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Peter Abelard's Logic and its Network
Proceedings of the International Conference held at
Ca' Foscari University, Venice
October 12–14, 2022

Caterina Tarlazzi and Heine Hansen

The papers collected in this issue of the *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* stem from the international conference “Peter Abelard’s Logic and Its Network,” held at Ca’ Foscari University, Venice, October 12–14, 2022.¹

The conference, organised by Caterina Tarlazzi, Charles Girard, Pietro Podolak, and Sofia Orsino, marked the beginning of the ERC STG 2021 “PolyphonicPhilosophy” (GA 101041596), a five-year project funded by the European Research Council and devoted to the study of logical commentaries and manuscripts from the Long Twelfth Century (1070–1220). From its inception, PolyphonicPhilosophy enjoyed close collaboration with the research project “Exploring Twelfth-Century Philosophy: Alberic of Paris and his School,” funded by the Independent Research Fund Denmark under grant number 1024-00214B and housed at the Saxo Institute, University of Copenhagen. This issue is one of the fruits of this collaboration.

Some of the papers in the collection retain some peculiar features of the original event. Sten Ebbesen’s contribution “Logic—the Foundation of Medieval Philosophy” was a general lecture closing the conference and is thus aimed at a wider, non-specialised audience. Anne Grondeux’s paper “*Genus causa speciei* in the *Glosulae in Priscianum maiorem*. An allusion to the material essence realism of William of Champeaux?” is followed by

¹ A report of the conference, written by Charles Girard, was published in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 65 (2023), pp. 353–60.

a comment by Laurent Cesalli (“Where does material essence realism come from? A speculative note on Anne Grondeux’s paper”), just as it was at the conference. Other papers were not presented at the conference as such, but have sprung from the research initiated there and in the context of PolyphonicPhilosophy more generally.



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Logic—the Foundation of Medieval Philosophy

Sten Ebbesen*

I have spent much of my life studying medieval philosophy, and I have done research in several of its sub-disciplines, but one has always remained central to my research, and that is logic.

One does not need an excuse for being interested in logic, but people might with some justification consider the subject somewhat restricted and somewhat arid—that is, until they realize the close connection between logic and ontology. Once you accept that the notions of possibility and necessity have a place in logic you are in deep ontological waters. And this, of course, is not the only example. Once you start to think about quantification you cannot avoid the perennial question about universals versus individuals, and before you can count to three you are engaged in in reflexions about the relation between human cognition and the external world.

Add to this that medieval logic covered fields that are no longer considered parts of the discipline, such as the Aristotelian theory of categories, or the theory of science presented in the *Posterior Analytics*, as well as logical tools that are no longer part of standard logic, such as the *topoi* or *loci*.

And finally, don't forget that studying the *Peri hermeneias* implies thinking about concept formation and the relations between words, concepts and the things that words signify and concepts are concepts of. Given all this, it becomes understandable that medieval logic is an extremely fertile field of study.

* This is a slightly revised version of a talk I gave at a conference in Venice in 2022. The main change is the addition of bibliographical references in footnotes. Most of those references are to works by myself. If I had had to give equal attention to the publications by other people, the notes would have swollen so as to fill more than the text.

Then there are some incidental historical facts.¹ Already in the Hellenistic Age it had become a common conviction that any study of philosophy must start with a training in logic, with the result, of course, that many never got beyond what was meant to be the preparatory instruction. Then, in the third century AD the old Hellenistic sects of Academics, Peripatetics, Stoics, Epicureans, Cynics and Sceptics were swept away and replaced by a combined Aristoteli-Platonism, in which Aristotle's logic was supposed to prepare the student for the higher matters treated by Plato and by Aristotle in his non-logical writings.

Soon a core curriculum of logic was established, consisting of Porphyry's *Introduction to the Categories*, Aristotle's *Categories* and *Peri hermeneias* plus the first seven chapters of book I of the *Prior Analytics*, while the rest of the *Organon* was not taught in elementary courses and was not summarized in handbooks.

Philosophical education had become scholastic in the sense that the foundation was analysis of the writings of the two authoritative writers, and introductory courses in logic were based on handbooks that boiled down the contents of the reduced *Organon* to a manageable set of definitions and rules.

This means that anyone who did get a training in logic, but did not spend a large part of his youth on it, would be introduced to the Porphyrian predicables and the problem of universals, the Aristotelian categories, the semantic theory of the *Peri hermeneias* and its analysis of opposition and entailment between propositions, plus, possibly, its reflections about modalities, and, finally, the theory of non-modal syllogistic reasoning in the three Aristotelian figures.

He would also learn a little about hypothetical syllogistic, even though this was something Aristotle had neglected. But he would not learn about modal syllogistic, nor about the theory of knowledge and demonstrative proof or about the topics or fallacies. In the Latin part of the Roman Empire this got a twist, it seems, as the instruction in logic was combined with an

¹ The picture of the development of ancient logic presented here is one I have advocated on numerous occasions. It was first presented in volume 1 of Ebbesen 1981a.

introduction to rhetoric, and Cicero's *Topics* became part of the core curriculum.

The sixth century saw the break-down of higher education in much of the Empire, and in particular in the West, where the city culture that was the carrier of such education almost disappeared. The Latin philosophical library had never been particularly rich, and what survived the deluge was—apart from Cicero and Seneca—mainly works that reflected the minimum course of logic.

Luckily for the Westerners, Boethius in the early sixth century had done a remarkable job as a translator of Aristotelian texts and a writer of Latin commentaries and companion texts in the Greek tradition.¹

So when cities began to blossom again in Italy and France in the late eleventh century and learned men started to set up shop as teachers of philosophy, this was their equipment:

Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories* and *Peri hermeneias*, all three accompanied with commentaries by Boethius. Further, Boethius' treatises on categorical and hypothetical syllogistic, as well as his *On Topical Differences* and *On Division*. Add to this a lonely Platonic item, a part of the *Timæus* with Calcidius' late-ancient commentary. And, finally, not to be forgotten: Priscian's Latin grammar. Though not a philosophical text by any standard classification, it was to play a major role in philosophical discussions until the end of the thirteenth century.² Priscianic grammar and Aristotelian logic—both with certain medieval offshoots—provided the scholastics with their basic toolbox.

It is difficult for us to imagine the philosophical schools of the early twelfth century, but one thing is certain: The detailed analysis of the authoritative texts went hand in hand with a well-developed culture of discussion, one characteristic of which was the production of complicated

¹ About Boethius, see Ebbesen 1987a; Ebbesen 2009a; Ebbesen 2011.

² The immense importance of the study of Priscian has not least been underscored by Irène Rosier-Catach in numerous studies from the 1980s onwards. There is no up-to-date comprehensive study of medieval linguistics to replace Jan Pinborg's (1937–1982) seminal *Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter* (Pinborg 1967).

concatenated arguments using all the resources of the logic of the time. Which in turn spurred an interest in finding ways to spot logical flaws in arguments.

John of Salisbury amusingly claims it was a good idea for members of the audience at a disputation to have a bag of peas at hand, so that during long and complicated sentences one could take out a pea each time a negation was used, and then at the end see whether the result was affirmative or negative by seeing whether the number of peas was even or odd.¹

Such was the backdrop when early in the twelfth century Boethius' long-neglected translations of the *Prior Analytics*, the *Topics* and the *Sophistical Refutations* were discovered in God knows which dusty library and brought to the attention of scholars in France and Italy, and when soon afterwards James of Venice translated the *Posterior Analytics* as well as several of Aristotle's non-logical works.²

Only the *Sophistical Refutations*, the book about fallacies, was an immediate success. As early as 1130 or not much later James of Venice pro-

¹ John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* I.3: "Inconueniens prorsus erat oratio in qua haec verba 'conueniens' et 'inconueniens', 'argumentum' et 'ratio' non perstrepebant, multiplicatis particulis negativis et traiectionis per 'esse' et 'non esse', ita ut calculo opus esset quotiens fuerat disputandum. Alioquin vis affirmationis et negationis erat incognita. Nam plerumque vim affirmationis habet geminata negatio, itemque vis negatoria ab impari numero conualescit, siquidem negatio iterata plerumque se ipsam perimit, et contradictioni sicut regulariter proditum est coaequatur. Ut ergo pari loco an impari versetur deprehendi queat, ad disceptationes collectam fabam et pisam deferre qui conueniebatur consilio prudenti consueverat."

² Most of the pioneering work both on Boethius' translations of the *Ars vetus* and on the texts of the *Ars nova* (*Analytics*, *Topics*, *Elenchi*) was done by L. Minio-Paluello (1907–1986), who in his later years was assisted by B. G. Dod. Their results were summarized in the introductions to volumes I–VI of *Aristoteles Latinus*, published between 1961 and 1975. Dod 1982 is a survey article, and several fundamental papers are gathered in Minio-Paluello 1972.

duced a commentary of his own as well as a translation of one by his Byzantine contemporary Michael of Ephesus, and soon a Latin tradition for teaching the *Elenchi* was established.¹

Alberic of Paris, Abelard's notorious opponent, probably gave a course on the book in the late 1140s. It was recorded in writing, whether by himself or by a pupil. We only have fragmentary reports of it, but the fragments interestingly show that time and again he took issue with James of Venice's interpretation of the Aristotelian text.²

Shortly afterwards, an anonymous author composed a well-developed commentary, and another an equally well-developed handbook of the doctrine of the work.³ In no more than a generation the *Elenchi* had changed from being a book that nobody had read to one that was fully integrated in the standard curriculum.

It is striking that while alert to the *Elenchi*, Alberic seems to have blissfully ignorant of both the *Prior Analytics* and the *Topics*. We have some information about the way he treated the fallacy of begging the question, and this shows that he took no account whatsoever of the highly relevant chapters about the matter in those other parts of the *Ars nova*.⁴

In fact, we only have one twelfth-century commentary on the *Prior Analytics*, and that one is from the end of the century,⁵ while we do not

¹ James of Venice's own commentary on the *Elenchi* seems to have had few readers; the little we know about its contents comes from the texts called *Glose in Aristotilis Sophisticos Elenchos* and *Summa Sophisticorum Elencorum* by L. M. De Rijk, who edited them in volume 1 of De Rijk 1962–67. There are plenty of quotations (and misquotations) of James' translation of Michael of Ephesus' commentary in Latin texts from the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries. For more about this, see Ebbesen forthcoming a.

² See Ebbesen forthcoming a.

³ *Glose in Aristotilis Sophisticos Elenchos* and *Summa Sophisticorum Elencorum* (see note 1 on this page).

⁴ See Ebbesen forthcoming a.

⁵ '*Anonymus Aurelianensis III*' in *Aristotelis Analytica priora*. The text is incomplete, breaking off in the exegesis of *APr.* I.29. I have tentatively dated it "ca. 1160–1180," and that date was accepted by the editor, but I am now inclined to think that a slightly later date, say the 1180s, is perhaps more likely.

possess a single twelfth-century commentary on the *Topics* or on the *Posterior Analytics*.¹

To all appearances, people felt that the *Elenchi* answered a need in their highly developed disputational culture, whereas there were no empty slots in the curriculum for the *Prior Analytics* and the *Topics*—their slots were already occupied by the more accessible Boethian works *De syllogismo categorico* and *De topicis differentiis*. The reasons why the *Posterior Analytics* was also put on ice for a long time are less clear, but its relevance for argumentation may not have appeared obvious, and it also seems to have been considered rather forbidding.²

Thus, with the exception of the *Elenchi*, the *Ars nova* had to wait till some decades into the thirteenth century to achieve its definite breakthrough. Which, then, was so thorough that people would even debate whether theology satisfies the criteria for being a branch of knowledge, a *scientia* in the sense of the *Posterior Analytics*.

Several theologians, with some regret, had to admit that this was not the case because the axioms of Christian theology, i.e., the articles of faith, are not self-evident.

Thomas Aquinas tried to save the scientificity of theology by a blatant misuse of Aristotelian theory, claiming that the articles of faith are self-evident to God and the blessed in the beyond, who thus have scientific

¹ For the fate of the *Topics* and the *Analytics* in the West, see Green-Pedersen 1984; Ebbesen 2010; Ebbesen 2015.

² Famously a non-identified John, who about the middle of the twelfth century produced a new translation of the *Posterior Analytics*, claimed the reason he did so was that James' translation was surrounded by such a dark mist of obscurity that the French masters did not dare teach it: "Translationem vero Iacobi obscuritatis tenebris involvi silentio suo perhibent Francie magistri, qui, quamvis illam translationem et commentarios ab eodem Iacobo translatos habeant, tamen notitiam illius libri non audent profiteri." (Text quoted after *Aristoteles Latinus* IV, p. xlv).

knowledge of theology; earthly theology is a subordinate science in relation to the heavenly variant, he claimed, and so also is *scientia*.¹ As Ockham was to scathingly remark:²

It is nonsense to claim
that I know certain conclusions
because you know certain principles
that I believe in
because you state them.
And in the same way it is childish to claim
that I possess scientific knowledge of the conclusions of the-
ology
because God possesses scientific knowledge of its principles
in which I believe
because he reveals them.

One of my favourite philosophers, Boethius of Dacia, who taught in Paris in the early 1270s, used the Aristotelian theory of scientific knowledge to totally dissociate faith from knowledge, so that theological arguments became completely irrelevant in a scientific context.³

The thirteenth century saw a considerable broadening of the arts curriculum, with Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, natural and moral philosophy all

¹ Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I^a pars, qu. 1, art. 2: "Respondeo dicendum sacram doctrinam esse scientiam. Sed sciendum est quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quaedam enim sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali intellectus, sicut arithmetica, geometria, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per geometriam, et musica ex principiis per arithmetica notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo."

² Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio*, p. 199: "Unde nihil est dicere quod ego scio conclusiones aliquas, quia tu scis principia quibus ego credo, quia tu dicis ea. Et eodem modo puerile est dicere quod ego scio conclusiones theologiae, quia Deus scit principia quibus ego credo, quia ipse revelat ea."

³ For an introduction to Boethius of Dacia, see Ebbesen 2020.

entering the programme, but logic retained a strong position—you did not get through an arts education, and hence not into theology either, without a solid training in logic. And this was not only true of the secular universities; the learned mendicant orders trained their friars in logic in much the same way as the secular schools. William of Ockham’s bulky and revolutionary *Summa logicae* from the early 1320s was, to all appearances, the final fruit of his activity as a teacher of Aristotelian logic in the Franciscan friary in London.¹

The ubiquity of logic in medieval philosophy is obvious even to a casual observer. If you know what a syllogism is, you cannot fail to notice that at least since the early thirteenth century, a medieval philosopher will express much of his argumentation in regular syllogisms, no matter what the subject, often first presenting the syllogism, then adding proofs of the major and the minor premisses, using formulas like *maior probatur ...* and *minor patet de se*. The argument may also have the form of a *consequentia*, typically a *modus ponens* “if *p*, then *q*; but *p*; therefore *q*”, and then it will be followed by a proof of the truth of the antecedent and a reason for considering the implication valid.

But the influence of logic goes beyond this. When interpreting Aristotle’s non-logical works, the medievals as a matter of course used conceptual tools they had learned while studying logic. The *Metaphysics* rather directly invites its readers to do so. Thus at the beginning of book IV Aristotle says:²

¹ It is generally acknowledged that Ockham’s commentaries on *Isagoge*, *Categories* and *Sophistici Elenchi* were composed ca. 1321–24 in London, and that the *Summa* dates from the same period, though perhaps only finished a little later. The obvious inference is that during those years Ockham functioned as a *lector* in the London friary. Cf. Courtenay 2008, p. 98.

² Aristotle, *Metaph.* IV.2.1003a33–b1: “Τὸ δὲ ὃν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμώνυμῶς ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ τῷ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς ὑγιείας τὸ δ’ ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς”.

Being is said in many ways, but with respect to one thing and one nature—not homonymously, but in the way everything *healthy* is so called with respect to health, whether because it preserves it, produces it, is a sign of health or is its bearer. [My translation]

This was an open invitation for commentators to employ all they had learned about homonymy when studying the *Categories* and the *Sophistical Refutations*, and so they did. Similarly, the *Metaphysics* offered many opportunities to employ what they had learned about genera, species and predication in Porphyry and the *Topics*.

But the commentators' basic training in logic also manifests itself at points where Aristotle's text does not obviously invite its use. Thus the discussion of the principle of contradiction in *Metaphysics* IV makes the late thirteenth-century master Radulphus Brito field no less than five *quaestiones* about signification:¹

- 1) Whether presupposing the significate of a term is a proper starting point for establishing the first principle
- 2) Whether every name signifies just one thing
- 3) Whether names signify things or concepts of things
- 4) Whether names signify the same whether their respective things exist or not
- 5) Whether it is natural for words to signify

Only the first question is directly linked to the text of the *Metaphysics*, the remaining four more naturally belonged in classes on the *Peri hermeneias* and the *Sophistical Refutations*.

¹ IV.9 Utrum supponere significatum termini sit principium conveniens ad determinandum primum principium; IV.10 Utrum omne nomen significat unum; IV.11 Utrum nomen significet rem vel intellectum rei; IV.12 Utrum nomen significet idem re existente et non existente; IV.13 Utrum significare sit naturale voci. About Brito's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* see Ebbesen 2001. The article contains a list of the questions treated in the work, an edition of which is now being prepared by Dr Charles Girard, Geneva.

And Radulphus Brito was far from alone in using the principle of contradiction as an occasion for discussing the signification of names. A generation before him, Siger of Brabant had dedicated no less than nine questions to the matter when lecturing on book IV of the *Metaphysics*.¹

Indeed, it is striking that as the curriculum came to encompass ever more Aristotelian writings on non-logical subjects, the scholastics tended to treat many of the problems discussed in those books as problems of logic and semantics.

One logical exercise consisted in the discussion of so-called *sophismata*, i.e. propositions that can be argued to be both true and false. The Liar paradox is the best known example, and the medievals discussed it eagerly,² but they spent even more energy on propositions involving what they called *syncategoremes*—principally quantifiers like *omnis* “every”, *quisquis* “whoever” or *qualiscumque* “of whatever sort”, negations and operators of exception or exclusion like *praeter* “except” and *tantum* “only”.³

Now, old Parmenides had argued for the unity of being and was attacked for this in Aristotle’s *Physics*. When lecturing on that work, thirteenth-century masters found it natural to approach this fundamental ontological question by discussing the sophisma *TANTUM UNUM EST*, the original purpose of which had been to elucidate the function of the operator

¹ Siger de Brabant 1981. In the Munich version of Siger’s commentary the questions are: IV.13. U. nomen significet aliquid naturaliter; 14. U. quid significet nomen possit doceri; 15. U. quid significet nomen possit haberi per rationem; 16. U. nomen significet intellectum rei; 17. U. nomen significet quod quid est et substantiam rei; 18. U. nomen possit significare infinita; 19. U. nomen possit significare plura; 20. U., si homo significat animal bipes, necesse sit ipsum esse hoc; 21. U. nomen idem significet et univoce, re existente et non existente.

² For an introduction to the topic, see Spade 1987; Spade 1988. For some examples of thirteenth-century treatments of the paradox, Ebbesen and Spade 1988.

³ See Ebbesen and Goubier 2010.

tantum.¹ In other words, they had transformed an unfamiliar ontological problem into a familiar logical one.²

Similarly, a fourteenth-century follower of John Buridan, when commenting on *De anima* III, raises the question *Utrum non ens possit intelligi* “Whether (something) not being can be understood”.³ In his solution, he takes it to be a question about the proposition ‘*non ens intelligitur*’ “some/the not being is understood”, and so starts by distinguishing several senses of that expression:

Non ens may function as a unity and supposit materially, i.e. be mentioned rather than used, as people say nowadays, and in this case the sentence ‘*non ens intelligitur*’ is true.

But ‘*ens*’ may also supposit personally, and then one further has to distinguish whether the *non* is a *negatio infinitans* or a *negatio negans*, i.e., whether it is a term negation or a sentence negation.

In the latter case the sentence is false because it means “being is not intelligible”, equalling “no being is intelligible”.

If the negation is a term negation, it may either negate only for present beings or for both present, past and future ones.

In the former case the sentence is true, for it means “what does not presently exist is intelligible”, and in this sense the actually non-existing, but future, Antichrist is intelligible. In the latter case, the sentence is false, because it means “what neither is nor was nor will be nor can be is intelligible”.

The *Antichrist* plays a considerable role in medieval logic because he is supposed to be actually non-existing but due to exist at some time in the future. He appears in several standard sophismata, as do other beings with interesting properties, such as *Caesar* who solely belongs to the past, the

¹ See Ebbesen 1995.

² For more about the “logicalization” of physics in the thirteenth century, see Ebbesen 1994b.

³ The text is question III.15 in *Le traité de l'âme de Jean Buridan*. The editor, Patar, claimed the text for John Buridan, but his arguments do not hold water. See Ebbesen 1994a.

phoenix, of which there is at any time exactly one specimen, and my special lady friend the *chimera*, who excels by being a non-being and indeed impossible quasi-entity.¹ Appropriately, the question on the *De anima* ends with some remarks about the chimera. Strictly speaking *chimaera intelligitur* “a chimera is understood” is nonsense, we are told, though one may have genuine concepts of the parts that constitute a chimera, i.e. the body of a young woman and the tail of a fish—which incidentally makes her a mermaid.

The distinction between the two types of negation can be traced back to Aristotle’s *Peri hermeneias*,² whereas that between different types of supposition is an independent medieval piece of doctrine that first appears in the late twelfth century and later becomes codified in various ways in handbooks of logic.

Interestingly, the logicalization of natural philosophy that transformed its problems into problems of sentence analysis did not abate as the relevant Aristotelian treatises ceased to be a new field of study. In fact, it seems to have reached a climax in the fourteenth century, as pointed out decades ago by my late friend John Murdoch (1927–2010),³ and this had consequences at least as late as the fifteenth century.

Theology was not impervious to the influence of logic either. Thus at a certain point in their *Sentences* commentaries, the mammoth works by which bachelors of theology qualified to become doctors, a series of theologians from Bonaventure to Ockham discuss how operators of exclusion (*dictiones exclusivae*) like *tantum* “only” and *solus* “alone” work in theological statements. The whole discussion presupposes the discussions of

¹ About the chimera, see Ebbesen 1986.

² Aristotle, *Int.* 2.16a30–32: “Τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ὄνομα· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ κεῖται ὄνομα ὃ τι δεῖ καλεῖν αὐτό,—οὔτε γὰρ λόγος οὔτε ἀπόφασίς ἐστιν—ἀλλ’ ἔστω ὄνομα ἀόριστον. “But ‘non-man’ is not a name, in fact, there is no established name by which to call it, for it is neither a sentence nor a negation, but let it be called an undefined name.” (my translation); in Boethius’ Latin translation: “‘Non homo’ vero non est nomen; at vero nec positum est nomen quod illud oporteat appellari—neque enim oratio aut negatio est—sed sit nomen infinitum.”

³ See, e.g., Murdoch 1982; Murdoch 1989.

such operators in the arts faculty, and more specifically in the context of the study of *sophismata*.¹

However, it was not just a one-way traffic. Even though the early history of supposition theory is not quite clear,² it is beyond reasonable doubt that the variant of the theory developed in trinitarian theology played a role also for the development of the non-theological variant.³ In particular, the fundamental distinction between simple and personal supposition—i.e., standing for a universal or for some or all of its particulars—this distinction almost certainly reflects a theological one between a term's standing for the whole of the Trinity or for one of the persons. But on the other hand, the theologians' attempt to develop tools to precisely describe the import of sentences found in Holy Writ was clearly inspired by logic.

So, if anyone claims that it is possible to understand medieval philosophy, or even medieval theology, without a solid knowledge of medieval logic, don't believe them. They do not know what they are talking about.

Sixty years ago Lambertus de Rijk (1924–2012) tried to provide an explanation of how the characteristically medieval type of logic that is often called 'terminism' and that he called *Logica modernorum* arose with its concentration on the referential range or *suppositio* of terms in various contexts. De Rijk argued that it was the study of the *Sophistical Refutations* that brought this about.⁴

Thirty years ago I argued that the issues that differentiated the schools or *sectae* of twelfth-century Paris were all such as grew out of the exegesis of the *Ars vetus*,⁵ and in an article that is to appear soon I will show that De Rijk's thesis about the origin of terminism is wrong; once again, to all

¹ See Ebbesen 1997.

² See Ebbesen 1981b; Ebbesen 2013.

³ For an example of the use of *supponere* in late twelfth-century trinitarian theology, see Ebbesen 1987b.

⁴ See L. M. De Rijk 1962–67.

⁵ Ebbesen 1992.

appearances, the study of the *Ars vetus* was much more important than that of the *Elenchi*.¹

This means that in the current situation we urgently need some detailed studies of twelfth-century commentaries on the *Ars vetus*.

Which is precisely what two new research projects will provide us with, the one about the school of Alberic headed by Dr Heine Hansen in Copenhagen and the brand new polyphonic one headed by Dr Caterina Tarlazzi and anchored in the lagoon of Venice.

Dr Tarlazzi has decided to give special attention to a cluster of closely related early *Categories* commentaries known as *The C8 Complex*, the one certain thing about which is that the relations between the texts that make up the complex are complicated.

I have not myself done any work worth mentioning on precisely those texts, but my first PhD student and close friend, Professor Yukio Iwakuma from Kyoto, has done much of the spade work, so I have for a long time been alert to the importance of the topic.

Twelfth-century philosophy has a charm of its own. One feels the scholastic movement is still young, and many bold ideas are tried out. People are not naïve beginners, they have some tradition behind them ... but not so much that it fetters their imagination.

I feel sure the Venetian project will produce many new insights and wish the participants good luck. Were I fifty years younger, I would have tried to get a slot for myself in the project.

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Boethius' *De syllogismis hypotheticis*: Eleventh-Century Emendations of the Text

Yukio Iwakuma*

0 Introduction

The earliest study so far known of Boethius' *De syllogismis hypotheticis* is Abbo of Fleury's treatise *De syllogismis hypotheticis*, dated to the late tenth century.¹ The Boethian work was next taken up and studied by proto-vocalists in the late eleventh century.² In the very beginning of the twelfth century, Peter Abelard first brought the book to Paris, where the work had not been studied yet.³ Abelard wrote the earliest full commentary on the

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¹ Mss. Paris, BnF, lat. 6638, ff. 1ra–4rb, Leiden, University Library, BPL 130B, ff. 17r–30r, Orléans, BM, 277 (233), pp. 74b–77b. Editions in Abbo of Fleury 1966; 1997.

² The following texts are by proto-vocalists: commentary SH6, Ms. Pommersfelden, Schlossbibliothek, 16/2764 ff. 2r–v + 4r–v; SH8, Ms. München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14779 ff. 39r–41v; tMP2, a treatise called *De mediis propositionibus*, Ms. München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14735 ff. 1r–2r; *Introductiones Lemovicenses*, Ms. Paris, BnF, lat. 544, ff. 110r–114r (hypothetical syllogisms discussed at ff. 112v–114r); *Introductiones Emmeranae*, Ms. München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14735 ff. 21r–22v (at f. 22r–v); and Gerland of Besançon's *Dialectica*, pp. 127–90.

³ The *Introductiones*, which I edited and attributed to William of Champeaux and dated to the late eleventh century, viz. before the arrival of Peter Abelard to Paris, do discuss inferential forms like hypothetical syllogisms, but in a completely different way from Boethius. See Iwakuma 1993 for my edition (see also my note “To Vienna II 3–4 and Escorial O 9.1–10” at pp. 53–54); and Iwakuma 2003 for my attribution to William and the dating.

book, and further studied the topic in his *Dialectica*.¹ Realists tried to give their own interpretation of the book until the mid-twelfth century,² but ceased to discuss hypothetical syllogisms in the second half of the century, and the logic books of the following centuries do not even mention hypothetical syllogisms, concentrating only on categorical ones. The Boethian book was then almost forgotten until the earliest printed text was published in the late fifteenth century.³

This is my view, in brief, on the history of the medieval studies of Boethius' *De syllogismis hypotheticis*. In this present paper, however, I refrain from discussing this view in detail. Instead, I shall discuss the manuscript tradition of the text itself. All the earliest manuscripts so far extant come from the late tenth and early eleventh century, around the same date as Abbo of Fleury's monograph. These manuscripts share

¹ Commentary SH2, Ms. München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14779, ff. 67v–86v; Peter Abelard, *Dialectica*, pp. 498–532. Cf. also the text by a *nominalis*: William of Lucca, *Summa dialectice artis*, pp. 205–49.

² SH3 in Mss. München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14458, ff. 59r–82r, Orléans, BM, 266 (222), pp. 78b–118a, Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, 134, pp. 96^{bis}a–133a, München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14779 ff. 66r–67r + 86v (in my view, it was written by a student of William of Champeaux just after William retired from teaching, and later revised by other students of William); SH4 (a commentary by a student of Jocelin of Soissons) in Ms. Orléans, BM, 266 (222) pp. 264a–276a; SH1 (a commentary by *Albricani*) in Ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, lat. fol. 634, ff. 76rb–80vb; SH5, Ms. Paris, Bibl. Arsenal, 910, ff. 142va–143ra; SH7, Ms. Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, 833 pp. 25–30. Treatises: *De mediis propositionibus*, tMP1, Ms. München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14458, f. 82v (attached to SH3); tMP2, *De dissimilitudine terminorum*, Ms. Orléans, BM, 266 (222), pp. 291a–293b (references to Jocelin of Soissons, Peter Abelard, Walter of Mortagne, and Ulger of Angers); *Introductiones Montanae maiores*, pp. 228–97; *Introductiones Montanae minores*, pp. 67–71; *Introductiones Emmeranae*, München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14736, ff. 21r–22v, at f. 22r–v; *Introductiones*, Paris, BnF, n.a.l. 3239 ff. 1ra–19vb, at f. 18rb–19vb; and *Ars Bernensis*, Ms. Bern, Burgerbibliothek, 618 ff. 51r–64v, at ff. 64v–74v.

³ I know the following four early printed books for Boethius' works, including the *De hyp. syl. Opera* (Venice: per Ioannem de Forlivio et Gregorium fratres 1491–92, 1497–99, 1540), *Dialectica* (Venice: apud Juntas, 1543, 1547), *Opera omnia* (Basel: apud Henricum Petrus, 1545, 1546, 1570, 1549), *Dialectica* (Venice: apud J. Gryphium 1575, 1580, 1585).

several serious *corruptelae*, which suggests that the earliest manuscripts are descended from a common, now lost, archetype. When medieval people like Abbo of Fleury and his circle first began to study the Boethian work in the late tenth century, they noticed the corrupt passages, and various emendations were proposed throughout the eleventh century and later. These facts are not evident in the editions currently in circulation, which are based on only a few of the extant manuscripts.¹ In the present paper, I shall present the corrupted parts in the archetype, and various emendations proposed in the eleventh century or later.

0.1 Abbreviations

After some introductory discussion, Boethius discusses several types of hypothetical syllogisms. I use the following abbreviations to refer to them in this paper: “CC” means that the first premise consists of two categorical propositions (CCmp for *modus ponens*, CCmt for *modus tollens*), “CH” means that it consists of a categorical and a hypothetical, “HC” vice versa; “Mi,” “Mii,” and “Miii” refer to those whose first premise is the first figure of *mediae propositiones*, and the second, and the third, respectively; “HH” means that the first premise consists of two hypotheticals, and “D” that it consists of a disjunctive proposition. These various types are discussed, after the introductory discussions in *Liber I* and *II*, as outlined in Table 1 (please note that some of Boethius’ inferences may sound wrong to modern ears).

¹ Boethius 1847; Boethius 1969.

Liber II		Examples of the first mode of each syllogism
CC	(CCmp) $X \rightarrow Y; X \vdash Y$	si est a est b; atqui est a; est igitur b (CC1mp)
	or (CCmt) $X \rightarrow Y; \neg Y \vdash \neg X$	si est a est b; atqui non est b; non est igitur a (CC1mt)
CH	$X \rightarrow (Y \rightarrow Z); X \vdash Y \rightarrow Z$	si est a, cum est b est c; est a; cum igitur est b est c (CH1)
	or $X \rightarrow (Y \rightarrow Z); Y \rightarrow \neg Z \vdash \neg X$	si est a, cum est b est c; si est b non est c; non est igitur a
HC	$(X \rightarrow Y) \rightarrow Z; X \rightarrow Y \vdash Z$	si, cum est a est b, est c; si est a est b; est igitur c (HC1)
	or $(X \rightarrow Y) \rightarrow Z; \neg Z \vdash X \rightarrow \neg Y$	si, cum est a est b, est c; non est c; si igitur est a non est b
Mi	$(X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (Y \rightarrow Z); X \vdash Z$	si est a est b, si est b est c; est a; est igitur c (Mi1)
	or $(X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (Y \rightarrow Z); \neg Z \vdash \neg X$	si est a est b, si est b est c; non est c; non est igitur a
Liber III		
Mii	$(X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (\neg X \rightarrow Z); \neg Y \vdash Z$	si est a est b, si non est a est c; non est b; est igitur c (Mii1)
	or $(X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (\neg X \rightarrow Z); \neg Z \vdash Y$	si est a est b, si non est a est c; non est c; est igitur b
Miii	$(Y \rightarrow X) \wedge (Z \rightarrow \neg X); Z \vdash \neg Y$	si est b est a, si est c non est a; est c; non est igitur b (Miii1)
	or $(Y \rightarrow X) \wedge (Z \rightarrow \neg X); Y \vdash \neg Z$	si est b est a, si est c non est a; est b; non est igitur c
HH	$(X \rightarrow Y) \rightarrow (Z \rightarrow W); X \rightarrow Y \vdash Z \rightarrow W$	si cum est a est b, cum est c est d; si est a est b; igitur si est c est d (HH1)
D	$X \vee Y; X \vdash \neg Y$	a aut b; a; non est igitur b (D1)
	or $X \vee Y; Y \vdash \neg X$	a aut b; b; non est igitur a

Table 1. The various hypothetical syllogisms discussed by Boethius

In *De Syllogismis Hypotheticis*, Boethius' variables (a, b, etc.) stand for terms. Even though he is not always consistent in this, Boethius builds his syllogistic inferences as composed of sentences such as “if [something] is (not) a, it is (not) b,” where the same subject is implicit in the antecedent and consequent.¹ For the sake of simplicity, I use A, B, ... as propositional variables in my formalisation (so that A stands for Boethius' formulation *est a*).²

Boethius distinguishes several modes by putting either A or its negation $\neg A$ for X, etc. For example, for CC, Boethius distinguishes four modes: CC1 $A \rightarrow B$ (or *si a est, b est*), CC2 $A \rightarrow \neg B$ (or *si a est, b non est*), CC3 $\neg A \rightarrow B$, CC4 $\neg A \rightarrow \neg B$; in the same way, Boethius distinguishes eight modes of CH, HC, Mi, Mii, and Miii, sixteen modes of HH, and four modes of D.

From the viewpoint of modern propositional logic, however, there is no need for such distinctions of modes—nor for the distinction of CC, CH, HC, and HH, since the same two inferences, CCmp (*modus ponens*) and CCmt (*modus tollens*), hold for CH, HC, and HH, too. However, Boethius does make such distinctions.

It is strange, too, that Boethius gives the inference of CH corresponding to CCmt as $X \rightarrow (Y \rightarrow Z); Y \rightarrow \neg Z \vdash \neg X$ (*si est a, cum est b est c; si est b, non est c; igitur non est a*), as the second premise should be $\neg(Y \rightarrow Z)$ from the viewpoint of modern logic. Similarly for HC, where $X \rightarrow \neg Y$ is used instead of $\neg(X \rightarrow Y)$. As for HH, Boethius does not refer to the inferences corresponding to CCmt.

¹ Cf. Martin 2004, esp. p. 161.

² It is questionable whether Boethius ever conceived of hypothetical syllogisms in propositional terms, i.e. as composed of propositional content which could be combined into more complex propositions. According to some classic interpretations (cf. Martin, 2004, pp. 163–64), *DHS* shows no notion of propositionality in this sense. In this article, I still propose a propositional interpretation of certain Boethian inferential schemata, because this kind of formalisation is now more palatable and easier to follow for contemporary readers. This propositional formalisation is accompanied in many cases by Boethius' own formulas in Latin.

In addition, Boethius strangely asserts that only for CC2 ($A \rightarrow \neg B$) two more inferences hold when A and B are *immediata* (meaning that $\neg A \vdash B$ and $\neg B \vdash A$ hold in addition to $A \vdash \neg B$ (= CC2mp) and $B \vdash \neg A$ (= CC2mt), for example with $A = \textit{est rationale}$ and $B = \textit{est irrationale}$). This Boethian assertion is strange, since when A and B are *immediata*, four inferences hold not only in CC2 but also in CC1, CC3, and CC4. Similar strange assertions are made for CH5, CH7, HC3, HC7, HH5, HH7, HH13, HH15, and D1, and perhaps also for Mi5, Mi6, and Mi7 (for the last three dubious cases, see § 2.11 below). I have failed to find any reasons why Boethius asserts that in only those cases two more inferences hold in addition to those corresponding to CCmp and CCmt.

Boethius' confusing treatment of the logical issues concerned made medieval readers, and Abelard in particular, investigate them anew.

0.2 Extant Manuscripts

The following is a list of all the extant manuscripts of the Boethian work to my knowledge,¹ together with the *sigla* that I use below to refer to them.

Around 1000 AD

$Mx(M^l)^2$ München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 6370, saec. X, ff. 29v–46r
(II f. 33v–, III f. 39v–);
AL 1147, CB IIs 8, Thörnqvist (M1)³

¹ AL (no. 437) mentions Orléans, BM, 277 as containing SH on pp. 74–77, which is in fact Abbo of Fleury's *De syl. hyp.* In his 1969 edition, Obertello (at p. 165) mentions other Mss.: Cassel, Fuld. Philol. Quarto 3, München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14272 and clm 14779, Paris, BNF, nouv. acq. lat. 1456, Montecassino, Bibl. dell'abbazia, 191, and Venezia, Bibl. Marciana, Z.L. 235 (1639). The first four Mss., however, do not contain Boethius' *De syl. hyp.*

² Mx is the *siglum* I use to refer to the manuscript (M^l is the siglum used by Obertello). Similarly for others.

³ AL = Lacombe 1939–55; ALs = Minio-Paluello 1961; CB = Gibson et al. 1995–2010; Thörnqvist = Boethius 2008a and 2008b (in 2008b, pp. xxiii–xxxiii Thörnqvist gives her description of each manuscript, with her *siglum* (e.g. M1); many of these manuscripts contain the *De syl. hyp.*, too).

- My* München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 6372, saec. X, ff. 96v–103v (vol. I impf., until ... *omnino* 841A2, 840.35);
AL 2105, Thörnqvist (M2)
- Py* Paris, BnF, lat. 11127, saec. Xex, ff. 145v–170v (II 153r–, III f. 161v–);
emendations by several hands (*Py**, *Py***, etc.) different from but
contemporary with that copying the main text (*Py*), glosses;
AL 618, Thörnqvist (Pd)
- Or* Orléans, BM, 265, saec. X/XI, pp. 107–113
(vol. I p. 107–113 (acephalous, from *-litatis definitio* ... 836A14,
222.15), vol. II p. 113–114 (impf., until ... *hypothe*- 845B1, 258.64));
AL 435
- Pz(F)* Paris, BnF, n.a.l. 1611, saec. X/XI, ff. 37r–51r (II f. 41v–, III f. 45v–),
from Fleury, emendations by *Pz**;
AL 2080, Thörnqvist (Pa)
- Kø* København, Royal Library, Thott. 166, 2°, saec. X/XI, ff. 36r–82r (II f.
49r–, III f. 65r–), emendations by *Kø**;
CB IId 7
- Va* Valenciennes, BM, 406, saec. X/XI (Magee) or X1/2 (Bischoff), ff.
124v–149r (II 131v–, III 139v–), emendations by *Va**;
AL 2085, Thörnqvist (Va)
- Vl* Vat., BAV, lat. 8591, saec. XI in, ff. 150v–201r (II 164v–, III 181v–),
glosses;
AL 1897, CB III 565, Thörnqvist (V4)

The Eleventh Century

- Mz(M²)* München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14272, saec. XI 1/4, ff.
137r–146r (II f. 140r–, III f. 143r–), glosses;
Thörnqvist (M3)
- Sg(S)* Sankt Gallen, Stiftbibliothek, 830, saec. XI 1/3, pp. 444–488 (II p. 457–
, III p. 473–), emendations by *Sg**;
AL 1165, CB IIs 61, Thörnqvist (S)
- Wx* Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, VPL 2269, saec. XI, f. 100vc–
105vb (II f. 102rc–, III f. 104ra–);
AL 2–23, CB IIa 76, Thörnqvist (W2)
- Be(B)* Bern, Burgerbibliothek, 300, saec. XI, ff. 50v–56v + 9r–16v + 57r–60r
(II f. 55v–, III f. 13v–), emendations by *Be**, glosses;
AL 2120, CB IIs 21, Thörnqvist (Be)

- Br* Bruxelles, KBR, 5439–43, saec. XI, ff. 78va–92rb (II f. 82ra–, III 87rb–), emendations by *Br** (ff. 88–89 are copied by a different contemporary hand);
ALs 171, CB IIb 14, Thörnqvist (Br)
- Ld* Leiden, University Library, BPL 84, saec. XI, ff. 17r–44v (II 24r–, III f. 34r–), glosses;
AL 2026, CB II: The Netherlands 10, Thörnqvist (Le)
- Vo* Vat., BAV, Ott. lat. 1406, saec. XIlex, ff. 125r–163r (II f. 135v–, III f. 148v–);
AL 2184, CB III 434
- Px* Paris, BnF, lat. 6400E, saec. XI/XII, ff. 57r–76v (II f. 162r–, III f. 69r–);
ALs 581

The Twelfth Century

- Ll* London, Lambeth Palace Libr., 339, saec. XII 1/2, ff. 140r–172v (II f. 149v–, III 160v–);
AL 287, CB II 46
- Ch(C)* Chartres, BM, 498, saec. XII (ca. 1140), ff. 37rb–53v (II f. 41va–, III 46va–);
AL 475, Thörnqvist (Ch)
- Dr* Darmstadt, Universitätsbibliothek, 2282, saec. XII (Paris, ca. 1140), ff. 34r–49r (II f. 38v–, III f. 43v–);
AL 848
- Pd* Padova, Bibl. Antoniana, Scaff. XXII 553, saec. XII med., ff. 131r–170v (II f. 142v–, III f. 156v–), emendations by *Pd**;
AL 1511, CB III 260
- Fx* Firenze, Bibl. Medicea Laurenziana, San Marco 125, saec. XII, ff. 57v–79v (II f. 64r–, III 72r–), glosses;
AL 1386, CB III 118
- Fy* Firenze, Bibl. Medicea Laurenziana, San Marco 166, saec. XII 2/2, ff. 65r–85v (II 71r–, III f. 78r–), emendations by *Fy**, glosses;
AL 1388, CB III 121, Thörnqvist (F2)
- Kl* Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek, 1098, saec. XII, ff. 92vb–114vb (II f. 99ra–, III f. 106va–);
ALs 51, CB IIa 23

- Pg* Paris, BnF, lat. 6400G, saec. XII, ff. 109v–111v (I impf., until ... *in negatione* 834B15, 214.6);
Thörnqvist (Pc)
- Pw* Paris, BnF, lat. 12959, saec. XII, ff. 53r–78v (II f. 60v–, III f. 69r–)¹
- Wy* Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, VPL 2498, saec. XII, ff. 33v–48v; (II 38v–, III 45r–48v impf., until ... *niger est cum sit* – 869B1, 360.19);
AL 2024, CB IIa 76, Thörnqvist (W2)
- Er* Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 191, saec. XII^{ex}, ff. 110r–130r (II f. 115v–, III f. 122v–);
AL 909, Thörnqvist (E1)

The Thirteenth Century

- Vx* Venezia, Biblioteca Marciana, lat. Z. 273 (=1574), saec. XII/XIII, ff. 85v–110v (II f. 92v–, III f. 101r–);
AL 1645, CB III 380
- Pa* Paris, Bibl. de l'Arsenal, 811, saec. XIII^{lin}, ff. 97r–114v
(II f. 103v–, III f. 110r–114v impf., until ... *aut est B fiunt* 874C10, 382.72);
AL 512
- Bs* Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F IV 16, saec. XIII^{1/2} (ff. 74r–80r saec. XIV), ff. 58v–80r (II f. 65r–, III 71r–), glosses;
AL 1147, CB IIs 8
- Vb* Vat., BAV, Borg. lat. 131, saec. XIII, ff. 39r–66v (II 46v–, III 56r–);
AL 1897, CB III 565

¹ This Ms. (*olim* Saint Germain-des-Prés 611, saec. XII) contains on ff. 1r–24r *De differentiis topicis*; on ff. 24r–30r *De divisione*; on ff. 31r–52r *De syllogismis categoricis*; on ff. 52rb–53rb examples of categorical syllogisms: “Primus modus primae figurae: omne sensibile substantia est, omne animal sensibile est, omne animal substantia est. Secundus ...”; on ff. 53r–78v *De syllogismis hypotheticis*; on f. 78v “Esse genus summum substantia dicitur unum, ... Infima nec species genus ulla tempore fiet” and “Syllogismus est inevitabilis argumentatio, quae interrogatos hinc inde concludit et utroque cornu praemit”; on ff. 79ra–131v Geoffroy de Venôme’s *Super Psalmos*; and on f. 132r (a small piece of membr.) “Dum ibis per patrias ...” with neuma; f. 132v is blank.

The Fourteenth Century

- Lb* London, BL, Burney 275, saec. XIVⁱⁿ, ff. 265rb–278ra (II f. 268rb–, III f. 272vb–);
AL 298
- Ma* Milano, Bibl. Ambrosiana, Y.7.Sup., saec. XIV,
I ff. 148r–161v,
II ff. 162r–166v (where f. 164 is blank¹) + 175r–182v, + 167–169v; the *quartenion* (ff. 175–182) is wrongly bound, as it should have been bound before the next *quartenion* (ff. 167–174).
III f. 169v–174v + 183r–188r, where on f. 184v the scribe skips a long passage,² and adds the skipped passage incompletely at the end of the copy, on ff. 188r–v + 189r–191v;
AL 1458, CB III 211

The Fifteenth Century

- Vy* Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, lat. VI. 65 (2847), saec. XV (c. 1448), ff. 30v–69v (II 141v–, III 54v–), glosses;
CB III 366
- Wz* Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, VPL 3253, saec. XV, ff. 1r–32v (II f. 19v–, III f. 20v–), glosses;
CB IIa 95

By *sigla* with * (e.g. *Py**), I mean emendations in the manuscript (*Py*) made by a hand different from but contemporary with the hand copying the main text.

¹ F. 163v ends with ... *non est igitur B* (845C14, 260.17) and f. 165r begins with -*onis(!) fiunt videtur in rebus* ... (846C13, 266.66), viz. a folio, on which *Id enim* ... *propositis enuntiationibus* (845C14, 260.17 – 846C3, 266.66) was copied, is lost; instead of the lost folio, the blank folio f. 164 is inserted.

² On f. 184v, after ... *non esse necesse sit* (867A11, 350.80, the end of the discussion of Miii8) the scribe skips to *Ex quibus omnibus* ... (874A7, 376.1, the discussion of HH) abruptly, with no remarks. On f. 188r the scribe begins to add the skipped part *Octavus modus est* ... (867A11, 352.1, the discussion of Miii8), but the addition ends on f. 191v, incompletely, with ... *praeter sanitatem esse potest* (871A12, 368.42), leaving ff. 192–194 blank.

In the quotations from these manuscripts I use the following abbreviations:

<i>i.m.</i>	<i>in margine</i>
<i>i.t.</i>	<i>in textu</i>
<i>a.c.</i>	<i>ante correctionem</i>
<i>p.c.</i>	<i>post correctionem</i>
'X'	X <i>supra lineam addidit scribe seu corrector</i>
[X]	X <i>expunxit scribe seu corrector</i>
[[X]]	X <i>delevit scribe seu corrector</i>
†	<i>corruptela</i>

1 Disordered Folios in the Archetype

The clearest corruption is that the lost exemplar must have contained disordered folios.

Many early manuscripts (*PzKøVaMzSgWx* + a twelfth century one, *Fy*) share the following three gaps in *Liber III*:

Gap I: *Pz*(46v)*Kø*(66v)*Va*(140v)*Mz*(143v)*Sg*(474)*Wx*(104rb)*Fy*(78v) jump from A1 to B2,

Gap II: *Pz*(48v)*Kø*(73r)*Va*(144r)*Mz*(144v)*Sg*(480)*Wx*(104vc)*Fy*(81v) from C1 to A2, and

Gap III: *Pz*(50r)*Kø*(79v)*Va*(147r)*Mz*(146r)*Sg*(485)*Wx*(105rc)*Fy*(84r) from B1 to C2,

where A1–A2, B1–B2 and C1–C2 are as follows in Migne and Obertello:

In the discussion of Mii3:

... at si non sit A erit C, si igitur sit B erit C. **(A1)** |860D14 (Migne), p. 326.5 (Obertello)| **(A2)** Quodsi non sit B, nihil est necessarium. Si enim ...

In the discussion of Miii8:

... Si enim non sit B non erit A, quodsi non sit A erit C **(B1)** |867A3, 352.3| **(B2)** Id enim conseqebatur eam partem propositionis quae dicebat ...

In the discussion of HH16:

... Si cum non est A non est B, cum non sit C non est D* **(C1)** |874A4,
376.78| **(C2)** Atqui cum non est A non est B, cum igitur non sit C non est
D. ...

Note that the length of B2–C1 is almost the same as that of A2–B1. This strongly suggests that the lost exemplar must have had the disordered folios: in between a bifolio (or a *binion*) on which A1 and C2 are copied, two quires are switched around, the quire containing B2–C1, and that containing A2–B1, in that order.

People of the late tenth century first noticed the gaps. The following remarks are found in some of the earlier manuscripts (*PzKøVaSg*, and an unsatisfactory remark in the later *Fy*), in the margin, by hands different from but contemporary with the hands copying the Boethian text (no such remarks are found in *Mz* and *Wx*).

Pz (f. 46v)

i.t.: ... erit C. Si non sit igitur B (*signum1*) si non sit A erit C (=A1)

(Gap I) (B2=) Id enim ...

i.m.: (*signum1*) Quere hoc signum in secundo folio sequenti.

Et totum perlege usque ad hoc signum aliud (*signum2*).

Deinde huc legi ingredi ad primum scilicet signum.

Et percurres quae praeterieras usque ad idem ipsam
secundi folii signum quod est (*signum1*)

(f. 48v)

i.t.: ... non est D (=C1) '*signum1*' **(Gap II)** Erit C (A2=) Quodsi non
sit B ...

i.m.: (*signum1*) ab hoc signo transi legendo ad istud (*signum2*) ita:

(C1=) *Si cum non est A non est B. cum non sit C non est D. Atqui cum
non est A non est B. Cum igitur non sit C non est D.*

(f. 50r)

i.t.: ... Si enim non sit B non erit A Quod (=B1) (*signum2*) **(Gap III)**

(C2=) Atqui cum non est A ...

i.m. Ø

Kø (f. 66v)

i.t.: ... Si [non] sit igitur [B. si non sit] A erit C. (=A1) (Gap I)(B2=) Id enim ...

i.m.: Ø

(f. 73r)

i.t.: ... non est D `signum d' (=C1) (Gap II) [erit C] (A2=) Quodsi non sit B ... (this part of the discussion of Miii8 is expunged by another hand, noticing that this part is out of place)

i.m.: -- hic deest -- in septi --ibo. ubi -- Quod -- mitur -- huius modo. (Because of the tight binding illegible in the microfilm at my disposal).

(f. 79v)

i.t.: ... Si enim non sit B non erit A (=B1) `signum Π' (Gap III) Quod `signum ×' ita assumitur. (C2=) Atqui cum ...

i.m.: Require ($\overline{RQ}$ Kø) ad illud signum quod infra scriptum est quod hic deest

Va (f. 140v)

i.t.: ... At si non sit A erit C. [[Sit non]] si[[t]] igitur B [[Si non]] sit [[A]] erit c[[um]] `signum W' (=A1) (Gap I)(B2=) Id enim `signum N' consequabatur ...

i.m.: ... M Require ($\overline{REQ}$ Va) hoc signum in ante in .iiii. folio. ubi incipit. (A2=) Quodsi non sit B. nihil est necessarium. Vsque ad hoc signum N (B1=) Quodsi non sit A erit C. et repete hic. (B2=) Id enim consequabatur eam partem propositionis N et his lectis usque ad idem superius signum W incipe ad hoc signum et perlege ultra hoc. (C2+=) Ex quibus omnibus .xl. conclusiones fiunt

(f. 144r)

i.t.: ... non est D (=C1) `signum ∩' [Atqui cum non sit D erit cum(!)]

(Gap II) `signum W' (A2=) Quodsi non sit B ...

i.m.: Ø

(f. 147r)

i.t.: ... Si enim non sit B non erit A + Quodsi non sit A erit C (*i.m. alia manu add.*) + (=B1) (Gap III)(C2=) [Atqui cum non est A non est B. Cum igitur non sit C (cum!) Va) non est D. Vel ita. Atqui cum non sit

cum est D. Cum igitur non sit A est B] (*[Atqui - B]* is falsely expunged in *Va*). Ex quibus omnibus ...
i.m.: *signum W*

Sg (p. 474)

i.t.: ... At si non sit A erit C. Si non sit igitur B. si non sit A erit C.
 (=A1) '*signum*' (**Gap I**) (B2=) [Id enim ... Quod si B] (*[Id enim - B]* is falsely expunged in *Sg*) |Sg475| terminus affirmetur ...
i.m.: Hic deest verte tria folia et habebis (*manu B*)

(p. 480)

i.t.: ... non est D (=C1) (**Gap II**) [Erit C] '*signum*' (A2=) Quodsi non sit B ...
i.m.: Quaere hic. quia magna pars ut aestimo deest (*manu A*), Hic habes quod prius ante tria folia defuit (*manu B*)

(p. 485)

i.t.: ... Si enim non sit B non erit A (=B1) '*signum* ∇ ' (**Gap III**) (C2=)
 Atqui cum ...
i.m.: hic habes quod ante duo folia desunt (*manu B*)

Fy (f. 78v)

i.t.: ... si igitur sit B A(!) erit C. (=A1) {(A2=) Quodsi non sit B nihil est necessarium}. {Si non sit A erit C} (**Gap I**) (B2=) Id enim ...
i.m.: $\emptyset$

(f. 81v)

i.t.: ... cum non sit C non est D (=C1) {(*signum*) B erit C} (**Gap II**) (A2=) Quodsi non sit B ...
i.m.: (*signum*) Atqui cum non est A non est B. cum igitur non est C non est D. (cf. the reading of *Va*)

(f. 84r)

i.t.: Si enim non sit B non erit A. quodsi non sit A erit C (=B1) {(B2=) Id enim consequeretur eam partem C(!)} (**Gap III**) (C2=) Atqui cum non est A ...
i.m.: $\emptyset$

The last phrase of A1 (*Si igitur sit B erit C*) is corrupt in all the manuscripts (with emendations by *Kø** and *Va**):

- Pz*: 'Si' non sit igitur B (*signum1*) si non sit A erit C in *Gap I* (f. 46v) et
add. erit C before B2 (Id enim consequabatur ...) in *Gap II* (f. 48v)
Kø: Si [non] sit igitur [B si non sit] A erit C in *Gap I* (f. 66v) et add.
[erit C] before B2 (Id enim consequabatur ...) in *Gap II* (f. 73r)
Va: [[Sit non]] si[[t]] igitur B [[Si non]] sit [[A]] erit c[[um]]
Sg: Si non sit igitur B. si non sit A erit C et i.m. alia manu add.: Hic
deest verte tria folia et habebis *Sg*, et add. erit C before B2 (Id
enim consequabatur ...) in *Gap II* (p. 480)
Mz (143v): Si non sit igitur B. si non sit A erit C
Wx (105rc): Si non sit igitur B. si non sit A erit C. Si non sit igitur B. si
non sit A erit C,
Fy (78v): Si igitur sit B A erit C. Quodsi non sit B nichil est
necessarium)

These facts suggest that the lost archetype would have given a wrong reading here: *si non sit igitur B. Si non sit A erit C*, and that the phrase is correctly emended by *Kø** and *Va**.

The same phrase is corrupt, too, in some other early manuscripts, *Mx*, *Py*, and *Vl*, where the text is copied in the right order without the three gaps (the extant parts of the two other earliest manuscripts, *My* and *Or*, do not cover these passages).

Mx (f. 40r) omits the whole discussion of *Mii3*, in which the phrase appeared.

Py (f. 162v) reads: *si[t] igitur 'sit' B [si non sit A] erit C*, corrected by another hand (*Py**)

Vl (f. 183r) reads *Si non sit igitur B*, omitting 'erit C'

Only *Py** gives the same emendation as *Kø*Va**. All the other later manuscripts follow the emended version, except for *Ma*, which omits the whole part containing this phrase. Thus:

Emendation:

*Py*Kø*Va*BeBrVoLdVoPxLlChDrPdFxPyKlPwWyErPaBsBsVbLbVy-
WzMigneObertello*

si¹ igitur² sit³ B⁴ erit C:

(1) si] sit *Ch* (2) igitur sit] sit igitur *Kø*Py*LdPxLlFxWyVbWz* (3) sit B] B sit
BrMigne (4) B + A *Fy*

This, then, suggests that the manuscripts without the gaps are not copies of another, better exemplar without gaps, but rely on the notes about the three gaps (in *PzKøVaSg*). It is clear in *Py*. Just as the manuscripts with the gaps, after A1 (part of the discussion of Mii3), *Py* (f. 162v) continues to B2 (*Id enim consequebatur ...*, which is part of the discussion of Miii8, ending with ... *necesse est esse vel non esse animatum* (867C3, p. 352.19)), and then continues back to the discussion of Mii4. In the margins of ff. 162v–163r, the emending hand (*Py**) gives a long emendation of the discussion of Miii8 into the correct continuation of the discussion of Mii3, and the discussion of Miii8 is copied again in the right place (f. 165v).

2 Erroneous Readings in the Lost Exemplar

The lost archetype must have contained many erroneous readings in addition to the three gaps so far discussed. The manuscripts show that emendations to each corruption were proposed throughout the eleventh century and later. I shall discuss all of the main cases where such emendations are proposed.¹ I shall begin with *Liber III*, which is full of erroneous readings.

¹ There are a lot of other smaller corruptions, too, in which for example a word of the archetype is emended into another more suitable word. But I shall not take up such smaller emendations here.

2.1 Quotation 1 (Miii2)

The discussion of Miii2 $((B \rightarrow A) \wedge (\neg C \rightarrow \neg A))$ runs as follows in many of the earlier manuscripts:

Quotation 1, Miii2; Py(a.c.)PzKø(a.c.)VaVlMzSgWx (in Fy Quotation 1 is added after the emended version quoted below)

(Step 1) *¹Ex secunda vero propositione hic modus est colligendi*

si non² est B, est A; si³ est C, non est A $((\neg B \rightarrow A) \wedge (C \rightarrow \neg A))$, dico quia⁴

si non⁵ est B, *⁶non est C $(\neg B \vdash \neg C)$. (This is Miii3, not Miii2).

Nam, si non⁷ est B*, est A $(\neg B \rightarrow A)$; sed⁸, cum est A, non⁹ est C

$(A \rightarrow \neg C)$; cum igitur non est B, non est C¹⁰ $(\neg B \rightarrow \neg C)$.

(Step 2) Quodsi B terminus affirmetur, nihil est necessarium. Nam, si sit ^[V1188r] B, consequitur quidem ut non sit A; sed non consequitur ut sit vel¹¹ non sit C; ut in terminis¹², si¹³ sit B animatum, A inanimatum, C¹⁴ animal. Si igitur enuntietur sic: *¹⁵si animatum est, non est inanimatum; si non est inanimatum, non necesse est esse vel¹⁶ non esse animal*.

(Step 3) C¹⁷ vero terminus si affirmetur, fiet protinus syllogismus et erit rata collectio¹⁸. Nam,

si¹⁹ sit C²⁰, non est A $(C \rightarrow \neg A)$,

si non sit A²¹, erit B $(\neg A \rightarrow B)$,

si igitur sit C²², erit B $(C \rightarrow B)$.

(Step 4) At, si negetur C²³, nulla conclusio²⁴ est. Si enim non sit C²⁵, non necesse est esse A; quocirca ne B quidem. Nam, si non est animal, non necesse est esse vel non esse inanimatum²⁶; quo fit ut ne animatum²⁷ quidem.

(1) *Ex – colligendi* om. Fy (2) [non] Va (3) si + 'non' Va (4) quia + [[non]] Kø (5) [non] Va (6) *non – B* om. Fy (7) [non] Va (8) sed] si Fy (9) [non] Va (10) C] cum Va Fy (11) *vel non sit* om. Py (12) terminis] his terminis Sg, terminis his ut KøFy (13) si KøSgFy] om. PyPzVaVlMzWx (14) C] cum Va (15) *si – animal*] si animatum non est, est inanimatum; si est animal, non est inanimatum; assumaturque esse animatum, sequitur quidem ut non sit inanimatum, sed non necesse est ut sit animal Py (16) vel non esse om. KøVaSgFy (17) C] cum Va (18) collectio] conclusio Sg (19) si + non Fy (20) C] cum Va (21) A + non Fy (22) C] cum Va (23) C] cum Va (24) conclusio est] est conclusio Kø (25) C] cum Va (26) inanimatum] 'in'animatum alia manu add. Pz, animatum Va (27) animatum] [[in]]animatum Pz

Since this passage is found in almost all of the earliest manuscripts, it certainly comes from the archetype. In the beginning, it tells us it will discuss Miii2 $((B \rightarrow A) \wedge (\neg C \rightarrow \neg A))$, but, as a matter of fact, it discusses Miii3 $((\neg B \rightarrow A) \wedge (C \rightarrow \neg A))$! (Strangely enough, after this passage the genuine discussion of Miii3 follows, in different wordings; see Migne 865A5–B14, Obertello pp. 342.7–44.23).

Some early manuscripts notice this error. *Va* makes an awkward attempt to make the passage a discussion of Miii2 (see (2), (3), (5), (7), (9) in the apparatus above, but here *Va* stops giving further emendations). *Ma* (f. 41v) and *Ld* (37v) give up on copying the whole discussion of Miii2, leaving a blank space (*fenestra*), presumably not knowing how to emend this wrong passage. Lastly, *Kø** and *Py** give the correct emendation (in slightly different wordings from each other), and all the later manuscripts follow their emendation.

*Emendation: Py*Kø*BeBrLdVoPxLlChDrPdFxFyKlPwWxErVxPaBs-VbMaVyWzMigne(864C15–865A6)Obertello(340.58–342.73)*

(*Step 1*) Ex /864D/ secunda vero¹ propositione hic modus est² colligendi
si est B, est A; si non est C, non est A $((B \rightarrow A) \wedge (\neg C \rightarrow \neg A))$,
dico quia³ /342/
si est⁴ B, erit⁵ C $(B \vdash C)$.

Nam, si est B, est A $(B \rightarrow A)$; sed⁶, cum est⁷ A, $[Vy49r]$ est C $(A \rightarrow C)$ (*⁸ita enim⁹ convertitur¹⁰ talis propositio¹¹, *¹²quae ait: si non est C, non est A* $(\neg C \rightarrow \neg A)$); si¹³ igitur¹⁴ est¹⁵ B, est C $(B \rightarrow C)$.

(*Step 2*) Quodsi B terminus abnuatur¹⁶, *¹⁷nulla fit¹⁸ syllogismi¹⁹ necessitas*. Nam, si non est²⁰ B, non²¹ *²²necesse²³ est esse vel non esse²⁴ A; *²⁵quocirca ne²⁶ ad C quidem ulla²⁷ necessitas perveniet²⁸*; ut *²⁹in terminis patet. $[Pd161r]$ Nam*, si³⁰ sit³¹ B animal, A animatum, C³² corporeum³³, et³⁴ proponatur

si est³⁵ animal, est animatum; si non est cor $[Py165r]$ poreum³⁶, non est animatum,
et³⁷ assumatur³⁸

atqui non est animal,
non³⁹ $[Kl109rb]$ *⁴⁰necesse est esse vel non esse⁴¹ corporeum*.

(Step 3) C vero⁴² terminus si negetur⁴³, *⁴⁴erit necessitas syllogismi. Nam,⁴⁵ /865A/ si non est C, non est⁴⁶ A ($\neg C \rightarrow \neg A$); quodsi⁴⁷ non est⁴⁸ A, non est⁴⁹ B ($\neg A \rightarrow \neg B$) (*⁵⁰ita enim⁵¹ converti potest^{52*}); *⁵³si igitur non est C, non erit B ($\neg C \rightarrow \neg B$).

(Step 4) Si affirmetur, nulla est necessitas. Nam, si est⁵⁴ corporeum, non necesse est⁵⁵ esse⁵⁶ animatum vel non esse; quocirca ne⁵⁷ animal⁵⁸ quidem⁵⁹ *⁶⁰esse |Vo153v| vel non esse necesse est⁶¹. |Er125r||Wz25r|

(1) vero] *om. BeLdVoPxLIChPdKIPwErVxMaWzMigne* (2) est colligendi] est colligendi 'vel -dus' *alia manu add. Py*, est colligendus *BeVoLIChPdKIPwErVxPaVbMaVyObertello* (3) quia] quidem *BeLdVoPdKIPwVxVyMigne*, quidem et *Ll*, quod *FyWy* (4) est B] B est *Dr* (5) erit] est *KøPxFxWyVxPaBsVbWz* (6) sed cum] quodsi *BeLdVoLIChDrFxFyKIPwWyErVxBsVbMaVyMigneObertello* (7) est A est C] A est C est *Pd* (8) *ita – A*] *om. KøPxPaWz* (9) enim *om. Vy* (10) convertitur talis] talis convertitur *Dr* (11) propositio + Qualis scilicet est 'si sit animatum, sit corporeum.' Propositio haec 'si est animal, est animatum,' ita convertitur, ut 'si non sit animatum, non sit animal.' *i.m. alia tertia manu add. Py* (12) *quae – A*] quae si (] quasi *Wy*) non esset C A (+ quoque *Fy*) non esse proposuit *FxFyWy*, *om. BeLdVoLIChDrPdKIPwErVxBsVbMaVyObertello* (13) si] cum *KøPxPdPaWz* (14) igitur *om. Kl* (15) est] sit *KøPxWz*, fit *Pa* (16) abnuatur] negetur *KøBeBrLdVoLIChDrFxFyKIPwWyErVxBsVbMaMigneObertello*, abnegetur *PdPa* (17) *nulla – necessitas*] nihil est necessarium *KøPxPaVyWz* (18) fit] est *BeLdVoLIChDrPdFxFyKIPwWyErVxVbMaObertello*, sit *Bs* (19) syllogismi necessitas] necessitas syllogismi *BeBrLdVoLIChDrFxFyKIPwWyErVxBsVbMaMigneObertello*, necessitas syllogismi et erit rata collectio *Pd* (20) est] sit *KøPxPaWz* (21) non *om. Vx* (22) *necesse – perveniet*] consequitur quidem (] quod *Pa*) ut non sit A. sed non (nec] *Pa*) consequitur ut sit vel non sit C *PdPa* (23) necesse est] consequitur *Kø* (24) esse] est *Ma*, esse est esse vel non esse *repet(!)*. *Vx* (25) *quocirca – perveniet*] quo fit ut ne B quidem *PxWz*, *om. KøVb* (26) ne] nec *BeLdVoLIChDrPdFyKIPwWyVxBsMaVy* (27) *ulla – perveniet*] necessitas ulla perveniet *ChPdKlErMaVy*, *om. Wz* (28) perveniet] pertinet *Dr* (29) *in – Nam*] in his terminis *PxPaWz*, *om. Kø* (30) si] si si *repet. Vx*, *om. Ma* (31) sit] est *Vy* (32) C *om. Ma* (33) corporeum] corporeum 'vel vitale' *tertia manu add. Ld*, vitale *PxWz* (34) et proponatur] si igitur enuntietur sic *Kø*, et ponatur *LlWy*, et ponatur et *Fx* (35) est animal] animal est *KøFy* (36) corporeum] animal vitale *Px*, vitale *Wz* (37) et] et si *Ma*, *om. Er* (38) assumatur atqui non est] assumamus non esse *PxWz* (39) non *om. BrKl* (40) *necesse – corporeum*] consequitur ut sit vel non sit animatum *PxWz* (41) esse] est *Fy* (42) vero *om.*

ChVb (43) negetur] abnegetur *Pa* (44) *erit – syllogismi*] fiet protinus syllogismus. et erit rata collectio *PxPaVyWz* (45) Nam + uni *Vb* (46) est] erit *Pa* (47) quodsi] si *KøPxPaVyWz* (48) est] sit *KøVy*, fuerit *Pa*, om. *Wz* (49) est] erit *KøPxPaWz* (50) *ita – potest* om. *PxPaWz* (51) enim om. *Kø*] (52) potest + aliter: propositio quae dicit si est B est A i.m. alia manu add. *Bs* (53) *si – est*] Si enim sit C consequitur (cum sequitur *Wz*) quidem ut sit A, sed non consequitur ut sit vel non sit B. Nam si sit vitale sequitur quidem (om. *Vy*) ut sit animatum; sed non consequitur (sequitur *Wz*) ut sit vel non sit animal. *PxVyWz* (54) est om. *Wy* (55) est om. *Be* (56) esse animatum vel non esse] animatum esse vel non esse *KøLdVoChPdFxFyKLPwWyErVxVbMaMigne-Obertello*, esse vel non esse animatum *LlDrBs* (57) ne] nec *BeLdVoLlDrPdFxFyKLPwWyVxBsVbMaMigneObertello* (58) animal] anima *Wy* (59) quidem + vel *ChVb* (60) *esse – est* om. *Dr* (61) est + Nam si est animatum non necesse est esse vel non esse animal. Quo fit ut nec rationale quidem. *Pd*, + Quotation 1 *Fy*

2.2 Quotation 2 (Miii4)

As Quotation 1 above shows, the discussion of Miii (*media propositio*, the third figure: $(Y \rightarrow X) \wedge (Z \rightarrow \neg X)$) consists of four steps: when the *media propositio* holds as the first premise (*propositio*),

- (Step 1) if Y holds as the second premise (*assumptio*), $\neg Z$ follows as the conclusion $((Y \rightarrow X) \wedge (Z \rightarrow \neg X), Y \vdash \neg Z)$;
- (Step 2) but if $\neg Y$ holds, nothing follows, neither Z nor $\neg Z$ $((Y \rightarrow X) \wedge (Z \rightarrow \neg X), \neg Y \vdash \emptyset)$;
- (Step 3) if Z holds, $\neg Y$ follows $((Y \rightarrow X) \wedge (Z \rightarrow \neg X), Z \vdash \neg Y)$; but
- (Step 4) if $\neg Z$ holds, nothing follows, neither Y nor $\neg Y$ $((Y \rightarrow X) \wedge (Z \rightarrow \neg X), \neg Z \vdash \emptyset)$.

Now, Step 2 of the discussion of Miii4 $((\neg B \rightarrow A) \wedge (\neg C \rightarrow \neg A))$, $B \vdash \emptyset$ runs as follows:

Quotation 2, Miii4 $(\neg B \rightarrow A) \wedge (\neg C \rightarrow \neg A)$ Step 2; *Migne 865C4–12, Obertello 344.5–346.10*

At, si B terminus affirmetur, nullus est syllogismus. Sequitur namqueⁱ ut non sit A ($B \vdash \neg A$), sed non sequitur ut sit vel ^[Py165r] non sit C ($B \nvdash C$, $B \nvdash \neg C$), velut in his terminis. ^{/346/} Nam, si sit B quidem ^[Vo154r] insensibile, A animal, C animatum, {^{error 2} et¹ proponatur: si² sit insensibile, non est animal ($B \vdash \neg A$), sed non necesse³ est esse vel non esse animatum ($B \nvdash C$, $B \nvdash \neg C$)}.

(i)¹ namque] enim *BeLiPwMigne*, om. *Kl* (1) et proponatur] et ponatur *FxWy*, om. *PxWz* (2) si + non est insensibile est animal; si non esset animatum, non est anima; si *Migne* (3) necesse est] est necesse e(!) *Pa*

The part underlined {^{error 2} et proponatur ...} in Quotation 2 is found in many earlier manuscripts (*MxPzKøVa(a.c.)VlMzSgWxLdPxLlChPa-Lb(?)WzObertello*); it must, then, have come from the archetype, and is followed by some later manuscripts and Obertello.

Py (by the hand copying the main text) and *Va** (by a hand different from that copying the main text) propose an emendation, which is followed by some later manuscripts.

*Emendation: PyVa*BeBrVoDrPdFxFyKlPwWyErVxBsVbMaVyMigne ... et¹ ^[Vb59r] proponatur, si non est² insensibile, est animal; si non est animatum³, non est animal⁴ ($(\neg B \rightarrow A) \wedge (\neg C \rightarrow \neg A)$); assumaturque⁵ esse insensibile⁶, ^{*7}sequitur quidem ut non sit* animal ($B \vdash \neg A$), sed non ^{*8}sequitur⁹ ut sit vel non sit* animatum ($B \nvdash C$, $B \nvdash \neg C$).*

(1) et || et pponatur(!) *Vb*, et ponatur *FxWy* (2) est] sit *Py(a.c.)PdFyVb* (3) animatum non] inanimatum *Vb* (4) animal + ^{va}et assumatur. Atqui est insensibile. Sequitur quidem ut non sit animal. Nam^{cat} *add. et exp. Bs* (5) assumaturque esse] si sit *BeVoDrMigne*, assumaturque *Wy* (6) insensibile] insensibilis *Vb* (7) sequitur quidem ut non sit] non est *BeFxFyKlWyPwErVx-BsVyMigne* (8) sequitur ut sit vel non sit] necesse est (est necesse *ChDrBs*) esse vel non esse *BeChDrPdFxFyKlPwWyErVxBsVyMigne*, sed non necesse est esse *Ma* (9) sequitur] consequitur *Br*

¹ In general, I report only the cases in which I follow readings different from Migne and/or from Obertello; for the part to be emended and the emendation, on the other hand, I report all the variant readings (the former are numbered as (i), (ii), (iii) ...; the latter as (1), (2), (3) ...). Similarly for the quotations below.

This emendation may not be indispensable, as the text means the same before and after the emendation ($B \vdash \neg A$); but it is necessary to make the discussion parallel to the discussion of other modes of Miii, explicitly showing that B is the second premise while the first premise is $(\neg B \rightarrow A) \wedge (\neg C \rightarrow \neg A)$, whereas the version before the emendation is written as if B (*est insensibile*) is the first premise.

Apropos, the other place underlined (*Sequitur namque ...*) in Quotation 2 is erroneous, too, although no medievals noticed it. For, from Miii4 $((\neg B \rightarrow A) \wedge (\neg C \rightarrow \neg A))$, $B \vdash \neg A$ does not generally follow; it incidentally follows only when we adopt the given example (A : *animal*, B : *insensibile*, C : *animatum*). The same type of error is also found in the second step of the discussion of Miii3 $((\neg B \rightarrow A) \wedge (C \rightarrow \neg A))$:

Miii3 $(\neg B \rightarrow A) \wedge (C \rightarrow \neg A)$ Step 2; all the Mss, Migne 865A12–B1, Obertello p. 344.78–82

Quod^{|Dr45v|} si^{|af|} Be^{|16r|} firmitur esse B terminum, nulla est necessitas conclusionis. ^{|Kø77v|} Nam, si sit B, necesse est quidem non esse A ($B \rightarrow \neg A$), sed non necesse est esse C, ^{|Fy83v|} ut in his ^{|Pw72v|} terminis, si sit B animatum, ^{|865B|} A inanimatum, C animal. Si quis igitur sic proponat ^{|Pa112r|}

si non est animatum, inanimatum est; si est animal, non est inanima^{|Ch48va|}tum.

Si igitur ponamus esse animatum, sequitur quidem ut non sit inanimatum ($B \rightarrow \neg A$); sed non necesse est ut sit animal.

In the discussion of other modes of Miii $((Y \rightarrow X) \wedge (Z \rightarrow \neg X))$, Boethius always correctly notices that if $\neg Y$ holds, neither X nor Z follows (see, for example, Quotation 4 for Miii6; and, for Miii2, the emended version quoted in § 2.1). So the errors that are present might presumably go back to Boethius himself. They suggest that the intricacies of hypothetical syllogistic may have sometimes confused him as well as his medieval readers.

2.3 Quotation 3 (Miii4)

Step 3 of the discussion of Miii4 runs as follows:

Quotation 3, Miii4 $(\neg B \rightarrow A) \wedge (\neg C \rightarrow \neg A)$ *Step 3 (continued from Quotation 2 above); Migne 865C12–D1, Obertello p. 346.10–13*
 C vero terminus si negetur, fiet protinus syllogismus. Nam, si non est C, non est A ($\neg C \vdash \neg A$); si non est A, erit B ($\neg A \vdash B$) (id enim consequitur {eam¹ propositionis² partem ($\neg B \rightarrow A$)}); si igitur non sit C, erit B ($\neg C \vdash B$).

(1) eam] cum(!) *Va* (2) propositionis partem] partem propositionis *Br*

{*Eam propositionis partem*} is the reading of many of the earlier manuscripts as well as of some later ones (*MxPy(a.c.)PzKø(a.c.)Va(a.c.)-VIMzSgWxBELdVoChPwVxVb*). It must, then, have been the reading of the archetype.

To show explicitly what the *ea propositionis pars* is, *Py** makes an addition, and some later manuscripts follow it.

*Addition: (Mx)Py*Kø(Va*)BrPxLlDrPdFxFyKlWyErPaBsLbMaVyWz-MigneObertello*
*quae ait*¹: si non est B², est A³.

(1) ait *Py*VlBrLlFxFy*], est *KøFy*, dicit *PdKlErMaVyMigneObertello*, dixit *PxWz*, proposuit *DrPaBs* (2) B + non *Wy* (3) A *om. Wz*

Va(a.c.) wrongly reads *cum(!) propositionis partem*, and the emending hand (*Va**) makes the same addition in the margin, but in the wrong order: *Si non est B est A eam partem propositionis quae ait*. In this reading the *quae ait* does not make sense; consequently, dropping *quae ait*, *Mx* reads *Si non est B est A eam partem propositionis*.

2.4 Quotation 4 (Miii6)

Step 2 of the discussion of Miii6 $((B \rightarrow \neg A) \wedge (\neg C \rightarrow A))$ runs as follows:

Quotation 4, Miii6 $(B \rightarrow \neg A) \wedge (\neg C \rightarrow A)$ Step 2; *Migne 866B15–C7, Obertello 348.48*

Quodsi B terminus abnuatur, nihil necessarium fiet. /866C/ Nam, si non sit B, nec A nec C terminos vel ad esse vel adⁱ non esse sequitur ulla necessitas, ut in ter^{|Py165v|}minis patet. Nam, ^{|Be16v|} si sit B mortuum, ^{|Ll166r|} A animatum, C inanimatum, {^{add.} et¹ proponatur² ^{|Kl110ra|} si mortuum³ est, non⁴ est animatum; si non⁵ est inanimatum, est animatum⁶};

si non sit mortuum, non necesse est esse vel non esse animatum; quocirca ne inanimatum quidem.

(i) ad non esse] 'ad' non esse *alia manu add. PyPzVa*, non ad esse *VLiFy*, non esse *MzWxPxPdPwPaVy*, non adesse *Migne* (1) et + si *Ma* (2) proponatur] ponatur *Ll*, ponatur. Si *Kl* (3) mortuum est] est mortuum *VlCh* (4) non est animatum] non est inanimatum *Fy*, animatum non est *Ma* (5) non est inanimatum] non non(!) est inanimatum *Be*, inanimatum non est *VoVxMigne* (6) animatum] inanimatum *Ch*

Here, the underlined part {^{add.}} is not found in almost all of the earlier manuscripts (*MxPy(a.c.)PzKøVa(a.c.)Vl(a.c.)MzSgWxLdPx*), nor then in the archetype, nor in some later manuscripts (*PaBs(a.c.)VyWzLb*), nor in Obertello. *Py*Va*Vl** make the addition, which is followed by some later manuscripts (*BsBrVoLiChDrPdFxFyKlPwWyErVxBx*VbMa*) and Migne. The addition may again not be indispensable, but is necessary to make the discussion parallel to the discussions of other modes of Miii, as was the case in § 2.2 above.

2.5 Quotation 5 (Mii8)

The discussion of Mii $((X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (\neg X \rightarrow Z))$ consists of the following four steps: when $(X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (\neg X \rightarrow Z)$ is the first premise (*propositio*),

(Step 1) if $\neg Y$ is the second premise (*assumptio*), Z follows as a conclusion (*conclusio*) ($\neg Y \vdash Z$); but

(Step 2) if Y is the second premise, nothing follows, neither Z nor $\neg Z$

($Y \vdash \emptyset$);

(Step 3) if $\neg Z$ is the second premise, Y follows ($\neg Z \vdash Y$); but

(Step 4) when Z is the second premise, nothing follows, neither Y nor $\neg Y$ ($Z \vdash \emptyset$).

Now, Step 4 of the discussion of Mii8 ($(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B) \wedge (A \rightarrow \neg C)$) runs as follows.

Quotation 5: Mii8 Step 4; Migne 863A15–B8, Obertello p. 334.51–57

At, si C ter/863B/minum neget assumptio, nihil est necessarium. Nam, si non est C, non necesse erit esse vel non esse A ($\neg C \nvdash A$, $\neg C \nvdash \neg A$); quo fit ut ne B quidem ($\neg C \nvdash B$). Nam, si non est inanimatum, ^{|Vb58r|} fortasse quidem necesseⁱ sit esse animatum, sed non necesse est esseⁱⁱ animal. Invenientur autem termini utⁱⁱⁱ non^{iv} sit necesse esse A, velut si C^v ponamus nigrum, A album, ^{add.} et ponatur 'si non est album', non participat albedine; et, si est album, non est nigrum ($A' \rightarrow \neg C$). {Negato^{vi} enim^{vii} nigro non consequitur ut affirmetur album ($\neg C' \nvdash A$)}.

(i) necesse sit] sit necesse *Migne* (ii) esse animal] animal *Px*, animal esse *Migne* (iii) ut] ut 'quibus' *Va** add., in quibus *P*BeBrVoLiChDrPdFyKlPwEr-VxPaBsVbMaMigne*, quibus *FxWy*, ut cum non sit C *Vy* (iv) non sit necesse] necesse non sit *Br*, necesse sit *Ch*, non necesse sit *Migne* (v) C ponamus] ponamus (proponamus *Dr*) C *ChDrFxWyMaMigne* (vi) Negato] negat[i]o *Py*, negatio *Migne* (vii) enim] autem *MxMa*, om. *Migne*

The addition {^{add.}} does not appear in all the earlier manuscripts, nor in some later ones (*MxPy(a.c.)PzKøVa(a.c.)VIMzSgWxLdPxPdKlEr(a.c.)-PaVbVyWzMigneObertello*), nor then in the archetype.

This addition is made in *Va**, and is followed by some later manuscripts:

$\{^{add}\}$: $Va*Py**BrLlFxPyPwWyBsLbMa$).

et ponatur¹ ‘si non est album²’, non participat albedine³; et⁴, si est album, non est nigrum ($A' \rightarrow \neg C$)

(1) ponatur] opponatur Va , ‘pro’ponatur *alia manu add. Vo*, proponatur Ma (2) album] albus Wy (3) albedine] albedinem Vx (4) et] sed Ma , *om. BeVoLlChDr-FxPwErVxBs*

This addition is not indispensable but simply explanatory, as is the addition in § 2.3 above. However, the next sentence, $\{Negato enim \dots\}$, is important and indispensable in this context. But the emending hand (Py^*) falsely proposes to put $\{^{add}\}$ in place of $\{Negato enim \dots\}$, expunging the latter. This false emendation is followed by some later manuscripts ($Py^*BeVoChDrEr^*Vx$), although in Py itself, yet another hand (Py^{**}) adds $\{Negato enim \dots\}$ back after $\{^{add}\}$, suggesting to go back to the Va^* emendation.

2.6 Quotation 6 (HH5)

As for HH $((X \rightarrow Y) \rightarrow (Z \rightarrow W))$, the discussion in many cases consists of the following three steps:

- (Step 1^{X/Y}) X is not necessarily followed by Y ($\Diamond \neg (X \rightarrow Y)$), and (Step 1^{Z/W}) similarly with Z and W ($\Diamond \neg (Z \rightarrow W)$), but
- (Step 2^{X/Z}) X is followed by Z ($\Box (X \rightarrow Z)$), and (Step 2^{Y/W}) similarly with Y and W ($\Box (Y \rightarrow W)$), and
- (Step 3) HH then holds $((X \rightarrow Y) \rightarrow (Z \rightarrow W))$;
- (Step E) after these three steps an example is given, showing that these three steps hold for those particular terms (Step E1–3).¹

¹ For example, the discussion of HH1 $((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D))$ runs as follows (Migne 868D8–869A6, Obertello 358.2–12):

Prima igitur propositio talis esse debet, (*Step 1*) ut si sit A positum, B terminus non continuo subsequatur; itemque si C ponatur, non necesse sit D terminum consequi ($\Diamond \neg (A \rightarrow B)$, $\Diamond \neg (C \rightarrow D)$); (*Step 2*) sed posito quidem A termino C terminum, posito

In the discussion of some modes of HH, some steps are omitted, as I shall show later (see §§ 2.7 and 4 below).

Now, the discussion of HH5 $((A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D))$ runs as follows:

Quotation 6, HH5, $(A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D)$; Migne 869C7–D4, Obertello 360.38–362.47

Quintae propositionis haec ^[Pw75r] membra sint, ut (*Step 1*) A cumⁱ B et C praeter D ^[Vl193v] esse vel non esse possit ($\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow \neg B) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B)$, $\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)$), (*Step 2*) sed A praeter C esse non possit ($\Box(A \rightarrow C)$), B atque D nunquam simul esse possint ita ut, si alterum non sit, alterum esse necesse sit ($\Box(\neg B \rightarrow D)$). (*Step 3*) Tunc enim eveniet ^[Ma190v] ut, si A posito B negetur, C posito D sequatur $((A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D))$, (*Step E*) ut si sit A quidem ^[Py167r] homo, B aeger, C animatum, D sanus. ^[Mz144r] (*Step EI*) Homo ^[Vo157v] quidem cumⁱⁱ aegritudine, ^[Kl111v] animatum ^[Wx104va] vero praeter sanitatem etⁱⁱⁱ esse et non esse potest ($\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow \neg B) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B)$, $\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)$). (*Step E2*) Sed, si ^{/869D/} homo sit, animatum esse ne/362/cesse est ($\Box(A \rightarrow C)$); ^{{^{add.}et¹, si non sit aeger, sanum esse} necesse est ($\Box(\neg B \rightarrow D)$). (*Step E3*) Itaque fiet ut, ^[Ll168v] si cum homo est non sit aeger, cum sit animatus sanus sit $((A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D))$. ^[Kø69v]

vero B terminum ^[Kø68v] D esse necesse sit ($\Box((A \rightarrow C), \Box(B \rightarrow D))$). (*Step 3*) Tunc enim eveniet ut, si posito A fuerit B, necesse ^[Pd164v] sit C posito subsequi D $((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D))$, (*Step E*) ut si sint termini A homo, B medicus, C ani/869A/maturnum, D artifex. (*Step EI*) Posito enim homine non necesse est ut medicus sit ($\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B)$), et cum sit animatum non necesse est ut sitⁱⁱ artifex ($\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D)$); (*Step E2*) at, si homo sit, necesse est ut sit animatum ($\Box(A \rightarrow C)$); et, si medicus sit, necesse est ut artifex sit ($\Box(B \rightarrow D)$). ^[Vx106v] (*Step E3*) Hoc itaque posito eveniet ut, si cum homo sit medicus est, cum sit animatum sit artifex ($\Box((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D))$).

- (i) C terminum] terminum C termino (et supra -o alia manu add. -v(m)) C Py, terminum C p.c. et cum a.c. Va, terminum C BrVoPxVxMigne, termino C VbWz
(ii) sit artifex] artifex sit VxMigne

To express $X \rightarrow Y$ etc., various expressions are used, as is the case in Quotation 7 (HH15). I explain how I interpret such expressions in § 4.

(i) cum *correxī*] *praeter omnes Mss et MigneObertello*¹ (ii) cum aegritudine]
praeter aegritudinem omnes Mss et MigneObertello (iii) et] *om. LldrObertello*
 {^{add.}} (1) et] ut *Pa, om. Vb*

The part underlined (= {^{add.}}) in Step E2^{B/D} is added only in later manuscripts (*LdLldrPd*ErPaVbLbMaVyWzMigne*), not in many other manuscripts, nor in Obertello's edition (*MxPyPzKøVaVlMzSgWxB-BrVoPxChPd(a.c.)FxFyKlPwBsVxObertello*). It must have not existed either in the archetype, but is a necessary addition made by somebody in the eleventh century, from which *Ld* and *Px* were copied.

2.7 Quotation 7 (HH15)

The discussion of HH15 ($(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow D)$) omits Step 1 and Step E1.

Quotation 7, HH15, $(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow D)$; Migne 871B14–C10, Obertello 368.56–370.66

Quinta decima propositio hos terminos habere debet, (Step 2) {^{error} ut A quidem cum C, at vero B cum D esse non possit ($\square(A \rightarrow \neg C)$, $\square(B \rightarrow \neg D)$)}, B vero atque D talia |*Py*168r| sint ut |*Ch*50vb| altero eorum negato alterum eorum esse necesse sit ($\square(\neg B \leftrightarrow D)$). (Step 3) Ita namque fiet ut, si cum sit A denega|*Er*128r|tum B negetur, cum negabitur C affirmetur D ($(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow D)$), (Step E) ut, si sit A quidem irrationabile¹, B sanum, C inanimatum, D aegrum, (Step E2) {^{error} irrationabile quidem atque inanimatum ($\square(\neg A \rightarrow C)$)}, sanum etiam /370/ atque aegrum simul |*Br*90va| esse non possunt ($\square(B \rightarrow \neg D)$), |*Vx*108r| et, qui sanum |*Px*74v| negaverit, aegrum necesse est affirmet, itemque |*Bs*77r| e diverso ($\neg B \leftrightarrow D$). (Step E3) Est igitur |*Be*58v| ut, si negato ir|*Kø*71v|rationabili ne|*Kø*71v|getur sanum, negato inanimato aegrum ponatur ($(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow D)$).

(i) irrationabile *WxChPwBs*] `ir`rationa[bi]le *alia manu Py*, `ir`rationale *alia manu add. Va*, `{In}`rationale *alia manu Vl*, `ir`rational(e) *Pd*, inrationale *Be*,

¹ I have emended the reading *praeter*, found in all the Mss., with *cum*. For this emendation, see § 4.3 below (the *cum-praeter* error).

irrationale *BrVoLlDrFyKlErVxVbVyMigne*, rationale *PzKøSgLdPa*, rationabile
Px

The place underlined in Step 2 ^{error 1} is the reading of almost all of the earlier manuscripts as well as some later ones and Obertello, and so of the archetype, too.

*Error (1): MxPy(a.c.)PzKøVa(a.c.)VlMzSgWxLdPxPaLbPaLbVyWzVy-
WzObertello*

ut A quidem cum C¹, at vero² B cum D esse non³ possit ($\Box(A \rightarrow \neg C)$,
 $\Box(B \rightarrow \neg D)$),

(1) C] cum *Va* (2) vero B] B vero *Mx* (3) non possit] non *s.l. add. Pz*, non
possint *Va*, non possunt *Lb*

*Py** and *Va** propose the following emendation, which is followed by some later manuscripts and Migne.

*Emendation (1): Py*Va*BeBrVoLlChDrPdFxFyKlPwErVxBs(new)Vb-
Migne*

ut A quidem si¹ non sit, C² non esse ne/871C/cesse sit ($\Box(\neg A \rightarrow \neg C)$)

(1) si] cum *Fx* (2) C] B *FyKl*

Exactly the same type of error is repeated in Step E2 ^{error 2}; but here only *Py** emends it (the corrector *Va** fails to make this emendation), and the same later manuscripts that followed the earlier emendation follow this one:

Error (2): MxPy(a.c.)PzKøVaVlMzSgWxLdPxPaLbVyWz

Irrationabile¹ quidem² atque inanimatum (... simul esse non possunt)
($\Box(A \rightarrow \neg C)$)

(1) Irrationabile] 'Ir' Rationa[bi]le *Py*, 'In' Rationa[bi]le *alia manu Vl*,
irrationale *PdVyMigne*, Irrationale *Br*, rationabile *MxPzKøMzWxLdPxPa-
LbWz*, Rationa[bi]le *Va*, rationale *SgLl* (2) quidem] quid *Wz*

*Emendation (2): Py*BeBrVoLiChDrPdFxFyKlPwErVxBs(new)Vb-MigneObertello*
 Irrationabile¹ |Vb63v| quidem² si non sit, non est inanimatum
 ($\Box(\neg A \rightarrow \neg C)$)

(1) Irrationabile] `Ir`Rationale Py*, `In`Rationale *alia manu* Vl*, Irrationale BeBr, irrationale VoMigne

We should note here that Emendation (1) is itself erroneous, since Emendation (1) is proposed instead of the whole of Error (1), viz. $\Box(A \rightarrow C)$ as well as $\Box(B \rightarrow D)$, but should have been proposed only for $\Box(A \rightarrow C)$, retaining $\Box(B \rightarrow D)$, as is the case in Step E2.

In addition, the other part underlined in Steps 2 and E2, viz. the part asserting $\neg B \leftrightarrow D$, is superfluous, since $\neg B \leftrightarrow D$ holds only incidentally in the case of the terms proposed in Step E; it is not generally the case with other terms.

2.8 Quotation 8 (CH4)

So far I have discussed corrupt readings and their medieval emendations found in *Liber III* of Boethius' *De syllogismis hypotheticis*. Next, I shall discuss those in *Liber II*, where only a few emendations are found.

The discussion of CH ($X \rightarrow (Y \rightarrow Z)$, $X \vdash Y \rightarrow Z$) consists of three steps:

- (Step 1) it is necessary that $X \rightarrow Y$,
- (Step 2) it is possible that $\neg(Y \rightarrow Z)$, and
- (Step 3) only when $X \rightarrow Y$ holds, $Y \rightarrow Z$ necessarily holds ($X \rightarrow Y \vdash Y \rightarrow Z$);
- (Step E) after these three steps, an example is given, showing that these steps hold for the terms chosen in the example (Step E1–3).

In the case of CH4 ($A \rightarrow (\neg B \rightarrow \neg C)$), Step 1 is $\Box(A \rightarrow \neg B)$, Step 2 is $\Diamond \neg(\neg B \rightarrow \neg C)$, and Step 3 is $A \rightarrow \neg B \vdash \neg B \rightarrow \neg C$. But Step E of the

discussion of CH4 runs as follows in many of the earlier manuscripts; and so, this must have been the reading of the archetype as well.

Quotation 8, CH4 Step E: MxPy(a.c.)Pz(a.c.)KøVa(a.c.)MzSgWxLd-WyVy

... ut (*Step E*) si sit A homo, B insensibile, C inanimatum. (*Step E1*) Insensibile enim non erit si fuerit homo; (*Step E2*) inanimatum vero potest¹ esse et non esse si non sit insensibile. (*Step E3*) Tunc tamen² inanimatum non esse necesse est ^{|Vy47v|} cum insensibile non sit, cum³ idcirco insen^{|Kø55v|}sibile non est, quia homo esse⁴ praedictus est.

(1) potest esse] esse potest *Ld* (2) tamen] tantum *WyVy* (3) cum idcirco
insensibile non est *om. Sg* (4) esse *om. Mz*

This reading is erroneous, because the relations which Steps E2 and E3 assert ($\Diamond \neg(\neg B \rightarrow \neg C)$ and $A \rightarrow \neg B \vdash \neg B \rightarrow \neg C$) do not hold with B as *insensibile* and C as *inanimatum*, but conversely, with B as *inanimatum* and C as *insensibile*. Such an emendation is made by *Py*Pz*(Va*)* (and followed by many later manuscripts), replacing insensibile (underlined in Quotation 7 above) with *inanimatum* and inanimatum with *insensibile* (*Vl* sometimes fails to replace the words—cf. (3) and (5) in the *apparatus criticus* below; many manuscripts forget to replace the last *insensibile* with *inanimatum*, cf. (15) in the *ap. cr.* below).

Emendation:

*Py*Pz*Va*VlBeBrVoPxLlChDrPd¹FxFyKlPwErVxPaBsVbMaWz-Migne(850C3–8)Obertello(280.16–282.20)*

... ut (*Step E*) si¹ sit A homo, B² *inanimatum*³, C *insensibile*⁴. (*Step E1*) *Inanimatum*⁵ enim non erit⁶ si fuerit homo ($A \rightarrow \neg B$); (*Step E2*) *insensibile*⁷ vero⁸ potest esse et⁹ non esse si non sit *inanimatum*¹⁰

¹ In *Pd* the main hand copies this passage, but another hand expunges it by enclosing the passage with 'va-' and '-cat'.

$((\neg B \wedge C) \wedge (\neg B \wedge \neg C)) \text{ viz } \Diamond(\neg B \rightarrow \neg C) \wedge \Diamond(\neg B \rightarrow C))^1$. (Step E3) Tunc tamen¹¹ insensibile¹² non esse¹³ ne/282/cesse est $|V_3 47 v|$ cum inanimatum non sit, cum¹⁴ idcirco inanimatum¹⁵ non est, quia homo esse praedictus¹⁶ est $(A \rightarrow B \vdash \neg B \rightarrow \neg C)$.

(1) si om. *Vb* (2) B ... C] C ... B *Ma* (3) inanimatum] insensibile *VI*, inanimatum ut *Vb* (4) insensibile] inanimatum *VI* (5) Inanimatum] insensibili *Ma* (6) erit] fuerit *Vx* (7) insensibile] inanimatum *Ma* (8) vero om. *VI Pd Vb Wz* (9) et non esse om. *Pa* (10) inanimatum] animatum *Vb* (11) tamen] tantum *VI Be Vx Bs Vy Migne*, vero tantum *Dr* (12) insensibile om. *Vo Vx* (13) esse + non *Kl* (14) cum] non *Kl* (15) inanimatum *Migne Obertello*] animatum *VI*, insensibile *ceteri omnes Mss* (16) praedictus] praedictum *Vb*

2.9 Quotation 9 (CC1mp)

The discussion of CC1mp runs as follows in almost all of the earliest manuscripts as well as in many later ones, and, therefore, presumably in the archetype too.

Quotation 9, CC1mp; MxPy(a.c.)Pz(a.c.)KøVa(a.c.)BrLdPxMzSgWx-BeVoLlChDrFxPyPwErBsVy (Migne 845B11–C4 Obertello 260.1–7)
Horum enim primus modus est hic veniensⁱ a prima propositione ‘si Aⁱⁱ est B est, atqui est $|Vx 93 v|$ A, est igitur B’ $(A \rightarrow B, A \vdash B)$. $|Pw 61 v|$ Cum enim $|Wy 39 v|$ prima propositio eamⁱⁱⁱ conditionem proponat, ut si sit A, necesse sit consequi essentiam B termini^{iv} $(\vdash A \rightarrow B)$, id quod praecedebat^v assumit ac $|845C|$ ponit dicitque $|Pa 104 v|$ ‘at^{vi} est A’ $(\vdash A)$, consequitur igitur ut sit B $(\vdash B)$. $\{^{corr} \text{Id}^1 \text{ enim ex}^2 \text{ consequentia primae}^3 \text{ propositionis}^4 \dagger \text{ ponamus}\}$, nullus efficitur syllogismus.

¹ Note here that I interpret *X potest esse et non esse si non sit Y* as $\Diamond(X \wedge \neg Y) \wedge \Diamond(\neg X \wedge \neg Y)$, and not as $\Diamond(\neg Y \rightarrow X) \wedge \Diamond(\neg Y \rightarrow \neg X)$. In the case that *X si Y* is used in the sense of “if Y, then X,” it should be interpreted as $Y \rightarrow X$; but *si* is used in the sense of *etiamsi* with a subjective verb, so it should be interpreted as a conjunctive. And of the two conjuncts, $\Diamond(X \wedge \neg Y)$ and $\Diamond(\neg X \wedge \neg Y)$, one is mainly asserted; the other is an additional comment. In the case of CH4, the conjunct $\Diamond(\neg B \rightarrow \neg C)$ is the one that is mainly asserted. The same type of expression often appears in the discussions of CH, HC, and HH.

(i) veniens a prima] a prima veniens *Migne* (ii) A est B est] est A est B *PxCh-LlDrPdLeFxWyErPaBsVbLbMaMigne*, est A B est *Vo* (iii) eam] tantum *Migne* (iv) termini] terminum *Migne* (v) praecedebat] praecedit *Py*KlPwErVoChLl-DrMigneObertello*, procedit *BeKlVx*, praedicebat *Py(a.c.)PxWz* (vi) at] atqui *VaLeChFxPwErBsPaLbMaMigne*, atque *WyVb*
 $\{\text{corr}\}$ (1) id enim *Mx(a.c.)Py(a.c.)Pz(a.c.)VaBrLdPxPdVxPaVyMigne*] Id enim [nisi] *Py*, si (s- *i.m. alia manu add.*) [enim] *p.c. prima et nisi* (ni- *i.m. alia tertia manu*) [enim] *p.c. secunda Pz*, Idem si *VlBeVoLlChDrFxErBs*, Idem B si *Fy*, Item si *Pw*, id enim si (si *i.m. alia manu add. Mx*), id enim si *KøVlMzSg-WxBeFyPwVy*, si enim *Obertello* (2) ex consequentia] vero (*seu non*) ubi (*seu nisi*) *Vb* (3) primae *om. Dr* (4) propositionis] positionis *KøMzSgWxLdVoPxDr-FyPwWyPaVbMaVyWz*

The last sentence, $\{\text{corr}\}$, is obviously corrupt and does not work well grammatically.

An awkward attempt to make it grammatical is found in earlier manuscripts (see (1) in the *ap. cr.* above), with another hand adding *si* or *nisi*; but this emendation does not work contentwise, since the emended sentence means that the two premises, $A \rightarrow B$ and A , do not make a syllogism, while Boethius has just asserted that they do make a good syllogism.

A better emendation is proposed in *Pz** by adding the following words in the place where I put † in Quotation 9 above, and this emendation is followed by *Vl* and *Obertello*.

*Emendation 1: Pz*VlObertello*
 id quod est secundum (= B) assumendo

With this addition, the last sentence means that the two premises, $A \rightarrow B$ and B , do not make a good syllogism. But this correction is not good enough, since while the last sentence begins with *Id enim ...*, the emended sentence does not give a reason for what is asserted by the previous sentence, namely that $A \rightarrow B$ and A do make a good syllogism.

A much better emendation is proposed in *Py** and *Va**, which have the following addition; this emendation is followed by a few later manuscripts:

*Emendation 2: Py*Va*BrVxVbMigne*
effectum est. At, si idⁱ quod sequitur (= B) assumendo

(i) id] id scripsit et delevit Py, om. VaBrVxVb

Other later manuscripts make another emendation, which has the same meaning as Emendation 2, but is differently worded.

Emendation 3: LdPxPdKlWyPaLbMaWz
ostenditur¹. Quodsi sequentem² partem primae³ propositionis (= B)

(1) ostenditur om. KlMa (2) sequentem] consequentem Kl (3) primae om. PxPaLbWz

2.10 Quotations 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 (Mi)

The discussion of inferences from Mi8 of the type $(X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (Y \rightarrow Z)$, $X \vdash Z$ ($(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B) \wedge (\neg B \rightarrow \neg C)$, $\neg A \vdash \neg C$) runs as follows.

Quotation 10.1, Mi8: Migne 857D13–858A3, Obertello pp. 310.39–312.1

Octavus veroⁱ modus est ^[Er122r] qui ita proponitur
si non est A non est B, et si /858A/ non est B necesse est non esse C
($(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B) \wedge (\neg B \rightarrow \neg C)$),
atqui non est A ($\neg A$),
non est igitur C ($\vdash \neg C$).

Quodsi C assumatur, {^{error}nec¹ in complexione nec in /312/ terminis erit²
ulla necessitas}.

(i) vero] om. BePxChLIerPdKlErLbMaVyMigne (1) nec ... nec] neque ErVb,
(2) erit ulla] ulla erit MxVoPwErPa

The phrase underlined in {^{error}} is found in almost all the earlier manuscripts, as well as in a lot of later ones (*MxPy(a.c.)PzKøVaVIMzSg-WxBrLdPxLlPdFxFyKlPwWyErPaLbMaVyWzObertello*), and so presum-

ably in the archetype, too. But the phrase is out of place, as I shall discuss below, and is emended only in *Py**; some later manuscripts follow the emendation:

*Emendation (1): Py*BeVoChDrVxBsVbMigne*
nulla¹ erit necessitas

(1) nulla] ulla *Vo*

A similar phrase appears in the discussion of Mi8 of the type $(X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (Y \rightarrow Z), \neg Z \vdash \neg X ((\neg A \rightarrow \neg B) \wedge (\neg B \rightarrow \neg C), C \vdash A)$.

Quotation 10.2, Mi8 (C ⊢ A): Migne 860A1–5, Obertello p. 318.53–60

Octavus modus est qui hac propositione formatur

si *ⁱA non est nec B est*, et si B non est C non esse necesse est

$((\neg A \rightarrow \neg B) \wedge (\neg B \rightarrow \neg C))$,

atqui est C (C),

igitur A esse necesse est ($\vdash A$).

Quodsi A terminum sumpserimusⁱⁱ {^{error} nec per¹ complexionis naturam²
neque per terminorum proprietatem fiet ulla necessitas}

(i) A non est nec B est] non est A non est B *MxMigne* (ii) sumpserimus]
sumpseris *Migne* (1) per *om. MaVy* (2) naturam *om. Ma*

The underlined phrase is found in *MxPy(a.c.)PzKøVaVlMzSgWxBRLd-PxLLPdFyPaLbMaVyWz*, which is out of place, too, and emended in *Py**; later manuscripts follow the emendation:

*Emendation (2): Py*BeVoChDrFxKlPwWyErVxBsVbMigneObertelle*
non¹ fiet ulla necessitas

(1) non fiet ulla] fiet nulla *FxWy*, nulla fiet *Vb*

Such phrases are out of place, for there is no reason why such an expression (*nec in complexione nec in terminis*) would appear only in the discussion of Mi8, while no such expression appears in the discussions of

the other modes of Mi (Mi1–7), nor in any modes of the other figures, Mii and Miii.

A phrase mentioning the distinction between *complexio* and *termini* appears again after the discussion of all the eight modes (Mi1–8) in the form of $(X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (Y \rightarrow Z), X \vdash Z$.

Quotation 10.3, Mi: Migne 858A8–B8, Obertello p. 312.47–314.13

In prima igitur figura (Mi) ex tribus terminis fientⁱ hypotheticae sedecim complexiones, ita ut id, quod positum est in propositione, idemⁱⁱ in assumptione quoque ponatur. Octo quidemⁱⁱⁱ, si A terminus in propositione^{iv} ponatur; octo vero, si C. Quodsi A terminus ponendo assumatur, erunt octo necessarii syllogismi; si vero ^{|Wz19v|} C terminus ^{|Ld33v|} ponendo assumatur, {^{error 1} quinque equidem¹ complexiones, id est quae² primo, secundo, tertio, quarto, atque octavo respon^{|Kø63v|}dent³ modo, nullius necessitatis⁴ esse deprehenduntur; tres vero⁵ complexiones, quae quinto, sexto, septimoque⁶ modo accommodantur⁷, per complexionis quidem naturam⁸ nullam necessitatis constantiam⁹ servant, per¹⁰ terminorum vero proprietatem necessarium colligunt¹¹ syllogismum, ^{|Pd155v|} ut sint omnes¹² octo¹³ vel undecim syllogismi}. Eodem quoque modo syllogismorum comple^{858B}xionumque ordo constabit, si id ^{|Ma168v|} in assumptione, quod in propositione positum fuerat, auferatur. Fient quippe sedecim complexiones, quarum octo quidem, ubi id quod sequitur auferatur^v, integra ^{|Vy54r|} necessitate perdurant; ^{|V1180v|} octo vero, in quibus id quod praecedit aufertur, necessitatem non^{vi} eadem ratione conservant. {^{error 2} Sed haec quidem complexiones, quae primo, secundo ac¹ tertio, quarto² atque ^{/314/} octavo modo³ accommodantur, nihil⁴ colligunt nec per terminorum ^{|Wx104ra|} nec⁵ per complexionis⁶ proprietatem; tres vero, id est quintus⁷, sextus, et⁸ septimus, nihil quidem colligunt⁹ secundum complexionis naturam, videntur vero colligere secundum terminorum proprietatem, ut hinc¹⁰ quoque octo vel undecim sint¹¹ syllogismi}. Horum vero omnium ^{|L1160r|} subdantur exempla. ...

(i) fient] fiunt Pz(a.c.)BeVoPxErVxPaLbVyWzObertello, fiant Migne (ii) idem] id VyWzMigne (iii) quidem] quid VbVb, Quod Px, om. Migne (iv) propositione] assumptione FxWyVyMigne, assumptione quoque Kl (v)

auferatur] aufertur *KøSgBeBrLdPxChDrPdFyKlErVxPaBsVbVyWzMigne-Obertello* (vi) non] in *VxMigne*, non in *Wz*, *om. Sg*
 $\{\text{error } 1\}$: (1) equidem] eiusdem *Pa*, quidem *Wz* (2) quae] quo *Mx*, -que *Wx* (3) respondent] respondetur *Pa* (4) necessitatis esse] esse necessitatis *Lb* (5) vero *om. Pd* (6) septimoque] se primoque *Pa* (7) accommodatur] accomodant *Pa* (8) naturam nullam] natura nulla *Pa* (9) constantiam] constantia *Pa* (10) per *om. Pa* (11) colligunt] colligitur *Pa* (12) omnes *om. Wx* (13) octo] aucto *Pa*
 $\{\text{error } 2\}$: (1) ac] *om. PxDLbWz* (2) quarto atque octavo] atque octavo et quarto *PxLbWz*, atque octavo *Pa* (3) modo *om. Pd* (4) nihil + quidem *Pd* (5) nec *om. Mx* (6) complexionis] complexionum *WxPxLbWz* (7) quintus + et *Pd* (8) et septimus *om. Pa*, septimus *Mx* (9) colligunt *om. Wx* (10) hinc] hic *PxLbWz* (11) sint syllogismi] syllogismi sint *PyKøVaSgBrLdPxPdPaLb*, sint 'vel sunt' syllogismi *alia manu add. Pz*, sint (sunt *a.c.*) syllogismi *BrWz*

After this passage, Boethius proceeds to the discussion of all the eight modes of Mi in the form of $(X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (Y \rightarrow Z)$, $\neg Z \vdash \neg X$.

Now, the parts underlined, $\{\text{error } 1\}$ and $\{\text{error } 2\}$, assert that, when Mi.5–7 are presupposed as the first premise, not only $X \vdash Z$ in $\{\text{error } 1\}$ or $\neg Z \vdash \neg X$ in $\{\text{error } 2\}$, but also $\neg X \vdash \neg Z$ in $\{\text{error } 1\}$ or $Z \vdash X$ in $\{\text{error } 2\}$ hold—but the latter hold, not by a syllogistic form (*per complexionis naturam*), but only by *terminorum proprietates*, viz. when $X \leftrightarrow \neg Y$ and $\neg X \leftrightarrow Y$ hold between the terms used. However, this assertion is very abrupt. In the discussion of Mi5–7 Boethius never mentions the cases in which $\neg X \vdash \neg Z$ or $Z \vdash X$ hold by *terminorum proprietates*. Moreover, even if this assertion were true and only applied to Mi5–7 for some reasons unknown to us, he should have mentioned the *complexio-termini* issue, not only for Mi8, as he does in Quotations 10.1 and 10.2, but also for Mi1–4, which he does not; and the reference itself to the distinction in Mi8 (in Quotations 10.1 and 10.2) should have been, not *nec in complexione nec in terminis*, but *non in complexione sed in terminis*.

$\{\text{error } 1\}$ and $\{\text{error } 2\}$ in Quotation 10.3 are found in all the earlier manuscripts as well as in some later manuscripts (*MxPy(a.c.)PzKø-Va(a.c.)VlMzSgWxBr(a.c.)LdPxPdPaLbWzObertello*), which suggests the readings go back to the archetype.

*Py** and *Br** propose to expunge both $\{\text{error } 1\}$ and $\{\text{error } 2\}$, and to replace $\{\text{error } 1\}$ as follows:

Emendation (3): (Va)Py*(Be)Br*VoLlChDrFxFyKlPwWyErVxBsVb-MaVyMigne (instead of {^{error 1}})*

nullus¹ efficitur² |Vx100v| syllogismus.

(1) nullus efficitur syllogismus s.l. add. alia manu Va (2) efficitur] fiet LMa

This emendation is followed by almost all of the later manuscripts other than those which follow the archetype. Only *Va* and *Be* are exceptions. In *Va* the emending hand (*Va**) adds *nullus efficitur syllogismus* (= emendation (3) above), retaining both {^{error 1}} and {^{error 2}}. In *Be* the hand copying the main text writes *nullus efficitur syllogismus* in place of {^{error 1}}, retaining {^{error 2}}.

2.11 Quotation 11 (Liber I)

In *Liber I* of *De syllogismis hypotheticis*, we find only one medieval emendation. This passage is as follows:

Quotation 11, Liber I, Boethius 835C4–835D4, Obertello pp. 218.59–220.70

Sunt autem aliae |Pa99v| quae habent ad se consequentiam naturae. Harum quoque duplex modus est. (I) Unus cum necesse est consequi, |Pd135r| ea tamen ipsa consequentia |My100r| non per |Py148v| terminorum positio/220/nem fit. (II) Alius vero cum fit consequentia per terminorum positionem.

(I) Ac prioris quidem modi exemplum est ut ita dicamⁱ
cum homo sit, animal est.

{[#]Non enim idcirco animal est quia homo est}, sed fortasse |Fx60r| a genere principium ducitur magisque essentiae causa ex |K795ra| universalibus trahi potest, |V7155v| ut idcirco sit homo quia animal est (causa enim |Pz39r| speciei genus est). At, qui |Bs61r| dicit ‘cum homo sit, animal est’, rectam ac necessariam consequentiam facit; per terminorum vero positionem talis consequentia non procedit. (II) Sunt autem ...

(i) dicam omnes Mss] dicamus MigneObertello

The underlined phrase {[#]} is found only in the following manuscripts:

{[#]}: *MxMyPz*KøVlSgBe(a.c.)BrLdPw(a.c.)WyMaObertello*
Non enim idcirco animal est quia homo est,

So far (§§1 and 2.1–10), we have found the readings of the archetype in almost all the earlier manuscripts (*MxPyPzKøVaVlMzSgWx*), but some of them give various different readings here, as follows:

- Lectio *Va(a.c.)*: quia homo est. Non enim
 Lectio *Pz(a.c.)*: quia homo est. Non enim ut ita dicam.
 Lectio *Py*: quia homo est idcirco animal est. ([#]) Non enim idcirco animal
 est quia homo est.
 Lectio *Va**: Non enim quia homo est idcirco animal est;
 aliter: ([#]) Non enim idcirco animal est quia homo est,
 Lectio *Mz*: quia homo est. Non enim ut ita dicam (= *lectio Pz*),
 scilicet: ([#]) Non enim idcirco animal est quia homo est.
 Lectio *Wx*: quia homo est. Non enim ut ita dicam (= *lectio Va*);
 non enim quia homo est idcirco animal est.

Presumably the archetype might *in textu* have had the corrupt reading: *quia homo est. Non enim* (= *Lectio Va(a.c.)*), and in the margin a twofold emendation: one is to add *ut ita dicam* (= *Lectio Pz(a.c.)*), and since this is still corrupt, a second emendation, viz. to change it into {[#]}. The other manuscripts in this list (*PyVa*MzWx*) might be reporting these emendation(s) found in the archetype in different wordings.

*Be** proposes another emendation, making additions before and after ([#]); and some later manuscripts follow the reading with these additions.

*Emendation: Be*VoPxLlChDrPdFxFyKl(Pw*)ErVxBs(Vb)LbVyWz-*
Migne

¹Hic² enim consequentia inconcussa³ veritate subnixa est. ⁴Sed⁵ (α')
non⁶ idcirco animal⁷ est quia homo est*. ⁸Non⁹ enim¹⁰ idcirco genus¹¹
 est quia¹² species est'.

(1) 'Hic - Sed'] *alia manu s.l. add. BePw, add. et alia manu postea seclussit Er, om. Vb* (2) Hic] Haec *PxFxWzMigne*, Sed hic *Vy* (3) inconcussa veritate subnixa est] veritate subnixa est inconcussa *Px*, inconcussa veritate est subnixa *PdMigne*, inclusa veritate subnixa est *Wz*, (4) *Sed - est*] non enim quia homo est idcirco animal (anima *Vy*) est *LbVy* (5) sed *om. Pw* (6) non + [enim] *Be*, + enim *alia manu add. Er* (7) animal ... homo] homo ... animal *Vb* (8) 'Non - est'] *alia manu s.l. add. BePw* (9) Non enim] Nec *Pw* (10) enim idcirco] idcirco enim *Be*, ideo enim *PxBs*, idcirco *Pw* (11) genus est] est genus *Px* (12) quia species est] quod sunt species *Px*

3 Three Unnecessary Medieval Additions

There are three more additions which are found only in a few manuscripts of the rather late eleventh century (*Px* in § 3.1 and *Ld* in § 3.3) or later (§ 3.2). So far (§§ 1–2) I have discussed the emendations and additions which are necessary to make the corrupt text in the archetype more readable. However, all the additions in § 3 are either not indispensable or simply false.

3.1 Quotation 13 (CC4mt)

In the discussion of CC4mt ($\neg A \rightarrow \neg B$, $B \vdash A$), Boethius says:

Quotation 13, CC4mt; Migne 848B10–C4, Obertello p. 272.78–85
 ... |Wz12v| Nam, si posito cum non sit A non esse B, sumatur esse B, dico quia consequens est etiam A esse ($\neg A \rightarrow \neg B$, $B \vdash A$). |Mx35v| Nam, si potest cum sit B |Mz141r| non esse A ($B \rightarrow \neg A$), |Vl169v| frustra est prima propositio, quae cum A non sit B non esse pronun|Pa106r|tietⁱ ($\neg A \rightarrow \neg B$), fiet igitur |Va134r| rursus ut idem B sit ac non sit. Ex assumptione namque erit B /848C/ (ita enim dicitur 'atqui estⁱⁱ B'); si vero hoc posito possit non esse A ($B \rightarrow \neg A$), rursus B non erit, quia prima propositio ait 'si non sit A, non est B' ($\neg A \rightarrow \neg B$); {^{add.}erit igitur B ac non erit}, quod est impossibile.

(i) pronuntiet] pronuntiat *PyVa*BeVoChLIPdFxErVxLbMigneObertello*, enuntiat *Vb* (ii) est B] B est *Migne*

Here, $\{^{add.}\}$ is an addition made only in $PxLbWz$; other manuscripts do not have it, nor do Migne and Obertello. In fact, the text makes good sense without the addition, which is only explanatory.

3.2 Quotation 14 (Mii)

Another not indispensable addition is found in the general discussion of Mii $((X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (\neg X \rightarrow Z))$, where Boethius discusses the distinction between *aequimodae* and *inaequimodae propositiones*, viz. between $(X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (X \rightarrow \neg Z)$ and $(X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (\neg X \rightarrow Z)$, as follows:

Quotation 14: Mii, Migne 859B8–C2, Obertello p. 320.7–14

In quibus illud est praedicendum quod saepe aequimodae $[Vy55r]$ propositiones ponuntur, saepe vero non. Aequimodisⁱ $[Vo149r]$ quidem nullus est syllogismus. $[Px69v]$ Aequimoda enim propositio est si ita dicamus

si A est, B est; et, si Aⁱⁱ est, Cⁱⁱⁱ non est.

$\{^{add.}$ Quodsi inaequimodis propositio ponitur, statim efficitur syllogismus $\}$. Inaequimoda vero secundae figurae propositio est in his syllogismis hypotheticis, quorum enuntiationes tribus $[859C]$ terminis componuntur, veluti cum ita proponimus

si est A, est B; si autem non est A, est C.

(i) Aequimodis] Aequimodarum *p.c. alia manu Py*, aequimodae *Va*, aequimodae `aequimodarum' *Br*, Aequimodarum *BeVoDrPwVxPa*, aequimodae *et i.m. add.* aliter aequimodarum quidem *Bs*, atque de aequimodis *Li*, Atqui de aequimodis *Ma*, Ac de aequimodis *LdPxLiFxFyWyErMigne* (ii) A est] est B *Ch*, est A *FxWyMigne* (iii) C non est] non est C *ChFxWyMigne*

Here, the addition $\{^{add.}\}$ occurs only in $PdVbVy$, not in all the other manuscripts, nor in Obertello (Migne has the addition in a different wording: *At si sint inaequimodae, faciunt syllogismum*).

3.3 Quotation 15 (Mii5)

In the discussion of Mii5 $((\neg A \rightarrow B) \wedge (A \rightarrow C))$, after claiming that if $\neg B$ is the second premise, C follows $(\neg B \vdash C)$, the text says that if $\neg C$ is the

second premise, B follows ($\neg C \vdash B$); but if B is the second premise, nothing follows, neither C nor $\neg C$ ($B \vdash \emptyset$), as follows:

Quotation 15: Mii5, $(\neg A \rightarrow B) \wedge (A \rightarrow C)$; Migne 861D6–862A2 & 862A6–12, Obertello pp. 330.48–56 & 59–64

(discussion of $(\neg A \rightarrow B) \wedge (A \rightarrow C)$, $\neg B \vdash C$)

Quodsi B esse ponatur, nihil fitⁱ necessarium. Si enim est ^{|Dr44v|} B, ^{|Fy82r|} non erit A ($B \rightarrow \neg A$ or $B \vdash \neg A$); quodsi A non est, nihil ad C ($\neg A \rightarrow \emptyset$ or $\neg A \nvdash C$, $\neg A \nvdash \neg C$); quocirca nullus est syllogismus. Non esse autem A si B sit ($B \rightarrow \neg A$ or $B \vdash \neg A$) ea propositio monstratⁱⁱ, per quam dicimus ‘si Aⁱⁱⁱ non est, est B’ ($\neg A \rightarrow B$) (haec^{iv} enim^v immediatis tantum contrariis convenit^{vi}). Age enim sit A quidem animal, B vero insensibile, ^{|Pa111r|} C^{vii} animatum; et proponatur ‘si animal ^{|Ma172r|} non est insensibile est, si ^{|Vx102v|} animal est animatum est’

($(\neg A \rightarrow B) \wedge (A \rightarrow C)$); et ponatur esse in/862A/sensibile (B), non^{viii} necesse est esse vel non esse animal ($\nvdash A$, $\nvdash \neg A$), quocirca^{ix} ne animatum quidem^x esse vel non esse necesse est ($\nvdash C$, $\nvdash \neg C$). ^{|Mz145r||Ll162v|}

(discussion of $(\neg A \rightarrow B) \wedge (A \rightarrow C)$, $\neg C \vdash B$)

Quodsi sit C, non necesse est esse vel non esse A ($C \nvdash A$, $C \nvdash \neg A$), quo fit ut ne B quidem esse aut^{xi} non esse necesse sit ($\neg A \nvdash B$, $\neg A \nvdash \neg B$).

Nam, ^{|Kø74v|} si est animatum, non necesse est ^{|Br88rb|} esse vel non esse animal ($C \nvdash A$, $C \nvdash \neg A$); cum vero ^{|Px70v|} animal non sit, non necesse est esse^{xii} vel non esse insensibile ($\neg A \nvdash B$, $\neg A \nvdash \neg B$); ^{|Vl185r|} propositio vero eadem^{xiii} quae superius^{xiv} ($(\neg A \rightarrow B) \wedge (A \rightarrow C)$).

(i) fit] sit *legunt tantum ErPaMaMigneObertello, omnes alii Mss legunt* fit (ii) monstrat] *PyBr*, demonstrata *DrMigne* (iii) A non est] est A non *Ll*, non est A *ChDrVyMigne*, est A non e(!) *Ma* (iv) haec] hoc *VbMaMigne* (v) enim + in *MxBrPxDrMigne*, + ‘in’ *FxErVb* (vi) convenit] evenit *PxLlDrVbMaMigne* (vii) C + vero *Migne* (viii) non necesse est esse vel] necesse est *Migne* (ix) quocirca ne] Sed non *Migne* (x) quidem + vel *Migne* (xi) aut] A *Pz(a.c.)Vo*, vel *PxLlWzMigne* (xii) esse vel non esse insensibile (sensibile *Vy*)] insensibile vel esse vel non esse *Migne* (xiii) eadem + est *Migne* (xiv) superius] superioribus *Migne*

At the bottom of Quotation 15 (after *superius*) the following addition is made only in *LdDrVb*.

Addition; LdDrVb (not in other Mss nor in MigneObertello)
 id est quae convenit¹ contrariis immediatis

(1) convenit + in Vb

This addition is simply false. For this addition is a repetition of the part underlined in Quotation 15: *haec enim immediatis tantum contrariis convenit*. However, there this phrase is necessary to explain why $B \rightarrow \neg A$ does not always follow from $\neg A \rightarrow B$, the first part of the first premise $((\neg A \rightarrow B) \wedge (A \rightarrow C))$, since $B \rightarrow \neg A$ follows from $\neg A \rightarrow B$ only when A and B are *immediata* (viz. only when $A \leftrightarrow \neg B$ holds); but even if $\neg A$ were to follow from B ($B \rightarrow \neg A$ or $B \vdash \neg A$), from $\neg A$ nothing would follow about C ($\neg A \rightarrow \emptyset$ or $\neg A \not\vdash C$, $\neg A \not\vdash \neg C$). On the contrary, however, the addition (*id est quae ...*) at the end of the quotation is not necessary at all, since $\neg A \not\vdash B$ and $\neg A \not\vdash \neg B$ are here asserted from the outset, without making the unreal supposition $\neg A \rightarrow B$; therefore there is no need to make such an addition.

4 Erroneous Readings that Passed Unnoticed in the Middle Ages

So far (§§ 1–2) I have discussed the corrupt passages in the archetype, necessary emendations of which were produced by eleventh-century scholars. There are, however, many other passages, in particular in discussions of HH, which according to my interpretation are erroneous, but which the medievals overlooked.

Discussions of HH $((X \rightarrow Y) \rightarrow (Z \rightarrow W), X \rightarrow Y \vdash Z \rightarrow W)$ consist of the following steps (as I have already said in § 2.6 above):

- Step 1 $\Diamond \neg(X \rightarrow Y)$ and $\Diamond \neg(Z \rightarrow W)$,
- Step 2 $\Box(X \rightarrow Z)$ and $\Box(Y \rightarrow W)$, then
- Step 3 $(X \rightarrow Y) \rightarrow (Z \rightarrow W)$, and
- Step E and Step E1–E3.

While HH1 and HH15 *p.c.* use only the normal *si*-clauses to express implication (“ $X \rightarrow Y$,” etc.), in the discussions of HH2–16 (including HH15 *a.c.*) various other expressions are often used in addition to the normal *si*-clauses. Such expressions are often used in discussions of CH and HC, too. I interpret such expressions as is shown in Table 2.

x (simul) cum y est	x atque y simul sunt ¹	x est y, ² id quod est x est y	$X \wedge Y$ viz. $\neg(X \rightarrow \neg Y)$
x (simul) cum y non est	-	-	$\neg X \wedge Y$ viz. $\neg(\neg X \rightarrow \neg Y)$
x praeter ³ y est	-	-	$X \wedge \neg Y$ viz. $\neg(X \rightarrow Y)$
x praeter y non est	x atque y simul non sunt, ut si <i>etc.</i> ,	-	$\neg X \wedge \neg Y$ viz. $\neg(\neg X \rightarrow Y)$

Table 2. Various phrases used to express implication

My interpretation in Table 2 is coherent, I believe, and works well in almost all discussions of CH, HC,⁴ and in many of HH. As a matter of fact, however, discussions of HH2–16 contain several passages that, according

¹ The expression *x atque y simul sunt* is always used only in the form *x atque y simul esse non possunt* for $\neg \Diamond(X \wedge Y)$ viz. $\Box(X \rightarrow \neg Y)$ (HH2 Step 2, HH9 Step 1). It is sometimes used for $\Box(\neg X \rightarrow Y)$ with additional remarks that mean that if one is denied, the other follows (HH5 step 2, HH13 Step 2 and E2, HH14 Step 2, HH15 Step 2 and E2; HH9 Step E2 lacks the additional remark, cf. § 4.4 below). Such an expression is never used in discussions of CH and HC.

² The expression *x est y* is used only in the form of *x esse y non potest* for $\neg \Diamond(X \wedge Y)$ viz. $\Box(X \rightarrow \neg Y)$ in HH2 Step 1, HH9 Step 1 and E1 (quoted in full in § 4.3 below), and HH11 Step E1. Such an expression is never used in discussions of CH and HC.

³ In HH11 Step 2 and HH12 Step 2 *sine* is used for *praeter* (in Step CH7, too).

⁴ Cf. § 4.5 below for the few cases where discussions contain a passage that is faulty according to my interpretation.

to my interpretation, are wrong, without this having been noticed in the extant manuscripts.

Discussions of HH normally follow the general structure described above. Some, however, deviate from this general structure: HH3 and 7–9 (cf. § 4.4 below), HH12 (cf. § 4.1), HH15 (cf. § 4.3), and HH16 (cf. § 4.2). This strongly suggests that the archetype was seriously corrupt in those places; in fact, discussions of all modes of HH are full of erroneous readings. I shall study each of the deviant cases, showing which error is committed and mentioning the other modes of HH that share the same error.

4.1 Omitting Step E2

The discussion of HH12 lacks Step E2, as follows:

Quotation 4.1: HH12 $((\neg A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow \neg D))$; Migne 870D8–871A3, Obertello 366.27–34

Duodecima propositio est quam talibus terminis constare oportebit, ut (Step 1) A quidem praeter B at vero $\{\text{err.CD-DC} C \text{ praeter } D\}$ vel esse vel non esse possit ($\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B)$; $\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)$, the former should be $\Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow \neg D)$); (Step 2) $\{\text{err.AC-CA} A \text{ vero sine } C\}$ et B cum D esse non possit ($\{\Box(A \rightarrow C)$, which should be $\Box(\neg A \rightarrow \neg C)\}$, $\Box(B \rightarrow \neg D)$); (Step 3) ita enim cadet ut si A negato B sequiturⁱ, C negato D etiam denegeturⁱⁱ ($(\neg A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow \neg D)$), (Step E) ut si fuerit A inanimatum, B album, C invitale, D [Br90rb] nigrum. (Step E1) Inanimatum (A) quidem [871A] praeter album (B), $\{\text{err.CD-DC}$ invitale (C) autem [Ld41v] praeter nigrum (D) $\}$ vel esse vel non esse potest ($\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B)$, $\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)$); (Step E3) si tamen cumⁱⁱⁱ inanimatum non^{iv} sit, et sit album, cum invitale non sit, non erit nigrum ($(\neg A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow \neg D)$).

(i) sequitur] sequitur p.c. alia manu et sequatur a.c. Py, sequatur p.c. alia manu et sequitur a.c. Va, sequatur Migne (ii) denegetur] negetur Ch, negatur Migne (iii) cum PxLbWz] om. ceteri Mss et Migne Obertello (iv) non] homo Migne

An error is committed in Step 2: $\{\overset{\text{err.AC-CA}}{A \text{ vero sine } C}\} \dots \text{esse non possit}$ means that $\Box(A \rightarrow C)$, but we expect $\Box(\neg A \rightarrow \neg C)$ here, viz. $\Box(C \rightarrow A)$; in other words, we should emend $A \rightarrow C$ to $C \rightarrow A$, transposing the terms A and C. I shall refer to this type of error as “XY-YX.”

The XY-YX error is committed in Steps 1 and E1, too. Step 1: *A quidem praeter B at vero* $\{\overset{\text{err.CD-DC}}{C \text{ praeter } D}\}$ *vel esse vel non esse possit* means that $\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B) \wedge \underline{\Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B)}$, $\{\overset{\text{err.CD-DC}}{\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D)}\} \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)$.¹ The first part ($\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B) \wedge \underline{\Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B)}$) goes well ($\underline{\Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B)}$ is what we expect). However, instead of the latter part ($\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)$), we expect $\underline{\Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)} \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)$ viz. $\underline{\Diamond \neg(D \rightarrow C)} \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg D \rightarrow C)$, so here the CD-DC error is committed. The same error is committed in Step E1, too.

The XY-YX error is also committed in discussions of many other modes: HH2, 3 (quoted in full in § 4.4 below), 4 (with another error, cf. § 4.3 below), 7–8 (quoted in full in § 4.4 below), 13, 14 (with another error, cf. § 4.3 below), 16 (quoted in full in § 4.2 below):

HH2 $(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (C \rightarrow \neg D)$; *Migne* 869A7–14, *Obertello* 358.13–360.1
 ..., ut (*Step 1*) A atque B itemqueⁱ C atque D praeter se esse possint;
 ... (*Step E1*) Homo (A) namque praeter nigrum (B) et $\{\overset{\text{err.CD-DC}}{\text{animatum (C) praeter album}}\}$ (D) velⁱⁱ esse velⁱⁱⁱ non /360/ esse potest;
 ...

(i) itemque] item *BeVoKlPwErMigne* (ii) vel] et *DrMigne*, et vel *Wx*, om. *Ch*
 (iii) vek] et *Migne*

$\underline{\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B)} \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B)$,
 $\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)$, which should be $\underline{\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow \neg D)} \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow \neg D)$
 viz. $\underline{\Diamond \neg(D \rightarrow C)} \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg D \rightarrow C)$

¹ Step 1 and/or E1 in discussions of HH often contain the phrase (*vel/et*) *esse vel/et non esse*, which I interpret as $\Diamond \neg(X \rightarrow Y) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg X \rightarrow Y)$. I put a double line under the part we expect (HH2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12). There is no difference whether *et* or *vel* is used (both phrases are used interchangeably in HH4, 5, and 8).

HH13 $(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D)$; Migne 871A5–12, Obertello 366.35–368.42

..., ut (Step 1) $\{\text{err. AB-BA}^A \text{ A quidem praeter B at vero C praeter D esse possit;}$

... (Step E1) $\{\text{err. AB-BA}^A \text{ Irratio/368/nabile (A) namque praeter aegrum (B)}\}$ et rationabile (C) praeter sanitatem (D) $|K7112rb|$ esse potest; $|K\phi 71r|$ $|Ma \text{ finit}|$

...

$\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B)$ which should be $\Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B)$ viz. $\Diamond \neg(B \rightarrow A)$, $\Diamond(C \wedge \neg D)$ viz. $\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D)$

4.2 Transposing Step 1 and 2 and Step E1 and E2

The discussion of HH16 runs as follows, transposing Step 1 and 2 as well as Step E1 and E2:

Quotation 4.2; HH16 $((\neg A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow \neg D))$; Migne 371C10–D5, Obertello 370.66–74

Sexta decima propositio est quae his terminis constat, $|Pa114r|$ ut (Step 2) $\{\text{err. AC-CA}^A \text{ A quidem praeter C}\}$ at vero Dⁱ praeter B esse non possit

$(\Box(A \rightarrow C)$, which should be $\Box(\neg A \rightarrow \neg C)$; $\Box(D \rightarrow B)$ viz $\Box(\neg B \rightarrow \neg D)$);

(Step 1) A vero cum B et C $|V7196r|$ cum D esseⁱⁱ $|V364v|$ nullo modo queant

$(\Box(A \rightarrow \neg B)$, $\Box(C \rightarrow \neg D)$); (Step 3) evenit ergoⁱⁱⁱ ut si A quidem negato,

negabitur B, denegato C terminus D abnuatur $((\neg A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow \neg D))$, (Step E) ut si sit A inanimatum, $|Pd167r|$ $|871D|$ B artifex, C invitale,

D medicus. (Step E2) $\{\text{err. AC-CA}^A \text{ Inanimatum igitur}^1 \text{ praeter invitale}\}$ et

medicus^{iv} praeter artificem $|Ld42r|$ esse non potest $(\Box(A \rightarrow C)$ which

should be $\Box(\neg A \rightarrow \neg C)$, $\Box(D \rightarrow B)$ viz $\Box(\neg B \rightarrow \neg D)$); (Step E1)

inanimatum vero cum artifice $|Sg479|$ et invitale cum medico esse non

poterit $(\Box(A \rightarrow \neg B)$, $\Box(C \rightarrow \neg D)$); (Step E3) si igitur, negato inanimato

negetur artifex, negato invitale negatur^v medicus

$((\neg A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow \neg D))$.

(i) D praeter B] B praeter D Ch (ii) esse nullo modo] nullo modo esse BeLl (iii)

ergo] igitur ChBsMigneObertello (iv) medicus praeter artificem] praeter

artificem medicum Ch (v) negatur] negetur PyVaBeBrDrFxPwBsVbVyMigne

(1) igitur] ergo Fx, om. PdPa

First, Steps 2 and E2 commit the AC-CA error, since they mean that $\Box(A \rightarrow C)$, but we expect $\Box(\neg A \rightarrow \neg C)$ viz. $\Box(C \rightarrow A)$.

Second, Steps 1 and E1 commit another error, since they mean that $\Box(A \rightarrow \neg B)$ and $\Box(C \rightarrow \neg D)$, whereas we expect $\Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B)$ and $\Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow \neg D)$. It is often the case that $\Box(X \rightarrow Y)$ is used for $\Diamond \neg(\neg X \rightarrow \neg Y)$ viz. $\Diamond \neg(Y \rightarrow X)$. We shall call this type of error the “ $\Box/\Diamond \neg$ error,” as $\Box$ is used instead of $\Diamond \neg$. The $\Box/\Diamond \neg$ error occurs together with XY-YX error in discussions of other modes: HH3 and 7–9 (quoted in full in § 4.4 below), and HH11:

HH11 ($\neg A \rightarrow B$) $\rightarrow$ ($\neg C \rightarrow D$); *Migne 870C13–D4, Obertello 366.18–23*
 ..., ut (*Step 1*) neque A cum B neque C cum D ^[K1112ra] simul esse possit;
 ... (*Step E1*) Inanimatum (A) quidem medicus (B) esse non potest,
 quocirca ne invitalle (C) ^[Fy80v] quidem artifex (D); ...
 $\Box(A \rightarrow \neg B)$, which should be $\Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B)$ viz. $\Diamond \neg(\neg B \rightarrow A)$,
 $\Box(C \rightarrow \neg D)$, which should be $\Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)$ viz. $\Diamond \neg(\neg D \rightarrow C)$

4.3 Omitting Steps 1 and E1

As I showed in § 2.7 above, HH15 omits Steps 1 and E1. Steps 2 and E2 run as follows:

HH15 a.c. ($\neg A \rightarrow \neg B$) $\rightarrow$ ($\neg C \rightarrow D$); *Migne 871B15–C9, Obertello 368.57–370.64*
 ..., ut (*Step 2*) $\{\text{err.AC-CA } A \text{ quidem } \{\text{err. cum-praeter } \text{cum}\} C\}$, at vero B cum D
 esse non possit, B vero atque D talia sint ut altero eorum negato alterum
 eorum esse necesse sit;
 ... (*Step E2*) Irrationabile (A) quidem atque inanimatum (C), sanum (B)
 etiam ^[370/] aegrum (D) simul ^[Br90va] esse non possunt, ^[Vx108r] et, qui
 sanum ^[Px74v] negaverit, aegrum necesse est, itemque ^[Bs77r] e diverso; ...
 $\neg \Diamond(A \wedge C)$ which should be $\neg \Diamond(C \wedge \neg A)$ viz. $\Box(C \rightarrow A)$ viz. $\Box(\neg A \rightarrow \neg C)$,
 $\Box(\neg B \rightarrow D)$

Steps 2 and E2 are emended by eleventh-century people into a version using only normal *si*-clauses (cf. § 2.7 above); but different emendations are also possible.

As for the relation between A and C, Step 2 says *A quidem cum C ... esse non possit*, viz. $\neg\Diamond(A\wedge C)$ viz. $\Box(A\rightarrow\neg C)$; but we expect here $\Box(\neg A\rightarrow\neg C)$. We should then emend it into *C quidem praeter A ... esse non possit*, transposing C and A (the CA-AC error) and emending *cum* to *praeter* (we shall call this the *cum-praeter* error). The *cum-praeter* error and *praeter-cum* error are very often committed in discussions of other modes (HH4, 5, 6, 7–9 (quoted in full in § 4.4 below), 10, 14):

HH4 $(A\rightarrow B)\rightarrow(\neg C\rightarrow\neg D)$; Migne 869B12–C4, Obertello 360.29–35
 ..., ut (Step 1) A quidem $\{\text{err. cum/praeter cum}\}$ B termino, $\{\text{err. CD-DC}\}$ C autem
 $\{\text{err. cum/praeter cum}\}$ D} vel esse vel non $|\text{Ch50ra}|$ esse possit;
 $\Diamond\neg(A\rightarrow B)\wedge\Diamond\neg(\neg A\rightarrow\neg B)$, which should be $\underline{\Diamond\neg(A\rightarrow B)}\wedge\Diamond\neg(\neg A\rightarrow\neg B)$,
 $\Diamond\neg(C\rightarrow\neg D)\wedge\Diamond\neg(\neg C\rightarrow\neg D)$,
 ..., (Step EI) Homo (A) quidem praeter nigrum (B), inanimatum (C)
 vero praeter $|\text{Er127r}|$ album (D) $|\text{Sg477}|$ esse et non esse potest; ...
 $\Diamond\neg(A\rightarrow B)\wedge\Diamond\neg(\neg A\rightarrow\neg B)$, $\Diamond\neg(C\rightarrow D)\wedge\Diamond\neg(\neg C\rightarrow D)$
 (Note that the *cum-praeter* error is here committed only in Step 1).

HH5 $(A\rightarrow\neg B)\rightarrow(C\rightarrow D)$; Migne 869C8–15, Obertello 360.39–45
 ..., ut (Step 1) A $\{\text{err. praeter-cum praeter}\}$ B et C praeter D $|\text{V1193v}|$ esse vel
 non esse possit;
 ..., (Step EI) Homo (A) $|\text{Vo157v}|$ quidem $\{\text{err. praeter-cum praeter}\}$
 aegritudinem} (B), $|\text{KI111v}|$ animatum (C) $|\text{Wx104va}|$ vero praeter sanitatem
 (D) et esse et non esse potest; ...
 $\Diamond\neg(A\rightarrow B)\wedge\Diamond\neg(\neg A\rightarrow\neg B)$ which should be $\underline{\Diamond\neg(A\rightarrow B)}\wedge\Diamond\neg(\neg A\rightarrow\neg B)$,
 $\underline{\Diamond\neg(C\rightarrow D)}\wedge\Diamond\neg(\neg C\rightarrow D)$

HH6 $(A\rightarrow\neg B)\rightarrow(C\rightarrow\neg D)$; Migne 869D5–11, Obertello 362.48–53
 ..., ut (Step 1) A $\{\text{err. praeter-cum praeter}\}$ B et $\{\text{err. praeter-cum}\}$ C praeter D} esse
 vel non esse possit;

...; (Step E1) Homo (A) quidem {^{err. praeter-cum}praeter artificium} (B),
 animatum (C) vero {^{err. praeter-cum}praeter medicinam (D)} et esse et non
 esse potest; |Vx107r| ...
 $\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B)$, which should be $\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B)$,
 $\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)$, which should be $\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)$

HH10 ($\neg A \rightarrow B$) $\rightarrow$ ($C \rightarrow \neg D$); Migne 870C2–8, Obertello 364.9–15
 ..., |Pw75v| ut (Step I) A quidem |Vy63v| praeter B, at vero C {^{err. praeter-}
^{cum}praeter} D esse <et non esse (addidi)> possit;
 ... (Step E1) Inanimatum (A) quippe praeter nigrum (B) et animatum
 (C) {^{err. praeter-cum}praeter album (D)} esse et non esse possunt; ...
 $\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B)$,
 $\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)$, which should be $\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D)$
 (Note that we should add <et non esse> in Step I, which is in Step E1)

HH14 ($\neg A \rightarrow \neg B$) $\rightarrow$ ($C \rightarrow \neg D$); Migne 871B3–10, Obertello 368.46–53
 ..., ut (Step I) {^{err. AB-BA}A quidem praeter B} |Wx104vb| et C {^{err. praeter-}
^{cum}praeter} D esse |Ll169v| possint,
 ..., (Step E1) Inanimatum (A) quidem praeter ar|Va143r|tificem (B),
 animatum (C) vero {^{err. praeter-cum}praeter medicum (D)} esse potest; ...
 $\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B)$, which should be $\Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B)$, viz. $\Diamond \neg(B \rightarrow A)$,
 $\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D)$, which should be $\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow \neg D)$

As for the relation between B and D, Steps 2 and E2 of HH15 use special expressions with additional remarks:

Step 2: *B vero atque D esse non possit*
 + *B vero atque D talia sint ut altero eorum negato alterum eorum*
esse necesse sit
 Step E2: *sanum (B) etiam aegrum (D) simul esse non possunt*
 + *qui sanum negaverit, aegrum necesse est, itemque e diverso*

For, without the additional remarks, they are interpreted as $\neg \Diamond(B \wedge D)$ viz.
 $\Box(B \rightarrow \neg D)$; but with the additional phrases they are intended to mean
 $\Box(\neg B \rightarrow D)$.

When the same kind of additional remark is necessary, it is sometimes added, but sometimes not (in the quotations below such remarks are underlined; I use ($\emptyset$) when it's omitted; HH9 is quoted in full in § 4.4):

HH5 ($A \rightarrow \neg B \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D)$); *Migne* 869C9–D2, *Obertello* 360.39–362.46
...; (*Step 2*) sed A praeter C esse non possit, B atque D nunquam simul
esse possint ita ut si alterum non sit, alterum esse necesse sit;
...; (*Step E2*) sed si /869D/ homo (A) sit animatum (C) esse ne/362/cesse
est, *et si non sit aeger (B) sanum (D) esse necesse est*; ...

et - est om. *MxPyPzKøVaVlMzSgWxBBrVoPxChFxFyKlPwBsVxObertello*
 $\Box(A \rightarrow C), \Box(\neg B \rightarrow D)$

HH10 ($\neg A \rightarrow B \rightarrow (C \rightarrow \neg D)$); *Migne* 870C3–10, *Obertello* 364.10–
366.17
...; (*Step 2*) sed {^{err.AC-CA}A cum C}, et B cum D esse non possit |*Er127v*|
 $\emptyset$;
...; (*Step E2*) sed {^{err.AC-CA}inanimatum (A) cum animato (C)}, et nigrum
(B) cum albo (D) simul esse non possint ($\emptyset$); ...
 $\Box(A \rightarrow \neg C)$, which should be $\Box(\neg A \rightarrow C)$ (so A cum C ... esse non possit
(*Step 2*) should be emended to A atque C ... esse non possit with the
additional remark; similarly for *Step E2*), $\Box(B \rightarrow \neg D)$

HH13 ($\neg A \rightarrow \neg B \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D)$); *Migne* 871A6–15, *Obertello* 366.36–
368.44
...; (*Step 2*) A vero atque C et B atque D ita simul esse non possint,
|*Pz48r*| ut si alterum |*Vy64r*| eorum non fuerit alterum esse necesse sit;
...; |*Kø71r*| |*Ma finit*| (*Step E2*) irrationabile (A) vero atque rationabile (C) et
aegrum (B) atque sanum (D) |*Pd166v*| simul esse non possunt, si tamen
alterum eorum non fuerit, alterum esse necesse est;
 $\Box(\neg A \rightarrow C), \Box(\neg B \rightarrow D)$

HH14 ($\neg A \rightarrow \neg B \rightarrow (C \rightarrow \neg D)$); *Migne* 871B4–12, *Obertello* 368.47–54
...; (*Step 2*) sed A atque C simul esse non possunt ita ut cum alterum
non fuerit alterum esse necesse sit, |*Fx77v*| D vero praeter B esse non
possit;

...; (Step E2) inanimatum (A) vero cum animato (C) non convenit ($\emptyset$),
 [Pw76r] et medicus (D) ab artifice (B) nullo modo separatur; ...
 $\square(\neg A \rightarrow C)$ (Step E2 lacks the additional remark), $\square(D \rightarrow B)$ viz.
 $\square(\neg B \rightarrow \neg D)$

4.4 Omitting Step 2^{BD} and/or E2^{BD}

Discussions of HH3 and 7–9 form a group because they all contain Step 1^{CD}&2^{CA} and/or Step E1^{CD}&E2^{CA}. (By “Step 1^{CD}&2^{CA}” I mean that Step 1^{CD} and Step 2^{CA} are expressed in one sentence with a common subject (C) and predicate (*potest*). Similarly for “Step E1^{CD}&E2^{CA}”). The other steps in these discussions are different from each other, as is shown in Table 3 (the steps in which they differ from each other are underlined):

HH3	Step 1 ^{AB}	Step 2 ^{CA} &1 ^{CD}	Step E	Step E1 ^{AB}	Step E2 ^{CA} &E1 ^{CD}
HH7	Step 1 ^{AB}	Step 1 ^{CD} &2 ^{CA} , <u>Step 2^{BD1}</u>	Step E	Step E1 ^{AB}	Step 1 ^{CD} &E2 ^{CA}
HH8	Step 1 ^{AB}	<u>Step 1^{CD}, Step</u> <u>2^{CA}&2^{BD}</u>	Step E	Step E1 ^{AB}	Step E2 ^{CA} &E1 ^{CD} , <u>Step E2^{BD}</u>
HH9	Step 1 ^{AB}	Step 1 ^{CD} &2 ^{CA}	Step E	Step E1 ^{AB}	<u>Step E1^{CD}, Step</u> <u>E2^{AC}</u>

Table 3. A comparison between the argumentative steps in HH3 and 7–9

The full quotations of all these passages run as follows; they all contain {error}, a new type of error in addition to the *praeter-cum* error:

¹ In Migne and Obertello (and in many manuscripts), Step 2^{BD} of HH7 is Step 2^{BC}, reading: *B etiam cum C simul esse vel non esse non possit* ($\neg \diamond(B \rightarrow \neg C) \wedge \neg \diamond(\neg B \rightarrow \neg C)$). But Step 2^{BC} never otherwise appears, and so I emend it as Step^{BD}: *B etiam cum D simul esse non possit* ($\neg \diamond(B \rightarrow \neg D)$) with some manuscripts as evidence (cf. (iii) and (iv) in the *ap. cr.* of the HH7 quotation below).

HH3, $(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow D)$; Migne 869B2–9, Obertello 360.21–27

Item tertiae propositionis tales terminos esse oportebit, ut (Step 1^{AB}) A praeter B esse possit, $(\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B))$ (Step 2^{CA} & 1^{CD}) C vero vel cum A $\{\text{err. } \Box/\Diamond \neg \& \text{CD-DC} \text{ vel } |V_y62v| \text{ cum D}\}$ simulⁱ $|B_r89vb|$ esse non possit $(\Box(C \rightarrow \neg A) \text{ viz. } \Box(A \rightarrow \neg C), \Box(C \rightarrow \neg D) \text{ which should be } \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D))$; (Step 3) quocirca evenit ut, si Aⁱⁱ posito fuerit B, negato $|B_s75v|$ C termino D esse necesse sit $((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow D))$, (Step E) ut, si sit A quidem animatum, B medicus, C inanimatum, D artifex. (Step E1^{AB}) Animatum enim praeter medicum esse potest $(\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B))$, (Step E2^{AC} & 1^{CD}) inanimatum $|K_069r|$ vero neque cum animato $|V_b62r|$ $\{\text{err. } \Box/\Diamond \neg \& \text{CD-DC} \text{ neque cum artifice}\}$ iungi potest $(\Box(C \rightarrow \neg A) \text{ viz. } \Box(A \rightarrow \neg C), \Box(C \rightarrow \neg D), \text{ which should be } \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D))$; (Step E3) itaque, si cum animatum est medicus est, cum inanimatum non sit artifex est $((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow D))$. $|P_z47v||W_z28r|$

(i) simul] om. *Va(a.c.)BePwVxMigne* (ii) A posito] posito A Migne

HH7, $(A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow D)$; Migne 869D14–870A9, Obertello 362.55–64

Septimae propositionis hi termini $|870A|$ suntⁱ, ut (Step 1^{AB}) A quidem $\{\text{err. praeter-cum praeter}\}$ B esseⁱⁱ possit $(\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B), \text{ which should be } \Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow \neg B))$, (Step 1^{CD} & 2^{AC}) C vero³ $\{\text{err. } \Box/\Diamond \neg \& \text{C-D-}\neg \text{CD}(\emptyset) \text{ neque cum D}\}$ neque cum A⁴ esse possit $(\Box(C \rightarrow \neg D) \text{ which should be } \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D))$, $\Box(C \rightarrow \neg A) \text{ viz. } \Box(A \rightarrow \neg C)$, (Step 2^{BD}) B etiam $\{\text{err. B-D-}\neg \text{BD} \& (\emptyset) \text{ cum D}^{\text{iii}}\}$ simul vel^{iv} esse $|V_{1194r}|$ vel^v non esse non possit $(\Box(B \rightarrow \neg D) \wedge \Box(\neg B \rightarrow \neg D), \text{ which should be } \Box(\neg B \rightarrow D) \wedge \Box(B \rightarrow D))$; (Step 3) ita namque eveniet^{vi}, ut, si posito A esse B denegetur, negato C termino D sequatur $((A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow D))$, (Step E) ut si A quidem sit animatum, B sanum, C inanimatum, D aegrum. (Step E1^{AB}) Animatum quidem $\{\text{err. praeter-cum praeter sanitatem}\}$ et esse et non esse potest $(\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B), \text{ which should be } \Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow \neg B) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B))$; (Step E1^{CD} & E2^{CA}) inanimatum $|V_b62v|$ vero neque cum animato $|P_d165v|$ $\{\text{err. } \Box/\Diamond \neg \& \text{C-D-}\neg \text{CD} \& (\emptyset) \text{ neque cum aegro}\}$ $|B_s76r||W_z28v|$ convenire potest $(\Box(C \rightarrow \neg D), \text{ which should be } \Diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow D), \Box(C \rightarrow \neg A) \text{ viz. } \Box(A \rightarrow \neg C))$; (Step E3) quo fit ut, si cum animatum est

sanum non^{vii} est, cum non sit inanimatum aegrum sit
 $((A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow D))$.

(i) sunt] sint *MxPzKøVlMzWxLdMa* (ii) esse + et non esse *Pz*VlMzChPd*
 (iii) D *Vy*] C *omnes ceteri Mss et MigneObertello* (iv) vel] *om. MxKøBeBr-*
VoPxChLlDrFxPyKlPwErVxPaBsVbLbWzMigne (v) vel non esse] *om. BeBr-*
VoPxLlDrFxPyKlPwErVxPaBsVbWzMigne (vi) eveniet] *evenit Migne* (vii)
 non] *om. Obertello*

HH8, $(A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow \neg D)$; *Migne 870A10–B6*, *Obertello pp. 362.64–364.74*

Item octava propositio his terminis copulanda est, ut (*Step 1^{AB}*) A
 quidem {^{err. praeter-cum}praeter} B terminum esseⁱ et non esse possit
 $(\diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B) \wedge \diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B))$, which should be
 $\diamond \neg(A \rightarrow \neg B) \wedge \diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B)$, (*Step 1^{CD}*) *ii C autem cum D velⁱⁱⁱ non
 esse vel esse possit $(\diamond \neg(\neg C \rightarrow \neg D) \wedge \diamond \neg(C \rightarrow \neg D))$; /364/ (*Step 2^{AC,DB}*)
 sed A cum C et* D praeter B esse non possit $(\Box(A \rightarrow \neg C), \Box(D \rightarrow B)$ viz
 $\Box(\neg B \rightarrow \neg D))$. (*Step 3*) Hoc enim pacto eveniet ut, si A [K/111vb] posito B
 denegetur, denegato C termino D terminus non sit
 $((A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow \neg D))$, (*Step E*) ut si sit A [Ld41r] animatum, B
 ar/870B/tifex, C inanimatum, D medicus. (*Step E1^{AB}*) Animatum enim
 {^{err. praeter-cum}praeter artificium} et esse et non esse potest
 $(\diamond \neg(A \rightarrow B) \wedge \diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B))$, which should be
 $\diamond \neg(A \rightarrow \neg B) \wedge \diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B)$, (*Step E2^{CA} & E1^{CD}*) inanimatum vero
 neque cum [Vo158r] animato {^{err. praeter-cum}neque cum medico} convenit
 $(\Box(\neg C \rightarrow A)$ viz $\Box(A \rightarrow \neg C)$, $\Box(\neg C \rightarrow D)$, which should be $\diamond \neg$
 $(\neg C \rightarrow \neg D))$, (*Step E2^{BD}*) medicus vero praeter artificium esse non
 potest $(\Box(D \rightarrow B)$ viz $\Box(\neg B \rightarrow \neg D))$, (*Step E3*) Unde evenit ut, si cum
 animatum est non sit artifex, cum non sit inanimatum non sit
 me[Be58r]dicus $((A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow (\neg C \rightarrow \neg D))$.

(i) esse et non esse] et esse et non esse *BeLdVoLlChDrPdFxPyErVxPa*, esse et
 non *Bs* (ii) *C - et*] C vero neque cum A neque cum D esse possit, sed *Migne*
 (iii) vel non esse possit] vel non esse possit vel esse *Va(a.c.)Kø*, vel non esse
 possit vel esse *MxPzMzWxMa*

HH9, $(\neg A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D)$; Migne 870B7–15, Obertello 364.1–7
 Nona propositio fiet, si (Step 1^{AB}) {^{err.} $\Box/\Diamond \neg$ & AB-BA} A quidem atque B
 simul esseⁱ non possint} ($\Box(A \rightarrow \neg B)$ which should be $\Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B)$),
 (Step 1^{CD} & 2^{CA}) C vero {^{err.} $\Box/\Diamond \neg$ possit esse praeter D}, cum A vero esse
 non possit ($\Box(C \rightarrow D)$, which should be $\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D)$, $\Box(C \rightarrow \neg A)$); (Step
 3) tunc enim eveniet ut, si A denegato [V194v] B esse consequitur, C
 posito D sequatur ($(\neg A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D)$), (Step E) ut si sit A quidem
 inanimatum, B medicus, C animatum, D artifex. [Px74r] (Step E1^{AB})
 Inanimatum quippe {^{err.} $\Box/\Diamond \neg$ medicus esse non potest} ($\Box(A \rightarrow \neg B)$,
 which should be $\Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow B)$), (Step E1^{CD}) animatum vero potest non
 esse artifex ($\Diamond \neg(C \rightarrow D)$), (Step E2^{AC}) {^{err.} $C \neg A \neg \neg AC$ or $\emptyset$ } inanimatum vero
 atque animatum simul esse non possuntⁱⁱ} ($\Box(C \rightarrow \neg A)$ which should be
 $\Box(\neg A \rightarrow C)$); (Step E3) quo fit ut, si cumⁱⁱⁱ non est inanimatum medicus
 sit, cum sit animatum sit artifex ($(\neg A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (C \rightarrow D)$).

(i) esse om. Vy (ii) possunt] possunt p.c. et possint a.c. Vl, possint
 PzKøVaVoPa, potest VyMigne (iii) cum] cum p.c. alia manu et quod a.c.
 PyVaVl, quod PzKøMzSgWxLdObertello, quidem Mx, siquidem cum Ll, om.
 Pa

4.5 Smaller Errors in CH and HC

So far, in § 4.1–3 above, I have indicated that discussions of HH commit four kinds of errors, viz. the XY-YX error (§ 4.1), the $\Box/\Diamond \neg$ error (§ 4.2), the *cum-praeter* error, and the “ $\emptyset$ -error” (§ 4.3). Discussions of HH3 and 7–9 commit these four kinds of errors here and there, as I have indicated in the quotations above.

In discussion of CH and HC, on the other hand, these types of errors are almost never committed. An exception is found in Steps 2 and E2 of the discussion of CH3, where the *cum-praeter* error is committed:

CH3 $A \rightarrow (\neg B \rightarrow C)$; Migne 850B1–10, Obertello 280.2–9
 ...; (Step 2) C vero terminum talem esse oportebit ut possit quidem non
 esse si non fuerit B ($\Diamond(\neg B \rightarrow C)$),

...; (Step E2) sensibile (C) vero potest simul non esse $\{\text{err. } \emptyset \text{ cum inanimato}\}(B)$, ($\Diamond(\neg CAB)$ viz. $\Diamond\neg(B \rightarrow \neg C)$), which should be $\Diamond\neg(\neg B \rightarrow C)$) possunt enim esse quaedam quae nec inanimata (B) sint nec sensibilia (C) ut arbores ($\Diamond(\neg BA \neg C)$ viz. $\Diamond\neg(\neg B \rightarrow C)$); ...

In discussions of HC,¹ there are two more cases where we need emendations:

HC2 ($A \rightarrow B$) $\rightarrow \neg C$; Migne 853B14–C4, Obertello 292.22–26
 ...; (Step 3) tunc tamen necesse sit <id quod A est> non esse C si A posito B sequatur; ...
 ...; (Step E3) tunc vero necesse est id quod animatum (A) est non esse equum (C), si id ipsum quod animatum (A) est homo (B) fuerit.
 $A \rightarrow B \vdash A \rightarrow \neg C$

Here <id quod A est> should be added in Step 3, as Step E3 says id quod animatum (A) est non esse equum (C).²

HC3 ($A \rightarrow \neg B$) $\rightarrow C$; Migne 853C5–8, Obertello 292.27–29
 ..., ut (Steps 1&2) A quidem $\{\text{err. cum-praeter cum}\} C^1$ vel esse vel non esse possit ($\Diamond\neg(A \rightarrow \neg C) \wedge \Diamond\neg(\neg A \rightarrow \neg C)$), which should be emended as indicated in ap. cr. below); (Step 3) tunc tamen necesse sit simul esse cum² C, si posito A termino B terminus abnuatur ($A \rightarrow \neg B \vdash \neg(A \rightarrow \neg C)$ viz. $A \rightarrow C$); ...

(1) C MxPy(a.c.)PzKøVlMzSgWxBrLdVoPwVxBsVb] 'B et' C manu^{corr} add.
 Py, B et C VaPxLlPdFxKlWyErPaWzMigneObertello, C vel B Be, C et B Ch,
 B atque C FyVy, (cum B et C om. Dr), which should be emended to cum B et
 <praeter> C (2) cum] om. PyVa(p.c.)BeVoDrVxPaVb

¹ The discussion of HC ($(X \rightarrow Y) \rightarrow Z$) consists of the following steps: Step 1&2 it is possible that $\neg(X \rightarrow Y)$ and that $\neg(X \rightarrow Z)$, Step 3 only when $X \rightarrow Y$ holds, $Y \rightarrow Z$ necessarily holds ($X \rightarrow Y \vdash Y \rightarrow Z$).

² All the other discussions of HC use the expression *id quod x est non est y* to express $X \rightarrow \neg Y$, or simply revert to the normal *si*-clause: *si est x non est y*.

Steps 1&2 of HC3 most likely say *A quidem cum C ...* in the archetype, as it is the reading found in all the early manuscripts except *Py* and *Va*; but the step should mention the relation between A and B, too. Therefore *Py* later adds *A quidem cum <B et> C ...*, which is followed by *Va* and other later manuscripts, as well as by Migne and Obertello (see *ap. cr.* (1) above). However, the emendation of *Py* is not correct, since the emended version is interpreted as $\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow \neg B) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B)$ and $\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow \neg C) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow \neg C)$, but the latter should be $\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow C) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow C)$; in other words, the *cum-praeter* error is committed here. Therefore I propose to emend it as follows:

My emendation of Steps 1&2:

A quidem cum C et praeter B vel esse vel non esse possit

$(\Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow \neg B) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow \neg B), \Diamond \neg(A \rightarrow C) \wedge \Diamond \neg(\neg A \rightarrow C))$

Step 3 says ... *necesse sit (A) simul esse cum C ...*, which means $\Box \neg(A \rightarrow \neg C)$. *Py* (so the hand which copies the main text, not *Py**, the hand making emendations) reads this phrase as *necesse sit (A) simul esse C*, omitting *cum*; and this reading is followed by *Va(p.c.)* and a few later manuscripts (see *ap. cr.* (2) above), but not by Migne nor by Obertello. The reading of *Py* without *cum* must be a simple copying error, since we never find an expression of the form *x simul esse y* (without *cum*) elsewhere.

5. Conclusion

The emendations discussed in § 2 are all of the main ones, to my notice, that medieval scholars proposed to the corrupt readings of the archetype (apart from some little one-word emendations). All the important emendations were made in the eleventh century (cf. § 1–2). Later period emendations do occur, but they are not as important (§ 3). Finally, many erroneous readings were left unemended (§ 4).

The important emendations made in the eleventh century were first made by hands different from that copying the main text; for example,

exactly the same emendations are made in $K\theta^*$ and Py^* (cf. § 2.1 above), in $Py^*Va^*Vl^*$ (cf. § 2.4) and in $Py^*Pz^*Va^*$ (cf. § 2.9). It suggests that the emendations by $Py^*Pz^*K\theta^*Va^*Vl^*$ (all of which are dated around 1000 A.D.) are based on common exemplars lost now. There must have been at least two types of such exemplars, since in § 2.10 Pz^* offers one emendation, while Py^*Va^* offer another. There are other groups of emendations which are recorded only in later eleventh-century manuscripts; for example, one emendation first appears in Be^* (cf. § 2.12), another in $LdPz$ (cf. § 2.6 and § 2.10). Therefore, emendations were made, not at once, but in several steps during the eleventh century.

Later manuscripts sometimes follow those emendations, and sometimes do not; but no later manuscript has exactly the same set of emendations as an earlier manuscript—that is to say, no earlier manuscript can be the direct exemplar of a later manuscript. For example, the emendation in § 2.1 by $K\theta^*$ and Py^* is followed by $BeBrLdVoPx$ and all the manuscripts after the twelfth century, but none of the later manuscripts have all of Py^* 's emendations.

As a result, significantly different versions of Boethius' *De syllogismis hypotheticis* circulated in the late eleventh century and later. A commentary of the work (SH3¹) shows that different versions were, in fact, in circulation in the early twelfth century. SH3 comments on the passage discussed in § 2.9 above, as follows:

SH3 M f. 73v, O p. 101a, (neither S nor N covers this passage)

Idem si ex consequentia (260.6, 845C2). Postquam ostendit¹ in prima propositione fieri syllogismum per positionem antecedentis, vult ostendere non posse fieri syllogismum per positionem consequentis, {^Msic dicens: **Idem si proponamus ex consequentia primae propositionis** id est si assumamus consequens primae propositionis ponendo}, **nullus efficitur² syllogismus** secundum naturam consequentis.

(1) ostendit *O*, *om.* *M* (2) efficitur *M*, erit *O*

¹ For SH3, see p. 20, n. 2 above.

The part underlined $\{^M\}$ is the reading of *M* (München clm 14458); *O* (Orléans 266) reads instead:

SH3 O-version

Id enim (260.6, 845C2). Vere assumptio est a, consequitur ut sit b in conclusione, quia id ostenditur **ex consequentia primae propositionis** id est ex ea quae dicit 'si est a, est b.' Ab effectu.

¶ **Quod(!) si** (260.6, 845C3). Postquam ostendit in prima propositione fieri syllogismum per positionem antecedentis, ostendit non posse fieri nullum in prima propositione per positionem consequentis. Continuatio. Per positionem antecedentis bonus efficitur syllogismus. **Quod** id est sed <si> **ponamus** in assumptione consequentem partem syllogismi primae propositionis,

It is clear that SH3 (the *M*-version) originally reads this passage as beginning with **Idem si ex consequentia**, as in manuscripts *VlBeVoLlCh-DrFxErBs* (cf. *ap. cr.* (1) of Quotation 9); but the *O*-revisor of SH3 reads the passage differently: **Id enim** ..., as in manuscripts *Mx(a.c.)Py(a.c.)-Pz(a.c.)KøVaMzSgWxBrLdPxPdVxPaLbMaVyMigne* (cf. *ap. cr.* (1) of Quotation 9), and **Quodsi** ..., as in manuscripts *LdPxPdWyKlPaLbMaWz* (= Emendation 3 of Quotation 9).

In short, Boethius' *De syllogismis hypotheticis*, which reached the Middle Ages in a corrupted form, was emended in various ways by people in the eleventh century, with some corruptions remaining unemended. As a result, several different versions were in circulation when, in the late eleventh and the twelfth century, people began to comment on the text. We must take these facts into consideration when studying the commentaries and other relevant works of Peter Abelard and his contemporaries, since many issues become understandable only with this knowledge.

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**“Lovers of Wisdom”
Etymology in the Service of Philosophy and Christianity
in Peter Abelard’s Writings**

Luisa Valente

My contribution investigates how Peter Abelard considers and uses etymology in his writings. I will start with some general considerations about the notion of etymology in the early Middle Ages, while the following two parts will concern Peter Abelard’s reflections on, and use of, etymologies in his logical and theological works respectively.

1 Etymology in the Early Medieval Tradition

According to Isidore of Seville, etymology gives the “origin of the words,” and is found “when one reaches, through interpretation, the force of the word or of the name”:

Etymologia est origo vocabulorum, cum vis verbi vel nominis per interpretationem colligitur.¹

In fact, during the Middle Ages *etymologia* did not have the modern sense of “the historical study of word forms”; medieval etymology was—as Vivien Law has said—“usually pursued on a synchronic rather than a diachronic basis.”²

With its proximity to other practices like *interpretatio* (in the strict sense of translation), *derivatio*, *definitio*, *descriptio*, and *expositio* (of words), we could say that in general the aim of *etymologia* in the Middle Ages was to find “revealing connections with other similar-sounding

¹ Isid. *Ethym.* I, XXIX.

² Law 1997, p. 264.

words.”¹ This is in fact how, in the twelfth century, Petrus Helias described etymology in his *Summa super Priscianum*:

Ethimologia ergo est expositio alicuius vocabuli per aliud vocabulum sive unum sive plura magis nota, secundum rei proprietatem et litterarum similitudinem, ut “lapis” quasi “ledens pedem”, “fenestra” quasi “ferens nos extra”. Hic enim et rei proprietas attenditur et litterarum similitudo observatur.

Est vero ethimologia compositum nomen ab *ethimo* quod interpretatur “verum” et *logos*, quod interpretatur “sermo”, ut dicatur “ethimologia” quasi “veriloquium”, quoniam qui ethimologizat “veram”, id est primam vocabuli originem assignat. Differt autem ab interpretatione que est translatio de una loquela in aliam. Ethimologia vero fit sepius in eadem loquela.²

Etymology is thus an exposition of a certain word through another word or words that are better known, <and is> based on a property of the thing and a similarity in the letters, e.g., “lapis” as “ledens pedem,” “fenestra” as “ferens nos extra.” Here, both the property of the thing and the similarity in the letters are considered.

In fact, “ethimologia” is a noun composed of “ethimo,” which translates as “verum” and “logos,” which translates as “sermo.” So it may be said that “etymology” is almost a “true speech,” since someone who etymologizes identifies the true origin of the word, that is, its first origin. It differs from interpretation, which consists in transferring from one language to another; etymology, on the other hand, is mostly carried out within the same language.³

¹ *Ibid.* About etymology in the Middle Ages, see Buridant 1998a, Cinato 2011, and the previous literature mentioned in these two studies.

² Petrus Helias, *Summa super Priscianum*, ed. Reilly, p. 70.86–96. The passage has been re-edited and translated into French in Rosier-Catach 1998b, p. 221 as well as quoted in Cinato 2011, pp. 286–87. Petrus also clearly distinguishes *ethimologia* from derivation—*ethimologia* aiming to find the property of things, *derivatio* aiming to describe the relation between words. Cf. Rosier-Catach 1998a, pp. 115–16.

³ When I do not give the name of the translator at the end of a quotation, the translation is mine.

The logical and rhetorical traditions also describe a *locus ex etymologia*, since we can look for etymologies to use them as premises to draw conclusions.¹ This *locus* is also called *ex notatione*, because *notatio* is the name preferred by Cicero for the Greek *etymologia*. In Cicero's *Topica*, for example, the *locus* from etymology is described as follows:

Tum notatio, cum ex verbi vi argumentum aliquod elicitur hoc modo: Cum lex assiduo vindicem assiduum esse iubeat, locupletem iubet locupleti (id est enim assiduus, ut ait L. Aelius, appellatus ab aere dando).²

Then, etymology; this is when an argument is drawn from the force of a word in this way: Since the law decrees that only an *assiduus* should stand for an *assiduus*, it decrees that only a wealthy man should stand surely for a wealthy man (for the *assiduus*, as Aelius says, is so called from *the paying of money* (trans. Reinhardt, p. 121; modified).

Boethius, commenting on this text, defines *notatio* as “a certain interpretation of a name,” and distinguishes it from definition: a definition declares, unfolds, and spreads out (*declarat, expedit et diffundit*) what is confusingly signified by the name.³ Furthermore, this *locus* is called *ex notatione*, writes Boethius, since every noun “is a mark and sign of” the thing (*nomen omnem rem notat atque significat*):

Tertius eorum qui in ipso sunt locus a notatione est constitutus. Notatio vero est quaedam nominis interpretatio. Nomen vero semper in ipso est. Ut enim diffinitio id quod in nomine involutum est declarat, expedit atque diffundit, ita etiam nomen id quod a diffinitione dicitur evolute, involute confuseque designat. Quod si definitio in ipso est, nomen quoque in ipso esse de quo agitur, non potest dubitari. Ex notatione autem locus vocatus est, quia nomen omnem rem notat atque significat.⁴

¹ See Buridant 1998b, pp. 27–43.

² Cic. *Top.* 10.

³ About the notion of *definitio* or *diffinitio* in the Middle Ages and its relation to etymology, see Buridant 1990.

⁴ Boeth. *In Ciceronis Topica*, PL 64, col. 1062C.

The Topic *from designation* is established as the third of those Topics that are in the thing at issue. Designation is a sort of explanation of a name, and a name is always in the thing at issue. As a definition disentangles and spreads out what a name proclaims in an involuted way, so the name designates in an involuted and undifferentiated way what the definition expresses discursively. And so, if a definition is in the thing at issue, a name undoubtedly is also. The Topic is called “*from designation*” because a name designates and signifies all of a thing (trans. Stump, p. 46).

The strict relation between *etymologia* / *notatio* and *interpretatio* must be stressed and clarified, since in medieval texts we can find *interpretatio* treated either as a genus with *etymologia* as one of its species, or as a synonym of *etymologia*, or as a kind of description of a name based on translation from another language (this is the way in which Petrus Helias uses it in the text quoted earlier, last lines) or on the composition of the word.

In any event, later in his *Topica*, Cicero writes about the kind of argumentation called *ex notatione*, which, as we have seen, derives its conclusion from the “force of the name” (*ex vi nominis*). The text clearly shows that the *vis nominis* of which Cicero and Isidore write concerns the word itself in its phonetic form (*vis nominis, verbum ipsum*), and not the thing to which the name refers to nor what falls in its “division”:

Multa etiam ex notatione sumuntur. Ea est autem cum ex vi nominis argumentum elicitur; quam Graeci ἐτυμολογίαν appellant, id est verbum ex verbo veriloquium; nos autem novitatem verbi non satis apti fugientes genus hoc notationem appellamus quia sunt verba rerum notae. Itaque hoc quidem Aristoteles σύμβολον appellat, quod Latine est nota. Sed cum intellegitur quid significetur, minus laborandum est de nomine. Multa igitur in disputando notatione eliciuntur ex verbo, ut cum quaeritur postliminium quid sit—non dico quae sint postlimini; nam id caderet in divisionem, quae talis est: Postliminio redeunt haec: homo, navis, mulus

clitellarius, equus, equa quae frenos recipere solet—; sed cum ipsius postlimini vis quaeritur et verbum ipsum notatur.¹

Many arguments are also derived from denotation [*notatio*]. This is when an argument is elicited from the force of a word. The Greeks call this etymology, that is, in word for word translation, *veriloquium* (saying of truth). But I shrink from the novelty of a word which is not particularly suitable and prefer to call this type denotatio [*notatio*], because words are the notes of things. Therefore Aristotle calls the same thing σύμβολον, which in Latin is *nota*. But when it is understood what is meant, there is less need to worry about the name. In a discussion many arguments are elicited from words through (the analysis of the) denotation [*notatio*], e.g. when the question is what *postliminium* (resumption of rights) is—I do not say is covered by *postliminium*, for this would fall under division, which is of the form: “These things return in virtue of *postliminium*: a man, a ship, a pack-mule, a stallion, a mare accustomed to the bit”—but when the force of the word itself *postliminium*, is the issue and when the word itself is etymologically explained (trans. Reinhardt, p. 133; modified).

Boethius, in his commentary on this passage, explains that the *argumentum ex notatione* is based on the interpretation of the name, i.e., ἐτυμολογία in Greek. Literally translated, ἐτυμολογία should be *veriloquium*, but since this name has not been adopted in Latin, Cicero calls etymology *notatio*. In other words, here Cicero and Boethius are discussing the etymology of the word “ἐτυμολογία” itself (the same *explicatio* is also given by Petrus Helias, in the text quoted earlier):

Post enumerationem partium recto ordine de notatione perpendit. Notatio igitur est quoties ex nota aliqua rei, quae dubia est, capitur argumentum. Nota vero est quae rem quamque designat. Quo fit ut omne nomen nota sit, idcirco quod notam facit rem de qua praedicatur, id Aristoteles σύμβολον nominavit. Ex notatione autem sumitur argumentum quoties aliquid ex notatione, id est nominis interpretatione, colligitur. Interpretatio vero nominis ἐτυμολογία Graece, Latine veriloquium nuncupatur; ἔτυμον enim

¹ Cic. *Top.*, 35–36. Cf. Buridant 1998, p. 16.

verum significat, λόγός orationem. Sed quia id veriloquium minus in usu Latini sermonis habebatur, interpretatione nominis notationem Tullius appellat.¹

Cicero considers designation in the right order, after the enumeration of parts. Designation occurs when an argument is taken from a sign of the thing that is in doubt. A sign is that which designates any thing. Hence, every name is a sign because it makes known the thing of which it is predicated. (Aristotle named this “*symbolon*.”) And an argument is taken from designation when something is inferred from the explanation of a name. An explication of a name is called “*etymologia*” in Greek and “*veriloquium*” in Latin, for the Greek “*etymon*” signifies “*verum*” and “*logos*” signifies “*oratio*”. But because “*veriloquium*” is less commonly used in ordinary Latin discourse, Cicero calls the explanation of a name “*designation*” (trans. Stump, pp. 108–9).

Thus, according to these descriptions, when we use etymology to draw a conclusion, we produce an *argumentum ex etymologia* or *ex notatione*.² Note that, while etymology concerns primarily the words in their phonetic form, conclusions drawn from etymology often concern the things signified by the words, and this shift is at the centre of Abelard’s discussions about etymology in his logical writings.³

In fact, as Jean Jolivet remarked in his fundamental book *Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard*, published first in 1969 and then again, in an augmented version, in 1982, etymology plays an important role in Abelard’s writings.⁴ First, Abelard repeats several times, in different formulations, the basic assumption that underlies Isidore’s use of

¹ Boeth. *In Ciceronis Topica*, PL 64, col. 1111B–C. Cf. Mart. Cap. *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* V, 483, ed. Willis, p. 168.9–12: “a nota vel etymologia ... sumimus argumentum sic: ‘si consul est, qui consulit rei publicae, quid aliud Tullius fecit, cum affecit supplicio coniuratos?’ quo in loco originem vobabuli tantum oportet attendere.”

² On etymology as an instrument of knowledge about things, see Buridant 1998b, p. 22.

³ About the difference between a notion of *etymologia* concerning just words and another concerning also things, see Buridant 1998b, pp. 18–20.

⁴ Cf. Jolivet 1982, pp. 72–74. Cf. also Bloch 1983, who, concerning Peter Abelard, substantially depends on what Jolivet writes.

etymologies in his *Etymologiarum sive originum libri XX* (which Abelard quotes very often): that is, the idea that names reflect the natures of things, so that by knowing the origins of names it is possible to know the things themselves, or at least something about them. As has often been remarked, in the *Logica nostrorum petitione sociorum*—which, even if apparently not written directly by Abelard, seems to reflect his thought—we read the forceful formula *voces sunt aemulae rerum*.¹ Furthermore, in the *Glosses on Porphyry* of his *Logica Ingredientibus*, within the discussion of the definition of *differentia* and of the fact that not every *differentia* produces a species with its own name, Abelard writes incidentally of the nature of things (*natura rerum*) as something “according to which” names can be imposed (*natura rerum secundum quam <nomina> imponi possunt*):

Videtur insuper non omni differentiae haec definitio [scil. DIFFERENTIA EST QUA ABUNDAT SPECIES A GENERE] conuenire, cum frequenter specierum nomina deficient, pro quibus frequenter differentias poni in *Diuisione* Boethius dicit. At uero nos non <ad> actum impositionis nominum respicimus sed magis ad naturam rerum, secundum quam imponi possunt.²

It seems, moreover, that this definition [i.e., there is a difference when a species leans out from a genus] does not apply to all differences, since the names of species are often lacking, and instead of them, Boethius says in *De diuisione*, <the names of> differences are often used. But we are not interested in the act of imposing names, but in the nature of things, according to which names can be imposed.

To a certain extent, therefore, Abelard seems to participate in the “grammatical Platonism” which, according to a famous article by Jolivet from 1966, unites Isidore of Seville, Fridugisus of Tours, and Gottshalk of Orbais in the Early Middle Ages, and, in the twelfth century, Thierry of

¹ Abael. *Logica nostrorum petitione sociorum*, ed. Geyer, p. 537.7. Cf. Jolivet 1982, p. 72, and Marenbon 2013, pp. 33–37.

² Abael. *Glossae super Porphyrium LI*, ed. Geyer, p. 75.9–14. Cf. Boethius, *De diuisione*, ed. Magee, p. 16.6–9.

Chartres: these authors share the conviction that, since names have been given based on the natures of the things, by knowing the origin of a name, we can reach a certain knowledge of the thing signified by it.¹

2 Etymology in Abelard's Logical Works

If we then look at how Peter Abelard effectively uses etymology, we find first that he quite often relies on etymologies in his reflections, both logical and theological. E.g., he offers the following etymologies in his logical writings: *adverbium* from *adiectivum verbi*,² *vox a vocando*,³ *homo dicitur ab humo*,⁴ or *Brito dictus est quasi brutus*.⁵

These are only few among the many etymologies that are spread throughout Abelard's writings, most of which can be found in Isidore of Seville's *Etymologies* or in the grammatical tradition. The etymology of *vox* from *vocando*, e.g., is given by Priscian in the section of his *Institutiones Grammaticae* about the *vox* (I, 6). The derivation of *homo* from *humus* can be found in Isidore's *Ethymologiae* (I, xxix, 3; XI, I, 4), as can the derivation of *Brito* from *brutus* (IX, ii, 102). It seems, therefore, that Abelard has considerable confidence in the heuristic power of etymology and takes the tradition originated by Isidore of Seville into great consideration.

Yet Abelard is neither deluded nor naïve about the heuristic potential of etymology, as Jolivet also noticed.⁶ Abelard knows and writes that

¹ Cf. Jolivet 1966 and Buridant 1998b, pp. 47–48.

² *Glossae super Peri Hermeneias LI*, X, 10, ed. Jacobi and Strub, p. 310.75. But Abelard also presents as “etymologies” two descriptions based in fact on translation: that of *hypoteticum* from *conditionale* (*Glosse super Peri Hermeneias LI*, V, 100, ed. Jacobi and Strub, p. 178.727) and that of *topice* from *localis* (*Glossae super Topica LI*, ed. Dal Pra 1969, p. 213.22, cf. Martin 2004).

³ Abael., *Dialectica*, ed. de Rijk, p. 128.4.

⁴ *Glosse super Porphyrium, Logica Nostrorum Petitione sociorum*, ed. Geyer, p. 549.3; and compare *Glosse super Peri Hermeneias LI*, III, 62, ed. Jacobi and Strub, pp. 112–13, about which see later in this article. Cf. Martin 2011, p. 35.

⁵ Abael., *Dialectica*, ed. de Rijk, p. 128.29–32.

⁶ Cf. Jolivet 1982, pp. 72–74.

although a name is given “according to a property of the thing” (see above), it does not completely express the nature of the thing.

Furthermore, if names have been imposed “according to some property” of the things, they have not been imposed “in order to signify exactly that property.” Thus, there is a great difference between definition and signification on the one hand, and etymology and interpretation on the other hand, and Peter Abelard stresses this difference.

Knowing the derivations of their names will clearly not be sufficient, according to Abelard, to instruct us about the nature of the signified things. An example of this is the case of the name *Brito*, “Breton.” *Brito*, Abelard remarks in his *Dialectica*, derives from *brutus*, “brute,” since those who imposed this name thought that most Bretons were stupid. But this is not to say that *all* Bretons, and *only* Bretons, are stupid:

Licet ... non omnes uel soli sint stolidi, hic tamen qui nomen “*Britonis*” composuit secundum affinitatem nominis “*bruti*”, in intentione habuit quod maxima pars Britonum fatua esset, atque hinc hoc nomen illi affine in sono protulit.¹

Although ... <the Bretons> are not all foolish and not only they <may be foolish>, nevertheless he who composed the name “Breton” because of the affinity with the name “brute” inwardly believed that most Bretons were fatuous and therefore invented this name, similar to that in sound.

Later in his *Dialectica*, in the section on *loci*, Abelard describes the limits of the explanatory capacity or heuristic force of etymology in a more detailed way. He is discussing the *locus ab interpretatione*, and he describes a different sort of *interpretatio*, using here *interpretatio* in a broader sense which includes, as different kinds of it, definition and *etymologia*. While definition is an interpretation that opens the meaning of a word by demonstrating the substantial properties of a *res*, etymology is based more on the composition of the name as such than on the substance of the thing. And sometimes, as in the case of the etymology of proper

¹ Abael. *Dialectica*, ed. de Rijk, p. 128.29–32.

names, etymology does not capture at all the properties of the thing itself, and consequently the argumentations which are based on it do not contain any necessity or probability:

Regule vero ab interpretatione nominis, secundum id quod ipsa interpretatio modo substantiam rei continet, modo vero quibusdam accidentibus subiectum depingit, modo necessitatem modo probabilitatem proponunt. Est autem substantialis interpretatio ut si “*anthropos*” grecum nomen, quod est “*homo*”, latina diffinitione aperiemus, hac scilicet: “*animal rationale mortale*”, vel si aliquod grecum nomen latina descriptione. Est enim interpretatio secundum id quod ignotum aperit vocabulum cuius nullam adhuc significationem tenebamus, diffinitio vero vel descriptio secundum id quod <rem> iam quodammodo cognitam alicui manifestius secundum eius proprietates demonstrat. Si vero interpretatio etymologiam fecerit, ut videlicet magis secundum nominis compositionem quam secundum rei substantiam fiat, veluti cum hoc proprium nomen “*Bartolomeus*”, “*filium regis*” interpretamur; secundum id scilicet quod “*Bar*” grece “*filius*” latine dicitur, “*tolomeus*” autem “*rex*”, huiusmodi interpretatio, quia solius nominis compositionem sequitur nec rei potius proprietatem exprimit, nullam probabilitatem exigit.¹

The rules that depend on the interpretation of a name, according to the fact that the same interpretation sometimes entails the substance of the thing and sometimes adds some accidents to the subject, sometimes produce necessity and sometimes probability. We have a substantial interpretation when, e.g., we disclose the Greek name “*anthropos*,” which means “human,” by the Latin definition, “*animal rationale mortale*,” or in the case of any Greek name of which we give a Latin description. Interpretation in fact occurs when we uncover <the meaning> of a word of which we knew no meaning until that moment. Definition or description, on the other hand, occurs when one demonstrates to someone else more clearly, through its properties, something already known to some extent. If, however, the interpretation has produced an etymology, so that it is based more on the composition of the name than on the substance of the thing, as when we interpret the Greek name “*Bartholomaeus*” as “son of

¹ Abael. *Dialectica*, pp. 338.35–339.16.

the king,” since the word “*bar*” means “*filius*” [son] in Latin, and “*tolomaeus*” “*rex*” [king]: this kind of interpretation, since it is based only on the composition of the name and does not express a property of the thing, produces no probability.

Again, in the *Dialectica*, treatise V, book II, in the chapter on *interpretatio* within the treatise on divisions and definitions, Abelard is even more explicit: in contrast to a definition of the thing (*definitio rei*), an interpretation as *definitio nominis* concerns more the name than the thing, whether it gives its etymology, points out its composition in parts, or explains it through translation into another language. For example, the definition of the name *philosophus* is *amator sapientiae*, reflecting the composition of this name.

An interpretation can express some property of the substance, but it does not fully capture its salient features as the definition does. While definition and defined are interchangeable, an interpretation always says something less than the reality it interprets, or, put another way, the reality exceeds the interpretation of the name and cannot be fully grasped by it. In the case of the interpretation of the name “philosopher” (*philosophus*) as “lover of wisdom” (*sapientiae amator*), the difference consists in the fact that we do not in fact call all those who love wisdom “philosophers” (*philosophi*) but, among them, only those who have “learnt the art”:

Diffinitionem autem aliam nominis esse dixit,¹ aliam rei. Eam autem que nominis est, interpretationem vocavit; interpretatio vero *ea* dicitur *diffinitio per quam ignotum alterius lingue vocabulum exponitur*, veluti cum “*philosophos*”, quod grecum est, latina expositio nobis sic resolvit: *id est “amator sapientie”*; nam “*philos*” am<at>oris designativum dicunt, “*sophia*” vero sapientie. ...

Sunt etiam qui interpretationem eiusdem lingue cum nomine ipso fieri concedunt, cum videlicet ipsum secundum partium compositionem exponitur; ut cum “*sacerdos*”, quod ex “*sacro*” et “*dante*” compositum dicitur, “*dans*, id est *ministrans, sacrum*” interpretatur. Sed has quidem non

¹ The editor, L. M. De Rijk, writes in a footnote: “Quis ubi?”.

inveni interpretationes appellari, sed forte etymologie vocis ipsius sonum maxime consequuntur, sive sint orationes, ut supraposita, sive dictiones, ut Britones quasi-brutones dicti sunt, eoquod bruti et irrationabiles ex insipientia videantur.

Attende autem quod cum interpretatio sive etymologia maxime nomen aperiant, rei quoque subiecte faciunt notitiam; alioquin vocabulum non aperirent; sed maxime rei demonstrationem diffinitio facit, que non solum ipsam substantiam tradit, verum etiam ipsam quibusdam suis proprietatibus depingit. Aliter enim diffinitio quam diffinitum vocabulum rem ipsam manifestat; illud enim involute, hec autem explicite ipsam designat ... Illa autem [*scil.* interpretatio] interpretatum sepius excedit; neque enim omnes qui sapientiam amant, philosophos dicimus, sed qui iam artis doctrinam perceperunt; “*philosophum*” tunc “*amatorem sapientie*” interpretamur, iuxta hoc quidem quod vocis compositio sonusque ipse innuere videtur. Unde merito hec [i.e., interpretatio or etymologia] nominis, illa autem [i.e., diffinitio stricto sensu] rei diffinitio dicitur.¹

He also said that there is a definition of the name and a definition of the thing. He called the definition of the name “interpretation.” In fact, one calls “interpretation” that definition by which one explains an unknown word of another language, as when the word “*philosophos*,” which is Greek, is clarified by the Latin exposition: “*id est ‘amator sapientiae’*”; for they say that “*philos*” indicates the lover, and “*sophia*” wisdom. ...

Some then hold that there is also an interpretation of a name within the same language, and that would be when that name is explained according to the composition of its parts; as when “*sacerdos*,” which is said to be

¹ Abael. *Dialectica*, pp. 582.26–584.12. Slightly similar remarks, even if with a different judgment about *philosophia*, can be read in Petrus Helias’ *Summa super Priscianum*, ed. Reilly, p. 105.5–14: “‘Syllaba est comprehensio litterarum consequens sub uno accentu et uno spiritu prolata’. Vide ergo quod ista descriptio data est per huius nominis quod est ‘syllaba’ interpretationem. *Syllabin* namque interpretatur ‘comprehendere’, unde syllaba dicitur quasi ‘comprehensio’. Hec ergo descriptio largior est quam ipsum descriptum, quoniam etymologia, sive interpretatio, quandoque excedit, ut quod ‘homo’ ab ‘humo’ dicitur. Multo namque plura de humo habent esse. Quandoque vero exceditur, ut interpretatio huius nominis quod est ‘syllaba’. Sunt enim syllabe quarum est nulla comprehensio litterarum. Quandoque iterum parificatur ut quoniam philosophia dicitur amor sapientiae.”

composed of “*sacro*” and “*dante*,” is interpreted as “*dans*, i.e. *ministrans*, *sacrum*.” In fact, I have not found <in the texts> that these are called interpretations, but they are perhaps etymologies of the same word, <which> depend mostly on its sound: whether they are phrases, like the one mentioned above, or whether they are words, as when the Bretons are said to be almost brutish on account of the fact that they seem coarse and irrational in their insipience.

But pay attention to the fact that, although interpretation or etymology explain the name more than anything else, they make the subject known too: otherwise they would not explain the word. But most of all it is the definition that provides a demonstration of the thing, since it not only conveys the substance itself, but also adds some of its properties to it. For the definition and the defined word make the same thing manifest in different ways, the one in an involute way, the other in an explicit way. ... <Interpretation,> on the other hand, very often goes beyond the interpreted; for not all those who love wisdom do we call philosophers, but only those who have already learnt the arts; we then interpret “*philosophus*” <as> “*amator sapientiae*” because of what the composition of the word and the sound itself seem to suggest. Therefore, this [scil. “*amator sapientiae*”] is rightly said to be the definition of the name, that [scil. “*qui iam artis doctrinam perceperunt*”] a definition of the thing.

Similarly, in the *Glosses on De interpretatione* of the *Logica Ingredientibus*, III, 61–62, within the discussion of *voces infinitae* like *non-homo* or *non-res*, Abelard gives the etymology of *homo* from *humus* as an example of the fact that the meaning of words—which is given by the definition and is the cause of the imposition of the name itself—is different from what the name is given from. Indeed, Abelard writes that human beings bear the name *homo* because they are made from *humus* and not because they are what they are, i.e., “rational mortal animals.” And many possible “reasons for the imposition” of a name are not actually marked in it (*non notantur in ipso*):

Boethius autem in primo Categoricalorum huiusmodi uoces infinitas appellari ideo dicit, quia infinita significant, his uerbis: “Et quoniam non homo haec uox” etc. usque illuc: “Et quoniam sunt.” At uero Boethius

magis ad causam translationis huius nominis quod est *infinitum* respexit quam ad vim significationis eius et ad proprietatem ex qua ipsum conuenit uocibus. Non enim secundum hoc datum est uocibus quod infinita significant, sed quod infinite, id est remotiue, ut diximus. Alioquin *res* que omnia continet, esset infinitum. Sed licet non sit datum uocibus ad notandum eas secundum hoc quod innumerabilia continet, ille tamen qui transtulit hoc nomen *infinitum* ad uoces significandas, hoc attendit, quod infinita ad innumerabilia se habent, et propter hoc sed non ad hoc notandum nomen hoc quod est *infinitum* uocibus dedit. Nam homo sic nominatus est, quia ex humo factus est, non secundum hoc quod est animal rationale mortale. Multae itaque sunt causae impositionis nominis quae non notantur in ipso.¹

But Boethius, in the <commentary to the> first book of the *Categories*, says that these words are called “*infinitae*” because they signify infinite things, and he does so using these words: “And since the word ‘non-homo’” etc., up to “and since they are.” But indeed Boethius has considered more the cause of the transfer of the name “*infinitus*” than the force of its signification and the property by which it applies to words. For it was not given to <some> words because they signify infinite things, but because they signify them in an infinite manner, that is, by removing <something>, as we have said. Otherwise the name “*res*,” which contains all things, would be infinite. But although it was not given to signify them according to the fact that they contain innumerable things, he who transferred the name “*infinitum*” to signify words did pay attention to the fact that infinite <words> refer to an innumerable quantity of things, and because of this, but not to signify this, he gave some words this name “*infinitum*.” For man [*homo*] is so called because he was made from humus, not because he is a rational mortal animal. And many are the causes of the imposition of a name that are not noted in the name itself.

We can find a similar distinction between definition and etymology in the grammatical tradition as well. Petrus Helias, in his commentary on Priscian, writes of definition and division as pertaining to philosophers,

¹ Abael. *Glossae super Peri Hermeneias* LI, III, 61–62; ed. Jacobi and Strub, pp. 112.484–113.487.

while etymology would pertain to grammarians.¹ The same distinction is also present in the *Glosulae super Priscianum Maiorem* linked to the school of William of Champeaux, according to which the definition of things pertains to philosophers, while etymology, concerning only words, pertains to grammarians: “Est autem philosophorum diffinitiones rerum grammaticorum uero uocum ethimologias formare.”²

Similar remarks about the limits of etymological argumentations can be found also in rhetoric. Quintilianus, for example, in his *Institutio oratoria*, gives the example of the word *tyrannicida*, explaining that not all those who kill a tyrant are properly called “tyrannicides”:

Saepissime autem quid sit proprium cuiusque quaeretur, ut, si per *etumologian* dicatur: “tyrannicidae proprium est tyrannum occidere”, negemus: non enim si traditum sibi eum carnifex occiderit tyrannicida dicatur; nec si imprudens uel inuitus.³

¹ Cf. text quoted by Rosier 1998b, p. 221: “VOX AUTEM DICTA EST VEL A VOCANDO. Praemissa vocis diffinitione et divisione secundum philosophos, ipse ex parte sua vocis aetymologiam ponit quam grammaticorum est.” Cf. also *Glosulae in Priscianum*, quoted in Rosier 1993, p. 130.

² M 2rb; K 1vb (this part of the *Glosulae* is the beginning of the section on “voice” [vox] and has been edited in Grondeux and Rosier-Catach 2011a; these passages in particular are at pp. 285, 299, 305). Cf. also “Premissa uocis diffinitione et diuisione secundum philosophos, ipse ex parte sua uocis ethimologiam ponit, quae grammaticorum est” (M 3vb); “Data diffinitione quod est philosophi, subdit ethimologiam huius uocis quae est ‘nomen’, quod est grammatici.” (M 20 rb) Where M = Metz, Bibl. mun. 1224 (*Glosulae* on ff. 1ra–110rb), K = Cologne, Dombibl. B. 201 (*Glosulae* on ff. 1ra–74rb). An edition of the *Glosulae* is being prepared by Anne Grondeux with the collaboration of M. Fredborg, E. Lorenzetti, I. Rosier-Catach, and C. Tarlazzi, and it can be consulted on <https://htldb.huma-num.fr/gpma/home.html>. For the complete list of manuscripts containing the *Glosulae in Priscianum* see this website and Grondeux and Rosier-Catach 2011b, p. 108. About etymology in the twelfth-century grammatical tradition, see Cinato 2011 and its bibliography. In particular Hunt 1952 is still very useful, as is the more recent Buridant 1998a, specially with Buridant 1998b, Jeudy 1998, Rosier-Catach 1998a, and Rosier 1998b. I am grateful to Anne Grondeux and Irène Rosier-Catach for their help while I was consulting the *Glosulae* and for other precious suggestions they gave me.

³ Quintil. *Institutio oratoria* V, 10, LIX.

We have, however, often to consider what is a *property* of some given object; for example, if it should be asserted, on the ground of etymology, that the peculiar *property* of a tyrannicide is to kill tyrants, we should deny it: for an executioner is not *ipso facto* a tyrannicide, if he executes a tyrant who has been delivered to him for the purpose, nor again is he a tyrannicide who kills a tyrant unwittingly or against his will (trans. Butler).

Thus, as we have seen, Abelard shows in his logical writings the same ambivalent attitude towards etymology which he can find in the tradition of the *trivium*: on the one hand a positive consideration of its explanatory strength, and on the other hand a clear consciousness of the limits of its use in argumentation.

Nevertheless, Abelard uses *etymologia* and *interpretatio* quite often in his reasonings, frequently without a clear distinction between these two names. I have already mentioned some occurrences of etymologies in his logical writings, but it is probably in Abelard's theological writings that we find the most extensive use of etymology and *interpretatio*.¹

3 Etymology in the Demonstration of the Convergence of Philosophy, Logic, Christianity, and Monasticism

Here I would like to concentrate on Abelard's systematic use of etymology to sustain one of the most fundamental, and controversial, points of his philosophico-theological thought: the thesis about the convergence and possible identity between philosophy, logic, Christianity, and monasticism. In other words, it seems to me that Abelard uses the ancient instrument of etymology to strengthen an idea which is central in his theology: the idea of considering the pagan tradition of philosophy, and especially logic, as having a value to some extent close to divine revelation.²

¹ In his *Sermo XI*, for example, we find the etymology of *latro* from *latendo*, which can be found in Isidore's *Etymologies* (X, 159). Cf. Abael. *Sermones*, ed. Engels and Vande Veire, p. 164.1006.

² About pagans in medieval philosophy, see Marenbon 2015.

Abelard presents this idea and strengthens it with etymologies, especially in the second book of his *Theologia christiana*, in his *Epistola XIII*, in his *Soliloquium*, and in his *Sermo XXXIII*. Summing up what Abelard writes in these works, we can say that according to him ancient philosophers, authentic logicians, authentic Christians, and authentic monks share a common and substantial feature: they all follow the *logos* or *ratio* or *sapientia*, recognising its divinity.¹

Thus, for Abelard, thanks to the convergence between philosophy and Christianity (which, in accordance with Augustine, he considers to be the “true philosophy,” *vera philosophia*²), on the one hand the mysteries of faith can be partly clarified and defended using natural reason, and on the other hand—and this point has been less investigated—philosophy itself, and particularly logic, turn out to be in themselves divine and Christian: to Abelard, they are a gift of grace.³

Let us look at some examples of how Abelard argues those theses by means of etymology. His *Soliloquium* is completely structured around etymologies. In the introduction to his edition of the text, Charles Burnett writes:

Most striking of all, however, is the very careful and logical arrangement of the subject-matter. In each of the first three sections a name of Christ and the implications of an adjectival form derived from that name are analysed, by investigation of the true meaning of the name and its adjectival form. So, the names in section I – *Christus* and *Christiani* – are followed in section II by *Christ* = *sapientia* (*sophia*) and *philosophi* (“lovers of wisdom”), and, in section III, by *Christ* = *Verbum* (*logos*) and *logici*. In section IV the terms discussed separately in section I to III, *Christus*, *Sapientia* and *Verbum*, are brought together. Their combination is responsible for the perfect teaching of Christianity, and the power of eloquence of those spreading the teaching. Section V sums up this

¹ Cf. Zerbi 2002, Georges 2007, Valente 2011, and Valente 2014.

² Cf. D’Onofrio 2013.

³ Cf. Allegro 2008.

conclusion with Christ's words of encouragement to his disciples as he prepared them for their ministry.¹

As Burnett remarks in his introduction, the *Soliloquium* and *Epistola XIII* are concerned with showing that being a philosopher and a logician is not incompatible with being a Christian, but that, rather, Christians by necessity should be philosophers and logicians, and in practice can be called such in a truer sense than pagan philosophers and logicians.²

Let us have a look at the second and third sections of the *Soliloquium*, to gain an idea of Abelard's method in this text. Here Peter Abelard has a discussion with his *alter ego* Abelard Peter about the interpretation of the word *philosophi* as "lovers of wisdom," *sapientiae amatores*, and of the word *verbum* as *logos*, with the consequence that only Christians would be true philosophers and true logicians:

II Ab<aelardus>. Sed et iuxta Apostolum, cum sit Christus ipsa Dei sapientia quam sophiam Greci nominant, nullos rectius dici philosophos autumo quam qui huius summe ac perfecte sapientie amatores³ existunt.

P<etrus>. Hoc equidem ipsa philosophici nominis ethimologia requirit, et maxime, tam doctrina fidei quam morum disciplina seu vita, ipsos nobis philosophos gentium certum est convenire. Adeo namque de fide Trinitatis aperte disseruerunt, ut mirabile sit eos quoque in plerisque diligentius quam prophetas ipsos totam huius fidei summam exposuisse. ... Quod si vitam quoque philosophorum ac morum disciplinam pensemus, nullos aut paucos fidelium Christianorum de contemptu seculi aut morum disciplina

¹ Burnett 1984, p. 874.

² Burnett 1984, p. 877. And again Burnett writes (1984, p. 878): "Abelard's method of argument in the *Soliloquium* implies that a word can be analysed in two ways: (a) in respect to its audible sound (*nomen*, *appellatio*; this might be called its outward form), and (b) in respect to its interpretation or 'etymology' (*ethimologia*; its inner significance)." Cf. also Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De grammatico*, ed. and tr. Henry, pp. 37–40 (parr. 4.232–4.415); ed. Schmitt, pp. 156–61.

³ For the explication of *philosophus* as *amator sapientiae*, cf. e.g. Augustinus, *Soliloquia* I, 13, 22 and *De trinitate* XI, 1.2. In *De civitate Dei* VIII, 1 Augustine writes "verus philosophus amator Dei." Cf. also *ibid.*, VIII, 8 and 11, where he mentions Plato as his source for this concept. In fact, cf. *Timaeus* 92c.

eis anteferendos esse censebimus—qui etiam sophum sive philosophum magis ex vita quam ex scientia dicendum esse asserunt. De fide autem philosophorum atque vita seu etiam disciplina morum in exhortatione nostra ad fratres et commonachos nostros satis arbitror a nobis esse expositum. Quam quidem exhortationem quisquis legerit, videbit philosophos non tam nomine quam re ipsa Christianis maxime sociatos. Neque enim Grecia tot philosophicis rationibus armata, evangelice predicationis iugo colla tam cito submisisset nisi antea scriptis philosophorum, sicut Iudea prophetarum, ad hoc esse preparata.

III Ab<aelardus>. Verbum quoque Dei—quod Greci logon vocant—solum Christum dicimus. Unde Augustinus in *Libro Questionum* .lxxxiii, capitulo .xliiii.: In principio erat verbum, inquit, quod Grece logos dicitur. Hinc, et iuxta nominis ethimologiam, quicumque huic vero ac perfecto verbo per doctrinam et amorem coherent, vere logici sicut et philosophi dicendi sunt, nullaue disciplina verius logica dici debet quam Christiana doctrina.

Petrus. Etsi hoc quidem modo sermonis usus non habeat—ut videlicet aut Christianos nunc specialiter nominemus philosophos, aut eorum de Christo scientiam aut a Christo traditam doctrinam appellemus logicam—profitemur tamen his que dicis nominum ethimologias maxime consentire.¹

II Ab<elard>. But also, according to the Apostle, since Christ is the very wisdom of God and the Greeks call wisdom σοφία, I affirm that no people are more rightly called philosophers than those who live as lovers of the highest and perfect wisdom.

P<etrus>. This, I agree, is what the very etymology of the word “philosopher” demands, and it is certain that, as much in regard to faith in the doctrine as in discipline of character or mode of life, the philosophers of the gentiles themselves especially agree with us. For they so evidently were debating about faith in the Trinity that, remarkably, they expounded the full summation of this faith in many ways more thoroughly than the prophets themselves. Moreover, their successors have dared to rush into such madness as to say that even the Lord Jesus learnt what he preached about the faith in the Trinity from the philosophers. ... And if we weigh up the mode of life of the philosophers and their discipline of character, we

¹ Abael. *Solil.*, ed. Burnett, pp. 886–89.

will judge none or very few of the Christian faithful to be superior to them in denying the world or in disciplining their character. For they also assert that a man should be called “wise” or “a philosopher” for his mode of life rather than for his knowledge. However, I consider that enough has been expounded by us about the faith of the philosophers and their mode of life or discipline of character in our *Exhortation to our Brothers and Fellow-Monks*. Whoever reads this exhortation will see that the philosophers are especially in fellowship with Christians not so much in name as in fact. For Greece, equipped with so many philosophical arguments, would not have submitted to the joke of the teaching of the Gospel so quickly had it not been prepared for this in advance by the writings of the philosophers, just as Judea had been prepared by those of the Prophets.

III Ab<elard>. We call Christ alone “God’s word”—which the Greeks call λόγος. Hence St. Augustine in his book *The 83 Questions*, chapter 44, says: “In the beginning there was the Word, which in Greek is called λόγος”. Therefore, also according to the etymology of the word, all those who cling to this true and perfect word through doctrine and love, should truly be called logicians as well as philosophers, and no discipline ought more truly to be called “logic” than Christian doctrine.

Peter. Although usage of the term does not sanction this form of speaking – that is, that either we should now call Christian as a species “philosopher,” or that we should name their knowledge about Christ or their doctrine handed down by Christ, “logic” – we nevertheless claim that the etymologies of the words are in absolute agreement with what you say (trans. Burnett, pp. 892–93).

The same thesis according to which the concordance between philosophy, logic, and Christianity may be demonstrated by etymology is also present in Abelard’s *Collationes*:

Christianus. Adiunge et quod patet et legem naturalem suscitatum esse et perfectam morum disciplinam, qua uos, ut dicitis, sola nitimini et ad saluandum sufficere creditis, non nisi ab ipso traditam fuisse, a quo tamquam uera sophia id est sapientia Dei quicumque instructi sunt, ueri sunt dicendi philosophi.

Philosophus. Atque utinam ut dicis sic conuincere possis, ut ab ipsa, ut dicitis, suprema sapientia, quam grece logon, latine uerbum Dei uocatis, uos uere logicos et uerborum rationibus exhibeatis armatos.¹

Christian. And add—what is clear—that there is one who both raised up natural law and handed down the perfect teaching on how to live, on which alone you, as you say, depend, and which you believe is enough for salvation. Those who are instructed by *him*—by, as it were, true sapience, that is, the wisdom of God—should be called true philosophers.

Philosopher. If only you were able to convince your own people of what you are saying, so that you would show yourselves truly as logicians, armed with verbal reasoning, through what, as you say, is the highest wisdom, which you call in Greek the ‘*logos*’ and in Latin the ‘word of God’ (trans. Marenbon).

Epistola XIII shares with the *Soliloquium* the intention of defending logic from the attacks of those who do not recognise its value or even consider it dangerous for faith.² Here we find considerations quite similar to those of the *Soliloquium*, but with a stronger emphasis on the divine origin of logic itself:

Ipsam quippe Dei filium quem nos uerbum dicimus, Graeci λόγον appellant, hoc est diuinae mentis conceptum seu Dei sapientiam uel rationem. Unde et Augustinus in libro Quaestionum Octoginta Trium capite quadragesimo quarto: “In principio”, inquit, “erat uerbum quod graece λόγος dicitur”. Idem in libro Contra Quinque Haereses: “In principio erat uerbum. Melius Graeci λόγος dicunt; λόγος quippe uerbum significat et rationem”. Et Hieronymus ad Paulinum de diuinis scripturis: “In principio erat uerbum; λόγος Graece multa significat. Nam et uerbum est et ratio et supputatio et causa uniuscuiusque rei, per quam sunt singula quae subsistunt. Quae uniuersa recte intelligimus in Christo”. Cum ergo uerbum patris, Dominus Iesus Christus, λόγος Graece dicatur, sicut et σοφία patris appellatur, plurimum ad eum pertinere uidetur ea scientia quae nomine quoque illi sit coniuncta et per deriuationem quandam a λόγος

¹ Abael. *Collationes*, II, 71–72, pp. 88–90.

² On this “letter,” see Jolivet 1982, pp. 269ff., and Allegro 2008.

logica sit appellata et sicut a Christo christiani, ita a λόγος logica proprie dici uideatur. Cuius etiam amatores tanto uerius appellantur philosophi quanto ueriores sint illius sophiae superioris amatores. Quae profecto summi patris summa sophia cum nostram indueret naturam ut nos uerae sapientiae illustraret lumine et nos ab amore mundi in amorem conuerteret sui, profecto nos pariter christianos et ueros effecit philosophos. Qui cum illam sapientiae uirtutem discipulis promitteret qua refellere possent contradicentium disputationes dicens: *Ego enim dabo uobis os et sapientiam cui non poterunt resistere aduersarii uestri*, profecto post amorem sui, unde ueri dicendi sunt philosophi, patenter et illam rationum armaturam eis pollicetur qua in disputando summi efficiantur logici.

Quae duo, de hoc uidelicet amore et doctrina eius quibus tam philosophi quam summi efficerentur logici, hymnus ille Pentecostes “Beata nobis gaudia” diligenter distinguit, cum dicitur: “Verbis ut essent proflui / Et caritate feruidi.”¹

The same son of God that we call Word, the Greeks call *logos*, that is, the concept of the divine mind or the wisdom or reason of God. This is why even Augustine, in the book of the *Eighty-three Questions*, chapter 44, states: “In the beginning was the Word, which is called *logos* in Greek.” And the same <Augustine> in the book *Against the Five Heresies* <writes>: “In the beginning was the Word. More appropriately, the Greeks call it *logos*; in fact, *logos* means both word and reason.” And Jerome in his epistle to Paulinus on the Holy Scriptures states: “In the beginning was the word. *Logos* in Greek means many things. For it is word and reason and reckoning and cause of every thing, by which the individual subsistents exist. And all these things we rightly understand in Christ.” Since, therefore, the word of the Father, the Lord Jesus Christ, is said to be *logos* in Greek, and is also called the *sophia* of the Father it is clear that in many ways this science belongs to him: a science which is conjoined with him also in its name and which, by its derivation from the word *logos*, is called logic. For just as Christians are named after Christ, so logic seems to be properly named after *logos*. Moreover, lovers of logic are said to be philosophers more truly the more truly they are lovers of that higher *sophia*. This supreme wisdom of the supreme father, moreover, when it

¹ Abael. *Epistola XIII*, pp. 274.101–275.134.

clothed herself in human nature to enlighten us with the light of true wisdom and to convert us from love of the world into love of her, has unquestionably made us both Christians and true philosophers. In fact, he promised his disciples that skill in knowledge by which they would be able to repel the disputes of those who contradicted them, by these words: *I will give you a language and wisdom which your adversaries will not be able to resist*. All the more will he [*scil.* Christ, i.e. the wisdom], after that love for him by which they are to be called true philosophers, grant them that armour of reasoning by which in disputing they will also be made supreme logicians.

These two things, namely, this love and his teaching by which they would become both philosophers and supreme logicians, are accurately distinguished in the Pentecost hymn entitled *Beata nobis gaudia* when it says: “With words to be eloquent, with charity to be fervent.”

The etymology of *logica* from *logos* is often repeated in the early Middle Ages: it can be found, e.g., in Isidore’s *Etymologies* (II, 24, 7), in Alcuinus’ *Dialogus de rhetorica et virtutibus* (PL 95, 1581A) and, in the twelfth century, in Hugh of Saint Victor’s *Didascalicon*.¹ But what is special in Abelard’s treatment of the subject is very well explained by Edmé Benno Smits, the editor of *Epistola XIII*, when he writes:

The elaborately worked out treatise on the relation between logic and Christ and the relation between logic and the Holy Spirit we find in letter 13 only. It is a clear attempt to present dialectic as a “Christian scientia.”²

We can read something similar in Abelard’s *Sermo XXXIII* as well. This sermon is usually considered to have been written for the Monks of Saint

¹ Hugo uses this etymology in *Didascalicon* I, XI, *De ortu logicae*: “Logica dicitur a Graeco logos, quod nomen geminam habet interpretationem. Dicitur enim logos sermo sive ratio, et inde logica sermocinalis sive rationalis scientia dici potest. Logica rationalis, quae dissertiva dicitur, continet dialecticam et rhetoricam. Logica sermocinalis genus est ad grammaticam, dialecticam atque rhetoricam: et continet sub se dissertivam. Et haec est logica sermocinalis, quam quartam post theoreticam, practicam et mechanicam annumeramus.” Ed. Buttner, pp. 20.28–21.7.

² Smits 1983, p. 184.

Gildas and dated no earlier than 1127. But its content and opening address to *Fratres et commonachos*, quite rare in Abelard's writing and in general, correspond to the description of an *Exhortatio ad fratres et commonachos* mentioned in the *Soliloquium* and usually considered lost (see the passage from the *Soliloquium* quoted earlier in this section). In my opinion, it is worth it to reconsider the question, and to better investigate whether this *Sermo XXXIII* could not be in fact that "lost" *exhortatio*, or at least derive from it (as has been suggested by, e.g., Cousin).¹

In any case, here Abelard's aim is that of exhorting his fellow monks to be respectful of their prerogatives as monks.² In the context of an admonishment not to accept gifts, and right after praising the morality and frugality of ancient philosophers, Abelard inserts the same identification of *sophia* and Christ as the true *logos* that we have seen in the *Soliloquium*:

Ut autem nunc documenta sanctorum omittam, gentilium saltem philosophorum exempla nostre cupiditatis impudentiam reprimant. Hi quippe sine ulla regule professione adeo mundum contempserunt, ut non solum potentum respuerent dona, uerum etiam possessiones amplissimas abdicarent. Quorum nonnulli tanta frugalitate referuntur contenti, ut uel unum retinere sciphum censerent superfluum cum ad hauriendum aque poculum proprias manus uiderent sufficere. Ex quibus illum Diogenem famosissimum et de contemptu mundi notissimum doctor praedictus Contra Iovinianum in Ilo libro inducens, inter ceteras eius laudes id quoque adiecit: "Quodam uero tempore habens ad potandum caucum ligneum uidit puerum manu concaua bibere, et elisisse illud fertur ad terram dicens: 'Nesciebam quod et natura haberet poculum.' Ad quem <cum in sole sedentem accessisset> etiam potentissimus Alexander multa ei donaria offerens, cum dolio eius tanquam dator importunus adsisteret, hoc unum ab ipso suscepisse dicitur responsum: "Ne obstes mihi, iuuenis, a sole." ...

Quod si de philosophis ad apostolos, immo ad ipsam sophiam Christum, quasi a minimis ad maxima conscendere uelimus, ut eorum uidelicet exemplis et auctoritate amplius instructi dona libentius respuamus, Paulum

¹ Cf. Valente 2011, pp. 47–48. Cousin 1859, pp. 357 and 727.

² About *Sermo XXXIII*, cf. Leclercq 1970; Delaurelle 1965, p. 233. On Abelard's 'monasticism' see also Luscombe 1975.

doctorem Ecclesie maximum ponamus in medium, qui non solum data sed etiam sibi debita recipere non acquieuit; ne, ut ipse ait, uel gloriam suam minueret uel occasionem turpis quaestus exemplo suo aliis relinqueret.¹

To say nothing of the teachings of the saints, let the examples of the pagan philosophers at least restrain the impudence of our greed. For these, without having professed any rule, despised the world so much that they not only refused gifts offered by the mighty, but also renounced too great possessions. Of some of them it is said that they contented themselves with such frugality that they considered even a single glass superfluous when they realised that their own cupped hands were sufficient to drink. Among them was that very famous Diogenes, well-known for his contempt for the world. The aforementioned doctor, introducing him in the second book of *Contra Jovinianum*, among other praises also added this: “once upon a time, having a wooden cup for drinking, he saw a child drinking with his hands. He then threw his cup on the ground and said: ‘I did not know that nature also had a cup.’ It is also said that one other time, <while he was sitting in the sun> and the most powerful Alexander had stood in front of his barrel like an importunate bidder and had offered him many gifts, this received in reply only this phrase: ‘Move, young man, from the sun.’” [...]

If we then wish, as from the lesser to the greater, to ascend from the philosophers to the apostles, nay to the wisdom itself <that is> Christ, so that, instructed more amply by their examples and authority, we may more easily reject gifts, let us have recourse to Paul, the greatest doctor of the church who did not only refuse to accept gifts, but also what was due to him. And this, he said, either so that his glory would not be diminished, or so that he would not provide others with an occasion of foul profit by his example.

Another important part of the exhortation is built around the etymology of the word *monachus* from *mónos*, i.e., *unus* in the sense of *solus*. Monks are those who have promised to live a solitary life:

¹ Abael. *Sermo XXXIII*, ed. L. J. Engels and Ch. Vande Veire pp. 359.404–360.421. About the equivalence wisdom = (true) philosophy = christian/monastic life, and even *philosophia* = *Christus*, cf. Leclercq 1961, pp. 39–79 (in particular p. 54), and Rochais 1951, pp. 244–47.

Ecce enim a solitudine monachi uocamur, id est solitarii. Etsi enim ‘monos’ unus interpretatur, non tamen monachus ita unus personaliter dicitur sicut etiam quilibet de plebe, sed ex solitarie uite conuersatione.¹

For we are called “monks,” that is, solitarians, from solitude. For although *monos* is translated as *unus*, nevertheless the monk is not said to be one personally (like any person of the people), but because he leads a solitary life.

4 Conclusions

In conclusion: it seems to me that Peter Abelard, while clearly recognising, as his logical texts show, the limits of etymological argumentation, nevertheless uses etymology at the very heart of his theology. In particular, he uses etymology as the key argument to explain the convergence of ancient philosophy and Christian revelation.²

Abelard’s extensive use of etymology in his writings is not a sign of an incoherence compared to his declarations about the limits of this kind of argumentation. On the contrary, it seems to me to be the consequence of an incontrovertible fact: the fact that in the domain of theology there is no place for exact definitions and for strong kinds of argumentation. In theology, as Abelard often asserts, words are used in an improper, transferred sense.³ Consequently, more than in any other domain, they need to be interpreted—even if interpretation, and etymology as a kind of interpretation, will never fully explain the signified thing.

¹ Abael. *Sermo XXXIII*, p. 367.624–27.

² Which allows him to speak of monasticism and theology as *christiana philosophia*. He uses this formulation in his *Epistola VII*, ed. Luscombe, p. 282: “in laude christiane phylosophye, hoc est monastice praerogatiue”; *Sermo XXXIII*, p. 350.136–38: “Ab his duobus [i.e. Elias and John the Baptist] tanquam ducibus nostri propositi seu principibus huius philosophie christiane tam in ueteri quam in nouo populo studia sunt exorta.”

³ Cf. Jolivet 1982, pp. 283–84; Rosier-Catach 1999.

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***Genus causa speciei* in the *Glosulae in Priscianum maiorem*:
An allusion to the material essence realism of William of
Champeaux?**

Anne Grondeux*

The topic of this paper is a brief quotation of Boethius that occurred in William of Champeaux's commentary on Book XVI of the *Ars Prisciani*, and has been transmitted by the voluminous *Glosulae in Priscianum maiorem*. I will present the passage in question and its sources (section 1), then Peter Abelard's opinion on the issue (section 2), and finally the commentaries on the same passage by William of Conches and Peter Helias (section 3).

1 The *Glosulae in Priscianum maiorem* ad XVI.3

The *Glosulae in Priscianum maiorem* (hereafter *GPma*) is a grammatical commentary, the greater part of which is attributed to William of Champeaux (†1121). It was elaborated on the basis of earlier notes, the traces of which appear here and there in his commentary (before 1100?–1110). First of all, it is useful to bear in mind the *stemma codicum* of the *GPma*, as established by Grondeux and Rosier-Catach (2011), and refined by Grondeux and Rosier-Catach (2017), while we were producing the critical edition of the *Notae Dunelmenses* (hereafter *ND*), another series of commentaries both by William and by his school in Châlons-en-Champagne. Produced later than the *GPma*, the *ND* often refer to this earlier commentary. The manuscripts containing the *GPma* are listed in

* I would like to thank Aimée Lahaussais and Caterina Tarlazzi for their careful reading and suggestions.

the bibliography, and a stemma containing all known manuscripts is found in Figure 1.




Figure 1. The genealogical relationships between the different manuscripts of *GPma*

The passage I want to deal with is in the commentary on Book XVI of Priscian’s *Ars grammatica*, which is devoted to the conjunction and deals with causal conjunctions in particular:

Effectionis ostenditur causa cum dico “MOVETVR, AMBVLAT ENIM”. Solet turbare quomodo “enim” ista coniunctio hic effectiua dicatur, cum “ambulat”, cui ipsa adiungitur, non effectus sed causa esse uideatur. Sed est uera ratio, Boetio in Hypotheticis eam ipsam attestante, *quatinus omne genus materialis causa est suae speciei*, quod si motus genus est et causa ambulationis, procul dubio ambulatio species est et effectus mouendi.

The cause of the realisation is indicated when I say “he is in motion, for he is walking.” It is generally considered disturbing that the conjunction “for”

here is said to be effective, since “he is walking,” to which it is attached, seems not to be an effect but a cause. But the reason is good, as Boethius attests in his *Hypothetical Syllogisms*: *since every genus is the material cause of its species*, if motion is the genus and cause of walking, then walking is without doubt a species and an effect of motion. (*GPma* ad XVI.3, 95.5; my emphasis)

William of Champeaux’s explanation is based on the connection he makes between two passages, one from Priscian:

Quidam tamen et has et continuatiuas inter species causalium posuerunt, quomodo et adiunctiuas et effectiuas, nec irrationabiliter; et continuationis enim et subcontinuationis et adiunctionis et effectiionis per has causa ostenditur reddi: continuationis, ut “si ambulat, mouetur”; subcontinuationis: “quia ambulat, mouetur”; adiunctionis: “ut moueatur, ambulat”; effectiionis: “mouetur, ambulat enim”. (Priscianus XVI.3 ; Hertz 1859, 94.25)

and the other from Boethius:

Causa enim speciei genus est, at qui dicit: “cum homo sit, animal est”, rectam ac necessariam consequentiam facit; per terminorum uero positionem talis consequentia non procedit. (Boethius 1969, p. 220, 67)

As is well known, Boethius’ *De syllogismis hypotheticis* (*SH*) is one of the treatises that he wrote alongside his work as a translator. The discovery by Suzanne Bobzien (2002, 300) of a Greek parallel suggests that both may have borrowed from the same Greek source. The first use of Boethius’ treatise in the West dates back only to Abbo of Fleury in the tenth century (ca. 975/985, ed. Schupp 1997). The treatise subsequently gave rise to a rich series of commentaries, a list of which is available on the website of Yukio Iwakuma.¹ The manuscripts containing commentaries on the *SH* are listed in the bibliography.

¹ <https://pric.unive.it/projects/logicalia-medievalia/home>

2 Abelard's View

Abelard's *Logica Ingredientibus* testifies to his interest in Boethius' treatise, since he commented on it, or at least intended to do so, but the fifth part of the *Logica Ingredientibus* has been lost. The *Logica Ingredientibus* consists of three complete commentaries on the *Isagoge*, *Categories*, and *De interpretatione*, a partial commentary on *De topicis differentiis*, and originally it seems to have contained also a commentary on *De hypotheticis syllogismis*. Its existence, or at least the project to write it, is attested by allusions made by Abelard himself:

LI Isag. 5, 100: de quibus in *Hypotheticis* disseremus.

LI Top. p. 325: quod in *Hypotheticis* nostris diligentius ostendemus.

Moreover, there is a literal quotation of Boethius' treatise in his *Logica 'Nostrorum petitioni sociorum'*. The *LNPS* is a commentary on the *Isagoge* preserved in ms. Lunel, BM 6, f. 8r–41r, written later than the *LI*. Previously attributed in its entirety to Abelard, it is now attributed only partially to him, but is still considered to reflect his teaching. The section dealing with universals is particularly close to his way of thinking (Tarlazzi 2018, 89; Marenbon 2013, 27–38). It is worth noting that the passage cited here is the only literal quotation of the *SH* ever made by Abelard:

LNPS p. 512, 30: Et in *Hypotheticis* dicitur: "Causa speciei genus est".

Moreover, the context in which the quotation appears is as important as the quotation itself. Indeed, as Caterina Tarlazzi has pointed out, the passage provides the set of arguments used by realist masters in defending their point of view.

De generibus et speciebus quaestiones enodare compellimur, quas <nec> ipse Porphyrius ausus est soluere, cum eas tamen tangendo ad earum inquisitionem accendat lectorem. ... Cum diuersi has diuersas diffinitiones

ad diuersa applicent, *alii uidelicet ad res*, alii uero ad intellectus, alii ad sermones, *tamen unusquisque tuetur se auctoritate iudice*.

Quandoquidem res uniuersales in pluribus locis reperitur quod sint, ut in eo loco, ubi [Boethius] Aristoteles dicit, quoniam haec rerum uniuersalia sunt etc. Et rursus Boethius in *Diuisionibus*: Rerum aliae superiores etc. Et non solummodo hic, sed etiam cum dicimus speciem constare ex genere et differentia, utpote hominem, ipsam rem, ex animalitate et rationalitate, sicut statuam ipsam ex aere et figura. *Et in Hypothesis dicitur: "Causa speciei genus est."* (LNPS 512.7–30, cf. Tarlazzi 2018, 90) (my emphasis)

Abelard therefore identifies the passage he quoted as an argument *ad res* (cf. Tarlazzi 2018, 90 n. 22).

The extract from the *GPma* quoted above must also be seen in the context of one of the commentaries on the *SH*, namely *SH3* in Iwakuma's list, because this commentary elaborates in detail on the relationship between genus and species. According to *SH3*, superior things are the cause of the essence of inferior things (*superiora sunt causa essentiae inferiorum*), and this cause can be characterised precisely as a *material* one. I quote the passage from Yukio Iwakuma's transcription which I checked against all three manuscripts that contain the passage, namely *M* 64v, *O* 87a, and *S* 107:

Non enim idcirco¹ (835C12). Hic probat a duplici toto quod animal non est idcirco² quia est homo³, sic: Quia non idcirco⁴ genus est quia est sua species, id est nullum genus existit gratia suae speciei⁵, ita quod illa species sit causa sui generis. |O87b Causa, dico, ut iam⁶ determinatum est. Ideo dico "ut iam determinatum est"⁷, quia species quodam modo est causa sui generis, scilicet⁸ talis causa quae posita ponat. Sed non est talis causa⁹ de qua iam determinatum est¹⁰, scilicet uel efficiens etc.

Sed fortasse¹¹ (835C13). Continuatio. Non idcirco¹² genus est quia¹³ est species¹⁴. Sed¹⁵ fortasse ducitur principium a genere, id est omne genus est causa suarum specierum. Quod dicit fortasse temperamentum est.

Et magis potest trahi causa essentiae¹⁶ ex uniuersalibus, id est ex¹⁷ superioribus quantum ad sua inferiora quam ex ipsius inferioribus quantum ad sua superiora. Superiora enim¹⁸ sunt causa essentiae inferiorum, sed

ipsa¹⁹ inferiora non sunt causa essentiae superiorum, ut patet in his exemplis, quod²⁰ idcirco sit homo quia est animal, id est animal est causa²¹ ipsius hominis, materialis scilicet²².

1. om. O – 2. iccirco O – 3. est homo tr. O – 4. iccirco O – 5. post speciei] id est add. M – 6. s.l. O – 7. ideo ... est s.l. O – 8. id est M – 9. quae ... causa] om. per hom. O 10. ideo dico ... determinatum est om. per hom. S – 11. post fortasse] ducitur principium a genere add. O – 12. iccirco O – 13. post quia] sua add. O – 14. est species tr. O – 15. om. S – 16. t. c. e.] c. e. t. M – 17. id est ex] et ex M id est O – 18. s. e.] id est s. O om. per hom. S – 19. om. S – 20. quia O – 21. est causa] tr. M – 22. om. OS

The fact that the extract espouses this view of the genus-species relationship is fully consonant with the hypothesis put forward by Iwakuma 2023, who proposed to attribute *SH3* to the school of William of Champeaux. I therefore venture the hypothesis that hearing either *GPma* ad XVI, or *SH3*, or both texts from William of Champeaux, led Abelard to regard *SH I*, III (p. 220, 67) as an argument *ad res*.

3 William of Conches and Peter Helias' Lectures on Priscian's Passage

I will now look at grammatical commentaries after the *GPma*, in order to see how the analyses provided by the *GPma* are received in the later tradition. Only two authors are considered, namely William of Conches and Peter Helias—the *Notae Dunelmenses* (III) do not comment on the passage, as its commentary on Book XVI focuses on sections not covered by the *GPma* (Grondeux and Rosier-Catach 2017, 75).

William of Conches (WC1) f. 81ra: Ad quod dicimus quod, ut meminit Boetius in *Ypoteticis Syllogismis*, omne genus *naturalis* causa est suae speciei, sed motus genus est ambulationis, procul dubio species est et effectus mouendi. (my emphasis)

Peter Helias p. 817.63: Sed quoniam motus genus est ambulationis, genus *autem* causa quedam est suarum specierum, satis rationabiliter ambulatio potest dici effectus quidam mouendi. (my emphasis)

Although it is obvious that both versions rely heavily on the *GPma*, the subtle changes made in the way they introduce the quotation are striking. In particular, it is worth noting that the quote is anonymised by Peter Helias, who writes only *autem*, as if the view expressed in the passage were common knowledge. What is certain is that neither author read Boethius' *SH* directly. Moreover, according to William of Conches, the genus no longer stands as a material cause, but as a natural cause of the species—a fact that is worth investigating.

<i>GPma</i> $\alpha = F$	<i>GPma</i> $\beta = I KMV$	WC1	PH
Boetio attestante in <i>Hypotheticis</i> eam ipsam, quatinus omne genus est causa speciei suae <i>materialis</i>	Boetio in <i>Hypotheticis</i> eam ipsam attestante, quatinus omne genus <i>materialis</i> causa est suae speciei	ut meminit Boetius in <i>Ypoteticis Syllogismis</i> , omne genus <i>naturalis</i> causa est suae speciei	... genus autem causa quedam est suarum specierum

Table 1. *GPma*, WC1 and PH on *causa materialis* vs. *naturalis*

Table 1 shows that the entire manuscript tradition of the *GPma* agrees on the expression *causa materialis*, and that William of Conches' *causa naturalis* does not rely literally on this passage. The comparison suggests that *naturalis* may have been a mere scribal error by William of Conches or a copyist, and that the understanding of the expression *causa materialis* was lost in his time.

Peter Helias' analysis of the passage raises a number of questions. For instance, was he working with William of Conches' *Glosulae* (WC1, earlier version), as Fredborg put forward (Fredborg 1973)? Or with the *GPma*, as Fredborg later suggested (Fredborg 2011, 479: "PH and WC ... must both have been working, independently so, with a copy of the *Glosulae* at their elbow")? Very interestingly, this analysis confirms both of Fredborg's intuitions, as we can see in Table 2. Just like the *GPma*, Peter Helias begins with *solet* and ends with *sufficit intueri*. But in the second cell of the column, the expression *quod contra effectiuarum*

proprietatem est is borrowed from William of Conches. In the third row, the words *Ad hoc ... respicimus* are common to both the *GPma* and William of Conches. The omission due to homoeoteleuton in mss. *KMV* (in the first cell of the *GPma* column) was probably already transmitted by their common ancestor. We thus face two possibilities:

- (1) WC1 has reconstructed an opposition thanks to its answer (*ad hoc ... respondebimus*).
- (2) Far more simply, WC1 was using ms. *C* in Chartres, which provides the full text.

<i>GPma</i>	William of Conches	Petrus Helias
Solet turbare quomodo “enim” ista coniunctio ... effectus mouendi.	Hic quaeritur quomodo ista coniunctio “enim” ... effectus mouendi.	Solet plerosque mouere quomodo ista coniunctio “enim” ... effectus mouendi.
Hoc concessio maior dubitationis cumulus accidit. Nam cum ambulationis species sit mouendi (<i>F I om. per hom. KMV</i>), erit necessaria oratio quae dicit “ambulat, mouetur enim”, cum effectio nullam necessitatem habere debeat.	Sed iterum uidetur “enim” ista coniunctio ibi notare necessitatem, quod est contra naturam effectiuarum, si coniungitur speciei ad quam necessario sequitur genus.	Quod si opponas de ambulatione ad motum necessariam consequentiam esse, quod contra effectiuarum proprietatem est,
Ad hoc autem breuiter respondebimus, quia licet ibi sit necessitas, minime tamen ad ipsam respicimus.		dicemus quod licet ibi sit necessitas minime tamen ad uim effective coniunctionis respiciendum est,
Hoc quoque solum quod per effectum causa probatur sufficit intueri.	Hoc solum sufficit intueri quod per effectum causa probatur.	sed hoc solum, quod per effectum ostenditur causa, quantum ad effective coniunctionis proprietatem, sufficit intueri.

Table 2. A comparison between *GPma*, William of Conches and Petrus Helias

To conclude, while commenting on Priscian's *Ars grammatica*, William of Champeaux made a brief reference to Boethius' *De hypotheticis syllogismis*. This reference shows his deep familiarity with Boethius' treatise, and may refer to his material essence realism. This seems to be confirmed by the attribution of *SH3* to William or his school, as proposed by Iwakuma 2023. The point seems to have been noticed by Abelard, who listed the passage among the arguments *ad res*, but it was quickly lost from view by later commentators of the *Ars Prisciani*.

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GPma

B Bruxelles, Bibl. royale 3921, f. 12r–20v (last lemma: II 22)

C Chartres, Bibl. mun. 209 (248) [†], f. 1–86v

F Paris, BnF, n.a.l. 1623, f. 1–56

K Köln, Dombibl. B. 201, f. 1ra–74rb

M Metz, Bibl. mun. 1224, f. 1ra–110rb

V Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 1486, f. 1ra–90vb

*I*₀ Incunable without Priscian's text, ed. by Guillaume Le Roy (?), Lyon/Venise (?), 1479–80

I Incunable (*I*₁) with Priscian's text, ed. Georgius Arrivabenus, Venise 1488

WC1

Guillaume de Conches, *Glosulae in Priscianum*, ms. Firenze, Bibl. Laur. San Marco 310.

SH

SH1 Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz, lat. fol. 624, f. 76rb–80vb

SH2 München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14779, f. 67v–86v

SH2a München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14779, f. 86v

SH2b München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14779, f. 86v

- SH3 München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14458, f. 59r–82r (*M*); Orléans, Bibliothèque Municipale, 266 p. 78b–118a (*O*); Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, 134 p. 96bis–133 (*S*); München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14779, f. 66r–67r
- SH3a Orléans, Bibliothèque Municipale, 266 p. 118–119
- SH4 Orléans, Bibliothèque Municipale, 266 p. 264–276
- SH5 Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, 910, f. 142v–143r
- SH6 Pommersfelden, Gräflich Schönbornschen Bibliothek, 16/2764, f. 2r–v + 4r–v
- SH7 Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, 833 p. 26–30
- SH8 München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14779, f. 39r–41v
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Where Does Material Essence Realism Come From? A Speculative Note on Anne Grondeux's Paper

Laurent Cesalli

The occasion of Anne Grondeux's solid and parsimonious paper in the present volume is the occurrence of the phrase *omne genus materialis causa est suae speciei* ("every genus is the material cause of its species") in the *Glosulae in Priscianum Maiorem* (ad XVI.3) linked to William of Champeaux. The phrase immediately calls to mind the theory of material essence realism (MER), so called after an influential formula proposed by Martin Tweedale (1976). Tweedale's suggestion is based on a passage in Abelard's *Glosses on Porphyry*, where some realists with respect to universals are said to conceive of a universal as a thing (*res universalis*), described as the material essence (also called substance) present in each member of a species. This material essence is said to be one in itself, although diversified in individuals by subsequent forms (Abelard 1919, p. 10; see Tarlazzi 2018, p. 110, n. 6).

Tracing back Champeaux's phrase to its explicit source—namely Boethius' *De hypotheticis syllogismis* (I, iii)—and taking into account the only explicit quotation of the same treatise found in Abelard (Abelard 1933, p. 512) as well as its doctrinal context—namely the exposition of the position of those who acknowledge the existence of universal things—Grondeux concludes that Abelard probably made the connection between Champeaux's quotation of Boethius in the *Glosulae* and Champeaux's realism of universals. A conclusion that is at the same time highly plausible and characteristically careful. This short comment is an attempt to push that line one step further in order to see whether what Champeaux read in Boethius might have contributed to shape his conception of universals, and hence, MER. In that sense, what is aimed at in the following is a

speculative answer to the question “where does MER come from?” or, rather, “where might MER have come from?”

William of Champeaux’s occasion for claiming that every genus is the material cause of its species is an intriguing example given by Priscian in his discussion of conjunctions in book XVI of the *Institutiones*. A conjunction is a part of discourse that joins other parts of discourse together; furthermore, a conjunction shows or expresses (*demonstrat*) either a power (*vis*)—when it signifies that some things exist at the same time, as in *et pius et fortis fuit Aeneas* (“Aeneas was at the same time brave and pious”)—or a certain order (*ordinatio*)—when it shows or expresses a certain consequence of things (*consequentia rerum*), as in *si ambulat, movetur* (“if she walks, she moves”). Thus, conjunctions express relationships among things and, as it seems, those relationships can be either something like contingent coexistence (it happens that Aeneas is both brave and pious) or something like necessary entailment (things in the world are such that one cannot walk without moving). As Priscian observes, many of those relationships are causal. Thus, for example, the conjunction *enim* may express a cause of realisation (*causa effictionis*) as in *movetur, ambulat enim* (“she moves, for she is walking”) (XVI.3).

William of Champeaux notes the (possibly) perturbing character of the example. He recalls that *enim* is called an “effective” conjunction (*effectiva*), meaning that what it is attached to is an effect and not a cause. But in the case at stake, walking seems to be a cause rather than an effect: one could indeed think that it is because one is walking that one is moving, so that the walking would cause the moving. However, this is not so, William explains, drawing on Boethius’ authority: since, as Boethius says, a genus is the cause of its species (*causa enim speciei genus est; De syllogismis hypotheticis*, I, iii), and since walking is a species of the genus moving, “walking” does indeed express an effect and not a cause.

But still, one might want to object—*pace* Boethius and Champeaux—that it nonetheless makes good sense to say that walking is a cause of moving. It seems, then, that the (possibly) perturbing character of the example *movetur, ambulat enim* is due to the encounter of two types of causality. Walking causes moving in the sense that walking is a sufficient

condition for moving: if one walks, one necessarily moves. But moving causes walking in the sense that moving is a constituent of walking: walking is a kind of moving.

Now, since i) Priscian takes moving to be a cause and walking an effect—and Champeaux agrees—and ii) Champeaux justifies that claim with Boethius' thesis that a genus is the cause of its species, and finally iii) the type of causality Priscian seems to have in mind is one that holds between a constituent (i.e. the cause) and what it constitutes (i.e. the effect), Champeaux might have found in Priscian, or, for that matter, in his own interpretation of Priscian, the idea that a genus is a constituent of a species. Furthermore, since, according to Priscian, conjunctions express relationships among things, Champeaux might have found in Priscian, or again, in his own interpretation of Priscian, the idea that a genus is a *real* constituent (i.e. a constituting *res*) of the species. Provided that is correct, it shows that grammatical matters were possibly more than a mere occasion for Champeaux to develop his own metaphysics, for one can read Priscian—by himself, but even more in conjunction with Boethius—as reasoning on the background of a metaphysics that is akin to the one that will be associated with Champeaux, and in particular, with his MER.

But where does the word *materialis* in William's formula *omne genus materialis causa est suae speciei* come from? The term does not appear in Priscian, nor in Boethius in the relevant passages. An obvious and highly plausible source here is Porphyry's *Isagoge*. In the chapter on difference (III.10), one reads that since things in the world are composed of matter and form, or rather, are constituted in a way that resembles hylomorphic constitution (*rebus ... ad similitudinem materiae specieiue constitutionem habentibus...*), just as a statue has bronze as its matter and a certain shape or figure as its form, so the common human being (*homo communis*), i.e. the species, is constituted by a matter-like genus and a form-like difference.

In that chapter, and contrary to what Boethius will do later, Porphyry does not say anything about a causal relation holding between a genus and its species. However, the fact that he illustrates the cases of the constitution of things and species with the statue example suggests that Aristotle's

Physics was in the back of Porphyry's mind when he wrote that section of the *Isagoge*. We know that Porphyry wrote a (lost) commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (Romano 1985). In *Physics* II, 3, 194b24–26, Aristotle introduces a first sense in which something is a cause, namely in the sense of “that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists,” as, for example, “the bronze of the statue.” Now if that passage in Aristotle did in fact motivate Porphyry to give the statue example in the *Isagoge*, one can speculate that what Porphyry had in mind was the idea of a genus being something akin to a material cause with respect to a species.

Thus, combining the elements found in Priscian, Boethius, Porphyry, and Aristotle, one can elaborate the following genetic scenario for William's MER: in Priscian, William found the idea that a constituent is the cause of what it constitutes (moving is the cause of walking, in that sense); in Boethius, William found the idea that a genus is the cause of its species; and in Porphyry (writing possibly under Aristotle's influence), William found the idea that the genus is a material constituent of the species. As the title of this short comment suggests, and as shown by the argument developed above, such a genetic scenario is highly speculative. It is not meant to prove anything—how could it?—but merely to follow a possibly fruitful line of thought directly inspired by Anne Grondeux's excellent paper.

Let me finish with a short remark on methodology. There is an ongoing discussion among historians of philosophy as to where one can legitimately look for relevant theoretical elements with respect to a given doctrinal question. The case of universals is paradigmatic in that respect. Firmly grounded in the prologue of the *Isagoge*, the pivotal doctrinal question in the case of universals is this: what are genera and species? But does that mean that relevant doctrinal elements to reconstruct and assess a given account of universals can only be legitimately taken from passages—typically *Isagoge* commentaries—explicitly raising that precise issue? To be sure, such passages will provide a highly relevant source, and they are the ones one should have a look at in the first place. However, as Anne Grondeux's paper demonstrates—and my speculative comment intends to show—it can also be fruitful to look for relevant

doctrinal elements in (relatively) exotic contexts, such as grammatical discussions, as in the present case, and the same argument can be made for quite a number of other doctrinal fields (theology, physics, law, biology, etc.) The lesson, I take it, is this: just as it is necessary to begin by looking at the direct exposition or development of a given theory, it would be a pity to discard in advance exotic contexts displaying promising signs.

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**Sankt Gallen ms. 134 and the Unpublished Additions
to Pseudo-Rabanus super Porphyrium (P3):
An Edition of the Text with a Study**

Pietro Podolak*

1 Introduction

Twelfth-century logical commentaries constitute a broad corpus of mainly unpublished texts. Their dissemination exhibits five important characteristics: 1. They tend to circulate in twelfth-century manuscripts only; 2. These manuscripts are often poor and not decorated; 3. The

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I would like to express my deep gratitude towards all those who made this research possible, first of all the principal investigator of the project, Caterina Tarlazzi, but also my colleagues within the project, Charles Girard, who proposed some very interesting corrections to the text of the manuscript, and Sofia Orsino, who in several cases improved my reading of the manuscript. I am also deeply indebted to Yukio Iwakuma for sharing his unpublished research and transcriptions with me. The present article is the product of true teamwork, or in other words, it is a polyphonic study from both philological and philosophical points of view of a twelfth-century commentary on the *Isagoge*.

This piece of research is complemented by the dataset: P. Podolak, “Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, MS 134, pp. 77-96a. Annotated Images for A Critical Edition of the Unpublished Sections of the Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* known as P3” (link: <https://datarepository.unive.it/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.71731/DATA/UW0ZYH>; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.71731/DATA/UW0ZYH>). The dataset contains open-access reproductions of all relevant pages in the manuscript, with annotations highlighting the sections peculiar to the Sankt Gallen manuscript, edited in this article.

manuscripts preserving the commentaries are few; 4. The texts are usually anonymous; 5. They are in most cases preserved in a single manuscript.¹

Taking into consideration the conditions under which these texts were preserved, it is no wonder that the study of such works poses more difficulties than in the case of other medieval texts. The text we are currently focusing on, that is to say the *Isagoge* commentary conventionally named P3, is particularly challenging. It benefits, indeed, from a pioneering edition by Iwakuma.² The transcription and publication of this and other texts opened the way for further studies, such as, for instance, the articles by Brumberg-Chaumont focusing on some doctrinal aspects of the work,³ and gave rise to different proposals concerning both chronology and attribution of the text. It is well known, for example, that Iwakuma first dated the text to the years 1060/1070.⁴ Later, he dated the work to the late 1090s and attributed it to William of Champeaux.⁵

The study of twelfth-century logical commentaries is further complicated by the fact that, when preserved by more than one manuscript, these different versions are often significantly different.

Textual criticism of classical texts often speculates about author's variant readings, and faces several difficulties in identifying traces of later

¹ For these elements see Marenbon and Tarlazzi 2018, p. 221.

² For this and other commentaries to Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's works we use the alphanumeric tags introduced by Marenbon 2000 and Marenbon 2018 (in the specific case of the *Isagoge*). For the edition of the text see Iwakuma 2008.

³ Brumberg-Chaumont 2008 and 2011; for a complete bibliography updated to 2018 see Marenbon 2018, pp. 173–175.

⁴ See Iwakuma 1992, p. 42, followed by Marenbon 1993, p. 102; Marenbon 1997a, p. 31. See also Marenbon 2004, p. 33: “this version of P3 [that is to say, the version of **O**] almost certainly predates William's encountering *in voce* exegesis, and therefore Abelard's arrival in Paris in 1100: the later version of P3 discusses *in voce* exegesis explicitly and raises objections to it, whereas there is no mention of it here”; Marenbon 1997b, p. 125: “dating perhaps from even before 1100”.

⁵ See Iwakuma 2008, pp. 52–53; Marenbon 2018, p. 173 dates it to “probably before 1090”. For an intellectual profile of William and the complicated issues concerning the attribution of the texts and opinions see Tarlazzi 2018, pp. 291–325; the most important contribution on William of Champeaux has been published by Grondeux and Rosier-Catach (*Notae Dunelmenses* 2017).

changes to the texts by their authors. The case of medieval texts is quite different. Since the extant manuscripts are written a relatively short time after the original, we have ample information about the history of the text.

La proportion de manuscrits conservés augmentant, l'écart chronologique diminue entre la rédaction première des œuvres et les premiers témoins qui nous en sont parvenus, ce qui permet de poser dans de meilleures conditions la question des recensions multiples.¹

Twelfth-century logical commentaries can be considered a clear example of texts with multiple drafts. As already highlighted by secondary literature, when preserved by more than one copy, “their text tend to vary greatly from one manuscript to the other”,² to such a large amount that we can speak about the *fluidity* of logical commentaries.³ As Poirel writes: “La multiplicité des recensions est au fond la situation la plus normale au Moyen Âge.”⁴

Starting with classical ancient texts, textual critics often considered how to distinguish author's variants from readings that originated during the manuscript tradition. Summarising, we can say that we are facing author's variant readings when, during the collation of different manuscripts or printed editions, we can identify not only mechanical errors or copy mistakes, but also substantial differences that can only be explained as an intentional choice.⁵

The amount of intentional variants in the different manuscripts preserving the text makes the *Isagoge* commentary labelled as P3 a

¹ Poirel 2003, p. 507.

² Marenbon and Tarlazzi 2018, p. 221.

³ Marenbon and Tarlazzi 2018, p. 222: “the fluidity of logical commentaries has been observed at different levels”; for interesting suggestions about how to treat texts in different versions see also Poirel 2003; Poirel 2011.

⁴ Poirel 2011, p. 257.

⁵ Poirel 2011, p. 258: “La question d'une multiplicité de recensions survient lorsqu'en collationnant divers témoins d'une même oeuvre, on remarque, outre les inévitables erreurs de copie, un nombre suffisant d'écarts substantiels qui ne peuvent s'expliquer que par un acte littéraire, conscient et délibéré.”

particular case for which “the very notion of the same text becomes problematic”, not to mention that more than one author/authorial voice may well be involved.¹ The pioneering edition prepared by Iwakuma offers an example of a complicated textual transmission of this logical commentary. The critical text is based on three manuscripts that contain the whole commentary:²

A = Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento, Fondo Antico Comunale 573, ff. 4r–15v.

O = Oxford, BL, Laud. Lat. 67, ff. 9v–14v.

P = Paris, BnF, Lat. 13368, ff. 215–223.

And a fourth one, whose text is composed completely of extracts from P3 and P16 (= München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14458):

D = Dublin, Trinity College, ms. 494.³

The printed layout of the critical edition gives an idea of the complicated manuscript tradition. Some parts of the text, printed in smaller typeface, are preserved by a single manuscript; in other parts, where two manuscripts agree against a third (in the most cases, **OA** against **P**), the text is split into two columns, so that the reader can quickly recognise the agreement and divergences of textual witnesses.

The different drafts of the text have been studied by Iwakuma, who summarised the “genetic” relationships of the three versions of the text in the following way:⁴

O substantially preserves the original version of P3.

A preserves a revised version of the original, augmented by additions.

¹ Marenbon and Tarlazzi 2018, pp. 222–223.

² For a description and bibliography of these manuscripts see Iwakuma 2008, pp. 44–48; Sofia Orsino is currently working on detailed codicological descriptions of all these manuscripts.

³ See Iwakuma 2008, p. 48.

⁴ Iwakuma 2008, pp. 48–49.

P preserves another version made independently from the **A** version, providing both additions to and revisions of the original version.

When Iwakuma's edition was already in press, however, a fifth manuscript emerged:¹ Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, 134, ff. 77ra–96a (= **S** in the following pages). The present article, based on a complete collation of **S**, does not aim to propose new hypotheses concerning the chronology or attribution of the work, but **a.** to investigate the relationships between the different versions of the text preserved in the four main manuscripts, **O**, **A**, **P** and **S**, and **b.** to make accessible the first edition, with translation and commentary, of the unpublished sections preserved by **S**. By doing so, I hope to shed some new light on the genesis of an important witness of twelfth-century logical commentaries.

2 Manuscript S

Before taking into account the textual features of the manuscript tradition of P3, it can be worthwhile to provide an analytical description of the neglected manuscript **S**. Since complete and exhaustive descriptions of the manuscripts preserving logical commentaries from the twelfth century are being prepared by my colleague Sofia Orsino, in what follows I will limit myself to providing a brief description of manuscript Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek 134 on the basis of the digital images available online.

The *codex* is made up of 135 *folia* of parchment, but they are numbered as 264 pages (because of a mistake, the page after 96 is not numbered, so I will indicate it as p. 96a; the numbers 200–204 are repeated after p. 204). It is a small-size (20,5 × 15 cm) composite manuscript; the units may have been bounded together in the fifteenth century; the binding

¹ At the end of the preface, Iwakuma pointed out: “I discovered a new manuscript while this article was already in press. I shall present and discuss this discovery in the next issue of the *Archives*” (Iwakuma 2008, p. 59), but, unfortunately, this supplement was never published. The exact shelf mark of this witness appears in secondary literature from 2018 onwards. The new witness is quoted with the exact shelf mark by secondary literature from 2018 onwards: See also Marenbon 2018, p. 174; Marenbon and Tarlazzi 2018, p. 223; Tarlazzi 2018, p. 295 n. 19.

is made up of wooden plates and a leather cover. The first and the third section could have been written in the abbey itself,¹ but in my opinion it seems unlikely that the second unit was written there.

The first codicological unit (pp. 1–76) dates back to the ninth or tenth century.² After two introductory texts to Prudentius (pp. 2–3, see Gennadius in PL 58, 1068 a–b) the unit contains Prudentius, *Cathemerinon*, hymns 1–10 (pp. 3–55) and *Peristephanon*, hymns 1, 5, and 2 (pp. 56–76; ed. M.P. Cunningham, CC SL 126). It contains a large amount of annotations in Latin and Old German.

The second codicological unit (pp. 77–147), dating back to the middle of the twelfth century,³ contains logical texts, that is to say P3 (pp. 76a–96a), SH3 (pp. 96bis a–133b, the explicit is *mutilum*) and D1 (pp. 134a–147b, acephalous).

The third codicological unit (pp. 148–264), dating back to the tenth or eleventh century,⁴ contains Boethius' *Opuscula sacra: De Trinitate* (pp. 148–175); *Utrum Pater et Filius* (pp. 175–180); *De hebdomadibus* (pp. 180–191); *De fide catholica* (without *inscriptio*, pp. 191–206); *Contra Nestorium et Eutychen* (pp. 206–264) [= pp. 165–241 Moreschini].

BIBLIOGRAPHY: G. Scherrer, *Verzeichniss der Handschriften der Stiftsbibliothek von St. Gallen*, Halle 1875, pp. 49–50; Aurelii Prudentii Clementis *Carmina*, ed. M.P. Cunningham, CC SL 126, Brepols, Turnhout 1966, p. XVIII; L. Smith (ed.), with the assistance of Th. Christchev – R. Gameson – A. Holdenried – F. Robb – T. Webber – J. Ziegler, *Codices Boethiani. A Conspectus of Manuscripts of the Works of Boethius*, vol. 2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, “Warburg Institute. Surveys and Texts 27”, Warburg Institute - N. Aragno, London-Torino 2001, p. 198 (with further bibliographical references); R. Bergmann – S. Stricker, unter Mitarbeit von Y. Goldammer – C. Wich-Reif, *Katalog der althochdeutschen und altsächsischen Glossenhandschriften*, W. de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2005, vol. 1, pp. 480–

¹ Smith et al. 2001, p. 198; Bergmann et al. 2005, p. 480.

² Bergmann et al. 2005, p. 480, but the tenth century according to Scherrer 1875, p. 49.

³ Smith et al. 2001, p. 198.

⁴ Bergmann et al. 2005, p. 480; it is dated to the eleventh century by Scherrer 1875, p. 49.

482 (with further bibliographical references). A reproduction of the ms. is available online: <https://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/it/list/one/csg/0134>.

3 Relationships between the manuscripts and different versions

At the very beginning I want to start with a simple philological consideration. First of all, we have to distinguish between the version of the text represented by a manuscript and the text which is concretely contained in this manuscript. For example, as correctly stated by Iwakuma, the version represented by **O** is the origin of the later revisions. However, there are several examples of copy mistakes in the text of **O**, so that it cannot be considered as the direct model used by the scribes for preparing the other versions of the text. In the following lines I collect the most relevant cases of gaps affecting the text of **O** only; mechanical errors like *sauts du même au même* are marked with an asterisk; in these cases it is certain that the variant cannot be an intentional choice (see §1).

[1.] **Copying errors of O:** p. 80, 9–11 *intelligi et – tantum intelligi*] *om.* O* || p. 86, 14 *supremo*] *om.* O || p. 89, 4–5 *propter – principium*] *om.* O* || pp. 91, 28 – 92, 4 *pater – quemadmodum*] *om.* O* || p. 93, 12–13 *in quale – praedicatur*] *om.* O* || p. 97, 2–3 *ita scilicet – cum disiunctione*] *om.* O* || p. 97, 20–22 *versatur – fundamentum*] *om.* O* || p. 99, 14–15 *ut – praedicatur*] *om.* O* || p. 99, 18–23 *sciendum est – de pluribus*] *om.* O || p. 112, 13–19 *id est – praedicamento*] *om.* O* || p. 118, 24–25 *fundantur – fundantur*] *om.* O* || pp. 119, 35 – 120, 2 *non – priorum*] *om.* O* || p. 122, 11–12 *ipsa – relationem*] *om.* O* || p. 150, 22–23 *secundum accidens – quae sunt*] *om.* O* || p. 161, 7 *sed illa – specifica differentia*] *om.* O* || p. 161, 21–22 *secundum quam – exposita est*] *om.* O* || pp. 165, 25 – 166, 2 *quia de – est risibile*] *om.* O* || pp. 169, 18 – 170, 1 *contingit id – illud quod*] *om.* O* || p. 170, 18–20 *speciem vero – de individuus*] *om.* O* || p. 174, 15–17 *nam cum – genera praedicantur*] *om.* O || p. 187, 16–17 *eas enumerare – enumerare noluit*] *om.* O*.

The ‘original’ of a work, of course, is quite complicated to identify. In particular, the presence of copying mistakes cannot be considered as a conclusive argument for excluding something from being an original, as

conveniently underlined by several contributions.¹ In this case, however, both the amount and quality of the errors we find in **O** can dissuade us from considering it as an original. Hence, in what follows we have to distinguish carefully the version of the commentary preserved by **O** (version **O**) and the text we read in **O**, which is affected by omissions and other copy mistakes.

To the current state of knowledge, the model from which **O** was copied can be considered lost. In what follows I will indicate this model, as usual for lost manuscripts, with a Greek letter, α .


Moreover, in all the extant manuscripts a large amount of mechanical errors occurs. That seems to suggest that neither **A** nor **P** can be considered as an original, but are copies of an original. The lists of copy mistakes found in the manuscripts show that none of the preserved manuscripts is a copy of another existing witness, so we are not in the presence of *codices descripti*. See the following examples (in this case too, *sauts du même au même* are marked with an asterisk):

[2.] **Copying errors of A:** pp. 66, 33 – 67, 1 vocis esse – vero divisionem] *om.* A* || p. 84, 3 quod ita – ipsum naturae] *om.* A* || p. 86, 23–24 determinatae secundum – hoc est] *om.* A* || pp. 87, 25 – 88, 2 item Hercules – est genus] *om.* A* || p. 89, 2–3 sub una – et ideo] *om.* A || p. 91, 7–8 dictum ad – dicit fortasse] *om.* A* || p. 96, 21–22 illa vel – quod definitio] *om.* A* || p. 98, 24–25 ad interrogationem – genus respondetur] *om.* A* || pp. 100, 24 – 101, 1 dicit enim – aliquo praedicari] *om.* A* || p. 102, 24–25 ut si – specie differunt] *om.* A || p. 103, 24 numerando ita – differunt in] *om.* A* || p. 104, 10–12 quod species – differentibus numero] *om.* A || p. 104, 29 de eis – et accidentia] *om.* A* || p. 119, 22–23 illi vero – esse accidentia] *om.* A* || p. 133, 9–11 dicitur enim – eorum individuus] *om.* A* || p. 164, 6–7 quattuor modis – et cetera] *om.* A || p. 178, 27–30 cum genere – genus commune] *om.* A* || pp. 189, 31 – 190, 1 sic quia – non praedicatur] *om.* A*.

¹ See Reeve 2011, pp. 3–23, with an interesting list of examples of author's errors collected under different labels and further bibliography on this issue.

[3.] **Copying errors of P:** p. 77, 10–11 quandoquidem neque – possit inquiritur] *om.* P || p. 87, 19–20 hoc est – gemitus est] *om.* P* || pp. 93, 17 – 94, 3 item dicendum – in quid] *om.* P || p. 102, 23–24 quaecumque igitur – esse specie] *om.* P || p. 108, 3–6 sicut autem – prolixitate confunderet] *om.* P || p. 109, 22–23 esse speciem – genere est] *om.* P* || p. 111, 8–9 id est – de pluribus] *om.* P* || p. 111, 15–17 substantialibus ut – specialissima species] *om.* P || p. 116, 18–24 dicetur ergo – rationalis dicatur] *om.* P || p. 125, 10–11 quod autem – omnibus convenit] *om.* P || p. 127, 13–19 vel aliter – et incorporeitate] *om.* P || p. 128, 6–14 vel per – descendentibus etc] *om.* P || p. 139, 26–27 differentia faciente – differentia id est] *om.* P* || p. 145, 9–18 si realem – magis proprias] *om.* P* || p. 153, 2–3 neque enim – genere potest] *om.* P* || p. 176, 17–21 remaneat quidam – ipsum genus] *om.* P* || p. 177, 1–2 cum eis – remanere potest] *om.* P* || p. 188, 16 due igitur – a partibus] *om.* P.

The analysis we have done so far to a large extent confirms the results of previous literature. Indeed, on the basis of the material he had access to, Iwakuma gave the following stemma for the different versions:¹



The reconstruction of the genealogical relationships between the four versions of the text, however, must be integrated with the information that can be obtained from the examination of **S**.

Keeping aside for a moment proper errors affecting the text of **S**, I will now analyse intentional variant readings of the version preserved in **S** and its relationships with other versions. The list of the variant readings shows that the manuscript often agrees with the versions preserved in **O** and **A**. As if there were some need, that confirms Iwakuma's thesis: the version preserved in **P** shows several innovations in relation to both the **O** and the **A** version.

¹ Iwakuma 2008, p. 49.

[4.] **Innovations of P:** pp. 65, 6 – 66, 34: S = OA; P has a much shorter text || pp. 70, 14 – 73, 32: S = OA; P has a much longer text || pp. 82, 26 – 83, 5: *om.* S = OA; P adds a section || pp. 85, 15 – 86, 8: S = OA; P has a much longer text || pp. 87, 21 – 88, 8: S = OA; P has a longer text || p. 90, 10–13, 20–25: S = OA || pp. 91, 11–15: S = OA; P has a longer text || p. 92, 1–2, 6–8: S = OA; P has a longer text || p. 95, 13–19: *om.* S = OA; P adds a section || p. 101, 25–29: *om.* S = OA; P adds a section || p. 105, 1–10: S = OA; P has a longer text || pp. 112, 23 – 116, 12: S = OA; P has a different text || pp. 117, 13 – 120, 11: S = OA; P has a different text || p. 121, 12–16: S = OA; P has a longer text || p. 122, 1–7: S = OA; P has a longer text || pp. 123, 22 – 124, 5: S = OA; P has a shorter text || pp. 128, 15 – 129, 11: S = OA; P has a shorter text || p. 129, 15–19: S = OA; P has a longer text || p. 130, 12–23: S = OA; P has a different text || p. 131, 11–14: S = OA; P has a longer text || p. 132, 20–25: S = OA; P has a longer text.

As seen before, however, **S** is not affected by the errors of **A** (see [2.]), so it cannot be considered a copy of **A**. The examination of the variants and errors of **S** lead us to postulate a lost common model, which originated from **α**; we will call this lost model **α'**.

The information that can be obtained from **S** can also confirm some of Iwakuma's hypotheses concerning the relationships among the various versions. The section printed at p. 82, 5–10, omitted by **O** and **P**, is not preserved by **S**, so that we can be reasonably sure that this bit of text is an original addition of the version preserved by **A**.

Iwakuma correctly points out that “it never happens that the **O** version gives different texts where the **A** and **P** agree with each other, except in only one case where **O** gives an abbreviation of the **AP** version.”¹ This is that one case:

[5.] The one exception: 122, 19–26: **A** and **P** exhibit a longer version of the text.

In this passage, **S** agrees with the versions preserved in **A** and **P**. The explanation for this can be very simple if we keep in mind that **O** is not an

¹ Iwakuma 2008, p. 48.


original, but a copy of **α**: we just have to admit that the copyist of **O** abbreviated the text of his model, so he introduced one of the few innovations that characterise the very conservative text of this manuscript. Iwakuma's statement is true if we only consider intentional variants exhibited by **A**, **O** and **P**. If we take into account minor variants, like for instance one-word omissions, differences in word order, and other minor textual phenomena (in such cases it can be difficult to decide whether we are dealing with intentional variants or copy mistakes) we have to note that there are several cases where **A** and **P** (and **S**) agree against **O**:

[6.] **Agreement APS vs. O**: p. 60, 3 utilis est APS] valet O || p. 60, 7 agere dicitur APS] dicitur agere O || p. 61, 10 idem APS] *om.* O || p. 61, 13 tantum APS] *om.* O || p. 61, 15 species sunt APS] sunt species O || p. 61, 21–22 generis descriptionem APS] descriptionem generis O || p. 63, 2 quae de APS] quod O || p. 63, 14 etiam APS] enim O || p. 63, 19 impossibile APS] possibile O || p. 64, 1 iudicatur APS] iudicabitur O || p. 69, 5 scientiae iudicandi] iudicandi scientiae O || p. 69, 8 solvendas quaestiones APS] solvendam quaestionem O || p. 74, 10 subsistant APS] subsistunt O || p. 77, 1 eorum intellectus APS] intellectus eorum O || p. 79, 5 rationis meae APS] meae rationis O || p. 80, 21 earum APS] eorum O || p. 81, 5 singularis APS] singularum O || p. 83, 9 tibi monstrare APS] monstrare tibi O || p. 89, 15 iudicat APS] indicat O || p. 94, 19 alias praedicationes APS] aliam praedicationem O || p. 96, 2 illa definitio APS] definitio illa O || p. 98, 3 cui definitio illa dicitur APS] definitio cui dicitur illa O || p. 109, 1 supponuntur APS] supponitur O || p. 112, 3 solum est species APS] solum species est O || p. 122, 17–18 species inferiorum O] inferiorum species APS || p. 134, 1 talibus APS] duabus O || p. 134, 16 scilicet speciem APS] speciem scilicet O || p. 147, 17 distantiam differentiarum APS] differentiarum substantiam O || p. 150, 9 divisivae differentiae APS] differentiae divisivae O || p. 152, 23 non sunt differentiae APS] differentiae non sunt O || p. 160, 15 species eiusdem generis APS] eiusdem generis species O || p. 160, 15 differre faciunt APS] faciunt differre O || p. 161, 5 definitionem esse propositam APS] esse praepositam definitionem O || p. 161, 15 sunt sub eodem APS] sub eodem sunt O || p. 161, 23 exponitur littera APS] exponunt litteram O || p. 165, 10 homini et soli APS] et soli homini O || p. 165, 22 est homo APS] homo est O || p. 165, 22 de quodam inanimato praedicatur APS] praedicatur de quodam inanimato O || p. 169, 1 dividitur APS] dividunt O || p. 169, 7 actum APS] acceptum O || p. 178, 4 ideo determinatur APS]

determinant ideo O || p. 178, 7 differentias APS] species O || p. 181, 9 differentiam APS] distantiam O || p. 181, 11 erit APS] erant O || p. 187, 4 efficiunt APS] faciunt O || p. 187, 5 quattuor sunt APS] sunt quattuor O.

Although we are not dealing with proper errors but (often equivalent) variant readings, the amount of passages where **A**, **P** and **S** agree against **O** suggests that **APS** originated from their common model α' . This way, cases where **APS** agree against **O** can be explained as innovations of either **O** or the common ancestor α' .

We can therefore draw the following stemma integrating the position of **S**:



Such a genealogical model is not contradicted by the facts.

We have already taken into account the passages ([4.]) where **S** agrees with **OA**; such cases can be easily explained as innovations by **P**, which contains the most innovative version. We have also already examined ([5.]) a single passage where **S** agrees with **AP** (this case can be explained as an innovation by **O**).

Within the commentary there are also some (few) cases of agreement between **S** and **A**. See the following passages:

[7.] **Agreement AS**: p. 101, 6–18: **S** exhibits a long section of text which is preserved by **A** only || p. 112, 17–18 quidam vero – alterum vocale] **S** exhibits two lines of text that are preserved by **A** and **D** only || p. 138, 11–15: the version of **S** shows some differences, but it exhibits a very similar version to a bit of text preserved by **A** only.

These features shared by **A** and **S** admit a simple solution if we consider them as innovations by α' that **P** (a very innovative version, as seen before) has elaborated upon. Two cases of agreement of **S** with **P**

could be *prima facie* more problematic, but they can also be clarified with the genealogic model we have proposed.

[8.] **Agreement PS vs. OA (?)**: The text of **S** shows two apparent similarities with the text of **P**.

[8.1.] pp. 74, 20 – 75, 2: the text of **S** seems to agree with **P**. This apparent similarity, however, stands in need of a more thorough investigation. (In what follows the text of different manuscripts is reproduced word for word, even with the most evident errors.)

P: Tres quippe incorporeorum formae sunt, ut alia praeter corpora esse possint et separata a corporibus in sua incorporalitate perdurent, ut Deus et angeli; alia in corporibus et etiam extra corpora, ut mens et anima; alia vero quae cum sint incorporea esse tamen non possunt praeter corpora.

S: Tres quippe incorporeorum formae sunt, ut alia praeter corpora esse possint et separata a corporibus in sua corporalitate perducet, ut Deus et angeli; alia in corporea quo cum corpore et extra corpora esse possunt, ut mens anima; animalia vero quae cum sint incorporea tamen in corporibus ita sita sunt quod ab illis divelli nequeunt.

The text of **O**, on the other hand, is quite different and deeply indebted to Boethius' second commentary to the *Isagoge*:

*In Isag.*², pp. 160, 23 – 161, 7: Duae quippe incorporeorum formae sunt: ut alia praeter corpora esse possint et separata a corporibus in sua incorporeitate perdurent (ut Deus, mens, anima); alia vero cum sint incorporea, tamen praeter corpora esse non possint (ut linea vel superficies vel numerus vel singulae qualitates), quas tametsi incorporeas esse pronuntiamus quod tribus spatiis minime distendantur, tamen ita in corporibus sunt ut ab his divelli nequeant aut separari aut si a corporibus separata sint, nullo modo permaneant.

O: Duae quippe incorporeorum formae sunt, ut alia praeter corporea esse possunt et separata a corporibus in sua incorporeitate perdurant, ut dicitur anima, alia vero quae, cum sint incorporea, esse tamen non possunt praeter corporea, ut linea superficies, quae cum sint incorporea tamen in corporibus ita sunt quod ab illis (!) divelli nequeant.

Differences don't just concern the form of the text but they entail important divergences from the doctrinal point of view. Boethius and **O** offer a twofold division of incorporeal things: God, the human mind, and the soul, on the one side, can subsist in their incorporeal nature; the line and the surface, on the other side, cannot subsist without a body. The versions preserved in **P** and **S**, on the contrary, offer a threefold division: God and the angels can subsist in their incorporeal nature; the human mind and soul can subsist both within a body and without a body; the third category, which is left unspecified but accompanied by clear allusions to the line and surface, cannot subsist without a body. This version, preserved (as far as we have seen until this moment) by **P** and **S** with its threefold and more sophisticated division, should clearly be considered a later development away from the Boethian starting point. But what about the text of **A**? Iwakuma's edition seems to be affected by some oversights at this point.¹ In the following lines, I present a transcription of this section based on a new collation of the manuscript.

¹ As noticed in the last line of the apparatus to p. 74, **A** exhibits *angeli*; p. 75, first line in the apparatus, **A** exhibits *et alia in corporibus et extra corpora* (Iwakuma 2008).

A, f. 5ra-rb: *Duae*¹ etiam quippe incorporeorum sunt formae, alia praeter corpora esse possunt et separata a corporibus in sua incorporeitate perdurant, ut Deus et angeli, et alia in corporibus et extra corpora, <***> ut linea et superficies; quae cum sint incorporea² tamen in corporibus ita sunt quod ab illis divelli nequeant et si ab illis separata sint nullo modo permanent.

Apart from the first word *duae*, **A** shows a threefold partition of the incorporeals: see, for instance, *Deus et angeli, in corporibus et extra corpora* and then *linea et superficies*. The main divergence we can observe in **A** is the omission of the words between p. 74, 24 *ut mens* and p. 75, 1 *praeter corpora* (this gap, originating from a *saut du même au même*, should be considered just a mechanical error). Last but not least, the word *duae*, in contrast to the content of the following lines where a threefold division is introduced, is written *in rasura* with a different ink and by the same later hand which adds a marginal annotation. To conclude, here we do not have an agreement of **OA** against **PS**, but simply a disagreement between **O** (the older and ‘more Boethian’ version) and **APS**.

[8.2.] pp. 75, 20 – 76, 3 item probat – substantiam valeat] this bit of text is placed in **P** after p. 76, 19 *inveniri potest*, but omitted by **S**. Moreover, **S** omits the lines (p. 76, 4–6) where we have a divergence between the versions preserved in **OA** on the one hand and **P** on the other. In this passage we do not have, properly speaking, an agreement between **S** and **P**, but different phenomena (replacement or omission of the same portion of text) affecting the same lines. Considering this, we could infer that this portion of text was originally not integrated into the main text, but it was written in the margins or in a *schedula* (a separate parchment sheet); that would explain why the scribe of **S** decided not to copy the text or why he did not find it in his model.

Finally, we have to consider just three examples of agreement between **S** and **O**.

[9.] Agreement **OS** (?): [9.1.] p. 99, 18–23 sciendum est – de pluribus] this section is omitted by **O** but placed by **S**, with several intentional modifications,

¹ *Duae* A^{p.c.} *in rasura*

² *incorporea* A^{p.c.}] *in corpora* A^{a.c.}

after p. 101, 12 *animalis generalitas* (see the edition of the text). In this case, too, the same bit of text is affected by different phenomena (omission/misplacing) in the manuscripts, which can be explained by a portion of the commentary being preserved in the margins of the original or on a *schedula*. [9.2.] pp. 102, 1 – 103, 16 nunc videndum – sit praedicatur] this long section is omitted by both **O** and **S**. The text, however, is an unoriginal paraphrasis of Boethius' second commentary, which is copied *verbatim*. Here, too, we can imagine the section was added in the margins or on a *schedula* and omitted by the scribes of **O** and **S**. [9.3.] pp. 165, 25 – 166, 2 quia de – est risibile] this section is omitted by **O** and **S**. The section of text is necessary for the logical sequence of the reasoning. The portion of text, however, is short, and the omission can be explained as an interlinear addition in the original omitted by **OS**.

Since, as seen before, there are no cases of agreement of **PS** vs. **OA** [8.], nor of agreement of **OS** vs. **AP** [9.], nothing suggests that there was a lost common ancestor of two or more manuscripts between **α'** and the extant codices.

As already noted by Iwakuma,¹ an important witness for reconstructing the text of P3 is **D** (= Dublin, Trinity College Library 494, ff. 113r–118v). Properly speaking, **D** does not preserve P3 but another *Isagoge* commentary named P15.² P15 is a composite commentary, conflating excerpts from P3 and P16.³ This is the reason why **D** has been collated and used by Iwakuma in the edition of P3. According to Iwakuma's reconstruction "the excerpts in **D** from P3 usually agree with the original version aside from minor variant readings, but there is one place where **D** contains an **A** addition. That is to say, the compiler of P15 used the revised version common to **A**."⁴

The comparison of P15 with the text of **S** can provide some additional important information.⁵ As far as I can see, there are at least two cases

¹ Iwakuma 2008, p. 48.

² Marenbon 2018, p. 182.

³ Iwakuma 2008, pp. 48–49; Marenbon 2018, p. 182.

⁴ Iwakuma 2008, p. 49.

⁵ For P15, here and in the following, I am using Iwakuma's transcription, occasionally

where the text of P15 seems to preserve some traces of the additions that are characteristic of **S**.

The first case is the annotation to p. 112, 13–21 (by the way, this is the only place where according Iwakuma **D** is following the version of **A**). The situation here is complicated by the fact that **S** both reworks the text of the previous versions, and adds some new lines. On the one hand, it is worthy of notice that lines 13–19 *id est in omnibus praedicamentis – unoquoque praedicamento* are omitted by **O**. So, it is not completely correct to say that **D** is following the addition of **A**, because **O** is lacking and **P** preserves an independent version. On the other hand, it is evident that, although they are just a few lines, the annotations preserved by **S** and P15 have some bits of text in common that cannot be found in other codices. In the following table the passages that are common only to P15 and the unpublished section preserved by **S** are underlined. (Major interventions are explained in the footnotes.)

checked against the reproduction of the manuscript. Minor elements in the punctuation have been changed.

p. 112, 13–21 non specialissima – accipiunt duo praedicamenta] | **S p. 84a ll. 36–45** | Vel altero modo dicitur: IN UNOQUOQUE PRAEDICAMENTO, omnibus praedicamentis tantum simul acceptis, quaedam SPECIALISSIMA sunt. Ideo sic exponimus litteram quia, si diceremus in unoquoque praedicamento esse generalissima, cum X sint praedicamenta, ad minus iam essent XX generalissima, quod quidem auctoritas contradicit. Quidam vero dicunt in unoquoque praedicamento II generalissima esse, unum vocale et alterum reale. Quod hic¹ dicatur in unoquoque praedicamento duo genera generalissima esse, unum vocale et aliud reale, non multum habet ponderis nisi² praedicamentum accipiat collective, quia in unoquoque praedicamento non sunt duo generalissima: in re reali enim tantum est unum, in vocali unum. Vel sic potest iungi littera: PLANUM ERIT QUOD DICITUR HOC MODO. IN UNO<QUO>QUE PRAEDICAMENTO (9.10), vel plurale accipitur pro singulari.

P15 (= **D**, f. 116v): IN UNOQUOQUE PRAEDICAMENTO id est in omnibus praedicamentis insimul acceptis quaedam generalissima. Ideo sic exponimus litteram quia, si diceremus in unoquoque praedicamento generalissima, cum decem praedicamenta, iam essent viginti generalissima, quod auctoritas contradicit. Quidam vero dicunt: in unoquoque praedicamento sunt duo generalissima, scilicet unum vocale, aliud reale. Sed non multum habet ponderis, nisi praedicamenta accipiantur collective³. Quidam vero sic exponunt: IN UNOQUOQUE PRAEDICAMENTO, id est in unaquaque praedicamentali collectione SUNT QUAEDAM GENERALISSIMA, et praedicamentalem collectionem ad minus accipiunt duo praedicamenta. Quidam vero sic dicunt quod alio modo facienda est distinctio litterae; hoc modo scilicet PLANUM autem ERIT QUOD DICITUR IN UNOQUOQUE PRAEDICAMENTO, postea vero dicit sunt quaedam generalissima per se; sic disponendo litteram, ut in unoquoque praedicamento sit ‘de’ praecedenti sententia, hic vero sit capitulum alterius sententiae sunt quaedam generalissima etc. Vel accipiat plurale pro singulari, quod multotiens evenit.

¹•hic] *correx*i, haec S, *ut videtur*

The second case is more clear, since it is an addition to the printed text and not a different version of it. The similarity of the two texts, as one can see, is exact, although the section shared by the two manuscripts is short:

p. 131, 5 superior eo iudicetur] S p. 86b ll. 46–49 <i>add.</i> Nota illud idem superius esse dictum in descriptione generis quod DE SPECIE PRAEDICATUR GENUS (13.1–4), hic vero ad aliud inducitur•, ¹ ut ostendatur modus praedicationis. †quod†• ² id est quae res sit genus, id est quae sit illa res cui conveniat generalitas, et quae res sit species, id est cui conveniat specialitas.	D f. 118r: Nota illud ideo superius dictum esse in descriptione generis quod DE SPECIE PRAEDICATUR GENUS, hic autem aliud inducitur scilicet ostendatur modus praedicationis.

A deep and complete study of the relationships between **D** and the different versions of the commentaries is not the aim of the present article, so I will limit myself to a provisional conclusion. **D** seems not to have excerpted the version preserved by **A**, but it presents some unpublished lines that are in **S** only: potentially, P15 could have extracted its text from a model which already contained some additions that are characteristic of **S**. This should not sound so strange if we consider that another addition peculiar to **S**, the addition to p. 118, 30, occurs almost identically in the margins of the manuscript preserving P14.³

4 Textual features of S

In this section I will take into account some cases that could give us an idea about the model of **S** and some of its features. As emerged from the

²•nisi] *correx*i ex P15, *probante Girard*, ubi S

³•collective] *correx*i, collectionem D

¹•inducitur] *correx*i ex P15, indicitur S

²•quod] <in> quid *Girard*, *recte, ut videtur*

³ See the commentary to the annotation to p. 118, 30.

collation of the manuscript, several cases can be found where, with no apparent reason, one or more words are omitted and a blank space is left in **S**. In what follows I quote just the most relevant examples (blank spaces between two words are marked with asterisks):

[10.] p. 63, 10 modis] *om.* S || p. 83, 8 subnixus] *om.* S || p. 93, 24 tres] *om.* S || p. 100, 9 individuorum] *** duorum S || p. 114, 14–16 homo aliud – Plato et ceteri] omne scilicet animal homo homo animal *** animal Plato etc. || p. 126, 13 quae res *** in tate] *add.* S || p. 132, 10 autem] *om.* S || p. 139, 20 ut nasi curvitas et cicatrix oculorum eo *** ex vulnere] *add.* S (see the Boethian translation of the *Isagoge* quoted in the commentary) || p. 148, 19 aquilum autem et simum] *om.* S || p. 158, 15 ex aere] *om.* S || p. 159, 16 proportionaliter] portio *** S || p. 161, 19–22 quod est esse rei id est pars [19.7–8] *** essentiae rei S (see text and commentary) || p. 161, 24 suum] *om.* S || p. 169, 12 nigrum] *om.* S || p. 176, 20 litteram] *om.* S || p. 180, 23 genera] *om.* S || p. 181, 28 supervadunt] superna *** S || p. 192, 27 curtatum] *om.* S || p. 194, 25 autem] *om.* S || p. 195, 1 species a proprio] species a proprio *** ostendit S.

As one can easily imagine, the scribe omitted these words, leaving blank spaces, because his model was difficult to read and decipher.¹ That is no wonder if we remember that manuscripts of twelfth-century logical commentaries are often poor and lower quality manuscripts, with a large amount of abbreviations and a minute text.² It is easy to imagine that the model of **S** was such a codex and that the scribe, facing the difficult handwriting of his model, from time to time could not decipher some words of the text he was copying.

Starting from some intentional additions preserved in **S** only, I would like to shed some new light on the fluid nature of twelfth-century commentaries. After the studies of Iwakuma, a complete collation of **S** will allow us to better recognise the innovative character of **P** as well as to identify some specific additions by **A**.³ I will now inspect more carefully

¹ For a similar phenomenon see Grondeux and Rosier-Catach (*Notae Dunelmenses* 2017, vol. 1, pp. 20–21).

² See §1 and Marenbon and Tarlazzi 2018, p. 221.

³ See above, [5.] and [6.].

how the master of **S** innovated with respect to the text of his model. There are some cases where portions of text added by **S** seem to be, so to say, a “foreign body” in the context of the former text. In the following examples additions by **S** are printed in brackets or, if too long, marked by three asterisks in brackets. (In what follows, the most important steps of the reasoning are underlined in order to help the reader to follow the logical sequence of the text and spot the added words.)

[11.] p. 61, 10–15: Licet enim idem sit genus et species, eadem vero res sit species et accidens, quando tamen agit de generibus, non agit secundum illam proprietatem quod species sunt, sed secundum illam tantum quod generalitatem suscipiunt [respectu inferiorum; tunc quando agit de speciebus, non agit secundum hoc quod genera esse possunt, sed secundum hoc quod specialitatem suscipiunt respectu superiorum]; rursus cum eadem res sit species et accidens, quando agit de accidentibus, non agit de eis secundum hoc quod species sunt, sed secundum hoc quod accidentia sunt; et eodem modo de ceteris. In this case, the standard text of P3 is marked by a perfect parallelism: *idem sit genus et species/ quando agit de generibus; eadem res sit species et accidens/ quando agit de accidentibus*. The bit of text preserved by **S**, starting with *quando agit de speciebus*, modifies this parallelism and seems to have been introduced just for analysing every detail in more depth. || p. 64, 25: Ad eam vero quae substantialis est cognitio generis et differentiae utilis est. [***] Ipsa enim, ut dictum est, ex genere et huiusmodi differentiis constituitur. After having distinguished between different descriptions, the standard version of P3 says that for substantial description the knowledge of genus and differentia can be useful. *Ipsa enim* (that is to say, the *substantialis definitio*) is composed of genus and differences. Now, if we read the text after the long addition preserved by **S**, it is impossible to understand the link between *ipsa enim* and the *substantialis definitio*. || p. 101, 8–10 [the text is preserved by **A** and **S**]: Sed ita ei respondendum est quod haec generalitas quae est in animali nihil aliud est quam generalitas animalis, et generalitas animalis adiacet pluribus, quare non est individuum. [Omne enim individuum accidens uni soli rei adiacet; sed generalitas animalis adiacet pluribus; quare non est individuum.] The addition preserved by **S** is just a detailed explication of the same syllogism which can be found above. ||p. 124, 12–15: Littera sic continuatur et legitur. In ascensu conveniunt genera et familiae, sed in hoc differunt quod in familiis quidem plerumque omnes familiae reducuntur ad

unum principium hoc est ad unum supremum patrem [Nota per similitudinem esse dictum: non enim omnes familiae ad Iovem reducuntur, sed in veritate ad unum supremum patrem, ut Adam, vel Deucalionem fabulose], verbi gratia ut supradictae familiae reducuntur ad unum supremum patrem, scilicet ad Iovem. Here the addition preserved by **S** interrupts the logical concatenation of the standard version. In this case the name of Jupiter provided the opportunity to point out that all human families can be traced back not to Jupiter, but to Adam (according to the sacred history) or Deucalion (according to pagan mythology). || p. 119, 5–8: quidquid enim fundatur in prima substantia alicui secundae substantiae supposita, fundatur in illa secunda substantia [Item haec regula “quidquid fundatur in prima substantia, fundatur in secunda,” sic est intelligenda: quidquid fundatur in prima substantia alicuius secundae substantiae eo respectu et eo nomine quo designatur esse prima substantia illius secundae, fundatur in secunda]. As already seen before, in this case too the addition preserved by **S** is just an attempt to explain fully and in every detail a syllogism which was presented in a shorter form in the standard text.

In these examples we can notice quite clearly that the commentary P3 is a text *in fieri* in all the manuscripts. That means that the masters responsible for the different additions felt free to add sections of text to integrate or better explain the former version of the *Isagoge* commentary. Anyway, if we compare variants in **S** to the standard version, it emerges that the most common innovations of our manuscript are additions, omissions, and minor textual phenomena (one-word omissions; changes in the order of the words), whereas the tendency to rewrite or modify the text seems not so marked. The additions can easily be considered a “second layer text”,¹ as examples of steps within a constant re-elaboration of the logical tradition on the margins of *Isagoge* starting with Boethius.

Within the additions to the standard text preserved by **S**, there is one case which can be interesting for understanding how some annotations were added to the main text:

¹ For logical commentaries as “layered compositions” or texts with a “layered character” see Marenbon 2011, pp. 186, 197–198; *Notae Dunelmenses* 2017, p. 262: “les commentaires ... se présentaient tous comme des textes évolutifs et stratifiés”.

[12.] In the published text of the commentary (p. 131, 5), after an explanation of the lemma '*de specie praedicatur genus*' (13.1–4), we find an asyntactical word (*quod*) and an explanatory sentence: *id est quae res sit genus, id est quae sit illa res cui conveniat generalitas, et quae res sit species, id est cui conveniat specialitas*. Some lines after that (p. 131, 8), after the lemma '*assignato genere et specie*', *id est assignato 'quid utrumque sit'*, the manuscript exhibits an almost identical annotation: *id est quae res sit genus, scilicet quae res sit illa cui conveniat generalitas et quid sit species, id est quae res sit cui conveniat specialitas*. It is quite evident that these two different annotations are a duplicate. Moreover, the words fit with the standard commentary of p. 131, 8: *quae res* and *quid sit genus* are to be considered as explanations of *utrumque*, whereas this bit of text is inserted with no evident reason into the commentary on p. 131, 5. Another element to be noted is that the lines are added to p. 131, 5 after a word (*quod*) which does not seem to make sense in this context; moreover, this word seems to be completely unnecessary, since it is followed by *id est*. We could explain this *quod* as the result of a misunderstanding of a cross-reference mark inserted for creating a link with an annotation added in the margin.¹ So, at least in the case of annotations of minor extension, we can imagine that some additions were born as marginal notes.²

This hypothesis, however, cannot be adopted for all the additions preserved by **S** and other manuscripts. For some portions of text preserved by **S** are too long to fit in the margins of a manuscript.³ In a similar way, **P** preserves a number of additions that are too long for being considered a marginal note.⁴ The same can be said about **A**; its additions, in at least two cases, are too long for the margins of a codex.⁵ On the other hand, these

¹ I owe this suggestion to Caterina Tarlazzi.

² Examples of marginal additions are attested in still extant manuscripts: see e.g. the case of P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 7v), preserving near the main text an addition from an **S**-version of P3 (see annotation to p. 118, 30 and commentary).

³ See for example the additions of **S** at p. 112, 13; 133, 3; 116, 24; 126, 13; 135, 24; 138, 7; 164, 1.

⁴ See for example the additions of **P** at pp. 61, 25 – 62, 23; p. 69, 18–33; p. 155, 6–28; p. 166, 6–19; pp. 167, 5 – 168, 4.

⁵ See for example **A**, p. 101, 6–18; pp. 171, 1 – 172, 16.

additions are quite long and complex from the theoretical point of view, so it is unlikely that they are improvised integrations added to the base text. As material support for such additions, we could imagine, theoretically, wax tablets or other provisional supports during the different phases of elaboration preceding the final draft.¹ But it is difficult to imagine a dozen wooden tablets containing about fifty “additional notes” linked to the main text with cross-reference marks, since it would have been too difficult to find where to place the note again. The best way to imagine the material shape of the codex containing the original text once integrated with the different second- (or third-) layer additions is a manuscript containing some inserted parchment sheets.²

5 The text of S and the current edition of P3

The collation of a new manuscript is a laborious ordeal which can also have some welcome surprises. It is well known that **P** ends abruptly while commenting on the text of *Isag.* 28.14.³ After this point, based on the manuscripts **O** and **A** only, Iwakuma was aware of the need to correct the text conjecturally. In several of these cases the reading of **S** confirmed the need for an intervention on the text of the manuscripts or validated Iwakuma’s conjectures. See the following cases:

¹ The use of wax tablets in antiquity is well known and studied, whereas there are much fewer modern studies concerning the use of wax tablets in the Middle Ages; see Lalou 1989; Lalou 1992; Brown 1994, p. 8. See in particular Lalou 1989, pp. 130–131 for the use of wax tablets in the schools and Lalou 1989, p. 133: “une grand partie de celles-ci étaient utilisées comme support de brouillons”. Here Lalou also quotes several examples of wax tablets as support for the first draft of a work to be copied on parchment once finished: “le diable en personne brisa les tablettes de saint Anselme de Cantorbéry parce qu’elles contenaient le brouillon d’un écrit qui lui était préjudiciable.” And on p. 134: “le parchemin était donc trop cher pour qu’on l’employât pour le brouillon”.

² For some *schedulae* at the origin of the *Notae Dunelmenses* see Grondeux and Rosier-Catach (*Notae Dunelmenses* 2017, pp. 21–22).

³ See Iwakuma 2008, p. 192.

[13.] p. 194, 19 *perficiunt* <aliam rem individualement>] *suppl. Iwakuma*, *perficiunt alium individuum* S || p. 194, 30 <quod>] *suppl. Iwakuma*, *praebet* S || p. 195, 36 <de>] *suppl. Iwakuma*, *praebet* S || p. 196, 4 <et>] *suppl. Iwakuma*, *praebet* S || p. 196, 18 <in>] *suppl. Iwakuma*, *praebet* S || p. 196, 25 <proprium>] *suppl. Iwakuma*, *praebet* S.

6 Collation of S

As already said, this article aims to integrate the already existing edition of P3 with the information to be obtained from the collation of S. To identify the unpublished sections and evaluate which text is shared with other manuscripts, the codex of Sankt Gallen has been collated with the edition prepared by Iwakuma. This edition is the base text used for the collation of S. After the page and line number of Iwakuma's edition, I indicate the word or words affected by variants, and after a square bracket the words by S are printed.

To render all the information accessible to the reader, the collation is printed as an appendix at the end of the edition of the Latin text. Only the complicated transpositions of S (p. 92b) are also reported in the pages containing the edition. Minor textual variants are annotated in the collation only. Merely graphical variants are not registered. For the sake of clarity, the bits of text that are preserved by just one manuscript (A, O or P) and omitted by S are indicated with *om.* (= *omisit*). For the same reason, cases where S agrees with two other manuscripts against a third one are indicated (for instance, S = OA vs P), so that the reader can know which version of the text S is following. In the same way, when the square bracket is followed by *add.* S without any further indication, that means that this passage is affected by one of the additions published in the article.

7 Principles of the edition

Since this text is conceived as a supplement to the edition of P3 published by Iwakuma, the text formatting of the Latin annotations is very similar to the main edition of P3.¹

¹ See also Iwakuma 2008, p. 58.

PASSAGES IN CAPITALS are quotations from Boethius' translation of the *Isagoge*, in lemmata as well as in paraphrastic sections. For the Boethian translation, I use the reference edition by L. Minio Paluello.¹ Other editions of Boethius or medieval texts are quoted in the bibliography.

Passages in italics are quotations from Boethius' second commentary of the *Isagoge*.

Before every annotation the exact passage of S (folio and line number) where the text is preserved is indicated.

If the annotation is simply added to the printed text, after the reference to the page and line number of Iwakuma's edition, the last two words of the standard text of P3 that precede the unpublished annotation are quoted, and the siglum "*add.*" precedes the Latin. In other cases, the annotation in S substitutes the text of P3 as printed by Iwakuma; in such cases the first and the last words of the text affected by the variant are given without the siglum "*add.*"

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¹ See the edition in the series *Aristoteles Latinus* I.6–7 (Porphyry 1966).

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LATIN TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

S = Sankt Gallen 134, pp. 77a–96a.

p. 60, 4 praedicamentorum cognitionem] |S p. 77a ll. 3–8| *add.* Quidam dicunt Porphyrium tantum intendere de his vocibus quae sunt ‘genus’ ‘species’ et cetera, vel de vocibus significatis¹ ab his vocibus quae sunt ‘genus’ et cetera, et de hac voce quae est ‘animal’ et ‘lapis’, ducti hac occasione quod iste liber est introductorius ad *Praedicamenta*: ibi vero intendit Aristoteles de vocibus, ergo hic Porphyrius debet agere de vocibus. Sed non valet, quia per naturam rerum bene ostendit naturam vocum, et etiam praedicamentum aliud reale, aliud vocale; et etiam Aristoteles cum de vocibus intendat, transferendo se ad res, per naturam rerum ostendit naturam vocum.

TRANSL.: Porphyry – some people say – wishes to discuss only the words (*voces*) ‘genus’, ‘species’, and so on; or <he wishes to discuss> words signified by the words ‘genus’, ‘species’, and so on, and this <particular> word ‘animal’ and <this particular word> ‘stone’. They have been induced <to this claim> by the fact that this book is an introduction to the *Categories*; and in the *Categories*, Aristotle wishes to discuss words, so in this work Porphyry must speak of words. But that reasoning is not correct, for <Aristotle> correctly shows the nature of the words through the nature of the things. Also, among the categories, there is both a real one (*reale*), and a vocal one (*vocale*); also Aristotle, when he wishes to discuss words, moves to <discussing> things, and, through the nature of things, he shows the nature of words.

COMMENTARY: The prologue of P3 provides several preliminary remarks to the commentary. This preface discusses a set of particular questions, which are concerned with *intentio*, *materia*, *utilitas* and “to what part of

¹•significatis] *correx*i, significans S

philosophy the treatise belongs” (*cui parti supponatur*). Iwakuma underlines a series of similarities with the prologues of C8 and H11 (Iwakuma 2008, p. 50). This prefatory schema, however, is not typical of medieval commentaries only, but can be traced back to Boethius. In his second commentary on the *Isagoge*, indeed, we find a discussion about the following points: **a.** to what part of philosophy the treatise belongs (*In Isag.*²; pp. 140, 13 – 143, 7); **b.** what the title of the work means (pp. 143, 8 – 146, 25); **c.** what the aim of the treatise is (*intentio*; pp. 146, 26 – 147, 4); **d.** the utility of the work (pp. 147, 17 – 149, 2). In doing so, Boethius is deeply indebted to the *schemata isagogica* of the Alexandrian tradition: πρόθεσις or σκοπός corresponds to the *intentio*; χρήσιμον to *utilitas*; αἴτιον τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς to *titulus*; and ὑπὸ ποῖον μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀνάγεται to *pars philosophiae* (see Mansfeld 1994, pp. 10–11). Medieval commentaries on the *Isagoge* seem to use Boethius as a basic model for the set of questions to be settled before commenting on the text: see for instance *Excerpta Isagogarum* (P2, p. 3, 5–9): *praedocent enim quae sit cuiuscumque operis intentio, quae utilitas, qui ordo, si eius proprius germanusque liber sit cuius dicitur esse, quae sit eius operis inscriptio et ad quam partem philosophiae cuiuscumque libri ducatur intentio*; *Excerpta Pommersfeldiana* (P4, Iwakuma 1992, pp. 103–104), with the set of headings *intentio*, *titulus*, and *cui parti supponatur*; *Editio super Porphyrium* (P5, pp. 3–4), where we find *intentio*, *titulus*, and *utilitas*; *Disputata Porphyrii* (Iwakuma 1992, p. 74): *intentio*, *materia*, *cui parti supponitur*, and *titulus*; Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, *Isag.* (P10, pp. 1–3): *cui parti supponitur*, *inscriptio*, *materia*, *intentio*, *modus tractandi*, and *utilitas*; *LNPS, Isag.* (P12, pp. 505–509): *intentio*, *materia*, *modus tractandi*, and *utilitas*.

Porphyry’s intention – say the *quidam* that are confuted here – is threefold: Porphyry is dealing **a.** with *voces*, that is to say, the words ‘genus’, ‘species’, and so on; **b.** with the *voces* that are signified by these *voces* (for instance, ‘animal’, ‘homo’, etc.); and **c.** with particular *voces* (*de hac voce*) that are proffered in a specific context or moment. Some similarities can be found in *Excerpta Pommersfeldiana* (P4 in Iwakuma 1992, pp. 103, 2–3): *intentio Porphyrii est tractare de vocibus quinque non*

significatis sed significantibus alias voces. In this case, as often in the following, the most similar parallel is to be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 1ra–rb): *volunt tamen quidem Porphyrium agere de his vocibus quae sunt genus et species et cetera, vel de vocibus significatis ab istis, i.e. de hac voce ‘animal’ hac ‘lapis’ et cetera, ponentes hanc causam quod liber iste est introductio ad Praedicamenta, in quibus agitur de vocibus. Sed non valet, quia tanta affinitas est inter res et voces quod voces contrahunt suas proprietates* |1rb| *ex rebus, et ideo per naturam rerum familiariter ostenditur natura vocum. Inde etiam Aristoteles, cum intendat de vocibus, transferendo se ad res per naturam rerum multotiens aperit proprietates vocum. Item cum praedicamentum aliud reale aliud vocale sit, recte per naturam unius declaratur proprietas alterius.* Concerning the expression *per naturam rerum bene ostendit naturam vocum*, see C14 (Assisi 573, f. 19ra): *per naturas rerum sicut supradictum est aperiat proprietates vocis*; in the same commentary we find the distinction between *praedicamentum reale* and *vocale*, see C14 (Assisi 573, f. 25ra): *vocali praedicamento*. For the distinction between something taken as *nomen rerum* and as *nomen vocum* in C8 see Rosier-Catach (2008, p. 128); a similar passage in S can be found in the annotation to p. 112, 22. The infinitive *intendere* indicates the *intentio* of the author as distinct from his subject matter; for *intendere* governing *tractare* see Abelard (*Dial.*, p. 111, 27): *vocum significatio ... de qua intendimus*; *ibid.* (p. 536, 9–10): *de his namque tantum ... Boethius intendit*.

pp. 60, 14 – 61, 7 dicitur – ipsius rei] *om.* S

p. 61, 13 quod generalitatem suscipiunt] |S p. 77a ll. 15–16| *add.* respectu inferiorum; tunc quando agit de speciebus, non agit secundum hoc quod genera esse possunt, sed secundum hoc quod specialitatem suscipiunt respectu superiorum.

TRANSL.: [when Porphyry is discussing the genera, he does not discuss them according to their capacity to be species, but only according to their capacity to admit the *generalitas*] with reference to inferior things; and when he is tackling the species, he does not discuss them according to their capacity to be genera, but according to their capacity to admit the *specialitas* with reference to superior things.

COMMENTARY: The section added to the prologue is a paraphrastic rewriting of the published text: the same element can be a genus as well as a species; depending on the context, it can be defined as genus or as a species. For a parallel to this see P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 1rb): *quando tractat de genere agit de eo secundum hoc quod habet habitudinem respectu speciei, quando de specie secundum hoc quod habet habitudinem ad suum genus, quando de accidenti secundum hoc quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem, et sic de ceteris.*

p. 64, 25 differentiae utilis est] |S p. 77b ll. 17–27| *add.* Videndum quod <de>¹ sua materia duobus modis agit, scilicet secundum relationem et secundum propriam essentiam. Et <in>² definitionibus harum rerum agit secundum relationem, in communitatibus agit et secundum relationem et secundum propriam essentiam.

Quidam dicunt individuum esse de sua materia, sed sciendum quinque res tantum esse suam materiam, quia quando de individuo agit³, incidenter agit. Obiciunt praedicamenta igitur non constitui ex individuis, quia cum Porphyrius sit introductorius ad *Praedicamenta*, agendo de eis quae constituunt praedicamenta, et non agat de individuis, constans est secundum illos individua non constituere praedicamenta. Sed non procedit, quia licet non agat de omnibus quae⁴ constituunt praedicamenta, tamen bene est introductorius ad *Praedicamenta*.

¹•de] *supplevi*

²•in] *add. Iwakuma*

³•quando de individuo agit] *corr. Girard*, quodque individuum agit *S*

⁴•quae] *Iwakuma*, non *S*

Modus vero tractandi talis est quod primum de unaquaque re agit, postea vero de eis communiter agendo dat inter eas communitatem et differentiam.

TRANSL.: The following has to be noted: Porphyry tackles his subject matter in two ways, namely, according to relation and according to <each thing's> own essence. In the definitions of these things (= genus, species, difference, proprium, and accident), he discusses <the issue> according to the relation; in the <section on> common features, he discusses <it> both according to relation and according to <each thing's> own essence.

Some people say that the individual belongs to Porphyry's subject matter, but we must keep in mind that five things only (= genus, species, difference, proprium, and accident) are his subject matter: when Porphyry discusses individuals, he discusses them in an accidental way. But then they object that the categories are not constituted by individuals: because, given that Porphyry is introducing the *Categories*, speaking of the things that constitute categories, and does not discuss individuals, it is clear – they say – that individuals do not constitute the categories. However, such reasoning does not go through: although he does not speak of everything that constitutes the categories, he is still introducing the *Categories*.

<Porphyry's> way of treating the subject matter is the following: first, he speaks of each thing (= genus, species, difference, proprium, and accident); then, discussing them together, he explains the commonalities and differences among them.

COMMENTARY: Text. The knowledge of genus and difference – we read in the text of P3 (p. 64, 24–26) – is important for substantial definition: the latter, indeed (*ipsa enim*), is constituted by genus and differences. The addition is inserted here by S between the *substantialis definitio* and the following sentence, which starts with *ipsa*. This breaks the thread of the reasoning as presented by P3. Therefore, these lines can be considered a “second layer addition” originating from a line of reasoning that was added later.

Philosophical content. Porphyry's discussion is defined as twofold: in a first section (§§ 1–12) Porphyry tackles his subject matter *secundum relationem*; in the rest of the treatise he discusses it *secundum relationem* as well as *secundum essentiam*. The content of this note can be organised as follows: 1. The individual – some people say (*quidam dicunt*) – belongs to Porphyry's subject matter; 2. The *adnotator* replies (*sed sciendum*): the subject matter of the *Isagoge* is only the five predicables, and Porphyry discusses individuals *incidenter*; 3. Objection (*obiciunt*): if the subject matter of Porphyry's *Isagoge* is only the five predicables, and the point of Porphyry's *Isagoge* is to introduce the *Categories*, and therefore to discuss what constitutes a category, then individuals do not constitute a category; 4. Final reply (*sed non procedit*): Porphyry provides an introduction to the *Categories*, but he does not discuss everything that constitutes a category. For the same issue concerning the structure of the treatise, see the addition of P to P3 (p. 69, 10–12): *de individuo non tractet. Sed hoc ideo facit quia istis quinque vocibus cognitis individuorum facilis est notitia*; see also P3 (pp. 61, 25 – 62, 23; addition of P), with the discussion of the *quidam*.

As far it concerns the *materia* of the treatise, the *adnotator* shares a very similar position to P3 and identifies the five *voces* as Porphyry's subject matter (P3, p. 68, 12): *materia sunt genus species differentia proprium et accidens*. On this point the *adnotator* shares the position that identifies the five predicables with Porphyry's subject matter: see *Excerpta Pommersfeldiana* (P4, p. 103, 10): *de quinque significantibus tractare vocibus*; Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, *Isag.* (P10, p. 2, 23): *tractando de quinque quae sunt eius materia*; *LNPS*, *Isag.* (P12, p. 509, 22): *materia sunt illa quinque nomina in quae agit*. That means that individuals are excluded from the five predicables. However, in several sources individuals are considered as the sixth predicable tackled by Porphyry: P7 (Iwakuma 1992, p. 74, 19–20): *materia vero huius operis sunt illae sex voces, scilicet genus species differentia proprium accidens individuum*; P5 (p. 3, 20): *huius operis sunt materia istae sex voces et earum significata*.

p. 85, 14 multiplicem significationem] |S p. 80b ll. 29–30| *add.* Hic accipitur ‘genus’ materiale impositum vel secundum aliam sententiam nomen ipsarum rerum.

TRANSL.: Here ‘genus’ is understood as *materiale impositum* or, according to another opinion, as the name of the things.

COMMENTARY: Philosophical content. This annotation is added before the commentary on *Isag.* 6.2 (*videtur autem neque genus neque species simpliciter dici*). The genus here is to be taken as *materiale impositum*. As highlighted by Rosier-Catach (2003, pp. 21–55), the mention of *materiale impositum* often occurs in twelfth-century authors involved in the grammatical tradition: see Petrus Helias, *Summa super Priscianum* (vol. 1, p. 193, 78–83): *hic enim non de nomine loquimur, sed potius de hoc nomine ‘homo’. Et hoc appellabant antiqui ‘materiale impositum’ quod quid sit ut intelligas, materiale impositum est vox representans seipsam id est posita ad loquendum de se ipsa et dicitur materiale impositum quia nomen, si ita contingit, representat materiam suam, id est vocem quae quasi materia preiacet ut inde fiat nomen; ibid.* (vol. 2, p. 914, 17–20): *appellant autem antiqui materiale impositum quando nomen imponitur ad agendum de sua materia id est de ipsa voce, ut cum dico “homo est nomen”, ibi nomen ‘homo’ est materiale impositum qua imponitur ad agendum de sua materia, id est de ipsa voce, quia vox est materia nominis; see also Notae Dunelmenses VIII.38 (p. 43, 471–473): accipi potest ‘tempus’ in designatione temporis ut sit materiale impositum; ibid.* (p. 43, 490); II.22 (p. 108, 47–49): *“homo est species” et similiter de qualibet alia nominali voce, et est in praedicta propositione ‘homo’ materiale impositum.* This theory is based on the distinction between vocal matter (vox) and form, that is to say, signification.

p. 93, 16 in hac descriptione generis] |S p. 81b ll. 34–37| *add.* Et non agitur hic de¹ praedicationibus, ut fundamentum de suo accidente vel minus de maiori vel accidens de suo accidente dicitur ut cum dicimus² ‘quidam †abunduntur’†³.

TRANSL.: He does not speak of predication here, such as <predicating> the foundation of its accident, or the less of the more, or the accident of its accident, like when we say †...†.

COMMENTARY: Parallels. P3’s text, commenting on *Isag.* 6.25 (cf. Boeth., *In Isag.*², pp. 183, 15 – 187, 21), distinguishes between predication *secundum accidens* and predication *secundum substantiam*; the latter, in turn, is divided into predication *in quid* and predication *in quale*. A similar distinction can be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 4ra–va). In this case, however, we have a different taxonomy: P14 divides predication *in quale* into *secundum substantiam* and *secundum accidens*.

The text added here by S shows several similarities with P14 (f. 4va): *de praedicatione autem, ubi minus de maiore, vel subiectum de accidenti vel de proprio vel de differentia, vel aequivocum de suis significatis vel e converso, vel coaccidens de suo coaccidenti, vel si qua est alia, hic non agit.*

Text. Concerning *de praedicationibus*, Tarlazzi suggests the integration <irregularibus>, quoting the parallel from P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 5ra): *nam individua videntur praedicari de pluribus, ut Socrates de hoc albedine et de hac crispitudine et de hac musica, quae insunt ei. Sed non est regularis praedicatio, quia subiectum de accidenti hic praedicatur; ibid. (f. 9ra): cum enim proprium de specie praedicatur, regularis est praedicatio; cum vero species de proprio, irregularis est praedicatio, quia sicut minus non praedicatur de maiori regulariter, ita illud quod subiacet alii ut proprio fundamentum si de eo praedicatur, irregularis est praedicatio.*

¹•de <irregularibus> *suppl.* Tarlazzi collato P14 f. 9ra

²•cum dicimus] *difficile lectu*

³•quidam abunduntur] S, ‘quoddam album <est> durum’ *corr.* Girard

In the last line of the text there is an evident copy mistake in the words *quidam abunduntur*, which is not Latin. From the parallel with P14 we can infer this passage is about predication *coaccidens de suo coaccidenti*. Subsequently, Girard's correction *quoddam album <est> durum* becomes probable; for the terms 'white' and 'hard' as examples of *coaccidentia* see Abelard (*Dial.* p. 578, 22–23): *haec autem illa est quae accidens in coaccidentia distribuit hoc modo: "album aliud durum, aliud molle."*

p. 93, 17–21 item dicendum – species specialissimae] |S p. 81b ll. 38–40| Item dicendum quod illa quae praedicantur alia de uno solo, alia de pluribus. De uno solo, sicut individua. Illa quae praedicantur de pluribus, alia praedicantur de pluribus speciebus, alia vero minime, ut species specialissimae.

TRANSL.: We have to say that among things that are predicated some are predicated of one element only, some of many <elements>. Predicated of one only: for example individuals. Among things that are predicated of many elements, some are predicated of many species, some are not, like for instance the most specific species.

p. 95, 3 sedens est Socrates] |S p. 82a ll. 15–18| add. Vel sic: 'Socrates est <hoc>•¹ album' et 'haec manus est hoc album', hoc•² est•³: 'albedo'•⁴ praedicatur de pluribus, scilicet de manu et de Socrate, sed figurative•⁵; quia gratia manus praedicatur haec albedo de Socrate, et de figurativis•⁶ praedicationibus hic non agitur. Vel sic: 'Socrates est hoc album' et 'haec albedo <est hoc album>•⁷', haec albedo praedicatur hic de Socrate et de

¹•hoc] suppl. Girard

²•hoc] haec aut <hic> haec Girard

³•est] an cum legendum?

⁴•albedo] an <haec> albedo supplendum?

⁵•figurative] an significative legendum?

⁶•figurativis] an significativis legendum?

⁷•est hoc album] suppl. Girard probante Tarlazzi

hac albedine, sed non eodem modo praedicationis, quia de Socrate in adiacentia et de albedine in substantia.

TRANSL.: Or like this: “Socrates is this white thing” and “this hand is this white thing”; here this whiteness is predicated of different things, that is to say, of the hand and of Socrates; but <it is predicated> in a figurative way, because this whiteness is predicated of Socrates because of his hand; and, here, <Porphyry> is not dealing with figurative predications. Or like this: “Socrates is this white thing” and “this whiteness <is this white thing>”; here this whiteness is predicated of Socrates and of this <particular> whiteness; but <it is> not <predicated> using the same type of predication, because in the case of Socrates <it is predicated> *in adiacentia*, in the case of whiteness it is predicated *in substantia*.

COMMENTARY: This section is added by S to the commentary on *Isag.* 6.25–7.3 (concerning the threefold meaning of the term *genus*). P3 (p. 94, 24) discusses the case of individuals that are predicated of more general concepts, as for instance Socrates being predicated of whiteness and seating. In this case – in the version of the commentary edited by Iwakuma – Porphyry tackles the predication *ubi accidens praedicatur de suo fundamento* or *secundum substantiam*; the proposition *hic albus est Socrates* (p. 95, 1), however, is not related to them.

Text. The manuscript reads *figurative* and, some lines after, *de figurativis praedicationibus*; in such cases the palaeographical abbreviation can easily be misinterpreted as *significative*. This alternation *significative/figurative* often creates problems for editors, see Abelard, *Gloss. Cat.* (p. 175, 35–40); *Dialectica* (p. 69, 22): *sic autem, “chimaera est opinabilis” significative intellegitur, cum non forma aliqua chimaerae, quae non est, attribuitur (significative corr. De Rijk, figurative V)*; see also Abelard, *Glossae super Peri hermeneias* 100 (p. 124, 728–730): *sicut enim figurative (significantem A) dicimus “chimaera est opinabilis”, vel “chimaera excogitatur”, non videlicet aliquid attribuentes chimaerae sed magis intelligentes aliquem opinari eam, ita nihil impedit et non figurative (haec significantem A) ad aliquem sensum transferri*.

Parallels. Here we have some interesting similarities with the text of P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813 f. 5ra): *iterum potest obici individuum praedicari de pluribus, ut hic “Socrates est hoc album” et “haec albedo est hoc album.” Sed non valet, quia non est idem modus praedicandi, quia licet eadem res praedicatur, tamen diversus modus est: praedicatio in essentia et in adiacentia.*

For a distinction between predication *in adiacentia* and *in substantia* see Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, Perih. (pp. 360, 33 – 361, 2): *in essentia vero non potest vere album Socrati copulari, ut scilicet dicatur “Socrates est albedo.” Unde ut et album copuletur in adiacentia et secundum substantivum ‘album’ coniunctio essentiae vere ponatur, adiectivum quod est album, coniungitur verbo quod et formam quam significat adiacenter praedicet et fundamentum quod nominat, essentialiter secundum albedinem tantum praedicet, quod in ea tantum vi, ut dictum est, poni intenditur.*

p. 100, 10–18 alii vero dicunt – tamen notanda est] |S pp. 82b l. 46 – 83a l. 1| Vel potest dici quod ‘Socrates’ ibi significat socratitatem, quandam summam quae efficitur coniunctione speciei et accidentium. Illi vero qui dicunt omnia individua de aliquo praedicari, idem de se ipso praedicari concedunt. Faciunt enim huiusmodi praedicationem: ‘hic homo Socrates est’ ubi eadem res de <se>¹ ipsa praedicatur; sed dicunt: licet diversitas <non>² sit in re, in vocibus tamen notanda est.

TRANSL.: Alternatively, one can say: here ‘Socrates’ means Socrateity, that is to say, a sum originating from the combination of species and accidents. Those who say that all individuals are predicated of something admit that one and the same thing can be predicated of itself. They make a predication like this: “this man is Socrates”, where one and the same thing is predicated of itself; then they say: although there is no difference in the thing, still there is a difference to be noted in the *voces*.

¹•<se> *supplevi*

²•<non> *suppl. Girard; an absit pro sit corrigendum?*

COMMENTARY: Commenting on *Isag.* 7.2, **S** preserves a section which differs from the printed text (p. 100, 10–18). Distancing itself from the *alii* of P3, this additional passage of **S** says that ‘Socrates’ signifies *socratitas*, that is to say, the individual form originating from the combination of species and accidents.

Parallels. The most interesting similarity can be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 5rb): *sed contra illi dicunt quod Socrates non est ibi appositum nisi exemplum individuorum, scilicet quod Socrates est individuum; vel potest dici quod Socrates sit ibi sumptum a Socracitate, i.e. individuali forma Socratis, quae efficitur ex coniunctione speciei et accidentium, et illa praedicatur de suo fundamento: “Socrates est Socrates.” Qui vero dicunt de omnibus [esse dictum], accipiunt large praedicari de uno solo, ita scilicet vel de uno fundamento vel de ipso. For socratitas as a collection of accidents see Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, *Isag.* (pp. 64, 25 – 65, 11): *et hi quoque socratitatem totam accidentium collectionem vocant. Nec tunc socratitas una res est per naturam, sed compositum individuum. Hi vero qui socratitatem vocant proprietatem ex accidentibus, in natura eam individuum appellant humanae compositionis ex accidentibus innatae.**

p. 101, 10 non est individuum] |**S p. 83a ll. 12–13**| *add.* Omne enim individuum accidens uni soli rei adiacet; sed¹ generalitas animalis adiacet pluribus; quare non est individuum.

TRANSL.: Every individual accident inheres in one single thing; but the generality of animal (*animalis generalitas*) inheres in many things, so it cannot be an individual.

COMMENTARY: P3 starts with the text of *Cat.* 5, 3a 36–37: ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας οὐδεμία ἐστὶ κατηγορία (cf. P3 p. 101, 1–2: *a principali*

¹•sed] *correx*i, scilicet *S*

namque substantia nulla est praedicatio); this sentence seems to be contradicted by *Isag.* 7.2–4: *eorum enim quae praedicantur alia quidem de uno dicuntur solo ... alia vero de pluribus*. P3's published text explains the dissonance with reference to a different target: Aristotle tackles the predication *ut de inferiori*, whereas Porphyry deals with the predication *superius de inferiori* or with the predication *de se ipso*. A adds a section shared by S (P3 p. 101, 6–18). In this passage we find an objection (*opponitur*) according to which *generalitas animalis* can be predicated of many subjects; but *generalitas animalis adiacet pluribus* – replies the author of the annotation – so, it cannot be an individual. The unpublished annotation preserved by S just clarifies with a syllogism the same reasoning that is also found in A.

Parallels. See P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 5rb): *videndum vero est quod quidam dicunt omnia individua praedicari de uno solo, alii tantum de individuis accidentium [hoc dictum] putant quorum unumquodque de uno solo individuali fundamento tantum praedicatur*.

p. 101, 12 sed tamen – sit universale] |S p. 83a ll. 14–17| *add.* Quare nec universale est nec singulare proprie, sed ‘quasi individuale’ dicitur. Sciendum est autem¹ quod ‘hic’ et alii articuli aliquando adduntur vocibus quae rem significant singularem, ut ‘hic homo’, aliquando adduntur vocibus quae significant rem universalem, ut ‘hoc genus’.

TRANSL.: Therefore, it is neither properly a universal nor a singular, but it is called ‘quasi-individual’. It should be known, moreover, that ‘this’ and other articles are sometimes added to words that signify a particular thing (such as, for instance, “this <particular> man”); sometimes they are added to words that signify a universal thing (such as, for instance, “this genus”).

COMMENTARY: This annotation shows several similarities with the printed text of P3 p. 99, 18–23 (a section that is omitted in S). Just for clarity, I

¹•autem] *difficile lectu, an hoc?*

prefer to treat this bit of text as an independent annotation. The main interest of this section is that it contains a short reflection on the use of the ‘articles’ *hic*, *haec* and *hoc* for singular and universal nouns.

p. 101, 15–16 non in quantum – fundamentum generalitatis] |S p. 83a ll. 19–20| non in quantum prima substantia, et cum dicitur ‘Socrates prima substantia est hoc genus’ tantum intelligitur quod sit Socrates actuale fundamentum generis.

TRANSL.: [The individual of the *generalitas* is founded in Socrates] but not in Socrates inasmuch as he is a first substance; when one says “the first substance Socrates is this genus” it is understood only that Socrates is the actual foundation of the genus.

p. 105, 4–5 sic quia – in quale] |S p. 83a ll. 40–43| Quia aliquibus INTERROGANTIBUS ILLUD, id est ponentibus in interrogatione illam rem de qua [re]•¹ ista habent praedicari, NON IN EO QUOD QUID SIT – id est non si illa interrogatio <facta est>•² (*spatium vacuum 6 litterarum reliquit*) per quid•³, sed MAGIS IN EO QUOD QUALE (8.3) – id est ad interrogationem factam per quale. Et hic MAGIS accipitur elective.

TRANSL.: [Here, he proves <with an argument> from the effect that differences and accidents are predicated in answer to a which-question.] For, “to some people who ask that” (that is, who put into a question the thing of which these <words> (differences/common accidents) happen to be predicated) <we give these (= differences/common accidents) as a reply> “not in answer to a what-question” (that is, not if the question is made through <the term> “what?”), but “rather in answer to a which-

¹•re] *seclusi*

²•facta est] *suppl. Tarlazzi*

³•an per quid <haec respondemus> *supplendum?*

question” (8.3) (that is, to a question made through <the term> “which?”). And here “rather” (*magis*) is taken in a superlative manner.

COMMENTARY: This annotation is added to the commentary on *Isag.* 7.35–81 (genera differ from differences and from common accidents: these last, indeed, are predicated of several subjects *non in quid sed in quale*). P3’s commentary (p. 105, 1–5) shows a twofold redaction here. The text of **O** and **A** (followed by **S**) is a literal analysis of Porphyry’s words as translated by Boethius.

Parallels. For the closest parallel see P14 (BnF. Lat. 17813, f. 5vb): *vere differentiae et accidentia praedicantur non in quid, sed in quale, quia nos dicimus ab auctoritate de quo i.e. est secundum quem modum. Magis dicit propter differentias quae videbantur quibusdam praedicari in quid, quia sunt substantiales; in veritate tantum non in quid sed in quale praedicantur.*

In the last line of the text we find that ‘especially’ (*magis*) in the *Isagoge* is to be interpreted as a superlative (*elective*); for other examples see P14 (BnF. Lat. 17813, f. 11vb): *maxime dicitur elective, non comparative*; Abelard, *Gloss. in Cat.* (p. 54, 35): *sed magis elective possumus dicere*; *Super Arist. De interpr.* (p. 137, 37): *magis dictum est elective.*

Text. The text preserved by **S** is probably incomplete, since we have an empty space of about six letters. Because of this gap, the translation is hypotheticalal.

p. 108, 6 prolixitate confunderet] |**S p. 83b ll. 19–23**| *add.* Notandum est Porphyrium praetermittere quandam subtiliorem speciem quae¹ conficitur ex coniunctione materiae et substantialis formae. Cum enim consideramus animal purum et substantiales formas, scilicet rationale et mortale², in compositione hominis speciei animalis³ convenire, ex conventu illarum

¹•quae] *correx*i probantibus Girard Tarlazzi, cum *S*

²•rationale et mortale] rationalem et mortalem *legeram*

³•speciei animalis] *corr.* Tarlazzi, specie alia *S*

trium illis¹ tribus alia species efficitur quae ‘humanitas’ vocatur, quae qualitati supponitur.

TRANSL.: The following has to be noted: Porphyry omits a certain subtler species that is made from the combination of matter and substantial form. So, when we consider that the pure animal and the substantial forms (that is to say, rational and mortal) come together in the composition of the human being, a species of animal, from the union of these three, thanks to them, another species originates which is called ‘humanity’, <and> which is placed under <the category of> quality.

COMMENTARY: Philosophical content. The *subtilior species* does not occur in Boethius’ commentaries on the *Isagoge*. Its far origin, however, is rooted in Boethius’ second commentary (*In Isag.*², p. 200, 7–8): *alia est enim substantialis formae species quae humanitas nuncupatur*. During the twelfth century, this concept undergoes important changes and becomes synonymous with humanity: see for instance *LNPS, Isag.* (p. 542, 4–8): *subtilem vero speciem vocat Boethius humanitatem. Ideo subtilem vocat quia cum aliae formae aliquantulum distinguantur per sensum ... sola humanitas non venit ad sensum sed sola ratione distinguitur*; John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* 3, 1 (p. 121, 11 = *CCCM* 98, p. 104, 28–36). Other parallels are to be found in Abelard and P17 (BnF, lat. 3237, f. 127ra [Lb]): *dicunt alii quod ipse homo sit subtilis species, et propter aliud appellatur species generi supposita, id est propter habitudinem relativam, et propter aliud subtilis species, id est propter constitutionem quam a genere suscipit, secundum quam const(ituti)onem non agitur hic de specie ut dicit Boethius, sed secundum relativam habitudinem*; P20 (Wien, ÖNB 2486, f. 49va–b): *has duas acceptiones ponit Porphyrius, Boethius vero tertiam adiungit in commento [In Isag.², p. 200, 7 – 201, 3], dicens “est tertia species subtilis vel substantialis” (quia utrumque in diversis commentis legitur), quae est propria forma speciei, de qua intendit auctor, et appellatur humanitas. Subtilis dicitur ista species, quia sola ratione et*

¹•illis] *correx*i, illas S

intellectu (post *intellectu*] *nec aliquam* add. ms.) *et non sensu corporeo* (*corporeo*] *incorporeo* ms.) *nec per se nec per individua potest percipi*. The best explanation of this concept has been provided by Geyer (Abelard 1933, pp. 598–599): the *species subtilis* originated from a false reading, or from an abbreviation in the manuscripts having been written out incorrectly.

The words *animal purum* refer to the terminology of purity: see for instance P3 (p. 79, 1): *res illa in puritate sua*; *ibid.* (p. 79, 18). This terminology may be connected to Boethius' translation of the *Isagoge* (*Isag.* 1.10 ἐν μόναις ψυλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κεῖται; transl. Vict.: *an intellectu solo et mente teneantur*; Boeth.: *sive posita sint in solis purisque intellectibus*).

p. 108, 15 *uniuscuiusque individui*] |S p. 83b ll. 29–30| *add.* id est species. Haec vox dicitur, id est enuntiatur, de compositione uniuscuiusque individui, ut significans de suo significato; et ibi 'species' est materiale impositum.

TRANSL.: ...that is to say, the species. This word is said, that is, it is uttered, about the composition of every individual, as the signifier <is uttered> about what it signifies; so here 'species' is *materiale impositum*.

COMMENTARY: The previous lines of the text provided a (traditional) definition of genus (as *principium/collectio/illud cui supponitur species*) and of species as form. This short annotation has important doctrinal implications due to the notion of *materiale impositum*: in the addition to p. 85, 14 it was said of the genus; here, however, it is said of the species.

p. 112, 13–21 *non specialissima – accipiunt duo praedicamenta*] |S p. 84a ll. 36–45| *HOC MODO IN UNO<QUO>QUE PRAEDICAMENTO* (9.10–11), id est in unaquaque praedicamentali collectione, ad minus accipiuntur duo praedicamenta. Vel altero modo dicitur: *IN UNOQUOQUE PRAEDICAMENTO*,

omnibus¹ praedicamentis tantum simul² acceptis, quaedam GENERALISSIMA³ sunt. Ideo sic exponimus litteram quia, si diceremus in unoquoque praedicamento esse generalissima, cum X sint praedicamenta, ad minus iam essent XX generalissima, quod quidem⁴ auctoritas contradicit. Quidam vero dicunt in unoquoque praedicamento II generalissima esse, unum vocale et alterum reale. Quod hic⁵ dicatur in unoquoque praedicamento duo genera generalissima esse, unum vocale et aliud reale, non multum habet ponderis nisi⁶ praedicamentum accipiat collective, quia in unoquoque praedicamento non sunt duo generalissima: in re reali enim tantum est unum, in vocali unum. Vel sic potest iungi littera: PLANUM ERIT QUOD DICITUR HOC MODO IN UNO<QUO>QUE PRAEDICAMENTO (9.10). Vel plurale accipitur pro singulari.

TRANSL.: [Porphyry's passage can be explained] "In the following way in every category" (9.10–11), that is to say, in every categorial collection, at least two categories are admitted. <Alternatively, it can be explained> in a different way: "in every category", if we just understand all the categories collectively, there are some *generalissima*. We explain the text in this way, because if we were to say that in every category there are some *generalissima*, then, since there are ten categories, we would have at least twenty *generalissima*, which is contradicted by authority. In every category – some people say – there are two *generalissima*: the one is vocal, the other is real. What is said here (that in every category there are two genera *generalissima*, one vocal, the other real) does not have much weight unless the category is understood collectively, since in every category there are not two *generalissima*: in the real domain there is just one, as well as in the vocal domain. Alternatively, we can construe the text as follows:

¹•omnibus] corr. Girard ex p. 112, 14, duobus S

²•simul] correxi ex p. 112, 14, similiter vel similis P. An tantum similis in insimul corrigendum (Girard)?

³•generalissima] corr. Girard ex p. 112, 14, specialissima S

⁴•quidem] corr. Girard, quae S, an secludendum?

⁵•hic] correxi, haec S, ut videtur

⁶•correxi ex P15, probante Girard, ubi S

“What is said will be clear, in this manner, in every category” (9.10). Again, alternatively, the plural form can be understood as singular.

COMMENTARY: Philosophical content. This annotation of **S** substitutes the text printed at p. 112, 13–21 (commentary on *Isag.* 9.10–11): *in unoquoque praedicamento sunt quaedam generalissima et rursus alia specialissima*. From this starting point the *adnotator* infers that there are two predications in each categorial collection, (for a parallel to *praedicamentalis collectio* see below, P5 [p. 14, 1–2]).

The second explanation has a parallel in P5 (p. 14, 1–6): *in unoquoque praedicamento, id est praedicamentis collectim acceptis, quaedam sunt nomina quae dicuntur generalissima, et quaedam alia quae dicuntur specialissima. Quippe si in singulis praedicamentis dicerentur esse generalissima, quod littera videtur velle, falsum esset. In praedicamento enim substantiae non est nisi unum nomen generalissimum*. At the end of the text we find the opinion of unspecified *quidam*: in each category there are two most generic genera, a real one and a vocal one. See on this P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 1ra): *item cum praedicamentum aliud reale aliud vocale sit...* (Iwakuma 1992, p. 45). However – the *adnotator* replies – this can be easily rejected: in the category of substance, indeed, there is a single most generic genus. For the same position see the addition by **A** (P3, p. 112, 17–18).

p. 113, 3 sit superveniens genus] |**S pp. 84a l. 47 – 84b l. 6**| *add.* est. Per hoc quod dicit ‘non est ALIUD SUPERVENIENS GENUS’ (9.13–14) videtur invenire quod supra generalissimum sit aliquid quod non sit genus, quod non est verum. Sed ideo voluit his verbis uti quia, si aliquid esset supra generalissimum [sit]¹, magis videretur genus quam species vel |**84 b**| individuum et, removendo illud quod magis videtur, ostendit nihil esse supra generalissimum. Dicunt² etiam quidam [quod]³, cum dialectici

¹•sit] *seclusi*

²•dicunt] *correxī*, dictum *S*

³•quod] *seclusi*

tantummodo agant de rebus formatis, esse generalissimum esse rem formatam, dicentes substantiam¹ generalissimum formari susceptibilitate² contrariorum; sine qua forma si consideretur, ipsa substantia remanet pura substantia quae est supra generalissimum et non est genus; sic sine forma considerata est secundum illos quia³, sive sine forma sive cum forma consideretur, semper remanet generalissimum.

TRANSL.: [Above it there is no superior genus.] By saying “there is no ‘superior genus’ ” (9.13–14) he seems to think that above the most general genus there is something which is not a genus, but that is not true. He wanted to use these words for this reason: if there were something above the most general, it would seem more <likely> a genus than a species or an individual; by removing that which seems to be more <likely>, he shows that there is nothing above the most general. Some people also say that, since the dialecticians speak of formed things only, the most general being is a formed thing, affirming that substance, that is to say, the most general thing, is formed thanks to its susceptibility to opposites; were it considered without such form, the substance itself would remain a pure substance that is above the most general and is not a genus; and so, it is considered without any form, according to them: considered with or without a form, it always remains the most general.

COMMENTARY: Philosophical content. The commentary refers to *Isag.* 9.12–14: *est autem generalissimum quidem super quod nullum ultra aliud sit superveniens genus*. At the very beginning, the *adnotator* offers a peculiar interpretation (*videtur invenire quod supra generalissimum sit aliquid quod non sit genus*). This reading of the text, however, is rejected as absurd: if there were something more general than the most generic genus, the latter would no longer be a most generic genus. In this case, the line of reasoning follows the *locus ab eo quod magis* of Boethius (*De diff.*

¹•substantiam] *correx*i, substantia *S*

²•susceptibilitate] *correx*i, susceptibilitat *S*

³•quia] *sed corr. Girard*

2, p. 38, 9–10): *si id quod magis videtur inesse non inest, nec id quod minus videbitur inesse inerit.*

With *dicunt quidam* starts a second, more difficult reasoning. I would summarise it as follows: 1. Dialecticians speak of formed things only; 2. Dialecticians speak of the most generic genus; 3. Therefore, the most generic genus is a formed thing; 4. Without this capacity substance is above the most generic genus but it is not a genus; 5. Substance, considered with or without form, is a most generic genus (this seems to be the position of the opponents). In this taxonomy the *pura substantia*, without the determination originating from opposites, cannot be explained as a genus; once it receives a form, however, it causes the *esse generalissimum*.

Parallels. In this case the most interesting similarities are to be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 6vb), which is very critical of this position: *notant quidam verba Porphyrii, quod non dicit “supra quod nihil est”, sed “supra quod non est aliud superius genus”; et volunt aliquid esse supra generalissimum, velut supra substantiam generalissimum, informatur susceptibilitate contrariorum, dicunt esse substantiam puram sine omni forma attentam.* However, the opposition between *pura substantia* and *esse generalissimum* seems to be similar to Porphyry’s opposition between εἶναι and τὸ ὄν. Some connection may be established with a well known Boethian passage in *De hebdomadibus* (nr. 2 p. 187, 26–28): *diversum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at vero quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit; ibid.* (nr. 6 p. 188, 37–40): *ac per hoc id quod est participat eo quod est esse ut sit; est vero, ut participet alio quolibet*). For this topic in Porphyry and Boethius and for its medieval reception see Hadot (1970).

p. 116, 24–28 animae rationalis dicatur – ante individua] |S pp. 84b l. 47 – 85a l. 1| animae vel corporis rationalis dicatur. Sciendum tamen in rerum natura hunc hominem compositum non¹ esse unum individuum sed duo individua sunt coniuncta. ET OMNE QUOD EST PROXIMUM ANTE INDIVIDUA

¹•non] corr. Girard, duo S

SOLUM SPECIES EST, NON GENUS (10.6–7). Probat a toto quod homo est solum species et non genus.

TRANSL.: [It cannot be called ‘rational’, because rationality does not inform this whole, that is to say, the corporeal and incorporeal nature, unless it is called ‘rational’ because of its parts, that is to say, because of] the soul or body. It has to be noted that in the nature of things the composite human being is not a single individual but consists of two united individuals. “Every thing which is immediately prior to individuals, is only species, not genus” (10.6–7). <Porphyry> here shows <with an argument> *a toto* that human being is only species, not genus.

COMMENTARY: This short annotation is related to the commentary on *Isag.* 10.6–7 (P3, p. 116, 25–28) and it simply paraphrases Porphyry. For the lines p. 116, 25–28 the published text of P3 is affected by a twofold redaction, where **O** and **A** agree against the innovative version of **P**. The present addition of **S** seems to have the remark concerning the *locus* (*probat a toto*), which cannot be found in **P**, in common with **OA**; on the other hand, the lemma of Boethius’ translation is different from the original version of the *Isagoge*, and it is shared also by **P** (in Minio Paluello’s apparatus there are no variant readings). For the man as *mixta substantia* see Iwakuma 2013, pp. 38–40.

p. 118, 30 secundae substantiae] |**S p. 85a ll. 15–20**| secundae, quod sic intelligendum: quidquid, id est quodcumque accidens singulariter acceptum, fundatur¹ in secunda substantia, fundatur² in prima. Non enim dictum est de duobus³ accidentibus quae⁴ fundantur⁵ in secunda substantia, quod fundantur in aliqua prima: namque haec risibilitas et haec

¹•fundatur] *correx*i, fundantur *S*

²•fundatur] *correx*i, fundantur *S*

³•duobus] omnibus *corr.* *Girard*

⁴•quae] *correx*i, quod *S*

⁵•fundantur] *Girard*, si sita *S* (*cf. commentarium*)

rudibilitas fundantur in animali, non tamen fundantur¹ in aliquo animali individuato. Et ideo notanda est illa argumentatio quam quidam² faciunt: si sunt³ mors et vita in secunda substantia, fundantur in prima.

TRANSL.: [Everything grounded in a second substance is grounded in the first substance corresponding to this second.] This expression has to be understood as follows: everything (that is to say, every accident intended as singular) that is grounded in a second substance, is grounded in a first. It was not said: two accidents that are grounded in a second substance, are grounded in a first one: indeed, this ability to laugh and this ability to bray are grounded in animal, but they are not grounded in a certain individuated animal. We should also take into consideration the argument of some people: if death and life are in a second substance, they are grounded in a first.

COMMENTARY: This annotation is added to the commentary on *Isag.* 10.6 (P3, p. 118, 30, *prima ipsius secundae substantiae*). This section of P3 is occupied by the aporia which starts at p. 117: if each thing that is above an individual is a most specific species, the body must be a most specific species. Moreover, a long section of P3 (p. 116–122) is affected by a long twofold redaction where **O** and **A** agree against **P**. The text of **S**, together with **O** and **A**, solves the aporia by identifying both the animate and the inanimate body as most specific species. After this, another problem arises: if divisive differences, for instance rationality and irrationality, are founded in the animal, the animal would be the most specific species above the individuals. The annotation added by **S** explains that just the *accidens singulariter acceptum* can be extended to the first substance. For the general rule which governs the conclusion, see the commentary on the following annotation.

¹•fundantur] *correx*i, fundatur *S*

²•quam quidam] *correx*i, quendam *S*

³•sunt] *correx*i, sum *S*

Parallels. The present annotation is almost identical to the text added in the margins of the main text of P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 7v): *quidquid fundatur in aliqua secunda substantia, fundetur in aliqua prima illius secundae. Quod sic intelligendum est. Quodcumque accidens singulariter acceptum fundatur in secunda substantia, fundetur in prima. Non enim dictum est de duobus accidentibus quod si in secunda substantia fundentur, fundentur etiam in prima. Nam risibilitas et rudibilitas fundantur in animali, non tamen in aliquo individuato animali. Et ideo illa argumentatio vitiosa videtur: si mors et vita fundantur in secunda substantia, et in aliqua prima substantia illius.*

p. 119, 8 in illa secunda substantia] |S p. 85a ll. 24–26| *add.* Item haec regula ‘quidquid fundatur in prima substantia, fundatur in secunda’, sic est intelligenda: quidquid fundatur in prima substantia alicuius secundae substantiae eo respectu et eo nomine quo designatur esse prima substantia illius secundae, fundatur in secunda.

TRANSL.: The rule “everything that is grounded in a first substance is grounded in the second one” has to be understood as follows: everything that is grounded in the first substance of a second substance from the same aspect and with the same name according to which the first substance is said to be first in relation to the second one, is grounded in the second.

COMMENTARY: This addition by S does not have deep philosophical implications, but it discusses a different rule than the previous addition.

Parallels. The previous annotation quoted the rule “everything that is grounded in a second substance is grounded in the first one”; for a parallel in Abelard see *Logica Ingredientibus*, Cat. (p. 147, 12–15): *nota, quod ex hoc loco talis habetur regula, quod quicquid fundatur in secundis substantiis, fundatur in primis, id est quicquid fundatur in re secundae substantiae, fundatur in re alicuius primae substantiae illius.* The published text of P3, however, seems to use the logical procedure in a different way (p. 119, 5–8): *quidquid enim fundatur in prima substantia*

alicui secundae substantiae supposita fundatur in illa secunda substantia; for further parallels see also P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813 f. 7va): quidquid enim fundatur in aliqua prima substantia, fundatur in qualibet secunda illius primae; P17 (BnF, Lat. 3237, f. 128ra): sed contra sic obicitur: quidquid fundatur in secunda substantia, fundatur in prima. Et ita, cum rationalitas fundetur in animali, fundatur in Socrate; et si fundatur in Socrate, et in homine; et ita posterior est homine in quo fundatur; et prior, cum eum substantialiter constituat, quod inconueniens esse dicunt.

p. 122, 26 ad inferiora] [S p. 85b ll. 19–24] *add.* Ex hoc quod ipse vocat specialissimas species EXTREMA (10.18), concipiunt¹ quidam individua² non constituere praedicamenta quia, si essent in praedicamentis, species specialissimae non essent extremae. Sed hic non agit de extremitate nisi secundum relationem. Illud etiam considerandum est, quod in hac propositione ‘homo est SPECIES INDIVIDUORUM’ (11.4) non specialitas sed continentia praedicatur, in hac vero ‘homo est species animalis’ specialitas praedicatur.

TRANSL.: Because [Porphyry] himself calls the most specific species “extreme” (10.18), some people hold that the individuals do not constitute categories: if they were in the categories, the most specific species would not be the extreme. Here, however, he [Porphyry] speaks about extremity (*extremitas*) only regarding relation. We also have to keep in mind that in the sentence “the human being is a ‘species <made> of individuals’ (11.4)”, the object of predication is not the property of being-species (*specialitas*), but <the property of> having a certain content; however, in the sentence: “the human being is a species of animal”, the object of predication is the property of being-species (*specialitas*).

¹•concupiunt] *correx*i, concipiunt concipiunt S

²•individua] *corr.* Girard, individuo S; *an* <ex> individuo *corrigendum?* (cf. S ad p. 64, 25)

COMMENTARY: Commenting on *Isag.* 10.19–20, **S** follows the same version of the text preserved by **A** and **P** (p. 122, 19–26). Just these lines are added. As already said before (p. 64, 25), the *quidam* deny that individuals cannot constitute a category; if that were the case, the most specific species could not be extreme.

p. 124, 14 supremum patrem] |**S p. 86a ll. 1–3**| *add.* Nota per similitudinem esse dictum: non enim omnes familiae ad Iovem¹ reducuntur, sed in veritate ad unum supremum patrem, ut Adam, vel Deucalionem² fabulose.

TRANSL.: It has to be noted: [Porphyry] is using a simile in his words. Indeed, in reality, all families can be traced back not to Jupiter, but to a supreme father, like Adam or, according to the fables, Deucalion.

COMMENTARY: This short annotation just adds to the previous lines that the common ancestor of all human families is not Jupiter but Deucalion (see Ovid, *Met.* 1, 348ff.) or Adam, according to the Christian tradition. As an interesting feature, the annotation breaks the thread of the reasoning as presented by P3. This shows that these lines can be considered a “second layer addition” inserted by the master of **S**.

p. 126, 13 quod est ens] |**S p. 86a ll. 27–41**| *add.* Probat a maiori quod genera et species non reducuntur ad unum supremum genus quia non reducuntur ad ens (de quo magis videretur), quia ens non EST COMMUNE GENUS OMNIUM (11.20–21). Videndum est quomodo in hac propositione ‘ens’ accipiatur: si enim ‘ens’³ ut vox [aequivoca]⁴ accipiatur in hac propositione, nullum pondus habet; nemo⁵ enim istas tres litteras quae

¹Iovem] *correx*i, Ionem *S*

²Deucalionem] *correx*i, Ducalionem *S*

³ens] *correx*i, eis *S*

⁴aequivoca] *secl*usi ex suggestu correctoris

⁵nemo] *correx*i, ne me *S*

sunt in hac voce quae est ‘ens’ genus omnium esse existimat. Rursus si in hac propositione ‘ens’ accipiatur in significatione alicuius suae significationis vel substantiae vel qualitatis, non multum valet, ut si¹ diceretur: vere ens non est commune genus omnium, scilicet aliquod² significatum entis, quia neque substantia neque qualitas³ etc. Nullus enim putat quod vel substantia vel qualitas⁴ sint genus omnium praedicamentorum. Sed hoc modo dici potest: vere non est aliquod⁵ commune genus omnium quia ens (id est aliqua universalis res significata ab hac voce quae est ‘ens’, quae sit dispersa per omnia genera et species et individua) de quo magis videretur, non est commune genus omnium. Quae res in veritate⁶ nichil est, et tamen⁷, quantum ad illos qui putabant ens esse commune genus omnium, ens (scilicet res ab hac voce quae est ‘ens’ significata) aliquid est; de significato entis magis videretur quod esset genus omnium, quia ‘ens’ omnia habet significare.

TRANSL.: [Porphyry] is demonstrating with an *argumentum a maiori* that genera and species cannot be reduced to a single supreme genus because they cannot be reduced to the *ens* (of which it would seem most likely <that it is a common genus>) because *ens* “is not the common genus of everything” (11.20–21). We also have to inspect in what sense *ens* is understood in this proposition: if it is understood as an equivocal utterance (*vox aequivoca*), <the proposition> does not have any relevance; nobody, indeed, thinks that these three letters that compose the word ‘*ens*’ can be the genus of everything. Then again, if *ens* is understood here to signify one of its senses (either substance or quality <etc>) <the proposition> would not make much sense, as for instance if we say: for sure (*vere*), *ens* is not the common genus of everything, namely a certain meaning of *ens*,

¹•si] *correx*i, sic *S*

²•aliquod] *an* aliquid *legendum*?

³•qualitas] *correx*it Tarlazzi, qualis *S*

⁴•qualitas] *correx*it Tarlazzi, qualis *S*

⁵•aliquod] *an* aliquid *legendum*?

⁶•in veritate] *correx*it Tarlazzi, in tate *spatio vacuo relicto* *S*

⁷•et tamen] attamen *dubitanter* Tarlazzi

since substance or quality is not the genus of all categories, and so on. No one, indeed, thinks that either substance or quality is the genus of all the categories. But it can be said in this manner: for sure (*vere*), there is no common genus to all, because *ens* (that is, a universal thing, signified by the word ‘*ens*’, which is dispersed through all genera and species and individuals) – of which it would seem most likely <that it is a common genus> – is not a common genus of everything. That <universal> thing, in reality (*in <ver>itate*), is nothing, and yet, according to those who think that *ens* is a common genus of everything, *ens* (that is, the thing signified by the word ‘*ens*’) is something. It seems most likely that the meaning of ‘*ens*’ is the genus of all, because ‘*ens*’ has the property of signifying everything.

COMMENTARY: This annotation is added to the commentary on *Isag.* 12.3 (cf. Boeth., *In Isag.*², pp. 222, 11 – 225, 9; see in particular p. 223, 24: *convincitur enim hac quoque ratione id quod dicimus ens praedicamentorum genus esse non posse*). Against the idea that being can be the common genus of all things see Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, *Isag.* (p. 51, 18–22): *ne propter similitudinem ascensus datam inter praedicamenta et familias videantur diversa praedicamenta ad unum genus posse reduci, sicut diversae familiae ad unum patrem, ideo hoc removet per ens, id est de quo magis videretur, quod genus omnium esset, quia scilicet de omnibus praedicatur*; LNPS, *Isag.* (p. 514, 23–26): *et Porphyrius cum secundum Aristotelem ostendit ens non esse genus omnium eo quod de omnibus hoc nomen ‘ens’ aequivoce praedicari dicitur, invalidam afferret rationem de nomine ad rem*; P5 (p. 17, 37–39).

The author does not think that *ens* is the common genus of all, but he wants to grasp the definition of *ens* used by those who do share this idea. Therefore, we find in the annotation three hypotheses for defining *ens*: 1. *ens* as *vox* is intended as common genus of all (*si enim ens ut vox aequivoca accipitur*); 2. one of the meanings of *ens* is a common genus (*rursus – substantiae vel qualitatis*); 3. *ens* means a *res universalis* dispersed in genera, species, and individuals (*sed hoc modo – species et individua*).

p. 131, 5 superior eo iudicetur] |S p. 86b ll. 46–49| *add.* Nota illud idem superius esse dictum in descriptione generis quod DE SPECIE PRAEDICATUR GENUS (13.1–4), hic vero ad aliud inducitur¹, ut ostendatur modus praedicationis. †quod†² id est quae res sit genus, id est quae sit illa res cui conveniat generalitas, et quae res sit species, id est cui conveniat specialitas. TRANSL.: Note that the same thing has been said above, in the description of the genus, that “the genus is predicated of the species” (13.1–4); but this statement is introduced here with another purpose, that is, in order to show the manner of predication. †...† that is to say, <to show> which thing is a genus (namely, which is the thing to which *generalitas* applies) and which thing is a species (namely, <which is the thing> to which *specialitas* applies).

COMMENTARY: This annotation is added to the commentary on *Isag.* 12.22. At this point P3 (p. 130, 24 – 131, 5) contains a summary of the previous reasoning (that a genus can be predicated of a species, but a species cannot be predicated of a genus). The addition of S aims to underline the connection of the present section with the previous lines of the *Isagoge* (*idem superius esse dictum*). The sentence can be identified with a later section of Porphyry’s text (13, 14: *de specie praedicatur genus*). Other than that, we can recognise in the words *in descriptione generis* a reference to p. 7, 20–21: *genus autem non de una specie praedicatur sed de pluribus*. The first part of this annotation can be found also in P15, with several variant readings in regard to our text (P15 = Dublin, Trinity College 494, f. 118r, I quote the text according to Iwakuma’s transcription: *nota illud ideo superius dictum esse in descriptione generis quod de specie praedicatur genus, hic autem aliud inducitur scilicet ostendatur modus praedicationis*). The second part of the annotation, that is to say the words after *modus praedicationis*, can be found in an almost identical form just some lines later (see the commentary on the following note). That gives

¹•inducitur] *correx*i ex P15, indicitur S

²•quod] <in> quid *corr.* Girard

the impression that these lines, which fit much better after p. 131, 8, were copied here because of a mistake of the scribe. That can be easily explained if we imagine that this note was in origin a marginal addition linked to the main text with a cross-reference mark. The word *quod*, which apparently makes no sense, could have originated from the misunderstanding by the scribe of this sign. On the basis of a comparison with P16, where the sentence ends after *praedicationis*, I believe the sentence ought to be interrupted with a full stop at the same point.

p. 131, 8 *utrumque sit*] |S p. 87a ll. 1–3| *add.* Id est quae res sit genus, scilicet quae res sit illa cui conveniat generalitas et quid sit species, id est quae res sit cui conveniat specialitas.

TRANSL.: [after having shown what are both genus and species,] that is to say, which thing is a genus (namely, which is the thing to which *generalitas* applies) and which thing is a species (namely, <which is the thing> to which *specialitas* applies).

COMMENTARY: This short annotation is added just some lines after the former addition and it repeats almost exactly the same words, so that the former addition seems to have been repeated and misplaced because of a mistake of the scribe. The immediately preceding words (p. 131, 7–8: *assignato quid utrumque*) seem to suggest that this annotation was supposed to be placed here (see the twofold explanation *quae res sit genus/quid sit species*, which fits with the *utrumque* of the text edited by Iwakuma).

p. 132, 25 *verum est Socratem etc.*] |S p. 87a ll. 17–23| *add.* Notandum est hanc conclusionem quam liber facit ubi dicit VERUM EST SOCRATEM esse ANIMAL ATQUE SUBSTANTIAM (13.11–13) non sequi secundum verba apposita sed secundum praedictum sensum. In omnibus enim

intelligendum est: si aliquid praedicatur de aliquo ut de contento¹, de quo iterum aliud praedicetur ut de contento², ultimum praedicatur de primo ut de contento³. Ideo quia⁴ hic Porphyrius ostendit praedicationem individui, hac⁵ occasione quidam⁶ ducti volunt individuum esse de sua materia principaliter, sicut est genus et species et differentia; sed non est ita, quia quod hic dicitur de individuo non dicitur gratia individui sed gratia generis et speciei.

TRANSL.: The following has to be noted: the conclusion reached by the book, where it says “it is true that Socrates is an animal and a substance” (13.11–13), does not follow from the words we find <before>, but from the previously stated sense. In every case it must be understood as follows: if something is predicated of something as of its content, and something else is predicated of the same as of its content, the last <element> is predicated of the first as of its content. Because Porphyry shows the predication on individuals here, some people have been induced to think that the individual belongs to his principal subject matter, like genus, species, and difference; but it is not true: what is stated here about individual is said not because of the individual but because of the genus and the species.

COMMENTARY: Philosophical content. This annotation is commenting on *Isag.* 13.9–15: *de quibus autem species praedicatur, de his necessario et speciei genus praedicabitur et generis genus usque ad generalissimum*. In other words: if *a* is predicated of Socrates as of its content and *b* is predicated of *a* as of its content, the last (*b*) is predicated of Socrates as of its content. Up until this point the annotation is very similar to Boethius’ second commentary on the *Isagoge*. In the second part, however, the text

¹•contento] *correx*i, contempto *S*

²•contento] *correx*i, contempto *S*

³•contento] *correx*i, contempto *S*

⁴•ideo quia] *legit Girard*, loquitur *legeram*

⁵•hac] *correx*i, ac *S*

⁶•quidam] *breuiatum ac difficile lectu, an quidem legendum?*

refutes an anonymous objection (*quidam*) according to which individuals are the subject matter (*materia*) of the *Isagoge*. That position is to be put in connection with the annotation to p. 64, 25: *quidam dicunt individuum esse de sua materia sed sciendum quinque res tantum esse suam materiam*. Quite the opposite – the *adnotator* says – everything that is predicated of individuals is predicated *gratia generis et speciei*. In this passage, the lower level is defined as *contentum*. For an Abelardian parallel to this terminology see Abelard, *Dial.* (p. 325, 7–10): *nam cum ex ‘continenti’ ad ‘contentum’ inferimus, videtur opponenda constantia quae hoc in illo comprehendendi demonstrat. Veluti cum dicimus: “si omne animal, tunc homo”; ibid.* (p. 340, 8–9): *quidquid praedicatur de genere ut de contento, et de specie*.

p. 135, 24 magis propriam] |S p. 87b ll. 17–42| *add.* Videnda est aequivocatio huius vocis quae est ‘differentia’. Dictum est namque in exordio¹ tractatus generis quod ideo cum genere speciem posuit *ne solum genus multiplicis significationis esse putaretur*²; ideo etiam differentiam et proprium et accidens apponere recusavit ne multiplici loquacitate animum lectoris impediret. Ex quibus verbis colligimus et differentiam et reliqua duo aequivoce debere accipi, quae aequivocatio in differentia³ hoc modo perpenditur. Ille qui prius⁴ imposuit hoc vocabulum quod est ‘differentia’ imposuit illud primum substantialibus differentiis, ita scilicet quod per hoc nomen poneret in illis quod facerent differre substantialiter; postea vero consideratum est quod omne accidens aliquo modo facit differre et ideo haec vox, scilicet ‘differentia’, est imposita omnibus accidentibus tam separabilibus quam inseparabilibus praeter substantiales differentias, imponens illis hanc proprietatem, quod faciat solummodo alteratum. Et ita hoc nomen quod est ‘differentia’, cum <in> substantialibus⁵ differentiis ponat quod substantialiter differre faciant, in

¹•exordio] exordio recusavit S *ante corr.*

²•Cf. *Isag.* p. 6, 1–2; Boeth., *In Isag.*², p. 171, 18–22; P3, p. 84, 19–20.

³•differentia] *mavult corrector*, differentiam S

⁴•prius] *an primus legendum?*

⁵•<in> substantialibus] *corr. Tarlazzi*, universalibus S

accidentibus quod solum alteratum, iudicandum est ad ea aequivocum¹. Secundum vero hanc sententiam ista divisio: differentia alia communis, alia propria, alia magis propria (cf. 14.15–16) est aequivocae vocis in significationes. Et est notandum quod illa duo membra, communis et propria, accipiuntur pro una significatione et ultimum membrum, scilicet magis propria, pro alia significatione, ut sic dicatur differentia alia communis, alia propria, alia magis propria. Et hic accipitur large differentia par ad accidens, et tantundem valet illa divisio quantum si diceretur: “accidens aliud purum, aliud substantiale; substantiale accidens idem est quod magis propria, purum idem quod communis et propria”. Potest etiam dici quod ‘differentia’ ponat eandem² rem in omnibus suis significatis, scilicet quod faciant differre. Quam sententiam videtur approbare Porphyrius ubi dicit quod OMNIS DIFFERENTIA FACIT ALTERATUM (15.3), et in hac proprietate differentia non erit aequivoca sed univoca, et tunc haec divisio ‘alia communis, alia propria, <alia>³ magis propria’ est superioris in inferiora. Vel potest dici quod sit vocis in modos, quae in hoc differt ad divisionem vocis in significationes quod vox aequivoca nihil universale ponit in suis significatis, in modos rem universalem ponit in omnibus suis significatis cum diversis <modis>⁴.

TRANSL.: We have to note the equivocity of the word (*vocis*) ‘difference’. At the very beginning of the treatise on the genus it has been said that <Porphyry> placed the species together with the genus so that one would not think that only the genus has multiple meanings; but he did not also mention difference, proprium, and accident so that he would not confuse the mind of the reader with loquacity. As we can understand from the above words, the difference and the other two elements have to be understood in an equivocal way. In the case of difference, this equivocity can be considered as follows. The person who first imposed the name ‘difference’ imposed it at the very beginning on substantial differences, so that –

¹•aequivocum] *correx*i, aequivoca *S*

²•eandem] eadem *S* (*difficile lectu*)

³•alia] *suppl. Girard*

⁴•modis] *suppl. Girard, collato p. 138, 2*

through this name – he determined that they make <something> differ substantially. Later, it was considered that every accident somehow produces a difference, so the word (*vox*) ‘difference’ was imposed on every accident, both separable and inseparable (in addition to substantial differences), attributing to them the property to produce alteration only. So, the name ‘difference’ (given that, in substantial differences, it determines that they make <something> differ substantially, but, in accidents, <it determines> that <they> only make something altered) should be judged as equivocal with respect to these. According to this position, the division according to which a difference is either common, proper, or most proper, is <the division> of an equivocal word into <its various> meanings. It should also be noted that these two members <of the division> (‘common’ and ‘proper’) are taken in one sense, while the last member (that is to say, ‘most proper’) <is taken> in another sense, so that one can say that a difference is either common, proper, or most proper. Here ‘difference’ is understood in a broad sense, on a par with ‘accident’, so that such division amounts to saying: “amongst accidents, some are pure, some are substantial; a substantial accident is the same as the most proper <difference>, a pure accident is the same as the common and proper <difference>.” Moreover, it can be said: difference determines one and the same thing in all the items it signifies, that is to say, that they make <something> differ. Porphyry seems to share this opinion when he says: “every difference makes <something> altered” (15.3); and in this property difference shall not be equivocal but univocal, and therefore the division “<a difference is either> common, proper, or most proper” is <the division> of a superior into its inferiors. Alternatively, one can say that it is <a division> of a word (*vox*) into <various> modes; this division is different from the division of a word into <various> meanings, since an equivocal word does not put anything universal in the items it signifies, whereas <the division> into modes puts a universal thing in all the items it signifies, in different ways.

COMMENTARY: This annotation is added to P3’s section *de specie* (p. 135, 24). At the very beginning of the *Isagoge* – the *adnotator* says – Porphyry

stated the equivocal nature of ‘genus’, just to avoid confusion in the reader. This equivocity is now discussed for difference and two other predicables, species and accident. Following Boethius (*In Isag.*², pp. 240, 14 – 241, 14), the *adnotator* distinguishes between substantial and accidental difference, that is to say, between a difference producing a different substance and a difference that only gives origin to a change in the same substance. In the second part of the annotation (*secundum hanc sententiam ... ista divisio*) the author collects the differences *communis* and *propria* on one side, and on the other side the difference *magis propria*. The text is, all in all, a paraphrase of Boethius (*In Isag.*², pp. 244, 12 – 245, 23): *communis* and *propria* are accidental differences, *magis propria* is a substantial one.

The same lines of Boethius’ commentary are also repeated in P3 (p. 140, 3–21), in a section that is preserved by S. That gives the impression that, while paraphrasing Boethius, the *adnotator* inserted a duplicate here.

At the end of the addition, the words *vocis in modos – cum diversis* are very similar to p. 137, 24 – 138, 2; this also renders the correction *cum diversis* <*modis*> proposed by Girard more probable. For a parallel to this sentence see also P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 10va): *hinc colligunt quidam supradictam divisionem melius esse vocum in modos quam in significationes, quia facere differre convenit omnibus, sed diverso modo, et hoc communiter attribuit eis Porphyrius*. The division *in modos/in significationes* is indebted to Boethius’ *De divisione* (p. 42, 1–9 = 888 d): *fit autem vocis diuisio tribus modis. Dividitur enim in significationes ut aequivoca vel ambigua ... alia autem modo secundum modum, haec enim non plura significant sed multis modis, ut cum dicimus “infinitum” unam rem quidem significat cuius terminus inveniri non possit, sed hoc dicimus aut secundum mensuram aut secundum multitudinem aut secundum speciem*.

p. 138, 7–10 secundum autem – generis in species] |S pp. 87b l. 46 – 88a l. 12| Si vero sic accipiatur differentia, in hoc libro non habemus aequivocationem huius vocis, sed alibi est quaerenda; et sciendum quod,

cum de substantialibus tantum intendat, [qui]¹ de communibus et propriis agens incidenter², interserit gratia³ substantialium. Notandum est quod substantialis differentia facit differre substantialiter, id est facit aliud in essentia diversas |S p. 88 a| species inter se vel individua diversarum specierum, vel ipsam speciem a suo genere, id est ipsum genus substantialibus differentiis informatum a se ipso puro et informi considerato, quia rationalitas adveniens animali facit ipsum animal formatum aliud a se ipso informi considerato; quia si <non>⁴ faceret animal formatum aliud a se ipso puro, homo⁵ non differret ab asino in substantiali esse quia si animal formatum rationalitate non est aliud a se ipso informi, tunc est idem, et ita illa res quae est homo est idem in suo substantiali esse quod animal suum genus. Item: <si>⁶ irrationale adveniens eidem animali non facit diversum a se ipso informi, id⁷ tunc est idem substantiali esse et ita asinus non differt ab homine in substantiali esse quia asinus nihil est aliud quam animal informatum irrationalitate quod non differt a se ipso informi in substantia et item homo nihil est aliud quam animal informatum rationalitate, quod similiter non differt a se informi. Quare homo et asinus, si differre non faciunt animal [animal]⁸ a se sine formis considerato, non differre videntur inter se in substantia.

TRANSL.: If difference is understood in this way, we do not find the equivocity of this word (*vox*) in this book, but it must be sought elsewhere. We have to keep in mind that because <Porphyry> intends to tackle just the substantial <differences>, discussing the common and proper ones incidentally, he inserts these because of substantial differences. The following has to be noted: substantial difference makes two things

¹•qui] *seclusi*

²•incidenter] *correx*i, incidendum *S*

³•gratia] *corr. Girard*, genera *S*

⁴•non] *addidi*

⁵•homo] *correx*i, iam *S*

⁶•si] *suppl. Girard*

⁷•id] *correx*i, in *S*, in <substantia> *suppl. Girard*

⁸•animal] *secl. Girard*

different concerning the substance, that is to say, it makes different species or the individuals of different species different in their essence; or it makes the species different from its genus, that is, <it makes> the genus, once informed by substantial differences, <different> from the genus itself considered as pure and not shaped by forms. Rationality, for instance, attaching itself to the animal, makes the animal, once informed, different from itself considered without forms. If <difference> would not make the informed animal different from the <animal> itself in its purity, a human would not be different from a donkey in its substantial being: if an animal informed by rationality is not different from itself <when> not informed <by rationality>, it must be the same, and that thing which is a human would be identical in its substantial being to its genus, that is the animal <in its purity>. Again: if irrationality, attaching itself to the animal, does not make it different from itself <when> not informed, this <animal> is identical to <its> substantial being, so a donkey is not different from a human in its substantial being: a donkey, indeed, is nothing else than an animal informed by irrationality, which is no different in substance from itself <when> not informed <by irrationality>; and likewise, a human is nothing else than an animal informed by rationality, which, similarly, is no different from itself <when> not informed <by rationality>. Therefore, if 'man' and 'donkey' do not make the animal different from itself considered without forms, then they do not seem to differ from each other in substance.

COMMENTARY: Text. In the pages 87b–88a the text of S shows several differences, both in extension and sequence, from Iwakuma's printed text. As in the printed edition, the section on difference starts with p. 87b, but after that Sankt Gallen's text shows the following order:

Sankt Gallen (S)	Iwakuma's edition (P3)
p. 87b ll. 7–17	p. 135, 1–24
p. 87b ll. 17–42	unpublished
p. 87b ll. 43–46	p. 138, 2–7 unde ait – scilicet infinitatem
p. 87b l. 46 – 88a l. 12	p. 138, 7–10 secundum autem – generis in species, with substantial differences
p. 88a ll. 12–45	p. 136, 1 – 137, 20 tribus modis – propria differentia
om. S	p. 137, 20 – 138, 2 hic etiam dici – tamen diversis modis
p. 88a l. 45 – 88b l. 1	p. 138, 11–15, with variants
p. 88b ll. 1–2	unpublished

In short, instead of the text of P3 published by Iwakuma, we find that: 1. S has an unpublished section after 135, 24 (S p. 87b ll. 17–42); 2. The section p. 138, 2–15 from P3 is misplaced in S and, where it is present, contains several variants; 3. The section p. 137, 20 – 138, 2 from P3 is omitted in S; 4. S adds two unpublished lines (88b ll. 1–2) after p. 138, 15. From that point onwards, S again agrees with the printed text (p. 138, 16 and further).

Philosophical content. Following Boethius, the section of P3 on difference (p. 135–137) distinguishes between *differentia communis*, *propria*, and *magis propria*. The first one can be identified with the *accidens separabile*, the second one with the *accidens inseparabile*, and the third one with the difference that shows the substance of each species (*quae substantiam uniuscuiusque speciei monstrant*). As a result, *differentia* is not a *vox aequivoca* (P3, pp. 135, 1 – 137, 20, in particular p. 137, 22: *non tamen differentia est vox aequivoca*). The unpublished annotation starts from this distinction, although in S it is placed *before* it (once again, S has a tendency to misplace sections of the text against their logical order). The first part of the reasoning seems to add elements that are not found in the text of P3 published by Iwakuma: substantial difference, for instance, makes things differ *substantialiter*, that is to say, it makes individuals of the same species different from each other, or it

makes a species different from its genus, or an informed genus from a pure genus. As in the former addition to p. 108, 6, the concept of purity is used to indicate the unformed genus.

In the second part of the note (*item...*) we have perhaps to recognise a *modus tollens*: if difference did not make the *genus formatum* different from the *genus informe*, species would be identical with their substantial being; as species which are both under the genus animal, a man and a donkey would then be no different from each other. If a man and a donkey do not make the informed genus different from the pure genus, then a man and a donkey do not seem to be different from each other in substance.

Parallels. The first lines of the annotation are similar to P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 9va): *et cum hic agat de communibus et propriis et magis propriis differentiis, de magis propriis principaliter intendit ... et gratia substantialium de communibus et propriis incidenter interserit.*

pp. 136, 1 – 137, 20 tribus modis – propria differentia] **S p. 88a ll. 12–45**

p. 138, 11–15 hic etiam – differre facit] **[S pp. 88a l. 45 – 88b l. 2]** Et rursus propria plura quam magis propria; communis enim differentia diversas species et diversa individua eiusdem speciei et idem individuum a se ipso differre facit; propria vero diversas species et diversa individua eiusdem speciei, sed numquam idem individuum a se ipso differre facit. Magis propria vero nec idem individuum a se ipso nec individua eiusdem specialissimae speciei sed diversas species a se differre facit.

TRANSL.: Again: proper <difference makes different> more elements than the most proper; indeed common difference makes different species differ <from each other>, and different individuals belonging to the same species, and even an individual from itself; proper difference makes different species and different individuals of the same species differ, but never an individual from itself. The most proper difference does not make

an individual differ from itself nor the individuals of the most specific species, but it makes different species differ from each other.

COMMENTARY: These lines are very similar, but not identical, to p. 138, 11–15. For the sake of clarity, I prefer transcribing the text of the manuscript in full. The threefold distinction is based on Boethius (see the commentary on p. 138, 7–10). The focus here is on the number of entities affected by the three kinds of differences. The common difference makes species differ from each other, different individuals from each other, and the same individual from itself. The proper difference, *qua* inseparable accident, cannot make the individual differ from itself. The most proper difference, *qua* specific difference, can only make species differ from each other.

An interesting parallel to our text can be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 9vb): *Nota quod communis differentia et propria plura fac<it> differe quam magis propria. Communis enim differentia diversa genera et diversas species et individua diversa eiusdem speciei et idem individuum a se ipso differre facit, ut sessio quae est in Socrates facit eum differre ab arbore et a ceteris et a se ipso stante; similiter et propria, ut cicatrix; magis propria vero nec idem individuum a se ipso nec individua eiusdem specialissimae speciei, sed diversas species a se differre facit.*

p. 139, 21 ut nasi curvitas etc] |S p. 88b ll. 23–24| ut nasi curvitas et cicatrix oculorum eo (*spatium vacuum reliquit*) ex vulnere. Notandum quod cum deberet exemplificare de inseparabili accidenti...

TRANSL.. [Inseparable accident is] like a curved nose, a scar in the eyes ... resulting from a wound. It has to be noted that <at this point>, when he had to give an example of an inseparable accident...

COMMENTARY: This short annotation just adds some examples to the preceding reasoning. The scribe left a blank space after *oculorum eo*, since he probably used an unreadable model. The content of the lost words

should have been similar to the *Isagoge* and Boethius' commentary: see *Isag.* (transl. Boethii, 14.22–23): *ut nasi curvitas, caecitas oculorum, cicatrix, cum ex vulnere obcalluerit*; Boethius, *In Isag.*² (pp. 242, 22 – 243, 3).

p. 141, 11 *substantiali esse*] |S p. 88b ll. 46–48| *add.* Videndum est quod OMNIS (15.3) hic apponitur contra usum quia non colligit individua, sed tantum universalia, scilicet communem et propriam et magis propriam differentiam, et ut colligat individua addit UNIVERSALITER.

TRANSL.: The following has to be noted: “every” (*omnis*, 15.3) is used here against the common usage: it does not bring together individuals, but only universals, that is to say, common, proper, and most proper difference; for bringing together individuals he adds “universally” (*universaliter*).

COMMENTARY: This short annotation just adds a lexical clarification concerning *omnis* and *universaliter* (*Isag.* 15.3; *In Isag.*², pp. 244, 1 – 245, 4).

p. 148, 14–16 *ut materiale – suscipiens est*] |S p. 90a ll. 4–5| et quod sit idem in omnibus ut materiale esse vel speciale esse quantum ad individua neque intensionem neque remissionem suscipiens.

TRANSL.: [We find this here: <ifferences> complete the definition of each thing, but the <essence> of each is one and the same in every subject]; it is the same in each thing as material or special being as far it concerns the individuals, and admits neither intension nor remission.

p. 149, 6 *non ab eis continentur*] |S p. 90a ll. 18–20| *add.* Potest etiam sic dici, ut fiat per apparentia membra: differentiae alicuius rei vel sunt divisivae eiusdem rei vel constitutivae, quia illae quae erunt constitutivae numquam erunt eiusdem divisivae.

TRANSL.: Alternatively, it can be said like this so that <the division> is made through apparent members: differences of a certain thing are either divisive or constitutive of it, since those that are constitutive will never be divisive of the same thing.

COMMENTARY: The starting point of this annotation is *Isag.* 16.21–17.3 (in particular 17.1–3: *hae quidem quae divisivae sunt differentiae generum completivae fiunt et constitutivae specierum*). This short addition specifies that the same differences cannot be constitutive and divisive in relation to the same thing.

p. 156, 10 quod fieri non potest] |S p. 91a ll. 17–23| *add.* Vel aliter potest legi supradicta littera ista, scilicet NEQUE ENIM (17.19). Dictum est species habere differentias a generibus, sed tamen¹ genus non habet oppositas et hic accipimus ENIM pro ‘tamen’. Vel aliter: species habet differentias a generibus, sed tamen genera non habent eas in actu et vere genera non habent, quia non habent eas oppositas. Et hoc habes ibi, NEQUE ENIM OPPOSITAS HABET (17.19), quod probat a toto sic: si nulla habet opposita, tunc non habet oppositas differentias, et hoc extra²; quam consequentiam sic probat in littera a destructione consequentis, quia si haberet eas oppositas, haberet opposita; et hoc est ibi: NAM IN EODEM (17.19–20).

TRANSL.: The words above, that is to say “nor indeed” (17.19), can be explained in another way. It has been said that species have their differences from the genera; but the genus does not have opposite differences; in this case we read “indeed” as “nonetheless”. Alternatively, <we can explain these words like this>: species have differences from the genera; nonetheless, the genera do not have differences in act and genera do not truly have differences, because they do not have opposite differences. This is what you find here: “nor does it have the opposite

¹•tamen] *an tantum legendum?*

²•Cf. P3 p. 154, 2–4: itaque genus consideratum extra omnia inferiora non habet differentias contrarias.

<differences>” (17.19), which <Porphyry> shows with an argument *a toto* in the following way: if <the genus> does not have any opposites, it does not have opposite differences <if considered> apart from other things. <Porphyry> proves this consequence in his writing with a *destructio consequentis*: if the genus had opposite differences, it would have opposites; this argument can be found in the words: “indeed in the same thing <they will have opposites at the same time>” (17.19–20).

COMMENTARY: The mention of the *littera* connects this annotation to the former lemma, p. 155, 29: *littera sic continuatur*. The lemma of the Latin translation is affected by a variant reading (neque autem *Kö Minio Paluello*] *om. Fl*, neque enim *cett*). That shows that the *adnotator* read a Boethian translation that was affected by the most common reading in medieval manuscripts. In the text of the preceding lines (which is identical to P3’s printed text) one reads that the *genus in sua puritate* does not have *in actu* opposite differences. The *adnotator* is aware of the impropriety of *neque enim* at the beginning of a sentence and proposes an explanation of these words as synonymous to *tamen*. A second explanation is introduced by *vel aliter*: a species derives its differences from genera; in genera, however, differences are not *in actu*. In this way, the presence of opposite differences in the genus is explained with the opposition *potestate/actu*.

Parallels. For a similar statement see P20 (Wien, ÖNB 2486, f. 55rb): *Neque enim* (17.19). *Vere genus non habet differentias quia non habet eas oppositas. A pari vel a toto. Vel aliter: Nam unde etc. Species abundat a genere differentiis, sed tamen habet eas a genere et vere habet eas a genere. Hoc extra. Nam unde habebunt eas differentias species nisi a genere, quod diceretur a nullo. Neque enim: dico quod species habeant differentias a genere, sed tamen genus non habet eas in sui constitutione. Hoc extra. Et vere non habet eas in sui constitutione, neque habet eas oppositas. A pari vel a toto.*

p. 159, 9 vel rationalitatem] [S p. 91b ll. 14–17] *add.* enim proportio est proprie duarum habitudinum similitudo, ut cum duae habitudines inter se

sunt similes earum similitudo vocatur proportio. Inter aes enim et statuam consideratur quaedam habitudo, inter hominem et animal alia; quae duae inter se sunt similes, quare similitudo vocatur proportio.

TRANSL.: Proportion is properly a similarity of two relations (*habitudinum*): for example, when two ratios (*habitudines*) are similar to each other, their similarity is called ‘proportion’. Between bronze and a statue there is a certain ratio (*habitudo*), between human and animal there is another one; but these <ratios> are similar to each other, so their similarity is called a proportion.

COMMENTARY: The manuscripts of the Boethian translation (*Isag.* 18.9–15) juxtapose the terms *proportionem/similitudinem* and *proportionaliter/similiter*. This annotation is quite similar to a paraphrase of *In Isag.*², pp. 267, 3 – 269, 5 (P3, p. 158, 19–27); it aims to connect *similitudo* and *proportio*; for a parallel see Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, *Isag.* (p. 79, 26): *est autem proportio similitudo habitudinum*.

p. 161, 19–22 sciendum est – unam descriptionem] |S p. 92a ll. 2–6| Vel sic est PARS EIUS QUOD EST ESSE REI id est pars ([19.7–8] *spatium vacuum reliquit*) essentiae rei id est speciei; differentia enim speciei pars formalis est. Et faciunt duas descriptiones differentiae de hoc quod dicit Porphyrius: et quod CONDUCIT AD ESSE et de hoc QUOD EST EIUS QUOD EST ESSE REI PARS EST; secundum quam sententiam littera superius exposita est, quidam vero unam.

TRANSL.: [Some people give a single description <of difference>; the text is explained in the following way]: Alternatively, “<difference> is a part of what the thing is” (19.7–8), that is to say, it is a part of the essence of the thing, that is, of the species; difference, indeed, is the formal component of the species. On the basis of Porphyry’s words, they give two definitions of ‘difference’: it “is what leads to being” or “is a part of what

the thing is”. The text has been exposed before according to this interpretation; some people, nonetheless, give a single definition.

COMMENTARY: After the words *faciunt duas* the text of the annotation is almost identical to P3’s printed text. However, I prefer editing the addition in this form in order to better highlight how its reading differs from the printed text. After the quotation from *Isagoge*’s text a word is lacking; the model used by the scribe was perhaps unreadable at this point. Based on the parallel with P3 (p. 161, 8–9: *est etiam illa quae est ars eius quod est esse rei id est quae est pars definitionis*), we can imagine the scribe omitted *definitionis*.

p. 162, 3 esse ipsius speciei] |S p. 92a ll. 10–12| *add.* Siquidem †insistit vim†¹ litterae sine determinatione verum est; differentia est QUOD CONDUKIT AD ESSE (19.7), non est enim natura generis quod conducat ad esse cum ipsum sit esse speciei, differentia vero ad esse conduit quia genus informando speciem² constituit.

TRANSL.: If we inspect the text without any determination, it is true: difference is “what leads to being” (19.7); the nature of the genus is not what leads to being: it is, in itself, the essence of the species; however, difference is what leads to being since, informing the genus, it constitutes the species.

COMMENTARY: Paraphrasing the *Isagoge* (p. 19, 7–8), P3’s printed text quotes two anonymous opinions about the definition of difference. According to the first one, difference can be defined as the thing which brings the species to its being (*condukit ... speciem ad suum esse*) and which is part of the thing (*est pars eius quod est esse rei*). The second definition seems to be attested in Porphyry’s text and just contains “the thing which brings the species to its being” (without mentioning being part

¹•siquidem – vim] *an si quidam inspicit vim corrigendum?*

²•speciem] *correxī, specie S*

of the thing); to avoid any confusion with the genus, the *adnotator* adds: “which is part of the essence of a thing”. The nature of the genus – so specifies the addition of **S** – does not bring the species to being; but difference does: indeed, difference constitutes the species by giving a form to the genus.

Parallels. For other discussions on the concept of *differentia* see P5 (p. 33, 22–28): *sed illud dicunt esse differentiam quod conducit ad esse, id est quod cum alio ducit ad esse, id est constituit substantialem diffinitionem*<*m*>; *et quia genus cum differentia ducit ad esse, determinat: et quod, scilicet differentia, est pars eius, id est generis, quod genus est esse rei, id est speciei, scilicet genus dat esse speciei, id est ipsum genus est materia speciei*; Abelard, *LNPS, Isag.* (p. 569, 24–28).

p. 164, 1 in iuventute pubescere] |**S pp. 92a l. 37 – 92b l. 7**| *add.* Hic videndum quomodo †haec vox†, quae est ‘propriū’, aequivocum ille prius¹ imposuit. Hoc nomen quod est ‘propriū’² imposuit ille³ risibilitati⁴ et rudibilitati⁵ et similibus secundum hanc proprietatem quod conveniunt alicui speciei omni et soli et semper, ponendo illud in illis, convenire alicui omni et soli et semper; et ita ‘propriū’ ad risibile et rudibile et similia univocum, quia idem ponit in omnibus, hoc scilicet quod omni speciei et soli et semper conveniunt. Postea vero ipse impositor consideravit medicinam et similia; secundum hanc proprietatem imposuit eis hoc nomen quod est ‘propriū’, quae diversa est a supradicta proprietate. Quare cum diversis rebus secundum diversas proprietates hoc nomen sit impositum, iure ad illa dicitur aequivocum; hoc idem in aliis notandum est.

¹•prius] *an primus legendum?*

²•hic videndum – quod est proprium] Hic videndum quomodo haec vox quae est ‘propriū’ aequivoca <est>. Ille <qui> prius imposuit hoc nomen quod est ‘propriū’ *corr. Girard*; *an* Hic videndum quomodo hanc vocem, quae est ‘propriū’, aequivocam ille prius imposuit. Hoc nomen quod est ‘propriū’... *corrigendum?*

³•ille] *correxerit Girard*, illud *S*

⁴•risibilitati] *corr. Tarlazzi*, ribibilitate *S*

⁵•rudibilitati] *corr. Tarlazzi*, rudibilitate *S*

Hic quidam obiciunt¹ quod tertia significatio proprii nihil differt a prima; est enim prima quod convenit soli et non omni; tertia vero quae convenit omni et soli et aliquando; ex tertia vero significatione sic sequitur pri<ma>². Verbi gratia si canescere convenit omni homini in senectute |S p. 92b | tantum, tunc non omni homini convenit, quia si in senectute tantum convenit, non convenit in iuventute; si in iuventute non convenit, tunc iuvenis non canescit; si iuvenis non canescit, quidam homo non canescit; et si hoc est, tunc³ canescere non convenit <omni>⁴ homini et sic, cum non conveniat omni et conveniat soli, convenit soli et non omni. Itaque non differre videtur tertia a prima, sed differt; illud enim quod ‘convenit soli et non omni’ sic debet intelligi quod nec semper nec aliquando omni conveniat, ut medicina conveniat soli et non omni, non semper nec aliquando omni convenit, canescere vero – quod continetur sub tertia – aliquando omni convenit.

TRANSL.: We must now take into account how he first imposed this word (*vox*) ‘*proprium*’ as equivocal. He imposed the name ‘*proprium*’ on the ability to laugh, the ability to bray and on similar things on the basis of the property that they <all> always happen to one whole species alone, determining this in them – namely, <the fact of> always happening to one whole <species> alone. Therefore, ‘*proprium*’, considered with respect to <what> is able to laugh, able to bray, and similar things, is a univocal term, because it determines one and the same <property> in all of them, namely, that they always happen to one whole species alone. Later, the name giver considered medicine and similar things; and he imposed the name ‘*proprium*’ on them according to this property, which is different from the former. Therefore, given that this name is imposed on different things on the basis of different properties, it is correctly described as equivocal with respect to them; and the same can be noted in other circumstances.

¹•obiciunt] *correx*i, abiciunt *S*

²•prima] *supplevi*, pri *S*

³•tunc] *corr. Girard*, non *S*

⁴•omni] *suppl. Girard*

Here some people object that the third meaning of ‘*proprium*’ does not differ at all from the first one: the first one is <the fact of> happening to a certain <species> alone, thought not to the whole <species>; the third one is <the fact of> happening to a certain whole <species> only, and at a certain time: so, the first <meaning> follows from the third. For instance: if becoming grey-haired happens to every human but just in old age, then it does not happen to every human, because if it only happens in old age, it does not happen in youth and if it does not happen in youth, a young human does not become grey-haired; and if a young human does not become grey-haired, there is a human who does not become grey-haired; and if this is so, then becoming grey-haired does not happen to every human. And so, it does not happen to the whole <species> but it happens to the <species> only, so it happens <to the species> only but not the whole <species>. If it is like this, the third <meaning> does not seem to differ from the first. But it does differ! The sentence “it happens to the <species> only but not to the whole <species>” is to be understood in the sense that it does not happen always nor at a certain time (as for example medicine happens to the <human species> only, but not to the whole <human species> and it does not happen always nor at a certain time to the whole species); becoming grey-haired, however – which falls under the third meaning – happens at a certain time to the whole <human species>.

COMMENTARY: The text of *Isag.* 19.18–20.1 distinguishes between *propria* that happen: **a.** *solī etsi non omni*; **b.** *omni etsi non solī*; **c.** *solī et omni et aliquando*; **d.** *omni et solī et semper*. P3’s published text (pp. 163, 13 – 164, 2) is, all in all, a simple paraphrase of Boethius’ translation. The text of **S** has several differences from Iwakuma’s edition, for instance the present addition and the misplacing of the section between p. 164, 19 and 165, 13. Concerning this annotation, the anonymous *adnotator* stresses the equivocity of *proprium*: in Boethius’ commentary (pp. 275, 3 – 280, 12) the adjective *aequivocus* is not used for *proprium*. Quite the opposite, in the opinion of the *adnotator* ‘*proprium*’ is imposed *diversis rebus secundum diversas proprietates*.

The second part of the annotation addresses an objection by some anonymous *quidam*. The third meaning of *proprium* – they say – is not different from the first. Their reasoning for showing that is quite sophisticated: *canescere* happens just to old people; so, *canescere* happens just to a part of the human species. *Sed differt* – adds the *adnotator*. His argument is based on the fact that the first kind of *proprium* does not happen *semper nec aliquando*, that is to say, it is not connected with differences that happen at a certain time. The third kind, on the other hand, happens to the whole species but it admits differences that happen at a certain time.

Parallels. P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 13vb): *quod dicit accidit soli et non omni, intelligendum est soli et nunquam omni, quia nisi nunquam intelligatur ex tertia significatione sequitur prima, quia quidquid omni aliquando, non convenit omni. Verbi gratia si canescere convenit omni homini in senectute tantum, tunc non omni convenit, quia si <in> senectute tantum convenit, tunc non convenit in iuventute; si in iuventute non convenit, tunc iuvenis non canescit; si iuvenis non canescit, quidam homo non canescit; et si hoc est, canescere non convenit omni homini, sed non potest inferri nunquam ei convenire; for a similar reasoning, although concerning the fourth kind of *proprium*, see P3 (p. 166, 10–19, in particular ll. 11–12): *si convenit omni convenit semper quia si non convenit semper nec convenit omni*.*

Text. The Latin text seems to be corrupted at the beginning of the addition (see the critical notes); the meaning, however, is clear enough.

p. 164, 19–21 hic obicitur – ad senectutem] |S p. 92b ll. 8–9| Hic obicitur: si convenit omni homini, tunc morienti puero in ventre matris accidit canescere in senectute, et si hoc est, tunc perdurabit usque in senectutem¹.

¹•senectutem] mavult corrector, senectute S

TRANSL.: Here, some people object: if it happens to every human, becoming grey-haired in old age happens even to a baby who dies in the womb of its mother; if it is so, then the baby will last until old age.

COMMENTARY: This annotation is a rewriting of P3's text as printed by Iwakuma (p. 164, 19–21; at this point the manuscripts **O**, **A** and **P** all present the same version of the text), but, for the sake of clarity, I prefer to give a full transcription of the note.

Parallels. For similar examples concerning a dying baby, see also P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 13vb): *hic obicitur: si convenit omni homini ea in senectute, tunc puero morienti; et si hoc est, tunc perdurabit usque ad senectutem, quod falsum est*; P17 (BnF, Lat. 3237, f. 129vb): *sed falsum videtur quod canescere in senectute omni conveniat homini, cum ei qui puer moritur non conveniat*; P20 (f. 56vb–57ra): *ut homini in senectute canescere (19.22). Nota quod dicit hoc esse proprium quod convenit omni homini et soli et aliquando falsum videtur esse, quia hoc nunquam convenit omni homini, scil. canescere in senectute, quia nonnisi illis qui ad senectutem ve[niunt], et si nunquam convenit omni, nunquam convenit soli.*

pp. 164, 21 – 165, 13 item falsum videtur – de una sola specie ut proprius] **[S p. 92b 9–22]**

p. 164, 1–18 aliud quod convenit – canescere in senectute] **[S p. 92b ll. 22–31]**

p. 165, 22 quia si] **[S p. 92b ll. 37–38]** de quocumque praedicatur de eo scilicet inanimato corpore¹ descriptio alicuius et describunt illius sed

¹•de eo – corpore] *linea infrascripta del. S*

COMMENTARY: In the text of P3 printed by Iwakuma, the objection of the anonymous *quidam* (p. 165, 20) starts from the definition of a *proprium* as *potens est ridere*. If *potens est ridere* is the definition of *risibilis*, the inanimate body of the foetus (which *in potentia* can laugh) must be defined as a human being. After this, the printed version of P3 provides further determinations of the definition of *risibilis* (p. 166, 2–4).

The short annotation preserved by S does not seem to have a full meaning. The words *de eo scilicet inanimato corpore* have been written and then deleted with an underlining; the words *descriptio alicuius et describunt illius*, on the other hand, are asyntactical; all that gives the impression that these are incomplete fragments of text that have been written here in an uncontrolled way.

p. 168, 18 subiectum non corrumpitur] |S p. 93a ll. 12–22| *add.* Vel possumus dicere, quod melius est, omne accidens tam purum quam substantiale¹ in hac accidentis descriptione describi. Omne enim accidens suum proprium fundamentum habet a quo sustentetur, cui et adesse et abesse potest absque eius corruptione, ut rationalitas proprium habet fundamentum animal, risibile hominem, quibus et adesse et abesse possunt absque eorum corruptione. Secundum quam sententiam quantitas et cetera² praedicamenta praeter substantiam hic describuntur in quantum sunt accidentia et, sicut in ceteris, sic hic huius vocis quae est ‘accidens’ notanda est aequivocatio. Et dicimus accidens aequivocum ad separabilia et ad <in>separabilia³, ponentes in separabilibus hanc proprietatem, quod separantur a subiectis, in inseparabilibus quod non separantur. Potest etiam dici quod ‘accidens’ significat substantias, secundum quod⁴ homo dicitur accidens in tractatu aliquod, et tunc ponit⁵ in illis extraneitatem. Rursus

¹•substantiale] *correx*i, substantialem S

²•cetera] cetera cetera S

³•inseparabilia] *correx*i, separabilia S

⁴•quod] *correx*i ex suggestu Girard, pro S

⁵•ponit] *an* ponenti *legendum*?

ita accipitur quod ponit¹ in rebus accidentibus esse in subiecto, et ad istas significationes² iure dicitur aequivocum.

TRANSL.: Alternatively, we can more properly say: every accident, both pure and substantial, falls under this definition of accident. For every accident has its own proper fundament by which it is supported, and to which it can be present or absent without its corruption. Rationality, for instance, has animal as its proper fundament, the ability to laugh <has> human <as its proper fundament>, to which they can be present or absent without their destruction. According to this opinion, quantity and other categories, apart from substance, are described here as accidents; as in other cases, we have to note here the equivocal character of the word (*vox*) ‘accident’. We say that ‘accident’ can be equivocal in relation to separable and inseparable things: we put in the separables the property that they can be separated from substances, in the inseparable <accidents> the property that they cannot be separated. Alternatively, we can say that ‘accident’ means substances, and according to this human is called “a certain accident” in the treatise, and then Porphyry puts in them the property of being extraneous. Moreover, it is understood that he puts in the accidental things the property of being in a subject, and in relation to these meanings <accidents> are correctly called equivocal.

COMMENTARY: This is the first annotation to the section *de accidenti*. Porphyry – says the printed text of P3 – excludes the *substantialis differentia* and the *proprium* from the accidents; P3, on the other side, points out that Porphyry’s position is more restrictive than Aristotle’s (p. 168, 14–18). The addition of S at the very beginning is a simple paraphrase of *Isagoge*’s text. Quoting the example of rationality, the *adnotator* seems to be on a very different path than Boethius; according to the latter, rationality, for instance, is a substantial characteristic and it cannot be removed without destruction of the substrate (*In Isag.*², p. 282,

¹•ponit] *an ponitur legendum?*

²•significationes] *correx*i, significationis S

1 – 283, 4): *ergo quod dictum est et adesse et abesse, non re sed animo intellegendum est. Alioquin et substantialia, quae omnino separari non possunt, si animo et cogitatione disiungimus, ut si ab homine rationabilitatem auferamus – quam licet actu separare non possumus, tamen animi imaginatione disiungimus – statim perit hominis species quod idem in accidentibus non fit: sublato enim accidenti cogitatione species manet.* This annotation is closer to P14's commentary (BnF 17813, f. 14rb): *si enim respiciamus earum proprium subiectum, abesse possunt vel ratione ab eo, ut cum animal sit proprium rationalitatis subiectum, sicut secundum quosdam superius probatum est, ab animali rationalitas potest separari. Nec dico tantum posse separari ab animali in eius simplicitate, quia tunc nemo sanus dubitat ei non inesse; sed dico posse separari ab ea re quae est homo, non in quantum est homo, sed in quantum est animal.* For rationality as a substantial characteristic see Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, Isag. (p. 42, 14–19).

In the last lines, the doctrine according to which 'accident' can be identified with the second substance and the short, cryptic allusion to the *extraneitas* of accidents are worthy of consideration. These statements can be explained with a (polemical) reference to Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, Cat. (p. 150, 1–4): *quare genera et species tantum, quae primas substantias continent, dicantur secundae substantiae et non etiam accidentalia vocabula, causam reddit, quia scilicet ista post primas substantias secundam significationem habent et dignius rem subiectam nominant quam accidentalia vocabula. Haec enim in essentia rem appellant et secundum naturam substantiae sunt imposita, accidentalia vero nomina extranea et adventitia proprietate conveniunt.*

p. 172, 19 namque animal etc.] |S p. 93b ll. 7–9| *add.* Quod dicit animal praedicari DE EQUIS ET BOBUS (21.8): est notandum quod, cum debet exemplificare quod animal praedicatur de speciebus, exemplificat de individuis, scilicet ideo exemplificat de individuis ubi debet exemplificare

de speciebus quia species nihil aliud est quam substantialis similitudo collecta¹ ex omnibus individuis.

TRANSL.: <Porphyry> says that ‘animal’ can be predicated of “horses and oxen” (21.8); the following has to be noted: when he has to give an example <to show> that ‘animal’ is predicated of species, he gives an example concerning individuals, that is to say, he gives an example concerning individuals in a place where he should give an example concerning species: species, indeed, is nothing else than a substantial similarity <that has been> collected from all individuals.

COMMENTARY: The starting point of this addition is the text of *Isag.* 21.8–10: *namque animal de equis et bubus et canibus praedicatur quae sunt species et de hoc equo et de hoc bove quae sunt individua*. Actually, Porphyry’s text does not give examples of individuals *instead of* species, but gives examples of individuals *beyond* species. For a definition of species as *substantialis similitudo* see Boethius, *In Isag.*² (p. 166, 16–17): *nihilque aliud species esse putanda est nisi cogitatio collecta ex individuorum dissimilium numero substantiali similitudine, genus uero cogitatio collecta ex specierum similitudine*; *ibid.* (p. 229, 7–10): *in speciebus etiam idem considerari potest. Ut enim ipsae individua, quae sunt infinita, una similitudine substantiali colligunt, ita indiuidua speciem propria infinitate distribuunt*.

p. 173, 18 quot suum genus] |S p. 93b ll. 19–20| add. RATIONALE ENIM (21.21–22.1). Hic ostendit in parte quod differentia continet species, licet non tot contineat quot suum genus.

TRANSL.: “Rationality indeed” (21.21–22.1). Here <Porphyry> shows in part that difference contains the species, although <difference> does not contain as many <species> as its genus.

¹•collecta] *correx*i, *collecta* S; *verba* cal-lecta – individuis *in sequenti versu* praebet S

p. 174, 9–10 hanc vero – ut genera etc] |S p. 93b ll. 32–37| Notandum est hoc omne dictum, quod diversa differentia quae dicit RATIONE UTI (22.10) praedicari¹ de rationali ut differentia. Omne enim dividens praedicatur de suo diviso particulariter; si divisum sit universale, totum ad dividenda; et cum RATIONE UTI de rationali praedicetur particulariter ut differentia eius divisiva, praedicatur etiam ut existens differentia de inferioribus RATIONALIS. Hanc vero communitatem ostendit Porphyrius dicens: ET QUAEcumQUE PRAEDICANTUR DE GENERE UT GENERA (22.3–4) etc.

TRANSL.: The following has to be noted: “use of reason” (22.10) <is> a different difference which is predicated of a rational being as difference. Everything causing division is predicated of its divided things in a particular way; if the divided is universal, it is a whole with reference to its dividings. Since “use of reason” is predicated of the rational in a particular way, that is to say, as a difference causing division, “rational” is also predicated of inferior things as existing difference. Porphyry <shows> this commonality with the words: “Whatever things are also predicated of genus as genera”, (22.3–4) etc.

COMMENTARY: This annotation substitutes the printed text of P3, p. 174, 9–10 (*Isag.* 22.3–4: *et quaecumque praedicantur de genere ut genus et de his quae sub ipso sunt speciebus praedicantur*). P3, like Boethius (*In Isag.*², p. 293, 1 – 294, 1), argues that two lower differences can be predicated of *rationalis differentia*, that is to say, *habere rationem* and *ratione uti*. Therefore – says the *adnotator* – predication *ut genus* can be used for the genus as well as for lower species; this way, predication *ut differentia* can be used for difference and for lower species as well (for a parallel see P5, p. 37, 30–35). Compared to Boethius and to the text of P3, some important elements are added: 1. *omne dividens praedicatur de suo diviso particulariter*; this statement is also attested in *De divisionibus*, attributed to Abelard (p. 157, 11–15): *intentio vero omnis divisionis est ut*

¹•praedicari] *an praedicatur corrigendum?*

ipsa dividencia recipiant praedicationem sui divisi, aut singillatim tantum, aut collectim tantum, aut utroque modo et ut ipsum divisum recipiat praedicationem suorum dividendum particulariter; 2. si divisum sit universale, totum ad dividencia.

p. 175, 11 quam accidens praedicetur] |S pp. 93b l. 49 – 94a l. 4| *add.* QUADRUPES |94 a| VERO (22.20). Probat a parte differentiae, quod differentia praedicatur de paucioribus quam genus, quia quadrupes de solis IIII pedes¹ habentibus; quod dicit DE SOLIS IIII PEDES HABENTIBUS (22.20–21) intelligendum est secundum naturam, non secundum actum; sed et equus tamen IIII pedes haberet ut minus² de eo praedicaretur quadrupes secundum naturam.

TRANSL.: “Quadruped” (22.20). <Porphyry> shows, starting from the difference with an argument *a parte*, that difference is predicated of fewer things than genus, since ‘quadruped’ is predicated only of animals that have four feet. When he says “only of animals that have four feet” (22.20–21), <it> has to be understood according to nature, not according to act; but even if a horse had three feet only, we would call it ‘quadruped’ according to nature.

COMMENTARY: The addition preserved in S is a quite simple extension of the previous lines. The number of elements to which the predicable can be applied becomes less when one moves from genus to difference, to proprium and accident. For the question on the nature of an amputee, see Martin 2003.

¹•pedes] *correx*i, pedis S

²•sed et – minus] sed et<si> equus tantum tres pedes haberet, non minus *vel aliquid simile intelligendum puto*; et<si> equus tantum tres pedes haberet vel minus *ma*vult Girard

p. 182, 19 secundum hoc quod est species] |S p. 94b ll. 38–39| add. quod¹
ideo dicimus quia eadem res quae est species aliter considerata quam sit
potest considerari ut generalissimum.

TRANSL.: We say this because the same thing which is a species, when
considered in a different way than it is, can be considered as a summum
genus.

p. 183, 20–24 de specie – definitione vel ratione] |S pp. 94b l. 49 – 95a l. 2|
Videndum est quod Porphyrius hic largius accipit ‘praedicari univoce’
quam Aristoteles in *Cathegoriis*: Aristoteles enim ibi accipit ‘praedicari
univoce’², hoc est nomine tali et definitione quae denotet primam
substantiam ex suo proprio esse, Porphyrius vero accipit ‘praedicari
univoce’, hoc est nomine et qualibet ratione.

TRANSL.: The following has to be noted: Porphyry here understands ‘to be
predicated in a univocal way’ in a broader sense than Aristotle in his
Categories; according to Aristotle ‘to be predicated in a univocal way’
means being predicated with a name and a definition that indicates the first
substance from its proper being; Porphyry, on the other hand, understands
‘being predicated in an univocal way’ as <being predicated> with a name
and any definition.

COMMENTARY: At p. 183, 10–19, the published text of P3 is affected by a
twofold redaction, where **O** and **A** (followed by **S**) agree against the
innovative version of **P** (*Isag.* 24.17–19: *commune autem et univoce
praedicari genus de propriis speciebus et proprium quorum est proprium*).
The *adnotator* draws a comparison between the *Isagoge* and Aristotle’s
text (*Cat.* 1, 1a 6–7): συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν το τε ὄνομα καὶ ὁ κατὰ
τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός; transl. Boethii: *univoca vero dicuntur
quorum et nomen commune est et secundum nomen eadem substantiae*

¹•quod] corr. Girard, quia S

²•quam Aristoteles – praedicari univoce] supra lineam add. S

ratio, ut animal homo atque bos. This comparison of the different meanings of Aristotle's and Porphyry's text has several parallels: see Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus, Isag.* (p. 100, 31–34): *commune est autem. Videtur Porphyrius largius hic accipere 'praedicari univoce' quam <Aristoteles> in Substantia, ubi scilicet ait de subiectis non praedicari univoce; Glossae in Categorias* (p. 52, 8–11): *scilicet dat eis praedicari univoce, quod est idem cum praedicari nomine et ratione. Sed hic largius accipit rationem, quia hic accipit rationem, id est diffinitionem vel sibi aequipollentem vel compositam ex ipsa.*

In this case, too, the most interesting similarity can be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 15ra): *sed nota Aristotelem strictius accipere praedicari univoce quam Porphyrius. Ille enim vult praedicari univoce de aliis, quae ex substantiali essentia eorum notantur, ut genera et formae substantiales; Porphyrius vero dicit praedicari univoce, quaecumque praedicantur de aliis nomine et ratione, qualicumque modo non attendens, sive notentur ex eorum substantiali essentia sive non.*

Text. It is worthy to note that the printed text of P3 (p. 183, 21–24) seems to be affected by a gap: after *Porphyrius hic largius accipit praedicari univoce* there is no second term for the comparison. **S**, on the other hand, seems to be the only one preserving the mention of Aristotle and of the *Categories*, which could fill the gap of P3. It is also remarkable that the section of text *quam Aristoteles – praedicari univoce* is preserved in **S** between the lines: in the model this section was most probably *in interlineo* or in the margin.

p. 189, 12 illarum participant etc] |**S p. 95b ll. 20–23**| *add. COMMUNE*¹ dicit speciem et differentiam PARTICIPARI² AEQUALITER (27.10); falsum esse videtur, quod species (ut albedo) praedicatur cum magis et cum minus, [in]³ differentia (ut calor) similiter. Et ideo determinandum est: in

¹•commune] *correx*i, quod *S*

²•participari] *correx*i, praedicari *S*; cf. *etiam* 24.14

³•in] *secl*usi

quantum est species non convenit suis inferioribus cum magis et cum minus, nec differentia de illis quibus substantialis differentia.

TRANSL.: Porphyry says: it is “common” to differences and species “to be equally participated” (27.10); but it seems to be false, because species (for instance whiteness) is predicated with more and less, as well as difference (for instance heat). So, we have to conclude: <a species>, inasmuch as it is a species, does not happen to its inferiors with more or less, and a difference <does not happen with more or less> to the elements of which it is substantial difference.

COMMENTARY: At pp. 189–193 the published text of P3 is affected by a twofold redaction: **O** and **A** (followed by **S**) agree against the innovative version of **P** (which offers a shorter version of the text). This unpublished fragment of text in **S** is added to the commentary on *Isag.* 27.10 (cf. *In Isag.*², pp. 325, 9 – 326, 10: difference and species are participated in in the same way). In this case, too, a parallel can be found in P14 (BnF, Lat. 17813, f. 15ra–b): *infert a simili propter idem, quia datae sunt differentiae commune inter genus et cetera, quia fuit propositum, ergo dandae sunt inter cetera propter idem. Et prius ostendit inter speciem [15rb] et differentiam hoc commune, scilicet quod aequaliter conveniunt eis quae eis participant, species scilicet rebus inferioribus eiusdem naturae, differentiae illis quae substantialiter constituunt. Et hoc ostendit in partibus*; see also Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, *Isag.* (p. 102, 33–35): *aequaliter participari, id est non praedicari cum magis et cum minus*; Abelard, *Logica Ingredientibus*, *Isag.* (p. 71, 2–37).

Text. The content of this annotation seems to be similar to the text of both **O** and **A**. If we do not want to change its meaning, we have to put a colon after *aequaliter*. To render the first sentence syntactical the word *quod* should be corrected into *commune*, as in the *Isagoge*.

The reading of **S**, *praedicari aequaliter* (another quotation from the *Isagoge*, p. 24, 14), is clearly wrong: as in the printed text of P3, equal participation is the subject matter of these lines. The correction *participari aequaliter* is needed.

COLLATION

Additions to the standard text of P3 are marked with the abbreviation *add.*; since the text is printed above, just the presence of such additions is highlighted here. In cases where the square bracket is not followed by *add.*, we are in the presence of a variant reading affecting the printed text of P3 for the words or lines indicated before the square brackets. On the other hand, the siglum *om.* indicates words or lines omitted by S.

When the same word occurs twice on the same line, superscript numbers are used to indicate which word is meant. “p. 95, 3 est²”, for example, refers to the second ‘est’ on the third line of p. 95.

The superscript ^{a.c./p.c.} after the siglum of the manuscript indicates words that are exhibited by the manuscript *ante correctionem* or *post correctionem*.

Where the printed text of P3 is affected by two different versions, I always indicate with which one the text of S agrees.

[S p. 77a] p. 60, 4 praedicamentorum cognitionem] *add.* S || p. 60, 7 tamen] tamen rebus AS || p. 60, 7 eis omnibus] omnibus eis S || p. 60, 8 vel] *om.* S || p. 60, 9–13 sic et – aliae partes] *om.* S || pp. 60, 14 – 61, 7 dicitur etiam Porphyrius – esse ipsius rei] *om.* S || p. 61, 9 his] eis S || p. 61, 10 proprietatum] proprietates S || p. 61, 13 quod generalitatem suscipiunt] *add.* S || p. 61, 14 de eis] de accidentibus S || p. 61, 17 nullum] nullum et S || p. 61, 18 quod] *om.* S || p. 61, 20 concesserit] occiserit S || p. 61, 21 supradatam] supradictam S || p. 61, 22 Porphyrius] *om.* S || pp. 61, 25 – 62, 23 quorundam tamen – modis acceptae] *om.* S || p. 62, 24 est quod] *om.* S || p. 62, 25 spargitur] spargit S || p. 62, 26 harum quinque] quinque harum S || p. 62, 28 conclusionis] conditione S || p. 63, 2 omnes] sunt S || p. 63, 5 speciem] species S || p. 63, 5 praedicari speciebus] speciebus praedicari S || p. 63, 9 cognoscantur] cognoscitur S || p. 63, 9–10 uniuscuiusque] cuiusque S || p. 63, 10 modis] *spatio vacuo relicto om.* S || p. 63, 12 praenosceda] praecognoscenda S || p. 63, 12 specierum] species S || p. 63, 13 quomodo] quae S || p. 63, 15 ad quae nisi] atque S || p. 63, 18 sunt differentiae] diversae sunt S || p. 63, 18 praedictis ignoratis] praedicti signatoris S || p. 63, 22 sit idem] idem est S || p. 63, 25 aggreditur] agi dicatur S || p. 64, 2 disputabitur] disputatur S || p. 64, 2 ignorabitur] ignoratur S [S p. 77b] p. 64, 6 differentiarum] differentia sunt S || p. 64, 9 esse] esset S || p. 64, 9 probant] probat S || p. 64, 12–18 quomodo vero – substantialis definitio] S = OA || p. 64, 14–15 potest cognosci] cognosci potest S || p. 64, 19 ea] ea definitio S || p. 64, 20 substantialibus differentiis] substantiali differentia S || p. 64, 22 Sophronici alia] Sophronitidis S || p. 64,

23 mortale alia] mortalia S || p. 64, 22 hominis] *om.* S || p. 64, 24 animal] ab S || p. 64, 25 differentiae utilis est] *add.* S || p. 65, 2 factam] facta S || p. 65, 4 sit natura propriorum] natura proprietatis S || pp. 65, 6 – 68, 4 ad divisionem – proficiat ostendamus] S = OA || p. 65, 8 scientiam] sententiam S || p. 65, 13 quae] quod S || p. 65, 16 se] se divisio S || p. 65, 17 autem] *om.* S || p. 65, 22 in] et S || p. 65, 25 quas] quam S || p. 65, 26 loco specierum] specierum loco S || p. 66, 4 enim] *om.* S || p. 66, 6 illa] ista S || p. 66, 7 definiantur] definiuntur S || p. 66, 8 significata illo] significantia illius S || p. 66, 8–9 una eius] *om.* S || p. 66, 10 ea univoca et generalis] univoca et S [S p. 78a] p. 66, 17 et] *om.* S || p. 66, 21 aequivoca] equoca S || p. 66, 27 igitur] *om.* S || p. 66, 32 sit quid univocum] univocum sit S || p. 67, 10 si generis natura] si si genero S || p. 67, 12 ignorabit] *om.* S || p. 67, 13 generis haec] haec generis S || p. 67, 13 scilicet] *om.* S || p. 67, 14 speciei suae] suae speciei S || p. 67, 15–16 nulli suae parti] suae nulli parti S || p. 67, 19 igitur] *om.* S || p. 67, 22 divisione] diffinitione S || p. 67, 28 et] quod S || p. 67, 34 putabitur] putatur S || p. 68, 12 et] atque S || p. 68, 14–28 est enim – logicae supponatur] *om.* S || p. 68, 29–31 videndum est – dialecticae supponatur] S = OA || p. 68, 32 scientia] scientiae S || p. 68, 33 in] *om.* S || p. 68, 34 invenire] inveniri S || p. 69, 3 sit tenenda] tenenda sit S || p. 69, 5 ad] *om.* S || p. 69, 7 docemur invenire] inveni S || p. 69, 10–12 notandum est – est notitia] *om.* S || p. 69, 13 autem] *om.* S || p. 69, 15 praeparare vel] *om.* S || p. 69, 18–33 titulus dicitur – se purgat] *om.* S [S p. 78b] p. 70, 3 quendam] quando S || p. 70, 5 quaestionibus] *om.* S || pp. 70, 7 – 73, 33 littera sic – mox de generibus] S = OA || p. 70, 10 et] *om.* S || p. 70, 13 subdit] subiungit S || p. 70, 14 velut] *om.* S || p. 70, 15 ita] *om.* S || p. 71, 15 id] hoc S || p. 71, 30 omnibus] rebus S || p. 71, 33 id] hoc S || p. 71, 37 id] hoc S || p. 72, 1 Aristoteles] *om.* S || p. 72, 2 assignationem] signationem S || p. 73, 16 aggressurum] aggredi S || p. 73, 17 quaestiones] *om.* S || p. 73, 19 positurus] posita S || p. 74, 2 si eas] sileas S || p. 74, 4 exsecutionem] obscuritates S || p. 74, 5 his] eis S || p. 74, 6 tamen] tunc S || p. 74, 8 quidem] *om.* S || p. 74, 10 an] aut S || p. 74, 10 quodsi] quae S || p. 74, 10–11 constiterit] constituerit S || p. 74, 11 corporea an incorporea] incorporea an coporea S || p. 74, 13 et incorporeum – accipiendum est] Ams (?) hic accipiendus est sensibile incorporeum S || p. 74, 13 differentiis] differentia S || p. 74, 14 sensibile vero dicimus] *om.* S || p. 74, 15 insensibile vero] insensibili S || p. 74, 16 et soli cogitationi] soli S || p. 74, 16 haec] *om.* S || p. 74, 17 omne] omne esse S || p. 74, 17 excludetur] excluditur S || p. 74, 20–24 duae quippe – et anima] S = AP || p. 74, 22 incorporalitate perdurant] corporalitate perducet S || p. 74, 23–25 in corporibus – extra corpora] incorporea quo (?) cum corpore et extra corpus esse possunt S || p. 75, 1 alia] animalia S || p. 75, 1–2 esse tamen – sint incorporea] *om.* S || p. 75, 2 ita] ita sita S || p. 75, 3 illis] aliis S || p. 75, 7 autem] *om.* S [S p. 79a] p. 75, 11 enim] *om.* S || p. 75, 12 assumptio] assumit S || p. 75, 12 uno eodemque] eodem S || p. 75, 15 totum genus] genus totum S || p. 75, 15–16 unum scilicet numero] scilicet numero unum S || p. 75, 17 in hoc – numero] *om.* S || p. 75, 18–19 omne enim – numero est] *om.* S || p. 75, 19 convenit dici] dici convenit S || pp. 75, 20 – 76, 6 item probat – non commune] *om.* S || p. 76, 7 esse dicantur] ipse dicantur Boethio S || p. 76, 8 sed] *om.* S || p. 76, 10 vi unius – includat vi] generis includebat vi sui nominis

quod S || p. 76, 11 praedicatur] dicitur S || p. 76, 12 omnia] enim S || p. 76, 14 secundum] *om.* S || p. 76, 15 ita quoque] itaque S || p. 76, 16 est] *om.* S || p. 76, 17 dicta est] est dicta S || p. 76, 24 capiuntur] capiantur S || p. 76, 25 aut] *om.* S || p. 76, 25 fiat] fiat aut S || p. 76, 25 sese res] res sese S || p. 76, 26 et] sed S || p. 76, 26 venit ita] venit ex re S || p. 77, 1 venit] *om.* S || p. 77, 2 habet] habent S || p. 77, 2 in] *om.* S || p. 77, 5 vanum] novum S || p. 77, 6 intellectus] *om.* S || p. 77, 6 aliqua] *om.* S || p. 77, 8 et cetera] ceterasque S || p. 77, 9 quin omnis sit] qui nomini S || p. 77, 10 cura] ratio S || p. 77, 12 has] hae S || p. 77, 12 consentiens] conscientiae S || p. 77, 14 intellectibus] *om.* S || p. 77, 15 est] *om.* S || p. 77, 18–20 quoniam cum – unquam erit] *om.* S || p. 77, 20–21 in intellectu concipiat] accipiat S || p. 77, 21 se] sese S || p. 77, 24 et] etiam S || p. 77, 24 disiunctas considerare] considerare disiunctas S || p. 77, 25 tamen quod] etiam S || p. 77, 25 quod] quia S || p. 78, 1 autem] *om.* S || p. 78, 3 separatam] separatas S || p. 78, 4 esse suum habentes] suum habentis esse S || p. 78, 6 dividere composita] composita dividere S [S p. 79b] p. 78, 8 in] *om.* S || p. 78, 10 subiecti] subiectis S || p. 78, 11 sese] esse S || p. 78, 14 suum esse nisi in corpore habere] esse suum habere nisi in corpore S || p. 78, 19 suum esse] esse suum S || p. 78, 19 et] *om.* S || p. 78, 20 de] *om.* S || p. 78, 21 esse] rem S || p. 78, 22 Boethius] *om.* S || p. 78, 23 posse] possit S || p. 78, 26 ipso] *om.* S || p. 79, 1 in puritate – res est] *om.* S || p. 79, 3 videor] videtur S || p. 79, 6 constituo] constituimus S || p. 79, 6 meus] vester S || p. 79, 6 separare a corpore] a corpore separare S || p. 79, 8 intellectus iste] iste intellectus S || p. 79, 9 semper] *om.* S || p. 79, 11 eius naturam] naturam eius S || p. 79, 18–19 cum illa – est individuo] quae in illa est et individuo S || p. 79, 19 universalem eam] eam universalem S || p. 79, 20 illa] illa natura S || p. 79, 22 eis per quae existit] *om.* S || p. 79, 23–24 et ideo – puram universalem] *om.* S || p. 79, 25 intelligere eam] eam intelligere S || p. 80, 3 considerare quam scilicet] consideratione sed in quam S || p. 80, 8 hoc] *om.* S || p. 80, 11 intelligi] *om.* S || p. 80, 12 esse tantum] tantum esse S || p. 80, 14 sunt autem] sed haec S || p. 80, 17 sunt eorum] eorum sunt S || p. 80, 17 vel] *om.* S || p. 80, 19 humanitatis] humanitate S || p. 80, 19–20 quae nisi – non potest] *om.* S [S p. 80a] p. 80, 21 in earum individuus] earum individuas S || p. 80, 24 omnium] *om.* S || p. 80, 24 numero] tantummodo S || p. 80, 24 cogitatione] collectione S || p. 80, 26 collecta] collecto S || p. 80, 26 aliud est] est aliud S || p. 81, 2 quod] nisi substantiale quod S || p. 81, 3 singularis] in singulis S || p. 81, 4 vero] *om.* S || p. 81, 4 eodemque] eodem S || p. 81, 7 insint] *om.* S || p. 81, 10 eodem quoque] eodemque S || p. 81, 15 speciem] species S || p. 81, 20 genera] *om.* S || p. 81, 22 universalia vel] *om.* S || p. 81, 23 autem] *om.* S || p. 81, 23 subsistentia] per subsistentia S || p. 82, 1 dicit ipse Boethius] ipse Boethius dicit S || p. 82, 2 vero] *om.* S || p. 82, 5–10 quod hic – considerata sunt] *om.* S || p. 82, 12 ab istis] *om.* S || p. 82, 13 illud sive] istud suum S || p. 82, 14 id est habeant esse] *om.* S || p. 82, 15 et] *om.* S || p. 82, 15 utrumque] *om.* S || p. 82, 16 subsistunt] *om.* S || p. 82, 17 nudis] undis S || p. 82, 18 verborum] *om.* S || p. 82, 18–19 dicere recusabo] recusabo dicere S || p. 82, 19–20 sive incorporalia] *om.* S || p. 82, 20 incorporea cum sint] cum sint incorporea S || p. 82, 21 tantum posita sint] sint posita tantum S || p. 82, 24 autem] haec S || p. 82, 24–25 est huiusmodi negotium] huiusmodi negotium est S || pp. 84, 26 – 83, 5 vel possumus – non

est] *om.* S || p. 83, 8 subnixus] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 83, 9 id] hoc S || p. 83, 10 id] hoc S || p. 83, 11 scilicet in quantum haec sunt] *om.* S || p. 83, 12 illud quod] *om.* S || p. 83, 12 verisimile] simile S || p. 83, 13 inter] contra S || p. 83, 13 id est] hoc S || p. 83, 16 id est antiquorum] *om.* S [S p. 80b] p. 83, 17 mediocritatem tractatus] tractatus mediocritatem S || p. 83, 23 expositionum] expositione S || p. 83, 25 et] *om.* S || p. 84, 1 aliis] *om.* S || p. 84, 4 infra] intra S || p. 84, 6 incohandum] *om.* S || p. 84, 7 illa semper] semper illa S || p. 84, 8–9 non perimantur – vero peremptis] *om.* S || p. 84, 12 genus] *om.* S || p. 84, 13–16 est etiam – in quale] *om.* S || p. 84, 17 tractatum generis] generis tractatum S || p. 84, 18 hic de specie] ibi S || p. 84, 18 praeponat] ponat de specie quae id est (?) S || p. 84, 20 multiplicis significationis] multiplici significatione S || p. 84, 22 significatione] significatione quare S || p. 85, 3 generis] *om.* S || p. 85, 5 de qua] quodquod (?) S || p. 85, 6 significationes] generis significationes S || p. 85, 7 species] speciei S || p. 85, 7 quod ideo] per omnino S || p. 85, 6 et] *om.* S || p. 85, 7 quod ideo] per omnino S || p. 85, 8 principium et collectionem] collectionem et principium S || p. 85, 11 continuatio litterae] litterae continuatio S || p. 85, 12 id] hoc S || p. 85, 14 multiplicem significationem] *add.* S || p. 85, 15–20 genus enim – supponitur species] S = OA || p. 85, 18 tres] *om.* S || p. 85, 18 scilicet] *om.* S || p. 86, 10 patre supremo] supremo patre S || p. 86, 10 ad] eidem S || p. 86, 12 id est] hoc est S || p. 86, 13 se] *om.* S || p. 86, 15 id est] scilicet S || p. 86, 15 et] *om.* S || p. 86, 16 est] *om.* S || p. 86, 17 supradictam] supradicta S || p. 86, 18 habitudine] altitudine S || p. 86, 21–22 et ita – se invicem] *om.* S || p. 86, 23 romanorum] romanae S || p. 86, 24 ut] *om.* S || p. 86, 28 id] hoc S [S p. 81a] p. 86, 30 inter hanc significationem] *om.* S || p. 87, 2 eius] *om.* S || p. 87, 5 principia] principalia S || p. 87, 5 unumquodque] unamquamque rem S || p. 87, 6 causa dicitur] *om.* S || p. 87, 7 pater filii] huius libri Porphyrius philosophus S || p. 87, 8 pugnae victoria] pugna victoriae S || p. 87, 10 quoniam] quoniam enim S || p. 87, 10 in tempore] secundum tempus S || p. 87, 11 eum] accidentalem S || p. 87, 12 accideret] accidentale S || p. 87, 14 utilia esse] esse utilia S || p. 87, 17 dicitur genus] genus dicitur S || p. 87, 17 generationis] nominis S || p. 87, 19 hoc] id S || pp. 87, 21 – 88, 10 sic enim – a partibus] S = OA || p. 88, 1 quod genuit] *om.* S || p. 88, 8 illi] illius S || p. 88, 9–10 eodem argumento] argumento eodem S || p. 88, 11 quia] et S || p. 88, 13–14 dicimus Pindarum esse Thebanum] Pindari dicimus Thebanum esse S || p. 88, 14 dicimus quod] quod dicimus S || p. 88, 15 sunt] *om.* S || p. 88, 15 Platonis] Platonis sunt S || p. 88, 17 locusque in quo quis] locoque in quoquo S || p. 88, 17 esse diversa] diversa esse S || p. 88, 18–19 enumerans unam] genus unum S || p. 88, 21 sub una] *om.* S || p. 89, 1 generationis] generis S || p. 89, 1 et pater] pater est principium ex se generatorum S || p. 89, 3 principium scilicet] principia S || p. 89, 3 et ideo dicit] vero S || p. 89, 5 quam – pater principium] *om.* S || p. 89, 8–11 locus a – pater et] *om.* S || p. 89, 11 indefinita] infinita S || p. 89, 13 si aliqua – cui] alii significationi S || p. 89, 15 collectionem] collectionis S || p. 89, 17 principio] principia S || p. 89, 17 et melior est collectione] *om.* S || p. 89, 18–19 generis significatio] significatio generis S || p. 89, 21–23 vere significatio – a parte] *om.* S || p. 89, 24 cecropidae] cicopidinae S || p. 90, 1 quidem] quam (?) S || p. 90, 4 in] *om.* S || p. 90, 5 impositum] *om.* S || p. 90, 6–9

appellatum est – a Romulo] *om.* S [S p. 81b] p. 90, 10–13 namque dividentes – sic dicens] S = OA || p. 90, 18 collectionem] illam collectionem S || p. 90, 18 ab] *om.* S || p. 90, 18 collectionem²] *om.* S || p. 90, 20–25 aliter autem – usus est] S = OA || p. 90, 22 monstrare intendit] ostendit S || p. 90, 24 cuiusque] quaeque S || p. 90, 25 usus] utilis S || p. 90, 27 ad similitudinem] *om.* S || p. 91, 1 multorum] *om.* S || p. 91, 4 rursus aliter dicitur genus] dicitur genus dicitur S || p. 91, 5 praedicamenti] praedicati S || p. 91, 7–8 scilicet principii et collectionis] *om.* S || p. 91, 9–10 vel aliter – illis simile] *om.* S || p. 91, 11–15 et enim – collectionis] S = OA || p. 91, 13 genus dicitur] dicitur genus S || p. 91, 15 principii et collectionis] collectionis et principii S || p. 91, 27–28 id est materiale] *om.* S || p. 92, 1–2 id est philosophicum] *om.* S || p. 92, 4 contenta] continentia S || p. 92, 5 cum genus dicatur] *om.* S || p. 92, 6–8 quandoquidem – modis genus] S = OA || p. 92, 16 cum] *om.* S || p. 92, 17–20 sciendum est – probat praecedentem] *om.* S || p. 92, 23 scire videmur] est scite videmus S || p. 92, 24 agnoscimus] cognoscimus S || p. 92, 25 quam maxime] *om.* S || p. 93, 1 philosophi] illi philosophi S || p. 93, 1 genus esse dicentes] dicentes genus esse S || p. 93, 3 definientes] deficientes S || p. 93, 3 in eo quod] quantum S || p. 93, 4 eius] *om.* S || p. 93, 6 omne genus haberet genus] genus omne genus haberi S || p. 93, 7 genus ergo] generis igitur S || p. 93, 9 fit] fit; agitur etiam de ea praedicatione ut idem de eodem praedicatur S || p. 93, 11 vel individuus] *om.* S || p. 93, 11 individuo] suo individuo S || p. 93, 13 de ea] *om.* S || p. 93, 13 praedicatur] *om.* S || p. 93, 15 duabus] duobus S || p. 93, 16 in hac descriptione generis] *add.* S || p. 93, 17–21 item dicendum – species specialissimae] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || p. 93, 17 praedicantur] *om.* S || p. 93, 21 item] *om.* S || p. 93, 22 de speciebus] praedicantur S || p. 93, 22 quid] quid ut genera S || p. 93, 22 quale – et accidentia] *om.* S || p. 93, 24 tres] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 94, 2 sit] *om.* S || p. 94, 2 his] eis S || p. 94, 4 vero] nunc S || p. 94, 5 id est potest praedicari] *om.* S || p. 94, 5 rebus] *om.* S || p. 94, 7 et] hominibus S^{a.c.} || p. 94, 8 de] *om.* S [S p. 82a] p. 94, 10 scilicet in] *om.* S || p. 94, 11 mortalitatem] in S || p. 94, 14 accidentibus] accidentalibus S || p. 94, 14 albedini] albedini specialitati S || p. 94, 16 ea] ea excludatur et ut S || p. 94, 17 et¹] *om.* S || p. 94, 19 eis] his S || p. 94, 22 de quibus] *om.* S || p. 95, 1 ubi] *om.* S || p. 95, 3 est²] *om.* S || p. 95, 3 sedens est Socrates] *add.* S || p. 95, 4–7 item individua – sunt diversa] *om.* S || p. 95, 8 opponitur] opponitur quidem S || p. 95, 8 substantiali] *om.* S || p. 95, 9 praedicatur] praedicetur S || p. 95, 10 dicitur enim] vero hic S || p. 95, 10 et dialecticus est homo] *om.* S || p. 95, 11–12 in qua – de accidentibus] *om.* S || p. 95, 13–19 item obicitur – animal praedicetur] *om.* S || p. 95, 21 suscipit] recipit S || p. 95, 23 definitur] diffiniatur S || p. 95, 23 est cum eo] cum suo finito S || p. 95, 24–25 id est omne genus] *om.* S || p. 95, 29 autem] vero S || p. 95, 30 praedicabitur] praedicatur S || p. 95, 31 pluribus] pluribus et S || p. 96, 1 specialissima species] species specialissima S || p. 96, 1 qualitatis vel] *om.* S || p. 96, 2 animal est] est animal S || p. 96, 4 egressus] transgressus S || p. 96, 5 vel vocibus gratia significatorum] *om.* S || p. 96, 5 de¹] *om.* S || p. 96, 5 de²] *om.* S || p. 96, 5 et – ceteris] *om.* S || p. 96, 8 suscipit] recipit S || p. 96, 12 huic opponitur definitioni] opponatur S || p. 96, 14 est de] *om.* S || p. 96, 15 non] vero S || p. 96, 16 quia animal secundum] animal enim S || p. 96, 19 secundum] *om.* S || p. 96, 19

sic] *om.* S || p. 96, 21 illa] *om.* S || p. 96, 21 e converso] ex conversa S || p. 96, 22 obiciatur] dicatur S || p. 96, 25 genus est] est genus S || p. 96, 26 etc est – omne significativum] *om.* S || p. 96, 27 arbor] *om.* S || p. 97, 1 scilicet] *om.* S || p. 97, 1 de pluribus] *om.* S || p. 97, 2 omne] *om.* S | **S p. 82b** | p. 97, 3 vel arbor] *om.* S || p. 97, 4 invenitur] invenerit S || p. 97, 5 est vel] *om.* S || p. 97, 7 dicit Boethius] Boethius dicit S || p. 97, 7 quae] quod S || p. 97, 8–9 ut dicamus – quid praedicatur] sit quod praedicatur de pluribus de ps (?) et S || p. 97, 11 hac] ea S || p. 97, 13 in quibus] in quibus in quibus S || p. 97, 13 fallit] fallit S || p. 97, 15 illi] *om.* S || p. 97, 15 per idem si de aliquo] quod id si cum aliquo S || p. 97, 18 praedicabitur] praedicatur S || p. 97, 19 de pluribus] *om.* S || p. 97, 21 ego] *om.* S || p. 97, 22 propositionis] *om.* S || p. 97, 22 fundamentum] *om.* S || p. 97, 24 describitur] describitur S || p. 98, 2 res] ius S || p. 98, 3 propositum] tractatus S || p. 98, 4 demonstratur] ostenditur S || p. 98, 6 aequivoco] aequivoca S || p. 98, ut] non S || p. 98, 8 eorum] earum S || p. 98, 8–9 aequivocum] *om.* S || p. 98, 10 re] *om.* S || p. 98, 10–11 canis respondetur] respondetur canis S || p. 98, 11 quae est] scilicet S || p. 98, 11–12 vox esse canis recte] recte canis esse S || p. 98, 12–13 individualis – esse] alia esse poterit S || p. 98, 13 illa] *om.* S || p. 98, 13–15 nec etiam – materialis est] *om.* S || p. 98, 15 in quid – de illis] de illis in quid praedicetur S || p. 98, 16 nec in quantum] *om.* S || p. 98, 17 neque aliquo alio modo] *om.* S || p. 98, 17 de illis] *om.* S || p. 98, 19 ut homo – istarum interrogantium] *om.* S || p. 98, 20 etiam] haec S || p. 98, 20 definitiones] *om.* S || p. 98, 21 ut genus] *om.* S || p. 98, 23 ut genus] *om.* S || p. 98, 23 est] *om.* S || p. 99, 1 id est – vocibus agere] scilicet gratia generis S || p. 99, 4 differentibus] de differentibus S || p. 99, 9–10 ac si – quia eorum] *om.* S || p. 99, 11–12 praedicantur alia – solo praedicantur] praedixit S || p. 99, 11 individua dico] *om.* S || p. 99, 13 quemadmodum] ut S || p. 99, 14 individualia] individua S || p. 99, 14–15 ut haec – solo praedicantur] *om.* S || p. 99, 16 communiter] convenienter S || p. 99, 18–23 sciendum – de pluribus] *om.* S, *sed cf. quae ms. addidit post p. 101, 12* || p. 100, 4 nullum] ei ullum S || p. 100, 7 alia] alia quae S || p. 100, 9 adducitur hic] apponitur S || p. 100, 9 individuorum] duorum S, *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 100, 10–18 alii vero – notanda est] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S | **S p. 83a** | p. 100, 20 genus] vel genus S || p. 100, 20 fundamento] fundamento suo S || p. 100, 21 nisi] ubi S || p. 100, 23 contrarius Porphyrius Aristoteli] Porphyrius Aristoteli contrarius esse S || p. 100, 23–24 individuum substantiae] substantiae individua S || p. 101, 3 Porphyrius] *om.* S || p. 101, 4 etiam] ita S || p. 101, 6–18 hic opponitur – ad genus] S = A || p. 101, 7 intellectum] intellectus S || p. 101, 7 sic] eodem modo S || p. 101, 8 esse] omne S || p. 101, 8 ita] sic S || p. 101, 10 adiacet pluribus quare] *om.* S || p. 101, 10 non est individuum] *add.* S || p. 101, 11 videtur] est S || p. 101, 11 animalis generalitas] generalitas animalis S || p. 101, 12 sed tamen – sit universale] *add.* S || p. 101, 14 et] sed et S || p. 101, 15–16 non in quantum – generalitatis] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || p. 101, 19 quidem ut animal] *om.* S || p. 101, 22–23 sic dicens – animal etc] S = OA || pp. 101, 24 – 103, 16 ab his – verba Boethii] *om.* S || p. 103, 19 hoc] quod S || p. 103, 22 unius] *om.* S || p. 103, 24 numerando] numerando tantum S || p. 104, 1 in] *om.* S || p. 104, 3 id] hoc S || p. 104, 4–7 continuatio genera – est individuus] *om.* S || p. 104, 8–12 homo enim – differentibus numero] S = OA || p. 104, 24–

26 continuatio – proprium praedicatur] *om.* S || p. 104, 29 communiter] *om.* S || p. 104, 29 et] vel S || p. 104, 32–33 continuatio – etiam differentia] *om.* S || p. 105, 1–10 interrogantibus enim – in quale] S = OA || p. 105, 3 accidentia] accidens S || p. 105, 3 praedicantur in quale] *add.* S || p. 105, 9 accidentia] accidens S || p. 106, 1 locus] illo S [S p. 83b] p. 106, 11 generis dicta descriptio] *om.* S || p. 106, 14–27 species autem – singulis persequitur] S = OA || p. 106, 15 superior] per superior S || p. 106, 16 omnem] omnem dicta descriptio S || p. 106, 18 genus] omne genus S || p. 106, 21–22 uno enim – aliud ignorabitur] *om.* S || p. 106, 23 et diversa] *om.* S || p. 106, 25–26 in proemio proposuit] imposuit S || p. 106, 27 persequitur] prosequitur S || p. 107, 1–3 et primum – dubitari potest] S = OA || p. 107, 2 specie] genere S || p. 107, 7 speciem continet cum] continens est et S || p. 107, 8 informant] in formarum S || p. 107, 8 autem] enim S || p. 107, 8 id quod] quod de S || p. 107, 12–16 huic respondendum – invicem sumunt] S = OA || p. 107, 16 ad] a S || p. 107, 25 est] *om.* S || p. 108, 1 adiunctus] et iunctus S || p. 108, 1 factus] *om.* S || p. 108, 3 distinxit] distinxerit S || p. 108, 4 ponit] ponit eius S || p. 108, 5 eius] *om.* S || p. 108, 6 prolixitate confunderet] *add.* S || p. 108, 7 vocari] *om.* S || p. 108, 8–9 figuram vel – dicit unuscuiusque] *om.* S || p. 108, 10 individui est] individua S || p. 108, 14 forma] de forma S || p. 108, 14 compositio] de compositione S || p. 108, 15 unuscuiusque individui] *add.* S || p. 108, 16 Priami] primum S || p. 108, 18 quae est sub] *om.* S || p. 108, 24 principaliter dicitur] principaliter vel quae sit universalis res S || p. 109, 3–6 et quia – pro forma] *om.* S || p. 109, 6 esse] *om.* S || p. 109, 8 genus] *om.* S || p. 109, 10 praedicatur] *om.* S || p. 109, 13 obici] dici S || p. 109, 14 apposuisse] nomen speciei] nominasset speciem S || p. 109, 19 esse] id est S || p. 109, 21 diximus] diximus eam S || p. 109, 23 generis nomen] nomen generis S [S p. 84a] p. 110, 6 ideo] idcirco S || p. 110, 9 iure] ipse S || p. 110, 9 nomine] *om.* S || p. 110, 10 est genus] genus est S || p. 110, 11 id est quia sunt relativa] *om.* S || p. 110, 12 uti utrisque] utriusque unius S || p. 110, 13–17 id est – quod definitur] *om.* S || p. 110, 19–25 hoc videtur – ad aliquid] *om.* S || p. 110, 26 et sic] *om.* S || p. 110, 27 sunt relativa] relativa sunt S || p. 110, 28 illud quod] illa res quae S || p. 111, 2 subintelligendum est] *om.* S || p. 111, 2–3 Boethius dicit] dicit Boethius S || p. 111, 5 duabus descriptionibus speciei] duobus speciei descriptionibus S || p. 111, 7 describunt] sic describunt S || p. 111, 13 quae] *om.* S || p. 111, 14 scilicet secundum] secundum scilicet S || p. 111, 14–15 in quale] quales S || p. 111, 17 virtus tamen] tamen virtus S || p. 111, 17 accidentia] accidentia et excludit omnia accidentia S || p. 111, 19 addit] subdit S || p. 111, 24–25 quidem definitionibus speciem] speciem definitionibus S || p. 111, 25 omni] eam S || p. 112, 1 tres] *om.* S || p. 112, 2 id est competat] *om.* S || p. 112, 3–4 ista definitio – scilicet definitiones] *om.* S || p. 112, 6–7 id est – planum autem] et S || p. 112, 9 quid] quid etiam S || p. 112, 11–12 ac si – specie sed] *om.* S || p. 112, 12 scilicet] *om.* S || p. 112, 12 esse] *om.* S || p. 112, 13–21 non specialissima – accipiunt duo praedicamenta] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || pp. 112, 23 – 116, 5 quid autem – asinus etc] S = OA || p. 112, 23–24 sit generalissimum] generalissimum sit S || p. 113, 3–4 sit superveniens genus] superveniens genus est S [S p. 84b] p. 113, 3 sit superveniens genus] *add.* S || p. 113, 5 est illa] illa est species S || p. 113, 6 item] *om.* S || p. 113, 7 et] *om.* S || p. 113, 10

et ad aliud] *om.* S || p. 113, 33 uno] quoque S || p. 114, 3 hac] *om.* S || p. 114, 4 ostendit] *om.* S || p. 114, 7–8 generalissimum ibi – quid specialissimum] ibi generalissimum S || p. 114, 14–16 homo aliud – Plato et ceteri] omne scilicet animal homo homo animal (*spatium vacuum reliquit*) animal Plato etc. || p. 114, 18 substantia] *om.* S || p. 114, 20 ea] eadem S || p. 114, 20 substantiis] corporeis substantiis et incorporeis S || p. 114, 22 hoc] *om.* S || p. 114, 25 conficitur ex anima et corpore] ex utroque conficitur S || p. 114, 26 corporeus] est corporeum S || p. 114, 26–27 incorporeus est] incorporeum S || p. 114, 29 quia] *om.* S || p. 114, 32–33 et vere non est vivens] *om.* S || p. 115, 3 vivat] vivet S || p. 115, 4 <non>] non est tale vivens quod S || p. 115, 5 numquam] aliquando S || p. 115, 6 aliquando] numquam S || p. 115, 6 morietur²] morietur sed aliquando morietur S || p. 115, 8 tunc] *om.* S || p. 115, 12 eius partibus] partibus eius S || p. 115, 15 erit mortua] mortua erit S || p. 115, 23 scilicet] *om.* S || p. 115, 24 homo] *om.* S || p. 115, 27–28 interior qui est specie] scilicet anima S || p. 115, 30–31 corpori supponitur] supponitur corpori S || p. 116, 4 animal] *om.* S || p. 116, 13 ut] *om.* S || p. 116, 15 formam] formam quantum partes non nisi in quantitate S || p. 116, 15–16 in differentia ait] ait in differentia S || p. 116, 16 non habet partes] partes non habet S || p. 116, 19 individua composita] composita individua S || p. 116, 20 partes hoc] *om.* S || p. 116, 20–21 eius substantialibus] substantialibus eius S || p. 116, 21 inde habemus] modo habent S (?) || p. 116, 22 aliis] *om.* S || p. 116, 23 naturam corpoream et incorpoream] corpoream et incorpoream naturam S || p. 116, 24 animae] animae vel corporis S || p. 116, 24–28 animae rationalis dicatur – individua etc] *aliam et ampliorem versionem textus praebet* S | **S p. 85a** | p. 117, 1 a quibusdam] *om.* S || p. 117, 3 individua – ante hoc] *om.* S || p. 117, 6 supponuntur] supponitur S || p. 117, 6 supposita sunt] suppositum est S || p. 117, 7 inferiorum sunt supposita] subpositum est S || p. 117, 7 dicat] *om.* S || p. 117, 8–9 supponi homini – homine fundatur] sub homine ponat sequitur inconueniens S || p. 117, 12 mortuis fundatur – mortuae dicuntur] viventibus consideratur S || p. 117, 13–23 huic quaestioni – corporis supponitur] S = OA || p. 117, 14 sic] *om.* S || p. 117, 17 corporis] corporis animati S^{a.c.} || p. 117, 18 semper uni] uni semper S || p. 117, 19 eo] corpore S || p. 117, 20 cum] dum S || p. 117, 21 in eo] subponitur S || p. 117, 22 inanimati] animati S || p. 117, 23 supponitur] *om.* S || pp. 118, 20 – 120, 11 opponitur etiam – individua generum] S = OA || p. 118, 23–24 et irrationalitas fundatur] fundatur S || p. 118, 24–25 et si – inanimali] *om.* S || p. 118, 28 secunda substantia] substantia secunda S || p. 118, 30 secundae substantiae] *add.* S || p. 118, 33 videretur] videtur S || p. 119, 2 enim] *om.* S || p. 119, 8 in illa secunda substantia] *add.* S || p. 119, 14 dicunt] dictum S || p. 119, 20 substantiae] substantia S || p. 119, 22–24 substantiales differentias – accidentia concedunt] *bis scripsit* S || p. 119, 24 rationalitatem] rationalitatem quidem S || p. 119, 27–28 natura rei] rei natura S || p. 119, 31 secundum] fundatur secundum S || pp. 119, 34 – 120, 11 nota enim – individua generum] *om.* S || p. 120, 13 se] sub se S || p. 120, 18 est] *om.* S || p. 120, 18 species] *om.* S || p. 120, 22 ibi] sic S || p. 120, 23 illud quod] autem S (*difficile lectu*) || p. 120, 24 se] sub se S || p. 120, 24–25 per contrarium] *om.* S || p. 121, 1–2 generalissimum est – genus generalissimum] est generalissimum sic S || p. 121, 4–7 ponit tria – relationem generalissimi] *om.* S | **S p. 85b** | p. 121, 12–16 quare

haec – duas habitudines] S = OA || p. 121, 28 quasi dicat – unam tantum] *om.* S || p. 122, 1–7 quod ostendit – posteriora sunt] S = OA || p. 122, 3 habitudinem tantum] tantum habitudinem S || p. 122, 4–5 specialissimum eam – ad superiora] *om.* S || p. 122, 6 et] ad S || p. 122, 8 hic] *om.* S || p. 122, 9 duas] duas, unam S || p. 122, 10 sed] quod S || p. 122, 13 nullam habet habitudinem] habitudinem nullam S || p. 122, 14 individuum] individua S || p. 122, 14 alio modo] *om.* S || p. 122, 16 sunt] sunt in mediae quae S || p. 122, 17 genera] genera dicuntur S || p. 122, 19–26 rursus dicitur – ad inferiora] S = AP || p. 122, 24 suum] suum substantiale S || p. 122, 26 ad inferiora] *add.* S || p. 123, 3 id] hoc S || p. 123, 8 genera] et genera S || p. 123, 12 repetit] repetetur S || p. 123, 14 ultimo gradu per medios] ultima gradu per medias S || p. 123, 17 Atreus] Atreus vero S || p. 123, 17 filius¹] *om.* S || p. 123, 17 filius² – in generibus] *om.* S || p. 123, 20 animatum] *om.* S || p. 123, 20 <est> corpus corpus est] *om.* S || pp. 123, 22 – 124, 5 quem ascensum – filius Iovis] S = OA || p. 124, 9 reducuntur] reducerentur S || p. 124, 10 unum] unum principium S || p. 124, 10–11 reducerentur – genus] *om.* S || p. 124, 12 continuatur et legitur] legitur et continuatur S || p. 124, 14 patrem] *add.* S [S p. 86a] p. 124, 16 et] cum S || p. 124, 18–22 neque enim – genus omnium] S = OA || p. 124, 18 commune] communis S || p. 124, 19 parte] patre S || p. 125, 2 convenit] praedicatur S || p. 125, 3–11 sed videtur – omnibus convenit] *om.* S || p. 125, 14 est genus] genus est S || p. 125, 18 dicit] dixit S || p. 125, 19 decem prima] prima decem S || p. 125, 21 auctoritate auctoritatem S || p. 125, 25 et legitur] *om.* S || p. 126, 4 commune] *om.* S || p. 126, 5 ens esset] *om.* S || p. 126, 5 non] et non S || p. 126, 7 convenire] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 126, 10 vero] *om.* S || p. 126, 10 genera] *om.* S || p. 126, 10 entis est] *om.* S || p. 126, 13 quod est ens] *add.* S || p. 126, 14–19 iterum alia – animal corpori] *om.* S || p. 126, 21 et] *om.* S || pp. 126, 25 – 127, 6 huic sententiae – refugiunt numerum] *om.* S || p. 127, 7 ergo] genus S || p. 127, 8 quiescere ibi] ibi quiescere S || p. 127, 9 autem] *om.* S || p. 127, 10–11 hoc iubet quod] *om.* S [S p. 86b] p. 127, 13 descendantem] dividendum S || p. 127, 18 post] postea S || p. 127, 18 informo] in forma S || p. 127, 22 causam quia] quod S || p. 128, 5 multas] diversas S || p. 128, 5–6 quae vocantur – praedicantur vel] quod illud quod unum est in multa dividunt S || p. 128, 7 dividendo] dividenda S || p. 128, 8 rationalitas enim et] ut S || p. 128, 9–14 possumus etiam – descendantibus etc] *om.* S || pp. 128, 15 – 129, 11 ascendentibus vero – remotas differentias] S = OA || p. 128, 17 subaudi] *om.* S || p. 128, 25 fit semper] semper fit S || p. 128, 27 homo sunt] homines S || p. 129, 2 descensio] descendantia S || p. 129, 10 redigendo] redigo S || p. 129, 13 colligant per – quod suppletur] suppletur per species et per genera S || p. 129, 14 collectiva multorum] multorum collectiva S || p. 129, 15–19 et ne – sua species] S = OA || p. 130, 2–3 speciem scilicet] semper S || p. 130, 3 dividunt] dividere S || p. 130, 3 hominem] homo enim S || p. 130, 6 sic] *om.* S || p. 130, 10 ille] *om.* S || p. 130, 12–23 sicut enim – multorum est] S = OA || p. 130, 13 sua] *om.* S || p. 130, 18 duplici] triplici S || p. 130, 24 autem] *om.* S || p. 130, 26 semper] *om.* S [S p. 87a] p. 131, 5 superior eo iudicetur] *add.* S || p. 131, 8 utrumque sit] *add.* S || p. 131, 8 id est – habeat utrumque] *om.* S || p. 131, 9 assignato uno] uno assignato S || p. 131, 11–14 et quod – plures species] S = OA || p. 131, 12 uno genere] genere eodem S || p. 131, 13 divisio]

diverso S || p. 131, 14 sit in plures species] in plures species sit S || p. 131, 22 illud] istud S || p. 131, 23 semper praedicantur de suis inferioribus] de inferioribus semper praedicantur S || p. 131, 24 de superioribus praedicatur] praedicatur de superioribus S || p. 132, 1 sic] *om.* S || p. 132, 3 contento] contempto S || p. 132, 4–9 hic obicitur – specie praedicari] *om.* S || p. 132, 10 autem] *om. spatio vacuo relicto* S || p. 132, 14–15 maioris et minoris] minoris et maioris S || p. 132, 17–18 genus illius speciei praedicatur et] praedicatur genus illius speciei ad S || p. 132, 19 id est – usque exclusivum] *om.* S || p. 132, 20–25 quod ostendit – socratem etc] S = OA || p. 132, 25 verum est Socratem] *add.* S || p. 132, 21 esse] esse animal S || p. 132, 22 autem] vero S || p. 132, 31 omnibus suis] suis omnibus S || pp. 132, 31 – 133, 3 maxima propositio – de Socrate] *om.* S || p. 133, 6 praedicari tantum] tantum praedicari S || p. 133, 7 genus vero generalissimum] generalissimum vero S || p. 133, 10 speciebus et generibus] generibus et speciebus S || p. 133, 11 quia de – dicitur generalissimum] dicitur generalissimum de omnibus suppositis S || p. 133, 13–14 specialissimae speciei – in praedicatione specialissimi] quod est ante generalissimum et in praedicatione specialissimae speciei S || p. 133, 15 autem] *om.* S || p. 133, 20 solis individu] solo individuo S || p. 133, 21 unum] *om.* S || p. 133, 23 si Socrates] sit ei solus filius S || p. 133, 25 est] dicitur S || p. 134, 3 erunt] *om.* S || p. 134, 4 erunt] *om.* S || p. 134, 7 numquam] numquam eadem S || p. 134, 7 individuo] *om.* S || p. 134, 8 autem] *om.* S || p. 134, 10 autem] *om.* S || p. 134, 11 erunt] esse S || p. 134, 11–12 et quia – magis autem] magis S || p. 134, 13 possum] *om.* S || p. 134, 15 individuum] individu] S || **S p. 87b** p. 134, 18 continetur sub specie] sub specie continetur S || p. 134, 21 est] est est S || p. 134, 23 id est – totum dicitur] *om.* S || p. 134, 23 totum] *om.* S || p. 134, 25 explicit de specie] *om.* S || p. 135, incipit de differentia] *om.* S || p. 135, 4–15 cur autem – accidens collocari] S = OA || p. 135, 7 illud] *om.* S || p. 135, 8 ordine tractatus] tractatus ordine S || p. 135, 11 differentiae] *post speciem (l. 10) coll.* S || p. 135, 12 est] *om.* S || p. 135, 17 solius] *om.* S || p. 135, 24 esse] *om.* S || p. 135, 24 magis propriam] *add.* S || **S p. 88a l. 12–45** = pp. 136, 1 – 137, 20 tribus modis – propria differentia || pp. 137, 21 – 138, 2 hic etiam – diversis modis] *om.* S || **S p. 87b l. 43–46** = p. 138, 2–6 unde ait – scilicet infinitatem || **S pp. 87b l. 46 – 88a l. 1.** = p. 138, 6–10 secundum autem – generis in species || **S pp. 88a l. 45 – 88b l. 2** = p. 138, 11–15 (*aliam versionem textus praebet S, cf. editionem*) || p. 136, 2–3 ab alia distat] distat ab alia S || p. 136, 4 quoniam] quod S || p. 136, 7 et idem] idemque S || p. 136, 17 differentiarum] has differentiarum S || p. 136, 19 vocat] vocans S || p. 136, 20 separabile] ad separabile S || p. 136, 22 nuncupatae] nuncupare S || p. 136, 23 sed leviter – leviterque recedunt] et tamen separabilia accidentia S || p. 137, 1 autem propriae differentiae dicuntur] dicuntur propriae differentiae S || p. 137, 14 accidens] accidens est S || p. 137, 16 calor] calca S || p. 137, 17 differentia] differentia differentia S || p. 137, 18 opposita hoc modo esse] hoc modo esse opposita S || p. 138, 4 quidem] *om.* S || p. 138, 4 id est] Boethius S || p. 138, 5 hanc scilicet] *om.* S || p. 138, 7–10 secundum autem – in species] *om.* S || p. 138, 16 supradictis modis] modis supradictis S || p. 138, 17 dicere] differre S || p. 138, 18 est communis] communis est S || p. 138, 19 autem] vero S || p. 138, 20 altero] alio S || p. 138, 22 levi] *om.* S || p. 138, 23

id] *om.* S || p. 138, 23 ipso] ipso differat S || p. 138, 23 autem] vero S || p. 138, 24 vel ab alio – differt] idem a se ipso differt vel ab alio S || p. 138, 26 vir] *om.* S || p. 138, 27 quiescente] discendente S || p. 139, 4 differentiam pueritiam] pueritiam differentiam S || p. 139, 5 differentiam] differentiam esse S || p. 139, 6 vir existens] existens vir S || p. 139, 7 hoc ideo determinamus] modo sic determinatur S || p. 139, 9 Socratis viri et si] viri Socratis et haec S || p. 139, 9 Socratis viri²] viri Socratis S || p. 139, 11 Socrates] *om.* S || p. 139, 12 iam] non S || p. 139, 15–22 dicens proprie – curvitas etc] S = OA || p. 139, 15 autem] vero S || p. 139, 16–17 altero] alio S || p. 139, 19 autem] *om.* S || p. 139, 21 nasi] vasi S || p. 140, 2 facit subiectumsuum rationale] subiectum suum rationale facit S || p. 140, 3 esse] *om.* S || p. 140, 4 etiam postquam] *om.* S || p. 140, 6 cuilibet] quilibet S || p. 140, 7 alteratum] alteratum; hic ostendit differentiarum officia S || p. 140, 10 faciunt alteratum] alteratum faciunt S || p. 140, 10 rem] *om.* S || p. 140, 10 ut] non S || p. 140, 12 intra] inter S || p. 140, 17 est effectum] effectum est S || pp. 140, 22 – 141, 3 illatio vero – facit alteratum] S = OA || p. 140, 22 illatio] illud S || p. 140, 24 propria] propria differentia S || p. 141, 11 proprie] propria S || p. 141, 11 substantiali esse] *add.* S || p. 141, 12 est] *om.* S || **S p. 89a**] p. 141, 14 quam equum esse] *om.* S || p. 141, 15 homo ab illo] ab alio S || p. 141, 17 attinet] continet S || p. 141, 19–20 sed dupliciter – vero simpliciter] *om.* S || pp. 141, 24 – 142, 9 differentiarum ergo – sub disiunctione] S = OA || p. 142, 1 sunt] sunt communes ^{a.c.} || p. 142, 4 quidem] *om.* S || p. 142, 10 quidem differentiae] differentiae quidem S || p. 142, 10 specifica] differentiae specifica hoc est S || p. 142, 14–18 animali enim – speciem animalis] S = OA || p. 142, 19 a] ad S || p. 142, 20 ita] *om.* S || p. 142, 23 a quiescente] ad quiescentem S || p. 142, 29 et] et ad S || p. 143, 1 formant] formam S || p. 143, 1 speciei] *om.* S || p. 143, 2 quod] quae S || p. 143, 6–17 illatio vero – sunt substantiales] S = OA || p. 143, 6 illatio] illud S || p. 143, 11 a] in S || p. 143, 17 scilicet sunt] id est S || p. 143, 22 autem eas] vero has S || p. 143, 23 alteratio sola] sola alteratio S || p. 143, 27 dicens] *om.* S || p. 144, 2 differentias] *om.* S || p. 144, 3 differentias secuit] secuit differentias S || p. 144, 6 autem est tertia divisio] divisio tertia S || p. 144, 6–7 alias inseparabiles] *om.* S || p. 144, 9 id est] scilicet S || p. 144, 11 facit hoc modo] hoc modo facit S || p. 144, 11 sunt] *om.* S || p. 144, 12 ut] non S || p. 144, 14 et quicquid – dicitur esse] *om.* S || p. 144, 15–20 quoniam igitur – hominem rationalitas] S = OA || p. 144, 21 ideo] idcirco S || p. 144, 22 adveniunt] advenient S || **S p. 89b**] p. 145, 2 dictum] dicendum S || p. 145, 4 *post* alias inseparabiles] *ll. 15–18* quandoquidem differentiae – magis propria *transp.* S || p. 145, 5 quia] quod S || p. 145, 6 ad inferiora sunt] sunt ad inferiora S || p. 145, 7 suis] *om.* S || p. 145, 10 volumus facere] facere volumus S || p. 145, 10 omnes] omnes aliae S || p. 145, 11 dividenda] individua S || p. 145, 12 a] *om.* S || p. 145, 14 in commento esse aequivoca] esse aequivoca in commento S || p. 145, 15–18 aliter etiam – potes sic] *om.* S || p. 145, 15–18 quandoquidem differentiae – magis propria] *post p. 145, 4* alias inseparabiles *transp.* S || p. 145, 22–25 et quod – quiescere etc] S = OA || p. 146, 1 iterum] *om.* S || p. 146, 3 separabilis] separabiles S || p. 146, 4 si] *male legitur* S || p. 146, 4 autem] vero S || p. 146, 5 in eodem est] eodem modo S || p. 146, 7 subdivisionem inseparabilium] inseparabilium subdivisionem S || p. 146, 12 perceptibilitatem] perceptibilem S || p. 146,

14–16 non sunt – differentiam tamen] *om.* S || p. 146, 17–19 hanc scientiam – substantialiter hominis] substantialiter scientiam S || p. 146, 20 sunt] *om.* S || p. 146, 22 divisionem] *om.* S || p. 146, 24 differentias] differentia S || p. 146, 25 hanc scilicet] hac solum S || p. 147, 1 secundum substantiam monstrant] *om.* S || p. 147, 3 suis subiectis] subiectis suis S || p. 147, 4 albius] albius est S || p. 147, 4 intensione – magis apparentem] id est magis apparentem id est intensionem S || p. 147, 6–12 sic autem – expositum est] S = OA || p. 147, 6 autem] *om.* S || p. 147, 19 per accidens] per accidens per accidens S || p. 148, 1 per se] *om.* S || p. 148, 5 esse] *om.* S | **S p. 90a** | p. 148, 10 definitionem] divisionem S || p. 148, 14–16 ut materiale – suscipiens est] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || p. 148, 19 aquilum autem et simum] *om.* S, *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 148, 21 ita est ac si diceretur] tantum valet ac si dicitur S || p. 148, 22 illo] illo et ideo additur aliquo modo rubrior per inferiora S || p. 148, 22–23 bene potest – et minus] dici possit S || p. 148, 25 quod differentiarum] differentiae S || p. 148, 27 sunt] *om.* S || p. 148, 28 aliae] aliae per accidens S^{a.c.} || p. 149, 3 subsequentibus] sequentibus S || p. 149, 5 vero] *om.* S || p. 149, 6 non ab eis] ab eis non S || p. 149, 6 non ab eis continentur] *add.* S || p. 149, 9 considerentur tres species differentiae] tres species differentiae considerentur S || p. 149, 10 differentiarum] differentiarum quaedam S || p. 149, 11 illae vero inseparabiles] aliae vero in se S || p. 149, 12 est] *om.* S || p. 149, 13 sunt aliae sunt] aliae S || p. 149, 14 dividimus genera] genera dividimus S || p. 149, 15 ipsa genera] genera ipsa S || p. 149, 16–17 nota quod – specie etc] *om.* S || p. 149, 18–21 est enim – constituunt animal] S = OA || p. 149, 22 hic] *om.* S || p. 149, 25 quidem] quidem quae S || p. 150, 3 aliae] a se S || p. 150, 4 sunt completivae] completivae sunt S || p. 150, 5–6 et hoc – specierum ostendit] quod S || p. 150, 8 item] tunc S || p. 150, 10 sive corporis] *om.* S || p. 150, 11 vel supremae – non sufficienter] *om.* S || p. 150, 12–18 quoniam ergo – specificae vocantur] S = OA || p. 150, 14–16 aliquo modo – sunt divisivae] aliquo modo sunt divisivae, aliquo modo acceptae S || p. 150, 17 differentiae omnes] omnes differentiae S || p. 150, 20 divisivae] consitutivae S || p. 150, 20–21 est opus] opus est S || p. 150, 21 generum] *om.* S || p. 150, 21 specierum] *om.* S || p. 150, 22 sunt secundum accidens] secundum accidens est S || p. 150, 26 et vocantur specificae] *om.* S || p. 150, 27 species a genere] et cetera S || p. 151, 2 quibusdam] *om.* S || p. 151, 2 ratione] *om.* S || p. 151, 5 genus habet] habet genus S || p. 151, 5 etiam species eius] et eius species S || p. 151, 6 ad minus] *om.* S | **S p. 90b** | p. 151, 13 superat] separat S || p. 151, 14 igitur] ergo S || p. 151, 15 suum genus] genus suum S || p. 151, 19 suum genus] genus suum S || p. 151, 20 et ea parte generis] *om.* S || p. 151, 22 a suo genere id est] *om.* S || p. 151, 22 rationalitatem] rationalitate S || p. 151, 23 mortalitatem] mortalitate S || p. 151, 26 homo plus habet] habet plus S || p. 151, 26 habeta] habet S || p. 152, 1 ea] eam S || p. 152, 2 acceptum] *om.* S || p. 152, 2 id] hoc S || p. 152, 7–11 secundum aliam – unam affirmationem] *om.* S || p. 152, 12 autem] *om.* S || p. 152, 13–14 sumens principium – in eodem] *om.* S || p. 152, 15 definitione] definitione quidam S || p. 152, 16 eidem] in eodem S || p. 152, 18 generibus] generis S || p. 152, 19 genera] gens S || p. 152, 20 eas non habent] non habent eas S || p. 152, 25 autem inter] vero in S || p. 153, 1 bina] duo S || p. 153, 2 solet] *om.* S || p. 153, 2 nigra] esse nigra dicitur S ||

pp. 153, 10 – 154, 34 haec autem – falsum est] S = OA || p. 153, 12 habent] habeant S || p. 153, 19–20 possunt esse] esse possunt S || p. 153, 21 fundato] considerato S || p. 153, 23 habeant] habent S || p. 153, 23 species] species et S || p. 153, 25 sustentet] substantiarum S || p. 154, 5 eas ut] casum S || p. 154, 9–10 specificatum est – quod genus] species ergo S || p. 154, 18 est differentia] differentia est S || p. 154, 20 suo] solo S || p. 154, 22 est] *om.* S || p. 154, 23 cum] et S || p. 154, 30 est ei] ei est S || p. 154, 31 species] genus S || p. 154, 32 autem] vero S [S p. 91a] p. 154, 36 universalitate sua] in sua multitudine S || p. 155, 1 si] *om.* S || p. 155, 4 contrarietatis] contrarietas S || p. 155, 5 esse in eodem] in eodem esse S || p. 155, 6–28 soluta illa – in simplicitate] *om.* S || p. 155, 31 ab] *om.* S || p. 155, 32 cum] *om.* S || p. 155, 34 dicat] *om.* S || p. 155, 34 autem] *om.* S || p. 156, 2 habere] habet S || p. 156, 5 enim] *om.* S || p. 156, 8 sic] *om.* S || p. 156, 8 id] hoc S || p. 156, 10 quod fieri non potest] *add.* S || p. 156, 13 distributum] distribuitur S || p. 156, 17 habet] habent S || p. 156, 17–24 id est – se habent] *om.* S || p. 156, 25–26 actu vero – sua puritate] S = OA || p. 156, 25 nullam] non illam S || p. 156, 29–30 fit aliquid] aliquis S || pp. 156, 31 – 157, 2 habent differentias – habent differentias] plus habere etiam S || p. 157, 4 substantialem] substantialem differentiam S || p. 157, 9 et] quod S || p. 157, 10 excludere accidentia] facere eam definitionem substantialis differentiae S || p. 157, 11–12 nec tamen – differentiae adaptatur] et de exclusionem scilicet accidentium inter haec diffinitio non substantiali differentiae non videtur competere S || p. 157, 13–19 de solo – perceptibile disciplinae] *in marg. add.* S || p. 157, 13 praedicatur] videtur praedicari S || pp. 157, 16 – 158, 6 rationale enim – dicere animal] S = OA || p. 157, 26 et] enim et S || p. 158, 1–2 homo sed non praedicatur] sed non S || p. 158, 4 in littera probat] quod probat in littera S || p. 158, 5 quod in quid praedicatur] *om.* S || p. 158, 6 enim] homo enim S || p. 158, 6 interrogatis] interrogans S || p. 158, 6 homo] *om.* S || p. 158, 10 utrumque probat] probat utrumque S || p. 158, 12 parte] parte vel ab effectu S || p. 158, 12 eam] ipsam speciem S || p. 158, 15 ex aere] *om.* S, *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 158, 15–17 et ex – sua differentia] et figura S [S p. 91b] p. 158, 20 consistere] constitutionem S || p. 158, 22 et formae] formaeque S || p. 158, 23 statuae Achillis] Achillis statuae S || p. 158, 23–24 aes quidem est] est quidem S || p. 158, 26 quod est] est quod est S || p. 158, 26 hominis] *om.* S || p. 159, 3 ita] ut S || p. 159, 4–5 in statua est] est in statua S || p. 159, 8 et] *om.* S || p. 159, 8 genus vel] *om.* S || p. 159, 9 differentiam vel] *om.* S || p. 159, 9 vel rationalitatem] *add.* S || p. 159, 13 id] hoc S || p. 159, 14 autem] vero S || p. 159, 16 proportionaliter] portio S, *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 159, 16 id est – proportionali similitudine] *om.* S || p. 159, 17 autem] vero S || p. 159, 21 homo habet animal ut] *om.* S || p. 159, 24–26 hic notandum – esset substantia] *om.* S || p. 159, 29 apta] aptat S || pp. 159, 29 – 160, 1 id est – id est separanda] *om.* S || p. 160, 1–6 nota quod – est inconueniens] *om.* S || p. 160, 12 differentiae] *om.* S || p. 160, 14 laxa] lapsa S || p. 160, 22–23 nos et irrationalia id – nos ab illis] cetera S || p. 160, 24–30 rationales enim – et dii] S = OA || p. 161, 1 interius] intentius S || p. 161, 2 esse substantialem differentiam] eam substantiam differentiam S || p. 161, 4 nunc] vero S || p. 161, 4 diligentius] diligentius S || p. 161, 7 differentia¹] differentia est S || p. 161, 7 quae] quae in S || p. 161, 8 iuncta] coniuncta S || p. 161, 9 id]

hoc S || p. 161, 10 cuiusque] uniuscuiusque S || p. 161, 10–11 nihil enim – definitionem dabit] *om.* S || p. 161, 12 continuatur et] *om.* S || p. 161, 14 speculantes] perscrutantes S || **S p. 92a**] p. 161, 16 id] hoc S || p. 161, 17 illam] illa S || p. 161, 19–22 sciendum est – unam descriptionem] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || p. 161, 24 suum] *spatium vacuum reliquit* S || p. 162, 2 est pars eius] pars est eius S || p. 162, 3 esse ipsius speciei] *add.* S || p. 162, 4–10 neque enim – substantialis differentia] S = OA || p. 162, 14 animalium] omnia linum S || p. 162, 15 aptum] *om.* S || p. 162, 17 id] hoc S || p. 162, 18 nec pars eius definitionis] *bis scripsit* S || p. 162, 20 a pari] S = A || pp. 162, 21 – 163, 4 erunt igitur – sit praedicantur] S = OA || p. 162, 24 ipsam] illam S || p. 162, 25 conducunt] concludit S || p. 163, 5 sunt] sunt quae S || p. 163, 8 non] etiam S || p. 163, 10 accipiuntur] accipiantur S || p. 163, 10 speciebus praedicantur] praedicentur speciebus S || p. 163, 13 incipit de proprio] *om.* S || p. 163, 14 proprium] proprium S || p. 163, 14 generis] generis naturae S || p. 163, 17 et] *om.* S || p. 163, 22 homini] *om.* S || p. 163, 22 quod convenit] *om.* S || p. 163, 23 quod omni et soli] soli et omni S || p. 163, 24 in senectute canescere] canescere in senectute S || p. 164, 1 in iuventute pubescere] *add.* S || **S p. 92b ll. 22–31** = p. 164, 1–18 || p. 164, 2 et semper] *om.* S || p. 164, 3 genus] genus et S || p. 164, 4 sed] *om.* S || p. 164, 4 id] hoc S || p. 164, 5–6 dividunt – modis] *om.* S || p. 164, 6 est proprium] proprium est S || p. 164, 7 soli] soli et cum S || p. 164, 8 speciei scilicet speciei non] scilicet non speciei S || p. 164, 9 universalitate sua] sua universalitate S || p. 164, 10 id¹] et S || p. 164, 10 omni] in sua universalitate S || p. 164, 11 sed] et S || p. 164, 12–15 nota quod – inest homini] *om.* S || p. 164, 16 acceptae similiter] similiter acceptae S || p. 164, 16 in] *om.* S || p. 164, 18 homini] *om.* S || p. 164, 19–21 hic obicitur – ad senectutem] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || **S p. 92b ll. 9–22** = pp. 164, 21 – 165, 13 item falsum – ut proprius || p. 164, 24 mors etenim] mox enim S || p. 164, 24–25 alia casualis – naturalis casualis] alia naturalis, alia casualis; casualis est illa S || p. 165, 1 extrinsecae] *om.* S || p. 165, 2 solet contingere] contingere solet S || p. 165, 5 iterum] ita non S || p. 165, 9 et quarundam – rationale mortale] *om.* S || p. 165, 12 corpori] *om.* S || p. 165, 12 semper] semper ut S || p. 165, 13 non est] *om.* S || p. 165, 13 ut] cuius est S || p. 165, 14 nam et] illam S || p. 165, 15 quando] quia S || p. 165, 16 quod] pro S || p. 165, 20 hic] *om.* S || p. 165, 20 quidam] *om.* S || p. 165, 20 est] *om.* S || p. 165, 21 risibilis] risi S || p. 165, 21 dicit] *om.* S || p. 165, 21 concedere] concedere quoniam sequitur S || p. 165, 22 quia si] *aliam versionem textus praebet* S || p. 165, 25 tunc] quare S || pp. 165, 25 – 166, 2 quia de – est risibile] *om.* S || p. 166, 2 tunc est homo] *om.* S || p. 166, 2 a quibusdam] *om.* S || p. 166, 6–19 alii dicunt – nihil concludet] *om.* S || p. 166, 20 propria] *om.* S || p. 166, 21 vel ultima proprii] *om.* S || p. 166, 23 convertantur] convertuntur S || p. 166, 25 proprie propria] pro patri (?) S || p. 166, 25–26 suis speciebus] speciebus suis S || p. 166, 26 possint] *om.* S || p. 166, 26 species] in speciebus esse S || p. 166, 26 esse] *om.* S || p. 166, 28 solvitur] dicitur S || p. 166, 29 proprie] *om.* S || p. 166, 29 separantur] separentur S || p. 166, 30 ea] *om.* S || **S p. 93a**] p. 167, 1 posterius sit] sit posterius S || p. 167, 2 alio ratione] alia ratione S || pp. 167, 5 – 168, 4 quod sic – separari est] *om.* S = OA || p. 168, 5 remanente specie] specie remanente S || p. 168, 7 possunt] non possunt S || p. 168, 8

subiecta sua] sua subiecta S || p. 168, 11 de¹] et S || p. 168, 11 de²] et S || p. 168, 12 de¹] *om.* S || p. 168, 13 adest et – corruptionem] est adest et cetera S || p. 168, 14–16 restrictius accipit – Porphyrius vero] *om.* S || p. 168, 16–17 illud – est] accidens tantum quod S || p. 168, 20 id] hoc S || p. 168, 20 quod adesse] et esse S || p. 168, 21 fundamento] subiecto S || p. 169, 1 autem] *om.* S || p. 169, 2 esse] *om.* S || p. 169, 5 videretur sibi ipsi] sibi ipsi videretur esse S || p. 169, 5 omne] *om.* S || p. 169, 7 hic] *om.* S || p. 169, 10 dormire] *om.* S || p. 169, 11 separabilia – sic] sunt separabilia sic dicens S || p. 169, 12 accidens est nigrum] est accidens *spatio vacuo relicto* S || p. 169, 12 accidit] accidit et accidit S || p. 169, 13–14 inseparabiliter – repugnaret] in quo repugnavit S || p. 169, 16 autem] *om.* S || p. 169, 17 descriptioni] descriptionem S || p. 169, 20–22 praeter subiecti – dum est] S = OA || p. 169, 29 iterum] *om.* S || p. 169, 30 determinatorum] *om.* S || p. 170, 3 est] tamen est S || p. 170, 4 id] hoc S || p. 170, 6 igitur] igitur determinatis S || p. 170, 6–7 de genere – accidenti] tractavit speciem differentiam proprio accidenti S || p. 170, 8 communitates et differentias] differentias et communitates S || p. 170, 9 cetera] omnia S || p. 170, 10 proposita sunt] posita S || p. 170, 11 proposita] posita S || p. 170, 11 genere] genere accidente S || p. 170, 14 singulorum] singulorum et S || p. 170, 15 eorum ostendit] ostendit omnium S [S p. 93b] p. 170, 17 habeat] habeant S || p. 170, 19 proprium de specie et de individu] suis S || p. 170, 19 vero] autem et de pluribus S || p. 170, 20 ipse determinat] determinat ipse S || pp. 171, 1 – 172, 16 videndum vero – sententia libri] *om.* S || p. 172, 17 et¹] *om.* S || p. 172, 17 et²] *om.* S || p. 172, 19 dicens] dicturus S || p. 172, 19–23 et vere – rerum cognitio] *om.* S || pp. 172, 26 – 173, 18 et quoniam – suum genus] *om.* S || p. 172, 26 et] *om.* S || p. 172, 26 inter] *om.* S || p. 172, 27 proposita] *om.* S || p. 173, 9 continentia specierum] specierum continentia S || p. 173, 13 et] *om.* S || p. 173, 16 de eo] *om.* S || p. 173, 19 secundam generis] secundum genus S || p. 173, 21 illis] eadem S || p. 173, 23 ita quod – sint divisivae] *om.* S || p. 173, 24 his] eis S || p. 173, 28 quod] *om.* S || p. 173, 28 uti] ita S || p. 174, 1 est aliud] aliud est S || p. 174, 1 aliud²] aliud est S || p. 174, 4 uti ratione] ratione uti S || p. 174, 6 demonstratum] demonstrandum S || p. 174, 6 est] *om.* S || p. 174, 7 etiam] *om.* S || p. 174, 11–14 dixit quod – praedicatione] *om.* S || p. 174, 16 specie] speciebus S || p. 174, 17 praedicantur] *om.* S || p. 174, 18 autem] hoc est perpetuo S || p. 174, 18 tertiam] et S || p. 174, 20 sunt] *om.* S || p. 174, 22 quemadmodum] quemadmodum enim si non sit S || p. 174, 22 a] in S || p. 174, 22 quod] *om.* S || p. 174, 24 et] *om.* S || p. 175, 2 est] esse S || p. 175, 3 differentia] differentiam S || p. 175, 4 et] ei S || p. 175, 5 constitutivis] constantis S || p. 175, 5 de pluribus praedicari] praedicari de pluribus S || p. 175, 6 eisdem] eius S || p. 175, 7 praedicatur] dicitur S || p. 175, 7 est] *om.* S || p. 175, 8 contentis] contemptis S || p. 175, 10 quam¹] *om.* S || p. 175, 10 quam²] *om.* S || p. 175, 11 praedicatur] praedicetur S || p. 175, 11 quam accidens praedicetur] *add.* S [S p. 94a] p. 175, 12–13 oportet autem – autem etc] *om.* S || p. 175, 17 quae] quae sunt S || p. 175, 17 sub eodem sunt] sunt sub eo S || p. 175, 18 segregantur] disgregantur S || p. 175, 20–21 nullam in se actu habeat] nullam actu in se habet S || p. 175, 27 continere] continet S || p. 176, 5 enim] *om.* S || p. 176, 5 hic] hic idem rationale S || p. 176, 7 et] *om.* S || p. 176, 7 quod] quia S || p. 176, 9 irrationale] rationale S || p. 176, 9 suo quodam]

quodam suo S || p. 176, 13 necessario] necessario et secundum actum et secundum naturam S || p. 176, 16 potest] potest scilicet sic determinat S || p. 176, 18 volunt] *om.* S || p. 176, 20 litteram] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 176, 23 peremptis] peremptas S || p. 176, 24 quod] qua S || p. 176, 24 remaneat] remaneat potest S || p. 176, 25 est] est genus S || p. 177, 2 remanere potest] remaneat S || p. 177, 3 Porphyrius explicat] exemplificat S || p. 177, 4 hoc scilicet quod] scilicet hoc S || p. 177, 5–6 ab eis aufertur] auferatur S || p. 177, 6 auferunt] *om.* S || p. 177, 13–22 sic probatur – dicit Boethius] *om.* S || p. 177, 24 aliam ostendit] ostendit aliam S || p. 177, 27–28 est genus] genus est S || p. 178, 1 genus quidem] quidem genus unum est S || p. 178, 4 unaquaeque] una S || p. 178, 5 habet genera] genera habet S || p. 178, 6 habet] *om.* S || p. 178, 8 simile] consimile S || p. 178, 8 est generis – distantia] discretio generis et differentiae S || p. 178, 9 habet] *om.* S || pp. 178, 13 – 181, 8 genus autem – ut differentia] S = OA || p. 178, 14 differentia] distantia S || p. 178, 16 ostendit communitatem] communionem dat S || p. 178, 23 ut] *om.* S [S p. 94b] p. 179, 2 autem] haec S || p. 179, 4 eadem res sit et] eadem sit res S || p. 179, 7 non] ut S || p. 179, 10 autem est] est his S || p. 179, 16 praedicantur] dicuntur S || p. 179, 16 esse eis] eis esse S || p. 179, 18 sicut genus est totum] et genus totum est S || p. 179, 24 autem eo] quidem hoc S || p. 179, 25–26 communitatibus] communibus S || p. 179, 27 discrepatione] discretionem S || p. 179, 28 genus a specie dicit] dicit genus a specie S || p. 179, 29 genus] *om.* S || p. 179, 31 talis est ratio] ratio est S || p. 179, 31 genus in se] in se genus S || p. 180, 2–3 et contractum] tractum S || p. 180, 8 cuius] quae S || p. 180, 9 arripuerit] corripuerit S || p. 180, 14 ipsa non contineatur] non continetur S || p. 180, 16 species ... auferat] specie ... auferatur S || p. 180, 23 genera] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 180, 26 est] *om.* S || p. 180, 32 id] hoc S || p. 181, 1 sunt naturaliter] naturaliter sunt S || p. 181, 3 simul] similiter S || p. 181, 10 speciem] species S || p. 181, 11 sua] suae S || p. 181, 12 quodam modo] quomodo S || p. 181, 13 forma] formae S || pp. 181, 15 – 183, 19 et genera – proprii praedicatur] S = OA || p. 181, 16 in] etiam S || p. 181, 19 definitione] differentia S || p. 181, 23–24 praedicantur – genere] de suo genere praedicantur S || p. 181, 25 genera] genera habundant S || p. 181, 28 supervadunt] superna *spatio vacuo relicto* S || p. 181, 31 pluralitate] *om.* S || p. 182, 1 genus] genus est S || p. 182, 3 et] *om.* S || p. 182, 9–10 suae substantiae] substantiae suae S || p. 182, 11 tenet] teneat S || p. 182, 13 species] species vero S || p. 182, 13 una] *om.* S || p. 182, 15 neque] neque species fit umquam generalissimum S || p. 182, 19 secundum hoc quod est species] *add.* S || p. 182, 25 differentiis] distantis S || p. 182, 26 et] *om.* S || p. 182, 29–30 hoc ostendit] hos S || p. 182, 31–33 eodem modo – ad speciem] quod S || p. 183, 1–19 et aequaliter – proprii praedicatur] S = OA || p. 183, 5 et] et cum S || p. 183, 8 dicens] *om.* S || p. 183, 9 bos] asinus (?) S || p. 183, 13 genus] *om.* S || p. 183, 19 definitio proprii praedicari] *add.* S || p. 183, 20–24 de specie – vel ratione] *om.* S [S p. 95a] pp. 183, 25 – 186, 26 differt autem – dicis niger] S = OA || p. 183, 25 differt] distent S || p. 183, 29 prius est proprio] est prius proprio S || p. 183, 31 enim] *om.* S || p. 183, 31–32 differentiis divisivis] divisivis differentiis S || p. 183, 32 differentiae autem] *om.* S || p. 184, 6 genus est prius] prius est genus S || p. 184, 8 id] hoc S || p. 184, 11 speciebus praedicatur] praedicatur speciebus S

|| p. 184, 26 inter] in S || p. 184, 28 semper] semper et S || p. 184, 29 inest] convenit S || p. 184, 30 est genus] genus est S || p. 185, 2 in hoc ostendit] ostendit in hoc S || p. 185, 5–7 species propria – quorum sunt] *om.* S || p. 185, 12 communitatem] communionem S || p. 185, 14 communitatem] communionem S || p. 185, 17 seu¹] sive S || p. 185, 17 seu²] sive S || p. 185, 22 hanc] in hoc S || p. 185, 26 etiam] *om.* S || p. 185, 28 sunt] *om.* S || p. 185, 32 accidenti] antecedenti S || p. 186, 1 quidem] participantur S || p. 186, 2 accidentia] accidentia in hoc S || p. 186, 3 in hoc] *om.* S || p. 186, 3–6 ea quae – aequaliter participant] *om.* S || p. 186, 7 sic] ibi S || p. 186, 9 quidem] *om.* S || p. 186, 12 in] *om.* S || p. 186, 12 id] hoc S || p. 186, 14 sunt naturaliter] naturaliter sunt S || p. 186, 16 sunt] sunt naturaliter in S || p. 186, 18 genera quidem] *om.* S || p. 186, 18–19 et in hoc etiam] et etiam in hoc S || p. 186, 19–20 de eis] et in his S || p. 186, 24 praedicantur] dicuntur S || p. 186, 27 ostendit] *om.* S || p. 186, 27 et] atque S || p. 186, 28–30 quandoquidem dictum – partibus quatuor] *om.* S || p. 186, 30 et dicit] dicens S || p. 186, 31 vero] *om.* S || p. 187, 1 erunt] erit S || p. 187, 1–2 differentiae – erunt] *om.* S || p. 187, 3 sunt quattuor] quattuor sunt S || p. 187, 3 differentiae] differentiae accidentis S^{a.c.} || p. 187, 6 sedecim] XIII S || p. 187, 6 quae] *om.* S || p. 187, 8 Porphyrius] ad consequentia S || p. 187, 10 et] *om.* S || p. 187, 11 decem] de esse S || p. 187, 13 noluit] velut S || p. 187, 14 et] *om.* S || p. 187, 16 differentiae] *om.* S || p. 187, 17 noluit] nolui S || p. 187, 19 iterum] *om.* S || p. 187, 20 differentia] differentiae vero S || **S p. 95b** || p. 187, 21 decem vero] vero decem S || p. 187, 23 superantur] separantur S || p. 187, 23 istae] ille S || p. 187, 24 tantum sunt tres] sunt tantum tres S || p. 187, 24 tertiae] tertii S || p. 188, 1 ibi] ille S || p. 188, 5 a differentia] ad differentiam S || p. 188, 5 sunt differentiae] differentiae sunt S || p. 188, 7 ab] *om.* S || p. 188, 8–9 sunt – locus] quattuor sunt differentiae S || p. 188, 10 ergo] genus S || p. 188, 11 ergo relinquitur] genus reliquum est S || p. 188, 12 differentia] *om.* S || p. 188, 13–15 reliquum est – ab accidenti] *om.* S || p. 188, 17 quo] quo species et differentia S || p. 188, 18 accidenti] accidente S || p. 188, 21 generis] generibus S || p. 188, 22 ergo] genus S || p. 188, 23 reliqua] propria reliqua S || p. 188, 23 demonstravimus] demonstratum est S || pp. 189, 1 – 193, 7 commune ergo – suo subiecto] S = OA || p. 189, 1 ergo] genus est S || p. 189, 2 a simili infert] infert a simili S || p. 189, 5 sit] fuit S || p. 189, 7 et] *om.* S || p. 189, 11 eis] *om.* S || p. 189, 15 et] *om.* S || p. 189, 20 differentiae] differentiae est S || p. 189, 22–23 inter eadem ostendit] ostendit inter eadem S || p. 189, 28 homo] homo velut qualitas S || p. 190, 3 praedicatur] praedicaretur S || p. 190, 8–9 id est formarum qualitibus] *om.* S || p. 190, 15 quidem] quidem in pluribus speciebus S || p. 190, 16 iterum] tamen S || p. 190, 19 vero] *om.* S || p. 190, 26–27 enim ablatum] sublatum S || p. 190, 30 disconveniunt et differentia] et differentia dissentiunt S || p. 191, 6 dicentes equum et asinum] equum et asinum dicentes S || p. 191, 7 mulus] nullus S || p. 191, 10 equae] equum S || p. 191, 12 individui muli] individuum S || p. 191, 13 duas] versas S || p. 191, 14 mulus] *om.* S || p. 191, 25 individuo] individuum S || p. 191, 26 et] *om.* S || p. 191, 28 equae] equum S || p. 191, 28 id] hoc S || p. 191, 29 individuo] individuum S || **S p. 96a** || p. 191, 34 mulus] nullus S || p. 191, 35 speciei nunquam] numquam speciei S || p. 192, 3 sunt species] species sunt S || p. 192, in] *om.* S || p. 192, 9 prosequitur] persequitur S || p. 192,

18–19 et differentia et proprium] proprium et differentia S || p. 192, 19 suo] *om.* S || p. 192, 22 subiecto suo] suo subiecto S || p. 192, 23–24 subiecto suo] suo subiecto S || p. 192, 26 subiecto suo] suo subiecto S || p. 192, 26 et] *om.* S || p. 192, 26 subiectum] *om.* S || p. 192, 27 curtatum] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 192, 33 est] *om.* S || p. 193, 7 semper adest suo subiecto] subiecto suo semper adest S || p. 193, 12 conversim] conversi S || p. 193, 15 est communitas] communitas est S || p. 193, 16 differentiam] differentias S || p. 193, 16–17 omnibus suis subiectis] suis omnibus substantiis S || p. 193, 18 omnibus] omnibus hominibus S || p. 193, 19 differunt autem] differt quidem S || p. 193, 22–23 vero continent quodam modo] quodammodo vero continet S || p. 193, 23 album] albedo S || p. 193, 24 quodam vero modo] quodammodo vero S || p. 193, 26 etiam – accidentium] plurimorum accidentium susceptibilis est S || p. 193, 28 aliquo modo continetur] *om.* S || p. 193, 28–29 rationabilitas] rationalitas S || p. 193, 29 continet quidem] quidem continet S || p. 193, 30 solam hanc] hanc solam S || p. 194, 1 de aliquo substantialiter] substantialiter de aliquo S || p. 194, 3 contineatur] continentur S || p. 194, 4 suis] *om.* S || p. 194, 5 scilicet] *om.* S || p. 194, 6–7 suscipere contraria – contrarias differentias] contrarias differentias suscipere S || p. 194, 8–9 rationalitatem et irrationalitatem] rationaliter et irrationaliter S || p. 194, 9 exponitur id est] id exponitur scilicet S || p. 194, 12 intensibilis] insensibilis S || p. 194, 12 in hoc] *om.* S || p. 194, 13 non] vero S || p. 194, 14 vero] *om.* S || p. 194, 15 quidem sunt] sunt quidem S || p. 194, 15–16 est differentia eorum] eorum est differentia S || p. 194, 17 id] hoc S || p. 194, 18 sua] *om.* S || p. 194, 18 faciunt] perficiunt S || p. 194, 19 perficiunt <aliam rem individualement>] *suppl. Iwakuma*, perficiunt alium individuum S || p. 194, 20 scilicet] hoc est S || p. 194, 20 in] *om.* S || p. 194, 21 perficiant] perficiunt S [S p. 96b] p. 194, 22 et] *om.* S || p. 194, 25 autem] *om.* S *spatio vacuo relicto* || p. 194, 25 speciei et proprii] proprii et speciei S || p. 194, 26 praedicantur converso modo] converso modo praedicantur S || p. 194, 27 sic] ibi S || p. 194, 28 praedicativa] cathedra (?) S || p. 194, 30 <quod>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet* S || p. 194, 31 sit] sic fit S || p. 194, 32 sic] *om.* S || p. 194, 33 sed] sed sit S || p. 194, 34 species] species aequaliter S || p. 194, 35 ea supervadat] supervadit S || p. 195, 1 proprio] proprio (*spatio vacuo relicto*) ostendit S || p. 195, 2 dicit] *om.* S || p. 195, 3 propria] proprium S || p. 195, 5 queunt] nequeunt S || p. 195, 7 specie] ipsa specie S || p. 195, 11 actus] actu S || p. 195, 11 species enim semper] semper enim species S || p. 195, 12 aliquando actu] actu aliquando S || p. 195, 1 sic] ibi S || p. 195, 14 homo] *supra lineam praebet* S, ti *in linea* || p. 195, 15 est eodem modo actualiter] homo actualiter est eodem modo S || p. 195, 16 non quod] numquam S || p. 195, 16–17 actualiter semper – ei risibilitas convenit] risibilitas semper ei actualiter S || p. 195, 17 homo est] est homo S || p. 195, 18 species] species actualiter S || p. 195, 22 semper cum] cum aliquo S || p. 195, 23 dicuntur] dictum est S || p. 195, 25 aliquo] aliquo suo S || p. 195, 25 legere vel cum ambulare] legit vel cum disputat vel cum ambulat S || p. 195, 26 vero] *om.* S || p. 195, 29 differentiam] distantiam S || p. 195, 30 sunt] *om.* S || p. 195, 30 differentes] differentes sunt S || p. 195, 31 sunt] est S || p. 195, 36 differentiam] distantiam S || p. 195, 36 et genus] *om.* S || p. 195, 36 <de>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet* S || p. 196, 1 est species] species est S || p. 196, 2 sed] *om.* S || p. 196, 3 individua – substantia]

individualis substantia S || p. 196, 3–4 proxima sibi participant] sibi proxima participat S
 || p. 196, 4 <et>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet* S || p. 196, 5 species] in hoc quod species S ||
 p. 196, 5 prius] *om.* S || p. 196, 5 accidentia] individua S || p. 196, 6 accidentia] accidentia
 vero S || p. 196, 8 quidem] quidem participatio S || p. 196, 10 alio] alio Aethiope S ||
 p. 196, 12 a se] a se invicem S || p. 196, 14 accidenti] accidenti et S || p. 196, 14 tantum]
om. S || p. 196, 15 proprium differt] differant proprium S || p. 196, 17 commune] commune
 is est S || p. 196, 18 quia] quod S || p. 196, 18 <in>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet* S || p. 196,
 19 etiam] *om.* S || p. 196, 20 quia] quod S || p. 196, 22 differunt autem] *om.* S || p. 196, 23
 uni soli] universali S || p. 196, 25 <proprium>] *suppl. Iwakuma, praebet* S || p. 196, 26
 uni soli] universali S || p. 196, 26 de ea – conversim] conversi de ea praedicantur S ||
 p. 196, 27 est] est particulariter S || p. 196, 28 etiam ea] inter in hoc S || p. 196, 30 enim]
 haec S || p. 196, 30 sed] sed nunc S || p. 196, 31 sufficiunt] sufficient S.



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**Generality and What Porphyry Defines.
On a Recurring Question in Realist *Isagoge* Commentaries
around 1100**

Charles Girard*

Realist logical commentaries from 1080–1150 (referred to below as twelfth-century commentaries) mention properties corresponding to the five Porphyrian predicables (genus, species, difference, proprium, and accident), properties such as generality (*generalitas*), speciality (*specialitas*), etc. These properties—predicable properties hereafter—point to what makes each predicable the predicable that it is: generality, for instance, makes a genus a genus. As Peter Abelard tells us, the authors of these logical commentaries view names of predicables as derivatives (*sumpta*), deriving from predicable properties, so that “genus” derives from generality just as “white” derives from whiteness.¹ Abelard sees the talk about predicable properties as harmless if put in a vocalist context, i.e.

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¹ Peter Abelard, *Logica ingredientibus*, p. 125. This constitutes an innovation because nothing in Aristotle or Porphyry implies that “genus” and “species” are derivatives. Following Porphyry, only names of differences can have such a status (Porphyry, *Isagoge*, I, p. 3, ll. 11–12). In Avicenna, this would apply to generic names, in a wide sense, as genera identify with *differentiae*. See Thom 2016, esp. pp. 140–41, 156.

if predicable properties amount to properties of words.¹ But he advocates that realist commentators stop putting such properties in the extra-vocal world, since it leads to many intricacies.²

Realist commentators mention predicable properties in various contexts: 1. When wondering what Porphyry actually defines in the *Isagoge*; 2. When asking whether predicable properties should exist in individuals (based on the principle from *Categories* 5 that everything found in secondary substances must also exist in some primary substance); 3. When addressing ontological issues following from the admission of such properties (usually in *Categories* 7, since generality and speciality were often thought to be relations); 4. When dealing with argumentative loci, since for William of Champeaux properties of things warrant the validity of inferences, as the property of generality warrants the locus *a genere* (e.g.: if this stone is not an animal, it is not a man).³ The passages from context 2., i.e. the Descent Problem, have been studied elsewhere.⁴ Here, I tackle context 1: the mention of predicable properties, like generality, in connection with what Porphyry defines, or the Definitum Problem.⁵ I shall consider texts from contexts 3. and 4. in future studies.

Various *Isagoge* commentaries mention the Definitum Problem when dealing with the definition of genus given by Porphyry: “genus is what is

¹ Peter Abelard, *Logica ingredientibus*, pp. 35, 39, and 125. Others thought that “genus” derives from the aptitude of predication. See Anonymus, *Glossae secundum vocales* (P11), Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana M63 sup., f. 77ra. For an edition of P11, see *Testi medioevali inediti*.

² Peter Abelard, *Logica ingredientibus*, p. 125.

³ On this see Guilfooy 2005.

⁴ See Girard, forthcoming.

⁵ I take definition and description as equivalent here. Sometimes commentators speak of a description of genus, since genus was considered undefinable, usually on the grounds that definitions require a genus and a difference. Most of the commentaries that I analyse here mention the argument: Pseudo-Rabanus, *Super Porphyrium* (only P3 hereafter), p. 93; P14, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France 17813, f. 4rb; P16, München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14458, f. 87ra. They follow Boethius on this: Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii commentorum editio secunda*, p. 180, ll. 20–22. See Barnes’s introduction in Porphyry, *Introduction*, pp. 58–62.

predicated of many differing in species in answer to the question ‘What is it?’”¹ But no authority (either Porphyrian or Boethian) suggests raising such a problem, let alone that generality should play any part in its resolution. Thus the Definitum Problem constitutes an non-authoritative topic of discussion. This implies that commentaries preserving such peculiar discussions are likely to be connected in some way.

The Definitum Problem has philosophical relevance: it has to do with what words like “genus” and “species” actually stand for. Where one might think that such words only stand for second-order concepts, these texts consider how “genus” as used in Porphyry’s definition refers to other words like “animal” but also to real beings. The heart of the matter is to understand what exactly in the complex meaning of “genus” should be prioritized if one want to glose Porphyry’s definition right.

I first specify which commentaries I study here, formulate hypotheses as to why they might have come to formulate the Definitum Problem in the way they did, and separate the commentaries into two groups; in the second and third section, I describe the texts from each group in turn; in the fourth, I analyse the late evolution of the Definitum Problem; in the fifth, I conclude and add further remarks about what this study teaches us about each group of commentaries, as well as about textual data still reported missing.

1 The Definitum Problem in P3, P14, P16, and P28

Four extant twelfth-century *Isagoge* commentaries preserve a rather similar treatment of the Definitum Problem: P3, P14, P16, and P28.² They all raise the Definitum Problem in relation to the first predicable (genus), mention as potential answers both what I will call the Generality Answer (Porphyry defines generality) and the Bearer Answer (Porphyry defines the bearer of generality), and develop some nearly identical initial objections against one or the other solution. P3 introduces the problem as follows:

¹ Porphyry, *Isagoge*, I, p. 2, ll. 15–17.

² For the sigla, see Marenbon 2018, pp. 172–88.

We ask here what is being described in this description: the thing that bears generality, generality itself, or the word that is “genus.”¹

All four commentaries also present two versions of the Bearer Answer: the Singular Bearer Answer (Porphyry defines some bearer of generality, for instance animal), and the All Bearers Answer (Porphyry defines all the bearers of generality at once, collectively).

Only P3 and P14 seriously consider a third solution, the Word Answer (Porphyry defines “genus”). As I emphasise below, the Word Answer amounts to an underdetermined and realist-compatible *de voce* answer where Porphyry defines “genus” without any determinate reference to what “genus” signifies. None of the twelfth-century commentaries tackles the more radical and challenging claim that Porphyry defines generic names signified by the name “genus” (except maybe for P17’s addition, which I won’t cover in detail).²

Out of context, the fact that the Definitum Problem revolves around generality, as in both the Generality Answer and the two versions of the Bearer Answer, may puzzle you. Two (speculative) hypotheses might help.

(Hypothesis 1) Realist commentators use predicable properties in *Isagoge* commentaries’ prologues to solve another problem, the Counting Problem.³

¹ P3, p. 95: “Hic quaeritur quid in hac descriptione describatur, utrum illa res quae generalitatem suscipit vel ipsa generalitas vel vox quae est ‘genus.’”

² But elsewhere, at the very beginning of the commentary, the Sankt Gallen version of P3 (Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek 134) tackles the radical *de voce* approach; the Paris version (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 13368) also seems to talk about signified names in an addition similarly located, but less clearly. On these additions, see Iwakuma 1992, p. 43–46 and Marenbon 2018, p. 163. On the Sankt Gallen version, see the article by Podolak in this volume. On the radical *de voce* approach, with contrasting views on its significance, see Cameron 2011 and Marenbon 2011.

³ Commentaries’ prologues also employ predicable properties to explain how some given thing is said to be some (intermediate) genus, for instance, when it is at the same time an (intermediate) species. See for instance P3, p. 61.

For these commentators, Porphyry deals with things, either directly or ultimately (as signified by names); and since Porphyry deals with five items, they want to identify *five things exactly*.¹ But genera, species, etc. are far more than five in number. To get to five and no more, commentators sometimes summon predicable properties: Porphyry deals with all the genera, species, etc. inasmuch as they possess one of the five predicable properties.² But then someone might have said: if the predicable properties are what is five in the subject matter of the Porphyrian treatise, Porphyry should describe these things, and not the genera, species, etc. So this whole set of discussions might have been primarily built in reaction to the presence of this terminology in prologues.

(Hypothesis 2) These realist commentators understand “genus” as a derivative (*sumptum*), and the analysis of *all* derivatives requires the distinction between a property, its bearer, and the derived word.³

This second hypothesis suffices to explain why the Definitum Problem might have popped up in such a form: if there are three ways to consider a derivative, it makes sense to ask what the definition of the derivative “genus” defines exactly. But the Counting Problem might have played some part as well. Anyhow, it played some part later in the development of the Definitum Problem.

¹ On the subject matter in prologues to *Isagoge* commentaries, see Podolak 2024.

² P17, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 3237, f. 125ra: “Praeparans Porphyrius introductiones ad praedicamenta Aristotelis habuit materiam in hoc opere quinque res: genus, speciem, differentiam, proprium et accidens. Nec intelligendum est quinque res discretas personaliter, cum generales de quibus agit innumerabiles sint et aliae similiter. Sed quinque dicuntur secundum quinque diversas proprietates, id est generalitatem, specialitatem et alias, secundum quas de rebus hic agitur.” Cf. f. 123ra (the beginning of the commentary has been copied twice). All transcriptions are my own.

³ The view of “genus” as a derivative could originate from Porphyry’s treatment of genus and species as relatives. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, p. 4, ll. 7–9. Since genus and species are relatives, there should be relations that make them relatives. In the *Categories* commentaries from the same period, the relative “father,” for example, is the derivative of the relation of paternity. On this, see Erismann 2014 and Martin 2016.

I use precisely this later influence of the Counting Problem as one of the two main criteria allowing the division of P3, P14, P16, and P28 into two groups. The other criteria is textual proximity. On the one side, there are:

1. P3 and P14, two connected commentaries that have been associated with William of Champeaux's school. They share the same basic text for this question about Porphyry's definition of genus, even if P14 sometimes innovates as well as modifies the structure of the section.¹ Both commentaries put forward a similar version of the Bearer Answer and both attempt to acknowledge alternative answers by ordering them in relation to the right one, i.e. the Bearer Answer. Another commentary, P17, can be associated with this group.

On the other side, we find:

2. P28 and P16, two commentaries that present different texts and replies but give more importance to the Counting Problem in the resolution of the Definitum Problem than texts from the first group do. Elements from another commentary, P20 (and by extension P19), seemingly depend on something resembling P16.

I now turn to the texts.

2 P3 and P14: The All Bearers Answer and the Ordering of False Opinions

P3 first raises objections against the Singular Bearer Answer (Porphyry defines some bearer of generality), the All Bearers Answer (Porphyry defines all bearers of generality collectively), and the Word Answer

¹ On the connection between P3 and P14, see Iwakuma 1999, pp. 121–22, Cameron 2015, pp. 51 and 60, Marenbon 2018, p. 165, and the article of Podolak in this special issue. I should mention that the Sankt Gallen version of P3, although sometimes closer to P14 than the three other versions of P3, gives the same text as the other versions of P3 here.

(Porphyry defines “genus”).¹ These initial objections rely on two basic rules for definitions:

Conversion Rule: if “*s* is *d*” is the definition of *s*, then every *d* is *s*.

Substitution Rule: if “*s* is *d*” is the definition of *s*, if *x* is *d*, *x* is *s*.

The objection to the Singular Bearer Answer runs as follows: Porphyry defines genus as what is predicated of many differing in species etc; if Porphyry defines some bearer of generality, for instance, animal, then according to the conversion rule animal would be predicable of everything that is predicated of many things differing in species etc. (for future reference, I tag the argument as [EVERYTHING PREDICATED OF MANY ETC. IS ANIMAL]). By extension, as P14 spells out, animal could also directly be predicated of every genus—of stone for instance.²

To the All Bearers Answer, one can object that if all generality bearers are collectively defined, then, according to the Substitution Rule, we would end up predicating the collection of generality bearers of anything that can be predicated of many differing in species, for instance of animal (hereafter [ANIMAL IS ANIMAL AND STONE ETC.]).³

¹ Interestingly, P14 already gives the gist of the determination when listing the options. See P14, f. 4va (my italics): “Sed prius considerandum est quid hic definiatur et quomodo definitio cum definito convertatur, <an> omnes res generales, scilicet animal et quaelibet aliae *in quantum participant generalitate* hic definiuntur, vel ipsa generalitas *in quantum est in subiectis*, vel haec vox ‘genus’ *secundum quod significat res generales*.”

² P3, p. 95 (text quoted without the small addition from Assisi): “Si dicamus quod res quae suscipit generalitatem hic definiatur, tunc animal hic definitur; et si animal hic definitur, tunc definitio illa est cum eo convertibilis; et sic omne quod praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie etc est animal, quod falsum est.” Compare with P14, f. 4va (differences underlined): “Sed obicitur quod si omnes res generales hic definiuntur, tunc vel unaquaeque per se vel omnes insimul. Si unaquaeque, tunc animal, et si hoc est, tunc definitio illa est convertibilis {communitabilis ms.} cum eo, et sic omne quod praedicatur de pluribus etc. est animal, et ita lapis est animal, quod falsum est.”

³ P3, ed. Iwakuma, p. 95: “Si vero dicamus quod omnes res quae suscipiunt generalitatem insimul definiantur, similiter sequitur inconueniens, scilicet de quocumque praedicatur definitio, et definitum; et ita si definitio illa praedicatur de animali, et omnes res quae suscipiunt generalitatem, quae sunt definitum, praedicabuntur de eodem, quod est inconueniens.” Compare with P14, f. 4va (differences underlined): “Si vero omnes

Then, P3 lists two objections to the Generality Answer.¹ First, if Porphyry defines generality, then the definition will be predicated of generality, and so generality will be predicated of many differing in species. This is impossible, since generality is not predicated of many differing in species, for it is an (inferior) species in the category of relation. The second objection relies on the Substitution Rule, like in [ANIMAL IS ANIMAL AND STONE ETC.]: since being predicated of many differing in species etc. can well be predicated of animal, then, if being predicated of many differing in species etc. defines generality, generality can be predicated of animal (hereafter [ANIMAL IS GENERALITY]).²

Against the Word Answer, P3 mentions the following objection: since Porphyry said he would deal with things, he cannot deal with words only in the definitions he provides for the predicables (hereafter [PORPHYRY'S REALIST INTENTION]). As we will see below, the objection targets commentaries claiming that Porphyry deals with words (*voces*), but

simul dicantur hic definiri videtur inde inconueniens sequi per hanc regulam 'de quocumque praedicatur definitio et {id est *ms.*} definitum:' si enim definitio illa praedicatur de animali, et omnia quae ibi definiuntur de eo praedica<n>tur, quod non est verum." Here P14's text is clearer than all four P3 manuscripts, spelling out the *inconueniens* as separated from the rule.

¹ In general, the structure of P14's text differs from P3's: for whereas P3 exposes all initial objections first, P14 replies to each set of objections before exposing and replying to the next.

² P3, ed. Iwakuma, pp. 95–96: "Si autem velimus generalitatem ipsam hic definiri, tunc definitio sua de ea praedicabitur, et ita generalitas praedicatur de pluribus speciebus etc; quod falsum est, quia est specialissima species in praedicamento relationis, et item de quocumque praedicaretur illa definitio et generalitas, et sic animal est generalitas, et sic non est substantia, quod est inconueniens." Compare with P14, f. 4vb (differences underlined): "Rursus opponitur quod si dicatur 'generalitas hic definitur,' tunc definitio sua praedicatur de ea, et ita generalitas praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie, quod falsum est, quia est species specialissima {alissima *ms. p.c.*} in praedicamento relationis. Item, secundum supradictam regulam de quocumque praedicatur illa definitio, et generalitas, et sic animal est generalitas, et sic non est substantia, quod est inconueniens."

without spelling out what these words signify, and so in a way that is compatible with realism.¹

When P3 and P14 give their own reply to the Definitum Problem, both commentaries defend all three answers, or more precisely, provide tools (italicised in the next quotation) to make all three answers entertainable.

We resolve this in diverse ways. For we say that this very thing that bears generality is described here *according to this bearing*, such as this thing, animal (and stone), has the description “what is predicated of many etc.,” not inasmuch as it is an animal but inasmuch as it can bear generality; the same goes for the other things that bear generality. ... Generality itself can also be defined, not in its proper being, but *inasmuch as it attaches to things*, that is, inasmuch as is shown in this description what things are its bearers. Indeed, “generality is defined here” is nothing other than “generality is determined in the things to which it attaches.” ... Moreover, we say that this word “genus” is described here *according to its signification*. For in this description is shown what are the significates of this word that is “genus.” And “the word is defined” is nothing other than “is shown for which thing it is a name.”²

¹ P3, p. 96: “Item si vox hic tantum definiatur sine respectu rerum, iam suum propositum egressus est, quia de rebus, scilicet de genere, de specie et differentia et cæteris se tractaturum proposuerat.” Compare with P14, f. 4vb (differences underlined): “Item, si ‘genus’ haec vox definitur, obicitur quod suum propositum Porphyrius egressus videtur, cum de rebus tractare proposuerit.” P14 misses the *tantum* that makes the point sharper in P3.

² P3, pp. 96–98: “Quod solvitur diversis modis. Dicitur enim quod revera illa res quae generalitatem suscipit secundum illam susceptionem hic describitur, ut animal et lapis haec res, non in eo quod animal est, sed in eo quod generalitatis susceptibile est, hanc descriptionem habet ‘quod praedicatur de pluribus etc.’; eodem modo de ceteris quae generalitatem suscipiunt. ... Potest etiam ipsa generalitas esse definita, non in proprio esse, sed in quantum adiacet rebus, scilicet in eo quod in hac descriptione quae sint eius susceptibilia demonstratur. Nihil enim aliud est ‘generalitas hic definitur’ nisi generalitas determinatur in quibus adiaceat. ... Rursus dicitur quod haec vox ‘genus’ hic secundum suam significationem describitur. In hac enim descriptione quae sint huius vocis significata quae est ‘genus’ demonstratur, et nihil aliud est ‘vox definitur’ nisi ‘demonstratur quibus sit nomen.’” The first part from *diversis modis* to *generalitatem*

At first glance, this threefold answer seems neutral. The thing that bears generality can be defined inasmuch as it bears generality; generality itself can be defined inasmuch as it attaches to some bearer; the word “genus” can be defined inasmuch as it signifies some things. But at a closer look, the first answer (the Bearer Answer) is the main one, and all other answers are only acceptable if made compatible with it. To be able to say that Porphyry defines generality, the things that bear generality must appear in the description. To grant that “genus” is the *definitum*, one must concede that the description mention the *things* called “genus”; and these things do not differ from the bearers of generality themselves.

But what about conversion and substitution? In indirect reply to [EVERYTHING PREDICATED OF MANY ETC.] and [ANIMAL IS ANIMAL AND STONE], P3 claims that the definition of genus does not play by the general rules of definition. For if the Substitution Rule were to apply, we would end up granting predications like “Man is predicated of many differing in species,” because animal is predicated of many differing in species, and man is an animal. The Substitution Rule works when we attribute to animal its natural definition, not the definition of genus, which definition animal only receives through the property of generality (having nothing to do with the nature of animal).¹

Conversion is a different matter: Boethius says that any definition, including the definition of genus, must exhibit this feature.² Hence P3 leans towards the All Bearers Answer, because it allows for maintaining conversion somehow.

suscipiunt is absent from the reorganised text of P14. Corresponding to the other portions of text, P14 has (4vb): “Ad quod responde quod generalitas non in proprio esse sed secundum quod adiacet rebus hic definitur, et nihil aliud intelligi quando dicitur generalitas hic definiri nisi ea quibus adiacet determinari. ... Sic solve: in hac descriptione quae sit significatio huius vocis quae est ‘genus’ demonstratur, et nihil aliud est vocem hic definiri nisi quibus sit nomen determinari.”

¹ P3, p. 96: “Si vero huic opponitur definitioni quod superius diximus, scilicet de quocumque praedicatur definitio, et definitum, sciendum est quod regula illa nihil nocet huic sententiae, quia regula illa data est de definitionibus attributis secundum proprium esse rerum, non secundum aliquam extrinsecam proprietatem.”

² Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii commentorum editio secunda*, pp. 196–97.

If it is objected that the definition must be convertible with what is defined, there is no objection, because if animal and stone and tree and the others that possess generality are defined here, the definition can well be convertible with these by the term that is “genus.” So, when I say “every genus is predicated of many differing in species etc.” it is as if was said “every genus,” that is every significate of “genus,” that is animal, stone, tree, and the rest, “has this property,” that is to be predicated of many etc. But the conversion will be under a disjunction, as such: everything that is predicated of many etc. is a genus, that is either animal, or stone, or tree, and the rest. And don’t be amazed if the regular <predication> is without disjunction and the converse <one> with disjunction. Indeed, this is found in many cases, like here “every rational and irrational is an animal” and “every animal is either rational or irrational.” And Boethius says in the *Commentary* that this definition must necessarily convert with what it defines.¹

So, first we have to sustain the All Bearers Answer. P3 believes that Porphyry’s definition can define all bearers of generality at the same time through the word “genus.” Then conversion can well occur, but under a special condition. For we cannot say that everything predicated of many things differing in species is animal *and* stone *and* tree etc. collectively. But the conversion works under a disjunction, meaning by replacing conjunctions with disjunctions: what is predicated of many things differing in species is animal *or* stone *or* tree *or* one of the other bearers of generality.

¹ P3, p. 96–97: “Si iterum obiciatur quod definitio debet esse convertibilis cum suo definito, nihil obest, quia si animal et lapis et arbor et omnia quae habent generalitatem hic definiuntur, bene potest definitio esse convertibilis cum illis per hoc vocabulum quod ‘genus’ est; ut quando dico ‘omne genus praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie etc.’ est quasi diceretur: omne genus, id est omne significativum generis, id est ‘animal’ ‘lapis’ ‘arbor’ et cetera habet illam proprietatem, scilicet quod praedicatur de pluribus etc. Sed conversio erit sub disiunctione, ita scilicet: omne quod praedicatur de pluribus etc est genus, id est vel animal vel lapis vel arbor et cetera. Ne mireris, si sine disiunctione recta est et conversa cum disiunctione; in multis enim sic invenitur, ut hic ‘omne rationale et irrationale est animal’ et ‘omne animal est vel rationale vel irrationale.’ Et quod necessario debet converti haec definitio cum suo definito, dicit Boethius in commento.”

Now, P14 modifies that portion of text and ends up providing a choice between two distinct solutions. The second one is identical to P3's, i.e. that conversion could work if the definitum is collective and the conversion happens under a disjunction.¹ The first answer, arguably P14's own take on the issue, argues that neither of the two rules (substitution *and conversion*) applies here because the definition of genus is not a proper definition.² This option makes the Singular Bearer Answer adoptable.

Turning to the substitution-based objection against generality [ANIMAL IS GENERALITY], P3 rules it out because the definition defines generality only inasmuch as it attaches to things:

And according to this opinion, the aforementioned rule “of whatever we predicate the definition, we predicate what's defined” does not fall short, since generality is here subjected to that definition by its derivative (*sumptum*), it is by this same <derivative> that if it is predicated of something, its definition will also be predicated of that thing. For instance, since generality is predicated of animal by its derivative, that is by the term that is “genus,” the definition will be predicated of animal. And when I say that every genus is predicated of many etc., generality is indeed put as subject by its derivative, but the meaning of the proposition regards the

¹ P14, f. 4vb (differences underlined): “Vel potest dici quod ipsae res generales per hoc nomen quod est ‘genus’ cum hac definitione convertuntur, ut bene convertatur cum omnibus illis hoc modo: omne significatum generis, id est animal, lapis etc., praedicantur de pluribus etc. Sed conversio erit sub disiunctione, ita: omne quod praedicatur de pluribus est vel animal vel lapis vel aliquid tale. Nec turbet te quod recta est cum coniunctione et conversa cum disiunctione. In multis enim sic invenitur, ut hic ‘omne rationale et irrationale est animal’ et ‘omne animal vel est rationale vel irrationale.’ Quod autem converti debeat haec definitio in commento Boethius dicit.”

² P14, f. 4va–b: “Quod sic solvitur: quia cum hic describitur animal illa res communis secundum quandam suam accidentalem proprietatem et secundum hoc quod est genus non est necessarium converti descriptionem cum animali. Illae enim descriptiones tantum convertuntur cum descriptis quae notant omnes illas proprietates quae plenum esse descriptum faciunt. Nec cogit supradicta regula {i.e. *substitution*}, quia non est data nisi de definitionibus expressum esse rei explicantibus, non aliquam extrinsecam proprietatem.” On the placement of additions *before* complemented passages in such texts, see Grondeux and Rosier-Catach 2017, for instance pp. 65, 265, 318, 365, 397.

foundation, just as when I say “every white is a body,” whiteness indeed is put as subject, but the meaning of the proposition concerns the foundation (*invenitur circa fundamentum*).¹

We find explicitly expressed here the fact that “genus” and “species” are derivatives (*sumpta*), as in the realist texts described by Peter Abelard.² “Genus” works like “white.” When saying “every white is a body,” the accidental form whiteness is used as a subject, but this form is signified relative to its foundation (*circa fundamentum*), i.e. its bearer, i.e. body. Similarly, when saying “every genus is etc.,” generality is used as a subject, but generality is only signified in connection to its foundation. Thus, since derivatives signify the form they derive from, when Porphyry uses “genus” as a subject in his definition, he defines generality here as well, but still generality cannot be directly predicated of animal or stone, because generality is signified *circa fundamentum* by “genus.”

To the [PORPHYRY’S REALIST INTENTION] objection, P3 replies that Porphyry’s intention to deal with things cannot prevent anyone from saying that Porphyry defines the word “genus,” provided consideration of what “genus” signifies. For, as a derivative, “genus” points to generality and signifies it in relation to its bearer. Signification specified, P3 even

¹ P3, p. 97: “Et secundum hanc sententiam non fallit regula supradicta ‘de quocumque praedicatur definitio, et definitum,’ quia generalitas per suum sumptum illi definitioni subicitur et per idem si de aliquo praedicatur, de eodem definitio sua praedicabitur; ut <cum> {*add. Assisi*} de animali praedicatur generalitas per suum sumptum, id est per hoc vocabulum quod est ‘genus,’ de eodem praedicabitur definitio; et quando dico ‘omne genus praedicatur de pluribus etc,’ generalitas quidem subicitur per suum sumptum, sed tamen sensus propositionis circa fundamentum versatur, sicuti, quando ego dico ‘omne album est corpus,’ albedo quidem subicitur, sensus vero propositionis circa fundamentum reperitur.” P14’s text is essentially the same.

² See the introduction of this paper.

promises unproblematic conversion.¹ Why so? Arguably, because the solution preserving conversion for the significate of “genus” can apply.²

Apart from P3 and P14, the commentary P17 also preserve traces of the first group’s way of dealing with the Definitum Problem. But P17 only hints at the issue, and only four lines, which might easily go unnoticed, remain:

Described here are all general things, all of which the description converts with under a disjunction. And generality is here described regarding the foundations (*circa fundamenta*). And the name “genus” is here explained with its signification.³

The summary keeps the apparent neutrality of P3 and P14 answers, entertaining all three options under certain conditions. But as in P3, the All Bearers Answer, with the conversion under a disjunction that comes along with it, prevails.⁴ Yet, after these four lines, P17 adds a new, lengthier development where a possible new answer appears, this time incompatible with the other three. It consists of a radical vocalist reading: general names are being defined. This option can be developed into a threefold answer similar to the realist reading presented in P3 and P14: Porphyry defines all the general words, their properties, and the word “genus” itself.

¹ P3, ed. Iwakuma, p. 98: “Et tunc bona est conversio in definitione consignificando circa res; nec ideo tamen propositum egreditur, quia per vocem ipsam, cui definitio illa dicitur convenire ut suum significans, proprietas illa inesse rebus demonstratur.” P14’s text is essentially the same, but closer to the P3 version of Paris (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 17813).

² The mention of conversion here is unexpected. Conversion was not mentioned in the initial arguments as playing against the *vox* option.

³ P17, f. 126vb: “Describuntur autem hic omnes res generales cum quibus omnibus sub disiunctione descriptio convertitur. Generalitas et hic circa fundamenta describitur. Et hoc nomen ‘genus’ cum eius significatio declaretur.”

⁴ P17, f. 126vb: “Potest autem dici quod in {utraque *del. ms.*} praedicta definitione de rebus non agitur sed de vocibus generalibus. ... Et secundum hanc expositionem voces generales et earum proprietas et earum nomen describitur.” The last sentence makes clear that the significates of general names are also signifying items themselves, and no signified *thing* is mentioned.

3 P28 and P16: Concerns with the Counting Problem

The Definitum Problem also appears at the very beginning of P28. The commentary begins by disqualifying the underdetermined vocalist answer altogether: no one entertains it. Some few elements from the old P3 text remain (italicised below) despite the reworkings:

We wonder therefore what Porphyry describes when he says “Genus is what is predicated of many differing in species in answer to ‘What is it?’ (*in eo quod quid sit*),” that is whether he defined generality, as some <thought>, or he defined animal and the other genera, the things that are the bearers of generality, as some thought, or this word “genus,” without connecting it to its significate. But this no one says: when we say that words are being defined we want to mean that by a phrase is explained what this word signifies. *Defining a word is nothing other than* making its significate clear <by> a phrase. But one can only make a significate clear by the collected properties; also, collecting the properties of something is making clear what the thing of which these are the properties is. Defining <then> is the same as making clear what the word “genus” signifies and making clear its significate. Therefore, the question remains: if <Porphyry> defines the significate of “genus,” is it animal and the others, or, <as> some thought, generality?¹

¹ P28, Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek 833, p. 4: “Quaeratur itaque quid describat Porphyrius dicens ‘Genus est quod de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid sit praedicatur,’ utrum scilicet definiat generalitatem ut quibusdam <videtur>, an definiat animal et cetera genera, haec quae {quidem *ms.*} generalitatis susceptiva sunt, ut quibusdam videtur, an vocem istam ‘genus,’ non respiciendo ad eius significatum. Sed hoc nullus dicit. Quando voces definiri dicimus hoc intelligi volumus ut scilicet per orationem quod vox illa significet explicetur. Nihil quippe aliud est vocem definire quam eius significatum <per> orationem aperire; significatum quoque aperiri non possit nisi per suas proprietates collectas; proprietates quoque alicuius colligere hoc sit <aperire> quid {quod *ms.*} est illud cuius proprietates sunt illae. Definire idem <quod> quid ‘genus’ haec vox significat aperire et eius significatum aperire. Restat igitur quaestio quod si ‘generis’ definiat significatum, utrumne animal et cetera, vel, <ut> quibusdam videtur, generalitatem.”

P28 builds upon some section where P3 and P14 try to explain what defining a word amounts to. Since defining a word necessarily implies its significate, saying that Porphyry defines “genus” without any respect to its significate is no viable option. Sooner or later one will have to specify the significate of “genus”—and there, for P28, words are not a candidate worth mentioning. So, only the Bearer Answer and the Generality Answer remain. Interestingly, P28 reports that some thinkers indeed thought that Porphyry defines generality. But it remains unclear whether the commentary refers to some specific position whereby Porphyry defines generality as such, or if it merely targets the nuanced answers found in texts from the first group.

Some of P28’s initial objections stand close to those of P3 and P14. Against the Generality Answer, P28 develops a slightly different version of [ANIMAL IS GENERALITY]. But in P16’s version, the problem is not that if animal is generality, then animal would not be a substance anymore, but rather that then generality could not be an accident anymore, since accidents, Aristotle and Boethius say, cannot be predicated directly of substances.¹ Also, conversion issues constitute the main threat against the Singular Bearer Answer, as in P3’s [EVERYTHING PREDICATED OF MANY ETC. IS ANIMAL] argument.²

¹ P28, p. 4: “Sed neutrum definire videtur Porphyrium. Et prius de generalitate dicemus quod illa quam dat Porphyrius sua definitio non est. Si enim illa esset definitio generalitatis, tunc possit generalitas cum illa definitione de subiectis (animali scilicet et aliis) praedicari eorum accidens, <et> eorum accidens generalitatem non esse constaret. Quod Aristoteles testatur nullum scilicet accidens de subiecto praedicari nomine et ratione, huiusmodi verbis ‘eorum, inquit, quae sunt in subiecto in pluribus quidem neque nomen neque ratio etc.’ Testatur idem Boethio in Commento. Ait enim: ‘quicquid est in subiecto aequivoce dicitur de subiecto.’ Unde si dicamus generalitatem de animali praedicari cum praedicta definitione, cum constet generalitatem esse accidens eorum, quod est inconueniens, videmus auctoritati contraire. Non igitur dicendum est quod generalitatis sit illa definitio.”

² P28, p. 4: “Sed neque animalis neque aliorum esse videtur. Si enim definitio animalis aut alicuius aliorum esse<it>, cum eo converteretur; sed cum nullo convertitur; quare non est eorum definitio.”

But against the All Bearers Answer, P28 puts forward a new argument, based on the Counting Problem: if Porphyry defines all the genera at the same time, Porphyry does not deal with five things, but with many more.

And it is not the definition of all at once, that is of whatever has generality, as others want it. For Porphyry would not deal with five only, but with many more (*plura*), that is {with} all the genera.¹

The reference to other thinkers points towards texts from the first group. More specifically, P3 is targeted (P14 also introduces another answer; and P17 only gives a summary of P3's position before adding his take on a more radical vocalist reading).

Instead of the All Bearers Answer, which conflicts with the Counting Problem, P28 prefers speaking of a single collection of genera. However, because this collection does not itself bear generality but collects all generality bearers, P28's reply constitutes a variant of the All Bearers Answer.

We can solve this in the following way, saying that Porphyry defines all genera inasmuch as they participate in generality, but yet he does not deal with many more things (*plura*). For the collection of all the genera inasmuch as they participate in generality is one, and so we can say that all genera at the same time are defined by Porphyry and that the definition is not convertible with any of them, and the things that are being defined are not many (*plura*), but one. The same can be said for species.²

¹ P28, p. 4: "Neque [omne] est definitio omnium insimul secundum hoc quod {sed hoc quod quod *ms.*} habe<n>t generalitatem, ut alii volunt. Non enim iam tractaret Porphyrius tantum de quinque, sed de pluribus, scilicet omnibus generibus."

² P28, p. 4: "Quod sic possumus solvere, ut dicamus eum omnia genera definire secundum hoc quod generalitate participant, et tamen non de pluribus agere. Collectio enim omnium generum {genus *ms.*} <secundum> hoc quod generalitate participant unum est, et ita omnia genera insimul possumus dicere a Porphyrio definiri, neque definitionem cum singulis convertibilem, neque plura esse quae definiuntur, sed unum. Idem de specie dici convenit."

The unity of the collection helps P28 solve the Definitum Problem without failing the Counting Problem. P28 does not care to spell out how convertibility fares with its reply.

Another text, P16, also tackles the Definitum Problem. I group P16 with P28 because I think that, as in P28, the Counting Problem influences P16's reply more than conversion issues.

P16 considers the Singular Bearer Answer, the All Bearers Answer, and the Generality Answer.¹ Uniquely, P16 separates from the start the two bearer solutions, as if they were well-known candidates. It does not mention the Word Answer once, not even only to eliminate it.

No new initial objections are raised. Against the Singular Bearer Option, P16 reports an argument identical to P3's [EVERYTHING PREDICATED OF MANY ETC. IS ANIMAL], but with the explicit further consequence that then any genus, like colour or stone, would be animal, a consequence also spelled out in P14.² P16 also summons something similar to P3's [ANIMAL IS ANIMAL AND STONE ETC.] against the All Bearers Answer,³ and something similar to [ANIMAL IS GENERALITY] against the Generality Answer.⁴

In reply to the Definitum Problem, P16 first reports two opinions it will reject. According to the first opinion (a version of the Singular Bearer Answer), Porphyry can well define some singular bearer of generality, like animal, since definitions that do not present the nature of some thing do not require conversion.

¹ P16, f. 87ra-b: "Videndum est quid sit quod hic definitur, videlicet si hic definiatur aliquod genus, ut animal, corpus et ita de aliis singulis, vel si omnia collectim accepta definiantur, vel ipsa generalitas."

² P16, f. 87rb: "Animal vero hic definiri non potest: sic enim quicquid praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid sit est animal, cum definitio debeat esse convertibilis cum suo definito; adeo si ita est, color est animal, quod est inconveniens. Sic de aliis singulis quod hic non definiantur com<pro>bari potest."

³ P16, f. 87rb: "Collectim etiam definiri non possunt: quicquid enim praedicaretur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid sit esset omnia genera collectim accepta, et ita animal esset omnia genera insimul accepta quod esse non potest."

⁴ P16, f. 87rb: "Generalitas etiam hic non videtur definiri: sic enim animal esset generalitas."

On this topic, some are of the following opinion: they say that animal and the other genera are being defined here and they do not concede that definitions can be converted, but only those that present the being of the thing. But we say that this definition is convertible, even if other definitions can be found that cannot be converted. For Porphyry himself shows this in what follows, where it is said “Thus nothing either superfluous etc.”¹

The wording suggests acquaintance with something similar to P14’s suspected own reply. In rejecting this reply, P16 sides with P3: conversion has to occur here. It does not matter that one can give examples of definitions without conversion: for P16, you cannot reduce Porphyry’s definition of genus to one of them.

Then P16 reports P3’s reply, more precisely its first step: conversion can occur thanks to the name “genus.”

Others say that all singular genera are defined here under the name that is “genus,” and they say that the definition is convertible with them under the name that is “genus.”²

To be fair, P16 does not give much detail to hang on to and does not even mention conversion under a disjunction. Yet, the “all” (*omnia*) clearly points to the All Bearers Answer; and P3, P14, and even P17’s four-line summary preserve the expression “under the name that is ‘genus’ (*sub hoc nomine quod est ‘genus’*).” Even if P16 chooses to resolve the matter differently, it does not directly attack this position—maybe because it prefers it to P14’s first reply since it saves conversion.

¹ P16, f. 87rb: “De hac re talis quorundam est sententia. Dicunt enim animal et alia genera hic definiri nec concedunt definitiones posse converti nisi eas solas quae exponunt esse rei. Nos vero dicimus istam convertibilem esse, etsi aliae invenirentur quae converti non possent. Hoc enim ipse Porphyrius ostendit in sequentibus ubi dicitur ‘Nihil igitur neque superfluum etc.’ ”

² P16, f. 87rb: “Dicunt alii omnia singula genera hic definiri sub hoc nomine quod est ‘genus,’ et sub hoc nomine quod est ‘genus’ cum illis dicunt definitionem esse convertibilem.”

Instead P16 replies as follows: Porphyry defines a genus common to all genera, a meta-genus, so to speak:

But we say that a certain universal is being defined that contains this genus that is animal and that genus <that is> body and the others in the same way. To this universal the name that is “genus” is imposed so that it means the same as “that which participates in generality.” And when such a universal is defined, animal, body, and the others that participate in generality, inasmuch as they participate, are being defined through their universal.¹

Porphyry defines the prime bearer of generality, the meta-genus, or universal genus, that contains every other genera. Through the definition of this prime bearer of generality, Porphyry defines all other bearers of generality.² So the Singular Bearer Answer prevails, provided that the singular bearer is identified as the meta-genus.³

Although P16 does not speak about the Counting Problem, the solution developed immediately dissolves it: with one property for each predicable, we get five predicable properties, primarily belonging to five meta-bearers only. Now, the exact ontological status of such universals as meta-genus remains undiscussed here. P16’s author merely says that this is an issue to be treated when speaking about denominatives (commenting on the *Categories*?).⁴

¹ P16, f. 87rb: “Nos vero dicimus definiri quoddam universale quod continet hoc genus quod est animal et hoc genus corpus et cetera similiter, cui universali imponitur hoc nomen quod est ‘genus’ ut idem sit quod participans generalitatem. Dum autem huiusmodi universale definitur, animal, corpus, <et> cetera participantia generalitatem, secundum hoc quod participant, per illud suum universale definiuntur.”

² The lexicon of participation is present in P14 (partially), P28, and P16. I purposely choose not to read too much into it now, and I take participating in generality to mean the same as being a bearer of generality.

³ An immediate issue with the meta-genus glose of Porphyry’s definition is that the definition does not seem to apply to it: the meta-genus cannot be defined as something predicated of many things differing in species.

⁴ P16, f. 87rb: “Huiusmodi universale et similium natura in denominativis {denominativus *ms.*} discutienda. Hoc solum hic sufficit determinare: quid hic definiatur.”

4 Evolution of the Definitum Problem

The treatment of the Definitum Problem proposed by P28 and P16 suggests that, at some point at least, the introduction of predicable properties was not seen as enough to solve the Counting Problem. What was needed was not only five properties but five subjects bearing these properties.

Looking downstream, one passage of the commentary connected to the school of Alberic, P20, elaborates on something like P16's view. P16's opinion implies that the meta-genus itself plays the part of a genus: it itself possesses generality, since it is the thing on which the name "genus" is imposed with the meaning "that which participates in generality." P20 denies that the meta-genus is itself a genus: if it were, it would have species and be predicated of them; but we cannot find a species of which such a genus would be predicated.¹ It must be a universal, but not a genus.

P20 then reports the following objection: if the meta-genus is not itself a genus, the definition of "genus" both defines genus and not a genus. The reply provided is that only genus is being defined. That this universal genus *is not a genus* cannot be added in a proposition expressing what is being defined, precisely because it is already subintended that what is being defined here is not a genus; indeed, the universal genus can be

¹ P20, Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2486, f. 48vb–49ra: "Quid praedicta definitione definiatur quaeritur, singulare scilicet vel universale. Sed quod singulare non sit manifestum est ... Quod ergo universale sit quod definitur ibi patet. Sed quaeritur cum sit universale an sit genus vel aliud universale. Si concedatur genus esse, ergo aliquam speciem de qua praedicatur in quid habet; sed non est ratio qua habeat unam speciem de qua praedicatur quin eadem de omni specie praedicetur, quia vel de omni vel de nulla praedicabitur. Quod de nulla praedicatur satis constat, quia cum quaeritur quid homo sit vel quid equus nequaquam potest respondi genus nec potest fieri praedicatio 'homo est genus' vel 'equus est genus,' nec de aliqua specie potest dici. Constat ergo quod aliud est universale quam genus quod definitur."

defined precisely because it is not itself a genus.¹ This is the only way the Definitum Problem can be solved.²

Some elements of P19 are also connected to this discussion about the meta-genus. P19 argues that the matter of the Porphyrian treatise is composed of five genera of universals that are not themselves universals, only commonly present in things. Otherwise, there would be such things in the world as a universal genus, a universal species, etc.³ So, for P19, the meta-genus cannot be an universal, it is only common to all genera. The drawback of that view, from a realist perspective, is that what Porphyry defines is not exactly a thing anymore (it is neither a substance nor an accident, and it does not add some thing in reality), even if it is *naturally* present in universals.

These passages from P20 and P19 suggest that at some point in the twelfth century, at least for one school, the meta-genus claim became a topic of discussion that, from our very limited perspective, overshadowed the old discussion, seemingly grounded on old opinions, whether Porphyry defined generality or its bearer.

¹ P20, f. 49ra: “Ad hoc dicendum est quod talis locutio, scilicet ‘definitur hic genus et universale quod non est genus, et sic genus et non genus,’ falsa est. Quia postquam dictum est ‘definitur hic genus’ non postea subdendum est ‘et non genus,’ quia hoc inde concessum est, scilicet definiri quod non est genus. Ut dictum est, genus definitur hic, quia hoc ipsum genus quod definitur non est genus.”

² For a parallel discussion of the generic paradox: Anonymus, *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, liber I, c. 1, p. 296: “Et sciendum quod non debet concedi hec disiunctio, ut cum dicitur est generis et non-generis, quia cum dicitur quod est generis, tunc dicitur quod est non-generis.”

³ P19, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Laud. Lat. 67, f. 6rb: “Materia sunt eius quinque genera universalium, id est universalia quinque generum, id est maneriarum. Ea autem genera universalium non sunt universalia, sed communia universalibus. Significantur etiam istis nominibus ‘genus,’ ‘species,’ ‘differentia,’ ‘proprium,’ ‘accidens,’ nec sunt substantiae nec accidentia, sed naturaliter universalibus inhaerentia. Dico autem ea non esse universalia licet sint communia, quia ex eis non habeant aliqua existere {exististere *ms. a.c.*} nec propter ea rerum numerus crescit.”

5 Concluding Remarks and Further Developments

I hope to have shown how a similarly formulated version of the Definitum Problem has been preserved in four twelfth-century *Isagoge* commentaries. P3 values the All Bearers Answer, maintaining conversion via the word “genus” through a disjunction; P14 adds another option, allowing for the Singular Bearer Answer to hold, namely that Porphyrian definitions do not require conversion any more than they require substitution. P28 attacks the likes of P3: there must be a single thing defined, since Porphyry dealt with five things only, so one must speak of a collection of genera, a collection of generality bearers, rather than of a collective of genera. P28 does not describe this collection as a bearer of generality. P16 moves away from both P14’s and P3’s replies. But contrary to P28, it favours a variant of the Singular Bearer Answer: Porphyry defines some unique prime bearer of generality, a meta-genus, in which all other bearers of generality (animal, stone, etc.) participate. Texts from P20 and P19 seem to depend on this P16 development: they report discussions over the status of this meta-genus: is it really a genus, is it a universal, is it a thing?

Let me now add three final remarks: one about the connection between these texts; one about the link of P3 and P14 to the school of Champeaux; one about things yet to be found.

First, the presence of the same question in P28 and P16 as in P3 and P14 provides new information regarding the context, sources, and dating of the former two commentaries. For currently very little is known about P28 and P16. Although more work on other topics would be needed, dating them not too far apart from P14 seems reasonable enough. Anyway, one has to explain how all four commentaries are acquainted with the same opinions and initial arguments on this matter. For P16 at least, there is evidence, as seen, to suggest the mediation of something like P14.¹

¹ Marenbon 2018, pp. 160–61 (for P16) and 169–70 (for P28). More precisely, for P16, not much is known about the few non-Boethian bits—and the passage analysed here is one of these non-Boethian bits. Still, P16 is also known as being indirectly connected to P3 through P15, a commentary mainly made up of bits taken from P3 and P16 (Tarlazzi, forthcoming). But the connection I am now highlighting should be different. Moreover,

Second, about the connection of P3 and P14 to the school of William of Champeaux, I need to add two things. First, that the doctrine of the signification of derived terms found in both texts (signification of the form *circa fundamentum*) seemingly matches what we know about William. Abelard says that for William the derivative term does not name the quality, but determines it with respect to the foundation (*determinando circa fundamentum*).¹ But we also know that, for William, “white” signifies both the substance and the quality, but the quality first by representing it, and the substance secondarily, by naming it.² P3 and P14 do not make such distinctions explicitly, even if the idea that the derivative signifies the form and determines it towards the foundation seems at least compatible with them. Second, the way P3 and P14 raise the Definitum Problem bears strong connections to another commentary linked to William of Champeaux’s school: B8. At some point, the commentary wonders whether the locus *a genere* warranting *a genere* arguments amounts to generality itself, the bearer of generality, or the name “genus.”

It must be known whether the word that is “genus” or that thing that bears generality or generality itself is rightly called a locus, that is the seat of the argument (and the same for the others).³

The commentary argues there that things properly warrant arguments, and names only inasmuch as things are signified by them. B8 also insists that words must not be detached from the things they signify.⁴ Moreover,

(as far as I can tell) P15 does not preserve any version of the question about what Porphyry defines.

¹ Peter Abelard, *Logica ingredientibus. Glossae super Topica*, p. 272.

² See Grondeux and Rosier-Catach 2017, pp. 190–91.

³ B8, Vatican, Reg. lat. 230, f. 72ra (cf. Orléans, Bibliothèque municipale 266, p. 43a; Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal 910, f. 105ra): “Sciendum tamen est utrum illa vox quae est ‘genus’ vel res illa quae generalitatem {generaliter *ms. a.c.*} suscipit vel ipsa generalitas recte locus, id est sedes argumenti, dicatur <et> eodem modo de ceteris.”

⁴ B8, Vatican, Reg. lat. 230, f. 72ra (cf. Orléans, Bibliothèque municipale 266, p. 43a–b; Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal 910, f. 105ra): “Quod a diversis diversis modis dicitur.

according to B8 all three answers can be maintained, as both the bearers of generality and generality itself can be called a locus, but here the power of proof seems to come primarily from the real connection (*habitus*) generality adds to its subject. All of this corresponds to what we know of William's teachings on argumentative warrants from commentary B9, i.e. arguments are warranted by things, or more precisely, by real connections (*habitudines*).¹ And all of this matches with the way P3 and P14 set the Definitum Problem, view signification as undetachable from words, and try to coordinate all potential answers to the same problem by specifying relations they bear to the correct one.²

Finally, three notes on things reported missing. First, according to P28, some authors readily accepted that Porphyry defines generality. I haven't been able to locate such an opinion, if it ever existed. Finding it would considerably increase our understanding of why the Definitum Problem

Quidam enim dicunt solas voces recte locos iudicari. Quidam vero dicunt rem ipsam esse sedem argumenti, non vocem, nisi gratia suae rei, ut <in> hoc sillogismo 'Omnis homo {oratio *ms.*} est animal; omne animal animatum; ergo omnis homo {oratio *ms.*} est animatus,' non hanc vocem quae est 'genus,' nec hanc vocem quae est 'animal,' dicunt esse sedem argumenti. Ipsae enim voces nihil probant nisi ad significata respiciant {respiciatur *ms.*}. Sed rem illam quae est animal vel ipsam generalitatem animali adiacentem sedem argumenti esse confirmant, ex quibus argumentum suam recipit firmitatem. Nos vero concedimus et ipsas voces gratia rerum et ipsas res proprie esse sedem argumenti, ut hanc vocem quae est 'genus' et hanc vocem quae est 'species' et cetera huiusmodi gratia suorum significatorum, et sua significata proprie dicimus esse argumentorum sedes. Rem vero illam quae est animal ideo dicimus esse sedem argumenti quod per eam habitudinem quam habet ad suas species, quod eorum genus est, {et *del. ms.*} ex ea trahitur firmitas argumenti; generalitatem vero animali adiacentem ideo locum {locus *ms.*} dicimus, quia per illam habitudinem sibi adiacentem ex animali suae species comprobantur, per quod ex ea argumenti firmitas recte trahi dicitur. Hanc vocem quae est 'genus,' ut dictum est, non proprie, sed tantum gratia rei sedem dicimus argumenti."

¹ B9, Orléans, Bibliothèque municipale 266, pp. 210b–11a: "Dicamus igitur rem esse locum, non tamen propter habitudinem, quod vult magister W., cum secundum nos quaedam habitudines nihil sint, ut generalitas et specialitas et cetera." For a lengthier transcription of this passage, see Green-Pedersen 1974, p. 18. On this topic, see Guilfooy 2005.

² A particular passage of the *Glosulae V* (Grondeux and Rosier-Catach 2011, pp. 313–14) stands as another interesting parallel, which I will tackle in a future study.

came to display the form it does in our four texts. Second, P16 says that the status of meta-genus should be discussed when dealing with denominatives, so not while commenting Porphyry, but rather Aristotle's *Categories*. There is no indication that such a treatment ever existed, and I have not been able to find a matching passage anyway. Third, I have also searched in vain for P3's conversion under a disjunction *as applied to definitions*. The view is surprising, to say the least: even if definitional conversion and conversion under a disjunction are sometimes compared to one another, conversion under a disjunction has a specific use, maintaining conversion between unequal terms, such as a genus and its species or its differences, and definitions just seem a wrong match for the part.¹ Moreover, according to P3 the usual example of a conversion under a disjunction is: "every rational and irrational is an animal" converting to "every animal is rational or irrational." But the claim that propositions about the division of the genera into species convert *from a conjunction* to a disjunction itself is questionable: according to the *De divisione* commentary D6, for instance, you make a mistake if you think that the proposition "every rational and irrational is an animal," even if it can be granted, has anything to do with the conversion into "every animal is rational or irrational." Rather, division conversions involve the disjunctive proposition "every rational or irrational is an animal."² From that perspective, even division conversions, operated under a disjunction,

¹ For a comparison: D6, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 7094A, f. 88va: "Ostenso quod genus per species et per differentias quandoque sive sicut posita nomina dividitur et etiam quod definitiones vel exempla sunt subdenda, intendit subsequenter dare quoddam praeceptum de divisione generis, hoc scilicet quod neque diminuta neque superflua debet esse ut convertatur sicut terminus, id est sicut definitio, videlicet divisum cum dividendis sub disiunctione convertatur et dividenda cum diviso, quemadmodum definitio cum suo definito."

² D6, f. 88va: "Sub disiunctione subicitur, ut cum dicimus 'omne animal aut est rationale aut irrationale,' et rursus quaelibet species est suum genus, id est qualibet species suo generi universaliter subicitur sub disiunctione, ut si dicamus 'quicquid est aut rationale aut irrationale est animal,' ideo hic dicimus sub disiunctione speciem subici suo generi, quia quamvis etiam sine disiunctione subiciatur, tamen nihil illud ad conversionem divisionis." On D6, see Iwakuma 1999, pp. 98–99.

cannot help one pass from a collective subject to a disjunctive one—which was the whole point for P3. Anyhow, more information on the use of disjunctions in conversions could prove precious.

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Alberic of Paris on Aristotle's *Categories*: Some Fragmentary Evidence

Heine Hansen*

This paper contains editions of three incompletely transmitted twelfth-century commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*. The commentaries, all of them anonymous, are the following:¹

- C21** Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal 910, fols 143rb–144ra
- C25** Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2237, fols 27r–28v
- C29** Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2486, fol. 4ra

In their current state, they are all rather short, but as noted by John Marenbon, there is for all three commentaries a more or less explicit connection to the philosopher Alberic of Paris, who, according to the testimony of John of Salisbury, was the most eminent logician besides Abelard in Paris in the later 1130s and a fierce critic of the nominalists.²

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¹ The alpha-numerical labels here and in what follows refer to John Marenbon's catalogue of early medieval Latin commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*. The first version of this catalogue appeared in Marenbon 1993. It was reprinted with a supplement in Marenbon 2000. The latest version is found in Marenbon 2013. Unless special reasons call for it, I refer only to the latest version in what follows.

² For the three commentaries here concerned, see Marenbon 2013, pp. 163–66; pp. 148–49. For Alberic, see John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* 2.10: “Cum primum adulescens

As far as known, none of Alberic's works survive. If he wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, it too appears to be lost. That he did write such a commentary seems likely, given the many references to his interpretation of the text found in other commentaries from the period, but it is perhaps possible that some of these references derive from oral teaching.

The fragments are short, but they nonetheless supply important evidence both for Alberic's interpretation of Aristotle's text and for his influence on other commentators. They also contain useful information for establishing Alberic's logical and metaphysical views more generally, though here I confine myself mainly to laying the philological basis.

The presentation of the material is structured as follows. The texts follow in the order that they occur in Marenbon's catalogue, which means that the order of presentation is not necessarily chronological. The edition of each text is prefaced by a short introduction and followed by a brief series of notes.

The editions are based on transcriptions made from high-resolution digital images of the respective manuscripts (for C21 in combination with a digital scan of the old microfilm). In cases of doubt, the manuscripts were inspected *in situ*. I have imposed a classicising orthography on the texts, as well as my own punctuation and paragraphing. I have put all lemmata in SMALL CAPITALS and supplied them with references to the Bekker edition of Aristotle. I use < > for conjectural additions, { } for conjectural deletions, and [] for supplements in cases where physical damage or wear has made the text illegible. In the critical notes underneath the text, I signal

admodum studiorum causa migrassem in Gallias, anno altero postquam illustris rex Anglorum Henricus leo iustitiae rebus excessit humanis, contuli me ad Peripateticum Palatinum, qui tunc in monte sanctae Genovefae clarus doctor, et admirabilis omnibus praesidebat. Ibi ad pedes eius prima artis huius rudimenta accepi, et pro modulo ingenioli mei quicquid excidebat ab ore eius tota mentis aviditate excipiebam. Deinde post discessum eius qui mihi praeproperus visus est, adhaesi magistro Alberico qui inter ceteros opinatissimus dialecticus enitebat, et erat revera nominalis sectae acerrimus impugnator. Sic ferme toto biennio conversatus in monte, artis huius praeceptoribus usus sum Alberico et magistro Roberte Meludensi, ut cognomine designetur quod meruit in scholarum regimine, natione siquidem Angligena est."

where my text differs from the reading of the manuscript (except for orthographical differences, which are signalled only in a few ambiguous cases). Provisional transcriptions of the material have also been made (and generously made available to other scholars) by Yukio Iwakuma and in cases where my edition contains an emendation that has already been proposed by Iwakuma in his transcription, I signal this in the apparatus (except in completely obvious cases where the scribe has either mistakenly repeated a word or corrected himself *in scribendo* without properly deleting the mistake he made). Because of the provisional nature of Iwakuma's material, I do not, however, signal where we differ in our reading of the manuscripts or in our constitution of the texts.

The main purpose of the notes that follow the edition is to provide parallels to other twelfth-century logical texts. They are not, it must be stressed, meant to be exhaustive, but merely to highlight some important contextual features of the material and bring out some of the unacknowledged debts to Alberic.

* * * * *

C21: Introduction, Edition, Notes

This fragment comprises c. 2000 words and consists in the very beginning of a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*. The fragment is contained in the composite manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal 910, fols 143rb–144ra and was identified, although rather inaccurately, in the nineteenth-century catalogue by Martin.¹ The importance of the manuscript, which once belonged to the Abbey of St. Victor, was first brought to the attention of scholars of medieval logic by L. M. De Rijk, who in the inaugural volume of his *Logica Modernorum* supplied a more complete and precise list of the manuscript's contents.²

¹ Martin 1886, p. 164 gives the correct incipit, but states that it's found on fol. 144. He fails to note the explicit and to correctly identify where the text ends.

² De Rijk 1962–67, vol. 1, pp. 116–20.

The connection to Alberic was first stressed by John Marenbon, who in his paper in the 1992 special issue of *Vivarium* dedicated to twelfth-century nominalism says the following:¹

In Paris Arsenal 910 (**Ar**), an important logical collection, there is a fragment of a commentary on the *Categories* (**C21**: ff. 143r–144r) which includes only the introduction and the very first glosses. By its polished style and its lack of references to a master or masters, it appears to be a particular master's own exposition of his views. Since a number of the comments it contains correspond exactly to what in **C15** and **C17** are recounted as Alberic's views, there is a strong probability that this fragment comes from a commentary by Alberic himself, or is very closely related to such a work.

Marenbon has subsequently had second thoughts about the tentative ascription to Alberic he here proposes. Whereas the first version of his catalogue listed the author of the fragment as “quite probably Alberic,” the most recent version no longer includes this ascription.² As Marenbon says in a footnote:³

In ‘Vocalism, Nominalism’, 55, I suggested that C21, the fragmentary beginning of a commentary, was Alberic's, because views attributed elsewhere to Alberic are put forward here by the writer himself. But there is not an exact correspondence, and this method of attribution is unreliable in an area where ideas were routinely taken and repeated.

Exact correspondence is certainly not always a feature of how medieval authors refer to one another's writings. Still, there may well be good reasons to have doubts about the ascription to Alberic. For while it is correct that other sources ascribe to Alberic several of the views explicitly endorsed by C21, there are also other ideas ascribed to him which are not found in C21.⁴ Of course, Alberic most probably lectured more than once

¹ Marenbon 1992, p. 55.

² See Marenbon 1993, p. 115; Marenbon 2013, pp. 163–64.

³ Marenbon 2013, p. 148 n. 20.

⁴ For examples, see the notes to the text below.

on the *Categories* and his views may well have developed, but the most likely scenario is probably, as Marenbon points to, that the commentary is not by Alberic, but by someone who hews very closely, albeit selectively, to his views.

Apart from references to Aristotle's *Categories*, the fragment contains references to the following authoritative texts:

Author	Text	References
Aristotle	<i>On interpretation</i>	1
Boethius	<i>in Cat.</i>	3
—	<i>in Isag.</i> ²	1
—	<i>in Top. Cic.</i>	1
Porphry	<i>Isagoge</i>	2

Table 1. References to authoritative texts in C21

There are no named references to contemporary philosophers, not even Alberic, many of whose views the author adopts, but there is one reference to “some people” (*quidam*).

Marenbon gives the date for this commentary as “probably 1130s–1150s.”¹ This is hardly wide of the mark and appears to tally well with the date of the extant copy.²

⟨Anonymi Commenti in *Categorias* Aristotelis Fragmentum (C21)⟩

⟨PROOEMIUM⟩

⟨I⟩NCIPIUNT *CATEGORIAE* ARISTOTELIS. Quod hoc nomen “praedicamenta”
 5 sonat apud Latinos, hoc idem sonat “categoriae” apud Graecos. Unde hic

¹ Marenbon 2013, p. 163.

² According to the “cautious proposal” of Dr Sofia Orsino, who has studied the matter and kindly shared her findings with me in private correspondence, the script indicates that the copy dates to the mid to third quarter of the twelfth century.

est habendus titulus huius operis {titulus} ita: Incipit liber *Praedicamentorum* Aristotelis. Cum inveniuntur plures huius nominis “praedicamentum” acceptiones, videndum est quot¹ sint. Dicitur praedicamentum praedicatum; unde habemus in libro *Peri hermenias*² “in quantiscumque praedicamentis nulla erit oppositio in adiecto etc.,” hoc est in quibuscumque praedicatis. Dicitur et aliud praedicamentum, genus videlicet generalissimum, et per excellentiam vocatur praedicamentum; est enim dignius praedicatum inter alia praedicata eo³ quod continet plura. In alia etiam ab his duabus significatione reperitur hoc nomen “praedicamentum.” Dicitur
 10 enim praedicamentum collectio generalissimi et subalternorum et aliorum usque ad specialissima (non enim sunt assignanda in praedicamentis esse individua; terminat etiam Porphyrius⁴ praedicamenta dicens: “extrema unam habent habitudinem⁵ etc.”).⁶ Dicimus igitur collectionem huius generalissimi *substantia* et secundarum substantiarum usque ad specialis-
 15 sima et eorum quae in secundis substantiis intelliguntur, videlicet substantialium differentiarum, primum esse praedicamentum, quod substantiae praedicamentum appellatur. Collectionem vero huius generalissimi *quantitas* et universalium quantitatum et eorum⁷ quae secundum quantitates dicuntur quantitatis praedicamentum appellamus. Et sic de aliis praedicamentis dicimus. In his tribus etiam significationibus et non in pluribus nomen hoc “praedicamentum” reperimus. Et quod talis collectio praedicamentum appelletur habemus Porphyrium⁸ sequacem, qui ait: “In unoquoque praedicamento sunt generalissima et specialissima et⁹ media, ad aliud quidem et ad aliud sumpta.”¹⁰ In praedicta etiam significatione accipitur

¹ quot] quod *ms*

² Arist. *Int.* 11.21a29 Bekker

³ eo] *coni. Ebbesen* : et *ms*

⁴ porphyrius] *coni. Iwakuma* : -lius *ms*

⁵ unam ... habitudinem] *scripsi cum fonte* : duas ... habitudines *ms*

⁶ Porph. *Isag.* 5.6–16 Busse

⁷ et eorum] eorum etiam *ms*

⁸ porphyrium] *coni. Iwakuma* : -lium *ms*

⁹ specialissima et] mali *ms*

¹⁰ Porph. *Isag.* 4.15–20 Busse

cum dicitur: Incipit liber *Praedicamentorum* Aristotelis. Quod etiam praedicamentum pro genere generalissimo accipiat, Boethium ubique¹ auctorem in commentis habemus.

Visa huius operis inscriptione, videnda est auctoris intentio. Quam
 5 Boethius assignat in commento supra *Praedicamenta* verbis his: “Intentio est Aristotelis in hoc opere de primis vocibus decem prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res significant disputare.”²

Cum dictum sit “de primis vocibus,” quaeritur quare primas eas vocet. Dici potest eas idcirco appellari primas quia designant rerum genera quae
 10 sunt prima et principia omnium aliarum rerum, et non idcirco quod aliqua prioritas sit in eis existendi, scilicet quod prius habuissent esse quam aliqua aliarum vocum, sed propter hoc quod dictum est. Potest et alia assignari causa quare primae sint appellatae. Voces enim hae³ sunt nomina primae impositionis, id est primo loco imposita ad significandum, et has idcirco
 15 primas appellavit. Nominum quidem haec habetur divisio: Nominum alia sunt primae impositionis, alia sunt secundae impositionis. Primae vero impositionis nomina sunt quae conveniunt⁴ rebus, sicut hoc nomen “homo,” “lapis,” “bos,” “asinus,” et alia huiusmodi. Secundae vero impositionis sunt nomina vocum quibus voces subiectae sunt secundum diversas proprietates quas habent. Quaedam enim voces appellatae sunt nomina secundum hoc quod sine tempore significant et quod nullam partem extra habent
 20 significativam, aliae vero verba sunt appellatae ex eo quod significabant cum tempore, aliae coniunctiones, aliae praepositiones. Dictum est: “secundum diversas proprietates sunt quaedam nomina quae conveniunt vocibus”; sunt enim quaedam nomina quae vocibus conveniunt⁵ sed non secundum proprietates quas habeant ex impositione, sicut hoc nomen “vox,” hoc nomen “sonus.” “Vox” enim nomen rei est, et “sonus.”

¹ ubique] verbiq[ue] ut v. ms

² Boeth. in *Cat.* 159c Migne (cf. 160a, 160b, 161a)

³ hae] s.l. ms

⁴ conveniunt] u add. ms

⁵ sunt enim...conveniunt] in marg. ms

Sic igitur dicendum est Aristotelem disputare de primis vocibus (dicunt quidam¹ “de decem primis vocibus,” sed nusquam reperitur hoc² in commento) decem prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res habent | 143va | significare. Illa Boethius genera in assignatione intentionis³
 5 Aristotelis appellat prima idcirco quia sunt ab Aristotele constituta quasi⁴ omnium rerum principia et ad ea⁵ reducuntur omnia. Dictum est de vocibus his Aristotelem agere in eo quod res significant. Non enim de eis agitur ut quomodo significant ostendatur vel quas habeant motuum variationes secundum casuum inflectiones vel temporum consignificationes vel ut
 10 ostendatur quod habeant se aliter, sed ut demonstretur quod habeant significare res.

In his quae praediximus verbis assignata est Aristotelis quam habuit in hoc opere intentio. Sed sic non videtur sufficienter esse assignata, ut ipse Boethius docet, paulo post in eodem commento dicens: “Tria sunt in
 15 mente quorum unum est quid velit *Praedicamentorum* intentio” (alia vero duo tacet).⁶ Unde manifestum est: Si sufficienter superius assignasset intentionem, hoc postea apponere superfluum esset. Si enim sufficienter {Aristoteles} assignasset de quo Aristoteles intenderet, pro nihilo hoc idem assignare repetisset.

20 Ut igitur sufficiens fiat assignatio, videndum est quid *Praedicamentorum* velit intentio. Quod ipse Boethius ad plenum ostendit in secundo commento Porphyrii dicens: “Ad hoc in libro *Praedicamentorum* tendebat Aristoteles et haec ipsius intentio est ut quod propter infinitas rerum diversitates minime sub scientia⁷ cadere posset generum paucitate comprehenderet et quod per incomprehensibilem rerum multitudinem sub notitia venire
 25

¹ Cf., e.g., Guillelmus Campellensis(?), C8, fol. 41ra MS Vatican, Reg. lat. 230; Anonymus D’Orvillensis, C26, 251–52 Ebbesen.

² hoc] *s.l. ms*

³ intentionis] diffinitionis *a.c. ms* : diffi intentionis *p.c. ms*

⁴ quasi] *coni. Iwakuma* : quiasi *ms*

⁵ ea] *s.l. ms*

⁶ Boeth. in *Cat.* 160a Migne

⁷ scientia] *i add. (sed fortasse exp.) ms*

non posset, ut dictum est, per paucitatem generum animo disciplinaeque fieret subiectum.”¹ Non enim sub notitia venire potest de quot hoc generalissimum *substantia* praedicetur et de quot hoc generalissimum *quantitas*, et sic de singulis. Omnium igitur² rerum genera propter eorum paucitatem
 5 collegit, de quibus disputare intendit, sic ostendens quae praedicata de quibus habeant praedicari et quae a quibus abnegari; hoc quidem per rerum omnium genera facit. Et sic sufficienter assignata est intentio Aristotelis.

Ab his quaeritur quare Boethius eorum quae erant in mente duo dicere praetermisit cum tertium dixerit, et quae sint illa quae ipse tacuit. Dicen-
 10 dum est quod ea idcirco tacuit quia in secundo³ *Praedicamentorum* commento quod se facturum proposuerat ea dicturus erat. Fuit enim consuetudo Boethii quod⁴ quaecumque commentabat supra ea duo commenta faciebat, primum quorum introductoriis scribebat et provectis secundum. Hanc et ipse habuit consuetudinem in *Praedicamentis* commentandis; fecit
 15 enim duo commenta, unum introductoriis, alterum provectis. In eo vero⁵ quod introductoriis fecit a gravioribus se abstinuit et ea in secundo dicere reservavit. Haec itaque quae in primo tacuit et in mente se habere dixit in secundo *Praedicamentorum* commento manifeste declaravit. Cum igitur secundo careamus commento, ignoramus ea quae Boethius tacuit in primo.

20 Opinamur tamen quaedam, existimantes eum velle dicere utrum illa genera quae appellavit prima {quod ipsa simul}⁶ sic sint prima quod ipsa simul nullum supra se habeant genus quod eorum {sint}⁷ principium sit, vel sic sint prima quod nullum eorum habeat superadveniens genus. Unde nos dicimus nullum eis simul superadvenire genus, aliquod tamen eorum
 25 est quod habet supra se principium et omnia novem *accidens* habent super-

¹ Boeth. in *Isag.*² 143.14–20 Brandt

² igitur] *s.l. ms*

³ secundo] com *add. ms*

⁴ quod] *s.l. ms*

⁵ vero] *s.l. ms*

⁶ quod ipsa simul] *secl. Iwakuma*

⁷ sint] *secl. Iwakuma*

adveniens genus, nullum tamen genus est quod non sit aliquod horum decem aut permixtum his.

Opinamur etiam Boethium tacuisse in illo primo¹ opere hoc: utrum illa divisio quam proponit Aristoteles dicens: “Singulum incomplexorum etc.”² sit sufficiens quantum ad terminos et ad res. Hoc est si nulla res sit quae non sit aut substantia aut quantitas aut aliquod aliorum, et si nulla vox sit incomplexa quae non significet aliquod praedictorum. Ad hoc vero respondemus sufficientem eam esse quantum ad utrumque spectat. Nulla enim talis vox est quae non significet aut hoc aut hoc; nulla etiam res est
 10 quae non sit aliquod istorum. Per opposita vero non est facta quantum ad terminos; quidam enim terminus quantitatem significat et substantiam. Non etiam debet dici divisio, sed quaedam enumeratio.

Visa auctoris intentione, | 143vb | videnda est eius materia. Quae in his verbis est assignanda: Aristotelis in opere *Praedicamentorum* est materia voces incomplexae et res a vocibus incomplexis significatae.
 15

Post haec videndum est qua causa scribat et ad quem finem tendat. Ab intentione vero finis attenditur. Ad hunc igitur finem tendit ut quod propter incomprehensibilem rerum multitudinem sub scientia cadere non poterat per generum paucitatem animo disciplinaeque subiectum fiat.

Utilitas vero haec est ut sciamus cognoscere quarum rerum multitudo sub quo genere comprehendatur. Et non haec solum³ utilitas ad dialecticam spectat facultatem, sed ad⁴ quamlibet aliam; physicis⁵ etiam utile est noscere⁶ quae res cui conveniat in genere et quae in generibus habeant differre.
 20

His omnibus ad memoriam redactis, sciendum est cui parti logices supponatur. Non magis enim pertinet ad scientiam inveniendi quam ad scientiam iudicandi. Utrumque enim docet liber iste, et invenire et de

¹ primo] prino primo *ms*

² Arist. *Cat.* 4.1a25–27 Bekker

³ solum] l *add. ms*

⁴ ad] *s.l. ms*

⁵ physicis] *iter. ms*

⁶ noscere] nosti noscere *ms*

inventis iudicare. Ex hoc enim quod scimus quae multitudo quarum rerum sub quo genere contineatur et quae sub quo non, scimus argumenta invenire et de ipsis iudicare. Potest igitur dici quod utrique supponitur scientiae: inveniendi et iudicandi.

- 5 Vel aliter solvitur¹, ut melius dicatur. Dividit enim Boethius logicam et per scientiam dividendi et per scientiam definiendi et colligendi, quas partes logices dicit.² Quae sunt aliae partes quam scientia inveniendi et quam scientia iudicandi, hae tamen sunt permixtae illis. Simili modo dici potest quod scientia praedicamentorum est una pars logices; est enim de
10 logica sicut et scientia colligendi et definiendi. Supponitur igitur liber iste logicae³ per praedicamentorum scientiam, et sic⁴ per logicam philosophiae attingit⁵.

- Hoc etiam in notitia debet haberi: Librum *Praedicamentorum* spectare ad demonstrativam disciplinam et dialecticam. Demonstrativa vero disci-
15 plina est illa quae necessariis⁶ utitur argumentis, et per excellentiam vocatur disciplina. Dialectica vero est illa quae probabilibus intendit uti. Quarum utrique supponitur liber *Praedicamentorum*. Docet enim de his ex quibus probabilia et necessaria consistunt argumenta, de specie videlicet et de genere et differentiis.

- 20 His omnibus sufficienter pertractatis, videndus est modus et ordo, quo modo scilicet et quo ordine utatur in his. In modi vero assignatione propter breviter comprehenditur assignatio ordinis. Hoc ergo⁷ modo et hoc⁸ ordine assignandum est Aristotelem uti quod prius agit de aequivocis quam sigillatim de praedicamentis, definiendo aequivoca et postea subdendo
25 exempla, postea de univocis, definiens ea et apponens exempla, et simili

¹ solvitur] *s.l. ms*

² Boeth. *in Top. Cic.* 1045b Migne

³ logicae] logices *ms*

⁴ sic] *s.l. ms*

⁵ attingit] atti attingit *ut v. ms*

⁶ necessariis] necessa necessariis *ms*

⁷ ergo] *s.l. ms*

⁸ hoc] *s.l. ms*

modo de denominativis. Post quasdam divisiones facit eorum quae dicuntur et eorum quae sunt. Deinde quasdam regulas ponit quae ad notitiam praedicamentorum sunt necessariae. His diligenter pertractatis, primo ingreditur praedicamentum substantiae, definiens primam et secundam substantiam ac si talem substantiae fecisset divisionem: Substantiarum aliae sunt primae, aliae sunt secundae. Post ostendit quae sint primae et secundae. Deinde dicit quae sit magis substantia et minus substantia. Assignat etiam proprietates quae conveniunt substantiis. Ad ultimum proprie proprium¹ substantiae dicere non praetermittit. Pertractato diligenter substantiae praedicamento, continue de quantitate incipit, statim dividens compositam quantitatem, quae est species quantitatis. Postea alias divisiones facit, dicens quod quantitatum quaedam constant ex partibus habentibus positionem, quaedam ex partibus non habentibus positionem. Deinde plures ostendit convenire quantitibus proprietates. Ad ultimum² innuit quid sit proprie proprium quantitatis. Statim post praedicamentum quantitatis ingreditur ad aliquid, ostendens Platonice definitionem relativorum esse culpabilem, postea callide introducit suam, deinde proprietates multas relativorum ostendens, in fine proprie eorum | 144ra | proprium³ assignans. His tribus pertractatis praedicamentis, de qualitate agere intendit, cuius definitionem ponit. Deinde ipsam per quattuor species dividit. Postea proprietates ostendit quae qualitibus conveniunt, et in fine praedicamenti assignat qualitatis proprie proprium. Haec itaque quattuor praedicamenta diligentissime et immoranter pertractat; erant enim minus nota et minus in usu habita. Alia vero sex praedicamenta breviter transcurrit nec in his diu detinetur faciendo ibi⁴ moras breviterque proponit de actione et passione, de situ et ubi et quando et habere. Horum autem decem praedicamentorum executis tractatibus, quattuor, sicut praedictum est, diligentissime, alia vero sex brevi transcurso, sicut quaedam antepaedicamenta posuit quae ad praedicamentorum notitiam valde erant necessaria, sic illis pertractatis

¹ proprium] prium *ms*

² ultimum] o *add. ms*

³ proprium] proprie prium *ms*

⁴ ibi] *s.l. ms*

statim supponit alia quae valent ad praedicamenta melius intelligenda. Agit enim de oppositis, ostendens quattuor genera esse oppositorum, deinde de priori demonstrans quot modis alterum dicatur prius esse altero¹, postea de simul similiter declarans quot modis res dicantur simul esse. Ab his transit
 5 ad motum, dicens: “Species sunt sex: generatio, corruptio, etc.”² In fine sui operis repetit de habere. Hoc modo et hoc ordine agitur in tractatu *Praedicamentorum* ab Aristotele.

⟨CAPITULUM 1⟩

10 AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR etc. (1.1a1) Quaedam praemittit priusquam agat de singulis praedicamentis, quae praemittere fuit necessarium ad habendam praedicamentorum notitiam, incipiens ab aequivocis. Agit itaque de aequivocis et univocis priusquam sigillatim de praedicamentis³.

Et est causa exigensque ratio quare prius agat de univocis. In praedi-
 15 camento enim substantiae erat facturum mentionem⁴ de eis, velut ubi⁵ ostendit quaedam praedicari univoce et ubi⁶ univocorum definitionem repetit, quare nisi prius ostendisset quae univoce praedicantur et quid sit univoce praedicari, capitulum illud nequaquam posset intelligi nec etiam scirent lectores quid esset univoce praedicari.

20 Tractatum vero aequivocorum praemittit univocorum tractatui. Hoc etiam facit ratione exigenti. Est enim consuetudo recte scribentium ut suas purgent doctrinas ab his per quae⁷ possunt impedire ⟨ * * * ⟩

¹ altero] q *add. ms*

² Arist. *Cat.* 14.15a13–14 Bekker

³ praedicamentis] praedicatis *a.c. ms*

⁴ mentionem] *coni. Iwakuma* : mensionem *ms*

⁵ Arist. *Cat.* 5.3a33–34 Bekker

⁶ Arist. *Cat.* 5.3b7–8 Bekker

⁷ quae] qua *ms*

272.3 <PROOEMIUM> The fragment comprises a prologue and some incomplete preliminary remarks on chapter 1 of Aristotle's text. The commentator discusses the following seven features of Aristotle's text in his proem:

1. Its title (*titulus*), incl. the various senses of the word "category" (*praedicamentum*)
2. Its author's intention (*intentio*)
3. Its subject matter (*materia*)
4. Its goal (*finis*)
5. Its utility (*utilitas*)
6. To which part of logic it belongs (*cui parti logices supponatur*)
7. Its mode and order of presentation (*modus et ordo*)

It was customary for commentators to discuss such proemial issues.¹ As noticed by Grabmann, a commentary on Aristotle's *On interpretation* found in ms Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz, lat. fol. 624, fols 87vb–96vb, at fol. 87vb seems to attribute to Alberic the view that six topics ought to be discussed: "*{C}um plura et vario ordine tam librorum quam artium principiis ad maiorem consequentium evidentiam magistri praemittere consueverunt, his impraesentiarum relictis quae circa principia cuiuslibet artis versantur, consideranda ea sola inspiciamus quae circa cuiuslibet philosophici operis principia sunt praemittenda. Ea autem sunt numero sex, scilicet intentio, materia, modus tractandi, cui parti philosophiae supponatur, causa operis, et quis libri titulus. Quidam tamen plura dicunt debere praemitti, scilicet nomen auctoris, vitam, et cuius fuerit conditionis. Magister Albericus ut puerilia et quasi supervacanea huiusmodi putans nulla ratione in principio philosophici operis dicit*

¹ There has been some interest in these twelfth-century discussions in recent scholarship: Iwakuma 2018; Podolak 2024. Unfortunately, the former study remains unpublished and the latter appeared too late to be taken into consideration here.

esse conspicienda. Sola enim sex sufficiunt ad consequentium evidentiam.”¹ According to this view, then, the six topics to be discussed are:

1. *Intentio*
2. *Materia*
3. *Modus tractandi*
4. *Suppositio (i.e. cui parti philosophiae supponatur)*
5. *Causa operis (= Utilitas)*²
6. *Libri titulus*

A commentary on the *Categories* (C17), which is found in the same Berlin manuscript and which also cites Alberic frequently, discusses precisely these six issues in this order in its proem.³ All other commentaries on the *Categories* associated with Alberic, however, do like C21 and distinguish between utility (*utilitas*) on the one hand and end (*finis*) or final cause (*finalis causa*) on the other; thus, they end up with seven topics.⁴ Whether this is a development that can be traced back Alberic is unclear.

272.4–273.2 INCIPUNT ... Aristotelis. According to H17, fol. 87va commentators disagreed about the order in which the proemial topics were to be discussed:⁵ “*Item, de ordine istorum diversa habetur sententia. Quidam enim dicunt intentionem debere praemitti, quidam materiam, quidam etiam et causam. Illi autem qui dicunt materiam esse praeponendam hac*

¹ See Grabmann 1939, p. 24. See also Grabmann 1938. An improved transcription, which I am quoting from here, was given by De Rijk 1966, p. 39. The commentary is known as H17, see Marenbon 1993, pp. 120–21; Marenbon 2000, p. 137.

² See fol. 88va: “*Utilitas huius operis est scientia habita ex hoc opere.*”

³ For this commentary, which is known as C17, see Marenbon 2013, pp. 162–63. I am currently preparing an edition of this commentary.

⁴ Apart from C17, C21, and C25, the commentaries are C15 and C20. For these two commentaries (of which I am also preparing editions), see Marenbon 2013, pp. 161–62; 163.

⁵ Again, I quote the text from De Rijk 1966, p. 40. I have noted, however, places in which De Rijk tacitly corrects the manuscript.

ratione utuntur: Prius enim quis habet materiam, qua habita aliquod opus de ipsa constituere intendit. Verbi gratia, habendo quis lapides de ipsis postmodum domum vel aliquid construere¹ tale cogitat. Magister vero Albericus, subtiliori acumine mentis² intuens, intentionem asserit praemittendam; haec enim naturaliter praecedit, etsi materia in quibusdam actu antecedit³. Illi qui dicunt vero causam antecedere ac sunt muniti ratione; aiunt enim esse aliquam causam propter quam quis habet intentionem et materiam. Sed haec ratio non omni(no) videtur spernenda. Sed quia ista sex convenientior sic ordinantur, ideo intentio omnibus praemitti potest.”

H17 seemingly takes Alberic's point to be about the overall ordering of the proemial topics rather than just the relative ordering of *intentio* and *materia*. If this is correct, then, by beginning with a discussion of the title, C21 is here diverging from the order of discussion Alberic prescribed.

273.2–21 Cum inveniantur ... reperimus. It was customary among twelfth-century commentators to discuss the various meanings of the word “category” (*praedicamentum*) in connection with the title of Aristotle's work. C21 claims that it has three meanings: (1) predicate, (2) most general genus, and (3) collection of a most general genus and all the subalternate and most special species falling under it (plus some other items, such as substantial differentiae, but excluding individuals). It is in this latter meaning that the word is to be taken in the work's title. The claim made at the end that there are no other meanings of the word is worth noting, for C25 lists one more: (4) mode of predication (*modus praedicandi*). Given that this meaning seemingly derives from Aristotle's *Topics*, it may suggest that the author of C21 (or his source) was less familiar with this text. For more on this, see the note on C25 on pp. 315–16 below.

¹ aliquid construere *De Rijk* : aliquod construeret *ms*

² mentis *De Rijk* : montis *ms*

³ antecedit *De Rijk* : antecedeat vel antecederat *ms*

274.4–7 Visa ... disputare. It was common at the time for discussions of the *intentio* of Aristotle's work to take the form of a commentary on Boethius' influential formulation of it in his commentary on the *Categories*: "*Ut igitur concludenda sit intentio, dicendum est in hoc libro de primis vocibus prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod significantes sunt dispositum esse tractatum.*"¹ Many commentators, however, adjusted the Boethian formulation slightly and, most importantly for present purposes, added two instances of the numeral *decem*. Thus, for example, the commentary known as C8 and attributed to William of Champeaux by Yukio Iwakuma opens as follows: "*(I)ntentio Aristotelis est in hoc opere de decem primis vocibus decem prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res significant disputare.*"² The *Anonymus D'Orvillensis* (C26), a nominalist commentator writing towards the end of the twelfth century, does the same; purporting to quote Boethius, he says (251): "*intendit enim de decem primis vocibus decem prima rerum genera significantibus prout res significant.*" The habit continued well after the twelfth-century; see, for example, the references to commentators from the first half of the thirteenth century collected in Hansen 2012 (65* n. 28). The author of C21 omits the first of these two *decem*, and, as it turns out, this omission is intentional.

275.1–4 Sic igitur ... significare. The objection to the qualification *decem* of *primis vocibus* is attributed to Alberic in C25: "*Magister noster Albericus dicit quod primum 'decem' non sit ponendum cum dicitur: 'Intendit Aristoteles de primis decem etc.,' quia si poneretur ibi, sequeretur hoc: Ergo intendit de aliquibus primis vocibus decem genera rerum etc., ergo de aliquibus <decem> Latinis vel de aliquibus decem Gallicis vel de aliquibus decem Graecis vel Anglicis vel aliis. Sed nec de aliquibus Latinis vel Graecis vel Gallicis, sed intendit de primis vocibus decem genera rerum etc. Unde dicit praedictus doctor quod si inveniatur in aliquo*

¹ Here and below, I quote the proem from the edition in Asztalos 1993.

² I cite the text from Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Reg. lat. 230, fol. 41ra. For more on this commentary, see Iwakuma 1999; Iwakuma 2003; Marenbon 2013, pp. 159–60. For methodological reflections concerning the attribution, see Jacobi 2011.

commento, absolvendum sit." For more on this, see the note on C25 on pp. 308–9 below.

275.12–19 In his ... repetisset. The claim that Boethius' oft-repeated formulation of the *intentio* of the *Categories* was inadequate is explicitly attributed to Alberic in a commentary (C15) in ms Padua, Biblioteca Universitaria 2087, fol. 1ra. Alberic clearly knew his Boethius very well and was well-aware that in the middle of his discussion of the *intentio* Boethius announces his plan to write a second commentary on the *Categories* intended for more advanced students: "*Haec quidem est temporis introductionis et simplicis expositionis apta sententia, quam nos Porphyrium nunc sequentes, quod videbatur expeditior esse planiorque, digessimus. Est vero in mente de tribus olim quaestionibus disputare, quarum una est quid Praedicamentorum velit intentio. Ibique, numeratis diversorum sententiis, docebimus cui nostrum quoque accedat arbitrium; quod nemo huic impraesentiarum sententiae pugnare miretur cum videat quanto illa sit altior, cuius non nimium ingredientium mentes capaces esse potuissent, ad quos mediocriter imbuendos ista conscripsimus.*"¹ According to C15 (fol. 1ra), Alberic then had two arguments for his claim that Boethius' initial formulation of the *intentio* is inadequate: "*Nunc Albericus assignat illam insufficientem esse tum ex verbis Boethii tum ex titulo huius libri. Ex verbis Boethii dicentis: 'Olim in mente auctoris venit de tribus quaestionibus disputare, quarum una haec est: quid velit Praedicamentorum intentio.' His verbis dicit Albericus quod Boethius demonstrat quod illa sit insufficiens; si enim esset sufficiens, non diceret: 'quid velit Praedicamentorum intentio.' Ex titulo demonstrat quod non intendit de vocibus tantum, qui talis est: Incipit liber Praedicamentorum, id est de praedicatis, quia hoc nomen "praedicamentum" tantum valet quantum "praedicatum ex pluribus confectum," quod habemus ab Aristotele dicente: "Quare in quantiscumque*

¹ I quote from Asztalos 1993, p. 379 (=160a Migne). Note that Asztalos's edition differs from Migne's on a crucial point here in that Migne's text includes what is clearly a gloss. See Asztalos 1993, p. 381 n. 47 for the details.

praedicamentis, " id est in quantiscumque praedicatis ex pluribus connectis, etc.; sed omne praedicatum est res, et ipse intendit de praedicatis; ergo de rebus; ergo non de vocibus tantum. Et sic non est sufficiens..." As is clear, C21 here reproduces the first of Alberic's two arguments, but not the second.

275.20–276.4 Ut igitur ... singulis. If the *intentio* given by Boethius in his first commentary on the *Categories* is inadequate and his second commentary (if ever written) is lost, what then is the *intentio* according to Boethius? The answer in C21 begins with a reference to Boethius' second commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* 1.4: "*Aristoteles enim librum qui De decem praedicamentis inscribitur hac intentione composuit ut infinitas rerum diversitates quae sub scientiam cadere non possent paucitate generum comprehenderet, atque ita quod per incomprehensibilem multitudinem sub disciplinam venire non poterat per generum, ut dictum est, paucitatem animo fieret scientiaeque subiectum.*" C17 also explicitly invokes this passage in this context, so the reference perhaps goes back to Alberic, although the passage is indeed called to mind by what Boethius himself says at *in Cat.* 160b–161a, esp. 161a: "*Rerum ergo diversarum indeterminatam infinitamque multitudinem decem praedicamentorum paucissima numerositate conclusit ut ea quae infinita sub scientiam cadere non poterant decem propriis generibus definita scientiae comprehensione claudantur.*"

276.4–7 Omnium ... Aristotelis. The core point in Alberic's formulation of Boethius' full view of the *intentio* is that the *Categories* is about predication (*quae praedicata de quibus habeant praedicari et quae a quibus abnegari*). Here is how the text from C15 (fol. 1ra) quoted above continues: "*Et sic non est sufficiens, sed ad hoc ut sit sufficiens sic debet assignari: Intentio Praedicamentorum est tractare de primis vocibus decem rerum genera significantibus prima in eo quod significant et de praedicatis assignando quae de quibus habeant praedicari et qualiter, quia maiora de minoribus et de paribus paria univoce, et quae de quibus non habeant praedicari nec tamen removeri, ut minora de maioribus, vel quae a quibus*

habeant removeri, ut oppositum ab opposito." A number of other commentaries associated with Alberic follow C21 in putting the point slightly more succinctly. Thus, C25 (pp. 295.28–296.2 below): "*Intentio Praedicatorum est docere quae praedicata de quibus praedicatis habeant praedicari et quae praedicata a quibus praedicatis habeant removeri.*" C20 (Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal 910, fols 147rb–162vb), fol. 147va: "*Illam autem intentionem non habemus, sed suspicamur talem quia Aristoteles intendit docere in hoc libro de praedicamentis, ostendendo scilicet de praedicatione rerum quae de quibus habeant praedicari et quae de quibus non praedicantur, id est per praedicationem ab aliis separentur.*" C16, pp. 606.28–607.2 (in Hansen 2023): "*Quoniam in duobus tota Praedicatorum versatur doctrina, id est ut sciamus quae de quibus praedicari habeant et quae non, ostendo quod secundae praedicantur de primis et quo modo, ostendit quae de quibus praedicari non possint, scilicet ea quae in eis sunt de eis praedicari non possunt.*" A commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* (P20) in Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2486, fols 45ra–60vb, also associated with Alberic, makes the same point (fol. 45va): "*Quemadmodum enim Aristoteles in Praedicamentis docet quae de quibus habeant praedicari et quomodo et quae non, per quod scimus et invenire et iudicare, sic Porphyrius quae de quibus praedicantur et quomodo et quae non instruit.*" It should be noted that, as the text from C20 makes explicit, predication here means thing-predication (*predicatio rerum*). It is, in other words, an *ontological* relation, and it is, as Donato (forthcoming) shows, the foundation on which Alberic's realist logic is built.

276.20–277.10 Opinamur tamen ... istorum. Boethius said he intended to discuss three issues in his second commentary on the *Categories*, the first of which was the *intentio*. What were the two others? C17, fol. 81ra deals with the question by telling us what Alberic thought: "*Dicit magister Albericus quod alia duo quae Boethius habebat in mente sunt ista: utrum illa denaria divisio sit sufficiens in terminis et in rebus, et utrum aliquid generalissimum possit esse supra illa decem.*" The author of C21 does not refer to Alberic, but this is also basically what he thinks, although he

reverses the order. The latter issue, moreover, he takes to include both the question whether there might be a genus that subsumes all ten categories at once (being (*ens*), for example) and the question whether there might be a genus that subsumes some but not all of them (accident (*accidens*), for example).

277.13–15 Visa ... significatae. Cf. C17, fol. 81ra: “*Materia Aristotelis est duplex: Voces incomplexae et res significatae a vocibus incomplexis.*”

277.25–278.4 His omnibus ... iudicandi. For the division of logic into invention (*inventio*) and judgement (*iudicium*), see Cicero, *Topica* 6 and Boethius, *De topicis differentiis* 1.1.1 (=1173b Migne). The view that the *Categories* falls under both perhaps goes back to Alberic (see the note on C25 on pp. 314–15 below for more on this).

278.5–12 Vel aliter ... attingit. For the alternative division of logic into division (*scientia dividendi*), definition (*scientia definiendi*) and deduction (*scientia colligendi*), see Boethius’ commentary on Cicero’s *Topica* 1045b Migne.

278.20–22 His omnibus ... ordinis. The author of C21 distinguishes between the mode and order of presentation, but treats them under one “for the sake of brevity” (*propter brevitatem*). In so doing, he is following Alberic. See H17, fol. 87vb: “*Sunt autem quidam qui faciunt distinctionem inter modum et ordinem, dicentes modum consistere secundum qualitatem operis, ordinem vero in dispositione ipsius ordinis, videlicet quid primo, quid secundo, quid alio loco dicatur. Magister vero Albericus hanc distinctionem esse commendabilem confitetur, sed ut brevius et commodius dicatur, modum et ordinem sub eodem ponit.*”

280.9 <CAPITULUM 1> The commentator now turns to discuss some preliminary points regarding chapter 1 of Aristotle’s text:

1. Why Aristotle had to discuss univocals from the outset
2. Why he nonetheless dissuades equivocals before univocals

The commentary breaks off in the discussion of the second point.

280.20–22 Tractatum ... { * * * } Why does Aristotle discuss equivocals before univocals? The question was raised by Boethius, in *Cat.* 166c Migne: “*Cur autem prius de aequivocis, post de univocis tractat?*” The answer proposed here in C21 appears to be roughly the view that C25 ascribes to “some people” (*quidam*): “*Quidam enim dicunt: Ideo praemittit de aequivocis quia prius extirpanda sunt vitia, deinde sunt inserendae (virtutes). Univoca autem praedicatio quasi virtus est, aequivoca vero quasi vitium collaterale illi virtuti. Ideo ne vitium possit obesse virtuti, prius tractavit de aequivocis quam de univocis, ut cognita aequivoca praedicatione sciremus quae essent univoca, quae non.*” C25 in fact gives several solutions and ends up endorsing Alberic’s view (see comments on C25 on pp. 317–18 below). Given that C21 breaks off before the discussion seems to have been brought to a close, it cannot be determined whether it too contained more than one answer to this question.

* * * * *

C25: Introduction, Edition, Notes

This fragment comprises c. 3800 words and, like C21, consists in the very beginning of a commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*. The fragment is contained in the composite manuscript Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2237, fols 27r–28v and was identified, although rather inaccurately, in the library’s nineteenth-century catalogue.¹ The importance of

¹ *Tabulae codicum manu scriptorum praeter Graecos et orientales in Bibliotheca Palatina Vindobonensi asservatorum* 1868, pp. 40–41. According to this catalogue, the commentary runs until fol. 34v. As Iwakuma 2013, p. 46 correctly indicates, the commentary fragment in fact ends on fol. 28v, the rest being other short notes on logic and a list of Alberic’s main theses.

the manuscript was first brought to the attention of scholars of medieval logic by Yukio Iwakuma, who in his pioneering article “Alberic of Paris on Mont Ste Geneviève against Peter Abelard” from 2013 edited the *De sententia magistri nostri Alberici*, a list of Alberic’s main logical theses, contained on fol. 31r.¹

The commentary’s connection to Alberic was noted by Marenbon in the addition to his initial catalogue, where, citing Iwakuma as his source, he notes that the commentator at one point explicitly refers to “our teacher Alberic” (*magister noster Albericus*), although at several other points the commentator also refers to “our teachers” (*magistri nostri*) in the plural.² The reference to Alberic, it should be noted, need not imply that the commentator had actually heard Alberic lecture or been taught by him personally, it may mean simply that he identified as one of the *Albricani*, that is to say, as a member of the school of thought (*secta*) that Alberic founded. The *magistri nostri* would then most likely be other *Albricani*, i.e. some of the philosophers who in later decades taught logic in accordance with Alberic’s views.³ That something like this is most likely the case is suggested by the fact that in several instances the commentator does not actually embrace the view that other sources cite as Alberic’s, but a view that is best described as a development of it (see the notes for these cases). Marenbon’s suggested dating (see below) tallies well with such a scenario.

¹ For this important edition, see Iwakuma 2013, pp. 30–31.

² Marenbon 2000, p. 135. For the updated version, see Marenbon 2013, pp. 164–65.

³ We know of one of them, Richard the Albrican, from Gerald of Wales, *Gemma Ecclesiastica* 1.9: “Vidimus in urbe Parisiensi virum de Anglia oriundum liberalibus artibus affatim eruditum, qui magister Richardus Albericanus nuncupative dicebatur, de sententia enim illa multos habens auditores principaliter in urbe legebat.” Gerald studied in Paris for several periods in the 1160s and 1170s. To my knowledge, nothing is known about this Richard apart from the anecdote Gerald proceeds to tell about his religiousness. See Lesne 1940, pp. 232–33.

Apart from references to Aristotle's *Categories*, the fragment contains references to the following authoritative texts:

Author	Text	References
Aristotle	<i>On interpretation</i>	1
Boethius	<i>Consolatio Philosophiae</i>	1
—	<i>in Cat.</i>	7
—	<i>in Isag.</i> ¹ (?)	1
—	<i>in Top. Cic.</i>	1
Priscian	<i>Institutiones Grammaticae</i>	1

Table 2. References to authoritative texts in C25

In addition there are general mentions of Aristotle's *On interpretation*, *Topics* and *Prior analytics*. There are also several references to contemporary philosophers in the text:

Author	References
Alberic, our teacher	1
Our teacher	1
Our teachers	5
Nominales	1
Quidam	2

Table 3. References to contemporaneous authors in C25

For more on these references to contemporaries, see the notes.

Marenbon proposes a date for this commentary around the mid to later twelfth century. This too is hardly wide of the mark and also seems to tally reasonably well with the date of the extant manuscript copy.¹

¹ Again, according to the “cautious proposal” of Sofia Orsino, who has studied the matter and kindly shared her findings with me in private correspondence, the script indicates that the copy dates to the late twelfth or early thirteenth century.

⟨Anonymi Commenti in *Categorias* Aristotelis Fragmentum (C25)⟩

Commentum super *Praedicamenta*

⟨PROOEMIUM⟩

5 | 27r | Summus et dux omnium Peripateticorum Aristoteles perfectam et absolutam compositionem huius artis in connexione syllogismorum instituit. Ex duobus sicut cuiuslibet¹ rei capit initium, ex materia scilicet et forma. Quaedam autem operum suorum instituit Aristoteles ad eruditionem materiae, quaedam ad eruditionem formae. De quibus, scilicet quae
10 instituit ad eruditionem formae, alibi dicendum est. Quae vero instituit² ad eruditionem materiae praesentis est speculationis.

Materia itaque categoricorum syllogismorum duplex est. Est enim alia prima, alia secunda. Aristoteles ergo *Categorias* suas, id est *Praedicamenta*, instituit ad docendam primam materiam categoricorum syllogismorum, librum vero *Peri hermenias* instituit ad docendam secundam materiam categoricorum syllogismorum. In hoc enim opere docetur quid sint simplices sermones et eorum significata, in *Peri hermenias* vero docetur quid sint compositi sermones et eorum significata. Simples autem sermones sunt prima materia categoricorum syllogismorum, compositi vero
20 sermones sunt secunda materia categoricorum syllogismorum.

Ad cuius rei evidentiam videndum est quoniam voces aliae sunt primae impositionis, aliae secundae. Voces primae impositionis sunt nomina rerum, ut hoc nomen “Socrates,” “Plato,” et hoc nomen “homo,” hoc nomen “albedo,” hoc nomen “animal.” Voces secundae impositionis sunt nomina vocum, ut [hoc] nomen “nomen,” hoc nomen “participium,” hoc nomen
25 nomen “verbum,” hoc nomen “oratio,” hoc nomen “syllogismus,” hoc nomen

¹ cuiuslibet] exclibet *a.c. ms* : clibet *p.c. ms*

² instituit] instuit *ms*

“enthymema” et huiusmodi. Ideo autem dicuntur nomina primae impositionis quia primo rebus imposita sunt nomina, quare dicuntur etiam illa primae impositionis. Dicuntur autem ideo secundae impositionis quoniam animus imponentis postea reversus est ad vocabula, et illa quae poterant
 5 inflecti per casus vocavit nomina, illa vero quae poterant inflecti per tempora vocavit verba.

Cum ergo Aristoteles in hoc opere intendat tractare de primis vocibus, non tamen de quibuslibet primis vocibus, quoniam non intendit de his quae appellant et significant individua, ut hoc nomen “Socrates” et hoc nomen
 10 “Plato” et huiusmodi, sed intendit de his quae appellant individua et significant universalia. Sed quoniam illorum alia significant species specialissimas et appellant individua, alia significant genera et appellant individua, non de his quae significant species et appellant individua intendit¹, sed de significantibus genera et appellantibus individua; sed non de omnibus ta-
 15 libus intendit, sed tantum de his quae significant decem rerum genera et appellant individua. Unde competenter Boethius in commento super hunc librum assignat intentionem Aristotelis dicens “de decem primis vocibus decem prima genera rerum significantibus in eo quod significantes sunt disputare.”²

20 Magister noster Albericus dicit quod primum “decem” non sit ponendum cum dicitur: “Intendit Aristoteles de primis decem etc.,” quia si poneretur ibi, sequeretur hoc: Ergo intendit de aliquibus primis vocibus decem genera³ rerum etc., ergo de aliquibus⁴ (decem)⁵ Latinis vel de aliquibus decem Gallicis vel de aliquibus decem Graecis vel Anglicis vel aliis.
 25 Sed nec de aliquibus Latinis vel Graecis vel Gallicis, sed intendit de primis vocibus decem genera rerum etc. Unde dicit praedictus doctor quod si inveniatur in aliquo commento, absolvendum sit.

¹ intendit] indtendit *a.c. ms*

² Boeth. *in Cat.* 159c Migne (*cf.* 160a, 160b, 161a)

³ genera] *s.l. ms*

⁴ aliquibus] alibus *a.c. ms*

⁵ decem] *suppl. Iwakuma*

Ad hoc dicimus quod ponendum sit “decem” et hoc modo intelligen-
dum: Intentio Aristotelis est de decem primis vocibus, id est¹ de decem
modis significandi, quem modum significandi habent decem voces prima
decem rerum genera significantes, quia sunt quaedam voces quae habent
5 significare decem genera rerum in quolibet genere linguae — in Latino et
in Graeco et in quolibet. Sed quia sunt voces secundae impositionis, ad
exclusionem illarum dicit “primis.” Sed quia sunt voces primae impositio-
nis, ut hoc nomen “Socrates” et huiusmodi, de quibus non intendit, ad ex-
clusionem illarum dicit “genera”². Sed quia sunt voces primae impositionis
10 quae significant genera ut³ hoc genus *animal* et⁴ genera subalterna, de qui-
bus non intendit, ideo dicit “decem prima genera rerum significantibus.”

Quaerit in hoc loco Boethius quare ponat “in eo quod significantes
sunt disputare,” et ibi dissolvit dicens quod et grammatici et dialectici trac-
tant⁵ de vocibus, sed grammatici de vocibus agunt secundum quod inflec-
15 tuntur per casus, dialectici vero tractant⁶ de vocibus non sic sed secundum
significata vocum. Ut ergo excluderet intentionem grammaticorum quam
habent de vocibus, dixit “in eo quod significantes sunt disputare.”⁷ Vel et
aliter solvitur quod ideo posuit “in eo quod significantes sunt disputare”
ad exclusionem intentionis quam habet Aristoteles in *Peri hermenias*. In
20 *Peri hermenias* enim tractavit de prima significatione vocis secundum
quod intellectus [est] in anima, in *Praedicamentis* vero intendit de vocibus,
id est de secundaria significatione vocis secundum quod intellectus de re-
bus habetur. Ad exclusionem ergo praemissae intentionis dixit “in eo quod
significantes sunt,” id est quod habent significare rem. Ex hac intentione
25 Aristotelis manifestum est esse decem genera generalissima.

¹ id est] *coni. Iwakuma* : et *ms*

² genera] *genere ms*

³ ut] et *a.c. ms*

⁴ et] et *a.c. ms* : ut *p.c. ms*

⁵ tractant] tractent *ms*

⁶ tractant] tractans *ms*

⁷ *Revera haec solutio apud Boeth. non invenitur; cf. autem in Cat. 162d–163b Migne*

Etiam dicit Aristoteles alibi tantum esse duo prima {rerum} genera rerum, quae sunt substantia et accidens.¹ Et ita sibi videtur esse contrarius. Ad quod dicimus quod illa contrarietas est in solis verbis. Nam multis modis dicuntur genera generalissima. Dicuntur enim genera generalissima super quae nulla alia sunt genera supervenientia, et secundum hanc acceptionem tantum sunt duo genera generalissima, scilicet substantia et accidens. Dicuntur etiam prima rerum genera quae per proprium modum praedicandi distincta sunt a se invicem et secundum ordinem rerum praedicamentorum, et secundum hoc sunt decem genera generalissima: substantia, quantitas, qualitas etc. Alio etiam modo dicuntur genera generalissima, scilicet quae per propria principia et per continentiam specierum et individuorum distincta sunt ab aliis praedicamentis, et secundum hoc sunt quindecim genera generalissima: *Substantia*, *quantitas* et reliqua quae ponit Aristotelis in *Praedicamentis*, et unum quod continet illa novem, scilicet *accidens*; praeterea hoc universale *singulare*, hoc universale *universale*, hoc universale *bonum*, hoc universale *malum*. Et haec sunt quindecim², quoniam unumquodque istorum distinctum est per propria principia et per continentiam specierum et individuorum.³ Unde dicit Boethius in commento super hunc librum: “Singularium bonorum et singularium malorum genus est hoc universale *bonum*, hoc universale *malum*.”⁴

Post assignatam intentionem Aristotelis subiungit Boethius in primo commento *Praedicamentorum*: | 27v | “Tria sunt quae olim in mente habui. Unum illorum est quid sibi velit *Praedicamentorum* intentio.”⁵ Reliqua vero duo reticet. Ex his verbis coniciunt magistri nostri Boethium in primo commento non plenarie assignasse intentionem Aristotelis, sed ex his verbis innuit se plenius assignare intentionem Aristotelis in secundo commento, quod non habemus. Sed magistri nostri coniciunt sic illic assignasse quid *Praedicamentorum* intentio sibi velit: Intentio

¹ Hoc nusquam dicit Arist., cf. autem Cat. 2.1a20–b9 Bekker

² quindecim] x s.l. ms

³ distincta ... individuorum] iter. ms

⁴ Cf. Boeth. in Cat. 283c Migne

⁵ Boeth. in Cat. 160a Migne

Praedicamentorum est docere quae praedicata de quibus praedicatis habeant praedicari et quae praedicata a¹ quibus praedicatis habeant removeri. Et hanc intentionem probant esse Aristotelis per duas regulas quas ponit Aristoteles in *Antepaedicamentis*. Quarum prima haec est: Si aliquid
 5 praedicatur de altero, quicquid praedicatur de praedicato, et de subiecto.² Haec enim regula utilis est ad cognoscendum quae praedicata de quibus praedicatis³ habeant⁴ praedicari. Item subiungit aliam regulam, quae utilis
 (est) ad cognoscendum quae praedicata a⁵ quibus praedicatis habeant removeri, talem: Diversorum generum et non subalternatim⁶ positorum di-
 10 versae sunt differentiae secundum species.⁷

Secundum olim habitum in mente Boethii arbitrantur magistri nostr[i] esse hanc quaestionem: Quare Aristoteles cum principaliter intenderet de vocibus, totam doctrinam refundat in earum⁸ significata, id est in ipsas res. Et huius ipsius rei subiungit talem solutionem, dicens: Ideo Aristoteles doctrinam vocum refundit in res, (quia)⁹ et res eadem sunt apud
 15 omnes, voces vero permutabiles sunt et non sunt eadem apud omnes (nam aliis vocibus utuntur Graeci, aliis Latini, aliis aliae gentes), et etiam voces nunc sunt in usu nunc non sunt in usu, res vero eadem manent apud omnes et earum¹⁰ doctrina rata est et firma. Sed quoniam novit haec Aristoteles,
 20 ideo volens facere firmum et impermutabile opus, fere omnem doctrinam vocum refundit¹¹ in res (“fere” autem ideo dico quia nusquam facit mentionem de vocibus nisi in quodam capitulo substantiae¹², dicens: “Omnis

¹ a] *coni. Iwakuma* : de *ms*

² Arist. *Cat.* 3.1b10–15 Bekker

³ praedicatis] *in marg. ms*

⁴ habeant] *coni. Iwakuma* : habent *ms*

⁵ a] *coni. Iwakuma* : de *ms*

⁶ subalternatim] subalternorum *a.c. ms*

⁷ Arist. *Cat.* 3.1b16–24 Bekker

⁸ earum] *coni. Iwakuma* : eorum *ms*

⁹ quia] *suppl. Iwakuma*

¹⁰ earum] eorum *ms*

¹¹ refundit] refundens *ms*

¹² substantiae] *in marg. ms*

substantia videtur hoc aliquid significare, et in primis quidem indubitabile et verum est, in secundis vero sub appellationis figura.”¹ Quod autem Aristoteles principaliter intendat de vocibus et secundario de rebus, ex hoc coniciunt magistri nostri quod Aristoteles in *Antepaedicaementis* (praepo-
 5 nit) divisionem eorum quae dicuntur divisioni eorum quae sunt.²

Tertium habitorum olim in mente Boethii magistri nostri esse coniciunt si denaria divisio quam facit Aristoteles in *Antepaedicaementis* omnia comprehendat an aliquid³ sit quod possit subterfugere illam. Solutionem huius quaestionis transferamus usque ad locum istum ubi dicit Aristoteles: “Singulum incomplexorum significat substantiam, quantitatem
 10 etc.”⁴ Quidam alii dicunt quod tertium habitorum olim in mente Boethii sit an aliqua divisio per pauciora membra facta quam per decem possit omnia comprehendere. Ad quod dicimus quod bimembris divisio potest omnia comprehendere, ut ista: esse in subiecto, non esse in subiecto.

15 Post assignationem intentionis Aristotelis restat assignare materiam auctoris, sed alia est auctoris, alia libri. Materia auctoris est id circa quod versatur eius intentio. Voces igitur et res circa quae versatur eius intentio sunt materia auctoris quantum attinet ad disquisitionem veritatis et falsitatis. Libri sententiae sunt quae subiectae⁵ suscipiunt formam per aptam ordinationem et per congruam verborum elocutionem. Et quod haec sint materia libri probatur auctoritate Boethii in primo libro *Consolationum* dicen-
 20 tis: “Vestes philosophiae textae erant tenuissimis filis subtili artificio et indissolubili materia.”⁶ Vestes philosophiae quadam similitudine vocat libros; sicut enim in vestibus latet⁷ res dum ad usum hominum extrahitur,

¹ Arist. *Cat.* 5.3b10–16 Bekker

² Arist. *Cat.* 2.1a16–1b9 Bekker

³ aliquid] aliquod *ms*

⁴ Arist. *Cat.* 4.1b25–27 Bekker

⁵ subiectae] substantiae *ms*, *sed cf.* P20 (Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2486, fols 45ra–60vb), fol. 45va: “magis proprie materia libri possunt dici sententiae illae et rationes ... quae subiectae compositionem suscipientes hunc tractatum constituunt.”

⁶ Boeth. *Cons.* 1.1.3.

⁷ latet] latent *ms*

sic philosophica sententia latet in libris donec per fidelem expositionem alicuius magistri detegatur¹. Tenuissima fila vocat subtiles sententias quadam similitudine; sicut enim de rudi lana fila eliciuntur, sic de rudi ingenio eliciuntur tenuissimae sententiae. Subtile artificium vocat sollertem iuncturam sententiarum, id est ut una sententia coniungitur alteri competenter. Indissolubilem materiam vocat necessitatem sententiarum.

Vidimus intentionem et materiam Aristotelis et libri. Restat videre per quam partem logicae² supponatur. Duae sunt itaque partes logices³ secundum unam divisionem: inventio et iudicium, tres vero secundum aliam divisionem, scilicet scientia dividendi, colligendi, definiendi. Hanc autem divisionem ponit Boethius in commento super *Topica* Marci Tullii, et de scientia colligendi addit quod scientia colligendi adiuncta sibi probabilitate fit dialectica, adiuncta necessitate fit demonstrativa, adiuncta apparentia⁴ fit sophistica.⁵ Cum igitur duae sunt partes logices secundum unam divisionem, et tres secundum aliam, videndum est per quam partem supponatur liber iste logicae⁶.

Sed primo videndum est quid sit aliquem librum supponi logicae per aliquam eius partem. Librum ergo aliquem⁷ supponi logicae⁸ per aliquam eius partem nihil aliud est quam partem illam vel aliquid {ad}⁹ cooperativum¹⁰ ad illam partem sibi comparari per librum illum, sicut liber *Divisio-*
num supponitur logicae per scientiam dividendi quia illa scientia vel

¹ detegatur] detegantur *p.c. ms* : retegantur *a.c. ms*

² logicae] logicen *ms*

³ logices] logicen *ms*

⁴ apparentia] *coni. Ebbesen* : apparenti *ms*

⁵ Boeth. in *Top. Cic.* 1045b–c Migne

⁶ logicae] logices *ms*

⁷ aliquem] *in marg. ms*

⁸ logicae] logicen *ms*

⁹ ad] *del. Iwakuma*

¹⁰ cooperativum] *coni. Iwakuma* : comparativum *ms*

aliquid cooperativum¹ ad illam scientiam comparatur² per³ illum librum; et sic de ceteris.

Liber itaque *Praedicamentorum*, ut placet Nominalibus, supponitur logicae per scientiam iudicandi. Et hoc dicunt hac consideratione, quia li-
 5 ber iste introductorius⁴ est ad librum *Peri hermenias*, librum vero *Peri hermenias* introductorius⁵ est ad librum *Topicorum*⁶ Aristotelis, qui omnino⁷ supponitur logicae per scientiam iudicandi; et ideo a primo ⟨ad⟩ ultimum liber iste supponitur logicae per scientiam iudicandi.

Sed magister noster dicit quod aeque convenienter liber *Praedicamen-*
 10 *torum* supponitur logicae per scientiam inveniendi et per scientiam iudi-
 candi, quia iste liber omni⁸ modo cooperatur ad scientiam⁹ cognoscendi
 quae praedicata de quibus¹⁰ praedicatis habeant praedicari, quae praedicata
 a quibus praedicatis habeant removeri. Ubi enim dicit: “Quando alterum
 de ⟨altero praedicatur⟩¹¹, quicquid¹² de praedicato et de subiecto”¹³ cogno-
 15 scitur per hoc praeceptum quae praedicata de quibus praedicatis praedi-
 centur. Sed hoc aeque valet ad inventionem argumentorum ut valet ad iu-
 dicandum de illis. Subiungit etiam aliam regulam ibidem, per quam scitur
 quae praedicata a¹⁴ quibus praedicatis removeantur, scilicet: “Diversorum

¹ cooperativum] *coni. Iwakuma* : comparativum *ms*

² comparatur] *coo- add. s.l. ms*

³ per] *coni. Iwakuma* : ad *ms*

⁴ introductorius] *introctorius a.c. ms*

⁵ introductorius] *introductorius a.c. ms*

⁶ topicorum] *sic ms* : analyticorum *malim, cf. C20* (Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal 910, fols 147rb–162vb), fol. 147va: “Dicunt quidam, ut Roscelinus, quod liber iste iudi-
 candi scientiae supponitur, quia liber iste tendit ad *Peri hermenias*, et *Peri hermenias*
 tendit ad *Analytica*, qui liber est resolutorius.”

⁷ omnino] *coni. Iwakuma* : omino *ms*

⁸ omni] *omnino ms*

⁹ ad scientiam] *coni. Iwakuma* : a scientia *ms*

¹⁰ de quibus] *iter: a.c. ms*

¹¹ altero praedicatur] *suppl. Iwakuma ex fonte*

¹² quicquid] *quic ms*

¹³ Arist. *Cat.* 3.1b10–12 Bekker

¹⁴ a] *coni. Iwakuma* : de *ms*

et non subalternatim¹ positorum etc.,”² et aequae valet ad inveniendum quantum ad iudicandum. Et ideo liber iste per utramque partem supponitur logicae.

Vel possumus dicere quod supponitur per facultatem³ quae comparatur per librum istum. Quaeritur per quam facultatem supponatur. Videndum est ergo quid sit facultas et quid sit supponi aliquem librum logicae per aliquam | 28r | eius facultatem. Facultas igitur sic definitur: Facultas est facilitas facile quid faciendi ex arte profecta⁴. Quattuor autem sunt facultates: dialectica, demonstrativa, rhetorica, sophistica. Dialectica facultas est facilitas colligendi ex probabilibus et facilitas sustinendi probabilem positionem ita ut nihil dicat sibi repugnans neque probabilitati. Nota quod temptativa continetur sub dialectica facultate, quod innuit Aristoteles in *Topicis* suis, deserviens aequae dialectico et temptatori. Demonstrativa facultas est facilitas colligendi ex necessariis, id est secundum praecepta quae dantur⁵ ab Aristotele in *Prioribus analyticis*, et facilitas iudicandi de necessariis. Sophistica facultas est facilitas sophisticandi aliquem et facilitas sustinendi positionem ut nihil contra eum agatur sophistice. Rhetorica facultas est facilitas persuadendi et dissuadendi. Librum aliquem supponi logicae per aliquam eius facultatem nihil aliud est quam illam facultatem comparari⁶ sibi per illum librum vel aliquid cooperativum ad illam facultatem. Supponitur itaque liber iste principaliter dialecticae et demonstrativae facultati, quia utraque comparatur per⁷ librum istum, sed secundario supponitur rhetoricae et sophisticae facultati.

Sequitur de fine. Finis libri huius est, sicut uniuscuiusque, scientia habita per librum.

¹ subalternatim] subalternorum *a.c. ms*

² Arist. *Cat.* 3.1b16–17 Bekker

³ facultatem] *coni. Iwakuma* : scientiam *ms*

⁴ profecta] *coni. Ebbesen* : provecta *ms*

⁵ praecepta quae dantur] *coni. Ebbesen* : quae dantur praecepta *ms*

⁶ comparari] comparare *ms*

⁷ per] ad *ms*

Utilitas eius est qualitas innata per istum librum. Quae ampla est, nam per hunc librum nobis spondetur omnimoda praedicatio terminorum et omnimoda remotio termini a termino.

Restat inscriptio tituli. Inscriptionem tituli diversi diversis modis assignant. Quidam enim sic assignant: Incipit tractatus Aristotelis de vocibus. Alii sic: Incipit tractatus de generibus rerum. Quos omnes, ut dicit Boethius¹, idem et similis error confundit, cum Aristoteles non minus intendat tractare de vocibus quam de rebus. Immo, ut dictum est, principalius intendit de vocibus quam de rebus, quamvis totam doctrinam refundat² in res et nullam vel³ parvam doctrinam faciat de vocibus (et superius dictum est quando hoc faciat). Est itaque inscriptio tituli talis: Incipiunt *Categoriae* Aristotelis. *Categoriae* dicuntur a Graeco verbo “categorō, categoras,” quod est “praedico, praedicas.” Inde dicitur categorica propositio, id est praedicativa propositio. Unde dicuntur *Categoriae* Aristotelis, id est *Praedicamenta* Aristotelis. Etiam “categorō, -as” in alia significatione (invenitur)⁴ pro “significo, -cas.” Unde dicit Priscianus⁵ quod adverbia et praepositiones et coniunctiones sunt syncategoremata⁶, id est consignantia⁷.

Item, notandum est quod praedicamenta multis modis dicuntur. Dicitur praedicamentum supremum genus. Unde dicit Boethius: “Quid enim est praedicamentum quam genus primum?”⁸ Rursus dicitur praedicamentum compositum praedicatum, ut homo albus. Unde dicit Aristoteles in *Peri hermenias*: “Quare in quantiscumque praedicamentis in quibus nullum contrariorum nec aliquid oppositorum ad quae sequatur contradictio inest, non verum sed falsum est.”⁹ Dicitur etiam praedicamentum collectio

¹ Boeth. in *Cat.* 162a–b Migne

² refundat] refundit *ms*

³ vel] ve *ms*

⁴ invenitur] *suppl. Ebbesen*

⁵ Prisc. *Inst. gramm.* 2.4.15

⁶ sunt syncategoremata] sint categoremata *ms*

⁷ consignantia] *scripsi cum fonte* : consignificata *ms*

⁸ *locum non inveni, sed cf. Boeth. in Isag.*¹ 1.22

⁹ *Cf. Arist. Int.* 11.21a18–33 Bekker

praedicabilium quae ⟨est⟩ a generalissimo usque ad specialissimum. Secundum¹ hoc dicitur genus *substantia* unum praedicamentum, scilicet² collectio praedicabilium quae est³ a generalissimo ex utraque parte usque ad species specialissimas contentas sub eodem praedicamento dicitur
 5 unum praedicamentum. Idem dicendum est de hoc genere *quantitas* et singulis aliis. Et secundum hanc acceptionem hic accipitur praedicamentum. Dicitur etiam praedicamentum modus praedicandi in quid vel quomodo se habet.

Modus agendi talis est: Antequam Aristoteles incipiat tractare de praedicamentis, praemittit quendam qui dicitur *Antepaedicamenta* tractatum⁴,
 10 in quo tractat de aequivocis, de univocis, de denominativis; postea subiungit divisionem eorum quae dicuntur et divisionem eorum quae sunt; ad ultimum illius tractatus facit divisionem incomplexorum in decem membra: “Singulum incomplexorum aut ⟨substantiam⟩⁵ significat ⟨aut⟩⁶ quantitatem aut qualitatem aut ad aliquid⁷ etc.” Postea incipit tractare de praedicamentis, primo de hoc praedicamento *substantia*. Qualiter autem tractet de illo suo loco determinabimus.

⟨CAPITULUM 1⟩

20 AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR (1.1a1) Postquam⁸ ea diximus quae extra litteram dicenda erant, restat litterae expositio. Sed sciendum est quod antequam Aristoteles agat de praedicamentis tractat de univocis, quia descensus et ascensus praedicamentorum consistit in univoca praedicatione. Genus enim generalissimum univoce praedicatur de suis speciebus et species

¹ secundum] *coni. Iwakuma* : sed *ms*

² scilicet] *coni. Iwakuma* : sed *ms*

³ praedicabilium quae est] quae est praedicabilium *ms*

⁴ tractatum] tractatus *ms*

⁵ substantiam] *suppl. Iwakuma ex fonte*

⁶ aut] *suppl. Iwakuma ex fonte*

⁷ ad aliquid] *coni. Iwakuma ex fonte* : aliquid aliud aliorum *ms*

⁸ postquam] posquam *ms*

praedicantur de suis differentiis divisivis et constitutivae differentiae praedicantur de suis speciebus univoce; similiter species praedicatur de suo proprio univoce et e converso; et sic praedicatio praedicamentorum consistit in univoca praedicatione. Ideo Aristoteles ad maiorem evidentiam
 5 praedicamentorum, antequam agat de praedicamentis, agit de univocis. Causa autem univocorum agit de aequivocis; nam univoca praedicatio quasi virtus est, aequivoca vero praedicatio quasi vitium est. Omnis enim virtus habet collaterale vitium.

Sed potest quaeri, cum Aristoteles causa univocorum intendat de aequivocis, quare tractatum aequivocorum praemittat tractatui univocorum.
 10 Ad hanc quaestionem sunt diversae solutiones. Quidam¹ enim dicunt: Ideo praemittit de aequivocis quia prius extirpanda sunt vitia, deinde sunt inserendae <virtutes>². Univoca autem praedicatio quasi virtus est, aequivoca vero quasi vitium collaterale illi virtuti. Ideo ne vitium possit obesse virtuti, prius tractavit de aequivocis quam de univocis, ut cognita aequivoca
 15 praedicatione sciremus quae essent univoca, quae non. Vel ideo ante tractatum univocorum tractavit de³ aequivocis, quia hoc nomen “praedicamentum” habet aequivoce convenire omnibus praedicamentis. Dicitur enim hoc genus *substantia* praedicamentum, hoc genus *quantitas*, *qualitas*, et
 20 sic de ceteris. Vel ideo quia nomina omnia continentia sunt aequivoca, ut hoc nomen “ens,” “aliquid,” “res.” Vel aliter solvitur, quae melior est omnibus: Ideo praemisit de aequivocis quia aequivoca praedicatio simplicior est quam univoca, et omnia simpliciora natura sunt priora. Quod autem⁴
 25 quia <non>⁵ nisi unum exigitur ad hoc ut fiat aequivoca praedicatio: termini communitas; plura vero exiguntur ad hoc ut fiat univoca praedicatio, scilicet ut {si} aliqua uniantur in aliquo verbo et ratio data {est} secundum

¹ Cf. C21, p. 280.20–23 *supra*.

² virtutes] *supplevi cum Iwakuma et fonte* (Isid. *Sent.* 2.36.6)

³ de] univocis *add. sed canc. ms*

⁴ autem] ui *add. sed canc. ms*

⁵ non] *suppl. Iwakuma*

verbum¹ praedicetur de illis, sicut in hoc nomine “animal” potestis videre; ad hoc enim ut praedicetur de homine et de asino univoce, oportet et homo et asinus uniantur in hoc termino “animal” et aliqua ratio sit secundum illud nomen quae conveniat eis et utrique illorum.

- 5 Hic notandum est quod omnis coniunctio terminorum aut est naturalis aut rationalis. Naturalis coniunctio est quando aliquid naturaliter pluribus convenit, ut hoc nomen “homo,” hoc nomen “animal,” hoc nomen “asinus”; quae omnia naturaliter pluribus conveniunt. Rationalis coniunctio | 28v | termini est quae fit aliqua deliberatione praecedente. Item, rationalis
10 coniunctio aut fit casu aut consilio. Fit casu ut in hoc nomine “Pyrrhus,” quod impositum est regi Epirotarum; item casu contigit quod idem nomen impositum est filio Achillis. Consilio fit quattuor modis. Aut enim fit similitudine aut proportionem aut fit ab uno aut fit ad unum. Similitudine fit coniunctio vocabuli, ut in hoc nomine “homo,” quod dicitur de vero homine
15 et de picto homine propter similitudinem quam habet pictus homo cum vero homine. Proportionem fit ut in hoc nomine “principium,” quod cum primo dicitur de unitate, postea translatus est ad punctum ut etiam punctum diceretur principium, et hoc ideo quia unitas et punctum proportionaliter habent se; sicut enim unitas est principium numeri, sic punctum est
20 principium lineae. Alia tamen significatione dicitur unitas principium, alia punctum. Fit ab uno ut in hoc nomine “Tullius,” quod dicitur de libro Tullii² et de statua Tullii. Dicitur enim liber Tullii Tullius et statua eius dicitur Tullius, et hoc ab uno, id est a Tullio, tamen in diversis significationibus. Fit ad unum ut quando aliqua duo tendunt ad unum et eundem exitum et
25 nomen aliquod distortum ab effectu utriusque utrique attribuitur, ut in hoc nomine “salutare,” quod dicitur de esca et de vocatione corporis³; dicitur enim esca salutaris et vocationis salutaris⁴ et ideo quia intendunt ad unum exitum, id est ad salutem. Sed alio modo dicitur esca salutaris, alio modo

¹ verbum] *coni. Iwakuma* : verum *ms*

² tullii] tulliu *a.c. ms*

³ corporis] cor *ms*

⁴ salutaris] salutare *a.c. ms*

vectatio; dicitur enim esca salutaris quod conferat salutem, vectatio salutaris ideo quod parit salutem.

Item, quinto modo dicitur fieri aequivocatio; fit enim translatione. Sed notandum est quod translatio alia ex necessitate, alia causa solius ornatus. 5 Sed aequivocatio quae est causa ornatus nullius momenti est, ut dicit Boethius, quoniam non facit terminum aequivocum.¹ Quamvis enim dicamus “pes montis,” “pes navis,” tamen hoc vocabulum “pes” non est aequivocum. Similiter, quamvis dicam: “Iste est meus Ulixes,”² id est meus placitator, tamen hoc nomen “Ulixes” non est aequivocum, id est diversarum 10 significationum. Translatio quae fit causa necessitatis facit terminum aequivocum, ut patet in hoc nomine “genus,” quod cum primo impositum sit ad significandam Romanorum collectionem habentium se ad unum supremum principium, id est ad Romulum—illa inquam congregatio dicta est genus, deinde postquam philosophi invenerunt unum philosophicum³ 15 praedicabile⁴ (quod sic describitur: Praedicabile de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid est), non habuerunt aliud nomen quod imponerent suo praedicabili et ita quadam necessitate vocaverunt illud genus;⁵ et hoc factum est quadam translatione, et ista translatio fit causa necessitatis.

Notandum est quod “aequivocans” et “aequivocatio” sunt nomina vo- 20 cum. Dicimus enim: “Hoc nomen est aequivocans sub se istas res.” Quod autem “aequivocatio” sit nomen vocis habemus a Boethio, qui dicit quod aequivocatio dividi dicitur in sex species.⁶ “Aequivocum” vero et “aequivocatum” sunt nomina⁷ rei, quamvis⁸ “aequivocum” sit aliquando nomen vocis.

¹ Cf. Boeth. in *Cat.* 166d–167a Migne

² Cf. Plaut. *Men.* 902

³ philosophicum] *coni. Iwakuma* : physicum ut v. *ms*

⁴ praedicabile] principium *a.c. ms*

⁵ Cf. Porph. *Isag.* 1.17–2.17 Busse

⁶ Cf. Boeth. in *Cat.* 166b–167a Migne

⁷ sunt nomina] *iter. ms*

⁸ quamvis] *coni. Iwakuma* : qua *ms*

Postquam diximus ea quae dicenda erant de aequivocis, restat exponere definitionem aequivocorum. Ait ergo definiendo aequivoca: AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR (1.1a1). Nota quod magis dixit in plurali AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR quam “aequivocum dicitur,” ideo quia hoc nomen “aequivocum”
 5 nomen ad aliquid, sicut hoc nomen “simile”; sed nomina ad aliquid in singulari non possunt venire in constructionem sine respectu obliqui. Sicut non dicimus: “Istud est simile” sed dicimus: “Istud est simile isti,” sic¹ etiam non dicimus: “Istud est aequivocum” sed: “est aequivocum illi.” In plurali autem numero nomina ad aliquid veniunt in constructionem sine
 10 respectu obliqui, ut “Ista sunt similia,” “Ista sunt aequivoca.” Maluit autem Aristoteles ponere dictionem quam plures dictiones, quia in omnibus fuit breviloquus, et ideo magis dixit AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR quam “Aequivocum illi dicitur.”

Item, quaeritur quare Aristoteles dixisset DICUNTUR et non dixisset
 15 “sunt.” Ad hoc dicimus quia “aequivocans” et “aequivocatio” sunt nomina vocis, “aequivocum” et “aequivocatum” nomina rei, sed res ex eo quod sunt non habent esse aequivocae vel aequivocatae, sed ex eo quod dicuntur et nominibus significantur habent esse aequivocae², et ideo magis dicit DICUNTUR quam “sunt.”

20 AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR, id est res aequivocae³ dicuntur.

QUORUM NOMEN etc. Hic incipit definitio aequivocorum. Nam hoc nomen AEQUIVOCA est subiectum, hoc verbum DICUNTUR est copula, sicut potestis videre: “Homo <est>⁴ animal rationale mortale.” Hoc nomen “homo” est subiectum, hoc verbum “est” copula, “animal rationale mortale” est loco praedicati. Sic et hic.
 25

Res aequivocae dicuntur QUORUM NOMEN COMMUNE EST. Sed quia hoc convenit univocis, ideo ad exclusionem univocorum addit SOLUM, excludendo per SOLUM rationem substantiae, id est substantialem definitionem. Sed quia aliquis posset putare quod aliud vellet excludere per SOLUM

¹ sic] sicut *ms*

² aequivocae] vel aequivocatae *add. sed exp. ms*

³ aequivocae] aequivocatae *ms*

⁴ est] *suppl. Iwakuma*

quam substantialem definitionem, ideo subdit quid velit excludere per SOLUM: AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR QUORUM (NOMEN) COMMUNE SOLUM EST, VERO, pro sed, sed ita dico SOLUM NOMEN COMMUNE quod, pro ut, RATIO SUBSTANTIAE sit DIVERSA, id est substantialis definitio. Sed pro ratione
 5 substantiae comprehenditur substantialis definitio, quae inchoans a genere completur specificis differentiis, et descriptio (quae)¹ data est secundum sententiam termini. Descriptio vero quae non est data secundum sententiam termini est ut “crispus albus musicus Sophronisci filius”; talis non comprehenditur sub ratione substantiae.

10 Nota quod hoc vocabulum DIVERSA (a) diversis diverso modo exponitur. Dicunt enim quidam^{2,3} RATIO SUBSTANTIAE DIVERSA, id est opposita, ut ratio latrabilis est diversa, id est opposita, rationi celestis canis. Sed hoc falsum est, quia saepe contingit totum et partem aequivocari sub aliquo nomine, ut hoc nomen “sensibile” est aequivocum et ad totum et ad partem,
 15 et idcirco definitiones sunt oppositae, scilicet istae “potens sentire” et “potens sentiri”; si enim est potens sentire est potens sentiri, sed non e converso. Ideo dicimus quod DIVERSA ponitur pro “non eadem,” scilicet nec in voce nec in sententia; sunt enim aliquae definitiones non eadem⁴ voce quae sunt eadem⁵ sententia, velut⁶ “animal rationale (mortale)” et “animal gressibile bipes.”
 20

Sed quia omnia quae praemissa sunt possunt convenire univocis, quia possunt solum nomen habere commune et rationem substantiae diversam, ut homo et equus hoc nomen “animal” habent commune, rationem vero substantiae diversam, ideo addit SECUNDUM NOMEN, id est⁷ ut data secundum illud nomen sub quo aequivocantur sit⁸ diversa.

¹ quae] *suppl. Iwakuma*

² quidam] o *add. sed exp. ms*

³ locum non inveni

⁴ eadem] eadem *ms*

⁵ eadem] eadem *ms*

⁶ velut] vel *ms*

⁷ id est] *coni. Iwakuma : .u. vel .ii. ms*

⁸ aequivocantur sit] aequivocatur sunt *ms*

Est itaque plena definitio aequivocorum: AEQUIVOCA DICUNTUR QUORUM NOMEN COMMUNE EST SOLUM, RATIO VERO SUBSTANTIAE DIVERSA SECUNDUM NOMEN { * * * }

292.4 <PROOEMIUM> The fragment comprises a prologue, preliminary remarks on chapter 1 of Aristotle’s text and an in-depth literal exposition of the definition of equivocals that take up its first one and a half lines. The prologue discusses the following features of Aristotle’s work:

1. Its author’s intention (*intentio*)
2. Its subject matter (*materia*)
3. To which part of logic it belongs (*cui parti logices supponatur*)
4. Its goal (*finis*)
5. Its utility (*utilitas*)
6. Its title (*titulus*), and, in this connection, the various senses of the word “category” (*praedicamentum*)
7. Its mode and order of presentation (*modus agendi*)

This is the same set of traditional issues that C21 discusses, although the order in which they are discussed is different. *Intentio* is thus discussed first, as according to H17, Alberic thought it should be. See the note on C21 on pp. 282–83 above.

293.20–27. Magister ... absolvendum sit. As noted above (pp. 284–85), the view here ascribed to Alberic is endorsed by C21. C15 and C17 do not mention the issue explicitly, but both omit the contested “*decem*” as Alberic says one should. C15, fol. 1ra: “*Et sic habemus talem intentionem: Intentio huius operis est tractare de primis vocibus decem prima rerum genera significantibus (in) eo quod res significant.*” C17, fol. 81ra: “*(D)icit Boethius in commento Praedicamentorum: Intentio Aristotelis est tractare de primis vocibus decem prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res significant.* C20, fol. 147rb follows suit and seemingly refers

to Alberic: “*Ut ait Boethius in commento, intentio Aristotelis in hoc opere de decem primis vocibus decem rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res significant disputare, id est earum significationem et rerum naturam subiectarum aperire. In quibusdam commentis habetur ‘decem vocibus,’ in quibusdam non; sed melius est, ut dicitur magistro, quod ibi non habeatur ‘decem’ ut sit doctrina generalior.*” As mentioned above, Boethius’ actual formulation (in both Migne’s and Asztalos’s edition) does not include numerals at all, neither the first nor the second *decem*. Abelard, *LI Cat.* 111.18–21 is thus more precise: “*teste Boethio in hoc opere intentio est de primis vocibus prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res significant disputare.*” However, Abelard (112.5–6) goes on, on the basis of Boethius in *Cat.* 160b–161a, to say that: “*Haec autem decem nomina Boethius intensionem huius libri aperiens primas appellat voces prima rerum genera significantes.*” The deeper point of Alberic’s remark is perhaps, as Marenbon 1992, pp. 57–58 suggests, to stress that the categorial distinctions are fundamentally ontological in nature and not dependent on some specific linguistic context.

294.1–6 Ad hoc ... quolibet. That the commentator disagrees with Alberic, whom he has just called “our teacher,” is worth noting, but it should also be noted, as done by Iwakuma 2013, 29–30, that disagreement on this or that point of doctrine was not uncommon within the twelfth-century schools, both in the form of disagreement between followers of the same master and in the form of disagreement with something or other the master has said. The disagreement here seems rather innocuous.

295.24–27 Ex his ... habemus. As discussed above (pp. 285–86) in connection with C21, the view here ascribed to *magistri nostri* is Alberic’s. Besides C21 and C15 mentioned above, the view is also endorsed in C17 and C20. See C17, fol. 81ra: “*Et quod praedicta intentio sit insufficiens demonstrat Boethius cum dicit: ‘Tria sunt quae mihi restant in mente, unum quid velit Praedicamentorum intentio.’ Si sufficienter esset assignata praedicta intentio, non sic dixisset Boethius.*” And C20, fol. 147va: “*Haec*

est intentio quam Boethius assignat in primo commento, dicens his verbis 'sitque in praesens quae data est intentio.' Deinde subiungit: 'Tres,' inquit, 'quaestiones habeo dudum in mente, quorum unum est quid sibi velit Praedicamentorum intentio.' Reliqua duo tacet. Ex his perpendimus nos nec inmerito intentionem huius libri non esse sufficienter assignatam, quia cum intendat et doceat magnopere de rerum praedicatione, tamen dicit eum agere de vocibus."

295.27–296.2 Sed ... removeri. As shown in the discussion of C21 on pp. 286–87 above, the view that the *Categories* is centrally about predication, and specifically about which predicates are predicated of which and which are removed from which, can be traced back to Alberic.

296.3–10 Et hanc ... species. I have not found texts that explicitly give such a “proof,” but the claim that the two rules given in chapter 3 of the *Categories* line up with the *intentio* in such a way that the first rule (3.1b10–15) stipulates which predicates are predicated of which and the second rule (3.1b16–24) which predicates are removed from which is found in all three commentaries associated with Alberic that comment on this part of Aristotle’s text: C15, C17 and C20. The point is most succinctly put by C20, fol. 149rb: “*QUANDO ALTERUM etc. (3.1b10) ... quia de praedicatis doctrina facere intendit, id est ostendere quae de quibus habeant praedicari et quae a quibus habeant removeri, quandam praemittit regulam qua ostendit quae de quibus habeant praedicari et quandam aliam subiungit qua docet quae a quibus removeantur.*” But see also C15, 10ra: “*Praemissa regula quae demonstravit quae de quibus habeant praedicari et qualiter, praemittit Aristoteles regulam quae demonstrat quae a quibus habeant removeri. Quae talis est: DIVERSORUM GENERUM etc. (3.1b16).*” That the view was most likely Alberic’s is also strongly suggested by C25 below (at pp. 299.9–300.3).

296.11–21 Secundum ... in res. Boethius said he intended to discuss three topics in his second commentary on the *Categories*, the first of which

was 1) *intentio*. What were the two others? As shown in the comments on C21 on pp. 287–88 above, Alberic took the two remaining topics to be: 2) Whether the list of categories is exhaustive (with regard to both terms and things), and 3) Whether there can be a genus subsuming all of the ten categories. C21 basically followed suit. C25, however, ascribes to his masters (*magistri nostri*) a somewhat different view. According to this view, the first remaining topic is: 2*) Why, when Aristotle is primarily concerned with words, he bases almost (*fere*) his whole doctrine on things (*refundit in res*). The *magistri nostri* here thus seemingly do not include Alberic. A version of the view is, however, found in C20, fol. 147va, who first gives Alberic's view and then an alternative proposal: “*Reliqua duo confingere possumus. Forsan enim quaerebat apud se utrum illa divisio quae in decem fit ab Aristotele sufficiens sit, et an aliquid excogitari valeat quod illa decem quasi superius continere queat. Sed si quis eundem Boethium inspiciat, ipse solvit primum cum dicit ‘quia maior hac divisione inveniri non potest.’ Secundum solvit in commento super Porphyrium, quod res et ens non sunt superiora ad illa decem. Possumus etiam alia duo confingere, quia quaerit Boethius: cum Aristoteles de vocibus intenderet, totam doctrinam fere ad res transtulit, et quare etiam pauca de vocibus, plura de rebus. Quod ideo fecit quia firma et stabilis doctrina non potest esse in voce propter diversitatem linguarum et nationum. Non enim sunt apud omnes eadem voces. Et si diceret: ‘haec vox “animal” de hac voce “homo” praedicatur;’ ista doctrina non esset omnibus communis, et cetera huiusmodi. Doctrina autem rerum immobilis est, quia sunt eadem apud omnes.*” According to C20's alternative proposal the two remaining topics were thus: 2**) Why almost (*fere*) all of the theory concerns things, and 3**) Why little is said about words and much about things. The distinction between 2**) and 3**) seems rather academic, and C20 gives just the one answer. Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to see only one issue here, as C25 does.

296.21–297.2 “fere” ... figura. Both C20 and C25 have the qualification “almost” (*fere*) here, but only C25 gives an explanation of it.

297.2–5 Quod autem ... sunt. Cf. C20, 148vb: “*EORUM QUAE DICUNTUR (2.1a16) Quia Aristoteles tam de vocibus quam de rebus intendit, tam rerum quam vocum inducit divisionem, sed quia vocum doctrina praecedit in logica per quas de rebus loquimur et doctrinam facimus, ideo vocum ad placitum significativarum praemittit divisionem hanc, scilicet: EORUM QUAE DICUNTUR ALIA DICUNTUR SECUNDUM COMPLEXIONEM, ALIA SINE COMPLEXIONE.*” The view that logic is about both words and things (in that order) was fundamental to the *Albricani*. See, for example, the opening lines of the anonymous logical textbook based on Alberic’s views known as the *Introductiones Montanae Minores* (De Rijk 1967, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 11.2–3): “*De duobus in logica agitur, scilicet de vocibus et rebus. Sed quia doctrina vocum prior est doctrina rerum, ideo primum de voce agamus.*”

297.6–14 Tertium ... subiecto. According to the view C25 ascribes to his masters (*magistri nostri*), the third topic Boethius intended to discuss was 3^{*A}) Whether the list of categories is exhaustive. This corresponds precisely to Alberic’s 2). C25 also gives another variant, ascribed to “some other people” (*quidam alii*), according to which the last issue was rather: 3^{*B}) Whether a division with less members than the tenfold one can be given. This, by contrast, seems to trace back to Alberic’s 3), if one takes into account its development in C21. What C25 is proposing, in sum, may be best described as two different amalgams of the view we find in C20 and Alberic’s view.

297.15–16 Post ... libri. For the distinction being invoked here, see H17, fol. 88ra: “*Auctoris vero materia alia est de qua, alia ex qua. Materia de qua est id de quo auctor tractat, ut genus et species sunt materia Porphyrii. Materia autem ex qua est id ex quo opus constat, ut sententia generis et speciei sunt materia Porphyrii — sed haec materia convenientius potest dici libri quam auctoris.*”

297.16–19 Materia auctoris ... falsitatis. See the note to C21 on p. 288 above.

297.19–20 Libri ... elocutionem. Cf. C20, fol. 147va: “*Materia huius libri secundum quosdam sunt voces incomplexae et res vocibus significatae de quibus tractat. Nos autem dicimus quod materia huius libri sunt sententiae et rationes quae tractatum istum componunt.*” Cf. also P20, fol. 45va: “*magis proprie materia libri possunt dici sententiae illae et rationes ... quae subiectae compositionem suscipientes hunc tractatum constituunt.*”

297.20–298.6 Et quod ... sententiarum. The invocation of Boethius’ *Consolatio Philosophiae* 1.1.3 to justify the idea that the *sententiae* (or *sententiae et rationes*) of a book constitute its matter is common in texts associated with Alberic. See, e.g., H17, fol. 88ra: “*Quod autem materia sit sententia probatur auctoritate Boethii in libro Consolationis. Ait enim: ‘Vestes Philosophiae erant textae tenuissimis filis et indissolubili materia.’ Quod ab omnibus magistris hoc modo glossatur: id est indissolubili sententia. Hic ergo habetur quod sententia materia dicatur.*” See also Anon., *Glossae “Doctrinae sermonum”* (H15) Pr.6.78–87 King: “*Dicimus enim uniuscuiusque materiam esse rationes et sententias quae in libro docentur, quarum contextu totus liber efficitur. ... Idemque in aliis libris dicimus, quod quidem Boethius in libro De consolatione plane insinuat ubi vestes Philosophiae inscribit. Vocat enim materiam indissolubilem rationes et sententias quae indissolubiler coniunctae philosophicos componunt tractatus, quae proprie materia dicuntur quia omnis materia debet esse in compositione sui materiati.*”

299.3–8 Liber ... iudicandi. Cf. C20, fol. 147va: “*Dicunt quidam, ut Roscelinus, quod liber iste iudicandi scientiae supponitur, quia liber iste tendit ad Peri hermenias, et Peri hermenias tendit ad Analytica, qui liber est resolutorius. Magister Petrus dicit quia supponitur scientiae inveniendi.*” The latter is, indeed, Abelard’s view in *LI Cat.* 114.16–19 Geyer: “*At vero cum haec scientia de logica esse concedatur, restat quaestio utrum scientiae inveniendi an iudicandi sit supponenda. Sed ad inventionem recte refertur, quia hic praecipue instruimur ad invenienda argumenta...*” C15, fol. 2ra appears to have gotten his nominalists confused and

mistakenly attributes Roscelin's view to Abelard: "*Tamen probat magister Petrus quod hic liber supponitur scientiae iudicandi hoc modo: Aristoteles composuit librum Analyticorum, in quo tractatur de iudicio, et gratia illius fecit librum Peri hermenias, et causa illius composuit librum Praedicamentorum; ergo iste liber supponitur scientiae iudicandi illis mediantibus.*" Later nominalists followed Abelard in placing Aristotle's book under invention, but they made a small disclaimer which may well have been prompted by the *Albricani*. Thus, Anonymus D'Orvillensis (C26), 254 Ebbesen: "*Supponitur autem hoc opus illi parti logices quae dicitur scientia inveniendi ... Plurimum tamen iuvat hoc opus artem iudicandi.*" C27, fol 1va: "*Iste liber scientiae inveniendi supponitur, quamvis agat de illis quae pertinent ad iudicium, eo scilicet quod in hoc opere inventio traditur.*"

299.9–300.3 Sed ... logicae. The *magister noster* is most probably Alberic. The view that Aristotle's *Categories* falls under both invention and judgement is also endorsed and grounded in the view that it centrally concerns predication by both C15 and C20. C15, fol. 2ra: "*Qua ratione supponitur scientiae iudicandi, eadem ratione supponitur et scientiae inveniendi, quia sicut in hoc libro tractatur vel demonstratur quae de quibus habeant praedicari, ut maiora de minoribus, et quae a quibus habeant removeri, ut genera et species unius praedicamenti a generibus et speciebus alterius praedicamenti, et quae de quibus non habeant praedicari nec tamen removeri, ut minora de maioribus, quod pertinet ad iudicium, eodem modo in hoc libro tractatur de locis illis ex quibus eliciuntur argumenta, quod attinet ad inventionem; et sic iste liber supponitur scientiae inveniendi.*" C20, fol. 147va: "*Sed nos dicimus quod neutri istarum magis quam utrique supponitur sed aeque utrique. Scire enim quae de quibus habeant praedicari et quae a quibus removeri valet ad inventionem argumentorum et iudicium.*" See also P20, fol. 45va: "*Dicimus tamen quod utrique, mediante scientia praedicamentorum ad quae introducit, supponitur. Quemadmodum enim Aristoteles in Praedicamentis docet quae de quibus habeant praedicari et quo modo et quae non, per quod scimus*

et invenire et iudicare, sic Porphyrius quae de quibus praedicantur et quo modo et quae non instruit, et ideo librum eius scientiae inveniendi et iudicandi supponi testamur." C17, fol. 81ra also places Aristotle's book under both invention and judgement, but gives no reasons for this: "*Supponitur logicae. Ad logicam reducitur per dialecticam. Per scientiam inveniendi et iudicandi reducitur ad dialecticam.*" For C21, see the note on p. 288 above.

300.8–9 Quattuor ... sophistica. Cf. Boethius, *De topicis differentiis* 1.7.17 Nikitas (=1181c Migne): "*Quattuor igitur facultatibus earumque velut opificibus disserendi omnis ratio subiecta est, id est dialectico, oratori, philosopho, sophistico.*" A few lines later, at 1.7.19 (=1181d), Boethius identifies the *philosophus* with the *demonstrator*: "*Philosophus vero ac demonstrator de sola tantum veritate pertractat...*"

300.11–13 Nota ... temptatori. This *nota bene* might have been occasioned by the similar but different division that we find in another text associated with Alberic, Anon. *Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum* (SE6), 282.10–12 De Rijk: "*Potest etiam facultas vel scientia disserendi praedicto modo dividi. Facultatum enim alia demonstrativa, alia dialectica, alia temptativa, alia sophistica.*"¹

301.18–302.8 Item ... se habet. As noted above (p. 283) in the comments on C21, it was customary among twelfth-century commentators to discuss the various meanings of the word "category" (*praedicamentum*) in connection with the title of Aristotle's work. C25 first lists three meanings: (1) most general genus, (2) complex predicate, and (3) collection of a most general genus and all the items falling under it down to the most special species. These three meanings roughly correspond to those given by C21, and the two commentators agree that it is in the third meaning that the word is to be taken in the work's title. But whereas C21 claimed that there were

¹ This text was edited by De Rijk 1962–67, vol. 1, pp. 257–458.

no more meanings of the word, C25 lists a fourth: (4) mode of predication. As a parallel passage in Anonymus D'Orvillensis (C26), 254 Ebbesen shows, twelfth-century commentators found this meaning in chapter 9 of the first book of Aristotle's *Topics*: "*Dicitur etiam praedicamentum modus praedicandi in quid vel in quale vel in quomodo se habet, secundum quod dicitur in primo Topicorum: 'Omnia genera et omnes species continentur in primo praedicamento,' id est omnia genera et omnes species praedicantur in quid.*" In fact, one of the rival twelfth-century logical schools, the *Meludinenses*, built its theory of categories on this fourth meaning. Thus, number (35) and (36) in the list of the school's theses found in the text known as *Secta Meludina* (see De Rijk 1967, vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 282–86) are: "(35) *Omnia genera et omnes species sunt in primo praedicamento.* (36) *Praedicamentum est modus praedicandi, et primum praedicamentum est primus modus praedicandi.*" See also Hansen 2023, pp. 578–79.

302.9–17 Modus ... determinabimus. Like C21 (see note on p. 288 above), C25 does not give separate proemial discussions of mode and order of presentation. This is in line with Alberic's practice. What C25 calls *modus agendi* here is really the order of presentation. The promise to discuss how (*qualiter*) Aristotle proceeds, i.e. the mode of presentation, in connection with the category of substance (and presumably also the other categories) shows that the author did not plan for his commentary to end where it breaks off in the Vienna manuscript.

302.19 <CAPITULUM 1> The preliminary remarks on chapter 1 discuss:

1. Why Aristotle discusses univocals from the outset
2. Why he nonetheless discusses equivocals and why he does so before discussing univocals
3. The various kinds of equivocals
4. The expressions "equivocating" (*aequivocans*), "equivocation" (*aequivocatio*), "equivocated" (*aequivocatum*) and "equivocal" (*aequivocum*).

The commentary then gives an in-depth literal exposition of Aristotle's definition of equivocals after which it breaks off with the end of fol. 28v. The first two points, it will be seen, are basically the first two points also discussed in C21 (see note on pp. 288–89 above).

303.9–16 Sed ... non. Why does Aristotle discuss equivocals before univocals? For the question and this first solution ascribed to “some people,” see the note on C21 on p. 289 above. Cf. also C20, fol. 147vb: “*De aequivocis autem ante univoca praemittit ... quia prius docet quid sit vitandum, deinde quid sit tenendum; aequivoca enim praedicatio secludenda est ab illis de quibus intendit in Praedicamentis.*” Note that C25 has actually paved the way for this solution just above (at p. 303.6–8).

303.16–20 Vel ideo ... ceteris. This is the solution Boethius proposes (*in Cat.* 166c Migne): “*Idcirco quod ipsa decem praedicamenta cum definitionibus diversa sint, uno praedicationis vocabulo nuncupantur; cuncta enim praedicamenta dicimus.*”

303.20–21 Vel ideo ... “res.” Cf. C15, fol. 2va (which has *res*, *ens*, *unum*, and *aliquid*): “*Item, prius tractat de aequivoco quam de univoco, quia inter aequivocos comprehenduntur termini digniores aliis sicut ‘res’ et ‘ens,’ ‘unum’ et ‘aliquid,’ de quibus dicit Aristoteles quod aequaliter de omnibus rebus praedicantur; et ex hac dignitate prius tractat de aequivocis quam de univocis.*” Cf. also C20, fol. 147vb (which has *res* and *ens*): “*De aequivocis autem ante univoca praemittit, quia inter aequivoca quaedam enumerantur quae omnia continent, ut res et ens.*” C17, fol. 81rb (which has only *ens*) mistakenly ascribes this solution to Boethius: “*Item, quaeritur quare prius de aequivocis quam de univocis. Ideo, ut dicit Boethius, quia omnia sunt aequivoca sub ente.*”

303.21–304.4 Vel aliter ... illorum. This last, best of all solutions, is explicitly ascribed to Alberic in C17, fol. 81rb: “*Dicit magister Albericus quod ideo prius de aequivocis quia sunt simpliciora. Ad hoc ut aliqua sint*

aequivoca oportet quod nomen sit commune solum, sed ut aliqua sint univoca oportet quod nomen et definitio sit communis.”

304.5–305.18 Hic ... necessitatis. This passage is an elaboration on Boethius, in *Cat.* 166b–c Migne in so far as the subdivision of what is here called *rationalis coniunctio terminorum* corresponds to the division of equivocals Boethius gives there. Boethius does not, however, use the phrase *coniunctio terminorum* there, and it is somewhat odd in this context. I have so far failed to find any parallels, but it seems that by *coniunctio* something like *communitas* or *communio* is meant (note that the text has *termini communitas* a few lines above). I have refrained from emending it, however, as the manuscript is very clear in all occurrences.

304.21–23 Fit ab uno ... significationibus. Whereas the commentator has taken over Boethius’ examples for the other types of equivocation, he here introduces a completely different one. A statue of Tully and a book by Tully are both called Tully, but they are so called from the man himself: Tully. This example, as it turns out, is taken rather from chapter 10 of Augustine’s *De Dialectica* (for some other traces of *De Dialectica* in the twelfth-century, see p. 6 in Jackson’s introduction to the text). What might have made the commentator introduce it here? Well, it appears to have been relevant to a piece of school doctrine. In the list of theses ascribed to Alberic (*De sententia magistri nostri Alberici*) on fol. 31r of this same Vienna manuscript we read (Iwakuma 2013, 31): “*Quinta est quod convenienter et vere dicitur: ‘Marcus et Tullius sunt,’ Marco existente; sed Marco non existente, incongrue dicitur.*” The thesis is among those of which Iwakuma (2013, 35) says: “I have failed so far to discover more detailed discussions and do not know what exactly they mean.” The passage here suggests that the deliberately strange-sounding and attention-grabbing tenet trades on the point regarding the ambiguity of “Tully.” Whereas “Marcus” refers to the human being Marcus Tullius Cicero, “Tully” can also, albeit in a different meaning, refer to a book he’s written. So after Marcus has written his book but before he gets his head chopped

off, there is a distinct, existing referent for both terms and one can correctly say in the plural that both Marcus and Tully exist.

* * * * *

C29: Introduction, Edition, Notes

This fragment comprises c. 500 words and is actually a series of brief notes on select issues relevant to the beginning of Aristotle's *Categories* (from the second half of chapter 2 to the very beginning of chapter 5). The notes may (but need perhaps not) be excerpts from a larger commentary. They are contained in ms Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2486, fol. 4r, where they occupy the blank space after a short treatise on universals which ends a little before the middle of the page.¹ Their existence was noted, albeit imprecisely by both Grabmann and De Rijk, but they were not properly identified until Iwakuma listed them in his 2013 paper on Alberic of Paris, and they then entered Marenbon's revised catalogue from the same year.² The importance of the manuscript was first brought to the attention of scholars of medieval logic by Martin Grabmann, who edited the short tract on universals mentioned above, and its relevance was further stressed by De Rijk, who edited an introduction to logic based on Alberic's views also contained in the manuscript, the *Introductiones Montanae Minores*.³

That items in the manuscript display a connection to Alberic was noticed already by Grabmann and was further brought out by De Rijk.⁴

¹ De Rijk 1962–67, vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 89–91 gives a description of the manuscript and its contents. I have found nothing that supports (at least with regard to these notes on the *Categories*) De Rijk's claim (at p. 89) that the notes in this part of the manuscript “were apparently taken, for the main part, from the greater logical works found in the manuscript.”

² Grabmann 1947, p. 60; De Rijk 1962–67, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 89; Iwakuma 2013, p. 46; Marenbon 2013, p. 166.

³ Grabmann 1947; De Rijk 1962–67, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 90; vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 7–71.

⁴ Grabmann 1947, p. 63; De Rijk 1966, pp. 1–9.

Iwakuma ascribes C29 to a “follower of master Alberic,” whereas Marenbon remarks that “[t]he master from whose teaching the notes derive refers to one of Alberic’s ideas, but rejects it.”¹

The issues discussed in these notes are the following:

1. The notion of being said of a subject (*dici de subiecto*), introduced at *Cat.* 2.1a20.
2. The rule of predication transitivity, introduced at *Cat.* 3.1b10–12.
3. Some purported counterexamples to the enumeration of the ten categories given at *Cat.* 4.1b25–27.
4. The division of substance into primary and secondary substance underlying Aristotle’s opening remarks at *Cat.* 5.2a11–19, and the further subdivision of the category.

The notes are all rather short, the longest being the one concerned with the transitivity rule in *Categories* 3. It is in this note, which makes up more than half of the edition below, that Alberic is mentioned. This note also contains a reference to “some people” (*quidam*).

Marenbon proposes a date around the middle of the twelfth century for these notes.² It is difficult to say, but perhaps a date like the one proposed for C25 (around the mid to later twelfth century) would be a safer bet.³

¹ Iwakuma 2013, p. 46 (this is what the notation “#” means, see *ibid.*, p. 44); Marenbon 2013, p. 166.

² Marenbon 2013, p. 166.

³ According to the “cautious proposal” of Sofia Orsino, the script indicates that the copy dates to the late twelfth or early thirteenth century, as was also the case with the copy of C25 (see note 1 on page 291 above).

⟨Anonymi Notulae in *Categorias* Aristotelis (C29)⟩

Dici de subiecto tribus modis dicitur: Dici de subiecto est esse universale, dici de subiecto est praedicari de contento, dici de subiecto est fundari in subiecto, ut albedo (quod dicit Aristoteles: “Qualitates¹ quae in subiecto
5 sunt de subiecto dicuntur”² de universalibus intelligendum est, non de singularibus); vel “praedicatur de subiecto,” id est per nomen denominative sumptum ostenditur esse in subiecto.

QUANDO ALTERUM DE ALTERO PRAEDICATUR UT DE SUBIECTO etc.³
(3.1b10) Quidam ita exponunt: Praedicari in substantiam, id est praedicari
10 ut materiale esse vel formale substantiale vel totum esse rei.⁴ Secundum istos iste syllogismus non esset syllogismus, scilicet: “Omnis homo est animal; sed omne animal est coloratum; igitur omnis homo est coloratus,” quia nulla regula formari potest.

Nos autem dicimus praedicari ut de subiecto non praedicari in substantiam, sed praedicari ad similitudinem eorum quae in substantiam praedicantur, id est quae de omni eo de quo praedicantur prorsus praedicantur et de sibi opposito, ut coloratum de homine et asino.

Si autem aliquis secundum praedictam regulam, scilicet: “Quando alterum de altero etc.,” probare voluerit Socratem esse speciem (vel genus)
20 dicens: “Homo est species (vel animal est genus); sed Socrates est homo (vel animal); igitur Socrates est species (vel genus),” dicimus non valere nec sequi posse. In prima enim propositione secundum magistrum

¹ qualitates] *in marg. ms*

² Cf. Arist. *Cat.* 2.1a29–1b3

³ etc.] *post praedicatur ms*

⁴ Cf. Anonymus, C27, fol. 2rb MS Milan, Archivio Capitolare della Basilica di Sant’Ambrogio M 2: “Et attende quod dici (dicit *ms*) de subiecto idem est quod in substantia praedicari. In substantia vero praedicari est praedicari tanquam genus vel tanquam species vel tanquam differentiam.”

Albericum¹ individuum subicitur nec de universali² aliquid praedicatur, immo de individuo; in assumptione autem universale praedicatur, videlicet species; ideo non sequitur. Sed quia huiusmodi individua nobis videntur ficticia, idcirco universale (vel universalia)³ dicimus ibi subici et de ipso
 5 speciem praedicari⁴ secundum accidens, id est secundum naturam universalis⁵ et non secundum naturam individuorum. In ista tamen⁶ propositione: “Animal est genus” et in similibus individuum quidem subicitur, vel potius ipsum universale, sed non ut universale, id est non universaliter subicitur, ac de ipso agitur, id est locutio de ipso habetur. Cum autem dicitur: “Nul-
 10 lum animal est genus,” hic genus a specie non removetur, sed a rebus quae sunt animalia; universale quidem subicitur, sed de ipso locutio non habetur, immo de rebus ipsius.

Duobus modis secundum accidens praedicari dicitur, vel quando aliquid praedicatur non in substantiam, ut coloratum de homine, vel quando
 15 aliquid assignatur de aliquo, ut species de hoc universali *homo* assignatur; cum dico: “Quid est universale *homo?*,” respondetur: “Species.” Non autem universaliter praedicatur de ipso; non enim possum dicere: “Omnis homo est species.”

SINGULUM INCOMPLEXORUM etc. (4.1b25) Obicitur de hoc nomine
 20 “Adam,” “Caesar,” “chimera,” et de similibus, quid haec⁷ significant. Ad quod dicimus quod de rebus existentibus facta est haec divisio. Vel dicimus quod significant ut substantiam, quia si res subiectae existerent, significare possent.

Substantia alia prima, alia secunda. Primarum aliae sunt unae numero,
 25 aliae non unae numero. Non unae sunt illae quarum coniunctione cum aliis

¹ magistrum albericum] *ma. a. ms*

² universali] universale *ms*

³ vel universalia] *in marg. ms*

⁴ et ... praedicari] *in marg. ms*

⁵ universalis] *vel universalium ms (lectio incerta)*

⁶ tamen] *lectio incerta*

⁷ haec] *lectio incerta*

non potest fieri¹ progressio ad aliquid numerale nomen. Hae sunt individua quae subiciuntur cum de universalibus agitur. Secundarum alia est generalis praedicata de generibus et speciebus, ut: “Omne subalternum genus secunda substantia est,” alia specialis praedicata de individuis tantum, ut
 5 cum dicitur: “Hoc universale *animal* est secunda substantia,” “Hoc universale *homo* est secunda substantia.”²

321.9–10 Quidam ... rei. I have found no exact correspondences to the exposition here ascribed to some people (*quidam*), but compare C15, fol. 9ra: “*Boethius sic exponit illam: QUANDO ALTERUM DE ALTERO in quid vel in substantia, quicquid de praedicato in quid vel in substantia, illud idem et de subiecto in quid vel in substantia.*” In glossing the passage in question, Abelard (*LI Cat.* 133.6–7 Geyer) says: “*Est autem praedicari de subiecto teste Boethio praedicari in substantia, quod nos diligenter supra exposuimus.*” This is, indeed, more or less what Boethius claims: “*De subiecto vero praedicare est quotiens altera res de altera in ipsa substantia praedicatur.*” This implies a restriction of the rule to certain types of predicate, as Boethius explicitly says a few lines later: “*quare illa sola de subiecto dicuntur quaecumque in cuiuslibet rei substantia et in definitione ponuntur.*” Abelard (*LI Cat.* 127.11–13 Geyer) follows suit: “*Dici itaque de subiecto convenit omnibus tam generibus quam speciebus, cuiuscumque sint praedicamenti, respectu suorum inferiorum et insuper differentiis respectu specierum vel individuorum earum.*” An anonymous nominalist commentator (C27, fol. 2rb) puts the view succinctly as follows: “*Et attende quod dici de subiecto idem est quod in substantia praedicari. In substantia vero praedicari est praedicari tanquam genus vel tanquam species vel tanquam differentiam.*” Boethius and the nominalists thus seem to

¹ fieri] *lectio incerta*

² non est inconueniens si aliquod universale dividitur per genus et speciem] *in marg. inf. ms*

agree in restricting the rule to the predication of genera, species and differentia. Of course, for the nominalists predication is a linguistic relation, and it is only Boethius who speaks of predicating one thing (*res*) of another. He does not, however, speak of material or formal being, as C29 does in reporting the view. Alberic, by contrast, seems to have used this sort of language, at least on occasion, as emerges from an anonymous twelfth-century commentary on Priscian known as *Tractatus Glosarum Prisciani*, which reports his exposition of Priscian's definition of the noun at *Inst.* 2.4.18 (*Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare*): “*Dicit enim magister Albricus: ‘Substantiam vocat materiale esse, qualitatem formale, quae nomen habet significare. Ac patet in hoc nomine ‘homo’: significat substantiam, id est materiale, ut animal, et qualitatem, id est formale, ut rationale et mortale.’*” In other words, what we find here in C29 is possibly an Albrician report of the Boethian view, such that “*materiale esse*” corresponds to the genus, “*formale substantiale (sc. esse)*” corresponds to the differentia(e), and “*totum esse rei*” to the species.

321.10–13 Secundum ... potest. Cf. C15, fol. 9ra: “*Sed secundum hoc iste syllogismus non potest confirmari illa regula, scilicet: Omnis cygnus est albus; sed omne album est corpus; ergo omne cygnus est corpus, et quamplures alii.*” That syllogisms of the first mood of the first figure conform to the rule in *Cat.* 3.1b10–12 is explicitly stated in both C15 and C17. See C15, fol. 9va: “*Regula illa quae assignatur hic ab Aristotele convenit omni syllogismo primae figurae et modi primi.*” C17, fol. 82ra: “*Et secundum hanc regulam fit primi modi et primae figurae syllogismus.*” If the rule is restricted to the predication of genera, species and differentiae, syllogisms of the first mood of the first figure involving other predicate types will not conform to the rule.

321.14–17 Nos ... asino. Regarding the notion of being predicated wholly (*prorsus*), see C15, fol. 9ra: “*Unde sic magister Petrus et Albericus expouunt, et in hoc concordant: QUANDO ALTERUM DE ALTERO PRAEDICATUR prorsus, quicquid de praedicato prorsus, illud idem et de subiecto*

prorsus." C15 immediately explains the notion as follows: "*Ideoque videndum est quid sit prorsus praedicari. Prorsus praedicari est ita praedicari quod ad quicquid perveniat praedicatio subiecti, et praedicatio praedicati; verbi gratia sicut album praedicatur de cygno prorsus, quia ad quicquid pervenit praedicatio cygni, pervenit et praedicatio albi.*" The attribution of this exposition to Abelard is surprising, because, as noted above, in *LI Cat.* he interprets the rule quite differently; nor have I found anything in later nominalist commentaries such as C26 and C27 to suggest that the Peripatetic of Le Pallet changed his mind. That Alberic expounded the rule in this sort of way is, however, most likely correct. At least, C17, 82ra also invokes the notion of being predicated wholly (*prorsus*) when glossing the rule: "*QUANDO ALTERUM PRAEDICATUR DE ALTERO UT DE SUBIECTO, id est prorsus singulariter vel universaliter, QUAECUMQUE DICUNTUR DE EO QUOD PRAEDICATUR, ut de subiecto, OMNIA ETIAM DICUNTUR DE SUBIECTO.*"

321.18–22 Si autem ... posse. Cf. Boethius in *Cat.* 176d: "*Sed fortasse quisquam dicat minime verum esse quod dictum est. Nam cum homo de Socrate praedicetur (Socrates enim homo est), de homine vero species (homo enim species est), Socrates species esse non dicitur. Et rursus cum animal de homine praedicetur, de animali vero genus (animal enim genus est), homo generis vocabulo caret (non enim dicitur homo esse genus; homo enim genus non est, sed tantum species).*" This sophism was a staple of the Greek commentary tradition and occurs already in Porphyry's commentary on the *Categories* (80.32–81.2 Busse; see also Ebbesen 1981, vol. 1, pp. 224–33).

321.22–322.3 In prima ... sequitur. Cf. C15, fol. 8va: "*Item: 'Omnis homo est animal; sed animal est genus; ergo omnis homo est genus.' Non sequitur, quia illud quod praedicatur in prima non subicitur in secunda, quia in prima praedicatur hoc genus animal, in secunda vero subicitur quoddam individuum, et est singularis illa propositio, quia quotiens fit sermo de aliquo universali vel singulari determinate, illa propositio est*

singularis.” As noted by Iwakuma 2013, p. 38, the idea that the subject term in sentences such as “Man is a species” stands for an individual is ubiquitous in texts by followers of Alberic. Moreover, that Alberic took the sophism in question to trade on an ambiguity in the middle term and thus to commit a fallacy of equivocation is also confirmed by SE6, pp. 357–58: “*Magister Albericus vero dicit quod non secundum accidens, sed secundum aequivocationem in his paralogismis fit sophisma ... Similiter dicit de alio paralogismo, scilicet ‘Socrates est homo, sed homo est species, ergo Socrates est species,’ quod est ibi sophisma secundum aequivocationem, quia in prima propositione ‘homo’ appellat homines, sed in secundo appellat illam speciem; ergo cum in utraque propositione diversa appellat, secundum aequivocationem est ibi sophisma, et non secundum accidens.*” As will be noted, however, the solution ascribed to Alberic in SE6 is slightly different in that no appeal to some subject individual is made with regard to the premise “Man is a species.” Did Alberic change his mind?

322.3–6 Sed quia ... individuorum. There are three things to note here. First, Iwakuma (2013, p. 38) suggests that Alberic’s claim that the subject term in sentences such as “Man is a species” stands for an individual “has little ontological implication.” This, as the remarks here in C29 suggest, is somewhat questionable. Second, a version of the view that the sophism in question commits the fallacy of accident because “species” is predicated accidentally (*secundum accidens*) in the second premise is attributed to James of Venice in SE6, p. 357.¹ Third, despite C29’s rejection here of Alberic’s “fictitious” individuals, they seem to reoccur below in his division of substance.

322.24 Substantia ... secunda. As noted by Iwakuma (2013, p. 37), the *Albricani* took this to be a division of a genus into its proximate species. As C15, fol. 13va explains, “primary” here means singular, “secondary” universal: “*Dicimus quod hoc nomen ‘primum’ et hoc nomen ‘secundum’*”

¹ For more on this dispute between Alberic and James, see Ebbesen, forthcoming.

non retinentur in propria significatione, immo aequipollent istis vocabulis 'universale' et 'singulare,' quae significant differentias."

322.24–25 Primarum ... numero. Cf. the strikingly similar division of the category of quantity in C17, fol. 84ra: "*Quantitas alia singularis, alia universalis; singularis alia una numero, alia non; una numero alia simplex, alia composita. Simplex ut unitas, punctum, elementum, instans et simplex locus. Composita ut linea, superficies, corpus, tempus, locus, numerus et oratio.*"

322.25–323.2 Non unae ... agitur. Although such individuals were dismissed above as fictitious, they are seemingly endorsed here. For the claim that these individuals are not numerically one or discrete, compare C15, fol.14rb: "*Item: Illud individuum est prima substantia; ergo est res discreta numero; sicut si dicerem: 'Socrates est prima substantia; ergo est res discreta numero.' Non est simile, quia aliud est de individuis quae subiacent tantum intellectui quam de eis quae subiacent visui.*" These curious "intelligible individuals" are a remarkable feature of the Albrican interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories*, and their appearance here in C29 is strong evidence that the notes, although critical of Alberic, have their background in this environment.

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***Enuntiabilia*, Consequences, and Impossible Antecedents.
Some New Evidence from ms. Paris BNF, lat. 3713, fols 86r–89v**

Irene Binini*

Introduction: Old questions, a new text. The *Tractatus Parisiensis de enuntiabilibus*

The codex Latin 3713, preserved in the French National Library and originally part of the Abbey of Saint Martial's library in Limoges, is a composite manuscript including texts of different content, which are datable to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Among these texts, we find two short logical treatises, included in fols 86r–88v and 88v–89v respectively, written by two different hands around the third or fourth quarter of the twelfth century.¹ The codex's modern list of contents, contained in the second front guard, registers the two treatises together under the label "*fragmentum dialecticae*." These two texts were first

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¹ The manuscript is available at: <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9078154m>. I am grateful to Sofia Orsino for suggesting this dating to me in private conversation.

discovered by Yukio Iwakuma, who listed them among the sources connected to the school of the *Parvipontani*, but their content has received no further attention in the secondary literature so far.¹ Like many other logical sources from this period, the texts in question are anonymous; the only clue that we have to the context of production of the second treatise is a brief comment, at the end of fol. 88v, saying that the phrase “you [are/were?] in England” is an example of a *per accidens* necessary statement, namely, something that could have been false in the past but is currently true. Some logical and ontological views offered in the text are compatible with what we know about the teachings of the *Parvipontani*, especially for what concerns the general theory of assertables and the idea that everything follows from an impossible antecedent. Nevertheless, because recent studies are significantly reshaping our knowledge of the logical schools in the mid-twelfth century, including their discussion of (impossible) *enuntiabilia*, I prefer to refrain here from attributing the text to a specific school, and I will thus refer to the two logical treatises as *Tractatus Parisiensis de enuntiabilibus I* and *II* (henceforth, *TEn I* and *Ten II*).

Both texts contain remarks on the nature and logic of assertables (*enuntiabilia*), that is to say, items that are suited to be asserted or said by means of oral and written statements. These are indicated in Latin with accusative and infinitive clauses.² In the first of the two treatises, the

¹ Iwakuma proposes these titles in his personal description of the manuscript, which he has made accessible via the following folder: <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1HRY2FckntQ7IJfx1FTFg99aF1sByLwRu?usp=sharing>.

² The English translation of Latin expressions of this kind poses problems. As pointed out by Martin (2022a, p. 112), the standard way of translating them with *that*-clauses may be problematic, because there is a difference in the logic of this period between accusative and infinitive clauses and *quod*-clauses. For this reason, in this article I follow Martin and leave these Latin expressions untranslated, in an effort to prioritize precision over readability. In *TEn I*, assertables are sometimes replaced with the corresponding sentences, which I translate into English—this occurs especially within demonstrations, although not consistently. The assertable *Socratem esse asinum* corresponds to the sentence “Socrates is a donkey” (*Socrates est asinus*).

content is structured in a rather systematic way, apparently with a didactic intent. The second treatise seems to be a shorter version, like a summary or a compendium, of the first. Many of the questions that are raised in the two texts echo similar debates taking place among the logical schools in Paris in the second half of the twelfth century, especially in relation to the question of what assertables are, whether their existence is eternal and independent of the existence of the things they are about, how they can be divided into categories or kinds, and how assertables falling into these categories may be structured to compose valid consequences or true conditionals. As Iwakuma and others have pointed out extensively,¹ the notion of *enuntiabile*, or *dictum*, underwent a philosophical revival in the middle and the end of the twelfth century, and was widely discussed by the school of the *Parvipontani* (whose master, Adam of Balsham, seems indeed to have coined the term “*enuntiabile*”), as well as by the *Meludinenses*, the *Porretani*, the *Nominales* and the *Albricani*. By the end of the century and especially after the gain of popularity of Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*, the reflection on assertables also stimulated questions of doctrinal and theological content, concerning their eternal nature in relation to God’s own eternity and the immutability of his knowledge.²

TEn I and *II* do not have much to say on the metaphysics of *enuntiabilia*. Their author explicitly endorses the eternity of all assertables and seems to confer an ontological status on both true and false *enuntiabilia*, which are said to be “something” (*aliquid*) and which he categorises into a complex taxonomy of “kinds” (*genera*). However, these views are simply assumed, almost without argumentation, and without delving into their metaphysical or theological consequences. There are some attempts in the texts to reject the views of others on assertables (such as the idea that nothing follows from a falsehood, or that false assertables

¹ See Nuchelmans 1973, p. 169; Iwakuma 1997, p. 19. On *enuntiabilia* in this period of the history of logic, see also Kneepkens 1997 and Wilks 2008, pp. 145–48. More recent studies on *enuntiabilia* in the teaching of these schools are found in Martin 2022a and Donato 2023.

² For the theological discussions on assertables, see Iwakuma 1997.

do not exist), but the reported conflicts concern the logic of *enuntiabilia* rather than their ontology. With respect to the question of what assertables are, then, the two Parisian treatises are not advancing any innovative or sophisticated theories, and seem to merely report the general opinion of a master or a school.

Nonetheless, the two texts are particularly noteworthy, I believe, for the detailed analysis they offer of *impossible assertables*. In both treatises, unusual attention is paid to the notion of impossibility: the author advances a distinction between *per se* and *per accidens* impossibility, adding that only assertables that are *per se* impossible are proper antecedents to every other assertable. A similar terminology may be found in other contemporary sources dealing with the *ex impossibili quodlibet* principle,¹ but nowhere is it as extensively discussed as in the two Parisian texts. Moreover, both *TEn I* and *TEn II* further subdivide *per se* impossibility into six sub-kinds, distinguishing impossible assertables such as *Hominem esse asinum* from the other sorts of impossibility expressed in, e.g., *Socratem esse Platonem* or *Socratem sedere et non sedere*. This subdivision is, to my knowledge, unique among parallel debates of this time. For each of these “kinds of impossibles” (*genera impossibilium*), the two Parisian texts aim to prove that all assertables follow from them (*ex omni impossibili per se—et eo solo—omne sequitur enuntiabile*, cf. fol. 86r). A study of the two logical treatises will thus provide, as I hope, new evidence for the interpretation of early medieval discussions of counterpossibles and of the logic of impossible statements. To this end, in what follows I shall highlight the passages in the texts that I find most relevant in this respect, and connect them with parallel discussions on the

¹ I mention here this version of the principle, namely that from an impossible *anything* follows (*ex impossibili sequitur quodlibet*), because it is the most known and used by contemporary interpreters of this medieval debate. However, *TEn I* uses a slightly different version, that is, that from an impossibility *everything*, or every assertable, follows (*ex impossibili omne sequitur enuntiabile*). In John of Salisbury’s *Metalogicon*, we find a formulation similar to the latter one for a different, though closely related, logical principle, namely that from an impossible every other impossible follows: *ex uno impossibili omnia impossibilia provenire* (1991, II 10, 72).

same topic. In this contribution, I will confine my analysis to *Tractatus Parisiensis de enuntiabilibus I*, and only to those parts that discuss the general theory of assertables or the *ex impossibili quodlibet* principle.

Before proceeding, it may be helpful to offer an overview of the contents of *TEn I*, which may be divided into four main sections. The first includes the definition of assertables, some general remarks on their eternity and their role in the construction of arguments and hypothetical propositions, as well as their twofold division into kinds: true and false assertables on the one hand, possible and impossible assertables on the other (the division is presented in slightly different terms in *TEn II*). The treatise's second section focuses on impossible assertables, which, as was said, are further divided into several sub-categories. For each kind of *per se* impossible assertable, the author offers one or more proofs to show that everything follows from it. These proofs always apply the same inferential strategy, apparently aiming to trace back all cases to the one considered as the first and principal kind of impossibility, exemplified by the assertable *Hominem esse asinum*. After giving proofs in favour of the *ex impossibili* principle for all kinds of *per se* impossibility, in the third section the author proceeds to consider assertables that follow from every other assertable, which he identifies as the *per se* necessary ones. Finally, the fourth section of the treatise discusses inferential relations between assertables that are neither necessary nor impossible, with a focus on affirmative, *de praesenti* ones. As mentioned, my analysis will only focus on the first two sections, which amount to approximately the first half of the entire treatise. The Appendix to this article includes a critical edition of this portion of the text.

1 The nature and division of assertables

As was mentioned, *TEn I*'s approach to assertables is logical rather than metaphysical. In the opening lines of the treatise, the author explains that assertables—defined as what is signifiable or sayable by an assertion (*enuntiatio*)—are the constituents of any relation in which something is said to “follow from” or to be “proved on the basis of” something else. And since logic is a discipline that is mostly concerned with the proving

and disproving of things, the constituents of these relations of following must be investigated. In the first paragraphs of the text, the author also provides a definition of consequence, which he apparently applies to both arguments and conditionals. This definition is given using the standard modal account of following, enriched with a temporal element: an assertable follows from another one if, at all times, it would be impossible for the latter to be true and the former false; or, in other words, if the antecedent is, was, or will not be able to be true without its consequent (see §3 in the Appendix). Originating from Boethius' modal account of consequence in *De Hypotheticis Syllogismis*,¹ according to which a consequence is good if it is impossible for the antecedent to be true and the consequent false, this criterion was not unanimously adopted in twelfth-century logic, as is well known, but is still common in logical treatises dating to the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, in connection with the discussion of impossible antecedents.²

At the beginning of *TEn I*, every assertable is said to be eternal and to have a necessary existence, in the sense that each of them is uncreated and can never cease to be (see §1 in the Appendix). The author, however, does

¹ See e.g. Boethius 1969, 1.9.4–5: “Necessitas vero hypotheticae propositionis, et ratio earum propositionum ex quibus iunguntur inter se connexiones, consequentiam quaerit, ut cum dico: ‘Si Socrates sedet, et vivit’ neque sedere eum, neque vivere necesse est sed, si sedet, vivere necesse est. Item cum dicimus: ‘Si sol movetur, necessario veniet ad occasum’ tantumdem significat quantum, si sol movetur, veniet ad occasum. Necessitas enim propositionis in consequentiae immutabilitate consistit. Item cum dicimus: ‘Si possibile est legi librum, possibile est ad verum tertium perveniri’ rursus necessitas consequentiae conservata est; nam si possibile est legi librum, necesse est etiam id esse possibile, ut ad verum tertium perveniatur. Opponuntur autem hypotheticis propositionibus illae solae quae earum substantiam perimunt. Substantia vero propositionum hypotheticarum in eo est, ut earum consequentiae necessitas valeat permanere.” See also Boethius 1969, 1.9.6: “Si quis igitur recte conditionali propositioni repugnabit, id efficiet ut earum destruat consequentiam, veluti cum ita dicimus: ‘Si A est, B est’ non in eo pugnabit si monstret, aut non esse A, aut non esse B, sed si posito quidem A, ostendit non statim consequi esse B sed posse esse A, etiamsi B terminus non sit.”

² For a discussion of late twelfth- and early thirteenth-century sources applying this definition of consequence in connection with the *ex impossibili* principle, see Spruyt 1993 and Binini 2024.

not discuss further whether assertables have a *sui generis* ontological status, nor does he consider at any point the theological implications raised by assertables' sempiternal existence. As has been pointed out, the eternity of assertables, and thus their independence from the existence of the *res* they are about, was endorsed not only by the *Parvipontani* but also, it seems, by the schools of the *Albricani* and *Meludinenses*, even if the latter restricted this claim only to some true assertables.¹ Other schools, like that of the *Porretani*, rather conceived assertables as the composition or division of things, and thus claimed that their existence depends on the beginning and ceasing of their constituents.²

As was quite common in twelfth-century discussions of this topic, assertables are also said to be the bearers of truth and falsity in *TEn I*. The treatise considers the two truth values in terms of "kinds" (*genera*) assertables fall into, and the author specifies that no assertable may fall outside these two kinds. Moreover, it is claimed that no other item, apart from assertables, can be properly said to be true or false (§2 in the Appendix). Interestingly, in the same passage the author also treats assertables as the exclusive bearers of modal properties, being either possible, impossible, or necessary.³ This is in line with the *de dicto* interpretation of modal claims that we may see throughout the entire treatise.⁴ Although the author considers all assertables as immutable with respect to their existence, still he seems to believe that assertables may

¹ See Iwakuma 1997; Martin 2022a.

² For a recent analysis of the *Porretani*'s views on assertables, see Donato 2023.

³ Contingency is never counted among modalities in either *TEn I* or *TEn II*. This is interesting, because it may be a sign that this logical text was composed quite early, before the influence of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*. Other sources from the second half of the twelfth century, like the *Ars Meliduna*, divide true *enuntiabilia* into necessary and contingent ones, using the term "contingent" not as synonymous with "possible" (like Abelard and others did at the beginning of the century) but in opposition to necessity (see footnote 2 on p. 339 below).

⁴ See for instance §11 in the Appendix, where the author considers the opinion of some according to whom it would be true to state, for instance, that it is possible for a white thing to be a black thing. This reading (which gains sense only within a *de re* reading of modals) is criticised in *TEn I*.

vary with respect to the category they belong to: they may pass from being true to being false and vice versa, and unidirectionally from being possible to being impossible, or from non-necessary to necessary.

On the basis of the two main divisions of assertables into true/false and possible/impossible, the author of *TEn I* then continues his taxonomy by identifying two kinds of true assertables (necessary and non-necessary) and two kinds of false ones (possible and impossible). Necessary and impossible assertables are further divided into a *per se* and *per accidens* category, and *per se* impossibles into six sub-categories, as will be detailed in Section 2 below. Modal notions are not themselves defined on the basis of more primitive concepts, but are simply analysed in terms of the (im)possibility of being true at some/all/no moment of time. Necessity, on the other hand, is defined as the impossibility of being otherwise, in a characterisation for which the author of the *Tractatus* invokes Boethius as authority, and that is often used in early twelfth-century works on modalities.¹ A slightly different division of assertables is proposed in *TEn II*: here six categories are identified, namely (i) true necessary *per se*; (ii) true necessary *per accidens*; (iii) non-necessary true; (iv) false possible; (v) false impossible *per accidens*; (vi) false impossible *per se* (see fol. 88v). Similar categorisations of *enuntiabilia* based on truth and modal values are advanced in contemporary debates, as for instance in the *Ars Meliduna*.²

¹ See for instance Peter Abelard's *Dialectica*: "*Necessarium*" *autem id dicit quod ita sit et aliter esse non possit*. (1970, p. 194; see also p. 272). The same definition is used in other early twelfth-century treatises on modalities, such as the commentaries on *De Interpretatione* labelled *H9* and *H11* in Marenbon's catalogue (see Marenbon 2000) and preserved in mss. Orléans, Bibliothèque municipale, 266, pp. 5a–43a; Assisi, Biblioteca Conventuale Franciscana, 573, fols 48rb–67vb; Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 13368, fols 225r–31r; Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, reg. lat. 230, fols 80r–87r.

² The *Ars* is preserved in ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Digby 174, ff. 211ra–241rb. An analysis and some excerpts of it are edited in De Rijk 1967, 264–390 and in Iwakuma 1993. For the passage in question, see *Ars Meliduna* IV, fol. 237vb: "Horum [i.e. *enuntiabilium verorum*] alia sunt necessaria, alia contingentia. Necessaria sic a plerisque

A few general inferential rules are enumerated that govern the logical relations among these kinds of assertables: from true assertables only other true assertables may be derived; similarly, from possible ones, only possible assertables follow. The latter principle was well known already at the beginning of the twelfth century, and is mentioned for instance by Abelard in the *Dialectica* (1970, p. 202). More controversial in the logic of the period were inferences drawn from false and impossible premises: according to the author(s) of *Tractatus Parisiensis I* and *II*, from what is false, both true and false assertables follow. Explicit mention is made in *TEn I* of the opinion of some *perversi disputatores* who deny that the false could be antecedent or consequent in a true conditional (cf. §6 in the Appendix): these “depraved dialecticians” may be easily identified with the *Meludinenses*, who defended the view that *nihil sequitur ex falso*. Of impossible assertables, *Tractatus Parisiensis* claims that they can be antecedent to both possible and impossible conclusions. Only impossibilities that are *per se*, however, entail all other assertables. To impossible assertables and their logic I dedicate the next two sections.

2 The taxonomy of impossible assertables

Once he has mentioned the idea that from an impossible assertable everything follows, the author points out that this principle should be restricted to a specific kind of impossibility, that is, *per se* impossibility, as opposed to impossibility *per accidens*. A similar position is endorsed in *TEn II*.¹ As the author characterises it, the distinction between *per se* and *per accidens* depends on whether something is impossible at all times (e.g.,

describitur ‘necessarium est enuntiabile necessario verum’; ab aliis vero ‘verum quod non potest esse falsum’. Impossibile quoque dupliciter. Similiter verum contingens ‘verum quod potest esse falsum’ aut ‘verum quod non necessario est verum’.”

¹ On the basis of the aforementioned division of assertables into six kinds, the sixth of which applies to *per se* impossibilities, the author remarks that assertables of any other kind follow from those belonging to the sixth kind, whereas *per se* impossibilities never follow from assertables within other categories, see fol. 89r: “Ex sexto [genere] sequitur sextum et quidlibet superiorum, et ipsum ex nullo eorum ... Item generaliter est sciendum quod ex omni enuntiabili sexti generis sequitur omne enuntiabile cuiuslibet generis.”

the fact that Socrates is a donkey), or instead that it is impossible now and from the present moment onwards, but could have been true in the past (e.g., that I did not exist). This distinction is not unique to *TEn I* and *II*. In fact, it is rehearsed in a few other sources from the second half of the twelfth century,¹ and it will again be used in later logical debates, often in connection with discussions of the *ex impossibili quodlibet* principle. For example, we find it in the *Ars Meliduna*, whose author divides necessary assertables into *per se* and *per accidens* ones, and then mentions that the impossible is similarly twofold.² A reference to *per se* impossibility is also found in Alexander Neckham's *De naturis rerum* (see 1863, pp. 288–89), in the fragment preserved in ms. Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, Fragm. lat. 32, ff. 1–3, and in the logical treatise contained in ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 2904, p. IVb.

While the terminology of *per se/per accidens* impossibility will be used by later logicians in several different meanings, in the period of the twelfth-century logical schools the distinction is made primarily in temporal terms, as it is in *TEn I*. By the end of the century and the beginning of the next one, however, the division between the two kinds of impossibility will also be characterised in different ways, for instance as a distinction between “metaphysical” impossibilities, expressing a natural repugnance or incompatibility between things (e.g., “A human is a donkey”), as opposed to things that are impossible only “with respect to a certain determination” (e.g., “Socrates is white in this instant”).³ In other cases, the same distinction is used to discriminate between natural and

¹ To my knowledge, however, in no logical text earlier than the mid of the twelfth century do we find a distinction of this sort applied to impossibility, even though a similar division between absolute and temporally qualified modalities is applied already in the logic of the early 12th century. On this, see Binini 2021, pp. 33–44.

² See *Ars Meliduna* IV, fol. 237vb: “Item necessariorum aliud necessarium per se, aliud per accidens. Necessarium per se quod nullo casu fit necessarium, sed semper fuit et est et erit necessarium, ut *deum esse*. Necessarium per accidens quod accidentaliter, id est aliquo rerum eventu, incepit esse necessarium, ut *Cesarem fuisse*. Impossibile quoque dupliciter.”

³ See for instance the use of this distinction in the early thirteenth-century *Tractatus Emmeranus de positione falsa*, ed. in De Rijk 1974, p. 113.

supernatural impossibilities—a virgin giving birth being an example of something that is naturally impossible but not *per se* impossible, since it could be brought about by God with his supernatural power.¹ The temporal characterisation of the distinction between different kinds of impossibility, however, continues to be prevalent by the end of the twelfth century and will still be used by many thirteenth-century philosophers and logicians, such as William of Sherwood, Roger Bacon, Nicholas of Paris, or Thomas Aquinas.²

As already mentioned, in *TEn I* and *II* the claim is endorsed that only *per se* impossibilities are proper antecedents to any other assertable. See for instance the following passage from fol. 86r:

From a false impossible [antecedent], both possible and impossible [consequents follow]. But in order for this principle to become clearer, you should consider that there are two kinds of true and false [assertables]: the true ones that are necessary *per se*, and the false ones that are impossible *per se*. From that which is impossible *per se*—and only from this—everything follows. Every assertable that is *per se* necessary—and only these—are entailed by every other assertable. (for the Latin text see §4 in the Appendix)

Indeed, we may suppose that the distinction between *per se* and *per accidens* impossibility was first formulated in the second half of the twelfth century with the aim of proposing a more fine-grained version of the *ex impossibili sequitur quodlibet* principle, rephrasing it as: “from what is impossible *per se* everything else follows.”³ We may also suppose that this version of the principle was indeed the one endorsed by the *Parvipontani*, or at least this is the version of the principle reported in the *Ars Meliduna* and in ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 2904

¹ See Stephen Langton, *Quaestiones theologiae*, I, q. 19a, par. 1, ed. Quinto and Bieniak, 402. On the discussion of *per se* impossibility in Langton’s *Theological Questions*, see also Binini 2024 and Wciórka 2024.

² For the development of this distinction in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see Binini 2022.

³ For a more detailed defence of this claim, see Binini 2024.

as the opinion of some contemporary dialecticians, and also the version referred to and demonstrated by Neckham in his *De naturis rerum*.

What seems unique to *Tractatus Parisiensis de enuntiabilibus* is that, apart from dividing *per se* from *per accidens* impossibilities, the author further distinguishes *per se* impossible assertables into six distinct kinds, and for any assertable of these kinds he feels compelled to demonstrate that any other assertable follows from it. The first kind of impossibility identified, which is also said to be the primary kind (*unum et principale per se impossibilium genus*), is metaphysically defined and applies to assertables affirming of a certain natural substance that it is of a different species than the one it actually belongs to, as when we say that a human is a donkey. As is well known, this is the paradigmatic example of an impossible assertable in the second half of the twelfth century, and will continue to be so in thirteenth-century literature of *sophistaria* and *obligationes*, when the logic of impossible antecedents or premises is discussed. Two other kinds of impossibles listed may also be characterised as metaphysical impossibilities: they include assertables stating that a certain subject belongs to two incompatible natural species (as in *Socratem esse et hominem et equum*, the second kind), and assertables expressing the identity of two different individuals (*Socratem esse Platonem*, the third kind). There are then *per se* impossible assertables that we would characterise as “analytic” impossibilities, such as the union of two contrary terms (*album esse nigrum*, the fifth kind) and the affirmation and negation of the same property or predicate (*id quod est album non esse album*, *id quod sedet non sedere*, the sixth kind). The fourth kind of impossible assertable is the one that we would now consider as a proper logical contradiction or formal impossibility, namely, the combination of two contradictory statements into one single assertable, as in *Socratem esse; Socratem non esse*. It may be noteworthy that, in the Parisian text, this is not expressed through a conjunction of contradictory opposites, in the form “P and not-P,” but rather as a juxtaposition of contradictory assertables (see §10 in the Appendix). Also noteworthy is the fact that, while several other twelfth-century discussions of impossible antecedents are centred around the discussion of natural or metaphysical impossibilities (see e.g. the ones

included in ms. Avranches, Bibliothèque Municipale, 244 and in the *Ars Meliduna*¹), we have at least one other source, apart from *TEn I*, in which the demonstration of the *ex impossibili quodlibet* principle starts from a formal or syntactic impossibility: Alexander Neckham's famous demonstration contained in *De naturis rerum*.

As briefly mentioned above, in both *TEn I* and *TEn II* the discussion of *per se* impossible antecedents parallels a discussion of *per se* necessary consequents, which are said to follow from every assertable.² *Per se* necessities are those that are true at all moments of time, and the examples given are the following assertables: *Quidlibet esse*; *Deum esse*; *Aliquid esse verum*; *Aliquid esse falsum*; *Omne verum esse verum*. These are all eternally true, the author says, and so no other assertable may be true or might have been true without them. Therefore, assertables of this sort follow from any antecedent (*Sic ergo ex quolibet enuntiabili quodlibet istorum sequitur*), just as *per se* impossibilities are antecedent to everything.³ Some proofs are offered in favour of this principle: these may

¹ The passages on impossible antecedents included in these two sources have been edited in Iwakuma 1993. Recent analyses of the two texts in connection to false and impossible assertables and their logic may be found in Lenzen 2021; Martin 2022a and 2022b; Binini 2024.

² We find mention of this principle also in other sources from the second half of the twelfth century, such as the *Ars Meliduna*, where the principle is attributed to the *Parvipontani* (see *Ars Meliduna* III, fol. 236ra: "Contra id vero quod praediximus ad categoricam non sequi continuativam, sic obiciet Parvipontanus sustinens necessarium ex quolibet enuntiabili sequi: 'si Socrates est homo, Socrates est animal, ergo si est homo, est animal si est homo' "); cf. Iwakuma 1993, p. 138; Ebbesen and Iwakuma 1992, p. 178.

³ Since this part of the text is not included in the partial edition given in the Appendix, I report here the *incipit* of the discussion of necessary consequents contained in *TEn I* (fol. 87r): "Dicto ex quo enuntiabilium genere omne sequitur enuntiabile, nunc dicere restat, quod genus enuntiabilium sequatur ex omni enuntiabili. Hoc autem est necessarium per se, iuxta hanc regulam: omnis conditionalis hypothetica in qua sequitur necessarium per se, vera est, quemadmodum omnis hypothetica conditionalis est vera in qua antecedit impossibile per se. Sunt enim duo principalia enuntiabilium <genera>, secundum contradictionem ad invicem opposita: necessarium per se et impossibile per se. Ex quorum uno, omne sequitur enuntiabile, eorum vero reliquum sequitur ex omni

be the earliest demonstrations of the principle concerning necessary consequents in the history of logic, together with the one included in ms. Avranches, Bibliothèque Municipale, 244.¹

enuntiabile, illud autem est impossibile per se, hoc vero necessarium per se, quod qualiter fiat ostendamus exemplis. Sunt autem necessaria per se huiusmodi: *Quidlibet esse*, *Aliquid esse*, *Aliquid esse verum*, *Omne verum esse verum*, *Omne falsum esse falsum*. Haec autem ex omni sequi enuntiabili sic ostendimus: Nullum enuntiabile potest vel potuit vel poterit (poterit] poterit vel *a.c.*) <esse> verum, nisi hoc esset verum: *Aliquid esse*; *Deum esse*; *Aliquid esse verum*, quod sic probatur: Quodlibet istorum ab aeterno fuit necessario verum, et est, et in aeternum erit necessario verum. Nec aliquid horum potest vel potuit vel poterit esse falsum. Ergo, nullum enuntiabile potest vel potuit vel poterit esse verum nisi quodlibet horum esset verum. Ergo, si aliquid enuntiabile est verum, quodlibet istorum est verum. Sic ergo ex quolibet enuntiabili quodlibet istorum sequitur. Amplius, si aliquid enuntiabile est, *Aliquod enuntiabile esse* est verum. Ergo, si aliquid enuntiabile est, *Nullum enuntiabile esse* est falsum. Ergo, si aliquid enuntiabile est, aliquid est verum et aliquid est falsum. Sic igitur haec duo, *Aliquid esse verum*, *Aliquid esse falsum*, ex omni enuntiabili sequuntur. Amplius, si aliquid est, *Aliquid* (aliquid] aliquid *a.c.*) *esse* est verum, et si aliquid est, *Aliquid esse vel non esse* est verum. Et si aliquid est, *unum esse* est verum. Ergo, si aliquid est, tria sunt quorum quodlibet est verum. Ergo, si aliquid est, trium quodlibet est. Et si quid est aliquid, ipsum est. Ergo, si aliquid (aliquid] aliquid *a.c.*) est, quidlibet est.”

¹ See Iwakuma 1993, pp. 136–37: “Ex hoc facile est habere quod necessarium sequitur ad quidlibet; quia ex quo necessarii oppositum est impossibile, ex opposito sequitur quidlibet; sed ubi ex opposito necessarii sequitur aliquid, ex opposito illius consequentis sequitur oppositum illius antecedentis, scilicet necessarium; quia ex quo ex illo opposito (quod est impossibile) sequitur quidlibet, necessarium (quod illi impossibili opponitur) sequitur ad quidlibet. Verbi gratia secundum praedictam tenet *si Socrates est asinus, Socrates est capra*; ergo *si Socrates non est capra, Socrates non est asinus*, quia si sequatur aliquid ex alia <ex> opposito antecedentis sequitur oppositum consequentis, quare sequitur *si Socrates non est capra, Socrates non est asinus*. eadem modo *si Socrates [non] est capra, Socrates non est asinus*; quia sic sequitur *si Socrates est asinus, Socrates non est capra*, quare *si Socrates est capra, Socrates non est asinus*. et ita *Socratem non esse asinum*, quod est necessarium, sequitur ex utroque ‘*Socratem esse capram*’ ‘*Socratem non esse capram*’. eodem modo potest haberi quod ex quolibet alio, et ita illud necessarium ex quolibet. eadem modo de quolibet alio necessario. Unde patet quod necessarium sequitur ex quolibet et impossibile antecedit ad quidlibet, sicut praehabitu est quod conclusio propter praedicta.”

3 The logic of impossible antecedents and proofs that everything follows from them

Discussions of the principle according to which everything follows from the impossible are not uncommon in the second half of the twelfth century and at the start of the next century. We know about a few other sources datable to this period that offer proofs in favour of and against the principle, among them the *Ars Meliduna*,¹ the logical text contained in ms. Avranches 244,² the anonymous *Tractatus Vaticanus de communibus distinctionibus*³ and Alexander Neckham's *De naturis rerum*.⁴ In some of these sources, the principle concerning impossible antecedents is demonstrated by appeals to inferential strategies similar to the ones we find in *TEn I*, namely, by appealing to disjunctive addition and disjunctive syllogism, and sometimes the rules of simplification,⁵ transitivity, and the

¹ The fragment of the *Ars Meliduna* that discusses the logic of impossible antecedents, which is found in ms. Oxford, Digby 174, ff. 236ra and 240va–b, has been edited in Iwakuma 1993, pp. 138–145. This part of the *Ars* has been recently commented upon in Lenzen 2021, which offers a reconstruction of the arguments and the connection between this text and the one included in ms. Avranches, Bibliothèque Municipale, 244. In Martin 2022a, Martin gives an analysis of the *Ars*' discussion of false (and impossible) *enuntiabilia* and the *Meludinenses*' idea that nothing follows from a falsehood.

² This text has been edited by Iwakuma in 1993, pp. 134–138. See Lenzen 2021 and Martin 2022b for recent discussions of its content.

³ This treatise is found in ms. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, lat. 7678, 73ra–82ra, and was edited in De Rijk 1988, 169–212.

⁴ See Alexander Neckham 1863, pp. 288–89. There are also a few fragments in which a debate concerning the principle is reported, such as the ones included in ms. Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, Fragm. lat. 32, ff. 1–3 and in ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Lat. 2904, p. IVb, the last of which shows similarities with the two Parisian treatises that are the subject of this article. I offer a survey of all known sources from this period dealing with the *ex impossibili quodlibet* principle in Binini 2024.

⁵ It seems to me that in *TEn I* only predicate simplification is used, that is, the rule that allows one to infer, from an assertable with a conjunctive predicate, the assertable predicating one of the conjuncts, as in the inference from: *Socratem esse hominem et equum* to: *Socratem esse hominem*. The author never uses the propositional correlate of this rule, which grants the inference from e.g. “P and Q” to “P”. The rule of addition (or disjunction introduction), on the other hand, is used propositionally in the treatise. On the

locus from opposites. What renders *TEn I* unique is that the same thesis—that from an impossible *per se* every other assertable follows—is proven for each of the six kinds of *per se* impossibility, and in all cases the author seems to replicate the same inferential pattern.

The first proof given in the text—which takes its cue from the first kind of *per se* impossibility, exemplified by the assertable *Socratem esse asinum*—is divided into two parts: first, the author proves that from the impossible antecedent corresponding to this assertable something true follows, namely that “If Socrates is a donkey, Socrates is a human.” This first part of the proof is followed by an attack on the opinion of some “depraved dialecticians” who “deny that from the false something follows, or that the false follows from something else” (see §6 in the Appendix). A few arguments are then offered against this opinion. Granted thus that something does follow from the false, and specifically that “If Socrates is a donkey, Socrates is a human” is true, the author of *TEn I* goes on to prove that from the same antecedent everything else would also follow. Let us see this demonstration in its two steps. At first, some reasons are given, which the author calls “irrefutable,” to prove that “If Socrates is a donkey, Socrates is a human.” One of these reasons is the equivalence between the two assertables *Socratem esse hominem* and *Socratem esse aliquid*, which are said to be inseparable and derivable from each other, since at no moment of time can one be true and the other false—as the reader may recall, this was the definition of good consequence given in the *Tractatus*’ opening section. Another reason appeals to the equivalence between *Socratem esse aliquid* and *Aliquid esse Socratem*, and claims that if Socrates is something, then this thing is either a human or a non-human; but the something that is Socrates is not something other than human; thus “If Socrates is something, Socrates is a human.” If we accept these or the other reasons given for the claim that “If Socrates is something, then he is a human” (see §5 in the Appendix), it is easy to move, by transitivity, from “If Socrates is a donkey, Socrates is something” to “If Socrates is a donkey,

development of these inferential rules in the twelfth century in connection to the discussion of the *ex impossibili quodlibet* principle, see Martin 2022b.

Socrates is a human.” Once this is granted, the author shows that from the impossible antecedent “Socrates is a donkey” everything follows. This second part of the proof may be reconstructed as follows:

1. If Socrates is a donkey, Socrates is a human;
2. If Socrates is a donkey, Socrates is a human or every assertable is true;
3. But if Socrates is a donkey, Socrates is not a human;
4. Thus, if Socrates is a donkey, every assertable is true.

This proof is similar to an argument offered in the aforementioned Avranches text, which also makes use of the rules of addition and disjunctive syllogism.¹ At the end of the proof, *TEn I* justifies the use of disjunctive syllogisms by saying that “when two [assertables] follow from the same [assertable] under disjunction, and if the contradictory of one disjunct also follows from the same antecedent, then the other disjunct follows from it.”²

Similar inferential steps are at play in the other proofs advanced in *TEn I* in connection to the other kinds of *per se* impossibility. Take for instance the second among the listed *genera impossibilium*, namely assertables that predicate two incompatible species of a single substance, such as *Socratem esse et hominem et equum*. From impossibles of this kind too “we demonstrate that every assertable follows,” in the following way:

1. If Socrates is a human and a horse, Socrates is a human;
2. If Socrates is a human, he is not a horse;
3. If Socrates is not a horse, Socrates is not a human and a horse;
4. If Socrates is a human and a horse, Socrates is not a human and a horse;
5. If Socrates is a human and a horse, Socrates is not a human and a horse or every other assertable is true;

¹ See Iwakuma 1993, pp. 135–36. For an analysis of this text and the proofs for the *ex impossibili* principle offered there, see Lenzen 2021.

² See §6 in the Appendix: “Ad huiusmodi argumentum confirmandum, datur haec regula: quotiens duo sequuntur ad idem sub disiunctione, si contradictio unius sequitur ad antecedens, reliquum sequitur ex eodem.”

6. But, if Socrates is a human and a horse, it is not the case that (*falsum est quod*) Socrates is not a human and a horse;
7. Therefore, If Socrates is a human and a horse, every assertable is true.¹

Noticeably, the author does not apply here another strategy he might have used, namely, the following one, picking up from step 3:

- 4*. If Socrates is a human and a horse, Socrates is not a human and a horse;
- 5*. If Socrates is a human and a horse, Socrates is a human and a horse;
- 6*. If Socrates is a human and a horse, Socrates is a human and a horse or every assertable is true;
- 7*. If Socrates is a human and a horse, every assertable is true.

One reason for not taking this path could be that the author wishes to avoid conditionals of the form “If P, then P,” perhaps considering them as too “frivolous,” or nugatory, to be included in the demonstration.² Another possible explanation is the author’s intention to always maintain the same inferential structure in each demonstration of the *ex impossibili quodlibet* principle from every kind of *per se* impossibility. Indeed, in all the demonstrations given, the last three steps of the proof always have the form:

¹ I arrived at reconstructing this structure by supposing an emendation in the text, adding a *non* in the fifth step (see §8 in the Appendix).

² I am grateful to Wojciech Wciórka for suggesting this to me, and I am also grateful to an anonymous reviewer for their useful comments on this matter. In logical sources of this time, we find some references to *nugatio* in relation to the inference “If P, then P.” For instance, while discussing the validity of the rules of conversion and the transposition of hypothetical statements, the *Ars Meliduna* reports the question of whether an inference in which the same assertion follows from itself is nugatory, an opinion that the author then rejects; see ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Digby 174, III, f. 235ra (I follow Iwakuma’s unpublished transcription here): “Si dicamus consecutionem in qua idem ad se sequi ostenditur locutionem esse nugatoriam, ut ‘si est homo, est homo, [est homo, est homo]’, oportebit recipi consecutionem in transpositione; sed non videtur esse nugatoria, quia sicut categoricarum nulla magis est vera quam in qua idem de se, sic consequentiarum nulla magis est vera quam in qua idem ad se.”

- *If P, then (R or Q)*; where *Q* stands for any proposition whatsoever, or for the proposition “every assertable is true”;
- *But if P, then, not R (or: it is false that R)*;
- *Thus, if P, then Q*.

See, for instance, the similar proof given in relation to assertables such as *Socratem esse Platonem*. The author aims to demonstrate that “If Socrates is Plato, then Socrates is a horned goat,” where the consequent is meant to stand for a random assertable:

1. If something is Socrates, that thing is not Plato;
2. If something is Plato, that thing is not Socrates;
3. Thus, if Socrates is Plato, Socrates is not Plato or Socrates is a horned goat;
4. But, if Socrates is Plato, it is false that Socrates is not Plato;
5. Therefore, if Socrates is Plato, Socrates is a horned goat.

Interestingly, the author of *TEn I* decides to adhere to this same demonstrative structure also when dealing with the fourth kind of impossibility, namely, assertables having the form of a syntactic contradiction, such as “*Socratem esse; Socratem non esse*” (see §10 in the Appendix). That every consequent follows from a contradiction of this sort may be proven quite easily thanks to propositional simplification, introduction of disjunction and disjunctive syllogism, in the way Alexander Neckham does in *De naturis rerum*.¹ The demonstrative path

¹ Cf. Neckham 1863, pp. 288–89 (translated in Martin 2018, p. 348): “I am amazed that some condemn the opinion of those saying that from what is per se impossible there follows any proposition (*enuntiabile*). This could be confirmed with many arguments or made clear with a few. For is it not the case that (1) if Socrates is a human being and Socrates is not a human being, then Socrates is a human being. But (2) if Socrates is a human being, then Socrates is a human being or a stone; therefore (3) if Socrates is a human being and Socrates is not a human being, then Socrates is a human being or a stone, but (4) if Socrates is a human being and Socrates is not a human being, then Socrates is not a human being; therefore (5) if Socrates is a human being and Socrates is not a human being, then Socrates is a stone.”

chosen by the author of *TEn I*, however, is more convoluted than Neckham's, at least to our contemporary eyes, even though he seems to know and master all the inferential rules that Neckham later applies. This might be because, as was mentioned in the preceding section, the author of the *Tractatus* does not conceive impossible assertables of the form "*Socratem esse; Socratem non esse*" in terms of a conjunction of two propositions, but rather as a juxtaposition of two contradictory opposites, and this does not allow him to apply the rule of propositional simplification which Neckham applies in the first step of his proof. Another explanation might be that the author of *TEn I* conceives the rule of simplification only as predicate simplification—that is, applicable to the conjunction of two predicates, not of two propositions. Or again, his intention might be to repeat, also for this kind of *per se* impossibilities, the same inferential steps that he applies to impossibilities of all sorts, in order to prove the general replicability of his argumentative approach.

4 Conclusion: *Tractatus Parisiensis de enuntiabilibus* and William of Soissons' "machine"

I will not delve into the details of the last two demonstrations of the *ex impossibili quodlibet* principle listed in *TEn I*, which start from the fifth and sixth kind of *per se* impossibility, exemplified by the statements *album esse nigrum* and *id quod est album non esse album*. That everything follows from them is proven using the exact same inferential pattern already applied above. This repetition may appear redundant, but in fact the "mechanical" reiteration of the same demonstrative strategy is, in my opinion, one of the most interesting aspects of the *Tractatus*. As we have seen, the author aims to show that, from any given impossibility, we may always obtain the same paradoxical result by replicating the same demonstrative pattern consisting of a handful of logical moves. As the author intends to show, this result is drawn from *per se* impossible assertables of all kinds, including what we may call metaphysical, analytic, or logical impossibilities. This is different from what happens in the other sources of the time dealing with the *ex impossibili quodlibet* principle: the

proof offered in the Avranches text, for instance, only applies to “metaphysical” impossibilities such as *Hominem esse asinum*, while the proof offered by Neckham is restricted to contradictory antecedents having the form “P and not-P.” Even though it is based on similar logical rules, the inferential scheme proposed in *Tractatus Parisiensis* has a generality that these other proofs lack. This makes this inferential scheme a very good candidate, I believe, for the identification of the famous logical “machine” invented by William of Soissons in order to “revolutionise the old logic” by “construing unthinkable consequences and destroying the theories of the ancients”, and of which John of Salisbury speaks in the *Metalogicon* (II 10, 72).¹

Although John does not explain in what exactly William’s logical device (*machina*) consisted, we may suppose that it was a logical proof designed for deriving consequences from impossible antecedents, in a way that was not permitted in “the old logic,” namely, in Aristotle’s and Boethius’ logic. On the one hand, as John suggests, William’s logical device was used to contrast the Aristotelian principle according to which, from the same antecedent, a certain consequent and its own contradictory cannot both follow (that is, the principle claiming that, for any P and any Q, both Q and not-Q cannot simultaneously follow from P). This principle would be undermined, for instance, if we take an impossible statement as our P, and if we are able to demonstrate—as William’s machine was perhaps supposed to demonstrate—that anything follows from an impossible. As has been already suggested by Martin,² William of Soissons’ machine might thus have been the first known proof

¹ See John of Salisbury 1991, p. 72: “Interim Willelmum Suessionensem qui ad expugnandam ut aiunt sui logicae vetustatem, et consequentias inopinabiles construendas et antiquorum sententias diruendas machinam postmodum fecit, prima logices docui elementa, et tandem iam dicto praeceptori apposui. Ibi forte didicit idem esse ex contradictione cum Aristotiles obloquatur, quia idem cum sit et non sit, non necesse est idem esse. Et item cum aliquid sit, non necesse est idem esse, et non esse. Nihil enim ex contradictione evenit, et contradictionem impossibile est ex aliquo evenire. Unde nec amici machina impellente urgeri potui, ut credam ex uno impossibili omnia impossibilia provenire.”

² To my knowledge, this suggestion was first made in Martin 1986.

demonstrating that from an impossible antecedent anything follows. This is certainly compatible with the words that John uses to describe William of Soissons' results, namely, as something both highly innovative and at the same time shocking or provoking paradoxical (*inopinabiles*) results. As is known, in mid- and late twelfth-century sources, proofs demonstrating that from an impossible statement all other statements can be derived are often accompanied by this paradoxical and provocative flavour. In addition, a few lines later, John of Salisbury mentions that William's argument was also supposed to demonstrate something that John himself says he is not willing to accept, namely, that "from one impossible antecedent all impossibles are drawn."¹ This further reinforces the idea that William's machine was aimed at proving that everything follows from an impossible antecedent, for indeed several twelfth-century proofs offered in favour of this principle demonstrate it by showing in parallel that from an impossible antecedent any other impossible statement follows: see for instance §8 and §9 in the Appendix below, where the author of *Tractatus Parisiensis de enuntiabilibus* establishes that everything follows from an impossible by showing that "If Socrates is both a human and a horse, then Socrates is both a cow and an archbishop," or that "If Socrates is Plato, then Socrates is a horned goat." These consequences, in which an impossible consequent is derived from an impossible antecedent despite their reciprocal irrelevance, are said, in the *Tractatus*, to be "similar" to the following claim: "if [impossible antecedent], then every assertable is true."

Although this is not said explicitly in John of Salisbury's text, there are thus good reasons to believe that the logical "machine" invented by William of Soissons was a formal proof demonstrating that from an impossible antecedent everything follows—likely the first such proof in the history of logic. This suggestion is reinforced by the connection acknowledged by John of Salisbury between William of Soissons and the teaching of Adam of Balsham: we now know that the school of the *Parvipontani* was the only school, in the middle and second half of the

¹ "Unde nec amici machina impellente urgeri potui, ut credam ex uno impossibili omnia impossibilia provenire."

twelfth century, endorsing the principle that from impossible antecedents anything can be derived. Because of the dating of the texts, their connection with the doctrines of the *Parvipontani*, the way in which the proofs are structured, and their similarity with some details contained in John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon*, I thus hypothesise that the *Tractatus Parisiensis de enuntiabilibus I* may be a representation of the powerful, innovative “machine” invented by William, a machine that, as Martin suggested, constituted a “turning point in the history of logic.”¹ I hope that the partial analysis of *TEn I* offered here may help put together another piece of this history.

¹ Cf. Martin 1986, p. 565.

Appendix

Sigla

< > : *supplevi*

add.: *addidit*

corr.: *correxī / correxit*

a.c.: *ante correctionem*

p.c.: *post correctionem*

<TRACTATUS PARISIENSIS DE ENUNTIABILIBUS I>¹

Paris BNF, lat. 3713, fols 86r–87r

| 86r | §1 [*Definition and eternity of assertables*] Cum inter universa secundum dialecticam facienda, probare aliquid vel improbare sit potissimum, ad maiorem huius artis cognitionem quae, qualiter et qua ratione probari habeant expedire proponimus. Hoc autem certius innotescet, prius tamen cognito quid ad quid sequi habeat et quid non. Omne enim illud per quod aliud et quod per aliud probatur, <et> quod ad aliud et quod per aliud sequitur, enuntiabile appellamus. Enuntiabile vero enuntiatione significabile vel dicibile. Omne autem enuntiabile ab aeterno fuit, et est, et in aeternum erit; et ex necessitate habet esse, ut quod <nec> habuit principium nec habebit finem.

§2 [*First division of assertables into kinds*] Horum aliud verum, aliud falsum. Et si quid est enuntiabile, est verum vel falsum, et econverso. Eorundem etiam aliud possibile, aliud impossibile. Et si quid est

¹ The entire *Tractatus* is contained in fols 86r–88v; this Appendix only contains the first half of the treatise. For the preparation of this partial edition of the first *Tractatus Parisiensis de enuntiabilibus*, I was able to take advantage of Yukio Iwakuma's private transcription of the same text and the advice of Caterina Tarlazzi and Wojciech Wciórka. All remaining errors are mine. The punctuation and division into paragraphs have sometimes been modified with respect to those present in the manuscript. Paragraph numbers and annotations within square brackets are my own. Italicised expressions indicate assertables.

enuntiabile, est possibile vel impossibile, et econverso. Est autem enuntiabile possibile quod potest esse verum, et si aliquod enuntiabile potest esse verum, est possibile, et econverso. Est autem enuntiabile impossibile quod non potest esse verum, et si quid est enuntiabile quod non potest esse verum, est impossibile, et econverso. Verorum aliud necessarium, aliud non necessarium. Est autem verum necessarium, ut ait Boethius, quod ita est ut dicitur nec aliter esse potest, id est, quod est verum et non potest esse falsum. Verum non necessarium est verum quod potest esse falsum. Necessariorum aliud per se, aliud per accidens. Necessarium per se est verum quod nec potest nec potuit nec poterit esse falsum, ut *Aliquid esse*; necessarium per accidens <est> quod, cum sit necessarium, potuit esse falsum, ut *Me fuisse*. Eodem modo impossibile aliud per¹ se, aliud per accidens. Est autem impossibile per se quod nec potuit nec potest nec poterit esse verum, ut *Hominem esse asinum*; impossibile per accidens quod, cum sit falsum, potuit esse verum, ut *Me non fuisse*.

§3 [*Definition of good consequence; inferential relations between kinds of assertables*] Dicto quae et quot sint enuntiabilium genera, quid eorum ad quid² sequi habeat consequens est dicere. Ex omni igitur enuntiabili id sequi dicitur sine quo³ ipsum nec potest nec potuit nec poterit esse verum. Si igitur duo sint enuntiabilia quorum primum nec potest nec potuit nec poterit esse verum sine reliquo, ad primum sequitur secundum. Verbi gratia: *Socratem esse aliquid* nec potest nec potuit nec poterit esse verum sine hoc, *Socratem esse hominem*, quare ad *Socratem esse aliquid* sequitur *Socratem esse hominem*. Econtrario, si duo sunt enuntiabilia quorum primum potest vel potuit vel poterit esse verum sine secundo, ad primum non sequitur secundum. Verbi gratia, *Deum esse potest esse verum* sine hoc, *Deum*⁴ *modo esse*; non ergo, si Deus est, Deus modo est. Omnis enim consequentia <est> vera cuius antecedens nec potest nec potuit nec poterit esse verum sine consequente. Econtrario, omnis consequentia est falsa cuius antecedens potest vel potuit vel poterit esse verum sine

¹ per] *lineam verticalem supra P scripsit MS*

² Quid ad quid] *corr.*, quod ad quod *MS*

³ post quo] *nec delevit MS*

⁴ post Deum] *d delevit MS*

consequente. Ex omni vero sequitur verum et non nisi verum. Ad quod datur haec regula: si aliquid sequitur ad aliud et primum est verum, et secundum. Ex falso sequitur et verum et falsum. Ex falso possibili nonnisi possibile. Ad quod datur haec regula: si aliquid sequitur ad aliud et primum est possibile, et ultimum. Ex falso impossibili sequitur et possibile et impossibile.

§4 [*Further division of necessary and impossible assertables into per se and per accidens ones; everything follows from what is per se impossible; what is per se necessary follows from anything*] Sed ut ista clarius innotescant, attende quoniam verorum et falsorum duo sunt genera: verum necessarium per se, falsum¹ impossibile per se. Ex quorum uno sequitur omne enuntiabile, et quorum unum² sequitur ex omni enuntiabili. Ex omni igitur impossibili³ per se, et eo solo, omne sequitur enuntiabile. Omne necessarium per se, et ipsum solum, ex omni sequitur enuntiabili. Quod qualiter fieri possit ratione demonstrandum. Et prius quod ex omni impossibili per se omne sequatur enuntiabile determinandum.

§5 [*Division of impossibility per se into six kinds; the first and main kind*] Sunt igitur impossibilium per se genera plurima, de quorum singulis singillatim disseramus. Unum et principale per⁴ se impossibilium genus <est> cum dicitur res unius speciei esse res alterius, ut *Socrates est asinus*. Ex quo omne sequi enuntiabile liquere⁵ poterit, prius cognito quod si Socrates est asinus, Socrates est homo. Ad quod ratio incontradictibilis est haec: *Socratem esse aliquid, Socratem esse hominem* duo sunt vera, quorum neutrum potest vel potuit vel poterit esse verum sine altero, et ad unum sequitur alterum, ergo si unum est verum, et alterum. Ergo, si verum est *Socratem esse aliquid*, verum est *Socratem esse hominem*. Ergo, si Socrates est aliquid, Socrates est homo.

¹ *post falsum*] necessarium *delevit MS*

² *unum*] unum unum *MS*

³ *impossibili*] impossibile *MS*

⁴ *per*] *lineam supra P add. MS*

⁵ *liquere*] *lequere MS*

Item, si Socrates est aliquid¹, aliquid est Socrates, et si aliquid est Socrates, ipsum est homo². Ergo, si Socrates est aliquid, aliquid est Socrates et ipsum est homo. Ergo, si Socrates est aliquid, Socrates est homo.

Item, si Socrates est aliquid, Socrates est homo vel aliud quam homo. Sed, si aliquid est Socrates, ipsum non est aliud quam homo. Ergo, si Socrates est aliquid, Socrates est homo.

Item, si aliquid est³ Socrates, illud est homo, et si aliquid est Socrates, idem est Socrates. Ergo, si aliquid est Socrates, aliquid est homo et idem est Socrates. Ergo, si aliquid est Socrates, homo est Socrates.

Item, si aliquid est Socrates, ipsum est hic homo, et e converso; si Socrates est aliquid, hic homo est aliquid, et e converso. Ergo, si Socrates est aliquid, Socrates est hic homo et e converso. Ergo, si Socrates est aliquid, Socrates est homo.

| 86v | Hoc ergo constante, quod si Socrates est aliquid, Socrates est homo, et si est animal est homo, facile⁴ est ad hoc transire quod si Socrates est asinus, Socrates est homo. Si enim Socrates est aliquid, Socrates est homo, et si quid est asinus, est aliquid. Ergo, si Socrates est asinus, Socrates est homo.

§6 [*Against the opinion of some according to whom nothing follows from false assertables, and false assertables follow from nothing*] Sunt tamen nonnulli perversi disputatores qui⁵ verentur huiusmodi concedere: si Socrates est asinus, Socrates est aliquid. Negant enim ex falso sequi aliquid, vel⁶ falsum sequi ex aliquo. Contra quos hic ex incidenti haec obicienda insinuamus: si Socrates est animal, Socrates est rationale vel irrationale. Ergo, si Socrates est animal et non est rationale, est irrationale.

Item, ad *Socratem esse asinum* nihil sequitur: ad *Socratem esse hominem* sequitur *esse rationale*. Ad *Socratem esse hominem vel asinum*

¹ *post aliquid*] Socrates *delevit* MS

² *homo*] Socrates *a.c.*

³ *post est*] hoc *vel* homo *delevit* MS

⁴ *facile*] *facilis* MS

⁵ *qui*] *quod* MS

⁶ *post vel*] *aliquid ex* *delevit* MS

aliquid sequitur. Ergo, ad *Socratem esse hominem vel asinum* sequitur *esse rationale*.

Item, si possibile est *Socratem esse sanum*, possibile est *Socratem esse animal*. Ergo, vel si verum est *Socratem esse sanum*, verum est *Socratem esse animal*, vel si falsum est *Socratem esse sanum*, falsum est *Socratem esse animal*, vel non si aliquid est sanum, ipsum est animal.

§7 [Proof that every assertable follows from the per se impossible “Socrates is a donkey”] Viso qualiter ad *Socratem esse asinum*¹ sequatur *Socratem esse hominem*², quomodo ad idem omne sequatur enuntiabile est videndum: si Socrates est asinus, Socrates est homo. Ergo, si Socrates est asinus, Socrates est homo vel omne enuntiabile est verum. Sed si Socrates est asinus, Socrates non est homo. Ergo, si Socrates est asinus, omne enuntiabile est verum. Ad huiusmodi argumentum confirmandum, datur haec regula: quotiens duo sequuntur ad idem sub disiunctione, si contradictio unius sequitur ad antecedens, reliquum sequitur ex eodem.

§8 [The second kind of impossibility per se] Est aliud³ impossibilium genus per se, quotiens dicitur de re⁴ unius speciei quod sit res duarum utriusque, ut cum dicitur *Socratem esse et hominem et equum*. Ex quo omne sequi enuntiabile sic ostendimus: si Socrates est et homo et equus, Socrates est homo, et si est homo, non est equus (locus ab oppositis). Et si non est equus, Socrates non est et homo et equus. Ergo, a primo, si Socrates est et homo et equus, Socrates non est et homo et equus. Ergo, si Socrates est et homo et⁵ equus, Socrates <non> est et homo et equus vel omne enuntiabile⁶ est verum. Sed, si Socrates est et homo et equus, falsum est quod Socrates non est et homo et equus. Ergo, si Socrates est et homo et equus, omne enuntiabile est verum. Similiter sequeretur, si Socrates est et homo et equus, Socrates est et vacca et archiepiscopus.

¹ asinum] hominem a.c. MS

² hominem] asinum a.c. MS

³ Aliud iteravit MS

⁴ re] rei a.c. MS

⁵ et] supra lineam MS

⁶ enuntiabile] equantiabile MS

§9 [*The third kind of impossibility per se*] Est tertium per se impossibilium genus, quotiens de uno singulari dicitur ipsum esse aliud singulare, ut cum dicitur *Socratem esse Platonem*. Quod, si verum est, Socrates est capra cornuta, quia: si aliquid est Socrates, ipsum non est Plato, et si aliquid est Plato, ipsum non est Socrates (locus ab oppositis). Ergo, si Socrates est Plato, Socrates non est Plato. Ergo, si Socrates est Plato, Socrates non est Plato vel Socrates est capra cornuta. Sed, <si> Socrates est Plato, falsum est quod Socrates non sit Plato (locus a contradictorie oppositis). Ergo, si Socrates est Plato, Socrates est capra cornuta. Similiter, si Socrates est capra, omne enuntiabile est verum.

§10 [*The fourth kind of impossibility per se*] Est quartum per se impossibilium genus¹, cum dicitur contradictorie oppositorum utrumque esse verum; ut cum dicitur: *Socratem esse, Socratem non esse*. Quod, si verum est, omne enuntiabile est verum. Si enim haec sunt contradictorie opposita, et unum est verum, reliquum est falsum, et e converso: talis enim est natura et lex contradictorie oppositorum. Ergo, si haec sunt contradictorie opposita, non utrumque est verum. Ergo, si haec sunt contradictorie opposita et utrumque est verum, non utrumque est verum. Ergo, si haec sunt contradictorie opposita et utrumque est verum, non utrumque <est> verum vel omne enuntiabile est verum. Sed si haec sunt contradictorie opposita et utrumque est verum, falsum est quod horum non utrumque est verum. Ergo, si haec sunt contradictorie opposita et utrumque est verum, omne enuntiabile est verum.

Circa huiusmodi concedunt quidam quod contradictorie oppositorum utrumque esse verum est possibile. Contra quos sic argumentandum: utrumque horum—*te legendum, te non legendum*—esse verum est possibile. Et si aliquorum utrumque est verum, neutrum eorum est falsum. Ergo, possibile est neutrum horum esse falsum. Ergo, non est necesse alterum horum esse verum et alterum esse falsum. Ergo non sunt contradictorie opposita. Contradictorie igitur oppositorum utrumque interdum est possibile, et utrumque possibile est esse verum. Numquam

¹ *post genus] d delevit MS*

possibile est contradictorie oppositorum utrumque esse verum nec unquam contradictorie oppositorum utrumque esse verum est possibile.

§ 11 [*The fifth kind of impossibility per se*] Est et quintum per se impossibilium genus, quotiens contrarium de contrario innuitur praedicari, licet utrumque possit praedicari de quo reliquum, ut cum dicitur *Album esse nigrum*. Quod si verum est, Socrates est asinus, quia si aliquid est album, ipsum non est nigrum, et si aliquid est nigrum, ipsum non est album. Ergo, si aliquid album est nigrum, ipsum non est nigrum. Ergo, si aliquid album est nigrum, ipsum non est nigrum vel Socrates est asinus. Sed, si album est nigrum, falsum est quod ipsum non est nigrum. Ergo, si album est nigrum, Socrates est asinus. Similiter, si album est nigrum, omne enuntiabile est verum.

Contra hos qui dicunt quod possibile sit album esse nigrum, haec est ratio. Si aliquid est verum, ipsum est verum. Ergo, si aliquid est verum, nihil est <verum>¹ quod non sit verum. Ergo, si aliquid est verum, nihil est verum quod sit falsum². Sed necessarium est aliquid esse verum. Ergo, necessarium est nihil esse verum³ quod sit falsum. Ergo, impossibile est aliquid quod est verum esse falsum.

Item, nihil simul est album et nigrum. Ergo, nihil aliquando est album quando ipsum sit nigrum. Hoc necessarium *Nihil simul esse album et nigrum*, ergo necessarium est⁴ nihil aliquando esse album quando ipsum sit nigrum. Ergo, impossibile est aliquid esse album quando ipsum est nigrum. | 87r | Praeterea quidlibet necessarium est vel non esse album vel non esse nigrum. Ergo, quidlibet impossibile est et esse album et esse nigrum. Ergo, quidlibet impossibile est esse et album et nigrum.

§12 [*The sixth kind of impossibility per se*] Est et sextum per se impossibilium genus, quotiens innuitur aliquid quod inest alicui non inesse eidem, ut cum dicitur: *Id quod est album non esse album; Id quod sedet non sedere*. Ad quod constat sequi omne enuntiabile, et similia. Quod sic probamus: si aliquid est Socrates, et illud est vel non est, ipsum est. Ergo,

¹ verum] *addidi Iwakuma probante*

² *post falsum*] ergo si *delevit MS*

³ verum] *supra lineam add. MS*

⁴ est] *supra lineam add. MS*

si id, quod est Socrates, est vel non est, ipsum est. Ergo, si id, quod est Socrates, non est, ipsum est. <Ergo, si id, quod est Socrates, non est, ipsum est vel omne enuntiabile est verum. Sed si id, quod est Socrates, non est, falsum est quod ipsum est. Ergo, si id, quod est Socrates, non est, omne enuntiabile est verum.>

Similiter, si aliquid legit et ipsum legit vel non legit, ipsum legit. Ergo, si id, quod¹ legit, legit vel non legit, ipsum legit. Ergo, si id, quod legit, non legit, ipsum legit. Ergo, si id, quod legit, non legit, ipsum legit vel omne enuntiabile est verum. Sed, si id, quod legit non legit, falsum est quod ipsum legit. Ergo, si id, quod legit non legit, omne enuntiabile est verum.

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Further References to the *Nominales* and *Reales* in Stephen Langton's Works

Wojciech Wciórka*

Introduction

The year 2022 marked the thirtieth anniversary of volume 30.1 of *Vivarium*, which has been the main point of reference for anyone interested in the logical school of the *Nominales*, the followers of Peter Abelard. One of the key contributions to the volume was made by Yukio Iwakuma and Sten Ebbesen, who prepared an extremely helpful list of sources mentioning logical or “logico-theological” schools from the second half of the twelfth century.¹ The present paper offers a small supplement to number twenty-nine on that list, Stephen Langton (d. 1228), who was represented by just one fragment from his *Sententiae* commentary. Seven additional passages can be found at the end of the article. I will briefly comment on all of them. One of the passages mentioning the *Nominales* (#29.4a) is taken from question 94 on the gifts of the Holy Spirit from Book III of Langton's *Quaestiones theologiae*. I stumbled upon three further mentions in his commentary on the Romans (#29.3a), Corinthians (#29.3b), and in the unedited part of the *Summa magistri Stephani* (#29.2a).² Three remaining

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¹ Iwakuma and Ebbesen 1992. Many passages citing the *Nominales* had been collected in Landgraf 1943 and Chenu 1935–36.

² Texts #29.2a, #29.3a, and #29.3b have been printed in Steph. Lang. *Quaest. theol.* III.1, q. 66b, par. 7, p. 233, note to ll. 96–104.

passages explicitly mention the *Reales* but imply something about the opposite *Nominales*.¹

Stephen Langton, who was active in Paris during the last quarter of the twelfth century and the early 1200s could be referring to the state of logical schools from any point within those thirty-odd years (or earlier). His familiarity with dialectic and other arts is well attested by his theological writings, filled with grammatical, semantical, and geometrical terminology.² In a letter of 1207 to King John, Pope Innocent III pointed out that Langton “devoted a lot of time in Paris to the study of liberal arts and made such a progress that he deserved being a teacher (*doctor*) not only in liberal sciences (*facultates*), but also in theological disciplines.”³ The phrase *meruit esse doctor* has been interpreted by John W. Baldwin as “being awarded the rank of master.”⁴ That this might be more than a formulaic or exaggerated recommendation is confirmed by Pseudo-Henry of Ghent’s *De viris illustribus*, according to which Langton presided over arts schools (*liberalium artium scolis prefuit*).⁵

1 The Creed of the *Nominales*. Text #29.3b

Let us start with a seemingly insignificant detail from text #29.3b, taken from Langton’s *Postillae* on the Corinthians, which may corroborate the idea that he had a first-hand familiarity with the inner workings of the schools. When referring to the views of the *Nominales* and *Reales*, he uses the semi-technical term *professio* (creed, declaration, avowal, manifesto):

¹ I have found one of them by accident in the Romans commentary. Two others, mentioning the *Reales*, are taken from Book I of Langton’s *Quaestiones theologiae*.

² As for geometry, for instance, he is one of the first sources to use the term *angulus contingentiae* (denoting the infinitesimal angle formed at the point of tangency by a circle and a tangent line); see Steph. Lang. *Quaest. theol.* II, q. 51a, ad l.1, forthcoming.

³ Inn. III, *Ep.* 219, *PL* 215, 1328B: “Parisius diu vacans liberalibus studiis in tantum profecit ut meruerit esse doctor, non solum in liberalibus facultatibus, verum et in theologicis disciplinis.”

⁴ Baldwin 2008, pp. 823–24; see also Baldwin 1970, vol. 1, p. 26.

⁵ See Powicke 1933, p. 554; Lacombe 1930, p. 14 n. 3.

This issue is similar to the question of whether this name “genus” has the same signification when used by a *Realis* in his creed and by a *Nominalis* in his.

Sten Ebbesen has suggested that the term *professio* specifically referred to the list of axioms or defining tenets of a given school.¹ Most notably, *professio* is used in the *Secta Meludina*, whose author first promises a full cognition of the Meludinian creed, and—a couple of sentences later—sets out to present “some elements of the Peripatetic discipline and the Meludinian creed.”² After listing fifty-three theorems, he says that we must first examine “the opinion of our creed” (*nostrae professionis opinio*) regarding the notion of singularity.³ But it seems that *professio* is not just an idiosyncrasy of the *Secta Meludina*. Text #26 on Iwakuma and Ebbesen’s list (Anonymus Parisiensis on the *Sophistical Refutations*) employs the phrases *profiteor opinionem* and *professor opinionis* in a similar context and gives two examples of views defended by the *Nominales*.⁴ Another case is found in the *Compendium logicae Porretanum*, in connection to the claim that a contiguous whole is many (*est plura*) because it is its own parts. Contiguous wholes are items whose parts have been artificially put

¹ Ebbesen 1992, p. 62: “Insider- and outsider-testimonies combine to suggest that membership of a *secta* was defined by adherence to a ‘creed’ (*professio*) constituted by a number of theorems (*positiones*), virtually all connected with the Old Logic.”

² Anon. *Sec. Mel.*, f. 95ra, printed in de Rijk 1967, p. 283: “<M>eludine professionis . . . perfecta et integra in huius operis volumine consum<m>atur cognitio” (#15 in Iwakuma and Ebbesen 1992, p. 178); “perhipatetice (!) discipline et Meludine professionis quedam elementa propono.”

³ Anon. *Sec. Mel.*, f. 95va, printed in de Rijk 1967, p. 285: “Quid igitur de singulari sentiat nostre professionis opinio, primo est pertranseundum.”

⁴ Text #26, Iwakuma and Ebbesen 1992, p. 184: “Proprius vero modus ducendi ad inopinabile est considerare ex quo genere sit qui disputat, an sit grammaticus an dialecticus et sic in aliis, vel cuius opinionem profiteatur. In qualibet enim opinione aliquid est quod aliarum professoribus inopinabile videtur, veluti Nominalium opinio quod nulla res crescit, et quod quilibet homo est id in quo nulla scientia est, nullus intellectus, nulla ratio.”

together, such as chain mail (*lorica*) or cloth (*tela*). The claim about being many was reportedly defended by the *Nominales* and the enigmatic *Coppausi*. The author complains that it is not accepted by all the *professores* of the Porretan doctrine.¹

The use of the term *professio* in Langton's biblical commentary may be significant since it has not been a standard way of referring to a doctrine or a set of tenets outside logic. In fact, in one of the manuscripts preserving text #29.3b, the word *professio* was omitted, and one of the readers inserted *sententia* instead:

P¹P³T¹ . . . realis in sua professione et nominalis in sua.

H¹ *ante corr.* . . . realis in sua et nominalis in sua.

H¹ *post corr.* . . . realis in sua et nominalis in sua \sententia/.

As for the logical content of text #29.3b, we are told that there was a meta-question, perhaps discussed in the dialectical schools, whether the term “genus” has the same signification both in the creed of a *Nominalis* and in a creed of a *Realis*. The passage does not assume that there is only one realist creed. It simply presupposes that some sects falling under the label *Reales* will use the term “genus” in their creed while understanding genera as things, non-linguistic items of some kind. Given that according to the *Nominales* genera and species are names or, more generally, linguistic items, the question amounts to whether being or not being a linguistic item is inscribed into the very meaning of the term “genus.” If it is not, then perhaps the signification of “genus” consists in a more general core that encompasses both the realist and nominalist uses, such as—potentially—the philosophical sense of “genus” from the *Isagoge*: “what is predicated, in answer to ‘What is it?’, of several items which differ in species.”² Otherwise, the *Nominales* and *Reales* would be talking past each other. If we assume that there is no common ground or no general core,

¹ Anon. *Comp.* III.12, pp. 38–39.

² Porph. *Intr.* 1, p. 4.

then we could argue either that the term is genuinely ambiguous or that one of the schools violates the proper signification.

In his *Postillae* on Paul's epistles (#29.3a–b), Langton uses the dialectical question about the semantics of “genus” as a simile for a question about the name “God.” If we adopt the realist perspective, we might say that Christians are analogous to the *Reales*, whereas the idolaters, who call their idols gods, are like *Nominales*, who say that only names are genera. I would rather not delve into the theological discussion found in the Corinthians commentary (#29.3b), since it is too intertwined with Peter Lombard's tripartite distinction between the substantive, adoptive, and nuncupative senses of “God.” Instead, let us look at the analogous passage from the Romans commentary (#29.3a).

2 What Did One *Realis* Say to the Other? Text #29.3a

Langton's *Postillae* is a super-commentary on Peter Lombard's *Collectanea* on Paul's epistles.¹ One of the Lombardian glosses, also present in the *Glossa ordinaria*, states that pagans *Deum putaverunt qui non erat*—that is, they thought about a certain creature (an idol or a demon) that it was God, which it was not.² This statement raises an objection discussed by Langton in text #29.3a. It is assumed that in order to understand the name “God,” one must know and use the proper signification of the term, and that this proper signification is of the Christian God. Now, did pagans understand the name “God”? (1) If they did, then they could not believe that an idol was God, because that would amount to thinking that their idol was the Christian God. (2) If, on the other hand, they failed to understand the name “God,” then they used it in a different signification. But then, Christians are not allowed to *assert* that pagans thought that an idol was God. The implicit reason for this conclusion is that when Christians say “putabant ydolum esse deum,” they should be using the term “deus” in the proper, Christian sense.

¹ See Bieniak 2019.

² On a different construal, pagans believed in God who did not exist.

Langton takes the dilemma by the second horn, although he qualifies it: the pagans neither fully understood the term “God” nor completely failed to understand it. Instead, they thought that “God” denoted something supremely powerful, good, etc. (*summe potens, summe bonum, et similia*). Accordingly, they were committed to the statement (*locutio*) “Ydolum est deus.” Yet Christians are not entitled to say that pagans were committed to the corresponding propositional content (*dictum*) picked out by the accusative-infinitive clause *ydolum esse deum* (that an idol is God). The implicit reason is that whenever a Christian uses the clause *ydolum esse deum*, it refers to the significate of the statement “Ydolum est deus” as though it were uttered by a Christian. But when uttered by a Christian, “deus” signifies the Christian God, so that the corresponding propositional content *ydolum esse deum* is about the Christian God. Accordingly, pagans were not committed to this *dictum*.

To put it another way, Christians can safely use direct speech, but they should be careful with indirect speech when attributing to pagans beliefs in which “God” serves as a predicate. For in indirect speech, the term “God” will be used in the Christian sense.

The same distinction between granting a statement and granting a *dictum* can be applied to the logical schools. According to Langton, the case is the same when two *Reales* are talking to one another. Call them Robert and Alberic. Robert says, “A *Nominalis* claims that genera and species are names.” (“*Nominalis dicit genera et species esse nomina*”). In the light of the theological case, Alberic should reply that Robert is wrong! The *dictum* that genera and species are names (*genera et species esse nomina*) is bound to the significations employed by Robert. But Robert uses “genera and species” in a realist sense of non-linguistic items. Thus, Robert’s statement amounts to something like this: “A *Nominalis* says that certain non-linguistic items are names.” Robert should have used direct speech.

The simile about *Reales* and *Nominales* from Langton’s Romans commentary (#29.3a) seems to presuppose a negative answer to the question raised in the Corinthians commentary (#29.3b): the *Nominales* and the *Reales* use “genus” in different significations. At the very least, they use the term in different senses—to refer to radically distinct categories of

items—whether or not we can call these senses “significations.” Significations should stem from different acts of establishing (*institutiones*).

Similar reports are found in Alexander Neckam and Peter Capuano, in passages already listed by Iwakuma and Ebbesen under numbers 40a and 44d. According to Neckam, who sometimes draws on Langton,¹ a *Nominalis* does not think that a genus is a name (*nominalis non opinatur genus esse nomen*).² Neckam, who was a Parvipontanian,³ assumes that a genus is a substantial similarity of things differing in species. Due to the accusative-infinitive construction, which requires understanding the term “genus” in Neckam’s realist sense, the statement “A *Nominalis* thinks that a genus is a name” would ascribe to the *Nominalis* the absurd thought that a non-linguistic item is a name. Similarly, according to Capuano (a self-professed member of the school of *Nominales*⁴), a *Nominalis* should concede that a *Realis* thinks that a genus is a name. This is because, when uttered by a *Nominalis* as part of an accusative-infinitive construction, “genus” has the nominalist sense, and a *Realis* indeed thinks that the generic term “animal” is a name.⁵

In this light, we can understand texts #29.2a and #29.4a.

¹ In Neckam’s *Speculum speculationum*, there are textual borrowings from Langton’s *Quaestiones*, Book II (e.g., q. 26.1c on whether the devil sins with his every act, q. 29 on Adam’s state before sin, q. 30.1 on *synderesis*).

² Text #40a in Iwakuma and Ebbesen 1992, p. 192: “In logicis quidem dicerem nominalem non opinari genus esse nomen. Non enim magis posset quis opinari substantialem similitudinem rerum diuersarum specierum esse nomen, quam hominem esse asinum.”

³ See Hunt 1984, pp. 5–6; Martin 2018, pp. 347–48.

⁴ See Landgraf 1943, p. 189; Iwakuma and Ebbesen 1992, p. 194, text #44c.

⁵ Text #44d in Iwakuma and Ebbesen 1992, p. 195: “Nominalis concederet ‘Realis putat genus esse nomen’, quia secundum Nominalem per hoc nomen ‘genus’ non supponitur nisi vox, quam revera Realis putat esse nomen. Sed interrogatus Realis diceret ‘Ego non puto genus esse nomen’, quia ipse dicit aliud significari hoc nomine ‘genus’ quam vocem.”

3 The *Nominales* Know Nothing about *Genus*. Text #29.2a

In text #29.2a, from the unedited part of the *Summa magistri Stephani*, we learn that the *Nominales* know nothing about universals. Apparently, Langton is here adopting the realist point of view. When the *Reales* use the term “genus,” the term signifies a non-linguistic item. Accordingly, they are entitled to say that the *Nominales* know nothing about genus, because the *Nominales* believe that genera—in the realist sense—do not exist. The “nothing” in “know nothing about genus” stands for any proposition about genera. By analogy, ancient pagan philosophers knew nothing about virtues—that is, about Christian virtues understood as aspects of divine grace. Here again, the explicitly mentioned *Nominales* are assimilated to pagan philosophers, and the implicit *Reales* correspond to the implicit Christians.

4 They Say That *Sumptum* Is Nothing. Text #29.4a

Text #29.4a (from Langton’s theological question 94 on the gifts of the Holy Spirit) is slightly more interesting because it involves an extended semantical discussion, and the *Nominales* are not simply used as a simile. Besides, we do not have anything like it in other sources from Iwakuma and Ebbesen’s list. It concerns the notion of *sumptum*, treated in a realist way as a non-linguistic item such as *white* or *being white*, as opposed to whiteness, from which *white* is “taken” or denominated. The semantical role of a *sumptum* is that of being attached or coupled (*copulatum*) by a predicate.¹ For instance, in the sentence “Socrates is white,” the predicate “white” couples the *sumptum white*; if the sentence is true, this *sumptum* is an attribute of the thing denoted by the subject term (“Socrates”).

Sumptum might perhaps be equated with an accident in a broader sense, though not in the sense of an accidental form such as whiteness but in the sense of an attribute: *sumptum* is a *quale* as opposed to *qualitas*, *quantum* as opposed to *quantitas*, etc. It is something predicated *in quale*, *in quantum*, *in quomodo se habet*, *in ubi*, etc., in contrast to *in quid*. In

¹ For a nominalist, *sumptum* is the predicate term itself; see below.

modern terms, *sumptum* resembles a propositional function understood as an unsaturated entity that contains an empty slot for an object. In this respect, the realist *sumptum* is like Abelard's *status* (e.g., *esse hominem*, being a human), which differs from forms (e.g., rationality). In contrast to the Abelardian *status*, however, the realist *sumptum* should be a universal item with some ontological weight apart from playing a semantical role.¹ Indeed, a quick perusal of some realist commentaries on the *Categories*, especially the Albrician C17, suggests that the realist *sumptum* is just another type of real universal in addition to genera and species.²

Now, according to Langton, the *Nominales* say that *sumptum* is nothing (*sumptum nihil esse dicunt*). To make sense of this report, we probably must invoke once more the distinction between being committed to a *dic-tum* and being committed to a statement. Surely, we will not find a statement such as “*Sumptum* is nothing” in the creed of the *Nominales*. If anything, they would rather assert something like “*Sumptum* is a term,” since this is the way Abelard treated *sumpta* throughout his works,³ and this is also the way they are handled by the Anonymus D’Orvillensis’ commentary on the *Categories* (C26) associated by Sten Ebbesen with the *Nominales*.⁴ It seems therefore that Langton intentionally uses indirect speech with an accusative-infinitive clause—*sumptum nihil esse dicunt*. We need to adopt the realist perspective and recall that indirect speech commits us to the significations accepted by our own school. Langton assumes in his response (and in his other writings) a realist interpretation of *sumptum*,

¹ Besides, as noted by a reviewer, Abelard discusses *status* in relation to items in the category of substance, whereas *sumpta* are restricted to the “accidental” categories.

² See Anon. Ber. *In Praed.* 7, ed. Hansen, p. 2: “Universale ad aliquid aliud relatio, aliud sumptum a relatione; vel aliud praedicatum in quid, aliud in quomodo se habet”; Anon. Ber. *In Praed.* 9, f. 86va, Yukio Iwakuma’s transcription: “Universale aliud praedicatum in quid, aliud in quid agit, ut sumpta quae continentur in hoc praedicamento.”

³ For Abelard’s definition and classification of *sumpta*, as well as the difference between *sumptum* and *denominativum* (paronym), see Pet. Ab. *LI Glos. sup. Praed.*, pp. 122–23; Marenbon 1997, pp. 141–42; Kang 2000; Rosier-Catach 2008, pp. 103–25.

⁴ See Anon. D’Orvill. *In Praed.*, p. 260 and passim. For the connection to the *Nominales*, see Ebbesen 1999, pp. 237–41; Ebbesen 2003, pp. 347–63.

according to which it is a non-linguistic item coupled or attached by a name like “white” when used as a predicate. If the realist *sumptum* is a universal, then it becomes clear why the Langtonian *Nominales* maintain that *sumptum* is nothing. Namely, *sumptum*—taken in the realist sense—is a universal non-linguistic item, and according to the *Nominales*, no such items are real or exist. I submit that this “nothing” is the strong “nothing” used to deny real existence, as opposed to “nothing” interpreted as a “non-thing” or a *sui generis* extra-predicamental entity such as *enuntiabile* in the *Ars Meliduna*.

Langton mentions the view of the *Nominales* because the realist *sumpta* play a role in his account of the sentence “Because he is loved by God, he believes” and its secular counterpart “Because he is white, he is coloured.” On this account, the expression “is loved by God” predicated in the antecedent connotes faith, and the whole statement “Because he is loved by God, he believes” says that faith is the cause of the *sumptum* attached by the predicate “believes” in the consequent. In other words, faith (regarded as a quasi-form) is the cause of believing. The predicate “is loved by God” connotes faith because it generally connotes every aspect of grace (not only love or charity), and faith is a sufficient truthmaker of “He is loved by God.” By analogy, in the sentence “Because he is white, he is coloured,” whiteness is said to be the cause of the *sumptum* attached by “coloured”; that is, whiteness is the cause of being coloured.

Since the *sumptum coloured*, or *being coloured*, is a universal, the *Nominales* cannot appeal to it in their semantical analysis. They only have particular forms, such as *this whiteness*, at their disposal. Thus, according to Langton, in the theological case, they would contend that in the sentence “Because he is loved by God, he believes,” the faith denoted by “is loved by God” in the antecedent is said to be the cause of *itself* insofar as it is attached or coupled by the predicate “believes” in the consequent. If someone wonders how to make sense of this self-causation, we must appeal to a simile from the arts, involving the distinction between signifying *in existentia* and *in adiacentia*, a variant of which was also used by Abe-

lard (with *essentia* instead of *existentia*).¹ According to Langton's *Nominales*, in the sentence "Because whiteness is in him, he is white," whiteness is said to be the cause of itself, but in the antecedent whiteness is signified as such (*in existentia*), whereas in the consequent it is signified in relation to a substrate (*in adiacentia*). These two different modes of signification are apparently meant to alleviate the worry about self-causation. I have not found any analysis like this in the logical sources so far, but it may be a matter of time.

To conclude, it may be said that all four passages, #29.2a, #29.3a, #29.3b, and #29.4a, refer to the *Nominales* primarily in connection to their views on the universals. Text 29.4a seems to be of particular interest since it is not about genera and species but about the "secondary" universals such as *white*. Another interesting point is that the three passages about "genus" help us to make sense of #29.4a about *sumptum*, as they strongly suggest that the claim "*Sumptum nihil est*" was not an article of faith of the *Nominales*. Rather, the point is that they reject the existence of *sumpta* as understood by the *Reales*.

Now, let me briefly comment on two other passages from Langton's *Quaestiones* (#29.4b–c) and one from his Romans commentary (#29.3c). All three mention the *Reales*, but indirectly—*ab opposito*—say something about the *Nominales*.

5 The Impossibility of the *Reales*. Text #29.3c

Text #29.3c is tantalisingly succinct. In his comment on Romans 4:2, Peter Lombard states that it was impossible for Abraham to be justified by deeds alone (he needed faith to be righteous in the eyes of God), and that this impossible scenario would entail another impossible situation (*aliud im-*

¹ See, e.g., Pet. Ab. *LI Glos. sup. Praed.*, p. 113.4–16: "Primae [sc. voces] etiam dici possunt ex modo significandi, . . . quia rem in essentia significant, non in adiacentia. . . ."; Pet. Ab. *LI Glos. sup. Praed.*, p. 139.6–8: "Si enim proponeret: 'cursus fit' vel 'cursus est', cursum in essentia significaret, non in adiacentia"; Pet. Ab. *LI Glos. sup. Porph.*, p. 75.28–29; p. 103.19–22.

possibile)—that Abraham would enjoy eternal glory in heaven solely on account of deeds commanded by law:

IF ABRAHAM WAS JUSTIFIED BY WORKS of law [Rom. 4:2]—that is, if he is truly just by virtue of physical obedience, which is utterly impossible—then another impossible thing follows, namely that HE HAS eternal GLORY [Rom. 4:2], which stems from justice; BUT he has it from himself, NOT BEFORE GOD [Rom. 4:2]—that is, not from God.¹

Of course, it is not *inherently* impossible for Abraham to have eternal glory: having glory is impossible only under the assumption that faith (grace) is necessary for salvation and that Abraham merely performed “works of law.” If we suppose—*per impossibile*—that Abraham was justified by works alone, then it follows that he has obtained eternal glory without faith.

In his gloss (#29.3c), Langton contrasts the entailment based on the impossibility of the *Reales* (*impossibilitas realium*) with the entailment grounded in a relationship between terms (*habitus terminorum*), which might perhaps be associated, among others, with the *Nominales* and Abelard’s relevance logic:

ANOTHER IMPOSSIBLE THING FOLLOWS [Lombard]: but not in virtue of the impossibility of the *Reales*, since then the argument would be null, but in virtue of the relationship between terms. “Follows”—that is, you ought to concede.

William of Sherwood will use similar terminology in his *Synecategoremata* to distinguish between natural and non-natural consequence: the former is based on a relationship (*habitus*) between the antecedent and the consequent, whereas the latter holds merely due to the impossibility of the ante-

¹ Pet. Lomb. *Coll.* in Rom. 4,2, *PL* 191, p. 1366C: “*si Abraham justificatus est ex operibus legis, id est si ex carnali observatione vere justus est, quod utique impossibile est, sequitur hoc aliud impossibile, scilicet quod ipse habet gloriam aeternam, quae ex iustitia sequitur; sed a se habet eam, non apud Deum, id est non a Deo.*”

cedent or the necessity of the consequent.¹ Thus, Langton's "impossibility of the *Reales*" may be a way of referring to the principle *Ex impossibili quidlibet*.² Lombard's formulation could easily sound to Langton like an application of *Anything follows from an impossibility*, a principle he discusses briefly in question 19 from Book I of the *Quaestiones* (on whether what is possible according to higher causes can be said to be possible *simpliciter*). According to Langton in q. 19b, even if we accept this principle and even if we assume that it is impossible in a weak sense that a virgin gave birth, this weak impossibility does not entitle us to use *Ex impossibili quidlibet* to validate the conditional "If a virgin gave birth, she slept with a man." For that, we would need a stronger impossibility, such as that involved in a contradiction or, more broadly, in a situation that cannot be realised even by a miracle.³ In question 19a (another version of q. 19),

¹ Will. Sher. *Sync.*, p. 152, writing about the word "if" (*si*): "Quandoque notat consequentiam naturalem, quandoque non naturalem. Naturalem, ut quando notat consequens sequi ad antecedens ratione alicuius habitudinis unius ad aliud; non naturalem, quando notat consequens sequi ad antecedens non ratione habitudinis unius ad aliud, sed solum propter impossibilitatem antecedentis vel necessitatem consequentis." See also Martin 2018, pp. 357–358.

² For recent overviews of various medieval attitudes to this principle, see Binini 2024 and Martin 2018. See also studies collected in Jacobi 1999.

³ Steph. Lang. *Quaest. theol.* I, q. 19b, par. 1.1, pp. 405 and 407: "1.1. Sustineatur illa opinio que dicit quod ex impossibili quidlibet; uirginem peperisse est impossibile per se; ergo ad illud sequitur quidlibet. Cum ergo dicat quod impossibile est uirginem peperisse et non cum uiro concubuisse, sequitur quod si uirgo peperit, cum uiro concubuit. Set naturalis philosophia quam isti sequuntur necessariam iudicat argumentationem a positione antecedentis. Est ergo necessaria 'si uirgo peperit etc.; set uirgo peperit; ergo cum uiro concubuit'. Hec argumentatio est necessaria, et premissa sunt uera—immo necessaria—ergo et ultimum"; "(ad 1.1.) Ad hanc uero propositionem 'si uirgo peperit, cum uiro concubuit' multiplex est responsio. Dicunt enim quidam quod consequentia est uera, set non ualet argumentatio a positione antecedentis, quia assumitur tale uerum quod est impossibile. Alii dicunt—et melius—quod illa consequentia est falsa, nec ualet hec argumentatio 'hoc est impossibile per se, ergo ex eo sequitur quidlibet': esset enim addendum 'et est tale impossibile quod non potest esse uerum'. Dicunt etiam quidam argumentationem esse necessariam, et premissa esse uera, non tamen ultimum, eo quod alterum premissorum assumptum sit, ut dicunt, in celo et non in terra; set absurdum est illud dicere."

Langton explicitly states that in order to employ *Ex impossibili quidlibet* one needs a propositional content that is impossible *per se*—that is, cannot be actualised even by God.¹

Now, if the *impossibilitas realium* is Langton's way of referring to *Ex impossibili quidlibet*, then we could make sense of his idea that the impossibility of the *Reales* cannot validate the conditional "If Abraham was justified by deeds alone, then he has eternal glory." Namely, the antecedent is impossible in a weak sense, insufficient for the application of *Ex impossibili quidlibet*. If we wish to warrant the entailment, we need to rely on the *habitus terminorum*—the connection between being justified and having glory.

6 The Common Consignification of the *Reales*. Text #29.4b

Text #29.4b, from the above-discussed theological question 19b, mentions something called *communis consignificatio realium*. Presumably, "common" is used here in the sense of being general or indefinite, as opposed to being common to all the *Reales*. Thus, the common consignification of the *Reales* should probably be contrasted with *consignificatio praesentis determinati* discussed by Alexander Neckam.² The idea of the consignifica-

¹ This has been pointed out to me by Irene Binini. See Steph. Lang. *Quaest. theol.* I, q. 19a, par. 1, p. 402: "Consequentia non est necessaria, nec ad uirginem parere sequitur quidlibet, quia non est impossibile per se. Impossibile enim per se est quod non potest fieri a deo." See also Binini 2024 for other contemporary sources that restricted the applicability of the *Ex impossibili quidlibet* principle to the *per se* impossibility, variously understood. See also Binini's contribution to this volume.

² Al. Neq. *Spec. spec.* II, c. 41, p. 180: "Dant uiri maturi pectoris idem enunciabile significari istis tribus: 'Sortes est', 'Sortes fuit', 'Sortes erit'. Quod si est, dabitur quod quicquid semel est uerum, semper erit uerum. Sed alia erit consideratio istorum quam eorum qui † ad id asserunt † [forsitan rectius ad id accedunt vel idem asserunt] propter consignificationem presentis determinati"; Al. Neq. *Spec. spec.* II, c. 38, pp. 177–78: "Difficultas autem non modica imminet in talibus eis qui dicunt uerbum consignificare presens determinatum. Secundum hoc enim, si dicam in tempore 'Sortes currit', perinde est ac si dicam 'Sortes currit in hoc instanti'. Si autem dicam 'Sortes curret', perinde est ac

tion of the definite present is roughly that a categorical statement such as “Socrates is running” signifies the propositional content that Socrates is running *at this instant*, where “this instant” refers to the moment of assertion. *Consignificatio praesentis determinati* should probably be linked with Abelard and the *Nominales*, as suggested by the reports from Albrician commentaries C15, C17, and H17.¹

According to Langton, we need to presuppose the common consignification of the *Reales* if we want to deny that the propositional content *antichristum esse* is impossible at this instant. The need to assume this kind of consignification implies that the claim in question—“It is impossible at this instant that the Antichrist exists”—might count as true according to a singular or definite consignification of “exists.” As I have suggested above, the definite consignification was probably postulated by the *Nominales*, who assumed that propositional contents should include a reference to the instant of assertion. Perhaps some *Nominales* would argue that the statement “It is impossible at this instant that the Antichrist exists” asserts

si dicam ‘Sortes curret post hoc instans’.” For a related distinction between consignifying *praesens determinatum* and *confusum*, see Kneepkens 1994, pp. 179–80.

¹ I argue for this link elsewhere (Wciórka 2024). The Albrician reports have been recently discussed in Donato and Hansen, forthcoming. The idea that a propositional content should be relativised to the present instant (i.e., the time of assertion) dovetails with the principle “Once true, always true” (*Semel verum, semper verum*), famously attributed to the *Nominales* in historical sources. Suppose that the statement “Socrates is white,” asserted at *t*, expresses the propositional content *that Socrates is white at t*. If this time-relativised propositional content is true, then it will remain true forever. Furthermore, if we set aside the problem of future contingents and accept the so-called retro-closure, the same propositional content has been true for the entire past. Although the catchphrase *Semel semper* is about propositional contents (*dicta* or *enuntiabilia*), it can also be applied to sentences. Namely, if “Socrates is white,” asserted at *t*, is once true, it is always true in the sense that the propositional content it expresses at *t* is always true. Furthermore, we can apply the maxim to non-relativised propositional contents such as *that Socrates is white* (*Socratem esse album*) if we insist that time-relativisation is required for having a truth-value, and so a true non-relativised propositional content must actually contain an implicit time index in each context. *Semel semper* and time-relativisation work in tandem for the other tenses as well.

that it is impossible at this instant that the Antichrist exists *at this instant*. The limitation to the present moment may make the statement true, provided that the Antichrist could only exist *in the future*.¹

7 A *Realis* Does Not Place Much Weight on Persons. Text #29.4c

Text 29.4c revolves around the sentence “This statue is being made” (“Haec statua fit”). According to Langton, “a *Realis* does not place much weight on persons” (*non facit vim de personis*). This looks like an allusion to the distinction made by the *Nominales* between *persona* and *essentia*, which underlies their catchphrase “Nothing grows” and plays a key role in obligational disputations in which one admits impossible unions such as Socrates who is both a human and a donkey.² If we generalise the distinction, then the piece of bronze of which this statue is made would be the *essentia*, and the statue made of bronze would be a *persona*. The *Nominales*, then, are in a position to accept the statement “This statue is being made” on the grounds that the predicate “is made” holds of the *persona* even though it is not true of the piece of bronze, the *essentia*. The *Reales*, by contrast, can only accept this sentence in an improper sense (*sub impropriate*): it is true by virtue of the accident *being a statue*, not by virtue of the thing denoted by the subject term, which is primarily a piece of bronze and thus is not being made.

It is worth noting that the distinction between *persona* and *essentia* was explicitly attributed to the *Nominales* by two theologians directly connected to Langton: Peter the Chanter, who was probably one of his teachers, and Geoffrey of Poitiers, Langton’s student.³ Geoffrey often followed his master in the *Summa* “*Ego novissimus*.” Unfortunately, the Langtonian counterparts of Geoffrey’s questions lack explicit references to logical schools. This is particularly striking in the case of Geoffrey’s texts #48a

¹ For a more detailed analysis of this passage, see Wciórka 2024, pp. 305–8.

² See Anon. *Tract. Emm.*, pp. 120–21; Martin 1998, pp. 8–15; Noël 2022, pp. 114–15.

³ See Iwakuma and Ebbesen 1992, #33a–b (p. 185) and #48d (p. 198), respectively. For the association between Langton and Peter the Chanter, see especially Baldwin 1970.

about the number of sins (that is, whether volition and act constitute two separate sins) and #48b about the identity of the articles of faith. Langton's corresponding questions 50 (Book II) and 73 (Book III, volume 1) do not mention the *Nominales* despite discussing the relevant theories.

Conclusion

The references to the *Reales* in texts #29.3c and #29.4b–c, in contrast to the passages that mention them together with the *Nominales* (#29.3a–b), are not concerned with the nature of universals. Although Langton invokes notions such as “the impossibility of the *Reales*” or “the common consignification of the *Reales*” without referring by name to any particular school such as the *Parvipontani*, *Albricani*, *Meludinenses*, or *Porretani*, he is unlikely to have thought that all the *Reales* accepted the principle *Ex impossibili quidlibet*. The indiscriminate use of the label *Reales* suggests that the above-discussed positions on conditionals, consignification, and persons may have been primarily perceived by Langton in opposition to the *Nominales*. That being said, we are dealing with mere snippets. In some cases, the amount of background information required to understand them somewhat dilutes their significance as independent sources of knowledge about the schools. But at least some of the texts seem unique, for instance the claim that *sumptum* is nothing according to the *Nominales* (#29.4a).

The list below gathers all the above-discussed passages from Langton's works along with another reference to the *Reales* found in Geoffrey of Poitiers' *Summa* (#48e). The list is not meant to be exhaustive, as more references may be found in Langton's biblical commentaries, which remain mostly unedited and unexplored.

A Supplement to Iwakuma and Ebbesen's List of Sources

29.2 Stephen Langton, *Summa magistri Stephani* (the unedited part)

29.2a Item. Videtur quod naturalia fiant gratuita. . . .

Solutio. Distinguendum est inter uirtutes naturales et politicas. Virtutes politice non possunt fieri gratuita, et iustitia Catonis non

erat iustitia licet putaretur. Et phylosophi nichil sciebant de uirtutibus, sicut **nominales** nichil sciunt de genere, sicut Arriani putant aliquid esse fidem quod non est fides. Licet similia essent opera illius putatiue iustitie que et istius, quia tamen non fiebant fine debito, non erant iustitia. Sicut intentio respicit uoluntatem et finem, ita uirtus opus et finem.

MS C ff. 168vb–169ra.

Cf. #40a (Alexander Neckam); #44d (Peter Capuano)

29.3 Stephen Langton, *Postillae super epistulas Pauli*

29.3a *Deum putauerunt qui non erat*: hoc uidetur impossibile. Aut enim intelligebant sensum huius nominis ‘deus’ aut non. Si intelligebant, ergo comprehendebant uerum deum, et ideo non putabant ydolum esse deum. Si non intelligebant, in qua ergo significatione utebantur illo nomine? Si in alia, non ideo putabant ydolum esse deum.

Quod hic dicitur simpliciter est intelligendum (scilicet quod deum putauerunt qui non erat): ponitur enim hoc nomen ‘deus’ in illa significatione in qua nos eo utimur, set ydolatre illam significationem nec penitus intelligebant nec penitus ignorabant. Credebant enim per illud nomen designari quiddam quod esset summe potens et credebant ydolum esse illud, scilicet summe potens, summe bonum, et similia, et concedebant hanc locutionem, scilicet “ydolum est deus”, set non dictum. Simile est si **realis** dicat **reali** “**nominalis** dicit genera et species esse^a nomina”. Et in hoc errabant.

Steph. Lang. *Post.* in Rom. 1:25, commentary on Pet. Lomb. *Coll.* in Rom. 1:25, *PL* 191, 1332B (see below).

¹ Pet. Lomb, *Collect.* in Rom. 1:25, *PL* 191, 1332B (also Anon. *Glos. ord.*, f. 1058vb): “Ostendit enim per partes eos mutasse gloriam Dei, scilicet quod Deum putauerunt qui non erat, et coluerunt, et seruiuerunt creaturae potius quam Creatori”; Rom. 1:25: “qui commutauerunt veritatem Dei in mendacium: et coluerunt, et seruiuerunt creaturae potius quam Creatori.”

MS T¹ f. 5rb; cf. S² f. 16a; V¹ f. 6ra.

^a esse S²sV¹] sunt T¹pV¹

Cf. #40a (Alexander Neckam); #44d (Peter Capuano).

- 29.3b <*Dicitur enim*> *tribus modis* <*deus*>: *substantiue*, idest essentialiter, <*adoptiue*, *nuncupatiue*>. <...> *nuncupatiue demones et ydola*.¹

Set obicitur: secundum quod dicitur de demonibus et ydolis, aut habet aliam significationem quam quando ponitur^a naturaliter, siue essentialiter, uel adoptiue, aut non. Si non, ergo non dicitur tribus modis. Preterea, secundum hoc hec est falsa “omnes dii gentium sunt demonia”. Si habet aliam, quare ergo dicitur in illa significatione poni nuncupatiue? Si ideo quia non ex prima institutione habet illam significationem set quasi translatiue, eadem ratione cum dicitur de sanctis ponitur nuncupatiue. Preterea, habetne eandem significationem apud nos et apud ydolatrias?

Questio ista consimilis est isti qua queritur utrum hoc nomen ‘genus’ habeat eandem significationem secundum quod utitur eo **realis** in sua professione et **nominalis** in sua. Et potest esse quod hoc nomen ‘deus’ aliam habeat significationem quando ponitur nuncupatiue quam quando essentialiter uel adoptiue. Et dicitur poni in illa nuncupatiue eo quod ydolatre stulti in illa significatione extendant illud ad uerum deum et^b credant etiam illud nomen secundum hoc uerum deum significare; sicut dicit glossa super principium Matthei quod solus Iesus Christus habuit hoc nomen ‘Iesus’ essentialiter, et alii nuncupatiue, et tamen unam habuit^c significationem propriam et discretam in qua Iesum Naue significauit. Set dicitur soli Iesu Christo essentialiter conuenire quia ei soli conuenit secundum nominis interpretationem, scilicet ‘salus’ actiue. Interpretatur enim ‘Iesus’ ‘saluator’, quod nullus habens hoc nomen nisi Christus fuit. Nec tamen plene soluimus que de ydolatria hic possent queri, quia in disputatione plenius sunt discutienda.

Steph. Lang. *Post.* in I Cor. 8:5, commentary on Pet. Lomb. *Coll.* in Cor. 8:5–7, *PL* 191, 1604A (see below).

¹ Pet. Lomb. *Coll.* in Cor. 8:5–7, *PL* 191, 1604A: “Dicitur enim tribus modis Deus, substantive, adoptive, nuncupative. Substantive dicitur Deus Trinitas; adoptive, sancti qui per adoptionis gratiam dii sunt; nuncupative, demones et idola, quia nomine tantum dii sunt, non natura vel participatione.”

MS P¹ f. 306vb; cf. H¹ f. 43va–vb; P³ f. 58ra; T¹ f. 58vb.

^a ponitur P¹P³] debitum *praem.* pH¹T¹ debito modo (?) *praem.* sH¹

^b et H¹T¹P³] Contra, aut intelligunt illam significationem aut non. Et si intelligunt, aut intendunt uti illo nomine in illa significatione aut in alia. P¹

^c habuit P³] habuerit H¹ habent P¹ hūnt (habuerunt?) T¹

Cf. #40a (Alexander Neckam); #44d (Peter Capuano).

- 29.3c *Sequitur et hoc aliud impossibile*:¹ set non ratione impossibilitatis **realium**, quia sic nulla esset probatio, set ratione habitudinis terminorum. [[“Sequitur”, idest oportet te concedere.]]^a

Ex hoc quod dicit hic glossa, et etiam textus, probatur quod Habraham fuit dignus uita eterna, quia cum dicit “Habraham habet gloriam”, non loquitur de eo^b secundum statum in quo fuit uiator. Aliter enim nulla esset deductio apostoli. Est ergo sensus eius quod dicit apostolus: si Habraham iustificatus fuit ex operibus legis sine gratia, habuit gloriam, idest dignus fuit habere. Eadem ratione, si iustificatus fuit ex fide, habuit gloriam, idest dignus fuit habere. Set iustificatus fuit ex fide, ergo dignus fuit habere gloriam. Quod concedimus licet quidam dicant quod nullus ante aduentum Christi meruit uitam eternam uel fuit dignus ea.

Steph. Lang. *Post.* in Rom. 4:2 (“Si enim Abraham ex operibus iustificatus est, habet gloriam, sed non apud Deum”); commentary on Pet. Lomb. *Coll.* in Rom. 4:2, *PL* 191, 1366C (see below).

¹ Pet. Lomb. *Coll.* in Rom. 4:2, *PL* 191, 1366C: “si Abraham iustificatus est ex operibus legis, id est si ex carnali observatione vere justus est, quod utique impossibile est, sequitur hoc aliud impossibile, scilicet quod ipse habet gloriam aeternam, quae ex iustitia sequitur; sed a se habet eam, non apud Deum, id est non a Deo.”

MS T¹ f. 10ra; cf. V¹ f. 9ra.

^a [[]]—auctorial addition (*versio longa*)

^b eo sV¹] deo T¹pV¹

- 29.4 Stephen Langton, *Quaestiones theologiae*
- 29.4a Dicimus quod nec aliqua uirtus nec aliquod donum faciens gratum naturaliter precedit fidem, nec aliquod donum faciens gratum precedit uirtutes, immo uirtutes naturaliter precedunt dona. Cum

autem dicitur “quia iste diligitur a deo, credit”, dicimus quod fides connotata per hoc uerbum ‘diligitur’ notatur esse causa sui sumpti copulati per hoc uerbum ‘credit’, sicut cum dicitur “quia iste est albus, est coloratus”, albedo notatur esse causa sumpti copulati per hoc nomen ‘coloratus’. Non^a sumptum sumpti notatur esse causa. Similiter, cum dicitur “quia deus diligit istum, iste credit”, hec dictio ‘quia’ respicit hoc uerbum ‘diligit’ ratione effectus connotati tantum, scilicet ratione fidei que notatur esse causa sui sumpti. Nam cum dicitur “deus istum diligit”, hoc uerbum ‘diligit’ connotat communiter omne gratuitum faciens gratum, et ita potest reddere locutionem ueram pro fide. Similiter, cum dicitur “iste diligitur a deo”, similiter debet dici.

Nominales uero, quia sumptum nichil esse dicunt, dicunt—cum dicitur “quia iste diligitur a deo, credit”—quod fides designata ut effectus diuine essentie per hoc uerbum ‘diligitur’ notatur esse causa sui ipsius prout copulatur per hoc uerbum ‘credit’; sicut cum dicitur “quia albedo est in isto non secundum quid,^b iste est albus, et non econuerso”, albedo significata in existentia est causa sui ipsius prout significatur in adiacentia. Eodem modo effectus connotatus per hoc uerbum ‘diligit’ notatur esse causa sui ipsius prout alio modo significatur.

Ed. Steph. Lang. *Quaest. theol.* III.2, q. 94, par. 8, pp. 378–379.

^a non α CaDH] nam β [Note: “nam”—the reading of family β —has been accepted in the edition on the assumption that not only *albedo* (a form) is the cause of *coloratum* (a *sumptum*) but also *album* (a *sumptum*) is the cause of the more general *sumptum* coupled by “coloratus.” Also, the position of “non” seemed off. On reflection, however, “non” probably goes with “sumptum,” so that the infinite name “non-sumptum” simply refers to *albedo* as opposed to *album*.]

^b quid H] quod *ap*CaDR(?)S quam *s*CaAB

- 29.4b Dicimus itaque quod non ualet talis argumentatio: “uirginem peperisse uel istum uidere ceco demonstrato non potest esse uerum secundum causas inferiores, ergo est impossibile secundum causas inferiores”: primo enim hec determinatio ‘secundum causas

inferiores' determinabat hoc predicatum 'esse uerum', in conclusione uero determinat hoc predicatum 'est impossibile'. Instantia: hoc dictum 'antichristum esse' non potest esse uerum in hoc instanti, ergo est impossibile in hoc instanti, quod falsum est (sustineatur communis consignificatio **realium**); si enim esset impossibile in hoc instanti, simpliciter esset impossibile. Similiter si aliquod enuntiabile est impossibile secundum causas inferiores, sequitur simpliciter quod sit impossibile; similiter si secundum causas superiores.

Ed. Steph. Lang. *Quaest. theol.* I, q. 19b, par. 1, p. 409.

- 29.4c Item. Nota quod licet uerbum mittendi dictum de filio uel spiritu sancto copulet diuinam essentiam que est ab eterno et est eterna, neuter tamen dicitur mitti eternaliter, set tantum temporaliter. Et hoc prouenit propter effectum temporale per uerbum connotatum: propter eandem causam dicitur missio spiritus sancti temporalis et non eterna, licet per hoc nomen 'missio' supponatur diuina essentia que est eterna. Simile est in statua que dicitur artificialis et non naturalis, licet es sit naturale.

Contra. Est ergo hec uera: "missio est temporalis" ratione effectus temporalis qui connotatur; ergo multo potius hec est uera: "missio est eterna" ratione diuine essentie que principaliter per subiectum supponitur et per predicatum copulatur.

Si usquequaque proprie loqueremur, non esset hec uera uel concedenda "missio est temporalis"; set sub eadem improprietate admittitur qua et ista secundum **realem** (qui uim non facit in personis): "hec statua fit", et eiusdem iudicii uidetur esse penitus, quia, sicut hic non fit attributio ratione suppositi set ratione accidentis significati, ita et ibi non ratione suppositi, set ratione connotati. Vnde sicut hec est falsa "statua est naturalis", ita et ista "missio est eterna".

Ed. Steph. Lang. *Quaest. theol.* I, q. 20a, par. 2.2, p. 417.

- 48 Geoffrey (Godfrey) of Poitiers, *Summa* “*Ego novissimus*,” q. *De primis motibus*
- 48e Instantia: non est uirgo, ergo est incontinens. Sicut enim dico quod continentia est uirginitas secundum quod accidentale est continentie esse uirginitatem—et loquendo ut **realis** dicam quod hoc accidens *continens* est hoc accidens *uirgo*, set accidentale est ei esse hoc accidens—ita dico quod accidentale est huic accidenti *sciens* esse hoc accidens *sciens*, secundum quod accidens importat donum.

MS Kl f. 32vb; cf. Pa f. 33va; To f. 44rb.

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