which

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7 S. Tanaka, Japan’s Orient, p. 244.
9 From the Korean sadae 사대 事大, referring to deference towards powerful countries.
emphasized the “incomplete” character of the “spirit” of the colonized; here again was an idea that was very common in modern colonialism.\(^{10}\)

The idea of ethnic proximity between the conquerors and the conquered was actually widely present in the discourses of colonialism, that is to say amongst non-historians. It is mostly typical of the years around the time of annexation. In the 1920, a less defined discourse, emphasizing miscegenation, would follow this idea of common origins.\(^{11}\) However, the idea of Korean history as being without dynamic, of “a long, level history” after the tenth century, during the period from 1910 to 1920, would remain impressed on colonial historiography for a long time. This finding confirms Said’s analysis of Anglo-French orientalism towards North Africa and the Middle East.\(^{12}\)

The \textit{de facto} involvement of historians at the time of the annexation appeared, for example, in a themed edition of the publication \textit{Rekishi chiri} 歴史地理 (History and geography), of the \textit{Nippon rekishi chiri gakkai} (Japanese society of history and geography), in October 1910.\(^{13}\) This issue, devoted to Korea, which followed the publication in September of the text of the August 22\textsuperscript{nd} Rescript, included around twenty articles legitimizing annexation.\(^{14}\) At that time, when the idea of climate \textit{determinism} maintained a strong influence on the discourses of compared geography as well as the discourses of colonialism (such as the similarities found between Provence and Algeria), history gave scientific support to the ideological discourses on \textit{proximity} between Japan and Korea, as did the press and other media, complicit as ever.\(^{15}\)

That same November 1910, Kita Sadakichi 喜田貞吉 (1871-1939), the famous historian from Kyōtō Imperial University, published \textit{Kankoku no heigō to kokushi 韓國之併合と國史} (The annexation of Korea and our national history).\(^{16}\) That work, which was emblematic of the discourses


\(^{13}\) This society, founded at the end of the nineteenth century, was one of the most important ones in Japan, with the \textit{Shigakkai} 史學會, the oldest historical society in Japan.


\(^{16}\) This work, published by Sanseidō, was reprinted in a facsimile edition within a series of
emanating from Japan during this period, combined conferences made during the month of August at that same society around the theme: “Kankoku heigō to kokushi no kyōiku” (The annexation of Korea and teaching our national history). Kita emphasized the idea of assimilation (dōka 同化). He brought the two countries closer through an ancient history imagined to be “shared”, and wrote, in a similar way evoking what Shiratori had earlier:

That Korea and Japan are one sole entity is a fact; this can in no way be seen as a discourse dictated by circumstances. This annexation has therefore not destroyed Korea, but instead has restored the situation to what it was during the ancient period.17

Kita continued in that direction for the following years. This therefore makes it clear that Tōkyō and Kyōto’s positions were in accordance with respect to Korea. It hence is possible here to see a discourse close to annexationism as defined by Hannah Arendt.18

Kita, who was present as a historian during all the great debates of the 1900-1930, is considered today as “the greatest ideologist of the pluri-ethnic Japanese empire”.19 But this observation may be too cursory: this ideology, far from being limited to a few figures, emanated from the whole range of scholarship, in a context where history, archaeology and linguistics, amongst others, concurred in the opinion that the Japanese had continental origins. Torii Ryūzō 鳥居龍蔵 (1870-1953) from the Tōkyō Imperial University, an anthropologist, archaeologist and philologist of the greatest renown, who studied Korea amongst other fields as mandated by the Tōkyō Imperial University after 1909, defended this discourse of “common origins” during the events of the First March 1919.20 We should however emphasize the ambiguous nature of those positions: Kita supported colonization in Korea in return for a future equality of rights. At the very beginning of the colonization period, Torii himself was very close to the Government-General of Korea, which allowed him to carry on his research until 1916. As for linguists, they were fascinated by the closeness, of historical nature rather than dating back to origins, between the Korean and the Japanese. In any documents and archives on the annexation of Korea, in forty-four volumes. Kankoku heigōshi kenkyū shiryō 韓国併合史研究資料 (Archives on the history of the annexation of Korea), Ryūkei Shosha, Tōkyō 1995, vol. 3. Kita at the time sat on the Ministry of Education’s Commission for the Redaction of School Manuals, created in 1903.

17 Kankoku heigōshi, pp. 72-73.
19 Oguma E., Tan’itsu minzoku, p. 119.
20 A. Nanta, “Torii Ryūzō”, p. 29.
case, anti-colonialism was virtually non existent, there just as anywhere else.  

For these reasons, the political discourses we have just described, dictated by circumstances having to do with the annexation, must be distinguished from colonial historical scholarship that we will now present.

The beginnings of colonial historiography: archaeological surveys and the preservation of sites and documents, 1905-1921

Researchers specializing in Korea began before the Colonial State was instituted, particularly in history and archaeology, but also in linguistics and anthropology. These four disciplines are linked for logical and practical reasons. The first historical studies, during the years 1905-1921, were characterized by a desire for the conservation of ancient texts. It was the same for colonial archaeology, which cannot be distinguished from history since it was essentially concerned with ancient Korea, notably the era of the Three Kingdoms (Samguk sidae 三國時代, from the fourth to the seventh century) and in particular the Kingdoms of Silla 新羅 (356-935), in the South, and of Koguryǒ 高句麗 (37-668) in the North—it is therefore necessary to make a clear distinction between prehistoric archaeology on the one hand and ancient archaeology (which has to do with historical eras), on the other.

Scholars at the time of the protectorate (1905-1910) and during the first years under Governor-General Terauchi Masatake 寺内正毅 (1852-1919), in post from 1910 to 1916, were still mandated from the metropole, in particular for extensive archaeological surveys, or were living in Korea but not attached to the Government-General at Keijō (Seoul). After 1915-1916, specialists of Korea per se started to work within institutions, first those created by Terauchi, who was passionate about Ancient Korea, then later, within institutions created between the years 1922 and 1924 (see below).

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22 The protectorate of 1905, organised around the Resident (Tōkan, Tōkanfu 統監府) was followed by the Government-General of Korea (Chōsen sōtokufu 朝鮮総督府) in 1910.

23 The first research institutions founded by the colonial power are the Museum of the Royal House of Yi, the Botanical Garden, and the Zoological Garden in 1909, inside the Ch’anggyeong palace 昌慶宮.

Unlike what was happening on the metropole, those institutions founded during the decade from 1915 to 1924 constituted clusters wherein each individual was linked to others and organizations largely interpenetrated. As a result, it is difficult to draw a clear historical picture of a colonial research that, in fact, worked organically. In other words, from a research point of view, these were not institutions as understood in the metropole. The only distinction worth making would be between individuals: those from Korea and those of the Kyōto “network”, discussed below. Rather, we should identify the different tasks or objectives, and not the institutions with the full autonomy that this word usually implies.

The art historian Sekino Tadashi 関野貞 (1867-1935) or the archaeologist and historian Imanishi Ryū 今西龍 (1875-1932), as well as Torii in the case of prehistory, played central roles between around 1905 and 1916, and remained present afterwards. These researchers laid the foundation of historic-archaeological knowledge on Korea, a work that was further carried out by later institutions, as well as, critically, by Korean research after 1945-1948. The case of Imanishi, who deconstructed the Korean founding myth of Tan’gun 檀君 in his famous article of 1937, is particularly well-known. In contrast to other colonial situations, corpus and written documents, as well as all historical or ancient sites, were very numerous in colonial Korea—just as in Indochina, whose historical configuration is similar to that of Korea.

Archaeological work, which seems to have preceded historical work, was in reality permanently entwined with the latter. Indeed, proto-historical archaeology was concerned with the “great historical cities” in works that mixed philological history (due to the inflated weight of written documents) and an archaeology that aimed to confirm the truth of texts taken to be entirely true, as Schliemann (1822-1890) had done in Mycenae and Troy, through most notably the Samguk sagi 三國史記 and the Samguk yusa 三國遺事, Korean chronicles of the Three Kingdoms period dating from the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, or the Wei Chronicle (Wei zhi 魏志). The region of Hwanghaedo 黃海道, for the sites of Koguryŏ, was the locus of intense exploration, in particular on the Command Post of Lelang 樂郎, an important Chinese colony-city founded during the Han dynasty, close to the outskirts of P’yŏng’yang. Whereas the myth of origin around legendary ruler

25 As for prehistoric archaeology, which is less prominent, Torii led an extensive study between 1911 and 1916 to determine the division and the type of sites present. This study led notably to the “Research report on the ancient sites of P’yon’g’an Namdo and Hwanghaedo” in 1916. Torii Ryūzō, “Heian nandō, Kōkaidō koseki chōsa hōkokusho” 平安南道及び北海道古跡調査報告書 (Research report on the ancient sites of P’yon’g’an Namdo and Hwanghaedo), in Chōsen sōtokufu (Government-General of Korea), Taishō gonendo koseki chōsa hōkokusho 大正5年度古跡調査報告書 (Research report on ancient sites for the fifth year of Taishō), Keijō, Seoul 1916, pp. 767-859.
Tan’gun was being deconstructed, the time of the Chinese presence in the North of the peninsula became perceived as an archaeological period in itself: the true beginning of History in Korea, thus reduced to exterior influences.

Moreover, those historians-archaeologists associated, as early as that period, Korea with Manchuria—then an ill-defined and disputed region, where Japan substituted itself to Russia after 1905. Japanese scholars posited a “Korea-Manchuria cultural sphere” (ManSen bunka 満鮮文化) read as a whole, by relating Koguryŏ to Korea—a point of debate still today, between Korea and China. This conception was not purely “ideological”, but rather reflected the complexity of the era of the Three Kingdoms, which led those historians and archaeologists to associate the north of the peninsula to the south of Manchuria as early as 1905. Koguryŏ encompassed the northern half of Korea and the south of the Manchuria of the time (today, the three Chinese provinces of the North-East). Its definition in relation to modern nation-states is problematic.

From a purely philological standpoint, the scholars of the years 1905-1916 worked along two different planes: the analysis of Korean texts, and the reprinting of many Korean texts that were considered to be essential. The work was first lead by “private agents” outside colonial power. The case of historian Oda Shōgo 小田省吾 (1871-1953) is particularly illuminating: in 1909, he founded, along with the historian Ayukai Fusanoshin 魚貝房之進 (1864-1946), the Chōsen kosho kankōkai 朝鮮古書刊行會, a private institution, which reprinted in a few years dozens of texts from the seventeenth and eighteenth century. They created a work edition of the Samguk yusa and Samguk sagi, and compiled a Chōsen gunsho taikei 朝鮮群書大系 (Historical Anthology of Korean literature). This work, which simultaneously involved conservation, reprinting, and analysis, drew on language, literature and history. It would then be continued by scholarly institutions put in place by the colonial powers.

At the same time, colonial power, as early as the Protectorate era, ordered the famous Kyūkan chōsa 旧慣調査 (Inquest on customs and mores of Korea). This event, in which ethnologists as well as historians took part, lead

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to a report as early as 1910, while linguistics was gaining in power. In 1920, 
Ogura Shinpei 小倉進平 (1882-1944), author of Korean grammar books and 
who lived in Korea starting in 1911, was already publishing a Chōsen 
gogakushi 朝鮮語學史 (History of Korean linguistics) in Japan.27

The institutional integration of researchers “outside of the power” and 
their work would also be encouraged by the acquisition in 1907 by the 
Gakumuka 學務課 (Social affairs and education bureau) of Tōkanfu 
of Korean archives, in particular the Royal Library of Kyujanggak 奎章閣 in 
Ch’angdŏk Palace 昌德宮 in Keijō. Conversely, it must be noted that these 
archives were mostly kept in Keijō, in prevision of future research 
institutions.28 Most, but not all of them, were written in classical Chinese, 
and were convenient for Japanese sinologists to use.

From the point of view of institutions, the end of Terauchi’s mandate was 
the first important milestone. The Chōsen sōtokufu hakubutsukan 朝鮮総督府博物館 (Museum of the Government-General of Korea) was 
founded in 1915; Ayukai came in the following year. Then, consequently, the Chōsen koseki chōsa inkkai 朝鮮古蹟調査委員會 (Commission for the 
study of ancient sites in Korea; later renamed Chōsen koseki kenkyūkai 朝鮮古蹟研究會),29 was created in 1916, while at the same time the Koseki oyobi ibutsu hozon kisoku 古蹟及遺物保存規則 (Rules for the 
preservation of ancient sites and artifacts from Korea) were being drawn.30 Those rules, later revised in 1933, preceded the 1919 law in the metropole.

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27 On the Japanese colonial empire and particularly Korea see Yasuda Toshiaki 安田敏朗, Shokuminchi no naka no “kokugogaku” 植民地のなかの「國語學」(The “national language” in colonial context), Sangensha, Tōkyō 1998; Id., “Gengo” no kōchiku 「言語」の構築 (The construction of “the language”), Sangensha, Tōkyō 1999.

28 Unlike the archive of the Kyujanggak annex in Kanghwa, which was pillaged by a French 
expeditionary corps in 1866, those documents were still archived at the Bibliothèque 
Nationale in France until 2011. Part of the Kyujanggak archives was however moved to the 
Tōkyō Imperial University, where it disappeared during the 1923 earthquake. Apart from this 
library, the Chosŏn royal family had stores of archives and documents, called Sago 史庫. Four 
of them fell under the control of the Kyujanggak in 1908, one of which would be later moved to 
Tōkyō. The books and documents that were taken by Japan were given back to Korea in 
three times: in 1965, then above all in 2006 and in 2011 (the restitution is still ongoing, in 
particular for the documents taken by Itō Hirobumi).

29 Both should be translated as “commission”; the organisation still fell under the authority of the 
Government-General. The same goes for the 1922 commission (see below).

30 These regulations were essential in the preservation of sites anterior to the Chosŏn period (1392-1897). Inada Takashi 稲田孝, “Iseki no hogo” 遺跡の保護 (The protection of 
archaeological sites), in Kondō Yoshirō 近藤義郎 (ed.), Nihon no kōkogaku 日本の考古学 
(Archaeology of Japan), Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1986, vol. 7, pp. 71-132; Jean-Paul Demoule and 
The question of the preservation of sites was not a purely colonial concern. This is evident by the various accounts of clashes between Japanese archaeologists and Japanese residents who engaged in illicit excavations. Through its objectives, it is clear that this historical work was focused on ancient Korea. This commission, which involved Torii, Hamada Kōsaku 濱田耕作 (1881-1938), director of the Archeology Department of the Kyōto Imperial University since 1916, and Korean researchers, is the equivalent in Korea of EFEO for French Indochina. The reports it produced are still considered significant in the study of proto-historic and ancient Korea.

This ensemble of institutions, including organizations founded between the years 1922 and 1924, was constructed in an integrated way. These institutions followed the dynamic driven by Terauchi and built an edifying colonial knowledge, which fell within archiving and complied by a similar logic to that demonstrated by Benedict Anderson in the case of British India and for Indochina. This work did not limit itself to official reports or publications, but was comprised of masses of articles and publications that were always published through the Government-General if in Korea, or through various publishing houses in Kyōto or Tōkyō.

A work that can be seen as emblematic of this scholarship is the imposing series Chōsen koseki zufu 朝鮮古蹟圖譜 (Description of the ancient sites of Korea). This series was published both in Japanese and English (in the case of the first five volumes) between the years 1915 and 1935 in a luxurious binding, with a vast amount of photographs, however it lacked any historical questioning. The work had a definite influence on many Western institutions (such as the Musée Guimet in Paris) as well as in Japan. However, it belonged more to the “photo safari” genre and supported a contradictory logic of enhancement of the Korean national past (therefore supporting nationalism).

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31 Umehara Sueji 梅原末治, Kōkogaku rokujūnen 考古学60年 (Sixty years of archaeology), Heibonsha, Tōkyō 1973.
32 The Mission Archéologique Permanente was founded in 1898, and later was turned into the EFEO (École française d’Extrême-Orient) in January 1900 by Paul Doumer (1857-1932), and moved to Hanoi in 1901. Trinh Van Thao, “École française d’Extrême-Orient”, in Claude Liauzu (ed.), Le dictionnaire de la colonisation française, Larousse, Paris 2007, pp. 263-264.
34 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, chapter 10 (Census, Map, Museum).
35 On the differences, some of which were chronological as well, between research on ancient Korea and that on modern Korea: of the fifteen volumes published, six dealt with the Chosŏn period—volumes 10 to 15, published between 1930 and 1935. They dealt mostly with architectural and art history.
and a strengthening of colonial paternalism (reinforcing the position of the colonizer).\textsuperscript{37}

Taken globally, this historical work would give a fresh, modern view on that ancient past and the antiquity, which up until then was not considered “central”, and which would later be reassessed by independence movements as being part of “Korean national culture”.

\textbf{Specialized Studies and contemporary Korea: around the Keijō Imperial University and the Historical Commission}

Historical studies from the end of the 1920s to the 1940s showed much better understanding of geopolitics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as well as a finer analysis of Korean history. Japanese researchers gradually moved away from the deterministic or ideological discourses of the beginning of the century and began producing historical studies that were in the same line as those produced after decolonization. The context of these new discourses differed as well. One reason for this was the accumulation of Koreanist scholarship over several decades. This change was also due to the “cultural politics” (bunka seiji 文化政治) of the 1920s: Korean newspapers were allowed back after the First March 1919, and the Government-General, led by Governor Saitō Makoto 斬藤實 (1858-1936), in power from 1919 to 1927, then from 1929 to 1931, under Prime Minister Hara Takashi 原敬 (1856-1921), pursued a policy of support of Korean culture. Once more, this might seem to contradict the \textit{a priori} objective of the colonial state. It was mostly a question of splitting the opposition in order to isolate the advocates of armed resistance on the one hand, and on the other, the proponents (rallied to the colonial government) of nationalism and gradualism.\textsuperscript{38}

The 1920s saw a reinforcement of “local” research, with researchers that worked solely within the institutions of the colony, following the Museum in 1915. In December 1922, the Chōsenshi hensan inkai 朝鮮史編纂委員會 (Commission for the redaction of the history of Korea; later renamed Chōsenshi henshūkai 朝鮮史編修會 in June 1925)\textsuperscript{39} was founded. Following

\textsuperscript{37} On this point as well, a comparison with French Indochina would be illuminating. B. Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, chapter 10 (Census, Map, Museum); Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery, \textit{Indochina, an ambiguous colonization, 1858-1934}, University of California Press, Berkeley 2009. And see also the works of Gwendolyn Wright on the French colonial empire.

\textsuperscript{38} Which is to say the notion that the “evolution” of Korea required it to undergo colonization. This policy was a success at the time, but ended up in the middle term being counter-productive for the colonial power.

\textsuperscript{39} See footnote 30.
the commission, in 1924 (1926) the Keijō Imperial University (Keijō Teikoku Daigaku 京城帝國大學), which was integrated within the metropole higher education system 40 was created. This university differed from previous institutions in its function, which was principally education, 41 and by the great variety of research themes it developed that went beyond Korea. Once again, all historians and archaeologists went there. In 1930, the University received the stacks of the Kyujanggak (cf. supra). Finally, recent Korean research has shed some light on the scholarly societies that revolved around those great institutions. Societies brought together and federated characters from both commissions, the museum and the university. This shows once more the difficulty of attempting, in a colonial context, to isolate a particular field along the logic of clearly separated institutions. In addition, those societies were more or less official organisms: in the case of history, whereas the Seikyū gakkai 青丘學會 (1929) would seem to have been autonomous, in fact its president was Fujita; the imposing Chōsenshi gakkai 朝鮮史學會 was created in 1923 by the seimu tōkan 政務統監 (Civilian governor), who assisted the Governor-General. Finally, although those gakkai were in majority comprised of Japanese, Koreans were also present.42

Amongst these, historians were thus divided between the Faculty of Law and Humanities of the University, 43 the Historical Commission and the Archaeological Commission, the Museum and the scholarly societies. Their work led to articles and various publications (to be detailed further later). Oda Shōgo, already mentioned, once becoming director of the Social Affairs and Education Bureau, sat at the Historical Commission from the very beginning. Similarly, famous historian and archaeologist Kuroita Katsumi 黒板勝美 (1874-1946), who worked on Korean corpus, was part of the commission, alongside sinologist Naitō Konan 内藤湖南 (1866-1934). 44

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40 The whole of the university opened in 1926. Chŏng Sŏn-I 정선이 (丁仙伊), Kyŏngsŏng cheguk taehak yŏng’gu 경성제국대학 연구 (Keijō Imperial University), Mun’ŭm-sa tosŏ ch’ulp’an 문음사 도서 출판, Seoul 2008. This was one of the nine (and not seven) Imperial Universities, with that of Taipei (1928). These two universities were founded before those of Osaka and Nagoya.

41 Unlike Taiwan, the Keijō Imperial University incorporated one third of “indigenous” students (i.e. Koreans), which is a high percentage.

42 As shown by the list of conferences given. “Seikyū” comes from the Korean place name Ch’ŏnggu, which was where the society was located. On these scholarly societies, see Pak K., Singminji sigi, pp. 100-102.

43 Korean studies were split between the Chōsenshigakka 朝鮮史学科 (Korean history section), the Chōsens bungakka 朝鮮文科科 (Korean Literature section) and the Chōsens gogakka 朝鮮語学科 (Korean language section) which is where Ogura was affected in 1926. The study of history can naturally not be separated from that of language.

44 See Kuroita Katsumi sensei seitain hyakunen kinenkai 黒板勝美先生生誕百年記念会 (ed.), Kuroita Katsumi sensei ibun 黒板勝美先生遺文 (The literary legacy of professor
Some of the objectives of the historical commission were the reprinting _en masse_ and the conservation of documents, as well as the completion of the _Sillok_ 實錄, the royal chronicles of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910). Their writing, interrupted by emperor Kojong 高宗 (1852-1919) after 1897, was started once again by the Government-General, who had the last two volumes written ("Kojong", “Sunjong” 純宗).

The main objective of the Historical Commission was to write an official history of Korea. Since its publication, however, this history has been widely criticized. This work led to two series: first, the _Chōsenši kōza_ 朝鮮史講座 (Lectures on the history of Korea), in three volumes, published in 1924 by the _Chōsenši gakkai_, which cannot be considered separate from the commission; then, between 1932 and 1938, the series of books _Chōsenši_ 朝鮮史 (History of Korea), in thirty-five volumes (24,000 pages). These works varied from the dynamic from the 1910s in that they dealt much more with the modern, even colonial, period. Korean “professors” were involved in the entire work. Some chapters of the _Chōsenši kōza_ were even published in original Korean (with _kana_), such as those penned by historian Yi Nŭng-hwa 李能和 (1869-1943), rallied to the colonial regime.

Let us now turn to a few emblematic figures of the archaeological and historian milieu of Korea. Fujita Ryōsaku 藤田亮策 (1892-1960) was a central character in the archaeological world of the peninsula between 1922, the date in which he was appointed director of the Museum, and 1945; he also became professor of history at the Imperial University and member of the Historical Commission. His theories on the formation of the Korean state influenced Korean archaeology after independence, in particular his 1948 synthesis _Chōsen kōkogaku kenkyū_ 朝鮮考古學研究. In this work, Fujita clearly recognized a “Lelang cultural sphere”, and moreover as the beginning of History in the Korean peninsula. However, at the same time, he gave an important place to the prehistory of the peninsula—that is to say the period before the first century A.D. Chinese colonization.

In fact, it is difficult to consider Fujita as one of the supporters of the idea that Korea was always a subject of outside forces. He felt, in 1948, that the peninsula (and Japan) had enjoyed the benefits of “the advanced culture of China” or of southern influences, while at the same time adding that “Korea [was] not only a bridge allowing cultural exchanges but [had] developed its

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45 An index was published in 1940, which makes a total 37 of volumes.

46 See the memoirs Keijō Teikoku Daigaku sōritsu gojisshūnen kinenshi inkai 紺碧遙かに (An inaccessible blue), Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, Tōkyō 1974.

47 Fujita Ryōsaku, _Chōsen kōkogaku kenkyū_ (A study on Korean archeology), Kōdō Shoten, Kyōto 1948. Fujita later had an important career in Japan.
own, specific culture (koyū no tokushu bunka 固有の特殊文化)". His importance remains considerable—although he is controversial—as does Imanishi’s influence. Imanishi was part of the archaeological commission since 1916, and later professor at the Keijō Imperial University after 1926, while at the same time teaching at the Kyōto Imperial University.

The implementation of the Kyōto “network” must also be emphasized. It should further be described throughout the colonial period (and in China through the Beijing University) in the fields of ancient history and archaeology from the 1916 work led by Hamada to those of his disciple and later colleague Umehara Sueji 梅原末治 (1893-1983) in the 1920s and the 1930s. What characterized the Kyōto “network” in the Korean case was a specific discourse that differed from the one held in Keijō. Hamada or Umehara, who were focussed on protohistory, compared the Korean tumuli (kofun 古墳) to the ones in mainland Japan and showed their similarities, following the idea that they constitute a continuum. This discourse, which is older and more colonialist (see above), thus reappeared amongst the Kyōto archaeologists around 1935. An example of this is found in the collective work Nihon minzoku 日本民族 (The Japanese people) published by the Anthropological Society in 1935, a Tōkyō publication, or in a special issue of the metropole journal Dolmen ドルメン around the theme “Nippon sekki jidai” 日本石器時代 (Japan stone-age) of June 1935, which covered a large part of Northeast Asia. In other words, the discourse in the metropole was more “colonialist” than that of researchers in Korea.

The publications of the University itself, in addition to that of its researchers, had various forms, which should be further detailed, extending from series of various names to investigative reports or books, and including, here as well, reissues of ancient documents or archives. As for ancient periods, the work of Suematsu Yasukazu 末松保和 (1904-1992), author of major bibliographies, emphasized interest in the period of the Three Kingdoms and relative neglect for the political and social history of the

48 Ibidem, pp. 43-44.
49 Pai H., Constructing “Korean” Origins.
50 It has been established that the funerary urns (Yayoi era) are common to the westernmost part of the islands (Kyūshū) and the south of Korea, and it is possible to effect a comparison between the tumuli in Korea and in Japan.
51 Umehara also noted, in the collective work by the Anthropology Society, that what could not have been studied in mainland Japan was studied in Korea. His article is well known for its criticism of the 1874 law, which forbids any systematic search of metropole kofun.
52 More clarification is needed as to the immense census of the Kyujanggak archive in Seoul. The reprints were primarily concerned with this archives, but they also involved private collections. Prefaces on Korean history, language, and literature were added, which show the extent of the philological work accomplished. See Keijō Teikoku Daigaku sōritsu gojissē hennen kinenshi inkai (ed.), Konpeki haruka ni, pp. 138-139.
following dynasties, Koryó 高麗 (962-1392) and Chosŏn 朝鮮 (1392-1897). As it was pointed out by Japanese researchers in the 1970s, this over-focalization on antiquity had the effect, although unconscious, of strengthening the ideas of stagnation and dependency of the later dynasties.

However, some historians concentrated precisely on the modern and contemporary periods, from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. Tabohashi Kiyoshi 田保橋潔 (1897-1945), a historian of international relations in East Asia, appointed to the University in 1924, Professor in 1928, looked into detail at the process leading to the 1910 annexation. Nakamura Hidetaka 中村栄孝 (1902-1984), first at the historical commission and then at the University, specialized in the middle of the Chosŏn era and on Hideyoshi’s wars. Those two authors, although outdated, left their mark on research with erudite works. Tabohashi participated after March 1933 in the historical commission, and directed the sixth part of the History of Korea. In 1940 he published the monumental Kindai NisSen kankei no kenkyū 近代日鮮関係の研究 (A study of Japanese-Korean relations during the modern period), then in 1944 the first history, focused on institutions of Japanese colonization in Korea. Tabohashi, just as Fujita, is a bridge and a link to post-colonial research, as are Jacques Berque in France or Jean Jengers in Belgium. Drawing an absolute cut-off point here would be difficult.

Finally, in addition to Pak Un-sik (mentioned above), an overview of historical studies in colonial Korea of the 1920s and 1930s would be most incomplete without mentioning the works published by Korean historians which can only be mentioned here, inside or outside of colonial institutions. Their position was somewhat ambiguous: occasionally insiders, occasionally outsiders, sometimes “against” like Sin Ch’ae-ho 申采浩 (1880-1936) who died in prison in 1936, sometimes “rallied” to colonialism like Ch’oe Namsŏn, to name two famous examples. It seems impossible (except in the

54 Nishikawa H., “Nihon teikokushugi”.
55 Seconded to the historical commission in 1927, Imanishi received a definite position at the University in 1937, and became chair of History in 1945. He got a position at Nagoya University in 1948.
56 Tabohashi Kiyoshi 田保橋潔, Kindai NisSen kankei no kenkyū 近代日鮮関係の研究 (A study of Japanese-Korean relations during the modern period), Chōsŏn Sōtoku Chūsūn, Seoul 1940, re-edited in 1964 and in 1973; Id., Chōsŏn tōchishi ronkō 朝鮮統史論稿 (On the history of Japanese rule in Korea), Chōsŏn Sōtoku Chūsūn, Seoul 1944.
case of members of the resistance like Pak) to make a clear distinction between a “Japanese” and a “Korean” group of researchers, even though, naturally, those two groups are not identical. Ch’oe Namsŏn 崔南善 (1890-1957), one of the inevitable Korean historians of that time, wrote in response to colonization, and elaborated, around 1927, the idea of an immense cultural sphere around Korea, Pulham 博 함. The case of Ch’oe is emblematic: after having taken part in the resistance in its broadest sense, he entered the historical commission in 1928, wrote in Japanese and became a professor at the University Kenkoku (Kenkoku Daigaku 建國大學) in Manchukuo in 1939. In 1949, he appeared in front of the Tribunal for anti-national crimes, where he was acquitted. Although Ch’oe achieved some importance during the 1950s, Sin Ch’ae-ho, however, who explained the history of Korea by following a dichotomy between dependence (sadae 事大, which he also called sadae-ju-ui 事大主義) and independence (chuch’e 主體), had much more impact on current Korean historiography.

In conclusion: the history of colonization after independence

Between 1905 and 1945, Japanese humanities in the colonial context in Japanese Korea experienced at least two “Schools” and several distinct periods regarding their work and the questions they addressed. This is the same case for protohistory and antiquity, as well as for the analysis of the contemporary period, in which geopolitical discourses coexisted with annexationist discourses—especially in the beginning of colonization. The difference between researchers in Korea and in mainland Japan cannot, however, be explained merely by the institutions present in the colony. As noted above, these very institutions saw both networks coexist.

Once Japan was defeated in World War II, its colonial empire was dismantled by the United States and the USSR between 1945 and 1949. After decolonization, the study of Korea and the study of colonization—which were superimposed through colonial knowledges—became autonomous. They nonetheless retained a close relationship: it were the specialists of Korean history that laid the foundations of the historiography of Japanese colonization in Korea, supported by economic historians.

Separate historical research on colonization was developed beginning in the mid 1960s, which gave rise to an inventory as early as the 1980s.58 First, 58 Arnaud Nanta, “Le Japon face à son passé colonial”, in O. Dard and D. Lefeuvre (eds.), L’Europe face, pp. 129-146. See for example: Ramon Myers, “Post World War II Japanese Historiography of Japan’s Formal Empire”, in R.H. Myers and M.R. Peattie (eds.), The Japanese colonial empire, pp. 465-477; Kobayashi Hideo 小林英夫, “Senkanki no higashi...
the research was about Korea and Manchuria, after a novelistic literature, many memoirs and notes by repatriates, and of hagiographical but well-documented reports published by the State between 1947 and 1949. These works, specifically those on Korea, can be explained by the number of Japanese specialists that had been trained during the colonial period. Although this new historiography developed against the colonial fact, it is no less situated in continuity with the old historiography. Moreover, as in the case of France towards Algeria, some of these first researchers started studying Korea because they were born there. The historian Hatada Takashi (1908-1994), who was the first historian to study the Japanese outlook on Korea, participated on this theme to the Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai (Japanese Society of Korean History), founded in 1959. Since its inception, this society devoted a substantial place to colonization in its bulletins and meetings.

Yamabe Kentarō 山辺健太郎 (1905-1977), militant writer, published in 1966 Nikkan heigō shōshi 日韓併合小史 (A Short History of the annexation of Korea by Japan), followed in 1971 by Nihon tōchika no Chōsen 日本統治下の朝鮮 (Korea under Japanese rule). At the same time, in 1968, Inoue Kiyoshi 井上清, historian of the war and imperial system, published Nihon teikokushugi no keisei 日本帝国主義の形成 (The formation of Japanese imperialism), which included the colonial question. Twenty years later, the historiography of colonization already constituted a massive corpus. In 1984, this caused one of its historians, Kobayashi Hideo


Pai Hyung-il noted the importance of Hatada in his review Constructing “Korean” Origins, p. 425, note 22.

Publications in Japanese on the history of Korea are very numerous: the bulletin counted around a hundred books and a thousand scientific papers a year on Korean history during the 1970s.


小林英夫, to propose a second inventory. Large-scale syntheses would be created at the beginning of the 1990s. Historians then turned to new issues (colonial modernity, long-scale movement of imperialisms, imperial circulations), while maintaining an open debate with their Korean colleagues via a very active translation process between the two countries.

What remains today in this post-colonial historiography (in the temporal sense) of the Koreanist historiography of the colonial period? Certainly the erudite scholarly work and the bibliographical censuses that were undertaken at the time. Thus, even today we find, although cited critically, many of the authors that have been presented here. This includes Korea, where it is necessary to question the role of these colonial human sciences in the construction of Korean historiography concerning all periods. Perhaps, there may also be a link between the weight of those colonial works at the time, and that of the criticism of these works in modern South Korea. But rather than a simple “continuity” (or “rupture”) between pre-1945 and post-1965, the recognition of this pervasiveness serves as reminder that research works cumulatively, and that erudite, large-scale works based on a thorough knowledge of primary documents survive longer than literary history, which gets forgotten with time.

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65 Ōe S. (ed.), Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi, evoked between others urbanization, the culture of empire and industrialization.
66 Notably, Hatada was translated into Korean in 1987, in the first issue of the journal Han’guk-sa simin kangjwa, already mentioned, founded by famous historian Yi Ki-baek 李基白 (1924-2004).
67 See for example the introduction to Moriyama Shigenori 森山茂徳, NikKan heigō 日韓併合 (Japan’s annexation of Korea), Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, Tōkyō 1992, or L. Babicz, Le Japon face à la Corée.
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Yasuda Toshiaki, Shokuminchi no naka no “kokugogaku” (The “national language” in colonial context), Sangensha, Tōkyō 1998.

Yi Sunja, Ilche kangjŏm-gi kojŏk chosa saóp yŏn’gu (The empire of Japan’s research on ancient sites during the occupation period), Kyŏng’in Munhwa-sa, Seoul 2009.
The first course in archaeology was created at the Imperial University of Kyōto in 1917. However, Japanese archaeology, and conception of times “before history”, came to its first scientific maturity a bit later, by the 1920-1930s. This implies that before this point, there was no real methodological inscription, no real unity in a disciplinary matter of speaking. Nevertheless, towards the end of the nineteenth century archaeologists did exist in Japan, however they defined themselves as anthropologists more than archaeologists, and their methodological approaches varied greatly from one person to another. Those archaeologists worked on a very narrow set of epochs, which can be roughly chronologically summarised in studies on the imperial institution and the times before the imperial institution. This way of grasping the past was not so different than from what it came to be during the Edo period, from the seventeenth century on.

We shall see that before archaeology became an admitted investigatory field, it was more of a reformulation in a new language—the scientific language—of ancient conceptions in the past. In the same way, the idea of “prehistory” was not yet clearly defined. In the present contribution, we would like to emphasize some important events in the construction and evolution of Japan, of the idea of times before textual memory. This travel into historical consciousness, which never ends, “originated” during the Edo period, and continued to evolve into new forms and meanings up until the present time.

**Rediscovering ancient Japan and discovering prehistory in Edo period (XVII-XX century)**

Both “ancient Japan” and “prehistory” are, of course, terminological anachronisms when considering the Edo period, just as it would also be for
“middle age Japan” or “pre-modern Japan”. The point, here, is to see if one can perceive, in the common conception of times during Edo, other ways of rendering the past, including moments going back beyond the memory and records of mankind.

Edo period, in its new way of thinking political legitimacy, tended to retrocede to the ancient Japan of Heian—jōdai 代 literally the high epoch—a high value, notably as the former bearer of Chinese Confucianism orthodoxy. This increased importance of Confucianism in the making of the ideology of the Edo period’s political elite, created the conditions necessary for the emergence of a mind that was willing to scrutinize the distant past and hold the past in great esteem. The aptitude for keeping records and tracks of the former rulers was considered a decisive condition in order to guarantee the legitimacy of the regime, then in the shape of the Tokugawa clan’s shogunate. Altogether with the rediscovery of classical texts of the ancient capitals, this interest quickly grew into a very large and diffused preoccupation regarding “anything ancient”.

Prehistory (whatever it is called), be it in Europe or in Japan, is at first an apparition of elements that do not fit with known times. The “high epoch”, and the figure of the tennō (the so called “emperor”), became the chronological and cultural gradient of the beginnings of times, very likely the deluge in Europe. With this background, an encounter with artefacts still older than the oldest textual memory of ancient Japan was just a matter of time. This happened in 1623 with the discovery in Kamegaoka in the north of Honshū, of potteries which were clearly “out of this world”, irrelative to the historical and cultural continuum from ancient capitals of the eighth-eleventh centuries through pre-modern times. This pottery, then called “pottery of Kamegaoka”, began what is now well known as “Jōmon pottery”. A hundred years later, it was the turn of the first obsidian tools to

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1 The terminological background of the chronology used nowadays in Japan is constructed between the beginning of Meiji era and the first quarter of the twentieth century.
2 Kojiki 古事記 (Record of ancient matters), Nihonshoki 日本書紀 (Chronicles of Japan), both from the eight century, but also the Shoku nihongi 続日本紀 (Continuation of the Chronicles of Japan), are among the official chronicles that retain special attention to Edo’s scholars. On the tracks of ancient chronicles, with the will to renew ancient practices (Edo will be the time of a vast rehabilitation of ancient practices and rites regarding the political economy), a project of a new history of Japan will be launched, for the first time in centuries since the end of the ancient period (twelfth century), by Tokugawa Mitsukuni 徳川光圀, in 1762: the Dai Nihonshi 大日本史 (History of Great Japan). This project in itself shows this renewed preoccupation concerning the past.
4 An entry in the Eiroku nikki 永祿日記 (a chronicle from the powerful governing family of the province of Mutsu, the Namioka-Kitabatakeshi 浪岡北畠氏, in the north of Honshū), in 1623, is the first source clearly mentioning Kamegaoka and its pottery.
be identified. These artefacts, which were not related to anything known up until then, were considered valuable antiquities of the times before the tennō, as remains of the so-called jindai 神代 (age of gods) of ancient chronicles. Hence, Japan had its “antediluvian times”, and one could consider that “prehistory” did exist in the Edo mind and it was apprehended as an age of gods, the age before the beginnings of history, before the first “emperors” of early Japan (Yamato).

During the eighteenth an nineteenth centuries, the burial mounds supposedly related to the ancient political elite, according to classical records, and the tennō were also part of this broad interest in the past. They turned out to be considered the oldest steps leading to the oldest times of the high epoch: before there was the age of gods (jindai 神代), then came the age of the tennō and Yamato. In the progressive recovery of legitimacy of the ancient culture, those tombs even became, in the last years of the 1850s and the 1860s, the sacralised symbols of the political power itself, and remained so after the Meiji restoration. The work of intellectuals on pre-modern Japan contributed to a situation where ancient times and their concrete remains were associated with the imperial institution. With Meiji period, this cleavage between ancient times and the age of gods evolved in a Japanese versus pre-Japanese split. This was relayed by the modern intellectual class, using the same logic, but with the brand new terminology of the time: the terminology of nation-state building.

Pre-scientific archaeology in the modern period: Japanese, pre-Japanese and proto-Japanese, all based on pottery

During the Edo period, pottery constituted a key element in the opening of the gates to the times before recorded history. It remained so, with an increased complexity of its interpretation with the rise of the Japanese nation-state during the Meiji era (1868-1912).

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5 Referred to as jindai seki 神代石 (stones from the age of gods) or raifu 雷斧 (likely, in Europe, the “thunderstone axe”, “pierre de foudre”; literally in Japanese “lightning stone axe”). Actually, first references to lithic artefacts, raifu, are from 1686 and the Kokon hyakumonogatari hyōban 古今百物語評判 (a collection of ghost stories in 4 volumes). However, it is in the 1773 writings of Kinouchi Sekitei 木内石亭 (1725-1808), in his Unkonshi 雲根志 (a collection, in 3 volumes, of various antiquities ranging very wildly chronologically, published between 1773 and 1801), that one can perceive the first main classification attempt (prior attempts existed nonetheless from the middle of the eighteenth century).

6 Prehistory holds nowadays in Europe quite a strict disciplinary inscription, but it was not so for a long period (until late nineteenth century), when “antediluvian times” or “antediluvian antiquities” were used prior to, then, time passing, equally to “prehistory”.
With Meiji, Edo scholars changed their language and became anthropologists and historians. European scholars, mastering excavation techniques of the time, were responsible for the first “archaeological campaigns” in Japan. However, measuring their real impact is not as easy as the Japanese post-war archaeology claimed it to be. From the Edo period scholars to modern human sciences, the change was, at first, more a matter of language, terminological reformulation rather than method, and the approach regarding the past remained the same: pottery was a vector to distant times, times before the tennō, thus times before the Japanese. The difference between Edo and Meiji is rather epistemological than structural, and actually relied on the same kind of cleavage. However, observation techniques did change and therefore allowed for an understanding of the concept of layers of time “before history”. On the contrary and in the meantime, sacralisation and institutionalisation of the new imperial figure tended to fossilize what was possibly debatable and questioned during Edo: the times nearing the formation of the imperial institution in ancient times. Consequently, what is now defined as the burial mounds of the end of protohistory, the kofun, became almost unreachable for the scholars of Meiji. This continues until the end of the Pacific War, as they were supposed to be the tombs of the early beginnings of ancient Japan history. The only field of study in which it was possible to deploy an archaeological reflexion in Japan became the times neatly before history. This was the case because they were before the imperial institution and before the Japanese, hence not subversive in regards to the reformulation in modern terms of the ancient chronology. This ancient chronology, claiming an uninterrupted imperial dynasty from 660 B.C. through present time, will be the official chronology of the history of Japan and the Japanese until, here again, the end of the Pacific War. In this context, let us say that prehistory, the history of times well before the existence of Japan, was kind of a “safe” area in order to freely deploy an analytic and discursive approach of the past. Which leads us, as an example, to the role of the pottery in that matter.

Since 1622, the Japanese were progressively more aware of the existence of a “pre-human culture” (related to the “age of gods”), which, in Meiji, will get the meaning of “pre-Japanese” culture in the new scientific language.

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7 The excavation on the shell mound of Ōmori, near Yokohama, held by the American naturalist Edward Sylvester Morse in 1877, is often presented by Japanese archaeologists of the post war era as the first real archaeological excavation of Japan. However, it is difficult to track down the real influence of this event on the formation of Japanese archaeology, a formation that tends to follow its own pace through the 1930s.

8 L. Nespoulous, “Des Empereurs et des tombes”.

This was mainly due to the pottery of Kamegaoka. In 1877, the United States’ citizen Edward Morse conducted excavations at the shell mound of Ōmori, near Yokohama, and found, among other things, a pottery that he called “cord-marked pottery”. This will be literally translated into Japanese and become Jōmon 縄文, in place of the appellation of Kamegaoka pottery. The first real archaeological campaign conducted by Japanese scholars does not start before the 1880s.  

So, let’s say that the first “archaeological culture” of Japan, in its historiography, is represented by the Jōmon pottery, and is considered to be the culture of former inhabitants of the archipelago before the rise of Japan and the Japanese. This is why anthropologists in the north will link it to what was left of the ainu culture. A “poor” material culture—compared back then to the ancient culture of the capitals—of times before history, of the former inhabitants of Japan, linked to the very poor situation of the ainu of Hokkaidō in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Japanese anthropology had its “inner alterity” to study, in history as well as in actuality, in the shape of the Jōmon and ainu, apprehended in an evolutionary way of thinking cultural decadence.

The situation became more complex when other pottery was found in the quarter of Yayoi, in Tōkyō, in 1884. It was then interpreted as a sort of Jōmon pottery, but in 1896, further analysis of these artefacts revealed that they belonged to a “higher level” of production technology, thus a different culture than the Jōmon culture. This is how the Yayoi pottery quickly became the Yayoi pottery culture between “prehistory” and “history”. As a more technologically advanced culture, Yayoi will be qualified as the furnace of the Japanese people and culture, and will be apprehended as a “proto-Japanese” level, very different from the pre-Japanese/non-Japanese level of a “backward Jōmon culture”. As a matter of discourse back then, Japanese people had their ancestor anchored to a higher level of culture than

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10 However, actual field investigations did exist before, without any disciplinary inscription. The most famous (and the closest to an archaeological excavation) example is the attempt to determine the name of the first ancient governor of Nasu province, leading to serious investigations on the burial mounds of Kurumazuka (in the hope of the discovery of a funerary tablet) in Mito, and ordered by Tokugawa Mitsukuni in 1692.

11 It will be necessary to wait for the 1980s for the Jōmon period to get a more flattering image. With the discovery of settlement sites in the north, speaking in favour of higher degree of complexity, and not the “poor and primitive culture” it was long considered to be in the first half of the twentieth century.

12 Makita Sōjirō 萩田鎗次郎, “Yayoishiki doki hakken ni tsuite kaizuka doki ni nite usude no mono” 弥生式土器発見ニ付テ貝塚土器ニ似テ薄手ノモノ (Thin objects similar to shell mound earthenware in the discovery of Yayoi-style earthenware), Tōkyō jinrui gakkai zasshi 東京人類学會雑誌 (Tōkyō Anthropological Society Journal), vol. 11, n. 122, 1896.

the supposed ancestors of the barbarians of the north, the *ainu* people, descending from the Jōmon culture.

This is how archaeology proceeds in Japan until the 1920s; having no investigation protocol, no real method of analysis compared to what it was about to become, and constituting a convenient way to grab extremely old data and constructing a sort of theoretical discourse formulated in a scientific language, but not based on grounds other than those of the academic authority of the scholars. This is going to “quickly change” with the foundation of the first School of Archaeology at Kyōto Imperial University, in 1917.  

**Birth of Japanese archaeology: the sound of silence**

The School of Formation in Archaeology emerged as a new exigency, urging for a methodological inscription in order to give archaeology its scientific status. It is done with the introduction of the typo-chronological approach in the early 1920s. Archaeology then became what it tended to be in Europe: a way to grasp distant times and to give them back their chronological perspective on scientific grounds. Archaeology, basically, is a science of observation which tends to construct chronologies based on the analysis of evolutionary characters of archaeological artefacts. This is how archaeology as a discipline started out in Europe, and how it equally began in Japan. This implies mastering some of the classification tools that were not so familiar to the theorists of Meiji.

With the use of the typo-chronological approach, Japanese scholars were able to build the chronology of Japanese prehistory and protohistory. The problem then, is that an official chronology, which can not be publicly criticised nor changed too harshly by scholars, already exists. It touches the integrity of the imperial figure, which is sacralised. The main chronological frame must remain untouched, and all attempts to revise it may fall under anti “lese-majesty” measures. Ironically, escaping from this yoke heads towards the newly acquired colonial field of Korea. Umehara Sueji, one of the main figures at the Imperial University of Kyōto in the 1930s, returning from a period of survey (the 1920s) on the peninsula, expressed this reality. He mentions that Korea, not submitting to the same regulation enforced in the archipelago, allows excavations on burial mounds, something that would not be tolerated, for ideological reasons, on the *kofun* of mainland Japan. The proximity of Korea (there are actual *kofun* in the south parts of the

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14 Many social and human sciences, such as sociology, reach their maturity nearly at the same period. Hamada Kōsaku is at the origin of the School of Archaeology of Kyōto, and will pioneer the typo-chronological method in Japan and on colonial fields such as Korea.
MEMORIES FROM BEYOND THE PAST

peninsula), from an archaeological point of view, tended to stimulate the curiosity of Japanese archaeologists.¹⁵

So, the new maturity of inland Japanese archaeology encouraged it to remain silent on the very matter it specialised on: the chronology surrounding the state formation during ancient times and the chronology of times surrounding the rise of the sacred figure of the tennō. The official chronology being based on classical texts, its scientific validity concerning the oldest steps of Japanese history is rather reduced, except when looking for the invention of tradition. This ideological background of Japan implies that archaeologists may be at work, and in fact, they are, but they won’t be able to talk so much about their results until a change of regime, a change that will take place after 1945 and the defeat of imperial Japan.

Post-imperial Japan and the choices of archaeology

Before the 1920s, archaeology in mainland Japan was a convenient way to build theories on the alterity or on the origins of the elite. We often designated this background as “imperial”, but “monarchist” would fit it best, as imperialism is actually another side of the regime in itself: an imperialist monarchy. As it remained discreet, archaeology and anthropology (closely entangled from the very beginning of Meiji) never really constituted a menace to the monarchist historical orthodoxy. In fact, in the first two decades of the twentieth century (before its disciplinary maturity), it tended to help when it came to emphasizing the common “origins” between Koreans and Japanese.¹⁶ After the 1920s, it became impossible, from a scientific point of view, to demonstrate the validity of the official, “tennō-centred” position on the origins of Japan and its chronology, and so, the archaeologists were confined in the theoretical role which existed before, or worked in silence waiting for better times to come.

¹⁵ In the 1920s and 1930s, for the archaeologists of the Kyōto University, Korea was an extension of mainland Japan, but freed from the blocking characters of the imperial paradigm. As such, one can note that Korea is not a “colonial archaeological field” as it is actually the place where Japanese archaeology can be itself. Umehara Sueji 梅原末治, “Jōdai kofun no kenkyū ni tsuite” 上代古墳の研究に就いて (On the ancient burial mounds [kofun] of the ancient time), in Tōkyō Jinrui gakkai 東京人類學會, Nihon minzoku 日本民族 (The Japanese People), Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1935.

After the war, the official chronology will remain intact, but will no longer be imposed on scholars. And as soon as the 1950s, archaeologists published the first works on protohistory on the grounds of solid data.

The Kofun period does not claim to be considered strictly as a part of imperial history, but as part of protohistory. The Yayoi period, long before the formation of the ancient Japan, is considered the matrix of Japanese culture, defined not by the existence of the tennō, but by the rise of rice growing. Archaeology, by setting new chronology, provided really new perspectives of the origins of Japan and the Japanese, very different than what had been claimed under the imperial paradigm.

Before the war, there was very little place to deploy a scientific discourse on the origins of the Japanese as a people. The people, “subject” of a sovereign, did not really matter in terms of cultural identity in the pre-war paradigm. After the war, Japan will follow new tracks in the narration of identity. Archaeology will also be caught up in this new nation building, and will participate in the process of giving a new self-identity to the people, in which the tennō does not play the central role anymore. In this new narrative, archaeology proves very efficient: with very concrete evidence, it disrupts the official chronology and gives a past to the Japanese as a people. Archaeology becomes an efficient provider of “Japanese insularity”, in absence of the figure of the tennō or other elites. Archaeology, in post-war Japan, specialised in societies' material culture. The role of protohistory is thus very important, as the idea of Yayoi being the real matrix of Japan, before the imperial construction of ancient times becomes a mainstream idea.

The claim could be summarized this way: there is a history of the people before the state formation of the ancient times, ancient times which are too related to the imperial institution. Up until the 1980s, all the works of Japanese archaeology can be schematized this way.

Based on a now very important amount of data collected during decades in the long forbidden burial mounds of old, the next step is, by the end of the 1970s, the emergence of new discourses aiming at the origin of political power, then, by the end of the 1980s, the state itself. Then, while post war archaeology emphasized the existence of a history before the tennō, now it began to claim that there was also a political history before the tennō, and even an untold state history before the emergence of the tennō. These times are the times that we are living in now: archaeology that investigates the origin of state formation long before the emergence of the ancient imperial

17 In this respect, see the works of Kondō Yoshirō 近藤義郎 (1925-2009).
18 Ōsaka University released some decisive contributions towards the shaping of this discourse, through the works of the founder of its Laboratory of Archaeology, Tsude Hiroshi 都出比呂志 (1942), from the end of the 1980s until now.
system. In a way, we could say that after helping to construct the Japanese nation’s identity, it tends to dilute the importance of antiquity and its system among a broader political and social history of the archipelago. The emergence of a broad chrono-cultural field of archaeological investigation (protohistory, ancient Japan, medieval and Edo period’s archaeology) in the decades following the war embodies this conversion to an insular/national narration of the past.

Another important step is the return of real “prehistory” at about the same time in the 1980s: protohistory involved nation building and deconstruction of the imperial state, for its proximity with historical times. But for a long time, prehistory kept its image as a discipline essentially considering either the first humans of the archipelago, or the societies of the Jōmon period. The increased field activity of the archaeologists and the enormous amount of data concerning these times before the rice growing eventually provided a new image of “respectability” to, for example, Jōmon, which became part of the narration of Japanese origins, Japanese then considered as a mixed “product” of Jōmon and Yayoi.\(^\text{19}\)

What is very clear is that if the paradigm before the war was imperial and sterilizing for archaeologists, after the war, the paradigm became “the nation” and its origins, then state formation and its origins, and archaeologists were heavily supportive and active in facing on these challenges.

**Japanese archaeology of the twenty-first century**

Since the year 2000, it is difficult to know exactly where archaeology is heading, both because we still lack sufficient distance, historically speaking, to have a grasp on its present trajectories and because recent major institutional changes will probably alter its shape in ways in which we can only try to predict. From Meiji through the end of the twentieth century, Japanese politics used to be of a very strong centralistic nature, culture was not an exception. Whether constructing an imperial model in the first half of the last century, or a more national-insular model after the war, the role of

\(^{19}\) On deeper layers of time concerning a human presence in the archipelago, the chase of “super-homo erectus”, conducting on and on extravagant discoveries (that nevertheless made it into school books, illustrating the deep hunger from the “collective mind” in grasping—even too—deeply with the insular past), ending in the unveiling, in 2000, of a multi decades fraud from the archaeologist Fujimura Shin’ichi 藤村新一, brought a great deal of discredit to paleolithic studies as a whole, even though it does not—and did not—lack many very high quality researchers and achievements.
the state was a central one in the act of redistributing chosen cultural characteristics throughout the whole country. Very early, just like in France, there were strict regulations on the cultural patrimony, culminating in 1950 with the Cultural Properties Protection Law. Consequently, with the cultural matter tending to become more and more connected to the people, a higher degree of institutionalization in the matter of excavating, and the presentation of archaeological research results to the public was achieved by and under strict direction of the Cultural Agency. At the very beginning of the twenty-first century, changes in governance paradigm planned a reduction in the scale of the Japanese state and started a vast decentralization program of, until then, numerous state prerogatives. Among them was the management of cultural patrimony. Cultural politics always had a firm regional basis in the past, but depended on the directives of the Cultural Agency. By the end of the 1990s and the onset of 2000s, this regional anchorage tended to have more and more “autonomy”. This meant that the regional cultural related institutions now had to fund themselves, and that the regional authority gained vast power of decision on the cultural matter (not only education but also protection of cultural properties). The Cultural Agency’s role evolved into a more “consulting” one, losing power in cultural protection enforcement. Hence, let us say that archaeology and its visibility seems to be characterized now by a change in scale: from the nation to the region, following new restrictions in its institutional organisation due to the desertion of the state from cultural politics. What about the foreseeable consequences? This is really not an easy matter to stretch.

First, the financial burden of cultural politics that was transferred to the regional, departmental scale will probably create unbalanced relations between regions of different wealth. The “retirement” of the state from part of its redistribution role will have, does have, an impact on how a locality is able to protect and how it can take advantage of its cultural patrimony.

Second, Japan is a country of strong and ancient regionalism, which disparity—“freed” from a unifying discourse—may very well go further now on. Of course, beyond—and before—economics, these differences have implications in identity building. For now, there is still a strong inertia in the trajectory of the collective mind. People who deal with regional identity and the new regionalized functioning of the country were raised in the pre-2000s context. The potential issue relies on the way that the upcoming generations will grasp their cultural identity, in a context where the scale will be more and more regional and narrower. Tuning down the national scale, tuning up regional/local scale, is a phenomenon strongly related to the present globalization which tends to connect many places in the world, but in the meantime tends to isolate them as well as the fact that the global framework is not in itself as protective as the classical national entity. However, in the
case of Japan, regarding identity, regionalization has a particularity we can’t find in western continental Europe: the nation building “software” is still very active, except it tends to re-localize in the regional frame. Kyūshū is the land of Yayoi, the north-east of Japan is the land of Jōmon: resurrection of the past in discourses on the origins of the Japanese are getting more and more related to preoccupations on regional origins and heritages, and are no longer automatically the grounds for constructing an insular identity at large, but rather a mosaic.

Final words

It is an understatement that there is no great coherence within a panorama spanning from the eighteenth to the twenty-first century. However, it does allow us to grasp how the relationship between times before history emerged then evolved.

The Edo period was a time of diffused curiosity among intellectuals towards the past, mainly for philosophical reasons. It permitted the past to be “present” in the discourses, as well as making it possible to grasp the idea of times before written records. The figure of the tennō greatly benefited from this new intellectual frame as it became one of the elements “unearthed” by the Edo mind. Together with very ancient artefacts, it renewed the start of the history of Japan, which also enabled the grasping of times before this history; pre-tennō and tennō times, held for prehistory and history.

With Meiji era and the construction of a monarchy based on—and dearly protecting—this cleavage, came the project of a national unification (conscription, education, language). In the construction of “the Japanese”, archaeology and anthropology made a link between pre-tennō/tennō and a pre-Japanese/Japanese cleavage. The national construction of Japan, at first, was not necessarily of the imperialist nature and insisted on the centrality of the tennō as the main reference for grasping time and Japan. With the success of Japan in the first wars against foreign powers (China in 1894-1895, Russia in 1904-1905) and the upcoming colonial expansion, identity tends to be formulated, for half a century, according to an imperial paradigm. This identity englobed the whole empire and was defined by the subjection to the tennō. In this paradigm, archaeology in itself had a very weak influence on identity, literally speaking. Of greater importance, was its ability to “validate” the legendary nature of the most ancient part of the chronology.

The year 1945 marks a radical shift in the narration of History, as the matter of origins of Japan and the Japanese became central. Western Europe and Japan were both involved in the construction of a new identity
framework. However, where in western Europe France and Germany tended to the deconstruction of national rhetoric and national identity, Japan, on the contrary, aimed at a the construction of a national narrative. Clashes of nationalism of all kinds led Europe to its ruin over more than half a century; imperialist monarchy led Japan to its ruin. In Japan, constructing a new model based on the people and not on the monarchy and its symbolic framework, then setting this new national identity strictly inside the limits of insularity after losing the empire, was probably a “logical” way of “embracing defeat”, hence the birth and the success of a “national archaeology” in Japan. Concerning “origins” of both Japanese culture and people, national archaeology gave the collective mind greater perspective on itself, deeper and broader “roots” in time and nature than those of the tennō’s legend and origins. The same applied to the birth of political power when setting it way before classical Japan.

Did the evolution begin from the rise of a monarchy and the setting of an empire, then to the construction of an insular nation and, finally, to the generation of regional identities? Archaeology plays the score of its context. For half a century it brought to the public the coordinates in time and space it demanded. Will the lack of a strong conductor at a national level lead to a more fragmented identity in Japan? This is not yet history, and there stops the panorama.

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RECENT TRENDS IN CHINESE HISTORIOGRAPHY
AND THE DEBATE ON THE 1911 REVOLUTION

Guido Samarani

Premise

The 2011-2012 biennium is particularly relevant with regards to the historical memory of China: we commemorate the centenary of the Revolution of 1911—which put an end to the Qing Dynasty and the existence of the ancient Chinese imperial system—and the birth of the Republic of China, the fruit of the revolutionary process but also of those elements of randomness that often recur throughout the history of mankind.

At the time this present work takes form and definition (late 2011), many international conferences, debates and discussions have already been held in China, but others are planned for 2012. Among those already organized, we should remember those held in October (the month in which the anti-Manchu revolution broke out) in the city of Wuhan (where the fire of the revolution originated) and Nanjing (where the first provisional republican government was located before the capital of the new republic was moved to Beijing, in the north).

The conferences and debates over the 1911-1912 centenary occur in a general context characterized by a steady growth of Chinese historiography. This reflects a process that took shape in the 1980s and that over the past two decades has seen enormous progress, even though certain themes and areas of research still remain insufficiently developed.

This contribution proposes, in the first part, to highlight certain recent trends in historiographical thinking in China on the periodization of Chinese history and, in the second part, to more specifically shine light on the new analyses that emerged during the recent debate on the Revolution of 1911 and on the birth of the Republic of China.1

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1 For a general, important overview on Chinese history and historiography (and more broadly on Asia), see the section “Themes in Asian History” in Ainslie T. Embree and Carol Gluck
Modern history, contemporary history, republican history: some general considerations

In Chinese historiography, the periodization of national history tends to identify a “modern” period, which marks the division between the “ancient” that precedes it and the “contemporary” period that follows it. Ancient history is defined as a discipline that studies the period of feudal society and the one prior to that (and therefore, according to the Marxist approach, the primitive and slaver phases of society). The modern period covers semi-colonial and semi-feudal society (1840-1949) and lastly, contemporary history is decidedly interwoven with the phase of socialism and marked by the foundation and development of the People’s Republic of China (1949 to date). So, the beginning of modern history in China takes place towards the mid-nineteenth century, in close correlation with the beginning of Western penetration (especially English) marked by the first Opium War. Within the “modern” period we place the “Republican” phase, which covers the period from 1912, the year of birth of the Republic of China, to 1949, the year of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China.

In recent years, the question of the relationship and the “border line” between modern and contemporary history has been one of the main focuses of historiographical debate in China. A broad convergence on two aspects has emerged: the first, that the modern period is essentially confined, albeit with its own stages and phases, within the historical framework represented by the experience of semi-feudal and semi-colonial society; the second, that the year 1949—and thus the birth of the People’s Republic of China and the initiation of the socialist experience—is the key moment in the passage from the modern phase to the contemporary, effectively focusing on elements of discontinuity, strongly present, and marginalising those—undeniable—of continuity between pre-1949 and post 1949.2

In the numerous papers published in leading Chinese academic and historical journals, and in the course of many organised national and international conferences, another of the main issues raised and debated was over of how much weight to attribute to the revolutionary process and how much to the modernization trends within the period 1840-1949. Emphasis on the first argument has been challenged in part in recent decades, asserting a need to address the “paradigm of modernisation” in a new way; in some

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2 See the symposium organized in 2007 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in www.cish.org (hereafter CASS 2007).
cases there have even been proposals to substitute the “revolution paradigm” with that of “modernisation”. Although these latest views appear to be on the fringe, there is no doubt that the notion is firmly established in the Chinese historiographical concept (or at least a major part of it) according to the way in which the process of modernisation may have, to some extent, accounted for actual trends within the semi-feudal and semi-colonial period as well.

In his turn, Wang Hui, a brilliant exponent of the anti-conformist Chinese intelligentsia, highlighted how the socialist experience in China under Mao Zedong can, at the same time, be defined as “an ideology of modernization and a critique of Euro-American capitalist modernization”. In his view, however, such an ideology is rooted in the history of the development of modern Chinese thought since the eighteenth-nineteenth century: i.e. that it was “more specifically due to the fact that the discourse on the Chinese driven towards modernity was born in the historical context of the imperialist expansion”. Therefore, “those intellectuals and State officials who promoted the modernisation of China had to necessarily think about how it was possible for Chinese modernisation to avoid the multiple abuses that characterised Western capitalist modernity”.3

The position of Chinese historians in general (even if it is not without its internal differentiations) seems very clear regarding the importance of 1949 as the watershed between “modernity” and “contemporaneity”. It particularly emphasises the specificity of the history of China from 1949 onwards, marked by the novelty of the building of socialism and the people’s democratic dictatorship. It also highlights how historical materialism, which, since 1949, became the compass of historiographical work, has to continue to guide historical studies in China in the future as well, even if then, there appears to be common and widespread awareness that the initiation and development of the process of reform in the last thirty years has brought about a strong ideological diversification in the country.

As it is well known, similar approaches are primarily the result of a narrative that has been developing in Chinese Marxist historiography following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China: a narrative that has set the year 1949 as the dividing line between before and after (pre-liberation and post-liberation).

In the West, and particularly in the United States, where historians have long played a dominant role in the analysis of modern and contemporary Chinese history, the idea of 1949 as a more or less rigid dividing line has raised concerns and criticism, but also agreement, even if for reasons very different from those expressed by Chinese Marxist historiography.

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From the outset of the Cold War, many American scholars, for example, were impelled to view the “rupture” of 1949 as a clear moment of separation between the “communist world” and the “free world”. Over the last few decades, however, there has been increasing tendency to leave behind such a strongly dichotomous vision of the development process of China’s twentieth century history.4

In recent years, Zhang Haipeng, one of the most authoritative Chinese historians, whose opinion is largely—although not unanimously—shared, has edited a monumental history of modern China in 10 volumes offering, broken down by volume, an articulation of the history of modern China as follows (the first volume is introductory):5

1) 1840-1864: The Beginnings of Modern China
2) 1864-1895: Early Attempts of Modernization
3) 1895-1900: The 100 Days Reforms and the Boxer Uprising
4) 1901-1912: The Establishment of the Constitution and the 1911 Revolution
5) 1912-1923: The Establishment of the Republic
6) 1924-1927: The First United Front and Nationalist Revolution
7) 1927-1937: The Civil War and National Crisis
8) 1937-1945: The War of Resistance against Japan
9) 1945-1949: The Battle for the Fate of China

According to Zhang Haipeng, the classic identification of the May Fourth Movement in 1919 as a watershed between modern and contemporary history no longer makes sense, in that “it does not correspond to a periodization based on social and economic formations as principle of distinguishing historical stages”.6

In other words, the May Fourth Movement breaks a single period that is constituted by the Chinese semi-feudal and semi-colonial phase and therefore contemporary history begins only with the end of that period and with the beginning of a completely new phase marked by the birth of socialist China.

If we look more specifically at the history of the People’s Republic of China, in the opinion of Zhang Xingxing—from the Institute of Contemporary China Studies at CASS—in the past, its specific and autonomous role has been

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largely neglected, being generally considered as “part of the modern history of China or part of the history of the Chinese Communist Party”.

This situation, Zhang underlines, means that the history of the PRC has been long absent “in the national catalogue of disciplines and majors of postgraduate training”.

On the level of periodization of the history of the PRC, essentially three proposals have emerged from the historiographical debate in recent years:

a) division into four phases, which rest substantially on what is indicated in the Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (June 1981):

- 1949-1956 (the period of largely accomplishing socialist transformation);
- 1956-1966 (the period of starting to build a socialist society in an all-round way);
- 1966-1976 (the Cultural Revolution);
- 1976-on;

b) division into three periods: 1949-1956 (the transition from New Democracy to socialism); 1957-1978 (the tortuous path of exploring the way to build the socialist society); 1987-on (the New Period of constructing socialist modernization);

c) division into two periods: 1949-1978 (the establishment of socialist system in China and the exploration of the way to build a socialist society); 1978-on (the New Period of building a socialist society with Chinese characteristics).

According to another of the most respected Chinese scholars, Yu Heping (also from the Institute of Modern History at CASS), one of the most important changes that has occurred in recent years has been the broadening of historiographical analysis from an approach heavily based on “political history” to one of historiographical specialisation, on the heavy enrichment of themes and issues, on the emergence of areas of study such as social history, intellectual history, the history of scientific and technological development, etc., that were hitherto largely nonexistent. In fact, recalls Yu, in the past one also discussed and wrote about “non-political” themes (economic history, cultural, etc.), however, these issues were always considered secondary and marginal: “They were merely regarded as minor issues that were dependant on political developments, or were simply introduced as ornaments”.

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8 Ibidem.
9 Ibidem.
12 Ibidem, p. 103.
Further, the past emphasis on political history was based on the centrality that had assumed the so-called “tides and incidents history”. 13 Yu Heping underscores that it often led to the production of a reading of history excessively centred on a few “periods” and “key incidents”, while now “historians not only conduct research on the key incidents themselves during the period, but also research the political, economic, social, and cultural situations in general during the time of the incidents”. 14

Finally, in regard to “Republican history”, it took off in China in the late 1970s and early 1980s: in particular, in 1978 the Department of Republican Chinese History in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences was established, heir of the Republican Chinese History Research Group created in 1972, which is generally considered the first official research unit in China specialising on the period. According to Wang Chaoguang, from the Institute of Modern History at CASS, 15 there are two main periods dividing the study of the republican history of China: a) the period of the Beijing Government; b) the period of the Nanjing Government, the second becoming the focus of research in recent years. Despite such important advances, there are still—in Wang’s opinion—some glaring deficiencies: amongst these, “the era of the Beijing Government, the parliamentary system, the occupied areas”, moreover, “research on the republican period is generally restricted to the activities of the ruling class”. 16

A hundred years later: historiographical notes on the recent debate on the 1911 Revolution

The 1911 Revolution represents one of the “three high tides” in the modern history of China, along with the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer Rebellion.

In the following pages I will try to offer a summary of considerations concerning recent historiographic trends emerging in China, with particular reference to the debate that has developed on the occasion of the centenary of the 1911 Revolution, on the revolutionary process and its links with the late Qing period and the birth of the Republic in 1912.

13 For instance, “high tides” like those represented by the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer Rebellion, and “incidents” like the Opium War, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Hundred Days Reform of 1898, etc.
16 Ibidem, p. 97.
A few years ago, reflecting on the historical significance of the 1911 Revolution, Peter Zarrow observed\(^\text{17}\) that Chinese Marxist Historiography traditionally regarded the 1911 Revolution as “a bourgeois phase of rebellion against a backward and feudal monarchical despotism”. With the initiation of the process of reform towards the end of the 1970s, and in particular since the early 1990s, such a narrative, however, has been largely disputed and revised, also following the maturation of new socio-political conditions in Taiwan.\(^\text{18}\) In this regard Zarrow observes:

A number of Chinese historians have even suggested that the revolution may have been a mistake from the beginning: if the new social forces of the period had not yet matured enough to carry through a revolution, then the revolution was premature and therefore a mistake.

And again: “Even more controversially, it is now claimed that the Qing’s own reform efforts were bearing fruit and would have eventually modernized the nation”.\(^\text{19}\)

Today, we can assert that many of the trends brought to light by Peter Zarrow appear to have been developed and articulated in an even broader manner, touching on many cases, issues and problems previously neglected or little considered.

In a series of recent publications,\(^\text{20}\) Zhang Xianwen—one of the most respected scholars on the history of Republican China and Director of the eponymous research centre at Nanjing University—has highlighted some key issues to a deeper understanding of the historical importance of the 1911 Revolution.

In the first place,\(^\text{21}\) the Revolution of 1911 laid the foundation for the construction of “a modern independent State, free, democratic, united and prosperous”; which was considered a “national and democratic revolution”, which successively paved the way for a period marked by the “social revolution” and the “struggle between new and old, progress and conservatism”. According to Zhang, “the Revolution of 1911 was fully successful, having reached its two principal objectives: to overthrow the Qing Dynasty and the dominant despotism, and build a democratic, republican system”.\(^\text{22}\)


\(^{18}\) We refer here to the birth and growth, during the last decades, of a “civil society” in Taiwan, which laid the base for the development of a multi-party political system.

\(^{19}\) P. Zarrow, *China in War*, p. 40.

\(^{20}\) See in particular Zhang Xianwen *et al.*, *Gonghe zhaoshi* (The start of the Republic), Nanjing Daxue Chubanshe, Nanjing 2011.

\(^{21}\) References are drawn from Zhang Xianwen’s “Introduction” in *ibidem*, pp. 1-11.

\(^{22}\) *Ibidem*, p. 11.
In the aforementioned book some particular issues are raised that represent a common thread between various aspects of the historiographical debate in China over the past months, and are worth dwelling on:

a) The importance of the Provisional Government at Nanjing. Established on January 1, 1912, its role—as pointed out by Zhang Xianwen—has in the past been “underrated or denied” by historiography. In reality, it represented “the first Democratic, republican historical experience in Asia” as well as an event of great importance for the future of China.

b) The role of Yuan Shikai within the revolutionary process and the relationship with Sun Yat-sen. In the past, the historical analysis on Yuan was totally negative, but now it has become more complex, underlining how the political action of Yuan Shikai was in a first phase—one that goes from the outbreak of the Revolution in October 1911 to his assumption of the office of provisional President of the Republic—a median in respect to the contraposition between the revolutionary and conservative forces and how, in a second phase—that which precedes the attempt at imperial restoration—he, to some extent, also acted in defence of the republican system, in particular strengthening the central authority, an essential task in that historical phase.

As for the Yuan-Sun relationship, historiographical analysis substantially tends to confirm the established image of a radical alternative between two personalities, one (Yuan) anchored to a conservative vision of politics and society, the other (Sun) aimed at reinforcing the democratic-revolutionary options.

c) Regional development of the revolutionary process. This is a subject to which increasing attention has been paid in recent years, as evidenced by more than a few papers on the situation in various provinces presented at the aforementioned International Conference in Nanjing. Of particular interest are a series of recent publications that focus on the Province of Jiangsu, a key area given the presence of the cities of Nanjing and Shanghai.

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23 Ibidem, pp. 6-7; see also chapters 6 and 7 of the same volume.
24 Ibidem, chapter 4.
25 See among others the papers presented by Ceng Bihong, Wang Hansi and Zhao Libing at the International Conference on “The Xinhai Revolution and the Nanjing Provisional Government”, held in Nanjing in October 2011 (see the Preprints of the Conference, vol. I).
26 See in particular Zhang X. et al., Gonghe zhaoshi, pp. 305-329; see also the paper presented by Li Xuezhi, in Preprints of the Conference, vol. I.
27 See Zhang X. et al., Gonghe zhaoshi, pp. 323-330; see also Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall (ed.), Datong daolu. Sun Zhongshan yanjiu (The road to the Great Harmony. Studies on Sun Yat-sen), Nanjing Chubanshe, Nanjing 2010, in particular the paper by Qian Jing, pp. 413-420.
28 See among others: Qi Longwei and Zhou Xinguo (eds.), Xinhai geming Jiangsu diqu shiliao heji (A collection of historical materials on the Xinhai Revolution in the Jiangsu area), Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, Nanjing 2011; Zhou Xinguo et al., Jiangsu Xinhai geming shi
d) The international context in which the Revolution of 1911 developed. This is an aspect still largely neglected by Chinese historiography, and on which the analysis still mainly tends to dwell on the relationship between the revolutionary process and imperialist domination, usually omitting the overall historical significance of the period marked by the effects in Asia and in the world of the Japanese victory over Czarist Russia, the Mexican Revolution of 1910, the Italo-Turkish War in Libya, amongst others.

Conclusions

Some decades ago, Chinese historiography’s contribution to the analysis and understanding of the 1911 Revolution, its significance and impact, was absolutely marginal, especially if compared to the most innovative areas of international historiography. Those were the years (the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s) in which the *Cambridge History of China*, even with the limitations and shortcomings that were later identified, dedicated two volumes to the historical transition from the nineteenth century (late Qing Empire) and the beginning of the twentieth century. In the second volume, the chapters edited by Michael Gasster and Marius Jansen brought to light, respectively, the origins of the republican revolutionary movement and the Japanese influence on the revolutionary process.\(^{29}\)

In the decades since, as Zarrow again points out, three general interpretations of the 1911 Revolution emerged within international historiography: the first, largely dominated by Taiwan, stresses that “the 1911 Revolution was a prologue to the national revolution of the 1920s” and emphasizes that “the revolution was essentially a product of revolutionary men who saw that the era of empire was over and did not believe the Manchus were fit to rule over the Chinese”; the second, the Chinese Marxist understanding of the revolution, accepted most of the story as recounted by the first interpretation but puts the events in a larger social framework: essentially, the revolution was “a bourgeois phase of rebellion against a backward and feudal monarchic despotism […] and was a progressive step toward the next phase of socialist revolution”; the third interpretation, largely dominated by Western historians, puts a strong emphasis on the role of local elites and maintains that

the revolution appears not to be a step toward making China stronger so much as part of an ongoing collapse; the revolution resulted in the further militarization of Chinese society, culminating in the warlord era between 1916 and 1927.30

Actually, we can say that all three schools have contributed, albeit in different ways, to our knowledge of the 1911 Revolution.

At the same time, we can affirm that during the last decades, and especially during the last 10-15 years, the contribution by the Chinese historians has been more and more important and we expect that such a contribution will be more and more fundamental in the future.

According to Professor Jin Chongji, another of the most authoritative scholars on the 1911 Revolution, the Wuchang uprising, which gave birth to the revolutionary process, generated tremendous echoes and was born naturally, while the reform generated by the Qing government only enhanced the expectation for change but failed to satisfy it.31

In fact—as professor Jin stresses—“historical development is a live fluid: it will break through once the timing is ripe, accelerating along the way, and bring forth new elements that were once absent”.32

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http://marxist.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history


De Giorgi Laura and Samarani Guido, La Cina e la storia. Dal tardo impero ad oggi, Carocci, Roma 2005.


30 See P. Zarrow, China in War, pp. 31-40

31 See Jin Chongji, Ershi shiji Zhongguo shi gang (An outline of twentieth-century Chinese history), Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, Beijing 2009, 4 volls. (see in particular vol. 1).


Qi Longwei and Zhou Xinguo (eds.), *Xinhai geming Jiangsu diqu shiliao heji* (A collection of historical materials on the Xinhai Revolution in the Jiangsu area), Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, Nanjing 2011.


Zhang Haipeng (ed.), *Jindai Zhongguo tongshi* (A comprehensive history of modern China), Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, Nanjing 2006-.


Zhang Xianwen et al., *Gonghe zhaoshi* (The start of the Republic), Nanjing Daxue Chubanshe, Nanjing 2011.


Zhou Xinguo et al., *Jiangsu Xinhai geming shi* (A history of the Xinhai Revolution in Jiangsu), Shehuikexueyuan Wenxian Chubanshe, Beijing 2011.
After liberation from Japanese colonialism, nationalism played an important role in legitimizing the successive authoritarian regimes that ruled over South Korea, especially during the decades dominated by Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee. The latter, in particular, was responsible for introducing the state-issued textbook system in the 1970s, a system that allowed the government to exert total control over the teaching of Korean history. These textbooks diffused highly nationalistic narratives, and contributed to the definition of Korea’s national identity as a homogenous race and unified state whose origins could be traced back to prehistory. With the democratization process beginning towards the end of the 1980s, the state monopoly faced increasing challenges. The controversies sparked by Japanese revisionist textbooks in 2000 accelerated the end of the government’s grip over national history: criticisms implanted in Japanese textbooks prompted reactions from the Japanese side, which in turn highlighted the flaws of South Korea’s own textbook system. Thereafter, various reforms gradually loosened state control over history teaching. History textbooks published in 2011 under the new government approval system marked the end of more than thirty years of state monopoly. We will examine how these textbooks handle ancient history, a contested field where Korean nationalism has to compete with Chinese nationalism, in order to assess to what extent these newly published textbooks have succeeded in overcoming the frame of national history.

As mentioned by Nishikawa Nagao, world maps are a strong visual symbol of our perception of a world centered around our country. They illustrate a globe made up of states with clearly marked boundaries, an impression reinforced by the use of different colors, suggesting that each country
represents a political entity sharing a common culture radically different than its neighbors.¹

This idea of nations as homogenous entities is particularly strong in South Korea. Korean history provides some explanation for reasoning behind this characteristic. The people that entered the peninsula in antiquity gradually merged into a single ethnicity sharing the same language. Before the partition by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1945, Korea had been, except for some brief periods, a continuously unified state since the seventh century. The political unity and the cultural homogeneity that took shape progressively over the centuries has become an important part of the Korean identity. In modern times there have been no significant ethnic minorities, nothing compared to the Ainu in Japan or the fifty-five minorities in China.

For Koreans who, at the beginning of the twentieth century, shared a common language, culture and history, but who had no nation-state of their own, nationalism, especially in its ethnic dimension, provided a powerful ideology of resistance against colonialism. A neologism for the ethnic nation, minjok 民族, a term which first appeared in Japan (minzoku), offered Korean historians a powerful tool to rewrite the past. Their histories were no longer centered on the king. The new subject of their national narratives was the minjok defined through bloodline, whose genealogy could be traced back to the single figure of Tan’gun 檀君, the progenitor of the ethnic nation. Shifting away from the royal court with a description of the nation in historical terms that made no reference to China and argues that minjok superseded state boundaries, historians like Sin Ch’aeho were instrumental in “decentering the Middle Kingdom” and providing existence to the nation even without a supporting state structure. This was a vision particularly appealing in a period when Korea was under Japanese domination.²

After the liberation, nationalism was used by both Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee to legitimize their respective regimes. Confronted with the task of national recovery, Rhee faced political cleavage and had to deal with the continuity of the colonial legacy, especially issues of Japanese collaborators in his government that were a potential threat to his legitimacy. Instead of “cleaning the elements of Japanese imperialism” (ilche chanjae ch’ongsan 日帝残滓清算), the Rhee government brought the compromised colonial elite back into power with the help of American political acquiescence, reinstating the state apparatus—bureaucracy and police—built

by the Japanese. Park, on his part, needed to legitimize his forceful seizure of power in 1961 and his extralegal exercise of authority. He substantiated his authoritarian politics with the need to enhance national security and economic development, a task he viewed as a patriotic mission. In identifying nationalism with anti-Communism, Park justified his anti-Communism on the grounds that Communists broke the long history of a unitary nation, skillfully presenting authoritarianism as the only possible alternative to Communism. 

These regimes chose to support highly nationalistic master narratives based on the premise of ethnic homogeneity, and aimed to diffuse them, among other means, through history textbooks. They were supported by nationalist historiography, which dominated the field of Korean studies and greatly contributed to define this notion of Korea’s national identity as a homogenous race and unified state whose origins could be traced back to prehistory. But with the democratization of South Korea at the end of the 1980s, this widely held notion of the formation of a pure Korean race and a Korean national consciousness with the founding of Old Chosŏn by Tan’gun has been challenged by historians who openly advocate the need to “overcome the myth of national history”.

Despite persistent claims of authenticity, Korean national identity is deeply indebted to Chinese civilization. This has of course profound implications for nationalist claims regarding originality, ideological legitimacy and territorial hegemony. The question is particularly sensitive when it comes to the origins of the first Korean states. Old Chosŏn and Koguryŏ, which remain at the core of the Korean national identity problem, developed into a region, the Northeast Asian borderlands, where the borders have been fluid and permeable. It is no wonder then that some nationalist Korean scholars have come so far as to argue that the question of the historical identity of the ancient kingdoms is far more important than contemporary territorial rights.

In this paper we will try to assess some of the results achieved by this ongoing process of overcoming the frame of national history through the analysis of recent development in the system and content of history textbooks.

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2 Im Chiyŏn 임지연 and Yi Sŏngsi 이성시 (eds.), *Kuksa ui sinhwa rul nŏmŏsŏ* 국사의 신화를 넘어서 (Overcome the myth of national history), Hyumŏnist’ŭ, Seoul 2004.
Debate over the history textbook system

During the three decades of authoritarian rule that followed the restoration of national sovereignty, successive governments exerted a more or less tight control over the content of history textbooks. In 1973, with the new Yusin Constitution that endowed the president with absolute power, Park Chung Hee decided to strengthen the teaching of national history in order to reinforce the identity of the Korean nation. He was the one who replaced the government-approval system (kŏmjŏng 檢定) by the government-compiled (state-issued system) system (kukjŏng 國定) that allowed only one textbook in the teaching of “National history” (Kuksa 國史).

Supporters of this measure argued that the content of the textbooks approved by the government at that time was almost identical and that the “nationalization” (kukjŏnghwa 國定化) or “standardization” (tan’ilhwawa 單一化) of textbooks would bring many advantages, like facilitating the reediting of their content, sparing time and paper, and enabling common evaluation for achievement tests. Opponents contended that the plurality of textbooks was necessary to guarantee the quality of teaching materials. They believed that the use of a single textbook would limit students’ understanding of history, which would eventually preclude them to exert any critical judgment on the knowledge they gained.5

With the blossoming of the pro-democracy movement during the 1980s, criticisms grew against the government-compiled textbook. It was accused of diffusing the anti-communist ideology of the government and as such, being a tool for the legitimization of the military dictatorship. The debate among supporters and opponents of this kukjŏng system took on a new meaning with the controversies sparked by Japanese history textbooks, particularly since the publication of the Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho 新しい歴史教科書 (New history textbook) in 2000, edited by a group of revisionist historians called Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho wo tsukurukai 新しい歴史教科書をつくる会 (The Japanese society for history textbook reform). This textbook, which was accused of downplaying Japanese war crimes during World War II, was approved by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) in 2001, causing a huge controversy in Japan and in neighboring countries, and prompting governments of both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) to address a list of demands for modifications.

The list of South Korea was by far the most impressive. It addressed thirty-five issues ranging from ancient to contemporary history. Moreover,

5 Kim Hanjong 김한종, Yŏksa kyoyuk kwajŏng kwa kyogwasŏ yŏngu 역사교육과정과 교과서연구 (Process of history teaching and textbook studies), Sŏn’in, Seoul 2005, pp. 41-43.
South Korea did not limit its complaints to the *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*: it also thoroughly examined and criticized all seven other middle school textbooks. By comparison, China addressed only eight issues limited to the “New history textbook”, lodging absolutely no complaint about the other textbooks. Unlike its Chinese counterpart, whose concern seemed to focus on revisionist attempts by Japan to play down its responsibility for its aggression during the Sino-Japanese War, South Korea’s government was seeing the revisionist *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* as the tip of the iceberg of a broader and deeper problem of history consciousness widely affecting all Japanese textbooks.

The reactions in Korea were not limited to official protests. The media but also scholars and teachers rallied to analyze and rebuff the so-called “distortions” of Japanese textbooks, leading to the publication of various studies dealing with that issue. There were even educational *manga* that were published aimed at denouncing Japanese lies and teaching children “correct” history, a strong indication of Korea’s mobilization against Japanese revisionism in the aftermath of the *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* crisis.

If the criticism from the Korean side was mainly leveled at the content of Japanese textbooks, many scholars were also prone to point out the flaws of the Japanese textbook authorization system (*kentei* 検定). The current system allows private companies to write and publish textbooks. The drafts are submitted to the Ministry of Education and go through a screening process to ensure that the content is in accordance with the educational curriculum guidelines (*gakushū shidō yōrō* 学習指導要領). During that process, companies may be asked to revise the draft in order to receive the approval of the Ministry. From a legal point of view, the government has no direct authority over the written content and its influence over the Ministry of Education is less important than what neighboring countries may believe. However, the fact that textbooks are approved by the state gives them a “quasi-official character”. It explains why some Korean scholars have not hesitated to dismiss such a system as “censorship” (*komyo* 検閲).

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8 Chang Sin 장신, “Ilbon ŭi kyogwasŏ chedo wa munjechŏm” 일본의 교과서 제도와 문제점 (Problems of the textbook system in Japan), in *Mundap ŭro inngun Ilbon kyogwasŏ yŏksa waegok* 문답으로 읽는 일본 교과서 역사왜곡 (Japanese textbooks distortion of history read as a dialogue), Yŏksa Pî’yŏngsa, Seoul 2001, p. 33.
The demand for revisions fell on deaf ears, the Japanese government arguing that it had no legal authority over the content of the textbooks. But the diplomatic protests added to the appropriation of these historical issues by Korea’s “civil society” in a country where condemnation of Japan’s perceived revisionism was exacerbated by a deep-rooted victim complex.9 This quickly prompted a counteraction from Japanese conservative scholars, especially among members of the Tsukurukai. One of their first criticism concerned South Korea’s textbook system, at that time obviously less democratic and pluralistic than its Japanese counterpart.10 In turn, the reaction of the Japanese provided ammunition for Korean opponents to the Korean state-issued textbook system. In other words, Korean criticism against Japanese textbooks also fostered introspection towards Korean textbooks; even members of the Comity for the compilation of the Kuksa pyŏnch’ an wiwŏnhoe (National history textbook), the editor of the official textbook published by Kyohaksa came to recognize the need to abandon the state-issued textbook system in order to allow more diversity in the teaching of Korean history.11

In spite of fears that the abandonment of the state-issued textbook system would be like surrendering in front of Japanese revisionism, the first signs of relaxation of the Korean governments firm grip on history textbooks appeared with the implementation of the seventh curriculum in 2003. As a consequence, textbooks for world history in middle school, and Korean modern and contemporary history in high school were published under the official approval system (kǒmjǒng). The content of these textbooks also tried to shift from a sheer political history centered on heroic figures of the nation, to a more social history centered on ordinary people. The territorial frame covered by these new textbooks also expanded beyond South Korea and included sections on North Korea or the Diaspora, categories which were overlooked by the official textbooks of “national history”.12 These changes were important signs of the efforts made in South Korea to allow the teaching of different narratives of history, but they were mainly limited to

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11 Park Chindong, “Haebanghu yŏksa kyogwasŏ parhaeng chedo ū ch’ui” 해방후 역사교과서 발행 제도의 추이 (The evolution of the history textbooks publishing system since the liberation), Yŏksa kyoyuk, n. 37, 2004, pp. 43-44.
supplementary textbooks or to modern and contemporary history. Compulsory courses of “national history” were still taught with state-issued textbooks.

A major change occurred in 2011 with the publication of new history textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. These new teaching materials were intended to replace the state-issued middle school and high school textbooks, and therefore incurred a more symbolic modification. The old *Kuksa* (National history) title gave way to more neutral titles reflecting the current tendency to tone down nationalist rhetoric, respectively *Yŏksa*13 (History) for middle school and *Hanguksa*14 (Korean history) for high school.

South Korea is joining Japan and China in discarding the state-issued textbooks and adopting government-approved textbooks system, suggesting efforts to exceed the rigid frame of national history. Therefore the question is, if such a radical move is accompanied by radical changes in the content. In order to assess that point, we will examine how current history textbooks deal with ancient history. It is during that period, with the formation of Old Chosŏn (*Kochosŏn*), that Korea’s national identity as a homogenous race and indigenous culture was supposedly forged out.

**Tan’gun**

According to the dictionary of Korean ancient and medieval history, the earliest Korean state is called Kochosŏn. The original name was Chosŏn but it was changed to Kochosŏn (Old Chosŏn) in order to avoid confusion with the Yi dynasty also known as Chosŏn dynasty.15 During the first half of the twentieth century, the period covered by Kochosŏn was commonly divided in the following “dynastic” sequence: Tan’gun Chosŏn, Kija Chosŏn and Wiman Chosŏn.

Three different founding myths are associated with Old Chosŏn. The first is about Tan’gun, the son of a union between a heavenly prince and a bear turned woman. According to the thirteenth century Korean work *Samguk yusa* 三國遺事 (Tales of the Three Kingdoms), Tan’gun established Chosŏn in 2333 B.C. He is said to have been succeeded by Kija 箕子 (c. Jizi), who

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13 Eight middle school textbooks have received the approval of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology: *Mirae kyoyuk* 미래교육, *Pisang kyoyuk* 비상교육, *Ch’ŏnjae kyoyuk* 천자영 교육, *Tusan tong’a* 두산동아.
allegedly fled to Korea during the fall of the Shang to the Zhou dynasty. Kija is mentioned in the *Shiji* 史記 (Records of the Grand Historian), but there is no clear connection with Korea since Sima Qian does not state if the place where Kija went to was *Chosŏn* or not. The third myth concerns Wiman 衛满, a military officer of the Zhou state of Yan, who is said to have fled to the northern Korean peninsula around 195 B.C. and have taken over the kingship of the state of Chosŏn from a king named Chun.

Until the 1970s, the legend of Tang’un was portrayed in South Korea as a state formation myth, but Tan’gun was then progressively transformed into a historical figure in textbooks. The elevation of Tan’gun to historical status has been accompanied by the denial of the existence of Kija as a historical individual. Wiman for his part, after being rejected as an usurper and a barbarian by “Sirhak” 實學 historians such as Yi Ik 李滉 (1681-1763), has been reinterpreted to an ancestrally ethnic “Korean”. In reality, it is very difficult to distinguish facts from fiction in the study of ancient Korean histories, especially when it comes to theories about Korean state-formation. How do Korean history textbooks approach this period of Korean state-formation? The *National history* textbook used in middle school from 2002 to 2010, reads as follows:

> With the establishment of bronze culture many tribes appeared in the Manchu region of Liaoning and in the Northwestern part of the peninsula. Tan’gun united these tribes and founded Old Chosŏn. The foundation of Old Chosŏn by Tan’gun tells us that the history of our country is very long.

The textbook provides an excerpt from the story of Tan’gun, as it appears in the *Samguk yusa*, but without specifying that it is a legend. The textbook for high school provides more or less the same account for the founding of Old Chosŏn:

> In the society of tribes, Old Chosŏn was the first to develop into a state. According to the records of the *Samguk yusa* and the *Tongguk tonggam* [東國通鑑] (15th century), [it is said that] Old Chosŏn was founded by Tan’gun wanggeom [檀君王儉] (2333 B.C.).

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16 Hanguksa t’ŭkkang p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 하국사 특강 편찬 위원회 (ed.), *Kaejŏng sinp’an Hanguksa t’ŭkkang* 개정 신판 한국사 특강 (Special lecture on Korean history), Sŏul Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’’anbu, Seoul 2008, p. 8.
17 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사 편찬 위원회 (ed.), *Chunghakkyo Kuksa* 중학교 국사 (Middle school national history), Kyohaksa, Seoul 2006, p. 18.
18 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사 편찬 위원회 (ed.), *Kodŭnhakkyo Kuksa* 고등학교 국사 (High school national history), Kyohaksa, Seoul 2006, p. 32.
In both textbooks, the line between myth and history is blurred. In the junior high school textbook, there is no mention of the term “myth” in relation to Tan’gun, whereas the high school textbook goes one step further in presenting the foundation of Old Chosŏn by Tan’gun as a historical event that took place in 2333 B.C.

What about the new textbooks? Apparently, the change from a system of state-issued textbooks to a system of government approved textbooks has not brought about much change to the content itself. The narrative of the founding of the first Korean state still mixes historical facts with fiction:

With the development of bronze culture many tribes appeared in the Manchu region of Liaoning and the North-Western part of the Korean peninsula. It is in such a social context that Old Chosŏn, the first Korean [uri nara] state was formed. According to the Samguk yusa, Old Chosŏn was a state founded by Tan’gun wanggŏm (2333 B.C.).

The narrative regarding the founding of Old Chosŏn by Tan’gun is not simply an invented story; it carries a historical signification. Through the story of the state-founding by Tan’gun, we can know that the Hwanung tribe considered itself heir of the heaven and that it unified neighboring tribes. Moreover, the fact that there were ministers of the rain, wind and clouds suggests that it was a society which attached importance to agriculture.

Some textbooks leave no doubt to why Koreans remain so attached to the date of 2333 B.C.:

In the myth of Tan’gun, it is written that Tan’gun wanggŏm founded the state of Old Chosŏn in 2333 B.C., stressing the fact that our country’s history is as long as China’s history. The fact that Tan’gun wanggŏm founded the state of Old Chosŏn and the ideal of the state founding called “Hong’ik ingan”, which means “broadly do good to men” are driving force whenever our country faces difficult times.

Tan’gun’s myth does not only contribute to define Korea’s national identity as distinctly separate from China and Japan, it also enhances Korea’s cultural prestige by endowing Koreans with a long history and allowing them to compete with their Chinese neighbors. This long history is a source of pride and also an inspiration in the face of difficulties.

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19 Kim Hyũnt’ae 김현태 et al. (ed.), Chunghakkyo Yŏksa (sang) 중학교 역사 (상) (Middle school history), Tusan Tong’a, Seoul 2011, p. 31.
20 Yang Hohwan 아호환 (ed.), Chunghakkyo Yŏksa (sang) 중학교 역사 (상) (Middle school history), Kyohaksa, Seoul 2011, p. 35.
21 Chu Chin’o 주진오 (ed.), Chunghakkyo Yŏksa (sang) 중학교 역사 (상) (Middle school history), Ch’ŏnjae Kyoyuk, Seoul 2011, p. 36.
According to the *Samguk yusa*, Old Chosŏn was founded by Tan’gun wanggŏm in 2333 B.C. Tan’gun wanggŏm was the denomination of the leaders during that period. Tan’gun means “priest” and wanggŏm means “political sovereign”. We can know through this fact that Old Chosŏn was a society where political and religious powers were united. The story of the founding of the nation by Tan’gun teaches us the nation’s founding ideal of “benefiting mankind” [hong ‘ik ingan] and shows us that our nation has a long history. So whenever our nation faces difficult times it is a driving force that brings us solidarity and pride.\(^{22}\)

High school textbooks present more or less the same picture:

According to the story of Tan’gun, Hwanung, the son of the god of heaven Hwanin leading the ministers of rain, clouds and wind and three thousand followers descended under a tree by the Holy Altar atop Mount T’aebaek and founded the City of God. He then married a bear turned woman and begot Tan’gun who founded Old Chosŏn (2333 B.C.).\(^{23}\)

The reality of the founding of Old Chosŏn can be known thanks to the story of Tan’gun. The people of Old Chosŏn lived on hills and cultivated the soil. The ruling class assumed leadership for social life such as administering agriculture and justice.\(^{24}\)

Some textbooks seem to distinguish between mythology and historical facts:

Among the patriarchal society, Old Chosŏn was the first to develop into a state. The main forces which founded Old Chosŏn were the Hwanung tribe and the Bear tribe. The two tribes united and their leader Tan’gun wanggŏm represented both religious and political authority.\(^{25}\)

The myth of Tan’gun reflects historical facts such as the union of the Hwanung tribe with the Bear totem tribe, the appearance of a political leader and the formation of classes, a society where religious and political power were united and where agriculture was valued.\(^{26}\)

Thus, the narratives of textbooks provide contradictory information about

\(^{22}\) Chŏng Chaejŏng 정재정 (ed.), *Chunghakkyo Yŏksa (sang)* 중학교 역사 (상) (Middle school history), Ch’ihaksa, Seoul 2011, p. 33.
^{23}\) Chu Chin’o 주진오 (ed.), *Kodŭnghakkyo Hanguksa* 고등학교 한국사 (High school Korean history), Ch’ŏnjae Kyoyuk, Seoul 2011, p. 17.
^{24}\) Chŏng Chaejŏng 정재정 (ed.), *Kodŭnghakkyo Yŏksa (sang)* 고등학교 역사 (상) (High school history), Ch’ihaksa, Seoul 2011, p. 20.
^{25}\) Yi Insŏk 이인석 (ed.), *Kodŭnghakkyo Hanguksa* 고등학교 한국사 (High school Korean history), Samhwa Ch’ulp’ansa, Seoul 2011, p. 18.
^{26}\) Han Ch’ŏlho 한철호 (ed.), *Kodŭnghakkyo Hanguksa* 고등학교 한국사 (High school Korean history), Miraeken K’ŏlch’ö Kárup, Seoul 2011, p. 16.
Tang’un. It is difficult to know if he was a historical figure, or if Tan’gun was a proper name or a title. This confusion is reflected by a recent survey carried out by the television network KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) showing that 58.7% of Korean people believe that Tan’gun really existed (silchon 實存). But the same survey also reveals that 65.7% admit that Tan’gun’s story is a myth.

As suggested by the KBS survey, only a minority of Koreans actually believe that Tan’gun was indeed the son of a bear turned woman. But when it comes to the meaning of Tan’gun’s myth, some historians like Han Young Woo, emeritus professor at the University of Seoul, offer quite surprising interpretations:

The above-mentioned Dangun mythology includes many mysterious stories that cannot be explained by modern science. However, a closer analysis of this story reveals several important historical facts. (First, it suggests that while the Hwanin and Hwanung tribe, which called themselves the tribe of heavenly descendants, produced kings, the tribe that worshipped the bear as its totem was the one which produced queens). It also shows that, according to the dates recorded, the original year of the founding of Dangun Joseon would have been 2333 B.C. […] Third, the Dangun myth helps to shed some light on the worldview of those behind the establishment of the country. For instance, the Dangun myth makes evident the pride of the Korean people who thought of themselves as the descendants of Heaven, and believed that their nation was founded at roughly the same time as China itself. Put differently, the strong sense of independence that animated the people of Joseon is clearly reflected in this tale […] It is necessary for us to remember that the self-reliance, morality, and optimism contained in the Dangun mythology were not only the worldview of the ancient Korean people, but also became, through thousands of years, the cultural genes that still flow in the veins of modern Koreans.

Like history textbooks, this history of Korea is mixing historical and mythological elements. For instance, Tan’gun’s story is supposed to reveal important historical facts, like the union of the Hwanin and Hwanung tribes and the role of the bear as a totem. The problem with such interpretation is that it refers to the idea of “Korean bear worshippers”, a theory that unfortunately lacks archeological or ethnographic evidence. Moreover, while these textbooks and histories underline the mythical nature of

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27 “10 myŏng chung 6 myŏng, Tan’gun silch’on inmul” 10명중 6명, 단군실존 인물 (For 6 out of 10 Koreans did Tan’gun really lived), KBS News (September 30, 2011), retrieved from http://news.kbs.co.kr/culture/2011/09/30/2364751.html
28 Han Young Woo, A Review of Korean History, Kyŏngsaewŏn, P’aju 2010, p. 89.
Tan’gun’s story, they still provide mythical elements such as the founding date of Old Chosŏn in 2333 B.C.

**Kija, Wiman and the Han commanderies**

The mention of this date is all the more paradoxical considering the fact that its calculation relies partly on mythical elements related to the controversial figure of Kija. Kija supposedly arrived in Korea after the fall of the Shang dynasty, unwilling to serve the Zhou dynasty. According to the *Samguk yusa*, he succeeded to Tan’gun who had already reigned for more than a thousand years. Based on the date of Kija’s arrival on the Korean peninsula and the age of Tan’gun at that time, Korean nationalist historians determined the year 2333 B.C. In other words, this dating relies on the assumption that Tan’gun really lived for more than a thousand years, and that Kija actually came to Korea. If the mythical nature of the former has been increasingly acknowledged recently, as shown by the KBS survey, the latter has long been dismissed as a legendary character.

During many centuries, Confucian scholars considered Kija to be Korea’s most important ancestor. Koryŏ King T’aegu (r. 918-943) was the first to promote the cult of Kija in order to legitimate himself. With the Yi dynasty and Confucianism elevated to the status of state ideology, Kija became a key ancestral link to ancient China: Yi Songgye, the founder of the Yi dynasty, declared himself Kija’s successor. Kija was revered for more than five centuries as the first king of Chosŏn who brought civilization to Korea. This point of view was challenged with the rise of national consciousness at the end of the nineteenth century. Nationalist historians like Shin Ch’aeho came to favor Tan’gun, elevated to the rank of progenitor of the nation over Kija whose “Chineseness” didn’t fit in the new nationalist discourse.

History textbooks, both ancient and new editions, take the same stance. Tan’gun and his role in the founding of the so-called first Korean state are underlined at the expense of Kija who gets no mention at all. The excerpts from the Tan’gun myth cited in Korean textbooks are obvious signs of efforts made by Korea to erase Kija from national memory. Accounts of the *Samguk yusa* all end with the birth of Tan’gun without mentioning the rest of the myth that continues as follows:

In the fiftieth year of the reign of Emperor Yao, Tan’gun made the walled city of P’yŏngyang the capital and called his country Chosŏn. He then moved his capital to Asadal on Mount Paegak, also named Mount Kunghol, or Kunmidal, whence he ruled for fifteen hundred years. When, in the year kimyo [1122 B.C.], King Wu of Chou enfeoffed Chi Tzu (Kija) to Chosŏn,
Tangun moved to Changdanggyeong, but later he returned and hid in Asadal as a mountain god at the age of one thousand nine hundred and eight.\textsuperscript{30}

The narrative differs when it comes to Wiman Chosŏn. As we have seen, Wiman is said to have come to Old Chosŏn and taken the power from King Chun in 194 B.C. Here is an excerpt from the account provided by Sima Qian in his \textit{Records of a Grand Historian}:

Wiman, the king of Chosŏn (Ch’ao-hsien), came originally from the state of Yen. When Yen was at the height of its power, it invaded and conquered the regions of Chen-p’an and Chosŏn, appointing officials to rule the area and setting up fortifications along the frontier. After the Ch’in dynasty destroyed the state of Yen, the area fell under Ch’in control, bordering as it did the province of Liao-tung. When the Han arose, however, it regarded the region as too far away and difficult to guard, and rebuilt the fortifications at the old border of Liao-tung, leaving the area beyond, as far as the P’ae (Yalu) River, to be administered by the king of Yen. When Lu Wan, the king of Yen, revolted and crossed over into the territory of the Hsiung-nu, Wiman fled into hiding. He gathered together a band of a thousand or more followers and, adopting the mallet-shaped hairdo and dress of the Eastern Barbarians, escaped over the eastern border. After crossing the P’ae River, he settled down in the region formerly administered by the Ch’in, moving back and forth along the old border. Little by little he brought under his control the barbarians and Chinese refugees from Yen and Ch’i who were living in the regions of Chen-p’an and Chosŏn and made himself their king, establishing his capital at Wanggŏm (P’yŏngyang).\textsuperscript{31}

The former edition of the Korean high school textbook provided a somewhat different explanation:

When Wiman came to Old Chosŏn, he used to tie a topknot and was wearing Korean clothes. After becoming king he kept Chosŏn as the name of the state, and under his rule many indigenous people obtained high ranking positions. That is the reason why we can consider that Wiman’s Old Chosŏn was the successor of Tangun’s Old Chosŏn.\textsuperscript{32}

Newly published textbooks offer a similar picture, some of them going even further in the “Koreanization” of Wiman:

When Wiman entered Old Chosŏn, it is said that he tied a topknot and was wearing Old Chosŏn clothes. Moreover, after he became king, he kept

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 9.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe (ed.), \textit{Kodŭnghakkyo Kuksa}, p. 34.
\end{itemize}
Chosŏn as the name of the country and many indigenous people were part of his government. Consequently, we can say that Wiman Chosŏn succeeded to Old Chosŏn.\textsuperscript{33}

When he entered Old Chosŏn, he had Korean clothes [hanbok] on and tied a topknot suggesting that he was a member of the Tongyi group who lived in China. After becoming king Wiman kept Old Chosŏn as the name of the state.\textsuperscript{34}

Contrary to Kija, who is dismissed as a “foreigner” and rejected outside the frame of national history, Wiman is fully integrated as a Korean ruler and presented as a legitimate successor to Old Chosŏn, that is, Tan’gun Chosŏn. Such a claim remains problematic since the Records of a Grand Historian only describe Wiman as wearing “barbarian clothes”. There is no mention at all of “Korean clothes”. Even the Samguk yusa, which is abundantly quoted when it comes to Tan’gun, does not seem to acknowledge the “ethnic” origins of Wiman:

When Lu Wan, the king of Yen, revolted against the Han and crossed over into the territory of the Hsiung-nu, Wiman, who originally came from Yen, fled into hiding. He gathered together a band of a thousand or more followers and escaped over the eastern border. After crossing the P’ae River, he settled down in the region formerly administered by the Ch’in, moving back and forth along the old border. Little by little he brought under his control the barbarians and Chinese refugees from Yen and Ch’i who were living in the regions of Chen-p’an and Chosŏn and made himself their king, establishing his capital at Wanggŏm.\textsuperscript{35}

It is interesting to note how the Samguk yusa references the account by Sima Qian, but with a slight difference: the sentence “adopting the mallet-shaped hairdo and dress of the Eastern Barbarians” which serves as the basis of the thesis of an ethnically Korean Wiman, has been omitted. The efforts made by textbooks to present Wiman as the successor of Tan’gun clearly show the will to draw a continuity amongst the Korean nation. If it wasn’t for the idea of Korean ethnic homogeneity, there would be no need to “Koreanize” Wiman Old Chosŏn. Whatever the origins of Wiman, he was just one of many actors, if indeed he really existed, who contributed to the formation of the Korean nation over the centuries.

\textsuperscript{33} Kim H. (ed.), Chunghakkyo Yŏksa, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{34} Chu C. (ed.), Kodŏnghakkyo Hanguksa, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{35} Ch’oe Namsŏn 최남선 (ed.), Samguk yusa 삼국유사 (Tales of the Three Kingdoms), Sŏmun Munhwasa, Seoul 2003, p. 34.
The omission of Kija as well as the “Koreanization” of Wiman both reflect the intent of Korean textbooks to emphasize the longevity and the homogeneity of the Korean nation while minimizing influences exerted by China on Korean history. Obviously, this pattern also applies to the Han commanderies, which were established by the Han dynasty following the victorious military campaign led by Han Wudi against Wiman Chosŏn in 108 B.C. In the former edition of the middle school textbook, the authors did not even bother to mention the commanderies. In the high school version, a minimalist account is provided. Besides a paragraph explaining that, in order to avoid repression and plundering after the establishment of the Han commanderies, indigenous people either fled or joined forces to resist, the text concerning the Han commanderies reads as follows:

After destroying Old Chosŏn, the Han tried to establish commanderies on parts of the ancient territory of Old Chosŏn and to control them, but they faced strong resistance from the indigenous peoples. Its power weakened progressively and eventually it was destroyed by Koguryŏ.36

This account fails to state clearly if the Han actually established commanderies or not. Admittedly, students can assume from the last sentence that the commanderies were indeed established since they were destroyed by Koguryŏ. But the text does not provide the name or the number of these commanderies. Without mentioning that Lelang was destroyed in 313, it is difficult to fully grasp the important role that these commanderies, especially Lelang, played during the more than four centuries on the history of the peninsula.

This tendency to minimize the influence of the Han commanderies is still perceptible among newly published textbooks:

After [destroying Old Chosŏn], the Han established commanderies on the ancient territory of Old Chosŏn and tried to control them. But because of the fierce opposition from indigenous people, sudden change occurred and they were soon abolished or relocated.37

The Han established Lelang and other commanderies on part of the territories of Old Chosŏn. However, Han commanderies faced violent resistance from local people and their influence weakened.38

36 Kuksa p’yŏnech’an wiwŏnhoe 국사 편찬 위원회(ed.), Kodŭngakkyo Kuksa 고등학교 국사 (High school national history), Kyohaksa, Seoul 2006, p. 34.
**Koguryŏ**

Like Old Chosŏn, Koguryŏ is one of the topics where Korean nationalism has to compete against its Chinese counterpart. While somewhat less known than the disputes over Japanese history textbooks, there is an ongoing and fierce debate between China and South Korea over which country “owns” the historical heritage of Koguryŏ/Gaogouli, often referred to as one of the ancient Three Kingdoms of Korea, along with Paekche and Silla.

The academic debate began in 1993 at an international conference on Koguryŏ history, when a North Korean historian challenged the Chinese view of Koguryŏ as a Chinese state. The Chinese position is based on two main arguments: firstly, Koguryŏ state grew out of the Han Chinese commandery of Xuantu, thus Koguryŏ, but also Parhae/Bohai (A.D. 698-926) are considered to have been founded by Malgal/Mohe ethnic people; secondly, Koguryŏ kings acknowledged their status as one of China’s “minority nationalities” by accepting investiture from Chinese emperors.39

On the Korean side, historians assume that the Three Kingdoms, despite their differences, were not founded by Malgal, but by Yemaek, an ethnic group that supposedly entered Korea from Manchuria in about 1000 B.C. Korean nationalist historians and archaeologists consider Yemaek as a representation of the origins of Korean nationality.40 Koreans regard Koguryŏ as a major power in East Asia that pursued territorial expansion through military conquests and that was frequently in a state of warfare with neighboring Chinese states. We can find an example of such a representation in Korean history textbooks which stressed and still stress Koguryŏ’s expansionist policy conquests and territorial expansion that led to the formation of a powerful empire rivaling China’s Sui and Tang dynasties:

At the end of the fifth century, mighty Koguryŏ wielded power over East Asia occupying the center part of the Korean peninsula and Manchuria, including the Liaodong peninsula. At that time, the Chinese dynasty of the Northern Wei gave preferential treatment to Koguryŏ’s envoys compared to other countries’ embassies. We can infer from it how high Koguryŏ’s status was in East Asia then.41

The Great King Kwanggaet’o who ascended the throne at the age of eighteen launched vigorous conquests. In the north, he occupied much of Manchuria,

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41 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe (ed.), Chunghakkyo Kuksa, p. 49.
comprising the area of Liaodong. In the south, he sent an expedition against Paekche and occupied the territories north of the Han river [...] Thus, Koguryŏ built up a great empire from the center of the Korean peninsula to Manchuria, including the Liaodong peninsula. Moreover, Koguryŏ considered itself the center of the world, the equivalent to China.42

This scholarly debate escalated to a new level of historiography warfare between the two countries with the Chinese government’s launch of a “Northeast Project” in 2002. The aim of the project was to conduct research on ancient Chinese territories, mostly in Manchuria. It included numerous topics regarding ethnic groups in the Northeast region, the history of Korean-Chinese relations, Old Chosŏn, Koguryŏ and Parhae, and revived claims that historical development of Koguryŏ and Parhae, among others, took place in the borderlands of the Chinese nation and that consequently, they occurred as part of Chinese national history. The conclusion is that there is almost no link between the people of the Korean peninsula and the people of Koguryŏ and Parhae, who cannot be considered part of the Korean nation.43

These contrasting views of Koguryŏ’s position in history between Korea and China share nonetheless a common point: they presume a clearly delineated geographical and national border between “Korea” and “China” in ancient times, and a linear national history to the present. In other words, they project the modern nation-state onto ancient times, reconstructing ancient history within the framework of their respective national history: as Andrei Lankov noted, “Koguryoans would have been surprised or even offended to learn that, in the future, they would be perceived by Koreans as members of the same community as their bitter enemies from Silla”.44 The main cause of the disagreement is that while China is defining its history and culture from the perspective of its present-day territories and borders, Korean national history is defined by the area where “Koreans” settled. Bloodline and not territory is the ultimate criteria used to distinguish Koreans from non-Koreans.

For China the objective is clearly to construct a unitary national history and identity through positing a common history, even if it means imposing on the past the way ethnic minorities are conceived today as forming part of a “Greater Chinese Nation”. For Koreans, Koguryŏ but also Puyo and Parhae have been thought of as spiritual motherlands nourishing Korean culture. The “loss” of Koguryŏ to China could result in reducing the span of Korean

history, erasing seven hundred years of a proud chapter of its resistance against China, and losing a historical pillar of Korean identity.\(^{45}\)

No wonder the protests against claims to the “Chineseness” of Koguryŏ have been fierce. The Chinese claims to Koguryŏ have also resulted in promoting cooperation between North and South Koreans and the Korean Diaspora. The nation is perceived as one surrounded by others trying to steal Korea’s history and territory. Whereas studies of ancient history in South Korea had been focused on Silla, due mainly to the fact that Silla was located in the South, the crisis with China resulted in a Koguryŏ studies boom in South Korea.

It should be noted that on both sides dissonant voices can be heard. Not all Chinese historians agree with the official position of Koguryŏ as a Chinese state, some even said it publicly, conceding that Koguryŏ belonged to Korean history. On the Korean side too, a few historians see Koguryŏ as a separate site from both Korea and China. The majority of Western scholars have shown little support for the Chinese case. For instance, the main arguments defended by the proponents of the Chinese Koguryŏ view, namely that Koguryŏ developed out of the Han Chinese military prefecture of Xuantu, and that Koguryŏ kings accepted investiture from Chinese emperors, could also be applied to Paekche, a kingdom that no Chinese scholar claims to be a Chinese state.\(^{46}\)

Despite the apparent flaws of the Chinese position and the existence of dissonant voices on both sides, the chances of a rapid settlement are slim. The main reasons for this are territorial concerns. While South Korea assumes that the Chinese attempt to take Koguryŏ’s heritage away from Korea is a preemptive territorial claim in the case of a North Korean collapse, China does not fear that ethnic Koreans in China’s Northeast might want to break away. Any admission that Koreans might have a valid historical claim to some Chinese territories may incite unrest among other border groups, particularly in the Southwest and Northwest. This would explain why the Chinese have been so unwilling to back down on the academic position.\(^{47}\)

Koguryŏ, but also Old Chosŏn, are good examples of the inadequacy of sticking to the frame of national history to understand historical reality of border regions. For centuries, borders between China, Manchuria, and Korea have been fluid and permeable, which led to the cultural and historical hybridity of multiple states and peoples occupying the Northeast Asian borderlands. By emphasizing the role of Yemaek, who supposedly form with


\(^{47}\) M.E. Byington, “The War of Words Between South Korea and China”. 
Han people in the southern part of the peninsula the ancestors of Korean people, Korean national history neglects the role of Malgal, and other tribes which were absorbed later into China as part of ethnic minorities. The question of whose national history Koguryŏ belongs to can only foster, whatever the answer might be, disregard for minorities, and of heterogeneity.

Conclusion

The analysis of the way Korean textbooks deal with ancient history suggests that peoples from Old Chosŏn and Koguryŏ were all members, along with the Three Han in the southern part of the peninsula, of the unique Korean nation. In other words, instead of trying to understand how Koreans came to share a common conscience of belonging to the same nation, Korean textbooks show how the Korean nation supposedly evolved through the centuries. It is as if that nation had appeared with the founding of Old Chosŏn by Tan’gun. They seem to assume, \textit{a priori}, that the Korean nation existed since ancient times, and that the identity of the nation has remained the same. That is exactly what was written in the introduction of the state-issued middle school textbook:

\begin{quote}
Our history is the record and the course followed by our nation \textit{minjok} […] National history is the trace of our lives and the root of our identity.48
\end{quote}

The pronoun “\textit{we\textquotedblright}”, which appeared more than twenty times in the introduction of this middle school textbook, had timeless qualities that fostered the relationship between the identity of the students and the object of their study. The lack of distance between the subject and the object of study can result in strong emotional reactions when someone else claims to own that object. The controversy about Koguryŏ provides a good example of such an attitude.

True, recent efforts made to overcome the frame of national history in South Korea are obvious. Middle school and high school textbooks have abandoned their old “\textit{kuksa\textquotedblright}” title; their content has gone beyond the “national” borders of South Korea and integrates the Diaspora and North Korea. The newly published government-approved middle school textbooks are also keen to highlight exchanges with neighboring countries and to embed Korean history in world history:

\begin{quote}
In the textbook, we paid particular attention to the following points. Firstly, we strived to give more weight to accounts of world history in order to grasp Korean history together with the evolution of world history. This will help
\end{quote}

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\begin{flushright}
48 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe (ed.), \textit{Chunghakkyo Kuksa}.
\end{flushright}
build a historical consciousness adapted to this era of globalization […] Sixthly, while valuing Koreans’ identity, we tried to avoid falling into excessively nationalistic interpretation, a problem that tends to be overlooked. Nationalism is necessary for a country like Korea, which went through so much hardship, but we consider that open-mindedness and flexible thinking are indispensable in the twenty-first century.49

Korean scholars and teachers have also taken part in efforts to narrow the gap between China, Japan and Korea’s respective visions of history. Alongside their Chinese and Japanese counterparts, they have worked together in joint committees, both government sponsored and not, either in a bilateral frame, Japan-South Korea, or more rarely, in a trilateral structure, as with the common history textbook published simultaneously in 2005 in all three languages.50 Unfortunately, the historically recovered ancient past, invested with narratives that are defining contemporary Korean national identity, is stuck in an ever more rigid frame of national history. In other words, while the contents of textbooks have gone beyond the “national” borders of South Korea, they still remain focused on the ethnic nation. In that sense, the frame of national history, that is the history of the “minjok,” has yet to be overcome.

49 Chu C. (ed.), Chunghakkyo Yŏksa.
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LEARNING HISTORY IN GLOBALIZING CHINA: AN OVERVIEW OF CHINESE HIGH-SCHOOL HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

Laura De Giorgi

In the last few years, the impact of reforms and globalization on history education in China has increasingly attracted scholarly attention. Academic research has been particularly significant in the investigation of the relationship between history education, ideology and nationalism. The way in which events of the past are narrated and taught to youth could mirror the relevance of nationalism as a legitimizing factor to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Furthermore, these narratives may even represent an obstacle to peaceful relations in an international context.

Due to their special place in school education, textbooks have represented one of the main objects of analysis. Actually, if history textbooks are an important instrument in building national identity in any country, in East Asia their importance is even greater. There they are considered the official interpretation of history. Not by chance, history textbooks have been at the core of international controversies between Japan and China, and China and South Korea. Moreover, the content of history textbooks has raised

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3 Controversies between China, Korea and Japan about Japanese history textbooks are too commonly known to be discussed here; for a recent overview see Claudia Schneider, “The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, n. 1, 2008, pp. 107-122; Id., “National Fortresses Besieged: History Textbooks in Contemporary China, Taiwan, and Japan”, in S. Richter, Contested Views of a Common Past, pp. 237-262; for the recent developments
intellectual and political debates in the domestic context, as briefly discussed in this paper.

In China, the need to modernize history education—and consequently to revise textbooks—has been openly recognized since the 1990s. In the context of social and economic reforms and cultural globalization, Chinese authorities issued new guidelines for middle and high schools’ history education and thus new textbooks were published according to the new standards. From an official point of view, this process can be described more as a consequence of changing social, economical and cultural context, than a response to the need to take into account new historiographic research. As described by an author of the People’s Education Press (PEP), the main Chinese publishing press in the field of education, globalization “demands a much higher intellectual standard of people in a country”. This is because

the trend toward pluralistic cultures in many countries has lessened confrontation among peoples of different ideologies; [...] the peoples of the world have made more efforts to pursue peace, oppose wars, reach a common understanding, and strengthen cooperation. Both geographically and culturally the information age has broken down the boundaries between nations. Communication within the ‘global village’ is both readily available and convenient.4

Actually, he seems to suggest that globalization implies a change in history education on two levels. First, students are increasingly required to interact with people and cultures different from their own and they must deal with global issues. Secondly, students are exposed to several different sources of information about the past and the present and consequently, education should also take this flow of data into account.

In this context, history education should assist pupils in handling change and motivating them to become modern and cosmopolitan citizens in the new globalizing China. This ambitious goal is consistent with the will to develop “quality education” (suzhi jiaoyu素质教育). Since the last decade of the twentieth century, the need to promote “quality” has developed as a slogan for country policies and has become a keyword in contemporary Chinese discourses on society.5 In the field of education, this word

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encompasses several meanings. It is relevant in both moral and ideological proprieties and emphasizes the need to develop creativity and critical thinking. As Spakowski has argued, *suzhi* in historical education is, above all, focused on the centrality of moral values and patriotism.6

Moreover, attention given to quality education should also be intended as an acknowledgement of the need to modernize teaching methodology. For instance, in China, schools emphasize the facilitation of student involvement in class work.7 Since international competition is based mainly on the capacity to innovate (*chuangxin* 创新), education needs to promote the development of individual talents. It must give value to youth’s original thinking and encourage a critical approach to society starting from true facts (*zhen shi* 真实). Teachers are required to stimulate and guide critical debates in classrooms, utilizing new sources and media facilities to personally and emotionally engage the students.

History textbooks edited in the recent years reflect this attempt to institute both correct content and a new methodological approach to historical learning. However, these textbooks also reveal the many contradictions in history education in contemporary China. Their goal is to offer an integrated approach in the understanding of the past, giving space for a more global perspective in order to nourish students’ cultural openness and world consciousness; however, the priority given to patriotism contradicts this objective. It is this aspect that allows cultural nationalism and political conformism to remain at the core of historical teaching in schools.

This paper offers an overview of a set of textbooks widely used in classrooms. The textbooks are edited by the People’s Education Press and have been published for high school students since the mid-2000s. The considered textbooks are addressed to students ages 15 to 18 years old who are attending high-school and possibly studying with the intention of pursuing a college education. This group embodies an important constituency of the Chinese public opinion. Their learned nationalistic feelings are also a relevant factor in domestic politics, especially in urban areas.8 With the revision of history education, schools aim to train students to simultaneously become good “Chinese citizens” and good “world citizens”. My attention will focus on textbooks’ attempt to integrate Chinese

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history and foreign history into a singular narrative, utilizing the perspective of Chinese political and ideological atmosphere and omitting issues concerning historiographical conceptualizations.9

The official framework for history education: the experimental new guidelines

Although post-Mao reforms have increased decentralization and strengthened the autonomy of local governments and institutions in designing schools' curricula, in China, the Ministry of Education obviously plays a pivotal role in determining the content of educational activities. Consequently, the general outline of history education is set by the central government. Here, the Ministry issues detailed guidelines dictating the standards for textbooks and requirements for teachers.

In the last decade, several new official documents have been issued concerning history teaching in Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biaozhun—shiyan——普通高中历史课程标准—试验 (History curriculum standards—experimental—for normal senior secondary schools). This document was issued in 2003 as a result of the Decision made in 1999 by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and State Council on Deepening Educational Reform and Promoting Quality. After the Decision of 1999, a technical group worked on the revision of the history curriculum in compulsory education and in higher education as well. They studied foreign experiences in East Asia (Japan and Korea) and the West (United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia). In 2000, new standards for compulsory education were ready, and three years later the guidelines for high-school history curriculum were issued.10

The innovative aspect of the new program for high-school students was the integrated approach to human past centered on the idea of civilization. The program aimed to overcome the gap between Chinese history and world history, still present in middle school education. According to this new trend,

Chinese history and the history of foreign civilizations should be studied in a single course, combining both comparative perspective as well as highlighting the connections among different cultures. This organization of learning is believed to fulfill the necessity to educate students on not only diverse historical experiences, but also increase awareness of the interconnectedness of historical and cultural processes in the modern world.

As a premise, the new standards identify the goal of history teaching as the need to develop students’ historical conscience, cultural quality and scholarly attainment in humanities: students are expected to analyze the evolution of societies from different perspectives, while teachers should guide their students to nurture their attitude of “taking the reality as a criterion for the truth” (shishi qiushi 事实求实), to improve their sense of innovation and ability to “scientifically” debate historical problems.\(^\text{11}\) However, patriotic emotions, feelings and values are also considered as a relevant part of history education.\(^\text{12}\)

One of the most relevant innovations of the program is the division of historical narratives into topical modules. These modules provide a thorough comprehension of the relationships between the past and contemporary age (gujin 古今) and the relationships between China and the world (zhongwai 中外).

In high schools, the study of history is distributed over three years. Each year students are required to focus on one aspect of human history; the first is dedicated to historical analysis of political systems, the second depicts the economy and society and the third regards science, philosophy, ideology and culture. While schools may offer more optional modules on specific topics, this course of study represents the compulsory curriculum.

Topics dedicated to political history are listed as follows: the origin and development of ancient Chinese political system, the imperialist invasion and the nationalist fight of the Chinese people, the Chinese national revolution in modern age, the political construction of contemporary China and the unity of the motherland, the foreign relations of contemporary China, ancient Greece and Rome political systems, the representative democracy of the bourgeoisie in Europe and America, China’s scientific socialist theory and the construction of socialist system, the emergence of a multipolar world in contemporary age.

The course dedicated to economic development in history requires: the study of the economy of ancient China (agriculture, handcraft and commerce), of economic change in modern China and of the construction of

\(^{11}\) PRC Ministry of Education, Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biaozhun (shiyan) (History curriculum standards (experimental) for normal senior secondary schools), Renmin Jiaoyu, Beijing 2003.

\(^{12}\) For the relevance of values and emotions, see Fan L., “New curriculum reform”, p. 143 ff.
socialism with Chinese characteristics, social change in modern China, the age of world exploration and the development of colonialism and of the capitalist global market, Roosevelt and the self-correction of capitalism, the experience and lessons from Soviet socialism, and finally economic globalization. According to the official guidelines, the goal of this approach is to nurture students’ responsibility towards socialist modernization in China.

In the third year the standards require a focus on cultural history. This means “to understand that culture and ideology have as main characteristic the variety […] different cultures and ideas develop together through reciprocal clashing and mingling”. Science, technology, ideology, literature and the arts are all included in this course. Topics include: the study of Chinese traditional mainstream culture, science, technology and culture in ancient China, the liberation of culture and ideas in modern China, theoretical results of the most important Chinese ideologies in the twentieth Century, science, technology and culture in contemporary China; science and technology in the modern world and world literature and art from the nineteenth century on.

As a whole, the official guidelines emphasize the idea that the study of history should increase students’ individual commitment to gain knowledge of “Chinese national conditions” (Zhongguo guoqing 中国国情), to love and continue to transmit the cultural tradition of Chinese national people, to nurture the national spirit and stimulate the national and cultural pride. However, patriotism should be equally matched by a critical and scientific attitude and by a “world conscience” gained through the “awareness of unity” (tongyixing 统一性) and knowledge of a variety of human societies.

The need to teach history by utilizing a more integrated perspective and balancing both patriotic feelings and international openness is a clear goal of the new official curricula. With this still a concern, the content of history textbooks has been controversial. This was especially the case during the initial years after the enactment of the experimental changes.

The most notorious case of controversy took place not at the high school level, but with middle-high school history textbooks. This is worth mentioning as it has attracted much attention and further emphasizes the most critical points relating to history, education and nationalism.

It involved the well-known historian Yuan Weishi 袁伟时, professor at the Zhongshan University in Guangzhou and public intellectual, who published an essay published in “Freezing Point”, a weekly supplement of the “China Youth Daily” in January 2006. Here he expressed his criticism regarding the way in which modern history was taught to Chinese students. He cited examples of the textbooks’ historical narratives on key-events in nineteenth century China such as the Taiping rebellion and the Second Opium War. Yuan's belief was that teachings related to the imperialist
invasion of China in the nineteenth century were inflated by hypernationalism and therefore invited xenophobia and violence. His ideas were vehemently criticized and in the end, the editor of the magazine was fired.13

A second case occurred later in the same year when a correspondent of *The New York Times* wrote an article about a new set of history textbooks that were going to be published for high schools in Shanghai. According to the article, the new books gave scant attention to politics and ideology and very little mention of the peasant revolts, traditionally a fundamental topic in a history syllabus. Meanwhile, the textbooks supposedly dedicated more space to Bill Gates than to Mao Zedong 毛泽东. A debate developed in specialized forums where opinions often severely critical of the new trends were expressed. Su Zhiliang 苏智良, the historian who was in charge of the project, declared that the goal of the new textbooks was to focus on the history of civilizations, not to reverse the interpretation of history based on historical materialism. Nevertheless, the Shanghai project froze.14

These controversies could be considered as an expression of political and intellectual conflict amidst the intellectual and political elites. However, they reveal the sensitiveness surrounding the issue of nationalism in history education. While everyone agrees on the need to revise education in the new globalizing context, what this implies in practice proved not so simply agreed upon. The debates were strictly connected to the relevance of history for patriotic education and identity building, with a special reference to the relationship with the West. From this perspective, many of the issues raised in these discussions remain unsolved and are doomed to resurface in the future.15

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15 The difficulties in dealing with hyper nationalist feelings in approaching modern history education still remains a concern; for an example of professionals’ reflections on teachers’ responsibilities, see Chen Zhigang, Liu Yazhong, Zhang Lihai, “Aiguzhuyi jiaoyu fangshi de fansi” (Reflections on the teaching methodology about patriotism), *Lishi jiaoxue*, 9, 2010, pp. 21-23.
A search for new approaches to history education? A synopsis of People’s Educational Press secondary school’s history textbooks

Although official guidelines in history education are quite detailed, the very existence of controversies over textbooks proves the fact that in their compilation there is enough room for authors to apply varied angles on the same subject. Although textbooks are subjected to official authorization, the current situation could be described as “One program, many textbooks” (yigang duoben 一纲多本). There are several editions of history textbooks, reflecting different regional contexts and market differences. This is a consequence of the administrative decentralization in education, all decided by the government in the reform era.16

In this section, I will only consider history textbooks published for senior-high-school students by the People’s Education Press in the second half of 2000s, widely adopted in the Beijing area. The series is entitled Putong gaozhong kecheng biaozhun shiyian jiaokeshu. Lishi bixiu 1, 2, 3普通高中历史课程标准试验教科书. 历史必修 1, 2, 3, (Textbooks for the experimental standards for normal secondary school curricula. History, compulsory program), and it consists of three volumes, one for each year of schooling. The students’ textbooks are matched by detailed teacher’s guidebooks which contain methodological suggestions, a selection of documents to be used for classwork and even video instructions on how to manage classwork.17

The revision of the history curricula has emphasized the concept of civilization as an important framework to organize the study of the past. History should be learnt by taking into account the various fields of human action, politics, economy and culture, and being aware of the evolution of human societies. This holistic approach is considered useful in offering a better understanding of the present time and of the relationship between China and the rest of the world. A reading of these textbooks reveals that history education is fundamental not only in building a national identity and nourishing patriotic feelings, but also in persuading students of the adequacy of the Chinese political system and official ideology in the global historical context.

At any rate, national pride should not become parochialism or conservatism, since it should be matched by an intellectual openness to the world and readiness to change. As it is expressed in the teacher’s guide, the feeling of attachment to the motherland should not be similar to Ah-Q 啊Q

16 Fan L., “New curriculum reform”.
17 Putong gaozhong kecheng biaozhun shiyian jiaokeshu. Lishi bixiu. 1, 2, 3, People’s Educational Press, Beijing 2007 (hereafter LSBX); Putong gaozhong kecheng biaozhun shiyian jiaokeshu. Lishi bixiu. Jiaoshi jiaoke yongshu. 1, 2, 3, People’s Educational Press, Beijing 2007 (hereafter LSBX. JKYS).
(evoking the well-known tale of Lu Xun 鲁迅), boasting of the superiority of Chinese civilization, but it should promote a self-confident attitude that leads to cooperation with the rest of the world.18

The textbook dedicated to political history serves as a comparison between the evolution of political systems in the West and in China. The preface of the book explains how students will learn

the characteristics and the development of the Chinese and foreign political systems as the Chinese people’s assemblies and the parliaments of Western capitalist countries; the key political events as the bourgeois revolution in England and the republican revolution in China; the main heroes of history, as Washington and Sun Yat-sen 孙逸仙, and in the end the most important historical phenomena, as the characteristics and trends in the world political context.19

This approach seems to suggest that the political differences between China and the West (Soviet Union is analyzed only with consideration to the October Revolution) are rooted in their respective pasts. The main concern of textbook’s compilers is, actually, to historically justify Chinese and current Western political systems and at the same time, value them according to a universal path towards democracy. Moreover, implicitly, the national State represents the main dimension for understanding progress or backwardness of human history.

In fact, according to the textbook, China’s political identity is historically marked by a continuous strife towards “unity” (tongyi 统一). This is accurately demonstrated by the emergence of a centralized empire in ancient times and by the early integration of different ethnic groups in Chinese nationality (Zhonghua minzu 中华民族).20 The textbook offers a simplified analysis of the political evolution of ancient China, as it aims, above all, to interpret the past: the history of imperial China from Han to Yuan is compressed in a single chapter. More space is dedicated to the Ming and Qing dynasties, considered the age when imperial autocracy froze the Chinese political evolution. Late imperial and especially Qing absolutism is depicted as a major obstacle in China’s progress.21

Parallely, the political history of the West focuses on the democratic system in ancient Greece and the role of the law during the Roman Empire.

18 LSBX. JKYS, 2, p. 3.
19 LSBX, 1, p. 3.
21 LSBX, 1, chapters 1-4.
Democracy is briefly discussed as a Western historical development that originated from a very peculiar geographical and social context (the Greek state-city). It is described as an ideal that is distant from factual reality and is characterized by the exclusion, for example, of women and slaves. After a very concise description of the Middle Ages, the narrative of the political evolution in the West continues with the bourgeois revolutions in England and France, the American Revolution and the constitutionalist government in Germany. Again, while it is mentioned that these events generated the idea of universal human rights, students are encouraged to understand the gap between the rhetoric of democratic institutions, originating in the capitalist system, and the reality of exclusion from political power for too many.22

The central part of the textbook is dedicated to the history of modern China, from the Opium War to the post-Mao People’s Republic (PRC).

There are three main sections. The first is entitled “The modern China’s tide to oppose imperialism and save democracy” (Jindai Zhongguo fan qinliu, jiu minzhu de chaoliu 近代 中国 反侵略 救 民主 的 潮流) and opens with a photographic portrait of Sun Yat-sen. Historical narrative of this section does not present any divergence from the official line and is mainly focused on events: the Opium War, the Taiping movement as an example of peasant uprising against imperialism, the first Sino-Japanese War and the Eight Powers Expedition against the Boxers, the Republican Revolution, the May Fourth Movement, the foundation of the Communist Party and the First United Front, the ten-year confrontation between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, the War of Resistance against Japan and the War of Liberation. Endogenous factors of crisis and change are downplayed in favor of a narrative based on China’s reaction to foreign imperialism.

The second section is dedicated to Marxism. This part focuses on the Paris Commune and the Bolshevik Revolution, with very few references to China. The last section deals with the People’s Republic, its institutions and its international relations. Political history of China is not developed because of the greater emphasis on the representative institutions in the PRC, the multi-party cooperation under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party and the establishment of the autonomous regions of national minorities. Students are invited to acknowledge a sort of ideal political continuity with the Hundred Days Reform and through the Republican Revolution to the People’s Republic in China’s march towards full democracy.23 Obviously, the Cultural Revolution is briefly presented as a temporary deviation from this track, even if its end is intended to coincide with the re-affirmation of the centrality of legality after 1978. Again, the chapter dedicated to

22 LSBX, 1, chapter 5.
23 LSBX, 1, chapters 9-12.
contemporary China’s political system mentions the grassroots elections as a demonstration of its democratic essence. Moreover, democracy and China’s political unity are represented as inexorably intertwined. Focus is on Hong Kong and Macao unification to the motherland, analyzed as the historical premise for the future unification with Taiwan. The textbook briefly describes the process of re-approachment to Taiwan, symbolized by the photograph of the meeting between Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 and the Guomindang leader Lian Zhan 连战 (Lien Chan) in 2005.

The history of People’s Republic’s foreign relations covers the last chapters of this section. This is only further enriched by the many photographs of Chinese leaders meeting their foreign counterparts. PRC’s foreign relations are presented as a drastic shift from the “humiliation” (chiru 耻辱) during the period 1840-1949,24 and at the same time as a process marked by the peaceful relations China was able to build with the rest of the world.

The final part of the textbook offers a portrait of contemporary world trends towards “multipolarity” (duojihua 多极化). Pupils are taught that a post Cold War world made by “one superpower, many powers” (yichao, duoqiang 一超多强) is going to become “multipolar” due to the emergence of European Union, Japan and China. This evolution is characterized by instability, as demonstrated by the Yugoslavia wars and international terrorism. China’s role in the new context is, at any rate, minimized, although it is defined as the most powerful among developing countries. It is just an actor in a almost multipolar world where new political powers, such as United Europe and Japan, are gaining prominence.25

In the textbook dedicated to economy and society the narrative is focused on economic organization and identifies the main factors of material progress in Chinese history with an emphasis on the role played by the State. While the birth of modern economy is credited to the European development of capitalism and colonialism, comparative perspectives are downplayed in favor of a China-centered approach, although interconnectedness, interdependency and exchange at an international level are strongly evident.

Students first learn that agriculture in China had specific features and emerged independently from other civilizations. Two long chapters are dedicated to handcrafted work and commerce in ancient China. This attention to the material advancement of Chinese ancient civilization is due to the fact that it is considered an “emotional” topic. It serves to nourish

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25 LSBX, 1, chapters 25-27. For representation of Europe in history textbooks, see Gotelind Müller, “Teaching the other’s history in Chinese schools; the state, cultural asymmetries and shifting images of Europe (from 1900 to today)”, in G. Müller, Designing History in East Asian textbooks, pp. 32-59.
student’s national pride and their will to preserve ancient culture remnants. It also has a political and ideological meaning as students learn of the importance of science and technology as the first productive force of progress. The chapter about trade in ancient China gives a positive evaluation of commercial activities for the wealth of a State and a society. It also emphasizes the role of the State in the creation of the necessary environment for the market. The feudal ideological backwardness of the Chinese imperial State is explained as the main reason for the hindering of the development of international trade in traditional China. In all, openness to the world is a motor of material and spiritual progress of a country.

The formation of a world capitalist market starting from the birth of capitalism in Europe represents the main section of the textbook dedicated to world history.

European maritime explorations are presented in a substantially positive light. They are depicted to students as a demonstration of the relevance of curiosity and aspiration for knowledge and human progress. On the contrary, the historical assessment of colonialism is completely negative. Pupils are taught that capital accumulation in the West has been granted by colonial exploitation of non-Western people, as the Chinese. That students should understand the history is not just an abstract concept and they should know that the development of human societies is manyfolded, so they can make develop an international consciousness with a correct openness and be able to confront with opportunities and challenges in an active attitude.27

Thus, openness should be matched by awareness of power relations and by patriotism.

Consequently, the chapters dedicated to China’s economy from the Opium War to 1949 describe Western imperialism as a propeller for economic change in China, yet a damaging agent for the Chinese people. A favorable assessment is given to all national movements aimed at economic modernization and industrialization, starting at the Westernization Movement (yangwu yundong 洋务运动) in the nineteenth century. Students are invited to reflect on how the most important condition for the development of economic modernization should be identified in the political realm, and specifically in national unification and State independence. Unavoidably, a real economic development for Chinese people begins only after the foundation of the People’s Republic. Economic policy in the post-Mao era is credited as being congruent with the socialist policy of the 1950s. As a celebration of the improvement of material life of Chinese citizens compared to the previous period, an entire chapter is specifically dedicated to the analysis of economic

26 LSBX, 2, chapters 1-4.
27 LSBX. JKYS, 2, p. 76.
and social change in contemporary China. This also represents an “emotional” topic, since progress should be understood referring even to personal memories of parents and relatives who have grown and lived in the previous decades.28

The final section of the textbook offers analysis of the evolution of capitalism; from economic crisis of capitalism to Roosevelt’s new deal and the Russia economic history. The goal of the lesson is to understand the continuous need for adjustment and reform in economics, as well as the capitalist and socialist systems. Finally, great attention is dedicated to world integration and globalization. This understanding is deemed important in order for students to be aware of the relevance of economic international relations for State power and human development. China’s entrance into the WTO is analyzed as a fundamental contribution to a global integrated economy. However, the negative impact on economic globalization in Third World countries is underestimated. In comparison to the sections dedicated to international political dynamics in post Cold War era, the centrality attributed to economic globalization is much more evident with a much greater space dedicated to the study of WTO organization and statutes.29

The third volume of the textbook series is dedicated to culture: philosophy, science, ideology, literature and arts. According to the introduction, pupils should be guided to understand how the progress of science and knowledge are founded on the legacy of the past and at the same time, that science and philosophy reflect the changes in social conditions inside a historical process that proceeds from bottom to top. The textbook postulates a sort of continuity between the golden age of Chinese philosophy in the Spring and Autumn period through the Neo Confucianism in Song and Ming eras to the Three Principles of People of Sun Yat-sen, Maoism and Deng Xiaoping theory. Similarly, in the West, the line of development goes from ancient Greek philosophy to the Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment period. Ancient China and ancient West are discussed in comparative perspective, attempting to give an account of the unity of human values and variety of cultures in the world as well. Secondly, to emphasize cultural continuity with the past, a second dominant theme of the textbook is the interaction among cultures, especially in modern times. As a whole, notwithstanding the effort to develop a more global approach to culture and science, even in this volume the China-centered approach is quite dominant. Fifteen out of its twenty-four chapters are dedicated to China, and the rest to the West, while no other civilization is considered.

The two sections dedicated to the ancient times are respectively dedicated to Chinese philosophy and to Western tradition. The first centers on

28 LSBX, 2, chapter 14.
29 LSBX, 2, chapters 22-24.
Confucianism (although Daoism and Legism are briefly described too), Song Neo Confucianism and Ming and Qing thinkers as Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 and Gu Yanwu 顾炎武, considered representative thinkers who were critical of absolutism; the implicit idea in the background is the endogenous capacity of reform and renovation of Chinese thought. The second section concerns ancient Greek philosophers, from Socrates to Aristotle, the Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, and on Enlightenment philosophers, seen as the main steps in the “liberation of thinking” (sixiang jiefang 思想解放).

The pupils are then invited to reflect on the “four great inventions of Chinese civilization” (gun powder, compass, paper and mobile print), on pre-modern sciences in China, and on traditional literature and arts, all considered as the main contribution of China to world human progress. On one side, the narrative aims to emphasize the impact of a Chinese collective genius on world evolution as a sign of cultural interaction between Chinese civilization and the world, and on the other side it exposes evidence of how Chinese literature and art were a product of a plurality of factors. They were the result of contact with foreign cultures, of different nationalities’ contribution and of social differentiation, as can be seen in Tang poetry, Song paintings, Ming’s novels, Beijing opera and so on.30

After this section, three chapters are dedicated to “The historical scientific development of the modern world”. Modern science is presented not specifically linked to Western social and cultural context, but as an effect of the universal trend towards the “liberation of thought” from false beliefs. Mathematics and physics from Newton to Einstein, natural sciences to Darwin and evolutionary theory, and applied sciences from the steam-engine, the discovery of electricity to Internet (considered since it is an important motor of globalization) are shortly described. The second part of the textbook is specifically dedicated to Chinese intellectual evolution in the modern era. The first topic concerns China’s learning from abroad. This narrative starts after the Opium War, from Lin Zexu 林则徐 to the 1898 reform, and then discusses the New Culture Movement and the introduction of Marxism to China. The leit-motif of these chapters is explained by the teacher’s guide: to learn from the West is strictly connected and justified by the will to save the nation and strengthen the State.31 This is shared by the first Chinese reformers to the intellectual heroes of the New Culture Movement, whose main contribution to the liberation of the Chinese mind is identified in the introduction of the concepts of democracy, freedom and equality in China. Consequently, they have prepared the terrain for an introduction and development of Marxism in China after the October revolution.

30 LSBX, 3, chapters 8-10.
31 LSBX, 3, chapters 14-15.
Students are also encouraged to reflect on the legacy of the New Culture Movement and its relation to traditional culture. In order to reconcile contradictions and recognize both as important legacies for contemporary Chinese identity, teachers are urged to make pupils understand that New Culture’s vehement criticism of tradition was as a consequence of the historical and contingent connection between political conservatism and Confucian values. Confucianism, however, must not be totally rejected since it is the main philosophical tradition of China and it has granted social stability for a long time.32

China’s twentieth-century culture is made to coincide with political ideology, as embodied by Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping up to Jiang Zemin 江泽民 “three-represent theory” (sāngé dài biǎo 三个代表). Their ideas are presented more as the “crystal” (jītǐ 晶体) of collective thinking than as the contribution of individual thinkers and share the attitude of “scientific” and pragmatic evaluation of societal needs.33 The following chapters are dedicated to China’s progression in education and in scientific research and appraisal of State policies in these fields. Only in the end does an interest for global developments re-emerge. Three chapters on world literature, music and arts from the nineteenth century, mainly dedicated to the West, mark the end of the course in history. From political ideology the attention moves to cultural production, including mass and popular culture.

Conclusive remarks

In contemporary China, history education is going through a phase of change and reform. Narrative and historical interpretation still conform to the officially sanctioned views: students must be educated to understand “scientific” laws of social evolution according to historical materialism, to consider socialism as the better response to China’s historical conditions and to love and be proud of their motherland. However, there is an increasing awareness that, in order to be effective, the study of history must also train students to have a global culture and a pragmatic and open attitude to innovation and interaction with foreign cultures.

High-school revision of history textbooks aims to produce a more articulated view of the past, in the framework of a more coordinated approach to Chinese history and foreign history in a unitary vision of human progress. Nationalist emotions and political and ideological prejudices have been tentatively diluted to give space for concepts such as civilization, plurality, integration, exchange and mutual influence.

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33 LSBX, 3, chapter 21.
However, a reading of textbooks reveals that the new revised texts do not really represent a shift in historical narrative nor do they weaken the nationalist spirit and political concerns which inspire many interpretations of past events.

First, the priority given to patriotic values and nationalist feelings in history learning is still evident in narratives of ancient and modern history as well. Confucian philosophy, material success of post-Mao reforms, technological advancements of the imperial age all are discussed as “emotional topics” in order to nourish students’ pride for national achievements. Moreover, Chinese state-centered approach is dominant not only in political history, but in the study of past economy, society and culture as well. The Chinese nation-state, taken for granted in ancient times, is the main source of understanding and judgement of historical events, processes and personalities. As for the last point, it is worth noting that textbooks implicitly suggest high school students’ identification with the educated patriotic élite of previous generations in order to nourish their sense of responsibility toward the nation and the State.

Secondly, in the textbooks considered in this paper, the need to integrate “foreign history”—which is exclusively constituted by Western countries’ selected historical experiences—to national history seems functional in building a tale of human progress where socialist China’s development becomes fully appreciated. On one side, the history of Western civilization is offered mainly from a comparative perspective to help students to understand the specificities of the Chinese historical path beginning from antiquity. On the other side, it represents a reserve of historical examples necessary to educate students on social and human values. These values are deemed important in the material advancement of contemporary China as pragmatism, rationality, readiness to innovate, and openness. As for relations between China and the rest of the world, while in the modern period their study is framed in the well-known paradigm of Chinese people’s fight against foreign imperialism, the development of economical and cultural exchanges between China and developed capitalist countries in the globalized world are presented as a confirmation of socialist China’s successful path towards modernization and international ascent.

In conclusion, the attempt to offer a more integrated view of the Chinese and the world past in current Chinese textbooks does not seem to reflect a substantial will to re-discuss the relevance of nationalism and ideological training in history education, but it could be seen as the effect of a current reconfiguration of Chinese national identity in a more global context. It serves as a sign of stronger confidence of political and intellectual élites in their own country’s capacity to keep up with the West in world competition.
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Yuan Weishi, “Xiandaihua yu lishi jiaokeshu” (Modernization and history textbooks), Bingdian, January 11, 2006.


Smith, Marx and Weber

Along with histories of power, histories of material life and economic growth are the most popular of metanarratives currently published in the growing field of global history. Indeed no surprise will be occasioned by the appearance in our times, of accelerated “globalization”, of histories seeking to encompass a “global economy”, dealing with chronologies going back millennia and written to expound upon the disparate levels of material progress achieved by tribes, societies, communities and national economies located on all the world’s continents. Such concerns continue to be the litmus test of the mission of global economic history to keep “humanity in view”. After all, most people, in most places for most of history have been preoccupied with obtaining food, shelter, clothing and other manufactured artefacts that they required to sustain either a basic, a comfortable and only latterly, an agreeable standard of living.

Traditions of historical enquiry into the wealth and poverty of nations began with Herodotus but modern paradigms for investigation need be traced no further back than to the towering intellects of two cosmopolitan, but perhaps equally “Eurocentric” Germans: Karl Marx and Max Weber. Both scholars maintained a serious interest (admittedly as a counterpoise to Europe) in the evolution of the Indian, Chinese, American and Russian economies. Although Weber’s investigations into Oriental religions, philosophies, cities and states look far more serious than anything written by Marx and Engels.

The vocabularies and concepts borrowed by generations of historians from the corpus of writings left by Marx and Weber can no longer be presented as coherent theory. Nevertheless, it is still heuristic – when trying to understand material progress and relative decline across continents over long spans of time – to distinguish Marxian from Weberian approaches. The
former has classically been concerned to investigate the potential for material progress embodied in distinctive “modes of production” observed for different parts of the world. While the Weberian “research programme” can be divided into two major strands of inquiry: firstly, a comparison of hegemonic systems of belief (cultures), operating to promote or constrain personal and group behaviour in economic life; and coupled secondly, with an empirical analysis of how the political, legal and institutional frameworks within which economic activity is embedded has operated historically to foster or hinder economic development around the world.

In classical Marxian thought, the only mode of production capable of generating sustained material progress, “capitalism”, is based upon wage labour and the accumulation of capital. Marx found that the first transition from pre-capitalist to capital modes of production occurred first in Western Europe. Thereafter global historians (working within a Marxian tradition) have addressed his question of when and why did the transition occur there before considering the obverse question: what sorts of “pre-capitalist” modes of production prevailed throughout Africa, Asia and the Amerindian Americas that delayed or arrested comparable transitions to capitalism upon other continents?

Recently a “deviant” (or supplementary) Marxian paradigm has been elaborated in an impressive volume of research conducted by the World Systems School of Historical Sociology. This “School” maintains that the transition to capitalism (or commercial society) that led eventually to the establishment of successful industrial market economies occurred initially in Western Europe because Europeans reaped timely and decisive gains from intercontinental trade and the colonization of the Americas for some three or more centuries before the onset of the French and Industrial Revolutions. Europe’s economic benefits from centuries of participation in inter-continental commerce and imperialism are broadly conceived to encompass positive externalities as well as a range of favourable political, institutional and cultural feedbacks and spin-offs connected to ever increasing flows of commodities shipped into European ports from all over the world, from across the Atlantic and Indian oceans.

Unsurprisingly, the World System Schools’ emphasis upon the extension of markets for European exports to Asia, Africa and the Americas and above all its insistence on the pervasive significance of imports (embodying productive knowledge) from other continents has been contested. Classical Marxist scholars defend canonical texts concerned with progressive and non-progressive modes of production and thereby implicitly join forces with neo-classical economic historians who continue to regard the particularities of Europe’s own history as the motor of its earlier transition to capitalism or commercial society. Parenthetically, and for this particular debate, neither of these representations, nor that other unresolvable discussion about continuous
versus discontinuous transformations from one kind of traditional economic system to another, and ultimately more progressive, system seem to matter. What is now at issue is to specify and measure the significance of endogenous compared to exogenous forces promoting economic growth in one part of the world economy (Europe) and restraining a similar momentum on the continents of Asia, Africa and Southern America.

Unfortunately, Marxian scholarship concerned with Asiatic modes of production and with the presence, or absence, of peculiar forms of “feudalism” found outside Europe now looks more theoretical than historical. Furthermore, (and perhaps because the tradition was ostracized and ossified during the Cold War) classical Marxism seems less influential than its Weberian counterpart in establishing the parameters, structure and vocabulary of a discourse concerned with “restraints” which for several centuries operated to prevent Asiatic economies from following the “European trajectory” which was leading towards divergent standards of living between the West and the Rest that became discernible by the 1700s and conspicuous over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Unfortunately, the ad hoc comments made by Marx on Asian societies are now regarded as little more than typical Eurocentric speculations of his time, which led generations of his followers down a blind alley in search of supposedly ubiquitous and unchanging Asiatic modes of production.

Max Weber’s erudition is more impressive. His approach, questions and topics for investigation have effectively set the parameters for the construction of global histories of material progress written in recent decades. He dealt with long spans of time, read widely about classical and oriental civilizations and used comparative methods in order to comprehend why capitalism arose in the West and not in the East. Reading, as he did, over chronologies covering millennia, he recognized that the economies of India and China displayed impressive scientific and technical precocity. Weber appreciated that Arabs and Asians had established sophisticated systems and efficient institutions for the conduct of internal and overseas trade long before European ships and merchants began to sail regularly into and around the Indian ocean and China seas during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Weber remained less impressed than Adam Smith or Karl Marx, with the economic significance for European development of the discovery and colonization of the Americas. He was not inclined to rank the gains from trans-Atlantic trade and colonization above endogenous forces, operating over centuries of history to promote economic growth within Europe. Thus in line with classical Marxism, Weber retained an appreciation of how and why the accumulation of capital and the evolution of slave, through feudal to free markets for labour mattered as “proximate” determinants of material progress within Western Europe.
For a growing band of scholars, concerned to include an analysis of
intercontinental connexions in their metanarratives about the long run history
of material progress, Weber elaborated upon themes that have exercised a
powerful impact on modern stories told about the economic success of the
West and the relative failures of the East over the past 400 years. Along with
Montesquieu and other thinkers of the Enlightenment, Weber (and
Weberians) believe that discernible contrasts in the institutional, ideological
and legal frameworks within which economic activities (especially internal
and overseas trade) were embedded in Europe compared to Asian economies
had prevailed for several centuries and that marked differences in religious
beliefs, family life, cultural conditioning, institutional frameworks and
political systems promoted divergent paths of economic growth that
eventually produced a clear divide within the world economy into affluent
and poor nations.

The New Global History of “Surprising Resemblances”

In recent decades, a modern generation of economic historians have carried
forward the Weberian tradition of attempts to explain for what became for at
least three centuries increasingly visible economic achievements of Western
societies in a global perspective. Weber left them with an approach, a
vocabulary and several suggestive hypotheses that have been accepted,
modified and also rejected by two generations of post war and post colonial
historical research. There are now libraries of books and articles dealing with
“Eastern” agriculture, industries, towns, commercial networks, communications,
trade, science, technologies, cultures, business organization, taxation, state
systems, government policies and cosmologies for the comprehension of
nature covering the centuries since the Tang dynasty (618-907) – some based
on research by historians from universities, not long emancipated from
imperial rule. This impressive, but still less than comprehensive, volume of
historical investigations has, moreover, been communicated to the West by
specialists in area studies from North American, European, Australian and
Japanese universities. Not long after the second world war and during an era
of decolonization, historians were offered an opportunity – provided by the
accumulation of a large and sophisticated body of knowledge (long available
about Europe and North America), but emerging on Asia, the Middle East
and Africa and Latin America – to reposition their hitherto disconnected
histories of wealth and poverty one against another in order to construct
global histories of material progress that might have satisfied the aspirations
of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Smith and their “enlightened” followers and
pleased Max Weber.
Clearly, and as a prelude to any scholarly analysis, and explanation, it will be necessary to date the divergence in living standards between the western and eastern ends of the Eurasian landmass because the assumption that unmistakable gaps in real incomes per capita and labour productivities (measured for the decade preceding the Great War) must have evolved and prevailed for centuries prior to that time, cannot supported with hard economic data. Indeed recent historical research on Asia has produced some partial, regionally specific and still inconclusive evidence to suggest that standards of living in Western Europe and the maritime provinces of China, South India and South East Asia may not have differed perceptibly much before the eighteenth century.

That contestable suggestion has led global historians, labelled as “Eurocentric” by their opponents, to fall back upon unquantified “Weberian” (and “Marxist”) assertions that the economies of “North Western” Europe were surely on potentially more promising trajectories for early transitions to efficient industrial market economies for “several” centuries before even the more developed regions of Asia. Europe’s cultures, political systems, property rights, legal frameworks, regimes for the discovery and diffusion of reliable knowledge, commercial and financial organizations, trading networks, markets for commodities, labour and capital are conventionally represented as being altogether more likely, than anything discernible in Asian systems of production to have generated: preconditions for factories, mechanized industry and steam-powered transportation by land and sea; for the generation of inanimate forms of energy; for the reorganization of agriculture and commerce into concentrated locations and functional farms and firms.

More than three decades ago, Marshal Hodgson (one of the Godfathers of modern global history) opined that “all attempts to invoke pre-modern seminal traits in the occident to account for the divergence in living standards can be shown to fail under close historical analysis”. Two generations of post war research on India, China and South East Asia (synthesized in the recent writings by Fernand Braudel, Kirit Chaudhuri, Guder Frank, Jack Goldstone, Jack Goody, John Hobson, Ken Pomeranz, John Reid, Kaoru Sugihara, David Washbrook, Bin Wong, Harriet Zurndorfer, Prasannan Parthasarathi, Victor Lieberman, et al) concur. From his own impressive and detailed comparisons of levels and types of economic development achieved by European and Asian economies during the early modern period, Braudel inferred that “the populated regions of the world faced with demands of numbers seem to us to be quite close to each other.” But there is, he observed,

a historiographical inequality between Europe and the rest of the world. Europe invented historians and made good use of them Her own history is
well lit and can be called as evidence or used as claim. The history of non-
Europe is still being written. And until the balance of knowledge and
interpretation has been restored, the historian will be reluctant to cut the
Gordian knot of world history.

One distinguished historian of Western Europe, David Landes, displays no
such reluctance and his celebrated book, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations*
(1998) elaborates over some 600 odd pages on an “historical record”, of
“Weberian” preconditions which he claims demonstrates why “for the last
thousand years Europe (the West) has been the prime mover of development
and modernity”.

Modern historical research, has, however virtually “degraded” (or at least
severely qualified) repetitions of Marxist and Weberian assertions that the
political, institutional and cultural frameworks within which economic
activities in Asia were embedded for centuries before the Industrial
Revolution, differed from Europe in ways that clearly and *significantly
impeded*: the evolution and integration of commodity and factor markets, the
development of financial intermediation, the spread of private property
rights, the operations of mercantile networks, proto industrialization and
above all the commercialization of agriculture. What recent but different
syntheses of whole libraries of historical research on the economies of Asia
(as well as Europe) observe and document are not only a range of advanced
and less developed regions across Western Europe, but (to use a now famous
phrase by Ken Pomeranz) a “world of surprising resemblances” across
Eurasia. Surveys of monographic literature have effectively rendered a
whole corpus of Marxian and Weberian interpretations redundant. It can no
longer be taken for granted that for centuries before the Industrial Revolution,
European economies experienced virtually exceptional transitions to
capitalism; evolved discernibly more efficient legal, behavioural, institutional
and political frameworks for the formation, integration and operation of
markets, and thereby allowed for progress (albeit at a slow rate and with
limited help from new technologies) down a path prescribed for in models of
Smithian growth. Historians of pre-industrial Asia have, furthermore,
analysed “cultures” that encouraged industrious and ambitious households to
transform their extra earnings into displays of possessions and luxuries.
Their work reveals that, contrary to the expectations of Werner Sombart (and
his modern European followers), common attributes of material life
appeared in too many cities, towns and villages across the Eurasian
landmass, for anyone to single out the “rise of material culture” as something
peculiar to the supposedly uniquely “acquisitive” and “industrious”
households of Western Europe.

Furthermore and before the era of liberal imperialism (from the Opium to
the Great War) states everywhere placed impediments in the path of
Smithian growth that emanated essentially from the spread and integration of
markets. That endlessly repeated (endemic but always implausible) notion that dynastic and territorial rivalries among European states consistently provided more favourable (less unfavourable) conditions for the operation of market forces during the early modern era of mercantilism and warfare has also been questioned. More simplistic versions of the hypothesis conflate virtuous circles and cycles for development flowing from “competition” with the destructive violence and rivalries of early modern European power politics. Notions (that have been floating around since Montesquieu) that the emperors, sultans, kings and bureaucracies of “despotic” eastern empires ruled over their economies (and ergo their fiscal bases) in irrational ways that can be represented as more predatory, arbitrary and consistently and peculiarly malign towards Smithian growth now look increasingly obsolete as historical scholarship.

In the recently reconstructed economic histories of a “world of surprising resemblances” canonical accounts of Smithian growth – of European economies growing up gradually but inexorably on distinctive market led trajectories within their restricted and relatively underdeveloped promontory of Eurasia – look untenable simply because too many “seminal” traits of the Occident turn out to be not only ubiquitous, but prior features of the Orient. Perhaps such Weberian (and/or Marxian) perceptions will be revived and underpinned by further research and debate. Research (or even a renewed search among extant histories) might delineate and perhaps measure unmistakeable/incontestable differences in the scale, scope and intensity of Smithian growth across time and space. Meanwhile and as recent reconconfigurations of Asian economic history become known and acceptable (to all but an anachronistic generation of historians and a-historical economists) and debate moves on from the realm of acrimony towards conversation, we may well witness a revival of more nuanced and carefully specified long run historical explanations for divergencies in productivity and living standards between east and west, that historians have long agreed became predictable during the eighteenth, unmistakable over the nineteenth and stark during the twentieth century, but which are disappearing today.

**Revisionist Explanations for Delayed and late Divergences Between Eastern and Western Economies**

Meanwhile to suggest (as anti Weberian revisionists do) that an unexpected and unpredictable conjuncture between East and West appeared quite suddenly in the late eighteenth century also remains too fragile to stand as a core hypothesis about long-run global economic development. That is so because they offer three contested explanations for both this ostensibly “late” and “great divergence”. 
The first contention is that in different ways, for different reasons and along different chronologies, imperial governmental structures in the Orient became increasingly incapable of providing their subject populations and territories with the good order, protection against external aggression and other public goods required to maintain satisfactory levels of private economic activity, market integration and innovation. In short, strategic and administrative defects afflicting the Safavid, Ottoman, Mughal and Ming-Qing empires, intensified through time and thereby made space for the rise of the West. Investigations into the nature, extent and significance of political crises (clearly affecting three of these Oriental empires in the eighteenth century and China by the time of the White Lotus Rebellion) continue and are leading to the kind of insights now coming on stream from comparative histories of early modern European states, concerned to contrast the evolution of political arrangements and policies conducive or obstructive towards economic growth and innovation within Western Europe. This debate about the constitutions of government and behaviour of states will only be taken forward by social scientists who know something about the histories of political and other subordinate institutions, their diverse forms and the precise ways they interconnected with the economic activities of households, farms and firms not only in early modern Europe, for Asia as well. Repetition of recycled enlightenment equations between republicanism, liberty and parliamentary forms of governance on the one hand and transitions to industrial market economies on the other, seem less and less satisfactory. The theories, concepts and taxonomies now emerging in illuminating forms from neo institutional economics, need to feed into and be reformulated in the light of historical investigations into specific political, legal and institutional frameworks that promoted and restrained national, regional and sectoral rates and patterns of economic growth across the whole of Eurasia.

Secondly, and at the heart of the key revisionist explanation for divergence, between East Asia and Western Europe is a quintessentially classical growth story which is based upon an impressive array of historical scholarship investigating connexions and mechanisms derived ultimately from the writings of Smith, Malthus and Ricardo. For example, Pomeranz agrees with classical economists who represented cultivable land as a relatively fixed factor of production and who perceived that additions to the stocks of useful and reliable knowledge could only generate incremental and strictly limited rates of technological progress. Historians know that upswings in population growth led (only in extremis and in some Asian regions) to Malthusian crises, but more commonly both in Western Europe and in the Ming-Qing Empire to constricting shortages of land intensive crops and agrarian raw materials, including: basic foodstuffs, timber utilized for manufacturing and construction, wood converted into fuel and energy for
both industrial and domestic purposes and fibres derived from plants and animals for purposes of transformation into textiles.

Over some two or more centuries, before 1750, when population growth rates in Europe and China advanced at comparable rates, the Chinese economy coped with the “pressure of numbers” basically by intensifying labour in order to relieve shortages of food and agrarian raw materials. For Pomeranz, and other scholars (who reject Eurocentric explanations for the great divergence cast in terms of Smithian growth), the core problem is to explain how and why European economies did not proceed down the same path as China, but instead avoided diminishing returns to labour engaged in agriculture and proto-industries and gradually diffused mechanized techniques of production across manufacturing and transportation. Pomeranz reposed the key question very cogently: “why” he enquired, “did England’s economy not continue to develop like the economy of the Yangzi Delta?” In other words modern revisionism insists, as Marc Bloch advised long ago, on carefully specified and reciprocal comparisons of economics with comparable geographical endowments.

The answers offered by the new global history are carefully supported with a reflexive reading of modern scholarship on China and Europe, and refer to contrasts between endogenous and exogenous potential for the avoidance of diminishing returns to the land and other natural resources available to China and to Europe. They suggest that after millennia of successful land management, Chinese agriculture stood closer to its production possibility boundary than European agricultures. Possibilities for coping with population pressures by extensions to margins of cultivation and cropping, through tenurial reform, investments in the infra-structure for intra-regional trade and specialization, by reallocating pasture to arable, improving the control of water supplies, implementing efficient food stabilization policies, etc., had already been carried further in China than Europe.

Europe not only enjoyed some discernible (alas, unmeasurable) opportunities for taking up “slack” within the agrarian system, but the potential gains from trade and specialization in foodstuffs and raw materials within northern and southern, eastern and western parts of western Eurasia remained greater than the long exploited patterns of intra-regional trade within the Chinese Empire. Indeed (and as demographic pressures intensified over the eighteenth century), the potential for trade diminished because, unfortunately, rates of population increase became faster among China’s poorer, less urbanized, provinces of primary production. The empire’s northern and inland provinces then adjusted by: reallocating surplus agricultural labour into proto-industry; consuming higher proportions of both the food and agrarian raw materials produced within their regional boundaries and by importing less manufactured goods. Thus China’s tradition of precocious Smithian growth, high levels of trade and path
dependency based upon a mix of labour intensive crops (particularly rice), rendered the imperial economy more “ecologically vulnerable” than most of Europe to population pressures when they intensified over the century before the Industrial Revolution.

Nevertheless, revisionists insist (and have traduced a not entirely convincing body of evidence to support their view), that Britain and all other the organic economies of Western Europe were also on a similar trajectory of diminishing returns and rising costs for the production of food, fuel and fibres, but the “core” postponed the onset of more severe ecological problems and shortages during the early phases of industrialization in the eighteenth century and circumvented them over the nineteenth century by exploiting two “windfalls” of massive significance, namely: endowments of cheap and accessible energy in the form of coal, and the fecund soils and abundant natural resources of the Americas.

In bringing to the foreground the contribution of the Americas, revisionists have returned our attention to exogenous (overseas) sources of Western Europe’s economic advance, underlined by Adam Smith and Karl Marx and reified in recent decades into a “primus mobile” by Wallerstein, Chase-Dunn, Blaut, Frank, Gills and others grouped into the World Systems School of Historical Sociology.

As for coal and other natural endowments, Wrigley and an earlier generation of British economic historians had already explored the profound significance and widespread ramifications of endowments of cheap fossil fuels in allowing Britain to escape (before the rest of Europe) from potential “Malthusian traps”. Although precise calculations are difficult to make and several figures (including revised estimates from Pomeranz) jostle for recognition the tradition of energy accountancy as a way of explaining increasing and decreasing returns go back to the nineteenth century. It is not difficult to accept that school’s major conclusions, namely that the substitution of coal and steam power to provide for the heat supplied to Britain (and with lags to other European economies) by oxen, horses, wood and manpower for various benchmark decades after the Napoleonic Wars, would (counterfactually) have absorbed ever increasing and implausibly large shares of Europe’s inelastic supplies of agricultural land. Furthermore, all forms of heat intensive industry and transportation (metallurgy, glass, pottery, beer, sugar and salt, refining soap, starch, railways and ships) benefited from the substitution of coal for other more costly and less efficient organic forms of energy. Feedbacks and spin-offs from the mining, transportation and utilization of coal, including the construction of canals, precision engineering and, above all, the impetus provided by coal for the development, improvement and diffusion of engines for the provision of energy from steam, remain impossible to calculate. They became central for Europe’s aptly named “age of steam”. Yet that age (1846-1914) remained
imminent rather than dominant during the first stages of the industrial revolution, which occurred decades before that particular golden age of liberal capitalism.

Furthermore (and to revert to Bloch’s reciprocal mode of comparative history), the question of why China failed to exploit its known and very considerable deposits of coal, and thus become more like England, Belgium and Westphalia has not been, pursued in the depth that such a salient contrast demands. Chinese coal may or may not have been more combustible and less well located than European deposits, but it stayed below ground as an abundant and presumably as a potentially more efficient source of energy, compared to the manpower, wind and water that the Chinese, Japanese and other Asian economies continued to utilize throughout the nineteenth century. References to geology, geography and transportation problems do not seem to be sufficient to explain why China neglected to exploit its endowments of coal throughout the age of steam?

The Significance of Intercontinental Trade for European Transitions to Industrial Market Economies

Finally, (to return to Adam Smith and overseas expansion) Europeans (not Chinese, Arabs or Indians) discovered, conquered, infected, plundered, colonized and eventually established mutually beneficial, commercial relationships with the Americas. That protracted enterprise should neither be designated as “peripheral” nor reified (as it continues to be in the writings of Immanuel Wallerstein, James Blaut and the world systems school of historical sociology) as the ‘motor’ driving Europe’s benign transformation towards successful industrial market economies over the course of the nineteenth century.

Material benefits from the rediscovery of the Americas did not come on stream for a long time after 1492, and accrued disproportionately to two latecomers and free riders – the Netherlands and England. No doubt quantitative exercises in national accountancy designed to measure the macro-economic significance of transatlantic commerce for either the development of Europe as a whole, or even for particular countries such as the Netherlands or Britain (most persistently and profitably involved with expansion overseas) are fraught with conceptual and statistical difficulties. No economic historian could deny that the establishment of colonies regulated along mercantilist lines, together with slave plantations in the New World, turned the terms and conditions for trans-Atlantic trade in favour of the West, compared to a counterfactual scenario, whereby the settlement and the build-up of viable and independent economies in the Americas depended upon unregulated, but unprotected private investment and the immigration of
free labour from Europe rather than the enslavement of millions of Africans. Furthermore, recent research into world trade in bullion has clarified the importance of the complex and multifaceted role played by Chinese, Indian and South East Asian demand for New World silver in maintaining the profitability and momentum of European investment in the Americas for some two centuries before the Industrial Revolution. That investment also promoted an entirely gradual movement towards the integration and growth of an embryonic global economy, within which the separated maritime towns and regions of Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas interacted – usually with more positive and widespread effects for European than for South and East Asian development.

Nevertheless, a national accounts framework continues to be the only viable perspective available to historians who wish to specify and quantify the overall significance of variables, such as intercontinental exports and imports for national (and European wide) rates of capital formation and structural change and innovation from 1492 to 1815. If (as Paul Bairoch’s imperfect and badly referenced data suggest), European exports to other continents and imports from the Americas, Asia and Africa are but “small” percentages of the total value of European output, then inferences that either the Americas (or the non-European World as a whole) continued, as late as the end of the eighteenth century, to play a comparably minor role for the advance of the West could only be meaningfully challenged in two ways. First, (and this logic could be compelling), in early modern Europe, economic growth took place as specific margins and if a large share of the annual increment to total European (or to particular national products) can be connected directly or indirectly to intercontinental commerce, then that over-publicized and glamorous sub-sector of several maritime economies might indeed be plausibly represented as “highly significant” for the economic advance of the West. Quantitative tests could then relate the gains from intercontinental trade to “net” capital formation and to aggregated volumes of potentially “tradable outputs” in order to manufacture ratios that are more relevant for locating, dating and comprehending the sources of economic growth from, say, 1500 to 1800. Revisionists, who take their perceptions from Adam Smith, will prefer to shift the focus for concentration to Britain, which over time became more involved than any other European economy (including The Netherlands) with intercontinental commerce and colonization. Perhaps, however, that shift looks far too convenient, simply because the “ratios of significance” for a precocious and quintessentially “British” Industrial Revolution (diffused as traditional and now degraded stories would have us believe with lags onto the mainland) will become that much larger and rhetorically more persuasive as numbers, designed to represent the importance of the Americas (and via their connexions with Asia) for the transitions of the West into modern industrial market
economies. Britain cannot represent the West and its peculiar transformation to an industrial market economy and was never a paradigm for its rivals on the mainland to follow.

Another route that can be followed in order to make the case in a less parsimonious way, but which comes closer to the details of micro dynamism favoured by economic historians (like Fernand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein and Ken Pomeranz) is to construct narratives built around the array of imports that Europeans transhipped from the New World and Asia back into their famous maritime ports (Lisbon, Seville, Cadiz, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Bordeaux and London). Imports represent tangible manifestations of the “bounty” that Europe eventually obtained from investments in commerce and colonization in the Americas and (by way of extension and linkages) to gains from trade and unequal exchanges with Asia as well.

American and Asian commodities carried into Europe included: bullion, foodstuffs, manufactured goods, industrial inputs and raw materials. These imports, obtained in very large part through the exercise of coercion designed to secure favourable terms of trade, increased in volume with the incorporation of maritime Atlantic economies into global commerce, slowly at first, but more rapidly as the infra-structure and organizations required for long distance trade were built up over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Histories of spin-offs and externalities have been woven around most of the major imports from other continents shipped into European ports. Their connexions to the extension of benefits from long established patterns of intra-European trade, to the foundation of new food processing industries, to geopolitical rivalry and state formation, to the growth in the wealth and powers of merchant oligarchies, to the rise of maritime cities, to changes in science, technology and the arts; indeed to almost all aspects of European economic, political and urban life have been elaborated in a plethora of histories of sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa, maize, rice, tobacco, tropical fruit, tomatoes, beans, chillies, potatoes, timber hardwoods, dyestuffs, wax, fish, oils, cotton fibres; quinine, curveé sarsparilla, pecal, laxatives; porcelain, silk and cottons, textiles and above all to silver and gold. That bibliography is long. Volumes imported fluctuated but increased on trend. Points of entry and distribution for Asian and American imports changed through time from city to city and from country to country. The problem of interpretation is how to plausibly connect imports from other continents to narratives (or models) of early modern European development in which national economies are carried forward to plateaux of possibilities from where transitions to industrial market economies became probable?

Fernand Braudel, Giovanni Arrighi and Charles Kindleberger find the key mechanisms they wish to underline in a geopolitical matrix of dynamic circuits between maritime cities, big merchants and nation states. Pomeranz devotes his research and analysis to two possible macro-economic
One operates through a thesis recently elaborated by Jan de Vries about Europe’s pre-modern “industrious” revolution, which emanated from decisions by myriads of western households to work harder and to allocate more of the labour time and other resources under their control to production for markets. Behind such decisions are shifts in tastes or propensities to consume, stimulated by the availability of “exotic” and “addictive” foodstuffs – such as sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa, tobacco, tropical fruit, tomatoes and spices; pharmaceuticals, opiates and luxurious but affordable Asian manufactures such as silks, jewels and porcelain, and above all, cottons from the East. In brief, the rise of material culture in Europe has been linked, in carefully specified and documented ways, to intercontinental trade and colonization to changes in consumption and investment and to the patterns of work by European households.

Apparently nothing comparable occurred in East and South Asia because the consumption of tropical groceries, porcelain, silks and cotton textiles and other indigenous products had already diffused down the social scale. In the Orient, imperial states had virtually no fiscal or other interest in the promotion of commerce and colonization that might in the fullness of time pay for itself in the form of imported and taxable luxuries. At the same time, Chinese and Indian demands for foodstuffs and manufactures produced in Europe remained limited in volume and scope. Although the new world silver that European merchants exchanged for Asian foodstuffs, manufactures and raw materials presumably promoted monetary transactions and internal trade in China and India in the same way that American bullion did within Europe?

Revisionists have made the most of a not unconvincing case for symbiotic linkages between the luxurious, exotic, addictive and desirable characteristics embodied in imports from Asia and the Americas to: the industrious revolution, the maintenance of European commitments to intercontinental trade, the enslavement of Africans and flows of investment into colonization and plantations in the New World. They cite literature which locates the impetus to development from urban processing industries (sugar refining, coffee roasting, tea and tobacco blending, etc.) in maritime cities, heavily engaged in trans-oceanic commerce. They are familiar with histories that explain how the manufacture of cotton textiles in Britain developed over the eighteenth century within a matrix of trade with India, the import of cotton fibres from slave plantations in the Americas, state involvement with its East India company and the promotion of a functional process of import substitution by English Parliaments from 1660-1721.

It should be heuristic to confront this argument, which foregrounds the role of Asian and Americas imports in bringing about divergent economic developments between Western Europe and East Asia. First the share of the calorific intake supplied by sugar, tea and other tropical groceries could only
have been small. Growing proportions of British merchant ships were indeed built in North American colonies (and in Asia) even before the French blockades cut off supplies of Baltic timber and other naval stores (pitch, tar and hemp) during the Napoleonic Wars. Nevertheless, established patterns of East-West and intra-European trade in timber reverted to normal after that war, and iron rather than American forests alleviated European shortages of wood for construction and for shipbuilding in the nineteenth century.

Yes, a statistically compelling case for the substitution of cotton fibres grown on slave plantations in the Americas, for supplies of flax, hemp, silk and wool grown in Europe can be made. Yet, once again, the scale of imports in relation to total consumption of indigenous fibres becomes important later rather than earlier in the nineteenth century. The suggestion that supplies of cotton wool from the Americas had long been “virtually indispensable” for the development of mechanized cotton textile production in Europe is not convincing because an equally plausible counterfactual scenario can be formulated to suggest that the accumulating and steadily improving capacity to produce mechanized cotton yarn and cloth first in Britain and then elsewhere on the continent, would have stimulated other primary producers in Asia (even China) and the Middle East to respond to European demand for cotton fibres.

New economic history consigned axioms of indispensability to the realms of improbability four decades ago. There is certainly a more nuanced but less dramatic argument to be made for the importance of supplies of slave produced cotton fibres, namely that cheap raw materials promoted the growth of one major manufacturing industry in Europe and that the engineering problems involved in the mechanization of spinning and weaving cloth were more easily solved with fibres with the tensile properties of cotton, than thrown silk (not so clear!), wool, flax, and hemp. Nevertheless, in rather short compass the problems of mechanizing all major processes in the production of cloth made from the entire range of natural fibres were solved. By then supplies of cheap flax from Russia and wool from Australia, Argentina and other primary producers come on stream to supply Europe’s textile industries with all the fibres that they could process mechanically.

Divergence and Convergence

The problem of “the Great Divergence” between Western Europe and East Asia is important for social scientists to address simply because it is still with us as a North-South divide. We can agree that the early shift from organic to inorganic forms of energy provided Europe (particularly Britain) with an early start. Nevertheless, and for several reasons, the other leg of the
revisionist explanation (which follows the line taken by Adam Smith, Karl Marx and the World Systems School) that the discovery, conquest and exploitation of the Americas also generated comparably large windfall gains and allowed Western Europe to circumvent the problems of diminishing returns afflicting oriental empires carries less conviction.

First of all, classical diminishing returns to land seem less applicable to India and South East Asia than to China. Furthermore, the convergence of Japan (despite a poor endowment of natural resources) undermines histories based on classical growth models. Secondly, and on any recasting and reconfiguration of the data, now available to measure the significance of intercontinental commerce, standard exercises in national income accountancy are unlikely to provide persuasively large ratios. Meanwhile the now fashionable post-modern retort that large outcomes could flow from small changes to exogenous variables, simple destroys any claims that economic history might have to precision. We might rhetorically enquire if small outcomes could flow from large changes to endogenous variables?

Thirdly, it is not at all clear that the arable land, pastures, forests and seas of Western Europe, together (and through trade) with its periphery to the East and South could not have sustained the rates of population growth, industrialization and urbanization experienced say, down to the mid-nineteenth century, without massive imports of primary produce from the Americas. To hark back to the central point of Mark Elvin’s classic book, was it not the case that China had exhausted more of the potential gains from intra-regional trade, intensification of labour inputs and agrarian improvements well before the growth of its population accelerated in the eighteenth century. Elvin’s thesis can moreover, be reformulated in the language of classical economics. Compared to Western Europe, just how far were China (and other regions of Asia) away from their (technologically constrained) production possibility boundaries or what historians of the Qing empire refer to as involution. Classical economists (Smith and Malthus) both perceived that China had proceeded further and had continued to move faster down the path of diminishing returns.

Leaving coal aside, the intercontinental trade data suggests that Europe possessed the foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials required to persist with Smithian growth and the urbanization and industrialization of the workforce without recourse to massive imports of primary produce from the Americas until well into the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, the accumulation, testing and application of a body of reliable knowledge required to carry the mechanization and transformation of industry and transport, the deployment of steam power, urbanization and reorganization of finance and commerce had proceeded a long way and perhaps beyond a point of no return.
With these observations, which are concerned with the unavoidable and important demarcation of relevant chronologies in place, I wish to underline a distinction that has perhaps not been made clearly enough throughout the modern debate about interconnexions between “The Industrial Revolution” and “The Great Divergence”. The Industrial Revolution owed something – but probably not as much as Adam Smith suggested to the incorporation of the Americas into global commerce. That remains clear, if we look again at the volume and array of imports entering European ports before 1846. On the whole (and with the conspicuous exceptions of maize, potatoes and cotton fibres) imports merely “supplemented” supplies of the continents’ own basic foodstuffs and raw materials. The cargoes carried by ships into European ports were dominated for centuries by tropical groceries and manufactured luxuries. At most they embodied attributes that scholars (who “represent” the “rise of material culture”, “industrious revolutions” and the multifaceted role of grand merchants engaged in oceanic commerce as “preconditions” for Western Europe’s early industrialization) find appealing to place at the centre of their narratives about the origins of the North-South divide.

Agreed the Great Divergence and the Industrial Revolution form part of an interconnected narrative and the degree of divergence in labour productivities and real incomes between Europe in China, that had so clearly appeared by 1914, looks inconceivable without the massive supplies of basic foodstuffs and raw materials imported from the Americas and other primary producers. But since those supplies came on stream over the second half of the century, questions of what started and what sustained the Industrial Revolution should not be conflated.

In most of its essentials, the Industrial revolution which demarcates the beginnings (sources?) (origins?) of divergence had appeared several decades earlier. During its early stages tenuous and not highly significant connexions can be constructed between intercontinental commerce on the one hand and the substitution of coal-based forms of heat and power for traditional forms of energy derived from wood, wind, water, animals and human muscles on the other. Some elements of early and gradual mechanization of industrial processes (particularly for textiles can be linked to trans-oceanic trade, but again the connexions still seem more tangential than central. There are missing elements in current explanations for divergence which are concerned with “regimes” for the production and diffusions of useful and reliable knowledge in Europe and China. Technology really mattered for the Industrial Revolution and if the English and follower economies on the mainland might well (but for coal and close involvement with the Americas) gone the way of the Yangzi Delta, then why has even that commercialised and advanced region of the Manchu Empire taken such a long time to regain the economic rank and status it held in the world economy in the mid-eighteenth century and is regaining today?
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

**Rosa CAROLI** is Associate Professor of Japanese History in the Department of Linguistics and Comparative Cultural Studies, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. She is Visiting Researcher at the Institute for Ryukyuan and Okinawan Studies, Waseda University, the Institute of the International Japan-Studies and the Institute of Okinawan Studies, Hōsei University. Her major field is the evolution of Japan’s modern state with particular regard to identitarian discourses on both the nation and its peripheries. She has also written extensively about Okinawan history and is the author of various books and articles.

**Laura DE GIORGI** is Assistant Professor in History of Modern and Contemporary China at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. Her researches focus on media, communication and propaganda in modern and contemporary China, Chinese urban society, and the history of Sino-Italian relations in the twentieth century. Among her most recent publications: “In the shadow of Marco Polo: writing about China in fascist Italy”, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, vol. 15, n. 4, 2010; *Lontane, vicine. Cina e Italia nel Novecento*, Carocci Editore, Roma 2011 (with Guido Samarani); “Gender and Displacement in Developing Countries: Focus China.”, special issue of *DEP. Deportate, Esuli, Profughe*, n. 17, 2011 (co-edited with Sofia Graziani).

**Kent G. DENG** is Reader at the Department of Economic History, London School of Economics, and Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, UK (FRHistS). In 1994, he was awarded the prize for “The Best Thesis in the Last Four Years” by the International Economic History Association (IEHA). His research interests include Chinese economic history of all periods (ancient to present) and China in comparison to other civilisations, in growth and development in the global context.

**Samuel GUEX** is Associate Professor at the Department of East Asian studies, University of Geneva. He is the author of *Entre nonchalance et désespoir, les intellectuels japonais sinologues face à la guerre*, Peter Lang, Berne 2006, a study about Japanese sinologists during the Sino-Japanese war. Recently, his research has focused on the controversies between Japan, China and South Korea over history textbooks.


**Laurent NESPOULOUS** is Associate Professor of Japanese Ancient Archaeology and History at Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO, Paris). He is Associate Researcher at the University of Osaka (Faculty of Letters, Laboratory of Archaeology) and Editor of *Cipango – Cahier d’Études Japonaises*, one of the two
French Japanese studies journals. He is author of a PhD dissertation and various articles in French on Japanese protohistory, as well as on Japanese archaeology’s history.


**Guido SAMARANI** is Professor of Chinese Modern and Contemporary History at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. He is Guest Professor of the Chiang Kai-shek Center for the History of Modern China (Hangzhou, PRC) and member of the scientific and editorial committee of journals such as *European Journal of East Asian Studies* and *Minguo yanju. Republican Studies*. He is the author of various books and articles, published in Italy and outside Italy.

**Pierre-François SOUYRI** is currently Professor of History of Japan at Geneva University and Head of the Departement of East Asian Studies. He is former Director of Maison franco japonaise in Tokyo. His major research field is Japanese medieval society (*The World Turned Upside Down*, Columbia University Press, New York 2001) and has also done several research works on the intellectual history of modern Japan. He has recently published *Nouvelle Histoire du Japon*, Perrin, Paris 2010.

**Brij TANKHA** is Professor of Modern Japanese History at the Department of East Asian Studies, Delhi University. He is also former Director and current Honorary Fellow and Coordinator of the East Asia Programme, Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi. His major research interests are the intellectual and social history of modern Japan and Japan’s relations with Asia. His publications include *A Vision of Empire: Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan*, Sampark, Kolkatta 2003, London 2006; a translation of Sato Tadao’s *Mizoguchi Kenji no Sekai* (*Kenji Mizoguchi and The Art of Japanese Cinema*, Berg Publishers, London 2008); and (as an editor) *Shadows of the Past of Okakura Tenshin and Pan-Asianism*, Sampark, Kolkatta 2008.
ABSTRACTS

Rosa CAROLI

Bearers of Modernity: the West, Japan and Its Peripheries

Our present-day globalisation does not represent an unprecedented historical event, at least if we consider it a phenomenon that draws the world into a state of greater connectedness and interdependence. In fact, forms of worldwide connectedness and interdependence—such as modernisation, industrialisation or colonialism—can be found in the past as well. A common feature of all of these forms of globalisation is the threat they pose to culture and identity, since they differ dramatically from past human experience. Not unlike what happened to those living in times of modernisation, industrialisation or colonialism, historians today are called upon to look at the different responses that formulate this new global phenomenon in terms of culture and identity, as well as to re-examine the past in light of current events. Thus, even though globalisation is still underway, historiography has provided different tools to both interpret the present and re-examine the past. Global history or (as Patrick O’Brien calls it) the “restoration of global history” is one result of such activity. When possible, it offers a method and a framework that allows one to “construct negotiable meta-narratives”. For historians specialising in East Asia, examining the various micro-histories within and between East Asian societies entails numerous complications, such as the need to constantly re-formulate a vocabulary to interpret and narrate these histories. Thus, they should reconsider the value and meaning of micro-histories in terms of negotiable meta-narratives. In fact, by focusing on reading the particular language used by a given East Asian population to represent themselves and the outside world, we gain access to various inflections of global phenomena, in both the present and the past. This chapter addresses Japan’s interaction with modernity originating in the West and its reverberation at the nation’s peripheries, especially Okinawa. I (1) delineate how some Japanese scholars interpreted Okinawa from the perspective of Japan’s interaction with modernity, and (2) examine how Okinawa’s interaction with modernity was perceived by local scholars, especially Iha Fuyū (1876-1947). Finally, I (3) consider how attempts by both Japan and its periphery to construct their own version of modernity were thwarted by dominant Euro-American conceptions of modernity and their assumption of universality.

Laura DE GIORGI

Learning History in Globalizing China: An Overview of Chinese High-school History Textbooks

In the last decade, some relevant changes have taken place in the teaching of history to high school students in P.R. China. It is noteworthy, for example, that in 2003, the Ministry of Education has issued new experimental educational standards for the history curriculum in schools, in order to modernize the approach to Chinese and
world past and the teaching methodology. Following the new directives, new history textbooks have been published. However the issues concerning which kind of historical knowledge is suited to educate Chinese youth in contemporary age were controversial and this process was matched by the development of some limited, but anyway, significant public debate among historians and intellectuals.

This chapter offers a first-hand reading of one set of the most currently used history textbooks produced in China according to the new standards in history curriculum, the one published by the People’s Educational Press; its aim is to offer some insights about the approach about history teaching that seems currently emerging in China and about the self-representation of China’s identity in world history as it is being constructed in the age of globalization.

Kent G. Deng

*Role of the State and State-building in Modern China: Review and New Insight*

During the period from 1800 to 2000 China endured a great many serious crises and changes. The common root of changes in China can be traced to state-building, something that has been overlooked so far. The failure of the Qing Confucian state opened many doors for non-Confucian state-builders to impose different type of state on Chinese society. They had two things in common: they were all Social Darwinists and formed a tiny minority in society.

In this context, not all changes were that necessary. This is justifiable given that with the changes, the living standards of the ordinary Chinese declined. By the end of Mao’s rule, about half of the population were under the official poverty line. China did not become a better place to live until 1978.

This chapter probes into the issue of state-building and its impact on the well-being of the general public.

Samuel Guex

*Overcoming the Frame of National History in South Korea*

Korea is probably one of the most homogenous societies in the world. The peoples that entered the peninsula in antiquity gradually merged into a single ethnicity. Before its partition in 1945 and except for some brief periods, Korea had also been one of the oldest continuously unified states in the world. This unity and homogeneity, that emerged progressively over the centuries, has become an important part of Korean identity. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Koreans, who shared a common language, culture and history, but who had no nation-state of their own, found in nationalism, especially in its ethnic dimension, a powerful ideology of resistance against colonialism. After the liberation, nationalism provided an important tool to legitimize the regimes of Rhee Syngman and Park Chung Hee. To date, South Korean history textbooks still bear the signs of the master narrative developed at that time. This chapter examines the problems posed by such a “state-sponsored” history and explores some of the attempts in South Korea to overcome the frame of “national history”.
Arnaud NANTA

The Japanese Colonial Historiography in Korea (1905-1945)

Korea, conquered in 1905, was the “pearl” of the Japanese modern colonial empire. Although many Japanese and American writers have drawn up appraisals of post-1945 historiography after the decolonisation, very few have studied colonial historiography in Korea, which is to say the one written during colonisation.

This chapter does not deal with Japanese historiography of colonisation in Korea in the general sense, but on colonial knowledge, which studies the history of Korea in the wide sense of the word (every historical era) during the first half of the twentieth century. We also mention the discourses that dealt with the history of modern Korea or the history of colonisation at the same period. There were a plurality of historian discourses on Korea, which is not discussed here: as early as the 1910s and 1920s, English-speaking historians were analysing modern Korea and colonisation, and found Japanese presence in Korea perfectly legitimate. At the same time, Korean historiography of Japanese colonisation in Korea was starting. In other words, there was, a long time before decolonisation and synchronously with the “general” history of Korea, a historiography of the contemporary, and therefore colonial, period.

I limit myself to clarifying a few time periods, drawing an institutional overview and call up a few figures. Firstly, we see the links between history and colonialism—the discourses supporting colonisation—at the beginning of the twentieth century. Colonial history during the years 1905 to 1921 is then introduced. Finally and thirdly, I examine the links between the institutions of colonial Korea and the imperial university. As a conclusion, we give an overview of the post-colonial studies and their timeline.

Laurent NESPOULOUS.

Memories from Beyond the Past. Grasping Prehistoric Times in Japan: the Birth and Evolution of an “Archaeological Consciousness” (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries)

Archaeology, both in Western Europe and Japan, implies a very unique relationship to time. First, let us say that although it has been for a long time specialised in the very distant past—often forgotten or even out of the reach for the common historical consciousness—on the scientific disciplinary plan, it is one of the “youngest” human sciences. Then, in order to exist as the very contemporary approach of the past it constitutes, its existence relies on a complicated background of consciousness and awareness of the past, which has much to do with the diffused rise of interest toward ancient times, interest itself inscribed in modern times (or pre-modern times if we follow the English historical terminology) rather than in contemporary times (modern times). archaeology’s historicity is indeed an unusual “blend”.

In Japan, from an epistemological point of view, archaeology, as a method of investigating the past, came to its first maturity around the 1920s/1930s (not so different from its European sister). But in order to understand why such a disciplinary perspective was able to bloom, we need to keep in mind the long chronology of the numerous disrupted attempts in giving life and sense to ancient times, and, in this process, the encounter with unexpected times that went even
further back: what would later be eventually called “prehistory”. The making of this new consciousness of the beginning of times starts as soon as the seventeenth century, and we would like to emphasize its chronology and its turning points from then to nowadays.

Patrick Karl O’BRIEN
The Debate on Economic Divergence Between the Occident and the Orient. An Essay in Bibliography and Criticism

Modern debates on the ancient narrative of when, how and why the economies of western Europe diverged from those to the south and east of Eurasia originated with the publication of three controversial books at the turn of the century by David Landes, Andre Gunder Frank and Ken Pommeranz. Their hypotheses derived from Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Max Weber has spawned what has been a prolonged, widespread and heuristic debate in the burgeoning field of global history and has given rise to several ongoing programmes of research. It is the aim of this chapter in bibliography and criticism to survey and mediate its way through this stimulating discourse of which “History at Stake in East Asia” is a most worthy contribution.

Guido SAMARANI
Recent Trends in Chinese Historiography and the Debate on the 1911 Revolution

The 2011-2012 biennium is particularly relevant with regards to the historical memory of China: in particular, we commemorate the centenary of the Revolution of 1911 and the birth of the Republic of China.

The conferences and debates over the 1911-1912 centenary occur in a general context characterized by a steady growth of Chinese historiography. This reflects a process that took shape in the 1980s and that over the past two decades has seen enormous progress, even though certain themes and areas of research still remain insufficiently developed.

This chapter proposes, in the first part, to highlight certain recent trends in historiographical thinking in China on the periodization of Chinese history and, in the second part, to shine a light more specifically on the new analyses that emerged during the recent debate on the Revolution of 1911 and on the birth of the Republic of China.

Pierre-François SOUYRI
Representations of the “History of Japan” During the Meiji Era: Future at Stake

This chapter concentrates on Japan during the Meiji era between the years 1868 and 1912. In order to tackle the issue of representations in history, it focuses on two moments: the first period is between the years 1868 and 1872. At the time, the new government implemented numerous institutional reforms and finally ended the Japanese old order, known as the Tokugawa regime. The second period I concentrate on is between the years 1905 and 1910. It was during this time that Japan, who had been victorious over China and Russia, began to see itself as an
imperialistic power. They launched a policy of colonial expansion and became increasingly nationalistic. The goal of this chapter is to prove how the representations of people influence their political practices. Our visions of the past therefore mold our practices in the present. Ideological representations are always more complex than one would expect. The Meiji Restoration is a time where old or ancient Japan was overestimated with the ideal regime of the Emperor as the core of the State. This representation is no more useful after the military victories of Japan. Japan then creates the need to develop another historical narrative, where Japan’s history looks like Europe. How and why do these changes occur?

Brij TANKHA
Religion and Modernity in Meiji Japan: Strengthening the People

The certainties of nationalist historiography were lost a long time ago but many of the assumptions on which it was based continue to exercise a pervasive influence. The trajectory of Japanese history is still framed in the narrative of a modernising Meiji leadership and its creation of a nation-state. Are there other narratives at work that sought a different future?

The chapter focuses on the neglected question of religion and its role in shaping the discourse of modernity in Japan. Religion is usually seen as peripheral and left to specialists in religious philosophy but, as an increasing body of work demonstrates, religious leaders and ideas inspired and shaped the public discourse both to sustain the dominant state narratives as well as to question and pose alternative ways of being modern and Japanese. These debates drew upon and were a product of global and regional networks. They drew both on these “outside” influences but were also crucially shaped by their local roots. If history is not the past but the consciousness of the past used for present purposes (G. Dening) then this history allows a recovery of a neglected past and is suggestive for present predicaments.