Founder Education and Start-Up Funds Raised

3 —STEFANO FRANCO

- Luiss Business School, Luiss University, 00197
 Roma, Italy
- 6 FRANCESCO CAPPA
- 7 Department of Engineering, Campus
- $_{10}^{8}$ Bio-Medico University, 00128 Roma, Italy
- 11⁹ Luiss Business School, Luiss University, 00197
- 12 Roma, Italy
- 13 —MICHELE PINELLI
- 14 Faculty of Economics and Management, Free
- 15 University of Bozen, 39100 Bolzano, Italy
- 16 (Corresponding author: Stefano Franco.)
- 17 IEEE DOI 10.1109/EMR.2021.3077966

Abstract—Start-ups need investor funding to overcome the early stages of their life, during which they are more vulnerable and exposed to failure. They need to convince investors to fund their business ideas by signaling the potential success of their entrepreneurial venture, through a demonstration of cohesion, shared views, and determination. The educational background of the founders of start-ups can be a strong driver of start-up performance, as it is a visible signal for investors. However, education is composed of two different dimensions (i.e., its depth and its heterogeneity), and their configurations should be carefully considered. To clarify this aspect, in this article, we discuss the impact that these two education dimensions have on funds raised by startups in the early stages of their life. Results show that highly educated cofounders have improved access to external funding as long as they do not have highly heterogeneous educational backgrounds; in a parallel fashion, cofounders educated in different disciplines also have improved access to funding, as long as they have less advanced levels of education. These findings are relevant to start-up founders and indicate the best team configurations to guarantee better access to capital in the initial stages of their life.

Key words: Education, educational heterogeneity, educational level, fund raising, start-up

I. INTRODUCTION

START-UPS are among the most prominent sources of innovation and technological development, and they have contributed to economic growth and delivered value to consumers more than any other economic activity since the Industrial Revolution [1], [2]. Start-ups are a global phenomenon, as they are rapidly growing not only in Europe but in the U.S. and Asia as well [3]. Although COVID-19 is having a negative impact on the rise of new entrepreneurial ventures and will require new models of innovation [4], the start-up economy is still thriving. and it is now worth \$3 trillion [5], with high-tech ventures in the fields of blockchain, cybersecurity, and gaming likely to be the most resilient to this crisis [6]. However, for each successful start-up, there are still nine

that fail [7]. Start-up growth and 62 success, indeed, depend crucially on 63 their ability to raise funds in the early 64 stages of their life, when they lack 65 cash-flows to sustain costs and 66 investments. Airbnb's history is a 67 clear example of this. In the initial 68 phases of its life, Airbnb's business 69 model was not considered capable of 70 disrupting the market or of making 71 significant profits, and so it received 72 several funding rejections. However, 73 an investment of \$20 000 from the 74 accelerator Y Combinator gave its 75 founders the opportunity to develop 76 product and customer relationships, 77 and the results of this became 78 obvious months later when the 79 venture capital firm Sequoia invested 80 \$600 000 in it, allowing the start-up to 81 embark on a process which, after ten 82 years, has led the company to have 83 an estimated market value of over 84 \$18 billion [8]. This story shows why 85

0360-8581 © 2021 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See https://www.ieee.org/publications/rights/index.html for more information.

start-ups need and seek investors to 86 fund their businesses. In 2019. 87 venture capitalists invested a total of 88 \$300 billion in new ventures [5], 89 although this figure alone is hardly 90 sufficient to frame the phenomenon. 91 since several other categories of 92 start-up investors exist, such as 93 friends and family, business angels, 94 corporate investors, banks, 95 accelerators, incubators, and 96 dispersed individuals. In particular, 97 incubators and accelerators are 98 among the most diffused kind of 99 investors. Differently from the others, 100 they provide workspace and 101 competences for startups, allowing 102 them to grow, not just financially, but 103 also at the capability level [9], [10]. 104

For their part, investors fund start-ups 105 for three main reasons: making 106 profits, nurturing innovations in the 107 sectors, and developing projects in 108 which they believe. Organizations like 109 incubators and venture capitals invest 110 in start-ups that they believe can 111 rapidly become profitable and 112 guarantee good returns on 113 investment, evaluating market 114 potential, uniqueness of product and 115 service, and human resources [11], 116 [12]. In contrast, corporate investors 117 or large corporations invest in start-118 ups because they constitute possible 119 sources of innovation for their 120 business. Indeed, start-ups have 121 "promising ideas, organizational 122 agility, the willingness to take risk, and 123 aspirations of rapid growth" that are 124 missing in corporations [9, p. 66]. 125 Finally, friends, family, and crowd 126 backers can also be motivated by the 127 willingness to support projects they 128 consider worthy [14]. 129

However, investing in early stage 130 start-ups is extremely risky for any 131 kind of funder due to the absence of a 132 credible track record of past 133 organizational results and financial 134 information [1]. So, what drives an 135 investor to fund a start-up? Investors 136 must rely on signals of organizational 137 qualities that are associated with 138

future business success [15]-[19]. Such signals have to overcome existing information asymmetries between start-ups and investors [20] while convincing the latter that the former are worth investing in. Examples of effective signals can be affiliations with prestigious companies, consistent business plans, governance characteristics that improve start-up reputation and reliability [20], and convince investors that the business idea is valid and very likely to be commercialized. Among these factors, human capital is also important in instilling confidence and trustworthiness. The knowledge possessed by a start-up's founders is, in fact, the basis for its technological capabilities and so is fundamental for its future development [21]. Such knowledge is the result of skills acquired through education and experience. However, skills acquired through experience are defined as tacit, because they are difficult to recognize for investors, who, in contrast, may easily access information about founders' codified skills, i.e., the ones attained through education [22]. For this reason, a founder's education is one of the most significant factors in signaling the future success of start-ups to potential investors. Education may be decomposed into two dimensions: education level and the degree of its heterogeneity. In order to have a comprehensive view of the phenomenon, this article seeks to analyze the impact of both dimensions on the funds raised by start-ups in the early stages of their life. In this manner, we clarify the best conditions to increase the funds raised by a startup, an outcome relevant to both the founders of entrepreneurial ventures and to investors.

II. START-UP FOUNDER EDUCATION

A start-up's human capital of among its distinctive resources. Above all,

during a start-up's early stage, human 191 capital garners even more importance 192 due to the absence of established 193 performance, adequate financial 194 resources, and evidence that the 195 business idea could be effective. 196 Knowledge, in particular, is a human 197 capital dimension and it is recognized 198 as a resource that is capable of 199 generating a competitive advantage 200 [23], [24]. It is composed of a tacit 201 component and a codified 202 component. While tacit knowledge is 203 hard to recognize, codified 204 knowledge may be signaled by the 205 education of the start-up's founders. 206 As a result, education can be 207 considered an indicator of founder 208 knowledge and, in turn, human 209 capital. Consequently, the founders' 210 education is likely to be evaluated 211 and to function as a signal, whereas 212 investors are less likely to perceive 213 and reward the tacit value of human 214 capital. 215

Education, indeed, is considered the 216 most crucial investment to improve a 217 start-up's knowledge base [1]. Data 218 show that most start-ups are founded 219 by highly educated groups of people. 220 On average, in the EU, in the 2017-221 2018 period, 53% of founders had 222 completed a master's degree or 223 equivalent, 19.3% a bachelor's 224 degree, and 12.6% a doctoral degree 225 [25]. Thus, a total of 84,9% of start-up 226 founders had attended and 227 completed a higher education 228 program. In addition, previous studies 229 have shown that higher levels of 230 education are associated with a 231 higher likelihood of developing and 232 improving products and business 233 models, detecting business 234 opportunities, and obtaining financial 235 resources [26]. 236

Level of education, however, is only237one side of the coin when considering238the knowledge capital of a start-up.239Education, indeed, may also be240thought of as the number of different241fields of expertise in which one242person has achieved a certified, i.e.,243

codified, amount of knowledge, Such 244 diversity is known as education 245 heterogeneity. Higher education 246 heterogeneity manifests itself when 247 founders are specialized in the areas 248 of expertise that are different from 249 each other, and the degree of startup 250 heterogeneity corresponds to the set 251 of heterogeneity brought by each 252 founder. For example, a start-up 253 operating in the biotech industry may 254 have founders educated in 255 biotechnology and others educated in 256 business studies. Such start-ups 257 present a higher degree of education 258 heterogeneity compared to a 259 counterpart having all founders with a 260 biotechnology background. The joint 261 presence of different fields of 262 expertise characterizing the group of 263 start-up founders can have positive or 264 negative impacts on a start-up's 265 success [27]. On the one hand, it 266 improves problem-solving 267 capabilities, learning potential, 268 dynamic capabilities, and diversified 269 perspectives. On the other hand, the 270 coexistence of very different areas of 271 knowledge may also be detrimental in 272 the early stages of a start-up's life, 273 causing misunderstandings and 274 conflicts, lack of cohesion, poor 275 coordination, and low-quality 276 decision-making. These aspects may 277 negatively impact the efficiency and 278 effectiveness of organizational 279 performance, thus communicating 280 negative signs to investors. 281

In other words, it is not automatic that 282 higher levels of education and a high 283 284 degree of education heterogeneity are positive for a start-up's ability to 285 raise funds, and we believe that it is 286 worth investigating the topic further by 287 considering the joint effect of the two 288 dimensions of education on the 289 amount of start-up funds raised. In 290 this vein, some of the questions that 291 this article tries to address are the 292 following: Which education 293 configurations are associated with the 294 most successful start-ups? Does a 295 high level of education improve or 296 worsen conflicts caused by a high 297

degree of heterogeneity? Does a high degree of education heterogeneity favor founder teams with a lower level of education?

III. METHODOLOGY

To provide answers to these questions, we analyzed a sample of 1078 startups-corresponding to a total number of 1725 founders-founded in the U.S. between 2012 and 2016. Greater details on the analyses conducted are reported here [28]. The database Crunch Base gave us access to several sets of information, such as the funds raised by each start-up, the level of education of each of start-up's founders (e.g., high school, bachelor's degree, Ph.D., etc.), the number and the fields of expertise in which they were specialized when they founded the start-up (e.g., social sciences, humanities, hard sciences, etc.), and their previous entrepreneurial experiences. Through econometric analyses, we assessed the impact that the level of education and the amount of education heterogeneity have on the financial resources start-ups collected in their first round of fundraising. In particular, we run an OLS regression setting the funds raised by startup at the first round of fundraising, and the level of education and education heterogeneity as independent variables. Moreover, to avoid endogeneity problems, we included several controls in the analysis. Finally, to measure the interaction between the two dimensions of education, we performed a mediation model that allowed us to understand how different configurations of level of education and education heterogeneity determine startup access to funds.

IV. RESULTS. COGNITIVE RIGIDITY AND COGNITIVE DISTANCE: THE BEST SETS OF START-UP FOUNDERS

Results show that both education dimensions have a positive impact on funds raised if considered separately. 348 This means that the higher the level 349 of education of the founders, the 350 higher the amount of financial 351 resources collected. In the same way, 352 a higher degree of educational 353 heterogeneity is associated with 354 higher funds raised. However, these 355 results do not consider the joint effect 356 of the two dimensions. Indeed, when 357 considering the simultaneous effect of 358 level of education and heterogeneity, 359 results show tensions between the 360 two. Such tensions, in turn, bear upon 361 on the ability of start-ups to raise 362 funds. 363

The disciplines of cognitive and social 364 psychology suggest that highly 365 educated people develop a so-called 366 cognitive rigidity; that is to say, an 367 individual who has studied a given 368 discipline for a long time, thereby 369 achieving a high-level qualification in 370 that topic, develops a mindset that 371 brings him or her to approach issues 372 using the dominant logic of that 373 particular discipline. In other words, 374 cognitive rigidity reduces an 375 individual's openness to different 376 forms of logic [29]. Founders who 377 possess a high level of education in 378 one discipline tend to pursue 379 business success with more 380 determination, to develop better 381 products and processes, and to be 382 better at recognizing and exploiting 383 business opportunities. But when 384 they interact with cofounders 385 educated in different disciplines, they 386 may run into conflicts and 387 misunderstandings due to cognitive 388 rigidity that may prevent them from 389 taking full advantage of their 390 advanced knowledge. 391

Cognitive and social psychology also 392 suggest that education heterogeneity 393 is a driver of *cognitive distance*; that 394 is, two individuals with different 395 backgrounds and kinds of education 396 develop different mindsets, 397 languages, and priorities over time 398 [30] that make communication more 300 difficult between them and, in turn, 400 this stiffens organizational
performance. This is detrimental for
early stage start-ups that, on the
contrary, need great flexibility and
quick choices.

The findings of our analyses suggest 406 that different combinations of level of 407 education (cognitive rigidity) and 408 education heterogeneity (cognitive 409 distance) have different effects on the 410 funds a start-up raises. Start-ups 411 whose groups of founders present 412 high levels of education and high 413 degrees of education heterogeneity 414 are characterized by a mix of 415 cognitive distance and cognitive 416 rigidity that is detrimental for early-417 stage start-ups. Teams of cofounders 418 with thorough education in different 419 disciplines present a higher chance of 420 negative group dynamics preventing 421 them from taking full advantage of 422 their advanced knowledge and of the 423 benefits of their diversified skill sets. 424 This mechanism is a threat to start-425 ups' prospects because it may hinder 426 the founders' ability to realize the 427 innovation and technological potential 428 of their start-ups as well as their ability 429 to communicate the start-ups' value 430 to investors, who consequently 431

perceive negative signs and are less willing to provide funding. Of course, teams of founders characterized by the joint presence of low levels of education and a low degree of heterogeneity are even less likely to raise funds, since these start-ups do not show established and verified expertise, thus signaling low potential success to investors. Education, indeed, remains a very important factor for a start-up's success and consequently for investor returns. This insight is highlighted by findings on mixing high levels of education with a low degree of education heterogeneity, and vice versa. In fact, teams of highly educated founders specialized in similar areas of knowledge are very likely to receive funds. These start-ups, indeed, are able to improve products and processes without wasting time, and they find shared solutions to problems. In other words, the cognitive rigidity of the founders does not clash with different educational backgrounds.

Finally, start-ups whose founders present different areas of expertise, but with a low level of depth, are also very likely to receive high funds. 463 Indeed, their cognitive distance does 464 not collide with the cognitive rigidity 465 that would prevent them from finding 466 a shared solution to any problems 467 that occur. On the contrary, a diverse 468 set of knowledge fields ensures that 469 they easily find solutions coming from 470 a multidisciplinary approach that 471 founders are more willing to accept 472 due to their low cognitive rigidity. 473

V. DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, 474 AND CONCLUSIONS 475

The start-up economy is still 476 thriving, despite the slowdown 477 imposed by the COVID-19 478 pandemic. Start-ups need investors' 479 funds to survive and overcome the 480 initial stages of their life, in order to 481 ensure prosperity and success for 482 their business ideas. Start-up 483 founders, thus, need to convince 484 investors to finance their 485 entrepreneurial ventures by 486 signaling potential success. Among 487 other factors, founder education is 488 one of the most influential signals 489 when pursuing this goal, and this 490 article advances the understanding 491 of its impact for scholars and 492



Figure 1. Combinations of level of education and education heterogeneity and their effects on start-up funds raised (source: authors elaboration on Pinelli *et al.*, 2021).

473

practitioners. Indeed, it has been 493 highlighted that high levels of 494 education and exposure to different 495 fields of knowledge guarantee 496 positive outcomes for firms. 497 However, in the early stages of a 498 start-up's life, their joint presence 499 may stand in the way of success 500 due to a clash between cognitive 501 rigidity and cognitive distance within 502 the team of founders, which hinders 503 effective decision-making and 504 organizational performance. Such a 505 result has relevant practical 506 implications that can affect start-up 507 success in raising funds. Indeed, at 508 the beginning of their venture's life, 509 a start-up's founders should build a 510

team that can easily take effective decisions by choosing one of two routes: selecting people highly educated in the same subject or selecting intermediate educated people that mix different education backgrounds. These results are relevant for entrepreneurs and startup founders because they highlight which conditions are more likely to communicate potential success to investors assessing young ventures in the early stages of their life, and, in turn, to raise more funds that guarantee prosperity and success for their business ideas (see Figure 1). Indeed, although we agree that both high levels of

education and high degrees of 529 education heterogeneity are 530 powerful tools for each company. 531 we demonstrate that in the initial 532 phases of their life—when they are 533 more vulnerable and exposed to 534 failure-start-ups need to carefully 535 manage their team compositions so 536 as to avoid risks related to the joint 537 presence of high cognitive rigidity 538 and cognitive distance. Although 539 the above-mentioned outcomes are 540 already of immediate applicability, 541 future research can enrich the 542 understanding of how such 543 dynamics could change in the 544 subsequent stages of a start-up's 545 life. 546

547 **REFERENCES**

- [1] D. Ratzinger, K. Amess, A. Greenman, and S. Mosey, "The impact of digital start-up founders' higher education on reaching equity investment milestones," *J. Technol. Transfer*, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 760–778, 2018.
- [2] M. A. Carree and A. R. Thurik, "The impact of entrepreneurship on economic
 growth," in *Handbook of Entrepreneurship Research*. Berlin, Germany:
 Springer, 2010.
- [3] D. Stangler, "The global startup economy is growing, but who is left out?," *Forbes*, May 9, 2019.
- ⁵⁵⁶ [4] J. Sarkis, "Managing in a Post-COVID-19 World," *IEEE Eng. Manag. Rev.*, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 6–12, Sep. 2020.
- [5] B. Herrmann, M. Marmer, E. Dogrultan, and D. Haltschke, "The Global Startup Ecosystem Report," *Startup Genome*, pp. 1–221, 2020.
- [6] T. Daim, K. K. Lai, H. Yalcin, F. Alsoubie, and V. Kumar, "Forecasting technological positioning through technology knowledge redundancy: Patent citation analysis of IoT, cybersecurity, and blockchain," *Technol. Forecasting Soc. Change*, vol. 161, 2020, Art. no. 120329.
- [7] N. Patel, "90% of startups fail: Here's what you need to know about the 10%,"
 Forbes, Jan. 16, 2015.
- [8] K. Warren, "Meet Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky, who cofounded the company in
 2008 to help pay his San Francisco rent and now may be taking his \$18 billion
 business public," *Bus. Insider*, Aug. 20, 2020.
- [9] G. Elia, A. Margherita, and C. Petti, "An operational model to develop technology entrepreneurship 'EGO-System," *Int. J. Innovation Technol. Manag.*, vol. 13, no. 5, 2016, Art. no. 1640008.
- [10] B. Aulet, Disciplined Entrepreneurship: 24 Steps to a Successful Start-Up.
 Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley, 2013.
- [11] Monika and A. K. Sharma, "Venture capitalists' investment decision criteria for
 new ventures: A review," *Procedia -Soc. Behav. Sci.*, vol. 189, pp. 465–470,
 2015.
- [12] E. Hudson and M. Evans, "A Review of Research into Venture Capitalists'Decision Making: Implications for Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists and
- 579 Researchers A Review of Research into Venture Capitalists 'Decision Making,"
- 580 *J. Econ. Soc. Policy*, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 45–63, 2005.

- [13] T. Weiblen and H. W. Chesbrough, "Engaging with startups to enhance corporate innovation," *California Manage. Rev.*, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 66–90, 2015.
- [14] F. Cappa, M. Pinelli, R. Maiolini, and M. Isabella Leone, "Pledge' me your ears!
 The role of narratives and narrator experience in explaining crowdfunding
 success," Small Bus. Econ., to be published, doi: 10.1007/s11187-020-00334-y.
- success," Small Bus. Econ., to be published, doi: 10.1007/s11187-020-00334-y.
 [15] L. A. Plummer, T. H. Allison, and B. L. Connelly, "Better together? Signaling interactions in new venture pursuit of initial external capital," Acad. Manag. J., vol. 59, no. 5, pp. 1585–1604, 2016.
- [16] M. S. Cardon, R. Sudek, and C. Mitteness, "The impact of perceived entrepreneurial passion on angel investing," *Frontiers Entrepreneurship Res.*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 1–15, 2009.
- [17] W. R. Kerr, J. Lerner, and A. Schoar, "The consequences of entrepreneurial
 finance: Evidence from angel financings," *Rev. Financial Stud.*, vol. 27, no. 1,
 pp. 20–55, 2014.
- [18] S. J. Chang, "Venture capital financing, strategic alliances, and the initial public
 offerings of Internet startups," *J. Bus. Venturing*, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 721–741,
 2004.
- ⁵⁹⁸ [19] M. Pinelli, F. Cappa, E. Peruffo, and R. Oriani, "Acquisitions of non-controlling ⁵⁹⁹ equity stakes: Agency conflicts and profitability," *Strategic Org.*, 2020.
- [20] M. Islam, A. Fremeth, and A. Marcus, "Signaling by early stage startups: US
 government research grants and venture capital funding," *J. Bus. Venturing*,
 vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 35–51, 2018.
- [21] M. G. Colombo, and L. Grilli, "Founders human capital and the growth of new
 technology-based firms: A competence-based view," *Res. Policy*, vol. 34, no. 6,
 pp. 795–816, 2005.
- [22] J. A. C. Baum, and B. S. Silverman, "Picking winners or building them? Alliance,
 intellectual, and human capital as selection criteria in venture financing and
 performance of biotechnology startups," *J. Bus. Venturing*, vol. 19, no. 3,
 pp. 411–436, 2004.
- [23] D. P. Dimov and D. A. Shepherd, "Human capital theory and venture capital
 firms: Exploring 'home runs' and 'strike outs," *J. Bus. Venturing*, vol. 20, no. 1,
 pp. 1–21, 2005.
- [24] J. Barney, "Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage," *J. Manage.*,
 vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 99–120, 1991.
- [25] A. Makowska *et al.*, "Annual Report on European SMEs 2017/2018," European
 Commission, Brussels, Belgium, 2018.
- [26] J. M. Millán, E. Congregado, C. Román, M. Van Praag, and A. Van Stel, "The
 value of an educated population for an individual's entrepreneurship success,"
 J. Bus. Venturing, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 612–632, 2014.
- [27] D. Henneke and C. Lüthje, "Interdisciplinary heterogeneity as a catalyst for
 product innovativeness of entrepreneurial teams," *Creativity Innov. Manag.*,
 vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 121–132, 2007.
- [28] M. Pinelli, F. Cappa, S. Franco, E. Peruffo, and R. Oriani, "Too much of two
 good things: Effects of founders' educationale level and heterogeneity on start up funds raised," *IEEE Trans. Eng. Manag.*, to be published.
- [29] D. Lei, M. A. Hitt, and R. Bettis, "Dynamic core competences through metalearning and strategic context," *J. Manage.*, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 549–569, 1996.
- [30] P. Chattopadhyay, W. H. Glick, C. C. Miller, and G. P. Huber, "Determinants of executive beliefs: Comparing functional conditioning and social influence,"
- 630 Strategic Manag. J., vol. 20, no. 8, pp. 763–790, 1999.

632 Stefano Franco received the Ph.D. in Management from Luiss University, Rome, Italy in 2020.

- 633 He is currently a Postdoctoral Researcher with Luiss Guido Carli University, Rome, Italy. He has
- been a Visiting Researcher with Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid, Spain. His papers have appeared in international refereed journals, among others IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING
- 636 MANAGEMENT, International Journal of Hospitality Management, and Journal of Cleaner
- 637 *Production.* His main research interests focus on the areas of sustainability and innovation.

Francesco Cappa received the Ph.D. degree in management from Luiss University, Rome, Italy 638 in 2018. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Innovation at the Campus Bio-medico 639 University, Rome, Italy, and an Adjunct Professor at Luiss Guido Carli University, Rome, Italy. He 640 has been a Visiting Researcher at the New York University Tandon School of Engineering, New 641 York, NY, USA, and Pace University Seidenberg School of Computer Science, New York, NY, 642 USA. His papers have appeared in prestigious international refereed journals such as Research 643 Policy, Journal of Product Innovation Management, Small Business Economics, Strategic 644 Organization, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, Business Horizons, Journal of 645 Environmental Management, Computers in Human Behavior, Information Technology for 646 Development, Quarterly Review of Economics and Management, Journal of Strategy and 647 648 Management, and Digital Business. His main research interests are in the areas of the areas of

- 649 innovation and sustainability.
- 650 Michele Pinelli received the Ph.D. degree in Business from Ca'Foscari University of Venice,
- 651 Venice, Italy in 2015. He is currently an Assistant Professor with the Faculty of Economics and
- ${}^{652} \qquad {\rm Management, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Bolzano, Italy, where he is also a Research}$
- 653 Fellow with the Centre for Family Business Management. He is the author or coauthor of works
- 654 published in prestigious outlets such as Research Policy, Strategic Organization, and Small
- 655 Business Economics. His current research interests include strategy, entrepreneurship, and
- 656 family business management.

Founder Education and Start-Up Funds Raised

3 —STEFANO FRANCO

- Luiss Business School, Luiss University, 00197
 Roma, Italy
- 6 FRANCESCO CAPPA
- 7 Department of Engineering, Campus
- $_{10}^{8}$ Bio-Medico University, 00128 Roma, Italy
- 11⁹ Luiss Business School, Luiss University, 00197
- 12 Roma, Italy
- 13 —MICHELE PINELLI
- 14 Faculty of Economics and Management, Free
- 15 University of Bozen, 39100 Bolzano, Italy
- 16 (Corresponding author: Stefano Franco.)
- 17 IEEE DOI 10.1109/EMR.2021.3077966

Abstract—Start-ups need investor funding to overcome the early stages of their life, during which they are more vulnerable and exposed to failure. They need to convince investors to fund their business ideas by signaling the potential success of their entrepreneurial venture, through a demonstration of cohesion, shared views, and determination. The educational background of the founders of start-ups can be a strong driver of start-up performance, as it is a visible signal for investors. However, education is composed of two different dimensions (i.e., its depth and its heterogeneity), and their configurations should be carefully considered. To clarify this aspect, in this article, we discuss the impact that these two education dimensions have on funds raised by startups in the early stages of their life. Results show that highly educated cofounders have improved access to external funding as long as they do not have highly heterogeneous educational backgrounds; in a parallel fashion, cofounders educated in different disciplines also have improved access to funding, as long as they have less advanced levels of education. These findings are relevant to start-up founders and indicate the best team configurations to guarantee better access to capital in the initial stages of their life.

Key words: Education, educational heterogeneity, educational level, fund raising, start-up

I. INTRODUCTION

TART-UPS are among the most prominent sources of innovation and technological development, and they have contributed to economic growth and delivered value to consumers more than any other economic activity since the Industrial Revolution [1], [2]. Start-ups are a global phenomenon, as they are rapidly growing not only in Europe but in the U.S. and Asia as well [3]. Although COVID-19 is having a negative impact on the rise of new entrepreneurial ventures and will require new models of innovation [4], the start-up economy is still thriving. and it is now worth \$3 trillion [5], with high-tech ventures in the fields of blockchain, cybersecurity, and gaming likely to be the most resilient to this crisis [6]. However, for each successful start-up, there are still nine

that fail [7]. Start-up growth and 62 success, indeed, depend crucially on 63 their ability to raise funds in the early 64 stages of their life, when they lack 65 cash-flows to sustain costs and 66 investments. Airbnb's history is a 67 clear example of this. In the initial 68 phases of its life, Airbnb's business 69 model was not considered capable of 70 disrupting the market or of making 71 significant profits, and so it received 72 several funding rejections. However, 73 an investment of \$20 000 from the 74 accelerator Y Combinator gave its 75 founders the opportunity to develop 76 product and customer relationships, 77 and the results of this became 78 obvious months later when the 79 venture capital firm Sequoia invested 80 \$600 000 in it, allowing the start-up to 81 embark on a process which, after ten 82 years, has led the company to have 83 an estimated market value of over 84 \$18 billion [8]. This story shows why 85

0360-8581 © 2021 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See https://www.ieee.org/publications/rights/index.html for more information.

start-ups need and seek investors to 86 fund their businesses. In 2019. 87 venture capitalists invested a total of 88 \$300 billion in new ventures [5], 89 although this figure alone is hardly 90 sufficient to frame the phenomenon. 91 since several other categories of 92 start-up investors exist, such as 93 friends and family, business angels, 94 corporate investors, banks, 95 accelerators, incubators, and 96 dispersed individuals. In particular, 97 incubators and accelerators are 98 among the most diffused kind of 99 investors. Differently from the others, 100 they provide workspace and 101 competences for startups, allowing 102 them to grow, not just financially, but 103 also at the capability level [9], [10]. 104

For their part, investors fund start-ups 105 for three main reasons: making 106 profits, nurturing innovations in the 107 sectors, and developing projects in 108 which they believe. Organizations like 109 incubators and venture capitals invest 110 in start-ups that they believe can 111 rapidly become profitable and 112 guarantee good returns on 113 investment, evaluating market 114 potential, uniqueness of product and 115 service, and human resources [11], 116 [12]. In contrast, corporate investors 117 or large corporations invest in start-118 ups because they constitute possible 119 sources of innovation for their 120 business. Indeed, start-ups have 121 "promising ideas, organizational 122 agility, the willingness to take risk, and 123 aspirations of rapid growth" that are 124 missing in corporations [9, p. 66]. 125 Finally, friends, family, and crowd 126 backers can also be motivated by the 127 willingness to support projects they 128 consider worthy [14]. 129

However, investing in early stage 130 start-ups is extremely risky for any 131 kind of funder due to the absence of a 132 credible track record of past 133 organizational results and financial 134 information [1]. So, what drives an 135 investor to fund a start-up? Investors 136 must rely on signals of organizational 137 qualities that are associated with 138

future business success [15]-[19]. Such signals have to overcome existing information asymmetries between start-ups and investors [20] while convincing the latter that the former are worth investing in. Examples of effective signals can be affiliations with prestigious companies, consistent business plans, governance characteristics that improve start-up reputation and reliability [20], and convince investors that the business idea is valid and very likely to be commercialized. Among these factors, human capital is also important in instilling confidence and trustworthiness. The knowledge possessed by a start-up's founders is, in fact, the basis for its technological capabilities and so is fundamental for its future development [21]. Such knowledge is the result of skills acquired through education and experience. However, skills acquired through experience are defined as tacit, because they are difficult to recognize for investors, who, in contrast, may easily access information about founders' codified skills, i.e., the ones attained through education [22]. For this reason, a founder's education is one of the most significant factors in signaling the future success of start-ups to potential investors. Education may be decomposed into two dimensions: education level and the degree of its heterogeneity. In order to have a comprehensive view of the phenomenon, this article seeks to analyze the impact of both dimensions on the funds raised by start-ups in the early stages of their life. In this manner, we clarify the best conditions to increase the funds raised by a startup, an outcome relevant to both the founders of entrepreneurial ventures and to investors.

II. START-UP FOUNDER EDUCATION

A start-up's human capital of among its distinctive resources. Above all,

during a start-up's early stage, human 191 capital garners even more importance 192 due to the absence of established 193 performance, adequate financial 194 resources, and evidence that the 195 business idea could be effective. 196 Knowledge, in particular, is a human 197 capital dimension and it is recognized 198 as a resource that is capable of 199 generating a competitive advantage 200 [23], [24]. It is composed of a tacit 201 component and a codified 202 component. While tacit knowledge is 203 hard to recognize, codified 204 knowledge may be signaled by the 205 education of the start-up's founders. 206 As a result, education can be 207 considered an indicator of founder 208 knowledge and, in turn, human 209 capital. Consequently, the founders' 210 education is likely to be evaluated 211 and to function as a signal, whereas 212 investors are less likely to perceive 213 and reward the tacit value of human 214 capital. 215

Education, indeed, is considered the 216 most crucial investment to improve a 217 start-up's knowledge base [1]. Data 218 show that most start-ups are founded 219 by highly educated groups of people. 220 On average, in the EU, in the 2017-221 2018 period, 53% of founders had 222 completed a master's degree or 223 equivalent, 19.3% a bachelor's 224 degree, and 12.6% a doctoral degree 225 [25]. Thus, a total of 84,9% of start-up 226 founders had attended and 227 completed a higher education 228 program. In addition, previous studies 229 have shown that higher levels of 230 education are associated with a 231 higher likelihood of developing and 232 improving products and business 233 models, detecting business 234 opportunities, and obtaining financial 235 resources [26]. 236

Level of education, however, is only237one side of the coin when considering238the knowledge capital of a start-up.239Education, indeed, may also be240thought of as the number of different241fields of expertise in which one242person has achieved a certified, i.e.,243

codified, amount of knowledge, Such 244 diversity is known as education 245 heterogeneity. Higher education 246 heterogeneity manifests itself when 247 founders are specialized in the areas 248 of expertise that are different from 249 each other, and the degree of startup 250 heterogeneity corresponds to the set 251 of heterogeneity brought by each 252 founder. For example, a start-up 253 operating in the biotech industry may 254 have founders educated in 255 biotechnology and others educated in 256 business studies. Such start-ups 257 present a higher degree of education 258 heterogeneity compared to a 259 counterpart having all founders with a 260 biotechnology background. The joint 261 presence of different fields of 262 expertise characterizing the group of 263 start-up founders can have positive or 264 negative impacts on a start-up's 265 success [27]. On the one hand, it 266 improves problem-solving 267 capabilities, learning potential, 268 dynamic capabilities, and diversified 269 perspectives. On the other hand, the 270 coexistence of very different areas of 271 knowledge may also be detrimental in 272 the early stages of a start-up's life, 273 causing misunderstandings and 274 conflicts, lack of cohesion, poor 275 coordination, and low-quality 276 decision-making. These aspects may 277 negatively impact the efficiency and 278 effectiveness of organizational 279 performance, thus communicating 280 negative signs to investors. 281

In other words, it is not automatic that 282 higher levels of education and a high 283 284 degree of education heterogeneity are positive for a start-up's ability to 285 raise funds, and we believe that it is 286 worth investigating the topic further by 287 considering the joint effect of the two 288 dimensions of education on the 289 amount of start-up funds raised. In 290 this vein, some of the questions that 291 this article tries to address are the 292 following: Which education 293 configurations are associated with the 294 most successful start-ups? Does a 295 high level of education improve or 296 worsen conflicts caused by a high 297

degree of heterogeneity? Does a high degree of education heterogeneity favor founder teams with a lower level of education?

III. METHODOLOGY

To provide answers to these questions, we analyzed a sample of 1078 startups-corresponding to a total number of 1725 founders-founded in the U.S. between 2012 and 2016. Greater details on the analyses conducted are reported here [28]. The database Crunch Base gave us access to several sets of information, such as the funds raised by each start-up, the level of education of each of start-up's founders (e.g., high school, bachelor's degree, Ph.D., etc.), the number and the fields of expertise in which they were specialized when they founded the start-up (e.g., social sciences, humanities, hard sciences, etc.), and their previous entrepreneurial experiences. Through econometric analyses, we assessed the impact that the level of education and the amount of education heterogeneity have on the financial resources start-ups collected in their first round of fundraising. In particular, we run an OLS regression setting the funds raised by startup at the first round of fundraising, and the level of education and education heterogeneity as independent variables. Moreover, to avoid endogeneity problems, we included several controls in the analysis. Finally, to measure the interaction between the two dimensions of education, we performed a mediation model that allowed us to understand how different configurations of level of education and education heterogeneity determine startup access to funds.

IV. RESULTS. COGNITIVE RIGIDITY AND COGNITIVE DISTANCE: THE BEST SETS OF START-UP FOUNDERS

Results show that both education dimensions have a positive impact on funds raised if considered separately. 348 This means that the higher the level 349 of education of the founders, the 350 higher the amount of financial 351 resources collected. In the same way, 352 a higher degree of educational 353 heterogeneity is associated with 354 higher funds raised. However, these 355 results do not consider the joint effect 356 of the two dimensions. Indeed, when 357 considering the simultaneous effect of 358 level of education and heterogeneity, 359 results show tensions between the 360 two. Such tensions, in turn, bear upon 361 on the ability of start-ups to raise 362 funds. 363

The disciplines of cognitive and social 364 psychology suggest that highly 365 educated people develop a so-called 366 cognitive rigidity; that is to say, an 367 individual who has studied a given 368 discipline for a long time, thereby 369 achieving a high-level qualification in 370 that topic, develops a mindset that 371 brings him or her to approach issues 372 using the dominant logic of that 373 particular discipline. In other words, 374 cognitive rigidity reduces an 375 individual's openness to different 376 forms of logic [29]. Founders who 377 possess a high level of education in 378 one discipline tend to pursue 379 business success with more 380 determination, to develop better 381 products and processes, and to be 382 better at recognizing and exploiting 383 business opportunities. But when 384 they interact with cofounders 385 educated in different disciplines, they 386 may run into conflicts and 387 misunderstandings due to cognitive 388 rigidity that may prevent them from 389 taking full advantage of their 390 advanced knowledge. 391

Cognitive and social psychology also 392 suggest that education heterogeneity 393 is a driver of *cognitive distance*; that 394 is, two individuals with different 395 backgrounds and kinds of education 396 develop different mindsets, 397 languages, and priorities over time 398 [30] that make communication more 300 difficult between them and, in turn, 400 this stiffens organizational
performance. This is detrimental for
early stage start-ups that, on the
contrary, need great flexibility and
quick choices.

The findings of our analyses suggest 406 that different combinations of level of 407 education (cognitive rigidity) and 408 education heterogeneity (cognitive 409 distance) have different effects on the 410 funds a start-up raises. Start-ups 411 whose groups of founders present 412 high levels of education and high 413 degrees of education heterogeneity 414 are characterized by a mix of 415 cognitive distance and cognitive 416 rigidity that is detrimental for early-417 stage start-ups. Teams of cofounders 418 with thorough education in different 419 disciplines present a higher chance of 420 negative group dynamics preventing 421 them from taking full advantage of 422 their advanced knowledge and of the 423 benefits of their diversified skill sets. 424 This mechanism is a threat to start-425 ups' prospects because it may hinder 426 the founders' ability to realize the 427 innovation and technological potential 428 of their start-ups as well as their ability 429 to communicate the start-ups' value 430 to investors, who consequently 431

perceive negative signs and are less willing to provide funding. Of course, teams of founders characterized by the joint presence of low levels of education and a low degree of heterogeneity are even less likely to raise funds, since these start-ups do not show established and verified expertise, thus signaling low potential success to investors. Education, indeed, remains a very important factor for a start-up's success and consequently for investor returns. This insight is highlighted by findings on mixing high levels of education with a low degree of education heterogeneity, and vice versa. In fact, teams of highly educated founders specialized in similar areas of knowledge are very likely to receive funds. These start-ups, indeed, are able to improve products and processes without wasting time, and they find shared solutions to problems. In other words, the cognitive rigidity of the founders does not clash with different educational backgrounds.

Finally, start-ups whose founders present different areas of expertise, but with a low level of depth, are also very likely to receive high funds. 463 Indeed, their cognitive distance does 464 not collide with the cognitive rigidity 465 that would prevent them from finding 466 a shared solution to any problems 467 that occur. On the contrary, a diverse 468 set of knowledge fields ensures that 469 they easily find solutions coming from 470 a multidisciplinary approach that 471 founders are more willing to accept 472 due to their low cognitive rigidity. 473

V. DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, 474 AND CONCLUSIONS 475

The start-up economy is still 476 thriving, despite the slowdown 477 imposed by the COVID-19 478 pandemic. Start-ups need investors' 479 funds to survive and overcome the 480 initial stages of their life, in order to 481 ensure prosperity and success for 482 their business ideas. Start-up 483 founders, thus, need to convince 484 investors to finance their 485 entrepreneurial ventures by 486 signaling potential success. Among 487 other factors, founder education is 488 one of the most influential signals 489 when pursuing this goal, and this 490 article advances the understanding 491 of its impact for scholars and 492

		Level of education – Cognitive rigidity	
		Low	High
	Low	Less likely to receive funds	<i>More likely to receive funds</i>
Education heterogeneity – Cognitive distance			
	High	More likely to receive funds	Less likely to receive funds

Figure 1. Combinations of level of education and education heterogeneity and their effects on start-up funds raised (source: authors elaboration on Pinelli *et al.*, 2021).

practitioners. Indeed, it has been 493 highlighted that high levels of 494 education and exposure to different 495 fields of knowledge guarantee 496 positive outcomes for firms. 497 However, in the early stages of a 498 start-up's life, their joint presence 499 may stand in the way of success 500 due to a clash between cognitive 501 rigidity and cognitive distance within 502 the team of founders, which hinders 503 effective decision-making and 504 organizational performance. Such a 505 result has relevant practical 506 implications that can affect start-up 507 success in raising funds. Indeed, at 508 the beginning of their venture's life, 509 a start-up's founders should build a 510

team that can easily take effective decisions by choosing one of two routes: selecting people highly educated in the same subject or selecting intermediate educated people that mix different education backgrounds. These results are relevant for entrepreneurs and startup founders because they highlight which conditions are more likely to communicate potential success to investors assessing young ventures in the early stages of their life, and, in turn, to raise more funds that guarantee prosperity and success for their business ideas (see Figure 1). Indeed, although we agree that both high levels of

education and high degrees of 529 education heterogeneity are 530 powerful tools for each company. 531 we demonstrate that in the initial 532 phases of their life—when they are 533 more vulnerable and exposed to 534 failure-start-ups need to carefully 535 manage their team compositions so 536 as to avoid risks related to the joint 537 presence of high cognitive rigidity 538 and cognitive distance. Although 539 the above-mentioned outcomes are 540 already of immediate applicability, 541 future research can enrich the 542 understanding of how such 543 dynamics could change in the 544 subsequent stages of a start-up's 545 life. 546

547 **REFERENCES**

- [1] D. Ratzinger, K. Amess, A. Greenman, and S. Mosey, "The impact of digital start-up founders' higher education on reaching equity investment milestones," *J. Technol. Transfer*, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 760–778, 2018.
- [2] M. A. Carree and A. R. Thurik, "The impact of entrepreneurship on economic
 growth," in *Handbook of Entrepreneurship Research*. Berlin, Germany:
 Springer, 2010.
- [3] D. Stangler, "The global startup economy is growing, but who is left out?," *Forbes*, May 9, 2019.
- ⁵⁵⁶ [4] J. Sarkis, "Managing in a Post-COVID-19 World," *IEEE Eng. Manag. Rev.*, ⁵⁵⁷ vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 6–12, Sep. 2020.
- [5] B. Herrmann, M. Marmer, E. Dogrultan, and D. Haltschke, "The Global Startup Ecosystem Report," *Startup Genome*, pp. 1–221, 2020.
- [6] T. Daim, K. K. Lai, H. Yalcin, F. Alsoubie, and V. Kumar, "Forecasting technological positioning through technology knowledge redundancy: Patent citation analysis of IoT, cybersecurity, and blockchain," *Technol. Forecasting Soc. Change*, vol. 161, 2020, Art. no. 120329.
- [7] N. Patel, "90% of startups fail: Here's what you need to know about the 10%,"
 Forbes, Jan. 16, 2015.
- [8] K. Warren, "Meet Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky, who cofounded the company in
 2008 to help pay his San Francisco rent and now may be taking his \$18 billion
 business public," *Bus. Insider*, Aug. 20, 2020.
- [9] G. Elia, A. Margherita, and C. Petti, "An operational model to develop technology entrepreneurship 'EGO-System," *Int. J. Innovation Technol. Manag.*, vol. 13, no. 5, 2016, Art. no. 1640008.
- [10] B. Aulet, Disciplined Entrepreneurship: 24 Steps to a Successful Start-Up.
 Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley, 2013.
- [11] Monika and A. K. Sharma, "Venture capitalists' investment decision criteria for
 new ventures: A review," *Procedia -Soc. Behav. Sci.*, vol. 189, pp. 465–470,
 2015.
- [12] E. Hudson and M. Evans, "A Review of Research into Venture Capitalists'Decision Making: Implications for Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists and
- 579 Researchers A Review of Research into Venture Capitalists 'Decision Making,"
- 580 *J. Econ. Soc. Policy*, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 45–63, 2005.

- [13] T. Weiblen and H. W. Chesbrough, "Engaging with startups to enhance corporate innovation," *California Manage. Rev.*, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 66–90, 2015.
- [14] F. Cappa, M. Pinelli, R. Maiolini, and M. Isabella Leone, "Pledge' me your ears!
 The role of narratives and narrator experience in explaining crowdfunding
 success," *Small Bus. Econ.*, to be published, doi: 10.1007/s11187-020-00334-y.
- success," Small Bus. Econ., to be published, doi: 10.1007/s11187-020-00334-y.
 [15] L. A. Plummer, T. H. Allison, and B. L. Connelly, "Better together? Signaling interactions in new venture pursuit of initial external capital," Acad. Manag. J.,
 - vol. 59, no. 5, pp. 1585–1604, 2016.
- [16] M. S. Cardon, R. Sudek, and C. Mitteness, "The impact of perceived entrepreneurial passion on angel investing," *Frontiers Entrepreneurship Res.*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 1–15, 2009.
- [17] W. R. Kerr, J. Lerner, and A. Schoar, "The consequences of entrepreneurial
 finance: Evidence from angel financings," *Rev. Financial Stud.*, vol. 27, no. 1,
 pp. 20–55, 2014.
- [18] S. J. Chang, "Venture capital financing, strategic alliances, and the initial public
 offerings of Internet startups," *J. Bus. Venturing*, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 721–741,
 2004.
- ⁵⁹⁸ [19] M. Pinelli, F. Cappa, E. Peruffo, and R. Oriani, "Acquisitions of non-controlling ⁵⁹⁹ equity stakes: Agency conflicts and profitability," *Strategic Org.*, 2020.
- [20] M. Islam, A. Fremeth, and A. Marcus, "Signaling by early stage startups: US
 government research grants and venture capital funding," *J. Bus. Venturing*,
 vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 35–51, 2018.
- [21] M. G. Colombo, and L. Grilli, "Founders human capital and the growth of new
 technology-based firms: A competence-based view," *Res. Policy*, vol. 34, no. 6,
 pp. 795–816, 2005.
- [22] J. A. C. Baum, and B. S. Silverman, "Picking winners or building them? Alliance,
 intellectual, and human capital as selection criteria in venture financing and
 performance of biotechnology startups," *J. Bus. Venturing*, vol. 19, no. 3,
 pp. 411–436, 2004.
- [23] D. P. Dimov and D. A. Shepherd, "Human capital theory and venture capital
 firms: Exploring 'home runs' and 'strike outs," *J. Bus. Venturing*, vol. 20, no. 1,
 pp. 1–21, 2005.
- [24] J. Barney, "Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage," *J. Manage.*,
 vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 99–120, 1991.
- [25] A. Makowska *et al.*, "Annual Report on European SMEs 2017/2018," European
 Commission, Brussels, Belgium, 2018.
- [26] J. M. Millán, E. Congregado, C. Román, M. Van Praag, and A. Van Stel, "The
 value of an educated population for an individual's entrepreneurship success,"
 J. Bus. Venturing, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 612–632, 2014.
- [27] D. Henneke and C. Lüthje, "Interdisciplinary heterogeneity as a catalyst for
 product innovativeness of entrepreneurial teams," *Creativity Innov. Manag.*,
 vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 121–132, 2007.
- [28] M. Pinelli, F. Cappa, S. Franco, E. Peruffo, and R. Oriani, "Too much of two
 good things: Effects of founders' educationale level and heterogeneity on start up funds raised," *IEEE Trans. Eng. Manag.*, to be published.
- [29] D. Lei, M. A. Hitt, and R. Bettis, "Dynamic core competences through metalearning and strategic context," *J. Manage.*, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 549–569, 1996.
- [30] P. Chattopadhyay, W. H. Glick, C. C. Miller, and G. P. Huber, "Determinants of
 executive beliefs: Comparing functional conditioning and social influence,"
- 630 Strategic Manag. J., vol. 20, no. 8, pp. 763–790, 1999.

588

632 Stefano Franco received the Ph.D. in Management from Luiss University, Rome, Italy in 2020.

- 633 He is currently a Postdoctoral Researcher with Luiss Guido Carli University, Rome, Italy. He has
- been a Visiting Researcher with Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid, Spain. His papers have appeared in international refereed journals, among others IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING
- 636 MANAGEMENT, International Journal of Hospitality Management, and Journal of Cleaner
- 637 *Production.* His main research interests focus on the areas of sustainability and innovation.

Francesco Cappa received the Ph.D. degree in management from Luiss University, Rome, Italy 638 in 2018. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Innovation at the Campus Bio-medico 639 University, Rome, Italy, and an Adjunct Professor at Luiss Guido Carli University, Rome, Italy. He 640 has been a Visiting Researcher at the New York University Tandon School of Engineering, New 641 York, NY, USA, and Pace University Seidenberg School of Computer Science, New York, NY, 642 USA. His papers have appeared in prestigious international refereed journals such as Research 643 Policy, Journal of Product Innovation Management, Small Business Economics, Strategic 644 Organization, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, Business Horizons, Journal of 645 Environmental Management, Computers in Human Behavior, Information Technology for 646 Development, Quarterly Review of Economics and Management, Journal of Strategy and 647 648 Management, and Digital Business. His main research interests are in the areas of the areas of

- 649 innovation and sustainability.
- 650 Michele Pinelli received the Ph.D. degree in Business from Ca'Foscari University of Venice,
- 651 Venice, Italy in 2015. He is currently an Assistant Professor with the Faculty of Economics and
- 652 Management, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Bolzano, Italy, where he is also a Research
- 653 Fellow with the Centre for Family Business Management. He is the author or coauthor of works
- published in prestigious outlets such as *Research Policy, Strategic Organization,* and *Small*
- 655 Business Economics. His current research interests include strategy, entrepreneurship, and
- 656 family business management.