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THE TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE OF IBN AȚ-ȚAYYIB: AN INTERPRETATION OF BABAI THE GREAT'S METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM IN THE WORLD OF ISLAM

BY

Bishara EBEID

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ABSTRACT

The Trinitarian doctrine of Abū al-Farağ 'Abd Allah Ibn at-Ţayyib $(10^{th}-11^{th} \text{ c.})$ may be considered a good example of an interpretation of the Trinitarian theology and metaphysical system of Babai the Great (7^{th} c.) . Babai made an effort to discern between metaphysical terms, such as: substance $(ky\bar{a}n\bar{a})$, hypostasis $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{a})$, and person $(pars\bar{o}p\bar{a})$, making a peculiar mixture of Cappadocian, Nestorian, i.e., East Syrian, and Antiochene theology. Ibn at-Ţayyib, however, did not make use of Babai's terminology. Particularly, although he explained the Trinitarian dogma in a similar way to Babai, he did not apply the term person $(pars\bar{o}p\bar{a})$ to the Trinitarian theology. This paper aims to show the importance of the Trinitarian thought of Ibn at-Ţayyib. It also answers the following questions: 1) how was he able to make an excellent interpretation of Babai's thought in the language and ambient of Islam, and 2) why did he consider it the best way to explain the Trinitarian dogma to the Muslims?

INTRODUCTION

The Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocians was the foundation stone for the Trinitarian dogma of the Church. In the first synods of the Church of the East, there are archaic expressions and a particular Trinitarian terminology: God is one nature $(ky\bar{a}n\bar{a})$ and three hypostases $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{e})$. Babai the Great $(7^{th}$ century) introduces an important development in the Trinitarian and Christological doctrine and terminology within the Church of the East. His effort was to discern between such terms as: nature $(ky\bar{a}n\bar{a})$, hypostasis $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{a})$ and person $(parṣ\bar{o}p\bar{a})$, a peculiar mixture of both Cappadocian and Antiochene theology. His philosophical terminology and theological doctrine was officially recognized by his church at the assembly of bishops in 612, but only with respect to its Christological part. As for his philosophical approach to the Trinitarian dogma, it was not totally approved, or we can say that it was neither accepted nor rejected.

In the 10th and 11th centuries, the Trinitarian theology of Abū al-Farağ 'Abd Allah Ibn at-Tayyib, an important theologian of the Church of the East, can be considered a good example of an interpretation of Babai's Trinitarian theology. It is worth noting that Ibn at-Tayyib respected the desire of his church not to apply the term "person" (*parṣōpā*) to its Trinitarian theology as Babai did. Rather, he explained the Trinitarian dogma by elaborating on Babai's metaphysical system from an Aristotelian philosophical context.

This paper aims to present and analyze the metaphysical systems of Babai and Ibn at-Tayyib in order to determine the common nucleus between the two, and then to analyze the further development of Ibn at-Tayyib. Additionally, it will demonstrate the importance of the Trinitarian thought of Ibn at-Tayyib, and his ability to explain the Trinitarian and Christological dogmas in the language and milieu of Islam, using traditional terminology and making an excellent interpretation and modification of Babai's metaphysical system. It will be also shown that with his elaboration of Babai's metaphysical system, Ibn at-Tayyib created his own system. This new and particular metaphysical system was a good way to answer questions posed by the Muslims of his time regarding the Trinitarian dogma.

Before beginning our analysis, we would like to make some terminological remarks. First of all regarding the term $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$: it is the Syriac translation of the Greek $\dot{v}\pi \dot{o}\sigma\tau \alpha \sigma \iota \zeta$, usually translated by scholars as "hypostasis" (at least in a Trinitarian context)¹, although it should be noted that not all

¹⁾ Cf. PATROS, "La cristologia", pp. 29-31.

scholars accept this translation². In fact, in the history of the Christian doctrine, the term hypostasis did not have one meaning and a unique metaphysical function. When hypostasis was translated into Syriac with the term $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$, it did not always have one specific meaning attributed to it by the Syriac theologians, and did not always correspond to the meaning attributed to it by the Greeks. Nevertheless, we will use terms, hypostasis and $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$, as synonyms.

The same applies to the term parsopa, which is the Syriac term for the Greek $\pi \rho \delta \sigma \omega \pi ov^3$. It was used in different ways to explain either Trinitarian theology or Christological doctrine. In the Syriac tradition, it was also used with different meanings and significances. For this reason, we will use the term parsopa with the English translation of the Greek term $\pi \rho \delta \sigma \omega \pi ov$, i.e., person⁴. Following is a list of English translations that will be used for Arabic philosophical terms: "essence" will be used for dat; "substance" for *ğawhar*; "hypostasis" for $uqn\bar{u}m$; "person" for *šahş* and *farsuf*; "attribute" for *şifah*, and "property" for *hassah*.

In addition, we chose to refer to the Church of the East also as Nestorian. This is not meant to be polemical or offensive in any way. We prefer to use this term because the same Church in 612 considered its doctrine to be Nestorian, a term that became synonymous with orthodoxy⁵. We also prefer to use the term Miaphysites for the Jacobites, i.e., the Syrians who did not accept the Council of Chalcedon, the non-Chalcedonians of Syriac language. Finally, for those who accepted Chalcedon, we use the term Chalcedonians.

5) Cf. CHABOT, Synodicon, pp. 573-574:

²⁾ Cf. BROCK, "The Christology", p. 131.

³⁾ Cf. PATROS, "La cristologia", p. 31.

⁴⁾ We think that translating the term $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ with hypostasis, and $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$ with person/ $\pi\rho\delta\sigma\omega\pi\sigma\nu$, is not wrong. The important thing is to underline the various comprehensions of the terms and the different meanings and metaphysical functions they hold, cf. André DE HAL-LEUX, "Hypostase' et 'personne' dans la formation du dogme trinitaire (ca. 375-381)", in André DE HALLEUX, *Patrologie et œcuménisme. Recueil d'études*, Peeters, Leuven, 1990, pp. 113-214; Andrea MILANO, *Persona in teologia. Alle origini del significato di persona nel cristianesimo antico*, Éditions Dehoniane, Naples, 1984; TURCESCU, "Prosopon", pp. 374-395; while for the meaning of these terms in the Eastern Syriac tradition see PATROS, "La cristologia", pp. 28-33.

אך בערטואה גארמא בלא איז לא של איז גבן למבעאה ביות אואיר לא ביאאר שי גאובי איין איין איין איין גאובי איין איין ביש בן ארמא אבא... במע בא גבאי גבל מי גאבאאראי ויגר שולאמאיא גמשטואה גברבאה מבטא אשרבי בעלמדיטה איין לאטי איי די גיינייה. משרמיים אייל אוע גאובי גבעיטה אוון בעו סאוין סטמבי אילמסור איי לאיי.

A. BABAI THE GREAT AND HIS DOCTRINE

Until the year 612, the doctrine of the Church of the East used a certain metaphysical terminology to express Trinitarian and Christological dogmas: 1) God is one nature $(ky\bar{a}n\bar{a})$ and three hypostases $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{e})$, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit; 2) Christ is one person (parṣopa) and two natures $(ky\bar{a}n\bar{e})$, united without division or mixture⁶.

During the Christological discussions within the Church of the East, for ecclesiastical, political and doctrinal reasons, some theologians began to develop metaphysically its Christology. The role of the schools and some monasteries was important in this development⁷. The so-called "controversy of Henanā of Adiabene" was the most significant event which shows the theological discussion within the same church and the direct and indirect contacts between it and the other churches-confessions, i.e., the Chalcedonians and the non-Chalcedonians (Miaphysites)⁸. The most important figure, whose activity as a monk, spiritual leader and theologian had the major influence on the Church of the East and its official doctrine, was Babai the Great⁹.

Babai the Great¹⁰ was born ca. 551 in the area of Beth 'Aynatha. He became a monk in the "Great Monastery" founded by Abraham of Kaškar (\dagger 588)¹¹, to whom he became superior and spiritual leader. After the death of the Catholicos of the Church of the East, mar Grigor (\dagger 610)¹², Chosroes II (d. 628), the Sasanian emperor, did not allow the bishops of this church to elect a new Catholicos. Until Chosroes' death, the church was led by the archdeacon Aba of Seleucia and Babai, who had the appointment of "visitor of the monasteries". In the year 612, according to the will of Babai, an as-

⁶⁾ On this topic, see our article EBEID, "The Christology"; see also the following references: BROCK, "The Christology", pp. 125-142; Sebastian P. BROCK, "The Christology of the Church of the East", in Dmitry AFINOGENOV & ALEXEY MURAVIEV (ed.), *Traditions and Heritage of the Christian East*, Izdatelstvo, Moscow, 1996, pp. 159-179; PATROS, "La cristologia", pp. 27-42.

⁷⁾ In this regard see BECKER, Fear.

⁸⁾ On the controversy of *Hennanā* see CHILDERS, "Henana", p. 194; BAUM & WINKLER, *The Church*, pp. 35-41; BECKER, *Fear*, pp. 90-91; EBEID, "The Christology", pp. 377, 389-390, 394-395.

⁹⁾ Cf. BAUM & WINKLER, The Church, p. 38.

¹⁰⁾ On Babai, his life and his historical context see BROCK, "Babai the Great", pp. 49-50; W BAUM & WINKLER, *The Church*, pp. 37-41.

¹¹⁾ On Abraham of Kashkar see Lucas VAN ROMPAY, "Abraham of Kashkar", in GEDSH, pp. 8-9; Sabino CHIALÀ, Abramo di Kashkar e la sua comunità. La rinascita del monachesimo siro-orientale, Qiqajon, Magnano, 2005.

¹²⁾ On this catholicos see Lucas VAN ROMPAY, "Grigor I", in GEDSH, p. 183.

sembly of bishops was held, which adopted a new Christological formula: Christ is one person (parsopa) in which were united, without mixture or separation, two natures $(kyan\bar{e})$ and two hypostases $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{e})^{13}$.

Certainly, this was the contribution of the metaphysical development that Babai made and expressed in his "Book of the Union"¹⁴, which we will briefly present in this paper. It is to be noted that Babai's theological system was adopted partly by the assembly of 612. This does not mean that his metaphysical system, especially regarding his Trinitarian thought, was totally rejected or was not used by others¹⁵. The main part of our paper here, in fact, will focus on how Ibn at-Tayyib used and interpreted Babai's metaphysical system to explain the Trinitarian doctrine to Muslims.

1. Babai the Great's metaphysical system

Going back to Babai's metaphysical system, we should always keep in mind that in the internal Christological discussion among the theologians and thinkers of the Church of the East there were questions regarding the two natures of Christ and their real union. If Christ is one person with two united natures, and these natures maintain their properties, should we consider the union real or not? In addition, the presence of the Miaphysites (Jacobites) into the Sasanian land, and their propaganda against the traditional doctrine of the Church of the East considering it a dualistic Christology and accusing it to be real Nestorianism, i.e., the doctrine of two separated subjects in Christ, had made a group of theologians of this church refute any non-dualistic Christological formula or proposal. They considered such doctrines a betrayal of the faith of the Church, that is, in Christ the united natures are perfect and each one conserves its natural properties.

For that reason, the Christological proposal of Henanā that Christ is one person (parsopa), one hypostasis (qnoma) and two natures $(kyana)^{16}$ was

¹³⁾ Cf. BAUM & WINKLER, The Church, p. 39.

¹⁴⁾ This work was edited and translated into Latin by VASCHALDE, Babai Magni.

¹⁵⁾ The Christological controversy within the Church of East did not end with the assembly of 612. On this see our article, Bishara EBEID, "La cristologia del *catholicos* Mar Georgis I. Un'analisi della sua lettera a Mina", in Rafal ZARZECZNY (ed.), *Aethiopia Fortitudo Ejus. Studi in onore di Monsignor Osvaldo Raineri in occasione del suo* 80° compleanno (OCA 298), Pontificio Istituto Orientale, Roma, 2015, pp. 203-220; see also Bishara EBEID, "Christology and Deification in the Church of the East. Mar Gewargis I, His Synod and His Letter to Mina as a Polemic against Martyrius-Sahdona" in *Cristianesimo nella Storia* (Studies in History, Theology and Exegesis) 38:3 (2017), pp. 729-784.

¹⁶⁾ Cf. CHILDERS, "Henana", p. 194.

seen as dangerous to some of the theologians and thinkers of the Church of the East. In fact, they tried to conserve their different Christological identity from the Chalcedonians and the non-Chalcedonians (Jacobites)¹⁷.

Babai, against such voices as the one of Henanā, wrote his "Book of the Union", and was one of the important theologians of the Church of the East to develop systematically the Trinitarian and Christological doctrine of his church, according to his point of view. He actually defined the technical and metaphysical terms used in these doctrines, giving them a clear explanation and a precise metaphysical role and use¹⁸.

There is no doubt that the concept of nature $(ky\bar{a}n\bar{a})$ was not a topic of discussion since there was already an agreement on its definition that it was the general and common substance $(it\bar{u}t\bar{a}/usi\bar{a})^{19}$. The problem, however, was regarding the definition of the terms hypostasis $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{a})$ and person $(pars\bar{o}p\bar{a})$, their relation to the common nature $(ky\bar{a}n\bar{a})$, and the one between each other.

According to Babai, a singular substance ($usi\bar{a}/o\dot{v}\sigma i\alpha$) is called:

hypostasis (qnoma), consisting in its single essence [expressed] by the number 'one'. And it is distinct from the 'many' [hypostases], not because of the fact that it became singular, but since it receives, in the created, rational and free beings, various accidents of virtue of abundance or of poverty, of knowledge or of ignorance; and in the irrational beings receives also various accidents, either by opposed temperaments or in any other way. And these [the accidents], as I said, are not creators, they are only created [things]. Hypostasis is fixed according to its nature and it is subject to the species and the nature of which it is hypostasis, together with the similar hypostases to it [i.e. of the same nature]. It is distinguished from these similar and equal hy-

מנהבא אינמיא מתוציא בשקובטי בסיט ביאה לעהרילא בבעוא הה ועוי הפוש בן שביאא לה בה, וכנויו אלא האב בסבל איא איבא, לאמא אירא ואיא אימאיאר איא or relies reiz rincua relieso מה האבידיו טע האמידיםו טע האטואישו الله المحالمة المال الم المحلمة المراجد الم my inso or relieve rein roin גולשה ואיז היו השרש מה האותובהשלוא אישי גאולוא לה בושא השביגא בלעהג. מנהכא אין טברא עם בכיוויטעע טאמייא אושא הבעיא וולח מה מנהצא אב געוא עבדממת, עבעי. מפועי א מנמדא עבדמת,. בגליאה המיניקאה גמוא בפויה טבאי. ו בבול לה והבישיתל. הפהלהם לה פלום. בות גין בבל עו עו בן מנהצא בלה בעא גמניא באנגב. מעו ביוא געבי לבנהבא ראיז בוצאה האידו באישי

¹⁷⁾ Cf. BAUM & WINKLER, *The Church*, pp. 35-41; see EBEID, "The Christology", pp. 377, 389-390, 394-395.

¹⁸⁾ Cf. BAUM & WINKLER, The Church, p. 38.

¹⁹⁾ Cf. PATROS, "La cristologia", pp. 28-29.

postases through the singular property which possesses by its person (*parsopā*). For example, Gabriel is not Michael and Paul is not Peter. But in each hypostasis (*qnomā*) [of them] the entire common nature is known, and [with regard to] the one nature that comprises the hypostases (*qnomā*) in a common way, it is known through the mind what [sort of nature] it is, whether it is the nature of men or of other things. The hypostasis (*qnomā*), however, does not comprise [all] the common [being]²⁰. لى سف لى مى .²¹

 $Qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$, being a singular nature, is fixed naturally, i.e., it cannot change to another species or another common nature; it cannot form a new reality with another $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$, or a new hypostasis $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{a})$ of new species. $Qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ can receive various accidents, and these distinguish one hypostasis $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{a})$ from another one of the same common nature. It is the group of singular properties possessed by one $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ that constitutes, according to Babai, a person $(parṣ\bar{o}p\bar{a})$. To be clearer, Babai gives an example: Gabriel and Michael, Paul and Peter are all human $qn\bar{o}m\bar{e}$, i.e., singular human natures. They are similar according to their natural properties, but Gabriel is not Michael because of the different personal properties of each $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$. This, in fact, is the metaphysical function of person $(parṣ\bar{o}p\bar{a})$ according to Babai's

²⁰⁾ The translation is ours.

²¹⁾ VASCHALDE, Babai Magni, pp. 159-160.

thought. Gabriel and Michael, Paul and Peter are $qn\bar{o}m\bar{e}$, but also are $pars\bar{o}p\bar{e}$. In the following citation, Babai further explains his system:

The person $(parsopa \bar{p}a)$ is the property of any [possible] hypostasis, which distinguishes it from other [hypostases], because the hypostasis of Paul is not the hypostasis of Peter. Although they [i.e. Paul and Peter or any other humans] are equal in nature and hypostasis -for each of them possesses a body and a soul, they is living, and rational and corporeal- nevertheless in person they are distinct from each other, either in age, appearance, health, wisdom, power, paternity, filiation, being male or female, or any other way that distinguishes and manifests the singular and individual property. [As a consequence], this one is not that one, nor is those these. Although in nature they are identical, [nevertheless] in the [domain] of the singular property that this hypostasis possesses, which is not that one, it is the person that makes the distinction²².

פו היש אב איאהת, ואואת ומואה אנא ומי ופוצ לה בי אוויא. an maker of valas, mouse, in אנה . בה, ובלעו הנתה בגוא הנפיא an our relation, ochin resid אלא כפוים הפא פושי אנה עו הנתה ... or respects or respects or בדהו באי אם בעבדואי אם בבהלאיני מה האמושם מה האמחשהם מה מהו הנהבי אי הרשמשש מה הראמיבים in regize occurs whether function no al ana an al remi reprise אאמיר במיא אישי במי במי גור אישי פא maker all resar rin ren returne

In this definition we should notice that for Babai, the qnomā has two kinds of properties and characteristics, the natural and the proper. By the natural, it is recognized to which common being it belongs. By the individual, it is distinguished from the other hypostases $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{e})$ of the same species and general substance. In our opinion, for Babai, the *qnomā* by itself, being a singular and concrete substance of a general nature, is a perfect manifestation of the natural properties of this species, however, to be recognized as individuality, i.e., a particular reality, it receives a person (*parsopā*), that is, a group of individual properties. One can notice that for our thinker, the general nature, in fact, does not exist. It is an abstract reality, while the concrete one is the subsistent reality, the singular and concrete substance, the $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$. However, this subsistent reality cannot be complete without the individual properties, which is the person that each *qnomā* possesses. The person of one hypostasis, i.e., reality composed by *qnomā* and *parsopā*, in conclusion, is a concrete, perfect and complete singular nature recognized so by its natural $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{a})$, and personal $(pars\bar{o}p\bar{a})$ properties²⁴.

²²⁾ The translation is ours.

²³⁾ VASCHALDE, Babai Magni, p. 160.

²⁴⁾ For more details regarding Babai's thought and doctrine of these terms see SCIPIONI, *Ricerche*, pp. 110-112; ABRAMOWSKI, "Babai", pp. 297-314.

Making this analysis we can, in fact, notice that Babai is developing his metaphysical system, having as its basis, not only the philosophy of stoicism regarding the categories of "κοινῶς ποιός" and "ἰδίως ποιόν", as Scipioni sustained²⁵, but also the Aristotelian concept of substance "οὑσία", the primary and the secondary. In our opinion, it is an elaboration and development of what we already find in Gregory of Nyssa's metaphysical system, i.e., the concept of the "partial substance" (μερικὴ οὐσία) or "particular substance" (ἰδικὴ οὐσία)²⁶. It is not our purpose to enter into detail regarding the doctrine of Gregory of Nyssa or the other Cappadocians²⁷, but we think that Babai had as a basis an existing elaboration of that metaphysical system, already in use by other Antiochene thinkers and theologians²⁸. However, Babai gave it a new dimension, which we may call "Nestorian".

According to the elaborated system that Babai had as a basis, we can say that the secondary substance is the common and general, the universal. It is an abstract nature, while the primary substance is the singular nature with the individual properties. It is the common nature which takes an existence in individuals. There is, however, another status or category of substance, the partial one, which is an intermediate status between the abstract reality (common and general) and the concrete one (individual and singular).

Babai applied the terminology he had to this metaphysical system. For the general and common, i.e., the secondary substance and the "κοινῶς ποιός", he used "substance" (حمصح), "nature" (حمد), and "essence" (حمد). This category is the group of the natural properties of one species, it is an abstract reality. When this abstract reality comes into existence and is distinct numerically, it is called hypostasis (مدەرت). The singular substance is one of many that are subject to one specific species and common

²⁵⁾ Cf. SCIPIONI, Ricerche, pp. 136-137.

²⁶⁾ Cf. TURCESCU, Gregory, pp. 26-38, especially pp. 37-38, and pp. 69-71.

²⁷⁾ In addition to the reference in the previous footnote, see also KARIATLIS, "St Basil's", pp. 57-83; TURCESCU, "Prosopon", pp. 374-395; HILDEBRAND, *The Trinitarian*.

²⁸⁾ We think, as Scipioni demonstrated, that Nestorius' Liber Heraclides, including Pseudo-Nestorius, used such a system, cf. SCIPIONI, *Ricerche*, pp. 98-158, 153-158. Regarding the Antiochene background of Babai, see ABRAMOWSKI, "Babai", pp. 328-341. In addition, in our view, Leontius of Byzantium, who had an Anthiochene education and formation, used a similar system and applied it to the Chalcedonian Christology. Regarding his system, see KRAUSMÜLLER, Dirk, "Making Sense of the Formula of Chalcedon. The Cappadocians and Aristotle in Leontius of Byzantium's Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos", in *Vigiliae Christianae* 65 (2011), pp. 484-513.We are, in fact, planning to further investigate this topic in order to demonstrate the common Antiochene metaphysical system of both Babai and Leontius. The former gave it a "Nestorian" dimension while the latter gave it a Chalcedonian dimension.

nature. In our opinion, the $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ in Babai's thought is the singular nature without individual properties, yet it is not a complete and perfect individual, even if it is singular and perfectly manifests the natural properties, that is, the partial nature in an intermediate status. When, however, this partial nature receives personal and individual properties through various accidents, it becomes a person (rec_{2} , rec_{3}), i.e., an individual. So when a $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ receives its $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$, this means that it receives its individualization, its personalization. For this reason, in our opinion, Babai calls it "the $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$ of the $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ ", as the first quotation of the next section demonstrates.

2. Babai the Great's Trinitarian doctrine

In his metaphysical system which we just presented, it is clear that Babai is making a very significant development, differentiating it from the traditional Cappadocian metaphysical system. In fact, this will become clear as we see how our thinker applies this system to his Trinitarian doctrine:

adorable hypostases Three are the $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{e})$ of the eternal Trinity identical in everything: in one glorious essence (*ītūtā*), cause of all creatures. However, if you want to distinguish through reason the one [hypostasis] from the other, you cannot [do it], except through the property of their persons (parșopē). The name 'Father' is, in fact, the person (parsopā) of his hypostasis [qnoma]: He is unbegotten; from whom the Son, already since eternity, was begotten. And [the Son] is distinct through the person (parsopā) of his hypostasis, so He is neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit, but the begotten from the Father before the ages. And so we distinguish the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit through its singular person (parșopā) that He possesses, for He is from the Father since eternity, that is, from the nature of Him through the way of the procession, so He is neither the Father nor the Son. This means that these [hypostases] are distinct through the distinct persons (parșopē) they own through their properties. These adorable persons (parsopē) can be given

مالا محقمه الع مام محتد Kina rapore Kyosopa Kyorpityi איאטאא שבעולא מבלאא ובל בוים. בוכ גין אי בבאז אונא i בעיאיטא גואפו וע איי ה הלה אוה השבע אל אוז אי בול אישה איבו במתום ביום אלתוליו ואיש ער אישטער אישטער איש אישיא. וכות בוא באומבאיא אוו. הבוא בוים משא המנה בלא אבא מסי טאראא ומשא המהגיאי. אלא בי אבא אולוג לבל בן אבאנ. הבוא אב לעומבא גומעא معد المعدم المعدم معدم المل אבאסראש אבא אבא האסראשנים אימסחרי הנה גיל ביוש בווש גובטשואא הגוה אבא מה הלה ביא. הכבול מנה תלא בבדה מבא בדישא המעה בהלשאמתה הנה מלג פוה הצא מגעודאי האתחרים הלח השרישיים. מנה היא היה לא הרא החרים באנשבים. בה, גלא באנשב הוא שהבא גנמסא בת מנהצא אינונא עו מנהצא. מה אלא השבעא אלא הם הגובן Kon in Kind of making provide ובת באפוב וליאהת, הה שהבא אינואי השמו הל הושם .הוש אל השא גם מש

and received; the hypostases (qnome), on the contrary, can neither be given nor received. Because of the fact that this hypostasis (qnomā) cannot be received, to become one hypostasis with another [different] hypostasis is impossible. But what inheres permanently in one hypostasis $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{a})$ is the thing by which it is distinguished, so that is not another hypostasis, i.e., the Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Holy Spirit. These names, as they are persons, not in the [domain of hypostases, can be given and received. The hypostasis (qnoma), however, shows only that this is this and not that. [For example], when two men come forward us, iy is known that they are two hypostases, but it is not yet known who is the one and who is the other, i.e., yet the property of the hypostasis (qnoma) is not manifested as person $(parsopa)^{29}$.

הסהשאי. מלא מכיל שבמא בלל הדים הבא אוס, לה במ, הסהדא בלתחב הבאנוסבין. מהדא הן מהדא בלתחה בעמאי המיא לא מה. אבוא בלתה להן אונין מודא לא מה. אבוא אוס, הבין, האינה הן מה המוא לא הביה איש בים הבא³⁰.

In his Trinitarian doctrine, it is notable that Babai, on the one hand, tries to be faithful to the Cappadocian tradition and his church's doctrine, and on the other hand, he succeeds in applying the Cappadocian doctrine to his own system. Without going into much detail, for the Cappadocians, $\partial\pi \delta\sigma\tau \alpha\sigma \varsigma$, which is somehow synonymous to $\pi\rho \delta\sigma \omega \pi \sigma v$, is the result of the common nature with an idiom ($\partial \delta\omega \mu \alpha$), that is, a property. For example, the Son is the divine common nature with the idiom of the generation, so he is the begotten Son. For the Cappadocians, the general nature and the idiom make the hypostasis, and at the same time, the idioms also reveal the relation ($\sigma\chi \epsilon \sigma \varsigma$) between the hypostases of the divine nature. Being the Son generated from the Father and the Spirit proceeding from the Father makes the latter to be the cause of the Trinity³¹.

Also, for Babai, the Father is the cause of the Son and the Spirit. The Father as $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$, i.e., divine concrete and singular substance with his own property of his person (*parṣōpā*), is the cause of the Son and the Holy Spirit,

²⁹⁾ The translation is ours.


³⁰⁾ VASCHALDE, Babai Magni, pp. 160-161.

³¹⁾ Cf. HILDEBRAND, *The Trinitarian*, pp. 82-92, especially pp. 91-92, and pp. 92-98, see also KARIATLIS, "St Basil's", pp. 67-68.

two $qn\bar{o}m\bar{e}$ with their $pars\bar{o}p\bar{e}$. It is not the general nature with the property or the idiom that make the hypostasis, as it is for the Cappadocians, but it is the hypostasis $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{a})$, as concrete singular substance of a general nature, with the property that make the person $(pars\bar{o}p\bar{a})$. It is clear that $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ and $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$ are two different metaphysical concepts with different functions. In these last affirmations we notice not only the differentiation between Babai and the Cappadocians, but also that for Babai there is a difference between idiom, and property $(r_{s}L_{s})$, and person $(r_{s}Q_{s})$.

It may be argued that the $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$ manifests the personal properties of one $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$. One can also observe, however, that sometimes the difference between these two concepts is blurred. The clearest example of this is the explanation that Babai gives regarding the names. For him, the names "Father", "Son", and "Holy Spirit" are the persons, and at the same time they are the individual properties of the $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$. For this reason, he affirms that "the name 'Father' is the person $(pars\bar{o}p\bar{a})$ of his hypostasis" (des argent ar

To make all of this more comprehensible, we will use the following schemes:



An abstract substance of specific species includes a mass of $qn\bar{o}m\bar{e}$ (hypostases), i.e., singular subsistent substances; each one perfectly manifests the common substance, that is, its natural properties.

Personalization or individualization of a singular substance: a $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ with a group of individual properties and idioms becomes a $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$, i.e., singular subsistent substance that manifests perfectly its natural and personal properties.

A divine $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ with the individual properties of unbegottness is the *parşōpā* of the Father. The *parşōpā* of the Son is a divine $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ with the property of generation, while the one of the Holy Spirit is a divine $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ with the property of procession.

The Father is the cause of the Trinity. The Son and the Holy Spirit are perfect divine $qn\bar{o}m\bar{e}$ from the perfect divine $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ of the Father. They are recognized by their $pars\bar{o}p\bar{e}$ because of their relation with the Father, i.e., their personal property that comes from their relation with their cause.

3. Babai the Great's Christological approach

Babai was not interested in developing his metaphysical system for the purpose of explaining the Trinitarian doctrine. For him, the Christological dogma was the most important issue. His system helped him to support the doctrine regarding the two natures and two hypostases in Christ united in one person. He said, in fact, as we have seen above, that the $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ is fixed and cannot be received or given, while the $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$ can be received or given. By this, he is trying to prepare the way for his Christological doctrine: the $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$ of the Son was given to the human $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ of Christ, and so this human $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ received or acquired its personalization; and in this $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$

the union was realized. We have, as a consequence, one person of Christ, which is a common *parṣōpā* of two $qn\bar{o}m\bar{e}^{32}$.

This system was adopted partially by the synod of 612. That assembly of bishops considered the doctrine regarding the two $qn\bar{o}m\bar{e}$ in Christ to be orthodox. Regarding the Trinitarian dogma, however, and the use of Babai's system in the Trinitarian field, especially applying the concept of $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$, it was not officially accepted³³. This is probably because there was either a danger of it being understood as tritheism, or simply that at the time, the problem was not Trinitarian but Christological.

With the arrival of Islam in the Near East, the Trinitarian dogma took its place once again within theological discussions, but this time between Christians and Muslims. For the latter, actually, this dogma meant polytheism. The Christians felt the necessity to re-produce apologetic works in order to cope with this new situation³⁴. Babai's system was not utilized in the Trinitarian field during his time because there was no need for it. However, Ibn at-Tayyib, in the new Islamic milieu, tried to explain the Trinitarian dogma to Muslims by further developing Babai's system, while keeping in mind that it was not officially accepted by his church.

B. IBN AT-TAYYIB AND HIS DOCTRINE

We do not have much biographical information regarding Ibn at-Tayyib's date of birth. Scholars, however, claim that it was in the last quarter of the 10th century³⁵. Regarding the date of his death, the Jacobite Barhebraeus (†1286) states that Ibn at-Tayyib died on October of the year 1043.

³²⁾ Regarding the Christology of Babai, see SCIPIONI, *Ricerche*, pp. 112-116, 118-130, 138-148; ABRAMOWSKI, "Babai", pp. 297-314; Luise ABRAMOWSKI, "Die Christologie Babais des Grossen", in *Symposium Syriacum I* (OCA 197), Pontificio Istituto Orientale, Roma 1972, pp. 219-244; Marijke METSELAAR, "The Mirror, the Qnoma, and the Soul: Another Perspective on the Christological Formula of Babai the Great", in *Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum* 19 (2015), pp. 331-366.

³³⁾ Cf. CHABOT, *Synodicon*, pp. 564-567 (for the Trinitarian and Christological doctrine), pp. 583-584 (regarding the orthodoxy of this doctrine), see also BAUM & WINKLER, *The Church*, p. 39.

³⁴⁾ A very good reference on this remains the book of Sidney GRIFFITH, *The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque. Christians and Muslims in the World of Islam*, Princeton University Press, Princeton-Oxford, 2008, especially pp. 1-11, 23-105. See also HADDAD, *La Trinité*, pp. 25-26.

³⁵⁾ For more details on his life, see FAULTLESS, "Ibn al-Ţayyib", pp. 667-674; GRAF, GCAL, vol. II, pp. 160-162.

He is one of the most important "Nestorian" thinkers of his time, and maybe the most important and greatest polymath of the Church of the East. He was a physician, philosopher and theologian; he wrote many works on medicine, commentaries on most of the works of Aristotle, Galen and Hippocrates, exegetical works on most of the books of Holy Scripture and dogmatic treatises, especially regarding Trinitarian dogma. Being a polymath and a great theologian afforded him the position of secretary to two Catholicoi of the Church of the East: Yūḥannā VII (1012-1020 or 1013-1022) and Elias I (1028-1049). Having taken the responsibility of approving the dogmatic works of "Nestorian" authors and theologians of his time, such as Elias of Nisibis, means that he was considered a theologian and teacher of the Church of the East in that period.

Samir Khalil Samir also demonstrated in his article, "La place d'Ibn at-Tayyib dans la pensée arabe", the importance of our author among the Arab thinkers and philosophers, both Muslim and Christian. The different citations that Samir uses confirm all that we have mentioned previously regarding the position of Ibn at-Tayyib as an Aristotelian philosopher and commentator, and as a theologian and approver of theological works³⁶. The fact that some of his works are cited by the encyclopedia "*Mağmū* '*usūl al-dīn* – Summa of the principles of religion"³⁷ of the Coptic theologian al-Mu'taman Ibn al-'Assāl († after 1265)³⁸, proves that his doctrine was admired by authors of other Christian confessions and was greatly useful to them, even if he belonged to a "heretical" church according to their beliefs³⁹.

He is also considered to be the last Christian Aristotelian teacher working in Baghdad⁴⁰. In his exegesis, he follows the Antiochene School, especially, the thought of Theodore of Mopsuestia, John Chrysostom, Ephraim the Syrian and others⁴¹. Scholars note that he explains the Trinitarian dogma

³⁶⁾ Cf. Samir Kh. SAMIR, "La place d'Ibn at-Țayyib dans la pensée arabe", in *Journal of Eastern Christian Studies* 58 (2006), pp. 177-193.

³⁷⁾ There is a critical edition of this work with Italian translation see al-Mu'taman Ibn al-'Assāl, *Summa*.

³⁸⁾ Cf. FAULTLESS, "Ibn al-Ţayyib", p. 671.

³⁹⁾ Some of his works, such as his commentary on the prologue to John, when copied by non-Nestorians received some changes in their content because of the Christological disagreements between them. For more on this, FAULTLESS, "The two Recensions", pp. 177-198. See also HADDAD, *La Trinité*, p. 73.

⁴⁰⁾ Cf. FAULTLESS, "Ibn al-Ţayyib", p. 668.

⁴¹⁾ Cf. FAULTLESS, "Ibn al-Tayyib", p. 669, regarding his exegesis see the following articles: Paul FÉGHALI, "Ibn At-Tayyib et son commentaire sur la Genèse", in *ParOr* 16 (1990-1991), pp. 149-162; Floris SEPMEIJER, "Ibn al-Tayyib's Commentary on Mathew 1-9: 32-34",

to Muslims without mentioning their names, using Aristotelian philosophy and the discussion on the attributes of God⁴². Our objective here is to present his Trinitarian doctrine and to demonstrate that he was a disciple, maybe indirectly, of Babai's philosophical system. In our opinion, he elaborated such system and used it in his doctrine, taking into consideration the new conditions of the Christians of that period and region: the Arabic language and the Islamic general context.

To accomplish this, we will use the following edited works⁴³ of Ibn at-Tayyib⁴⁴:

- a. Treatise on the Trinity $(Maq\bar{a}lah f\bar{i} at-tat l\bar{t} t)^{45}$.
- b. Treatise on the Trinity and Unity $(Maq\bar{a}lah f\bar{i} at-ta\underline{t}l\bar{i}\underline{t} wa-t-tawh\bar{i}d)^{46}$.
- c. Discourse on the Union $(al-Kal\bar{a}m f\bar{i} al-ittih\bar{a}d)^{47}$.
- d. Work in fourteen chapters (Arabic title is unknown)⁴⁸.
- e. Treatise on the Union $(Kit\bar{a}b \ al-ittih\bar{a}d)^{49}$.

1. Terminology and metaphysical definitions

Before we look at or examine the Trinitarian doctrine of our author, we should present two of his quotations that illustrate his metaphysical system, which is based on Babai's system as will be made clear by our analysis:

in ParOr 25 (2000), pp. 557-564. See also FAULTLESS, "The two Recensions".

⁴²⁾ Cf. FAULTLESS, "Ibn al-Tayyib", p. 670.

⁴³⁾ We follow the English titles suggested by FAULTLESS, "Ibn al-Tayyib", pp. 674-697. In the same pages, there is a list of the works of Ibn al-Tayyib related to the Muslim-Christian dialogue. Another list of his works is offered in GRAF, *GCAL*, vol. II, pp. 162-177.

⁴⁴⁾ Unfortunately we do not have complete critical editions of all the works of Ibn at-Tayyib. Although we have editions of some works, they are not always critical, but based on just one manuscript. For this reason and in order to have a clearer image of his thought, we need a complete critical edition of all the works attributed to him. These critical editions would ensure the authenticity of his works and might also resolve other important issues regarding his doctrine.

⁴⁵⁾ There is an edition with a French translation: Ibn al-Țayyib, *Maqālah fī at-ta<u>t</u>lī<u>t</u>, pp. 74-89.*

⁴⁶⁾ There is an edition with a French translation: Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Maqālah fī at-ta<u>t</u>lī<u>t</u> wat-tawhīd*, pp. 108-123.

⁴⁷⁾ There is an edition with a French translation: Ibn al-Țayyib, *al-Kalām fī al-ittiḥād*, pp. 144-150.

⁴⁸⁾ This work came to us by way of the citation provided by al-Mu'taman ibn al-'Assāl: Ibn at-Tayyib, *Work in fourteen chapters*, pp. 275- 277 (ch. 11, par. 92-101); pp. 409-416 (ch. 19, par. 28-51).

⁴⁹⁾ This work came to us only partially, since it is quoted by al-Mu'taman Ibn al-'Assāl: Ibn aţ-Ţayyib, *Kitāb al-ittihād*, pp. 77-78 (ch. 8, par. 126-255).

The terms used by Christians regarding the essence $(\underline{d}at)$ of the Creator (Glorified and Exalted Be He!), are: substance $(\underline{g}awhar)$, hypostasis $(uqn\bar{u}m)$, person $(fars\bar{u}f)^{50}$, unity $(tawh\bar{t}d)$, trinity $(tatl\bar{t}\underline{t})$, attributes $(\underline{s}if\bar{a}t)$ and union $(ittih\bar{u}d)$.

The term **substance** (*ğawhar*) in every **essence** $(d\bar{a}t)$ indicates the absolute nature (*mutlag at* $tab\bar{a}'i'$) in the thing, such as the nature of the human being (al-insān) in his persons (ašhāsihi) and the fire in its persons (ašhāşihā). If [the essence] becomes particular (tahassasat), through the specification, you name it hypostasis (uqnūm), and if the attribute lof the hypostasis] becomes specific (*ta'ayyanat*), you name it [**the essence**] person (farşūf wa šahş). When [the essence] obtains a multitude of descriptions [i.e. attributes], according to one side, it may be considered one, and according to another, many: It is one, from the side of the substance (ğawhar), it is, [however], many, from the side of its descriptions [i.e., attributes]⁵¹.

الأسماء المستعملة عند النصارى، في ذات البارئ (سبحانه وتعالى) هي لفظة: جوهر، وأقنوم، وفرصوف، وتوحيد، وتثليث، وصفات، واتّحاد.

فاسم الجوهر، في كل ذات، يدل على مطلق الطباع في الشيء، كطبع الإنسان المطلق في أشخاصه، والنار المطلقة في أشخاصه. فإذا تحمّصت بصفة سميتها بالتخصيص أقنومًا، وإذا تعمّنت الصفة سميتها فرصوفًا وشخصًا. وإذا تحمّلت لها الأوصاف كانت بوجه واحدًا، وبوجه حميرًا، فإنما من جهة الجوهر تكون واحدًا، ومن جهة أوصافها تكون كثيرة⁵².

It is notable that for Ibn at-Tayyib, the substance ($\check{g}awhar$) is an abstract essence ($d\bar{a}t$) and reality. This is the meaning, in fact, behind the expression, "the absolute nature in the thing". It is the common nature of the persons ($a\check{s}h\bar{a}s$) of the same essence, and it indicates its species. This abstract reality obtains its existence when it becomes particular (tahassasa). Becoming particular means for our author that the essence obtains an attribute. We think that he means that it manifests its natural properties, and in this case it could be called hypostasis ($uqn\bar{u}m$). In our opinion, we have a kind of identification between the natural properties and the hypostasis. It means that the hypostasis is the perfect manifestation of the natural properties of one species in a singular substance. When this singular substance, i.e., natural properties, obtains specific attributes and descriptions, it becomes a person (farsuff/ $\check{s}ahs$). This is the only text that we read among the works of Ibn at-Tayyib in which the term farsuff ($parsopa\bar{o}p\bar{a}$) was found. He identified it with the term $\check{s}ahs$, which is used more often to refer to the same metaphysical category⁵³.

⁵⁰⁾ It is an Arabic transliteration of the Syriac term parsopa (الفري عنه), which also may be read as farsofa.

⁵¹⁾ The translation is ours.

⁵²⁾ Ibn at-Tayyib, Work in fourteen chapters, p. 275 (ch. 11, par. 93-94).

⁵³⁾ Cf. HADDAD, La Trinité, p. 176. See also Bo HOLMBERG, "Person' in the Trinitari-

Our author, then, uses the three different categories that Babai developed in his system. Considering these three categories as three statuses of substances confirms our opinion that behind this system there are the three types of natures: the abstract, the concrete and the intermediate. In addition, we can note that he tries to apply the Cappadocian⁵⁴ doctrine regarding the meaning of hypostasis: a general and common nature with a specific idiom⁵⁵.

Ibn at-Tayyib gives an example to his readers in order to make it clearer. This example is taken from a quotation in the 13/14th century ms. Vatican Arab. 36, which is attributed to our author with the title "The difference between the substance and the hypostasis":

"The difference between the substance $(\check{g}awhar)$ and hypostasis $(qn\bar{u}m)$ and person $(\check{s}ahs)$ ", attributed to him [to *Ibn at-Tayyib*] (May God be pleased with him!).

The substance (*ğawhar*) is the indication of the **essence**, absolutely, as we say "human being".

And the hypostasis $(uqn\bar{u}m)$ is the indication of it [**the essence**] when it becomes, with vagueness, particular (*tahaşşaşat*) as we say "a man" or "a woman".

And the person (*šahs*) is the indication of it [**the essence**] when it becomes, with pureness, particular (*tahassasat*), as we say Moses and Mary⁵⁶.

الفرق بين الجوهر والقنوم والشخص له [ابن الطيب]، رضي الله عنه. الجوهر دلالة الذات على الإطلاق، كقولنا الإنسان. والقنوم دلالة عليها اذا تخصّصت بابحام، كقولنا رجل ما وامرأة ما. والشخص دلالة عليها اذا تخصّصت بتفصيح، كقولنا موسى ومريم⁵⁷.

First of all, we notice that our author is following the three metaphysical categories that Babai developed. Even if these three categories are different amongst each other, they are related to each other in some way, they are three statuses of the essence. The hypostasis ($uqn\bar{u}m$) is a singular nature

an Doctrine of Christian Arabic Apologetics and Its Background in the Syriac Church Fathers", in *Studia Patristica* 25 (1993), pp. 300-307.

⁵⁴⁾ That our author knew very will the doctrine of the Cappadocians, especially the one of Basil the Great, is confirmed by the numerous citations and references to his thought that he makes in his commentary on Genesis, see for example Ibn At-Tayyib, *Commentaire*, p. 7; this reference to Basil, in addition, is related to Basil's doctrine on the Trinity.

⁵⁵⁾ We find an affirmation of this in his work, "in fourteen chapters", see Ibn at-Tayyib, Work in fourteen chapters, p. 217 (ch. 8, par. 239): المُقنوم هو الجوهر بصفة»; He also gives the same definition in Ibn at-Tayyib, *Maqālah fī at-ta<u>t</u>līt*, p. 109: لأن الأقنوم ليس هو أكثر من ». We will return to this topic later in this paper.

⁵⁶⁾ The translation is ours.

⁵⁷⁾ Vat. ar. 36, f. 138^v.

without clear specification, i.e., without personal properties, or let us use the expression "without personalization". If the general and common substance is the human being, its singular natures are men and women. Simply, men and women are the perfect manifestation of the natural characteristics and attributes of the common essence. They indicate that this singular hypostasis belongs to the species of "human being".

When, however, each singular nature, i.e., hypostasis, obtains specific attributes and properties, it becomes a person (*šahş*). Therefore, we can say that we have different singular natures, the difference being indicated in the particularity of each singular nature, so that one may be called Moses and the other Mary. We think that the key for understanding the thought of Ibn at-Tayyib is his use of the word "*tahasşaşat*", which is a verbal form of the term "*hāsşah*", property.

This supports our claim that for our author hypostasis ($uqn\bar{u}m$) and person ($\bar{s}ahs$) are two different kinds of properties and attributes⁵⁸, being natural and particular. Here, in fact, is the explanation of the expressions "vagueness" and "pureness". Another thing we should note in this citation is the non-use of the term *farsūf*. This, in our opinion, is because, in contrast with its synonym *šahs*, the term *farsūf* did not enter the Arabic philosophical lexicon. Finally, this citation illustrates that these three categories are the three kinds of natures developed by the elaboration of Aristotle's doctrine on the substance with the one of stoicism.

2. Ibn at-Tayyib's metaphysical system and Trinitarian dogma

How could Ibn at-Tayyib apply this system to his Trinitarian doctrine? We must take into consideration that when he writes about the Trinity, he

⁵⁸⁾ In his work "in fourteen chapters" our author affirms this opinion by clearly stating that the hypostasis is one substance with a property, while the person is substances with many properties. It is clear that he is developing his doctrine dealing with the Christological issue, so he is talking about substances in one person. What interests us is the fact that hypostasis and person are identified with two different kinds of properties and attributes, see Ibn at-Tayyib, Work in fourteen chapters, p. 218 (ch. 8, par. 244): هذا القول قول من لا يفهم الفرق بين». In the same work we notice, as we did with Babai, that this identification means simply a manifestation of the attributes and properties, so the person manifests the personal attributes, and through its hypostasis manifests the natural properties, see Ibn at-Tayyib, Work in fourteen chapters, p. 219 (ch. 8, par. 246): "... attributes, par. 246): "... attributes, active and through its hypostasis manifests the natural properties, see Ibn at-Tayyib, Work in fourteen chapters, p. 219 (ch. 8, par. 246): "... attributes, active active, as we did with Babai, that this identification means simply a manifest the natural properties, see Ibn at-Tayyib, Work in fourteen chapters, p. 219 (ch. 8, par. 246): "... attributes, active active, attributes, active, attributes, active, attributes, active, attributes, active, attributes, active, attributes, active, active, attributes, active, attributes, active, activ

has his opponents specifically in mind, i.e., the Muslims⁵⁹. This means that in applying his metaphysical system, he must be careful not to be understood as a tritheist. In addition, we will notice that he uses Muslim language and doctrine, especially in the discussion on the divine attributes.

He said: "The Church believes that the Creator is one substance ($\check{g}awhar$) and He is described by three attributes ($sif\tilde{a}t$), and it believes that He is described by three hypostases ($aq\bar{a}n\bar{n}m$)...".

And the substance indicates the essence $(d\bar{a}t)$ of the sublime Creator, which, as it is demonstrated, is one; and the attributes indicate existing meanings of this essence, and [they] are not subsistent essences ($daw\bar{a}t q\bar{a}$ 'imah binufūsihā); they are the "paternity", the "filiation" and the "procession". And the hypostasis ($uqn\bar{u}m$) indicates the result of the essence with each one of the attributes. So when the essence is taken with the meaning of paternity, the result is called "Father", when the same [essence] is taken with the meaning of the filiation [it] is called "Son", and when it is taken with the meaning of the grocession [it] is called "Holy Spirit"...⁶⁰

قال البيعة تعتقد ان البارئ جوهر واحد موصوف بصفات ثلاث وتعتقد فيه بأنه يوصف بثلاثة أقانيم ...

والجوهر يشار به الى ذات البارئ تعالى التي قد بان أنما واحدة والصفات يشار بما الى معان موجودة لهذه الذات لا ذوات قائمة بنفوسها هي أبوة وبنوة وانبعاث، والأقنوم يشار به الى مجتمع الذات مع كل واحدة من الصفات فان الذات اذا أخذت مع معنى الأبوة قيل في المجتمع انه أب واذا اخذت بعينها مع معنى البنوة قيل فيها انما ابن واذا أخذت مع معنى الانبعاث قيل فيها انما روح القدس ...⁶¹

From the first affirmation we notice that for Ibn at-Tayyib the uniqueness of God is to be found in the fact that the divine nature is one: God is one according to his substance ($\check{g}awhar$), which is his essence ($d\bar{a}t$). The second thing we should note is that this one essence is described by three attributes ($sif\bar{a}t$) and by three hypostases ($aq\bar{a}n\bar{n}m$). Does our author limit the metaphysical function of hypostasis to describing the general essence? If the answer is yes, does he identify hypostasis with the attribute?

In the same citation above, it is clear that the attributes, which are also called "meanings" ($ma \, (\bar{a}n\bar{i})$, are not subsistent essences ($daw\bar{a}t$). This means that the attributes are not identified with hypostases ($aq\bar{a}n\bar{i}m$), which are essences as he claimed in his metaphysical system above. As a consequence, when Ibn at-Tayyib mentions that the divine essence is described by three

⁵⁹⁾ As we said, our author never mentions Muslims in his works, although it is clear that he writes apologetically to them as we will demonstrate in our analysis, see also FAULT-LESS, "*Ibn al-Ţayyib*", p. 670.

⁶⁰⁾ The translation is ours.

⁶¹⁾ Ibn aț-Țayyib, Maqālah fī at-tatlīt wa-t-tawhīd, p. 109.

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attributes and three $aq\bar{a}n\bar{i}m$, he is intending two different metaphysical categories. The attributes, in fact, according to our text, are the "paternity", the "filiation" and the "procession". This causes or leads us to argue that for him the attributes in Trinitarian doctrine are the idioms of the persons $(a\bar{s}h\bar{a}\bar{s})$ of his metaphysical system⁶².

As for Babai, "person" for Ibn at-Tayyib is the idiom of the Cappadocians, and in our case is called attribute (*sifah*). It is the group of the personal and individual properties of each singular substance. Attention, however, should be placed on Ibn at-Tayyib's approach to the Cappadocian system, and how he modifies Babai's system and applies it. He does not use the metaphysical term person ($fars\bar{u}f/\bar{s}ahs$), even though it is used in his general metaphysical doctrine, as we have seen above. For him, the Father is already a specific hypostasis, i.e., hypostasis with an attribute, which is the meaning of the paternity. For Ibn at-Tayyib the Cappadocian affirmation that the essence with an idiom forms the hypostasis is accepted under one condition: this general essence with the attribute makes not just any hypostasis, but a specific one. According to his metaphysical system, this hypostasis is a person, i.e., a singular subsistent substance 63 .

If the three divine $aq\bar{a}n\bar{n}m$ are known and recognized as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, this means that they are already specific $aq\bar{a}n\bar{n}m$, that is, hypostases with their persons (individual attributes of paternity, filiation and procession). The divine essence is one, but it is an abstract concept; it obtains its existence through the hypostases. These hypostases, however, are with their attributes, because they exist with the relation between them, i.e., they are cause and caused⁶⁴. The following scheme further clarifies this point:

⁶²⁾ Regarding the difference between hypostasis and person according to our author, see HADDAD, *La Trinité*, pp. 150, 157.

⁶³⁾ See also a comment on this in HADDAD, La Trinité, p. 154.

⁶⁴⁾ See also his *Maqālah muļtaşarah fī al-aqānīm wa-l-ǧawhar wa anna al-fi'l li-l-ǧawhar*, "Brief treatise on the hypostases and substance, and the fact that action pertains to the substance", edited twice, once by Gérard Troupeau and the second time by Samir Khalil Samir, cf. FAULTLESS, *«Ibn al-Ţayyib»*, 694. We were not able to read and check either of these editions, but since this work exists in one manuscript only, Vat. ar. 145, ff. $70^{v}-73^{v}$, we were able to read the manuscript and check the text of Ibn at-Ţayyib.

Father	=	Hypostasis of the Father	=	Divine essence with the attribute of pater- nity (person of the Father)	=	Hypostasis (divine subsistent substance)	+	Person (attribute of paternity)
Son	=	Hypostasis of the Son	=	Divine essence with the attribute of filia- tion (person of the Son)	=	Hypostasis (divine subsistent substance)	+	Person (attribute of filiation)
Holy Spirit	=	Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit	=	Divine essence with the attribute of pro- cession (person of the Holy Spirit)	=	Hypostasis (divine subsistent substance)	+	Person (attribute of procession)

The Father is the divine essence subsisting and recognized by a specific attribute, it is a hypostasis with a person. The Son is recognized as Son because of his relation to the Father; He is caused by the hypostasis of the Father, who is a divine particular essence, so He is also divine particular essence, (divine hypostasis). However, being caused by the Father, i.e., the inter-trinitarian relation, He has his attribute eternally, that is, the person of filiation. As a consequence, He is recognized to be Son, hypostasis and person. We can say the same about the Holy Spirit.

In his "Treatise on the Trinity and Unity", Ibn at-Tayyib declares that the result of the essence and the attribute is a specific hypostasis, i.e., hypostasis with person. Before we cite the text in which he mentions this doctrine, we need to underline the fact that in his apologetic works regarding Trinitarian dogma, he develops Trinitarian analogy, as all Arab-Christian theologians do. He chose the one of "knowledge" (*'ilm*), "knower" (*'ālim*), and "known" (*ma 'lūm*)⁶⁵. For him, these are three attributes that characterize the divine essence. This essence has the "knowledge", i.e., the Father, this essence knows itself, so it is "knower", i.e., the Son, and it is also "known" to itself, i.e., the Holy Spirit⁶⁶. It is clear that to develop such an analogy, he

⁶⁵⁾ Cf. HADDAD, La Trinité, p. 228.

فنقول ان النصارى تعتقد أن ذات البارئ واحدة» :60 Cf. Ibn at-Tayyib, Maqālah fī at-taulīt, p. 81 (66 بأدلة التوحيد ... وتعتقد ايضًا أن هذه الذات هي ذات لها صفة العلم، تعالت على أن تكون على ضد هذه الصفة، والذات التي تكون بصفة العلم شأنها أن تعلم فذات البارئ تعالى شأنها أن تعلم فهي تعلم ذاتما واذا كانت تعلم ذاتما ف والذات التي تكون بصفة العلم شأنها أن تعلم فذات البارئ يعالى شأنها أن تعلم فهي تعلم ذاتما واذا كانت تعلم ذاتما والذات التي تكون بصفة العلم شأنها أن تعلم فذات البارئ يعالى شأنها أن تعلم فهي تعلم ذاتما واذا كانت تعلم ذاتما والدات التي تكون بصفة العلم شأنها أن يعلم فذات البارئ يعالى شأنها أن تعلم في تعلم ذاتما واذا كانت تعلم ذاتما منه معلومة لها فيتحصل لها صفة العلم والعالم والعلوم عد ثبت أن ذات البارئ يعالى موجودة وأنما واحدة، ومعلوم أن هذه الذات لا تخلو أن تكون بصفة» :211 العالمين العاقلين أو لا وحرشيت من القسم الثاني فبقي أن تكون لها صفة العالمين العاقلين لأنه محال أن يكون خالق العلوم والعقول غير عالم ولا عاقل، وإذا كانت بمذه الصفة فلها قوة ان تعلم ذاتما احدى المعلوم الحافة العلم والعالم والعلوم

uses as a basis the discussion on the attributes that describe the divine essence. We will return to this topic further on in this paper. For now, let us read how he uses this analogy and integrates it into his metaphysical system:

And the Christians define the essence $(al-d\bar{a}t)$ as substance, not similar to the [created] substances, and they nominate the attributes $(sif\bar{a}t)$ properties $(haw\bar{a}ss)$.

They name the attribute of knowledge "paternity", and the attribute of knower "filiation", and the attribute of known "procession".

They name the sum [i.e., the results] that are [composed] by the essence with the attributes hypostases (*aqānīm*).

And when the essence is taken with the meaning of knowledge, this sum is called the hypostasis of the Father ($uqn\bar{u}m \ al-\bar{A}b$).

And when it is taken with the meaning of the knower, this sum is called the hypostasis of the Son (*uqnūm al-Ibn*).

And when it is taken with the meaning of the known, this sum is called the hypostasis of the Spirit $(uqn\bar{u}m al-R\bar{u}h)^{67}$.

According to such a system, the three hypostases can describe the divine essence, as Ibn at-Tayyib affirms in the above citation. Since the $aq\bar{a}n\bar{n}m$ include the attributes within themselves, i.e., the persons, they also describe the divine essence. It is clear again that there is no identification between hypostasis and attribute, but there is a relation. Let us read the following quotation, which further illustrates our analysis:

لأن الأقنوم ليس هو أكثر من مجتمع الذات مع is the result الأن الأقنوم ليس هو أكثر من مجتمع الذات مع

د ذاتها معلومة لها فتحصل لنا ذات فيها قوة على أن تعلم وقد علمت ذاتها وصارت معلومة لذاتها ... analogy see HADDAD, *La Trinité*, p. 228.

67) The translation is ours.

68) Ibn at-Ţayyib, Maqālah fī at-tatlīt, pp. 81,83. We find the same affirmation in his "Treatise on the Trinity and Unity", but without the application of the term uqnūm to the Father and the Son and the Spirit, although he says that these three are aqānīm: « كل »: "المحلفة القوة على العلم وهي المدلول عليها بالأبوة اذا أخذت مع واخدة من هذه الصفات مع الذات كان من الجملة أقنوم، فصفة القوة على العلم وهي المدلول عليها بالأبوة اذا أخذت مع الذات قيل في الذات انحا ذات من شأنها أن تعلم وهذا يعبر عنه بأنه أب، وصفة علمها لذاتها وهي المدلول عليها بالبنوة أخذت مع الذات تقوم من الجملة معنى العالم وهو المعبر عنه باقنوم الإبن، وصفة كونما معلومة اذا أخذت مع الذات نقوم أحذت مع الذات يقوم من الجملة معنى العالم وهو المعبر عنه باقنوم الإبن، وصفة كونما معلومة اذا أخذت مع الذات نقوم المعبر عنها بالروح

والنصارى تقول في الذات انحا جوهر لا كالجواهر وتسمي الصفات خواص، أما صفة العلم فيسمونحا أبوة وصفة العالم بنوة وصفة المعلوم انبعائًا. أقانيم، والذات إذا أخذت مع معنى العلم دعيت هذه الجملة أقنوم الأب، وإذا أخذت مع معنى العالم سميت هذه الجملة أقنوم الإبن، وإذا أخذت مع معنى المعلوم سميت هذه الجملة

أقنوم الروح⁶⁸.

of the essence (\underline{dat}) with the attribute (*sifah*); and since the attributes (*sifāt*) are three, if the essence is taken with each one of them, the result is one hypostasis (*uqnūm*). As a consequence, the Creator is one and many; one, from the side of the essence (\underline{dat}) and many from the side of the hypostases ($aq\bar{an}\bar{n}m$)⁶⁹. الصفة، ولأن الصفات ثلاث. فإذا أخذت الذات مع كل واحدة منها كان ذلك أقنومًا فيكون البارئ تعالى واحدًا وكثيرًا واحدًا من قبل الذات كثيرًا من قبل الأقانيم⁷⁰.

The last sentence, in fact, is similar to the one of his metaphysical rules presented above. Here we present a comparison:

When [the essence] obtains a multitude of descriptions [i.e. attributes], according to one side, it could be considered <u>one</u>, and according to another, <u>many</u>. It is <u>one</u>, from the side of the **substance** (*ğawhar*), it is, [however], <u>many</u>, from the side of its **descriptions** [i.e. attributes].

As a consequence, the Creator is one and many; <u>one</u>, from the side of **the essence** ($d\bar{a}t$) and <u>many</u> from the side of **the hypostases** ($aq\bar{a}n\bar{n}m$).

It is clear, then, that within the Trinitarian field, when our author affirms that the hypostases $(aq\bar{a}n\bar{i}m)$ describe the divine nature and that they are, in some way, identified by attributes, i.e., the individual idioms of each hypostasis (property, $h\bar{a}ssah$), he means that these hypostases are eternally with persons, because they came to exist through a relation between them⁷¹.

In our opinion, there are two reasons behind this interpretation and modification of Babai's system: 1) on the one hand, Ibn at-Tayyib wants to maintain one cause in the Trinity, i.e., the Father as hypostasis and person; 2) on the other hand, he also desires to underline the unity of the three hypostases in the one common essence.

⁶⁹⁾ The translation is ours.

⁷⁰⁾ Ibn at-Ţayyib, Maqālah fī at-tatlīt wa-t-tawhīd, p. 109.

⁷¹⁾ For some scholars the Nestorian Church identified hypostasis with attribute, see in the introduction of Robert CASPAR, "Les versions arabes du dialogue entre le Catholicos Timothée I et le Calife al-Mahdī (II^e/VIII^e Siècle) 'Mohammed a suivi la voie des prophètes' ", in *Islamocristiana* 3 (1977), 107-175, here 121. But, in fact, this identification must be read under the conditions that our author gives. For example, if here in Ibn at-Tayyib we do not find a clear identification between hypostasis and attribute, in Elias of Nisibis, a contemporary Nestorian author of Ibn at-Tayyib, the hypostases are attributes. Since both authors are of the same church, we think the key for understanding this identification in Elias is the doctrine of Ibn at-Tayyib here. For the Trinitarian doctrine in Elias see EBEID, *La Tunica*, pp. 451-482. Years before Elias, the Coptic bishop Sāwīrūs Ibn al-Muqaffa' identified hypostases with attribute, but he had a different basis for this identification and, as a result, a different doctrinal outcome, see EBEID, *La Tunica*, pp. 293-307, see also Mark SWANSON, "Are Hypostases Attributes? An investigation into the Modern Egyptian Christian Appropriation of the Medieval Arabic Apologetic Heritage", in *ParOr* 16 (1990-1991), pp. 239-250.

The cause cannot be an abstract reality, but the common nature is abstract. To resolve this problem, he considers the hypostasis a perfect manifestation of the common essence in a singular way that is the common essence with the attribute. The Father in this case is not identified with the abstract common nature, but being the cause, he manifests this common nature perfectly, and the hypostases caused by him also manifest perfectly the common nature. To explain this problem and to resolve it, he again uses the analogy of "knowledge" (*'ilm*), "knower" (*'ālim*) and "known" (*ma'lūm*). Through this analogy he tries to show that the three hypostases as essence are one, co-existing together eternally. Having one cause (Father) and two caused (Son and Spirit) does not mean that this one cause is of the divine essence and its existence. Rather, it is simply cause of itself, i.e., it manifests the inter-trinitarian relations:

And if we say that the Father is cause and the Son and the Spirit are caused, this should not be understood that we mean cause of existence [i.e., creation], because the essence is one numerically.

The Father, however, who is the same essence with the power of knowledge, is the cause of the Son and the Spirit, I mean, the same essence with the [ability] to be knower and known.

It is one essence, a cause of itself, not [as a cause] of [its] existence. If we, [however], comprise the essence of the Creator with the rest of the created beings, it [the divine essence] is cause of their existence [of the created beings] and of their formation and their creation⁷².

ونحن وان قلنا في الاب انه علة وفي الابن والروح انهما معلولان فلا يفهم منا أنا نريد علة وجود اذ كانت الذات واحدة بالعدد، الا أن الأب وهو الذات نفسها مع القوة على العلم هو علة الابن والروح أعني الذات نفسها في أن تكون عالمة ومعلومة

فتكون ذاتًا واحدةً علة لنفسها لا في الوجود فاما اذا قسنا ذات البارئ الى باقي الموجودات سواها فانما تكون علة لوجودها وكونما واحداثها⁷⁴.

In this way, he maintains a differentiation between the three metaphysical categories: essence, hypostasis and person; and at the same time, he tries to be closer to the Cappadocian doctrine and consistent with the official doctrine of his church. He does not have as a basis, as Rachid Haddad claimed, the neoplatonic doctrine⁷⁴. According to us, he is taking an Aristotelian approach to Babai's system⁷⁵.

⁷²⁾ The translation is ours.

⁷³⁾ Ibn at-Ţayyib, Maqālah fī at-tatlīt wa-t-tawhīd, pp. 119, 121.

⁷⁴⁾ Cf. HADDAD, La Trinité, pp. 243-245.

⁷⁵⁾ Cf. FAULTLESS, "Ibn al-Tayyib", p. 670.

The question that arises from such analysis is why did our author avoid using the term of person ($far s \bar{u} f/ s a h s$), even though he applied it as a concept, since he identified it with the attributes and the properties? A quick answer could be that he wanted to be consistent with the official doctrine of his church. The key, however, comes from his historical context and the discussion regarding the divine attributes.

3. Divine attributes and Ibn at-Tayyib's metaphysical system

One important element of the Christian-Muslim dialogue at the time of our author, and even earlier, was the divine attributes. It was also a dialogical topic among the different Islamic theological and philosophical schools. The question was the following: if the divine attributes are eternal as God is, it means that they co-exist with him and, as a consequence, there is polytheism in God, or as Muslims call it, $širk^{76}$.

Having this element in mind, Ibn at-Tayyib, who accepted the metaphysical system of Babai and modified it to explain the Trinitarian doctrine, also developed it through the doctrine on the divine attributes⁷⁷. First of all, his doctrine on the attributes of God consists of the distinction between two kinds of attributes: essential (*sifāt dāt*) and verbal (*sifāt fi 'l/ta 'addī*)⁷⁸. The essential attributes describe the divine essence and the inter-trinitarian relation of the

⁷⁶⁾ On this topic one can read the second chapter of Harry Austryn WOLFSON, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge-Massachusetts-London 1976, pp. 112-232. See also Harry Austryn WOLFSON, "The Muslim Attributes and the Christian Trinity", in *The Harvard Theological Review* 49 (1956), pp. 1-18; David THOMAS, "The Doctrine of the Trinity in the Early Abbasid Era", in Lloyd RIDGEON, ed., *Islamic Interpretations of Christianity*, St. Martins' Press, New York, 2001, pp. 78-98; Sidney GRIFFITH, "The Unity and Trinity of God: Christian Doctrinal Development in Response to the Challenge of Islam - An Historical Perspective", in Michael ROOT & James J. BUCKLEY, ed., *Christian Theology and Islam*, James Clarke & Co, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 11-21; Sara HUSSEINI, *Early Christian-Muslim Debate on the Unity of God: Three Christian Scholars and Their Engagement with Islamic Thought (9th Century C.E.)*, Brill, Leiden, 2014.

⁷⁷⁾ For a short comment on *Ibn at-Tayyib*'s doctrine on the divine attributes see FAULT-LESS, "*Ibn al-Tayyib*", p. 670; See also HADDAD, *La Trinité*, p. 156.

⁷⁸⁾ We would like to mention here that in this division of attributes we note the nucleus of the discussion regarding the distinction between essence and energy in God, which was developed during the 11th century in Byzantium. This discussion, however, was based on the doctrine of Basil the Great, cf. Γεώργιος ΜΑΡΤΖΕΛΟΣ, Ουσία και Ενέργειαι του Θεού κατά τον Μέγαν Βασίλειον. Συμβολή εις την ιστορικοδογματικήν διερεύνησιν της περί ουσίας και ενεργειών του Θεού διδασκαλίας της Ορθοδόζου Εκκλησίας, Πουρναράς, Thessaloniki, 1984, pp. 13-26. Again, we then see a Cappadocian influence in our author. However, we think that this topic requires another and more detailed research. See also HADDAD, La Trinité, pp. 189-190.

three hypostases. The verbal attributes, however, describe the extra-trinitarian relation, i.e., the relation of God with the other created beings.

This is not the place to analyze this aspect of Ibn at-Țayyib's doctrine; we would simply like to mention that the analogy of "knowledge" (*'ilm*), "knower" (*'ālim*) and "known" (*ma 'lūm*) is also used here to explain his opinion regarding the two kinds of attributes⁷⁹. These three attributes are of the essence and describe it. They are only three⁸⁰ because Scripture talks about the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, i.e., it is divine inspiration to believe in three divine hypostases⁸¹; In addition, our author tries to demonstrate the necessity of the number three through philosophical and logical instruments.⁸² The rest of the attributes are not essential and they describe the relation between God and His creatures. When we say God is "knowledge" (*'ilm*), "knower" (*'ālim*) and "known" (*ma 'lūm*), we are describing His essence that has the power of knowledge, knows itself, and is known to itself. When we say, however, God is powerful, or Creator, this manifests that in comparison with his creatures, He is powerful and He is their Creator.

From an Aristotelian approach he also shows that the verbal attributes

فصفات الذات هي الثلاث صفات التي قلنا، لا» :85 بعام والعالم والمعلوم ولا تتخطى ذات البارئ الى غيرها، وبمذا السبب قالت يجوز ان تزيد عليها ولا تنقص منها وهي صفة العلم والعالم والمعلوم ولا تتخطى ذات البارئ الى غيرها، وبمذا السبب قالت النصارى ان صفات البارئ ثلاث ووقفت عند ثلاثة اقانيم. فأما وصفه بأنه خالق المخلوقات فهي صفة تتعلق بالبارئ وبالمخلوقات اذ كانت صفة تدل على خلق المخلوقات، وكذلك صفة رازق وحكيم تتعداه الى الأمور المتقنة والمزوقة وصفة والمحلوقات اذ كانت صفة تدل على خلق المخلوقات، وكذلك صفة رازق وحكيم تتعداه الى الأمور المتقنة والمزوقة وصفة والجواب أن صفات البارئ تعالى على ضربين، صفة تتعدى الذات الى المخلوقين ولا تقف عند » :215 سعداه الى المقدور عليه والجواب أن صفات البارئ تعالى على ضربين، صفة تتعدى الذات الى المخلوقين ولا تقف عند » :315 سعداء الى المقدور والجواب أن صفات البارئ تعالى على ضربين، صفة تتعدى الذات الى المخلوقين ولا تقف عند » :315 سعداء الى المقدور معها جوهر الجود وصفة القدم تجر معها الزمان. والبيعة تعتقد أن البارئ ثلاثة اقانيم جوهر واحد فما كثر من صفات الذات معها جوهر الجود وصفة القدم تجر معها الزمان. والبيعة تعقد أن البارئ ثلاثة اقانيم جوهر واحد فما كثر من صفات الذات استقصائها، وهذه هي التي تخص الذات، وبأنما ثلاث أعني الصفات التي نص الذات فبحسبها تكون الاقانيم قلاقة لا التي يوصف بكا البارئ (تعالى) تنقسم الى: صفات الذات وصفات التي نفص الذات فبحسبها تكون الاقانيم قلاقة لا ومعوم أن الاوصاف » :(3 معلى الذات، وبأنما ثلاث أعني الصفات التي نفي العقول البشرية بالوقوف عليها ولا التي يوصف بكا البارئ (تعالى) تنقسم الى: صفات الذات وصفات التي نفي المات بالوجود الوصف بأنما موجودة، ومعوم أن الاوصاف » :(3 معالى) الذات وحفات التعدي. وصفات التي فبحسبها تكون الاقانيم قلاقة لا التي يوصف بكا البارئ (تعالى) عنه معان الذات وصفات التي على والمات بالوجود الوصف بأنما موجودة، ومع كمال الوجود وفي غايته، وإذا كانت هكذا، فلها الذائية بحسب الوجود. والفرق بين الكمال والغاية، أن الكمال كمال التي يوصف بكا البارئ (تعالى) منها الذات بعسب نفسها. فتكون أوصافها من جهة الوجود ثلاثة وهكدا من جهة الكمال كمال والعم، وكمال الوجود وفي غايته، وإذا الذات بعسب الموجود، فهذه، وان كانت كثيرة، فهي تجمع في ثلاث: في العمم، والعلم وكمال العلم. فأم

فصفات الذات هي الثلاث صفات التي قلنا، لا» SO Cf. Ibn at-Tayvib, *Maqālah fī at-tailīt*, p. 85: «V كَا (80 كَّا (80 يَجوز ان تزيد عليها ولا تنقص منها ... والنصارى ليس تمتنع من وصف البارئ باكثر من ثلاث صفات لكنها تمتنع من ان يجوز ان تزيد عليها ولا تنقص منها ... والنصارى ليس تمتنع من وصف البارئ باكثر من ثلاث صفات لكنها تمتنع من ان see also Ibn at-يجوز ان تزيد عليها ولا تنقص منها ... والنصارى ليس تمتنع من وصف البارئ باكثر من ثلاث صفات لكنها تمتنع من ان see also Ibn attayib, *Maqālah fī al-tailīt wa-l-tawḥīd*, p. 115: « يخص الذات فأما صفات الفعل فليس تقف فيها عند حد معين وبأنها ثلاث أعني الصفات التي تخص الذات فبحسبها ». تكون الاقانيم قلاقة لا زاءدة ولا ناقصة. .. تكون الاقانيم قلاقة لا زاءدة ولا ناقصة

⁸¹⁾ See for example, Ibn at-Tayyib, *Work in fourteen chapters*, pp. 412-414 (ch. 19, par. 37-47). See also HADDAD, *La Trinité divine*, 99, 102-103.

⁸²⁾ See for example, Ibn at-Tayyib, Work in fourteen chapters, p. 411 (ch. 19, par. 36).

exist in God eternally, so they are in him as «δυνάμει εἶναι» (*bi-l-quwwah*), i.e. He has the power to manifest them. At one specific time, these attributes are manifested as «ἐνέργεια εἶναι» (*bi-l-fi 'l*)⁸³. It is also notable that in this explanation, he is modifying the Cappadocian use of Aristotle's system. They talked about «δυνάμει εἶναι», «ἐνέργεια εἶναι», «εὖ εἶναι», to show that the energy of God is one, and each hypostasis has its own role in manifesting this one energy⁸⁴. For our author, however, the interest is to prove that the verbal attributes exist eternally in God. In conclusion, we can say that for Ibn at-Tayyib all the attributes are of the divine essence, however, one group describes the essence as it exists, while the other group describes the actions of this essence, either as "power to act" or as "manifestation of the action".

According to Babai's system there are two kinds of properties: the natural and the personal. The hypostasis $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{a})$ manifests the natural, that is, the common substance. The person $(pars\bar{o}p\bar{a})$ is the group of the individual idioms of one hypostasis, its personalization. Ibn at-Tayyib, on the one hand, wants to maintain Babai's system as a basis of his doctrine, and, on the other hand, has in mind the discussion on God's attributes and their two kinds, which are the essential and the verbal. In our opinion, his desire not to complicate his system so that it could be comprehended by his Muslim readers, and his will to demonstrate that the hypostases are eternal attributes of the divine essence and are not identified with the essence but coexist and describe it, led him to modify Babai's system and to interpret it in a very interesting way.

First of all, he avoids using the term person ($fars\bar{u}f/sahs$) in his Trinitarian doctrine, and we think that he gives the attribute (sifah) and property ($h\bar{a}ssah$) the metaphysical function of Babai's $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$, but with some difference. Attribute, in this case, is essential, i.e., it describes the common essence. The result of this description is one specific hypostasis ($uqn\bar{u}m$). We see, in addition, an approach to the Cappadocians' system, but even in this approach our author departs from it by explaining it in a way we would call an Aristotelian interpretation of Babai's system. The attribute, then, is not exactly as Babai's $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$, that is, the individual properties of one $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$.

⁸³⁾ Cf. Ibn at-Tayyib, *Maqālah fī at-ta<u>t</u>līt wa-t-tawhīd*, p. 115: « فالبارئ تعالى يوصف بحذه الصفات في القدم على أنها فيه وملكات شأنها أن تفعل، وما تفعله فهو موجود لها في القدم بالقوة ايضًا فان القدرة ما دامت بالقوة فمقدورها بالقوة واذا فعلت صار مقدورها بالفعل وبعد ايجاد العالم يوصف بانه حكيم وجواد بالفعل لأن Regarding Aristotle thought see ΜΑΡΤΖΕΛΟΣ, "Η έννοια", p. 57. 84) Cf. ΜΑΡΤΖΕΛΟΣ, "Η έννοια", pp. 72-73.

The attribute for Ibn at-Tayyib describes the common essence (\underline{dat}) and forms with it a particular substance, an $uqn\bar{u}m$. The result in both systems is the same: a specific hypostasis, i.e., a singular substance with personal and individual property.

Although Ibn at-Tayyib makes this modification, he maintains three different metaphysical categories in his system. He refuses, however, to use the term "person" for the reason of its meaning in the Arabic philosophical lexicon. First of all, the term *farşūf* is not used in such lexicon; the term *šahş*, in fact, is its synonym and replaces it metaphysically. *Šahş* in Arabic means individual, and this concept contains the meaning of division within itself⁸⁵. If Ibn at-Tayyib would apply it in Trinitarian dogma, as he does in the anthropological field of Christology⁸⁶, the Trinity would be understood as a tritheistic doctrine⁸⁷.

The reasons which led Ibn at-Tayyib to interpret Babai's system in this way are now clear. We should pay attention, however, to the fact that when we say that he considers the attributes as essential, he does not understand them as the category of natural properties. They describe the divine essence, but at the same time each attribute gives the essence a different description, giving it a different personalization. His whole purpose is to convey the idea that, since the hypostases include the common essence and different attributes, they describe the common essence through its perfect manifestation in each hypostasis, without, however, underlining that the hypostases are three particular substances of the common species. In this way, the hypostases are not understood to be three divided realities and individuals, which would be tritheism or polytheism. As a result, Ibn at-Tayyib at the same time tries to follow Babai's system, to modify it to be in concordance with the official faith of his church, and to elaborate it in order to answer the questions regarding the issues of his time, i.e., the divine attributes. He is a real inter-

⁸⁵⁾ See in regards the opinion of the Nestorian 'Ammār al-Başrī, *Apologie et Controverses* (coll. "Recherches, Nouvelle Série B", 5), Arabic text edited by Michel AL-HAYEK, Dār al-mašriq, Beyrouth, 1977, pp. 161-162.

⁸⁶⁾ For our author the term *šaḥş* when it is applied to human beings means a single human nature, i.e., an individual. This is clear in his Christological doctrine as he calls the humanity of Christ the assumed human person (*šaḥş*), with whom God was united. cf. Ibn at-Tayyib, *al-Kalām fī al-ittiḥād*, p. 149: (*šaḥş*), with whom God was united. cf. Ibn atgdf نه ليس من الأشياء المحسوسة وليس بجسم اتخذ شخصًا واتحد به»; see also Ibn at-Tayyib, *Al-Kalām fī al-ittiḥād*, p. 194 (ch. 8, par 138): ... ه.

⁸⁷⁾ Cf. HADDAD, *La Trinité*, p. 176; See also FAULTLESS, "*Ibn al-Tayyib*", p. 670. We came to the same conclusion regarding another author of the same church, i.e., Elias of Nsibis. See, EBEID, *La Tunica*, p. 479.

preter, philosopher and theologian of his church.

4. Ibn at-Ţayyib's Christological approach

As we said, according to the Christological doctrine of Babai and the official Christology of the Church of the East after the year 612, Christ is the union of two natures and two hypostases. He is the one person of filiation, one Christ and Son. This means that the person of the Son was given to the $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ of the human being in Christ so that it could be personalized.

We would now like to present very briefly the Christology of Ibn at-Tayyib in order to see how he explains it after having modified Babai' system:

And the belief of this group [Nestorians, Orientals] regarding the union is that the two substances (*al-ğawharayn*) remain as they are, and the two hypostases (*al-uqnūmayn*) as they are, and the union took place in the property ($h\bar{a}ssah$) of the filiation, which is the meaning of knowing the Creator's essence of itself. This person (sahs) [Jesus] chosen from the Lady. [Mary] shared this property ($h\bar{a}ssah$) with God, and became from it one Christ, one Son, not one substance ($\check{g}awhar$) or one hypostasis ($uqn\bar{u}n$)⁸⁸.

And through these arguments it is demonstrated that Christ, after the union, is two substances ($\check{g}awhar\bar{a}n$) and two hypostases ($uqn\bar{u}m\bar{a}n$), one Son. The union, then, is in the filiation, [not] in the substance ($\check{g}awhar$) nor in the hypostases ($uqn\bar{u}m$)⁹⁰.

واعتقاد هذه الفرقة في الاتحاد أن الجوهرين على طباعهما، والأقنومين على طباعهما، ووقوع الاتحاد في خاصة البنوة التي قررناها، وإنما معنى علم ذات البارئ بنفسه. فهذا الشخص المصطفى من السيدة شارك الإله في هذه الحاصة، فصار منها مسيحًا واحدًا، ابنًا واحدًا، لا جوهر واحد ولا أقنوم واحد⁹⁰. الإتحاد، جوهران وأقنومان، ابن واحد. فالاتحاد الاقنوم⁹¹.

The interesting thing in this Christological approach is that Ibn at-Tayyib differs, in some way, from the traditional and official doctrine of his church; he does not mention the term "person" to express the uniqueness in Christ⁹². Even though Christ is one, the subject after the union is one Christ and one Son. There are, however, two united substances and two united hypostases in this one subject. So terminologically, he differs from his tradition, but the content is the same.

⁸⁸⁾ The translation is ours.

⁸⁹⁾ Ibn at-Ţayyib, Al-Kalām fī al-ittihād, p. 193 (ch. 8, par. 130).

⁹⁰⁾ The translation is ours.

⁹¹⁾ Ibn at-Tayyib, Al-Kalām fī al-ittihād, p. 197 (ch. 8, par. 152).

⁹²⁾ We arrived at the same conclusion regarding Elias of Nisibis. See, EBEID, La Tunica, pp. 569-570.

Instead of talking about the person of the union, the person of filiation, as it is called in his tradition, i.e., the person of Christ and Son, he mentions that the union took place in the property of filiation. According to our analysis, however, the essential property and attribute has the function of Babai's *parşōpā*. In this case, he follows the doctrine of his church applying to it his development of the metaphysical system.

The divine essence with the one property of filiation forms the hypostasis of the eternal Son. With the same property the human substance forms the hypostasis of the man taken from the Virgin Mary.

What is interesting in all of this is that at one side, Ibn at-Tayyib does not use the term person $(\check{s}ah\check{s})$ as a term for the metaphysical concept of *parsopā*, even though in his metaphysical system this term is mentioned clearly. At the other side, however, he uses this term, as we said above, for the human being in Christ in order to underline that the humanity in Christ is one individual, one single human hypostasis and person. He made this modification for one reason, which is to emphasize that the humanity in Christ is not an abstract nature, or the common substance of humanity, but one single substance.

He could not apply the term šahs to the divine hypostasis because, as we said, he wished to avoid being understood as tritheistic. What is important in this case is to underline the fact that the union was made between one *uqnūm* of the three divine hypostases, the Son, with one single man, the *šahs* taken from Mary. It is clear that in this case the term *šahs* is only used in anthropological doctrine, and means a singular, personalized substance and one individual⁹³. In the Trinitarian field, however, it is not used.

In conclusion, Ibn at-Tayyib's, in his theological thought modified his metaphysical system, and as a result, he created two different metaphysical categories: person (δahs) and property ($sifah/h\bar{a}ssah$). Hypostasis in Trinitarian doctrine is specific, so it includes its particular attribute and property. It is not person, since the three hypostases are not separated realities. However, in anthropological doctrine, the specific hypostasis, that is the essence and

⁹³⁾ In fact one can notice that in anthropological context *šaḥṣ* is to be considered as a synonym of hypostasis (*uqnūm*), which is a single subsistent substance personalized and individualized, see for example this identification in his commentary on Genesis Ibn At-tayyib, *Commentaire*, p. 28: وتسمية ادم بحذا الاسم واسم الرجل اما الثاني فتسمية جنسية ولاول **شخصية**. وكذلك سميت vidualized, see for example this identification in his commentary on Genesis Ibn At-tayyib, *Commentaire*, p. 28: وتسمية ادم بحذا الاسم واسم الرجل اما الثاني فتسمية جنسية ولاول **شخصية**. وكذلك محود بحدا الاسم واسم الرجل اما الثاني فجنسية والاول قنومية (Nature Commentary on Genesis Ibn At-tayyib, commentary on Commentary

one attribute, is one person, i.e., an individual, since it is a separated reality.

CONCLUSION

The metaphysical system is the basis for expressing the Christian faith in philosophical terms and concepts, that is, in dogmas. Different metaphysical systems, different definitions and comprehensions of the concepts and terms produce different ways for expressing the dogmas. Among the Antiochene thinkers and theologians, there was the use of an elaborated version of the Aristotelian metaphysical system regarding the substance and its kinds. This elaborated version began with the Cappadocians, namely Gregory of Nyssa who mixed Aristotle's and Stoicism's doctrines on the substances.

This Antiochene system consists of three kinds of nature: abstract nature (the species), concrete nature (singular and particular), and partial nature, i.e., nature in intermediate status (not abstract and not particular). We also find such division in some commentators of Aristotle, under a Stoic influence, which means that it was a current philosophical system⁹⁴. Babai the Great, in a decisive moment of his church, developed a metaphysical system that had as its basis the system circulating among the Antiochenes, with the purpose of defending the Christological doctrine of the two natures, two hypostases, and one person. His starting point, then, was Christological, and consequently he had to apply his system to the Trinitarian field.

Nature $(ky\bar{a}n\bar{a})$ is an abstract reality, hypostasis $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{a})$ is a nature in intermediate status, i.e., it has the natural properties of the species to whom it belongs, however still not personalized. It is concrete reality and singular nature, but without specific properties which make it distinct from the other hypostases subject to the same common nature. This distinction is made by the person (parsopa) that each hypostasis possesses, which is the group of the individual properties. According to this system, the divine nature is abstract reality; the three divine hypostases $(qn\bar{o}m\bar{e})$ are subject to this reality and manifest perfectly its natural properties. These three hypostases are distinct through the particular person (parsopa) of each one, the group of the particular properties of each $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$. In the Christological field, Christ is two natures, i.e., two different substances. These natures are distinct through their natural properties that are manifested by the $qn\bar{o}m\bar{a}$ of each one, and

because of this, the two realities are also two $qn\bar{o}m\bar{e}$, i.e., two distinct and different concrete natures. These two $qn\bar{o}m\bar{e}$, however, are personalized by the same $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$, i.e., the common $pars\bar{o}p\bar{a}$ of filiation.

If for Babai the starting point was the Christological doctrine for which he developed his metaphysical system and then applied it to the Trinitarian field, for Ibn at-Tayyib, the starting point was the Trinitarian doctrine. He elaborated and modified Babai's system, applied it to his Trinitarian doctrine, and then came to use his new approach in the Christological field. We can say that Ibn at-Tayyib adopted Babai's system when he talks metaphysically, i.e., when he gives definitions for the metaphysical concepts. When he had to apply it, however, in Trinitarian and Christological doctrine, he had to make a modification, an elaboration and interpretation. While the theological and doctrinal content of both theologians was identical, that is, the faith of the Church of the East, the context of Ibn at-Tayyib was different: 1) we have the return of the discussion on the Trinity and also on the person of Christ; 2) we have a new language and a different philosophical lexicon. This element, in fact, was the reason behind the interpretation that Ibn at-Tayyib made of Babai's system.

Ibn at-Tayyib used the same basis as Babai, i.e., the doctrine regarding the three kinds of nature. He was able to accept such a division, since he was an Aristotelian philosopher and commentator, and since such a system was also adopted by other commentators of Aristotle. In addition, he was familiar with the use of this system by Babai. Ibn at-Tayyib, then, on the one hand, wanted to maintain the basis of the Cappadocians' doctrine, and on the other, he knew that Babai's system, with some modification, could be helpful in explaining the Trinitarian faith to Muslims. We understand this modification as an Aristotelian interpretation of Babai's system, and not simply an application of the Cappadocians' thought into Babai's system, since Ibn at-Tayyib approached the Cappadocians' doctrine through an Aristotelian reading.

The three divine $aq\bar{a}n\bar{i}m$, then, are the composition of the divine essence with essential attributes that describe the common divinity. These three hypostases are not partial natures, since their attributes are specific; they manifest the inter-trinitarian relation. For this reason, Ibn at-Tayyib was able to affirm that the $aq\bar{a}n\bar{i}m$ describe the essence, and they are not three separated realities, that is, they are not three divinities. As a consequence, trying to avoid the accusation of being tritheistic, he did not apply the term person ($fars\bar{u}f/sahs$) in his Trinitarian doctrine. The metaphysical function of this concept was given to the concept of property/attribute ($h\bar{a}ssah/sifah$),

which is related to the hypostasis. In this way, he was able to say that the three Christian hypostases are three distinct essential attributes of God's one essence, and not three individuals or three singular separated divine substances.

From this starting point, he also modified the Christological doctrine by not calling the one Christ and Son "person" ($\hat{s}ah\hat{s}$). Consequently, the union took place in the property of the filiation and not in the *parsopā* of the Son that was given to the human nature in Christ, as Babai teaches. That being so, the natures in Christ are two, and these two natures have one attribute, and are two hypostases ($aq\bar{a}n\bar{n}m$). Ibn at-Tayyib was able to affirm that the union was between one *uqnūm*, the Son, and not the whole Trinity, with one single human being, i.e., one human *uqnūm*, which is person ($\hat{s}ah\hat{s}$), that is, separated concrete nature.

In this way he could:

1) reply to Muslims and prove to them that the three $aq\bar{a}n\bar{n}m$ are essential attributes of God, and not three gods;

2) explain that there are differences between essential attributes and verbal ones;

3) maintain his ecclesiastical tradition of not using the term person in Trinitarian doctrine;

4) give the metaphysical function of person to the property;

5) apply, after this modification, Babai's system to the Cappadocians' doctrine with an Aristotelian approach;

6) avoid the accusation of tritheism by using the term "person" only in an anthropological doctrine; and

7) express the Christological faith of his church using this system.

Finally, we conclude by saying that the work of Ibn at-Tayyib was more than a mere transmission of the doctrine of Babai or the Cappadocians, and was more than an elaboration of it or a simple modification. Rather, it should be considered a doctrinal and philosophical development within the Church of the East and Christian thought.

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