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The Silk Road in the Tangut Era: Preliminary Thoughts by the Editor

The present volume is not just the product of editorial cooperation but also heralds new intellectual developments. Whereas the Silk Road has been studied from a number of angles by textual and art historians, archaeologists and also linguists in the past, this volume of the *Central Asiatic Journal* bears witness to the increasing incorporation of subjects once regarded as “niche” into the mainstream of Asian history. This encouraging trend is incarnate in this CAJ volume by means of contributions by scholars who are familiar with the Tangut, Tibetan, Turkic and Chinese writing systems necessary for decrypting the intricate network of textual and material legacy of Central Asiatic civilisations.

The authors who have contributed to this volume know the manuscript collections at all relevant university and national libraries and museums, which they have analysed with great accuracy and by taking into account the historical and cultural (religious) context. The core of the present volume goes back to the initiative of our two guest editors, namely Prof. Yu Xin 余欣, of Zhejiang University 浙江大學 in Hangzhou, and Prof. Kirill Solonin, of China Renmin University 中國人民大學 in Beijing, who employed their own academic expertise in scrutinising and coordinating the contributions by what can rightfully be regarded as the nexus of mediaeval Silk Route studies. The contents of their articles can be found summarised and contextualised in the foreword by Prof. Stephen Teiser, Princeton University.

The remaining contributions have been carefully selected as being compatible in content and time period, complementing the selection made by our two guest editors. We begin this volume with a linguistic article by Erdem Uçar, who proposes a new interpretation of an important passage in the Tuñuquq Inscription, famed witness to the Second Eastern Turkic Khaganate, founded by the Göktürk Ašina dynasty and predecessor of the Uyghur Khaganate. It is thus contemporary to the articles in this volume which focus on the other populations and states of “mediaeval” Central Asia, be these Sogdian, Tangut or Chinese. Transporting us to their historical roots, Maddalena Barengi devotes her academic energy to a Turkic warrior community of the ninth century, collectively referred to as the Shatuo, who migrated from the northwestern fringes to the core regions of the Tang empire. Barengi illustrates the degree of socio-political mobility within the Tang military and even within the civilian administration. The article also provides a vivid reminder of the crisis which emerged from the collapse of the Uyghur Khaganate. The Uyghurs would eventually migrate to Ganzhou and Qocho (Turpan), where they established themselves as Buddhist state units. Barengi’s contribution thus heralds the transition of the Uyghurs into the Tangut, Khitan and – eventually – the Mongolian em-

pires. Romain Lefèbvre's comparative study of the *dhāraṇī sūtra* in Tangut and in Chinese underlines the fluidity of cultural determinants in the region. Translated from Sanskrit to Chinese by Dānapāla (Shi Hu 施護) in the early Song era, i.e. late tenth century, the *dhāraṇī sūtra* was one of hundreds of Buddhist scrolls translated by imperial order at the state-sponsored monastery of Taiping Xingguosi 太平興國寺 in Henan. The important role of the Tangut state as a transmission base for Buddhist knowledge is thus underlined. The continuation of this tradition into the Mongol-dominated Yuan era is emphasised in Nie Hongyin's article on a newly discovered Tangut compilation of three texts on astral worship. Nie's contribution shows that the three *sūtras*, translated into Tangut from Chinese or Tibetan, show subtle differences compared with the other preserved versions. In particular the *Suvarṇacakra-uṣṇīṣa dhāraṇī*, transmitted by Jayānanda and translated by Dehui in the mid-12th century, shows unique features. Yuan-era monk Huijue outlined that this was published in order to abate the suffering caused by the Haidu rebellion against the Yuan forces (1268–1301). The role of Buddhism in the complex and shifting political sands of Central Asia also becomes clear in the article by Peter Zieme and Aydar Mirkamal, who present two fragments of a Pure Land Buddhist *sūtra* on a *pustaka* leaf kept in separate portions at the Turfan Collection in Berlin and at the National Library of China. Joined up for the first time and interpreted as one, this article focuses on Turfan and Dunhuang between the 11th and 13th centuries and thus forms a harmonious whole with the body of contributions coordinated by our guest editors. Hartmut Walravens, finally, in his contribution on the Turkologist Friedrich Wilhelm Radloff (1837–1918), not only provides us with detailed insight into the academic and personal gestation of this eminent Russian scholar, but also creates a link between the Turkic, Mongolian and Tungusic entities of mediaeval Central Asia and with the populations of the late Tsarist empire.

The final part of this volume consists of two obituaries and a brief sequence of book reviews provided by the editor. All titles reviewed are directly relevant to the thematic contents of this volume and will be known to the specialists concerned, but probably not to the wider public and academic institutions, who deserve to be kept informed of the considerable academic progress which has been made in recent years. The first of the obituaries is authored by Huang Xin, illustrating the scholarly legacy of the Altaist James Bosson (Univ. Berkeley, †2016), who helped shape the knowledge of Mongolian languages, but also of Tibetan and Manchu, during an era when the knowledge of these languages became integral to the historical understanding of Central Asia, Russia and China. The other obituary, by Hartmut Walravens, reflects on the life of the ethnographer and Mongolist Erika Taube (Univ. Leipzig, †2020), who devoted her life not only to the furthering of Altaic studies, but in particular to the culture of the Tuvans (Тывалар/Tıvalar).

This volume has required a significant input of collective energy, from its very conception to the final technical editing. Further to thanking my guest editors Prof. Yu Xin and Prof. Kirill Solonin, I wish to express my gratitude, as always, to Dr Petra Himstedt-Vaid, without whose devotion this volume would have been im-

possible to accomplish. On behalf of the *Central Asiatic Journal*, I also welcome Prof. Tatiana Pang 龐曉梅 Татьяна А. Пан as full member of our editorial board. Tatiana Pang has decades of experience as Manjurist and as a general expert in the history and cultures of Central Asia and of China and was recently promoted to the position of vice-director of the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, Russian Academy of Sciences (Институт восточных рукописей – Российская Академия Наук) in Saint Petersburg. To Prof. Pang, as well as to all our contributors over the years and to our readers, a heartfelt welcome to volume 63 of the *Central Asiatic Journal*.

Finally, this volume is dedicated to Albert Hoffstädt, who is close to retiring from the publishers Brill, to whom he has devoted a significant part of his life. Albert Hoffstädt will be known to most academics and librarians who deal with Central Asia and China, and his professional and erudite advice concerning publications will be much missed.

Lars P. Laamann
March 2021

New Approaches and New Materials in the Study of Central Asia

Preface by

Stephen F. Teiser

Princeton University

The articles gathered in this issue of *Central Asiatic Journal* take innovative approaches, utilising material old and new, in the study of central Asia. Each contribution is based on the scrupulous philological study of texts ranging from manuscripts and rare editions to transmitted sources in a variety of languages, as well as artistic and material evidence. Beyond that, each essay engages in serious interdisciplinary consideration of the cultural, ethnic, linguistic, religious and political forces at work. The authors practise historical writing at its best, combining close readings of individual documents and unique objects with sophisticated reflection on how small pieces of evidence relate to – and significantly alter – the received understanding of broader patterns. This issue of the journal also demonstrates how, in the premodern period, the now-popular rubric of Silk Road Studies covered a much broader range of time and space than usually assumed.

Popova provides meticulous, copiously annotated translations of important sections of the two most important primary sources for the study of Chinese administration of the Western Regions during the Former Han dynasty, the *Records of the Historian* (*Shiji* 史記, completed in 87 BCE) and the *History of the Former Han* (*Qian Hanshu* 前漢書, completed in 76 CE). She combines these with her own astute analysis of toponyms, office names, administrative and military organisations, and other terminology. She also draws on the still underappreciated scholarship of one of the first Russian sinologists, Nikita Bichurin (1777–1853). While focused on the early period, the article also broaches important subjects that were salient through the following two millennia, including the limits of Chinese control over Xinjiang and other parcels included in the shifting concept of the “Western Regions” and the policies adopted by successive Chinese states toward relations with foreign states.

Ogihara offers what he modestly titles a “Miscellany on the Tumshuqese Documents”, but, in fact, through the linguistic methods used and the corpus of materials consulted, the article delivers much more. It summarises significant advances in our

understanding of an important Eastern Iranian language of the western Tarim Basin, the Tumshuqese dialect of Saka. His findings concern noun classes, the meaning of specific locutions, the construction of passages denoting quantity, and words used as forms of address. Most of his direct evidence is drawn from a small, rarely consulted batch of Tumshuqese contracts first pioneered by Sten Konow.¹ He also traces productive connections with the legal culture and linguistic practices of contracts written in Prakrit, Khotanese, Yarkand Uyghur and Bactrian.

Ching, Enami and Okada advance the striking thesis that cotton was used in combination with other materials in the making of paper for documents written in Chinese and other languages of Kucha (Sanskrit, Tocharian B, Khotanese and Tumshuqese). Advanced digital microscopy lies at the heart of their research. Their photographs (employing magnification up to x 500) definitively show the different types of materials (including cotton, mulberry, fibrillated millet, foxtail millet bristles, raw hemp fibre, hempen thread, grass fibre, starch dyed animal hair and other plant debris) used in various manuscripts from the Otani collection held at the Omiya Library at Ryukoku University. They explain their methodology and interpret the microscopic evidence clearly, taking great pains to place the scientific examination of fibres in the context of codicology, manuscript studies, the history of papermaking, and the cultural, religious, political and social forces at work along what Jonathan Bloom and others have called the “Paper Road”.² They also highlight the fact that cotton was cultivated in the Tarim Basin much earlier than is usually acknowledged. Their combining of hard scientific techniques with philological sophistication and sensitive understanding of the cultural forces at work is a model for other scholars.

Wen’s article, the longest in this issue, uses the multidisciplinary study of two eighth-century Khotanese-language wooden account tablets to advance our understanding of social life in Khotan. His methodology draws on linguistic analysis, the codicology and palaeography of ancient documents, sociolinguistics and key concepts of social history. The core of his analysis is a transcription, critical edition, translation and detailed topical commentary on the two wooden texts. But his conclusions extend far beyond the material. He shows how local granaries in eighth-century Khotan disbursed grain for a variety of purposes and to numerous local actors: to the government for tax payments, to local citizens for loans and sales, to monasteries for the copying of Buddhist texts and to support Buddhist monks travelling under state auspices. Along the way, Wen also casts significant light on the nature of kinship ties in Khotanese villages, the collective ownership of goods, and

1 Sten Konow, “Ein neuer Saka-Dialekt”, *Sitzungsberichte der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philologische-historische Klasse* (1935): 772–823.

2 Jonathan Bloom, “Silk Road or Paper Road?” *Silkroad Newsletter* 3, no. 2 (December 2005): 21; idem, *Paper Before Print: The History and Impact of Paper in the Islamic World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 16–89.

the different ways that local society was connected to the broader Silk Road network.

Yu's article amasses a huge variety of material in many different media – from precious artifacts and sarcophagi unearthed in digs to historical treatises and collections of legends – to probe how the Chinese world imagined fabulous exotica and the fabled realm of Qiuci. His project focuses on five unusual objects: beautiful washing pots, magical wooden boards, glass marvellously inlaid with gold, silver bowls for libation and stone pillows that transport the dreamer to never-never land. While firmly rooted in the material (the texts and objects) and their materiality, Yu is especially attentive to what Edward Schafer called the “real life” of exotic objects, which he says were fashioned in “the bright world of the imagination, where we take our true holidays”.³ Yu shows deftly how the imagination of distant objects was achieved through a dialectical movement of ideas and objects between Chinese and foreign sources. He also develops a new understanding of the Chinese discourse of natural history (*bowuxue* 博物學), significantly different from how this episteme has been understood in the West.

Arrault's important contribution places the close study of annotated calendars of lucky and unlucky days among the Dunhuang manuscripts in the longer history of hemerology. Also drawing on earlier Chinese bamboo manuscripts, Turfan materials, and Khara-khoto manuscripts, he lays out the most important stages in the development of hemerological systems and the various influences from early China, India and Persia, as well as late-mediaeval China. He finds that calendars at Dunhuang grew noticeably more complicated in the tenth century. Specifically, tenth-century calendars use a system of 28 lodges arranged according to seven sexagenary cycles to number the days of the month, and they combine the 28 lodges with the 12 houses of the Western zodiac. His multidisciplinary approach allows him not only to interpret the surviving material fully and convincingly, but also to reconstruct the original arrangement and design of fragmentary documents.

Solonin uses the comparison of Tangut, Tibetan and Chinese language sources to deepen our understanding of how Buddhism developed during the Western Xia dynasty. He focuses on a batch of eleventh-twelfth century Tangut manuscripts held in St. Petersburg. His conclusions are important for understanding both the local development of Buddhist traditions in the Western Xia and the ways in which Buddhist doctrine developed somewhat differently in the Tibetan and later Chinese traditions. Altogether, he concludes, the Tangut material testifies to a systematic effort to propagate *Rdzogs chen* Buddhism in the Tangut state. Solonin is particularly adept at combining the method of comparative philology with the analysis of the texts' contents, titles and organisational principles.

Fu's article poses the arresting question of “Why was the Taoist Master Qiu Chuji received by a Christian priest on his journey in Central Asia?” and utilises the

3 Edward H. Schafer, *The Golden Peaches of Samarkand: A Study in Tang Exotics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 1.

genre of a detective story to cast fascinating new light on the communication networks along the eastern Silk Road following the weakening of the Tang, Arab, Tibetan and Uyghur empires in the eighth through twelfth centuries. Fu argues that Nestorians were responsible for maintaining an organised system of postal relays and that their priests served as envoys and officials for various states and tribes. The history of Nestorianism (Syriac Christianity or the Church of the East, a.k.a. the Teaching of Resplendent Light, Jingjiao 景教) is notoriously difficult to trace; it held minority status in the Sinosphere and was proscribed along with other foreign religions in China in 845–846. Fu provides meticulous, close readings of valuable material in Uyghur and Chinese among the Dunhuang and Turfan manuscripts, together with Chinese historical sources and accounts in other languages. He also considers the prehistory of the Nestorian network, suggesting that it superseded an earlier network connecting Buddhist monasteries on the eastern Silk Road.

Oyunbilig's article enlarges the temporal and spatial catchment of this issue of *Central Asiatic Journal*. Moving ahead to post-Yuan history and looking eastward to Mongolia, he focuses on the evolution of a group of astrologers employed by the Yuan court and argues that they eventually became the ethnically-denominated tribe of Üjümüčün during the Ming and Qing dynasties. He traces cultural, political and ethnic history by utilising historical records and legends in Mongolian and Chinese, as well as accounts in European languages and Arabic. For the earlier period of Mongol domination over Eurasia, he demonstrates how foreign astrologers from the West included Persians, Arabs and central Asian Turks. Moving into the early modern period, he draws a compelling portrait of how Mongols maintained a dual institution that combined native diviners (traditional Mongolian shamans who often consulted oracle bones) with specialists using astral calculations originating in Western traditions.

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Abstracts 摘要

Alain ARRAULT

A Brief Study of the 28 Lunar Lodges Annotated Calendar: Focused on the Annotated Calendars of Dunhuang

The passage of time, and the predictability of our future, have always preoccupied the individual and our societies, and calendars which indicate auspicious and unlucky days play an important role in this quest. This article traces the development of calendars from the earliest surviving manuscripts located in Dunhuang, Turfan and Khara-khoto to influences from early China, India and western Asia, and late-mediaeval China. In particular the tenth-century calendars excavated at Dunhuang, with its twenty-eight lodges in seven sexagenary cycles (one for each day of the month) show signs of significant complexity. Arrault concludes that these combine the twenty-eight lodges with the twelve houses of the Western zodiac.

Keywords: Tang China, Dunhuang, astronomy, calendar, Central Asia

再談二十八朔宿釋法註天文日曆～以敦煌註釋日曆為主

時間的流逝，以及我們未來的可預測性，一直關心個人和社會，指示吉日和凶日的日曆在這一追求中起著重要的作用。本文概述中亞日曆歷史的發展過程，從最早存在的敦煌、吐魯番和黑城手稿到早期中國、印度和西亞以及唐至元代中國的影響。本文以敦煌開挖的十世紀日曆為例，其中七種干支天文週期（一日一宿），顯示二十八朔宿法高水平的複雜性。按照作者的總結，此二十八朔宿法與西方十二宿天文會有共同的交流歷程。

關鍵詞： 唐朝、敦煌、天文、日曆、中亞

Maddalena BARENGHI

The Making of the Shatuo: Military Leadership and Border Unrest in North China's Daibei (808–880)

This paper explores the stages of the Shatuo's growth in the late Tang period (ninth century CE) from retainers to an enlarged military force. It shows how "Shatuo" was used both for a specific military formation, the Daibei expeditionary troops and for the troops affiliated to the Zhuxie-Li clan. The latter were able to take advantage of the relative mobility that characterised the Tang military ranks, quickly progressing

through the ranks of the army and taking over civilian positions as well. The Shatuo also benefited greatly from the general shortage in manpower in the aftermath of the Uyghur refugee crisis and the various mutinies that took place in the Hedong provincial armies during this period. In both senses, different ethnic elements are to be found under the catch-all term “Shatuo.” This paper shows how ethnicity played little to no role in the internal dynamics of military affiliation. Belonging to the Shatuo was more of a military, political, and constitutional matter. The emphasis on biological and cultural ties among the Shatuo may only be the product of later periods, as a means of expressing political loyalty.

Keywords: Tang China, Shatuo, Daibei, Uyghur Empire, Central Asia

沙陀之製造：晚唐華北軍隊與邊界動亂（808 - 880）

本文探討唐末沙陀軍隊的發展，自行營至強大的陸軍，也描述屬於軍隊的軍官較快在大唐陸軍之內的发展機會，一直到最有權勢的軍官、甚至唐朝政府職位。沙陀之概念表示河東代北地區之軍隊，也意謂著朱邪與李兩氏族的私軍。回紇汗國瓦解後以及由於多地之軍隊叛變，沙陀利用人口和軍事的危機為了發展自己的良機。當代沙陀組織有多民族性，民族認同絕不影響到軍事、官僚或法律上的機會，以後也包含忠誠的意義，本文探討上列的若干方面。

關鍵詞： 唐朝、沙陀、代北、回紇汗國、中亞

Oyunbilig BORJIGIDAI

The Üjümüčün Office for Astral Divination at the Mongol Court and the West Asian Astrologers

The period of the Mongol Yuan dynasty was one of the renaissance of commercial and cultural exchange along the Silk Road. One of the factors in the exchange was the transmission of astral science from the Arabic and Persian world into Yuan China. This paper deals with a less known facet of this exchange – the transformation of the experts in the astral science and horoscopy into tribes within Mongol society following the demise of the Yuan dynasty. After the fall of the Yuan, the descendants of the Persian and Arab astrologers evolved into the tribe known as the Üjümüčün. The word Üjümüčün derives from the older Mongol *üjemerčün* (兀者麻兒陳), a translation of the Chinese term “*yin yang*”, originally implying “astrologers”. This process of transformation of the western Asian “astrologers” into a nomadic tribal group is one characteristic example of the cultural exchanges and transformations along the Silk Road.

Keywords: Yuan China, Astrology, Silk Road, horoscope, Central Asia

蒙古宮廷占卜署與西亞占星家

蒙元時期，「絲綢之路」變得比任何前代都漫長，其沿線地區各民族的文化交流和民族交融也十分活躍。本文認為，來自阿拉伯、波斯和中亞等西域占星家們不僅為蒙元王朝帶來了西方的天文學知識，而且他們及其家族最終融入蒙古民族共同體中。元廷退回蒙古草原後，他們進一步蒙古化和游牧化，逐漸演變為明代蒙古烏珠穆沁（Üjümüčün）部的組成部分。「烏珠穆沁」一詞來源於元代蒙古語的「兀者麻兒陳」（Üjemerčün），漢譯為「陰陽」（Yin yang），指占星者。從西方的占星者到蒙古的游牧部族的這一事實，是「絲綢之路」沿線民族融合和不同文化交匯交融的一個很典型的例子。

關鍵詞：元朝、占星術、絲綢之路、星座、中亞

CHING Chao-jung 慶昭蓉, ENAMI Kazuyuki 江南和幸 & OKADA Yoshihiro 岡田至弘

Paper in Eighth-Century Kucha: Discovery of Cotton Fibres within Chinese and Kucheana Documents

This paper presents our discovery that already around the middle of the first millennium, cotton fabrics were used in the Tarim Basin in early mediaeval paper. Cotton mix paper was, however, not exclusive to Kucha. Our research suggests that both the cotton and the paper were produced locally, as evidenced by the straw and grasses found *in situ*. Accordingly, the Garrison of Kucha (龜茲都督府, the official Tang name) and the Anxi Great Protectorate already supplied their own paper before the An Lushan Rebellion (755–763). The earliest datable Turfan paper fragment was written in Kharoṣṭhī in 386 CE, but there were also traces of a Sogdian letter. This suggests that Sogdian merchants and immigrants played an important role in the spread of Chinese paper and papermaking technology to the Tarim Basin.

Keywords: Tang China, Kucha, cotton paper, Turfan, Sogdians, Central Asia

唐代龜茲產生的紙——中國、龜茲文獻製造用的棉織

本文建議唐朝設立之前的塔里木盆地已經製造紙及棉產品，紙做文獻包含本地之稻草、綿織。從而唐代龜茲都督府以及安西大都護府安史之亂以前製造自己的文件紙。最早追溯到的吐魯番文獻（公元386年）以佉盧文題字，此外考古學家找到粟特文之信函。因此本文作者認為粟特商人以及定居塔里木盆地人員發揮重要的作用為了製造華式紙及發展造紙的技術。

關鍵詞：唐朝、龜茲、棉紙、吐魯番、粟特、中亞

FU Ma 付馬

Buddhist and Christian Relay Posts on the Silk Road (9th–12th centuries)

With the decline of Tang Empire in the 8th century, the unitary postal system connecting China proper with the Hexi corridor and eastern Central Asia ceased to function. Buddhist and Christian communities took up the role with their networks that transcended the boundaries of states. Buddhist and Christian monks were entrusted with diplomatic and commercial duties as official envoys and sent to distant states via their own religious networks. Monasteries along the main routes filled the gaps left by the former relay posts, especially in relatively isolated areas where no civilian conurbations existed. Akin to the prevalent Buddhism, the Christian network also extended to most regions in east Central Asia and Gansu by the 9–10 cc. This was centrally organised under the leadership of the metropolitan in Merv, resulting in highly efficient communications within these regions, as well as with western Central Asia and northern Asia.

Keywords: Central Asia, Church of the East, Buddhism, Silk Road, envoy, relay post

唐朝瓦解後期絲綢之路上佛、景教的驛站

連結著中原、河西走廊和中亞東部的統一的郵驛系統在8世紀中葉瓦解。佛教和基督教教團利用其超越政權壁壘的網絡填補了帝國郵驛系統的缺失。僧人被地方政權委任為使者，利用各自的宗教網絡前往異國執行外交和通商的任務。絲綢之路沿線的寺院用於接待來使，發揮了館驛的作用，在政權邊緣遠曠之地作用尤著。與流行在當地的佛教一樣，景教網絡也可覆蓋中亞東部和河西走廊的大多數地區。不同在於，上述各地的景教教團統一組織在以木鹿大主教為中心的體系中，可以藉此與中亞西部以及北亞的教團直接溝通。

關鍵詞：中亞、景教、佛教、絲綢之路、使者、館驛

Romain LEFEBVRE

Fragment F24 of the Pelliot Xixia Cave 181 Collection, National Library of France

This paper sets out to prove that fragment № 24 of the Tangut collection at the National Library of France represents a unique alternative to the versions kept at the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts in St Petersburg and at the Gansu Provincial Museum. Written by hand, rather than printed by woodblock, we can assume that this translation was produced by means of Chinese sources. Its basis is the *dhāraṇī sūtra* 聖六字增壽大明王陀羅尼經, translated by Dānapāla (Shi Hu 施護) in 991. The

fragment was discovered by Paul Pelliot at the end of the Qing era in the Mogao Grottoes near Dunhuang.

Keywords: Tangut, Buddhism, Dunhuang, Mogao Cave, dhāraṇī sūtra, Central Asia

法國國家圖書館西夏藏第24號碎片, 伯希和西夏窟181號

本文著手證明法國國家圖書館西夏藏第24號碎片與聖彼得堡東方文獻研究所和甘肅省博物館保存的版本不同。作者認為此碎片文獻以中文來源翻譯成西夏文，手寫而不用木刻印刷。譯文基礎為《聖六字增壽大明王陀羅尼經》，於991年由施護翻譯成西夏文。此碎片是由伯希和（法）清末時在敦煌附近的莫高窟發現的。

關鍵詞: 西夏、佛教、敦煌、莫高窟、陀羅尼經、中亞

NIE Hongyin 聶鴻音

A Compilation of Three Tangut Astral Texts (1270 CE)

The paper discusses a newly discovered Tangut text, which is a compilation of three texts on astral worship. The three *sūtras*, translated from Chinese or Tibetan, are slightly different from the versions preserved today. This is especially true for the *Suvarṇacakra-uṣṇīṣa dhāraṇī* transmitted by Jayānanda and translated by Dehui in the mid-12th century. An epilogue by Yuan monk Huijue indicates that the collection was published by Dharma preceptor O-ba to release the sentient beings from the suffering caused by the Haidu rebellion (1268–1301).

Keywords: Tangut, Xixia, Mongol-Yuan, sūtras, celestial deities

三部西夏星曜文獻的1279年合刊本

在忽必烈汗敕命編集河西大藏經之前出現了一個三部星曜經的合刊本。這三部經譯自漢文或藏文，與現今所見的譯本略有不同。尤其可以確定的是，《金輪佛頂陀羅尼》是12世紀中葉由Jayānanda口傳，又由德慧翻譯的。合編本的捲尾保存著元代僧人德慧的序言，表明這本書是由O-ba法師刊行的，目的在於使眾生從海都之亂（1268–1301）帶來的苦難中解脫出來。

關鍵詞: 党項、西夏、蒙元王朝、佛經、星曜神

OGIHARA Hirotoshi 荻原裕敏

Miscellany on the Tumshuqese Documents

Rather than being a linguistic note, Ogihara's article provides a convincing summary of the research into the Tumshuqese (تۆمشۇق/圖木舒克/Tumxuk) dialect of Saka, an Iranian language once located in the western Tarim Basin. With typical accuracy, the author creates typologies of noun classes, quantifiers, terms of address and fixed expressions, based on rarely used contracts in Tumshuqese. To this end, Ogihara also compares the legal traditions and terminology of contracts written in Prakrit, Khotanese, Yarkand Uyghur and Bactrian.

Keywords: Tumshuqese, Saka, Tarim Basin, legal contracts, Central Asia

關於圖木舒克語文件的若干問題

本文詳細地分析屬於伊朗語系塞語的圖木舒克(تۆمشۇق)方言文獻。以前在塔里木盆地西部發現的文獻一般處理佛教、國事，但本文注意到法律類的條約，主要其名詞、稱為、成語、量詞等類術語。因此荻原裕敏教授以普拉克里特、和田、葉爾羌以及巴克特里亞語文來比較本地區的歷代法律傳統以及條約辭彙。

關鍵詞：圖木舒克語、塞語、塔里木盆地、法律條約、中亞

Irina F. POPOVA

The Administration of the Outlying Territories of the Western Regions of the Chinese Empire under the Early Han Dynasty

By means of the two principal sources for the study of the Western Regions during the Former Han era (202 BCE–9 CE) – the *Records of the Historian* (*Shiji* 史記) and the *History of the Former Han* (*Qian Hanshu* 前漢書) – the author analyses toponyms, official names, administrative and military organisations and other terminology. The article also scrutinises the changing perception of the “Western Regions” throughout China's imperial history, up to present-day Xinjiang. For this purpose, also the research of the Russian sinologist Nikita Y. Bichurin/Никита Яковлевич Бичурин (*alias* Hyacinth/Иакинф 1777–1853) is evoked.

Keywords: Han China, *qian han shu*, Sima Qian, Western Regions, Bichurin

漢初中國西域邊疆的管理

本文分析關於前漢時期西域重要的兩本歷史書，即《史記》以及《前漢書》，以及有關地名、官僚職位、文官及武官機關、等類術語。此外本篇文章也探討

中國西域自秦漢時期一直到現在新疆演變中的意義。為此俄國漢學家比丘林（公元1777–1853年）之貢獻被回憶起來。

關鍵詞：漢國、前漢書、司馬遷、西域、比丘林

Kirill J. SOLONIN

“The Five Parts of the Dharma Realm”: Preliminary Remarks on the Collection of the *sems phyogs* Texts in the Tangut Translation

The paper discusses the recently identified collection of *sems sde* class texts in Tangut translation. The author provides initial textual analysis of the texts in the composition and offers several suggestions concerning the historical setting of these texts. There is also evidence allowing to suggest that several versions of the “five early translations”, probably based on varying Tibetan versions, were current in the Tangut State. The study revealed a systematic relationship which existed between the compositions united under the *sems sde* category in the Tangut State. They formed a coherent whole of core texts, commentaries and historical accounts. Finally, several observations concerning possible historical traditions of the Tangut *sems sde* are provided.

Keywords: Tangut, *sems phyogs*, *rnying ma*, Vairocana, *rdzogs chen*

「法國五部」：初探「心部」西夏譯本

文章首次介紹一批寧瑪派「心部」（*sems phyogs*）文獻西夏譯本。文中初步討論《五部法界綜文》，即是「心部」根本續的翻譯集，本續的相關註釋以及「心部」傳承記載，所謂《五類法界都序》的西夏譯本。除了初步介紹內容之外，文章討論「心部」西夏語翻譯特色，與一部分收錄在《大乘要道密集》的「心部」漢譯本進行初步比較。據文章考證，雖然未能鑑定「心部」文獻傳入西夏的時段，可以假設其在西夏的傳播與噶舉派的傳播是同步的，並且西夏似乎同時流傳過二種「心部」文獻體系，其中一個系統的痕跡可見在《大乘要道密集》的漢譯大手印文獻中。

關鍵詞：西夏、*sems phyogs*、*rnying ma*、毗盧遮那佛、*rdzogs chen*

Erdem UÇAR

A New Interpretation of ...] süŋ(ü)g(ü)n (a)čd(i)m(i)z (i North 4 = 28) in the Tuñuquq Inscription

The Tuñuquq inscription consists of two separate steles. The first stele is preserved in better condition than the other stele. The inscription was made by Tuñuquq, advi-

sor and statesman of the Göktürk Khanate. This article focuses on the sentence ...] *süŋ(ü)g(ü)n ačdımız* in line 28 of the inscription. This contribution proposed a new filling of the lacuna at the beginning of the line and other meaning of the verb *ač-* based on historical evidence. On the basis of previous interpretations, I arrive at the conclusion that the lacuna can be filled with [*qıl(i)č(i)n*] and that the verb *ač-* here means ‘to conquer’ in elliptical use.

Keywords: Tuñuquq, Göktürk, Old Turkic, stele, Central Asia

突厥汗石碑文之重新詮釋

Tuñuquq 石刻字刻於兩隔離的石碑之上，第一塊石碑保存得比較好。石碑的原著叫Tuñuquq，第二世突厥汗之顧問及大臣。本文注重碑上第二十八恆...] *süŋ(ü)g(ü)n ačdımız* 幾個詞的意義，據歷史資料也建議解決本恆之頭的空白問題以及找到*ač-*一動詞其他的意義。根據以前的語言學研究我們的結論是本次空白可以以[*qıl(i)č(i)n*]來填補，如此動詞橢圓使用的意思就是『征服』。

關鍵詞： 噶欲谷、古突厥、突厥、石碑、中亞

WEN Xin 文欣

Two Khotanese Account Tablets and Local Society in Pre-Islamic Khotan

In this article, I publish two Khotanese account tablets written on wooden boards. These tablets are closely related to one another, and are records of grain expenditure from the same village granary in Khotan within the same eight-month period in a certain year of the eighth century CE. By means of new transcriptions and translations as well as textual commentaries, the content and the making of these tablets in a Khotanese village granary are discussed. These tablets are important for the study of Khotanese history, because they help us define and clarify the roles of the social institutions of the family-village and the village-level granary. They thus enrich our understanding of local society in pre-Islamic Khotan.

Keywords: Tarim Basin, Khotan, account tablets, local history, Central Asia

兩篇和田會計木片以及伊斯蘭教前之地方社會

本文探討兩篇木片上的會計文件，木片很相似，記錄整八世紀每年八個月時期之內和田地區同一村莊糧倉的穀物支出。通過新的轉錄和翻譯以及文件內容分析，本文討論會計木片在和田糧倉中的內容和製作。木片文件的研究解釋和田人地方史，使我們了解伊斯蘭教化之前的和田社會。

關鍵詞： 塔里木盆地、和田、會計木片、地方史、中亞

YU Xin 余欣

Archaeological Evidence, Cultural Imagination and Image of the Mediaeval World: New Perspectives on Treasures from Qiuci

The Kingdom of Qiuci (now Kucha in Xinjiang) was a key city along the central east-west route of the Silk Road, providing many unusual treasures. This paper analyses five of these treasures: the Quzhi pot, Qiuci board, golden glass, the silver bowl known as Polou (*patrōd*) and the Youxian (immortals' land) pillow. This study of foreign cultures in the medieval Chinese imagination stands at the intersection of philology, material culture studies and art history, utilising a range of sources, such as historical records, literary anecdotes, excavated documents, archeological finds and Chinese rare books. Treasures from Qiuci constitute one case study of a larger topic that the author has been grappling with, namely what can be considered as Chinese "natural history" and concerning China's mediaeval understanding of the world. The treasures are valuable because they show how foreign treasures, both in material objects unearthed through modern archaeology, and in the lore and symbolism of the objects circulating in the medieval Chinese imagination, are a synthesis of history and myth, of the known and the mysterious.

Keywords: Qiuci, foreign treasures, natural history, Silk Road, world view

龜茲異物的文化想像與世界圖景

作者仔細搜羅來自龜茲的實存的異物珍玩和帶有較大想像成份的虛構寶物資料，對五種珍奇異物：屈支灌、龜茲板、金頗黎、銀頗羅、遊仙枕，進行了細緻的考察，試圖將傳統史志、出土文獻、考古發掘寶物與域外漢籍互相印證，綜合運用小學、名物考證、歷史學—考古學—語言學分析等工具進行會通式的研究，揭示這些寶物作為異文化符號的象徵意義。本文是中國古代博物學整體構架中關於殊方異物研究的一部分。作者認為，文獻中關於異物以及出產這些異物的異國的記載，經常是真實的史料、傳說與神話並存，這些虛實之間的材料，恰好為我們提供了交互的異文化圖景，也是時人觀念和心態的表徵。從文化心理的角度審視和重繪中古時代之世界圖像，追索它的成立與變幻的過程，可以使我們獲得新的歷史認知和體悟。

關鍵詞： 龜茲、國際寶物、博物學、絲綢之路、世界觀

Aydar MIRKAMAL & Peter ZIEME

Further Fragments of the *Guanwuliangshoufo jing* 觀無量壽佛經 in Old Uyghur

In this paper, the authors present two fragments of the *Guanwuliangshoufo jing* preserved at the National Library of China and at the Turfan Collection of Berlin.

GT 15–37 from the National Library of China is a *pustaka* leaf from the beginning of book U 2084 and U 1843 from Berlin are similar to GT 15–37 and can be joined into one leaf. The authors present here an edition of these fragments as further proof that the *sūtras* of Pure Land Buddhism were widely known and accepted by Uyghurs in Turfan and Dunhuang between the 11th and 13th centuries.

Keywords: Old Uyghur, Turfan, Buddhist literature, *Guanwuliangshou jing*.

古維吾爾文《觀無量壽佛經》新發現碎片

本文介紹中國國家圖書館和柏林吐魯番館藏保存的《觀無量壽佛經》兩片段。中國國家圖書館GT15–37是本書開頭的一幅文件葉。柏林的U2084和U1843與GT15–37相似，可以連接到一片葉子上。我們在此提供這些片段的一個版本，以證明以下事實，即在11至13世紀之間，吐魯番和敦煌的維吾爾族廣泛了解和接受淨土教的佛經。

關鍵詞： 古維吾爾文、吐魯番、佛經、觀無量壽佛經

The Making of the Shatuo: Military Leadership and Border Unrest in North China's Daibei (808–880)¹

Maddalena Barenghi

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Historical background

Once the Tibetans had taken the Gansu corridor in 787 and the Beiting 北庭 garrison in the early 790s, Lingzhou 靈州 became the last western frontier outpost under the control of the Tang army.² In 793, Dezong 德宗 emperor (r. 799–805) decreed the undertaking of a series of measures to restore the old fortifications of Yanzhou 鹽州,³ the southernmost gateway to Chang'an 長安 from the Ordos region. Yanzhou had been taken by the Tibetan army in 787 and recovered by the Tang empire five years later.⁴ Thirty thousand armed men from different armies were despatched by imperial decree.⁵ Some six thousand were employed in the reconstruction of forts and walls, the others posted as border guards.⁶

It was shortly after these events took place, or during their unfolding, that the Shatuo 沙陀 people appeared on the Lingzhou border at the beginning of the ninth century. The traditional sources provide only glimpses of the Shatuo's movement eastward: A migration story appears in the history of the Shatuo in the "Shatuo liezhuan" 沙陀列傳, chapter 218 of the new official history of the Tang dynasty, compiled in the eleventh century and known as *Xin Tang shu* 新唐書. The story is

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- 1 I would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and corrections, Hans van Ess for reading and commenting on an early draft of this article, and the participants on the panel "After the Heavenly Qaghans: Multi-ethnic Approaches to the Tang-Song Transition" to be presented at the AAS Annual Conference 2021 (Shao-yun Yang, Andrew Chittick, Soojung Han, and Luo Xin) for the stimulating discussions that greatly inspired the writing of this article.
 - 2 Liu Xu 劉煦 [887–946] *et al.*, *Jiu Tang shu* 舊唐書 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975, hereafter *JTS*), 1.381,150.4044; Dong Gao 董誥 *et al.*, *Quan Tang wen* 全唐文 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 539.5477.
 - 3 Earlier called Wuyuan 五原 garrison, in present-day Dingbian 定邊 County in Shaanxi (Li Jifu 李吉甫 [758–814] *Yuanhe junxian tuzhi* 元和郡縣圖志 [Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1933], 4.6).
 - 4 Song Qi 宋祁 [998–1061], Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 [1007–1072] *et al.*, *Xin Tang shu* 新唐書 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975, hereafter *XTS*), 37.973, 156.4908; *JTS* 144.3923, 196.5259.
 - 5 The general Hun Jian 渾瑊 (736–800), the military governor of Zhenwu 振武 Fan Xichao 范希朝 (d. 814), Du Xifan and other military commanders of mobile troops were ordered to relocate units of their troops.
 - 6 Soldiers were to be replaced every three years and rewarded according to rank (*JTS* 144.3923); *Quan Tang wen* 52.567–68; *JTS* 150.3923–24.

probably a revised version of an account included in an early tenth-century chronological history compiled at the court of the Shatuo rulers; it narrates how Zhuxie Jinzhong 朱邪盡忠 (d. 806[?])⁷ and his son Zhuxie Zhiyi 朱邪執宜 (d. 830s[?]) agreed that fleeing to the Tang empire was their only means of salvation from Tibetan dominion. They led the Shatuo units in their flight from Ganzhou 甘州 in the Gansu corridor, where they had settled as part of the Tibetan border garrisons, to the Tang frontier. The story details the bloody nature of the Shatuo's escape and their decimation by the Tibetan army. Shatuo Jinzhong perished in battle, together with most of his armed men. The Shatuo suffered such dreadful losses that they were reduced to two thousand unmounted warriors and seven hundred horsemen. Shatuo Jinzhong's son successfully led the survivors to the Tang border fortification, and all were granted the protection of the Tang empire.⁸

The Old History of the Tang Dynasty, the *Jiu Tang shu* 舊唐書, offers a far less dramatic account of the movement to the east, speaking of a militia of ten thousand armed men, and says that the military governor of Ling-Yan 靈鹽 at the time, Fan Xichao 范希朝 (d. 814), lured them into seeking Tang patronage because he had heard from the northerners about the Shatuo troops' reputation as valiant warriors.⁹ Fan Xichao settled Zhuxie Zhiyi and his men beyond the fortifications of Yanzhou, south of the Ordos region. Fan named the military garrison settlement as Yinshan-fu 陰山府 and registered the Shatuo troops as “wardens against the caitiffs” 捍虜. He also provided their civil settlement with the means for herding livestock. This policy prompted other Shatuo to move to Yanzhou, with the effect that “their young and old from the Fengxiang, Xingyuan and Taiyuan circuits all returned to their unit” 其童耄自鳳翔、興元、太原道歸者，皆還其部。¹⁰ When Fan Xichao became military governor of Hedong 河東 in 809, Shatuo units resettled into the territory north of the Yan Pass 雁門 known as Daibei 代北 (northern Hedong), on the upper Sanggan River 桑乾河, southwest of the prefectural seat of Yunzhou 雲州 (Datong 大同).¹¹

In the decades that followed their appearance at the western border in the early ninth century, the Shatuo would be recruited as retainers in the auxiliary expeditionary troops (*xingying* 行營) funded by provincial and prefectural governors. Despite the bias of the sources, the pre-dynastic history of the Shatuo as imperial retainers is

7 For the *xie* reading of 邪, see Christopher P. Atwood, “The Notion of Tribe in Medieval China: Ouyang Xiu and the Shatuo Dynastic Myth”, in Denise Aigle, Isabelle Charleux et al. (eds), *Miscellanea Asiatica: Festschrift in Honour of Françoise Aubin* (Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Serica, 2010), pp. 593–621, here p. 600, n. 21.

8 *XTS* 218.6155; on the migration narrative, see Maddalena Barengi, “Representations of Descent: Origin and Migration Stories of the Turkic Shatuo”, *Asia Major* 32.1 (2019): 53–86.

9 *JTS* 151.4059.

10 *XTS* 218.6155. If we consider this statement to be true, it is plausible that several clans were already settled within the Tang provinces, and that they had moved to the newly established Yinshan garrison in Yanzhou by the beginning of the ninth century.

11 See our map in this article.

a well-documented example of how groups of Central Asian soldiers were recruited as mobile troops in the Tang army during the post-An Lushan period.¹² The existing texts also demonstrate how the leading Shatuo clan was able to take advantage of the characteristic mobility within the Tang army in order to advance through its military ranks. This paper analyses the historical evidence of the development of this Shatuo military group to show that recruitment of the Shatuo as garrison soldiers was part of the military reforms undertaken by the Xianzong 憲宗 emperor (805–820) in 819. The paper also shows how the provincial governors were able to exert control over the Shatuo retainers and exploit them as a mobile force throughout most of the ninth century. The decision by these military retainers to submit to the command of a Tang provincial general yielded rewards in the form of wages and military mission bonuses. Moreover, different ethnic elements were found within the Shatuo ranks, yet ethnicity played little or no role: experienced soldiers advanced up the ranks based on military merit, no matter their origins or cultural background. In later periods, by contrast, biological and cultural ties were emphasised and eventually forged, as a means of expressing political loyalty.¹³ In the decades that followed the Uyghur crisis, the concurrence of a number of causes (including severe famines and consequent cuts to the prefectural military budget) led to several military mutinies in the ranks of the Hedong provincial armies. In particular, the incident at the Cockfighting Terrace 鬪雞臺 in Yunzhou 雲州 and the slaughter of Duan Wenchu 段文楚 (d. 878 [?]) marked a shift in the balance of power, and the court lost control over some of its Shatuo mobile troops. Li Guochang 李國昌 (d. 887) and Li Keyong 李克用 (856–908), father and son, had consolidated their power in Daibei by this date.

Early stages: From Guanzhong to Daibei

By the beginning of the ninth century, the three prefectures north of the Yan Pass collectively known as Daibei were a scarcely populated and heavily militarised border region, located between the Tang central provinces and the steppe belt dominated by the Uyghur 回鶻 empire (744–840). Yuzhou 蔚州, Yunzhou 雲州 (present-day Datong 大同) and Shuozhou 朔州 formed the three prefectural seats of the

12 Hu Yaofei argues that the “marching garrisons” of the late Tang period all originated from the Beiting and Anqing border provinces’ (藩鎮 *fanzhen*) armies. These troops, mostly composed of Central Asian armed men, had been employed by the Tang court to suppress the An Lushan rebellion. In the aftermath of the rebellion, they became active as “marching garrisons” within the Tang territory (Hu Yaofei, “Xingying zhi shi: Anxi Beiting de fenqi jianzhi ji qi yiyi 行營之始: 安西、北庭的分期、建置及其意義”, *Xinjiang daxue xuebao* 47.1 (2019): pp. 86–93.

13 For a discussion on the nature and constitutional process of Central Asian groups, see Peter Golden, “Ethnogenesis in the Tribal Zone: The Shaping of the Türks”, *Archivum Eurasiae medii aevi* 16 (2008/09): 73–112; see also Albert Dien, “Introduction”, *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 2. The Six Dynasties*, 220–589, Albert Dien & Keith N. Knapp (eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 4–5. For a comparative approach, see Herwig Wolfgram’s *The Roman Empire and Its Germanic Peoples on the formation of the Germanic peoples in mediaeval Europe* (transl. Thomas Dunlap [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997]).

region that extended into the the Sanggan River 桑乾河 basin, delimited to the south by the Hengshan 橫山 mountain range (see Map).

Several permanent armies were stationed in Daibe. Situated three hundred *li* north of the Yan Pass and thirty *li* east of Shuozhou, the Datong garrison 大同軍 (formerly called Dawu 大武) constituted the largest standing army of all, with about ten thousand soldiers and more than five thousand horses.¹⁴ To the east, within the territorial jurisdiction of Yuzhou prefecture, stood Hengye garrison 橫野軍, with about eight thousand soldiers and eighteen hundred horses.¹⁵ The territory north of Yunzhou was the base for the Yunzhong Defence Detachment 雲中守捉, a military unit of roughly eight thousand soldiers.¹⁶

Between the end of the eighth and beginning of the ninth centuries, heterogeneous Central Asian migrant military forces moved east with their families and followers, from the territory of Guanzhong 關中 and the western frontier, where decades of incursions by the Tibetan military forces had decimated the population so that “to the north up to the [Yellow] River loop there were but a few households” 北至河曲，人戶無幾，reducing access to resources for military maintenance.¹⁷ These groups ultimately settled on the sparsely populated land north of the Yan Pass. Most of their members were not newcomers or outsiders from the steppe: they had already lived on Tang soil and were well acquainted with and trained in the Tang military system, having contributed as auxiliary expeditionary troops (*xingying*) to the suppression of several rebellious provincial governors, primarily An Lushan’s rebellion in the northeast¹⁸ but also the less studied Jing-Yuan 涇原 army mutiny on the western frontier, led by Zhu Ci 朱泚, between 783 and 784.

The latter insurrection in particular triggered a movement of armed forces to the east. In the autumn of 783, the troops of the Jing-Yuan 涇原 army mutinied, entered the capital city Chang’an, and plundered the imperial palace, forcing Dezong to flee westward to the city of Fengtian 奉天. In the early spring of 784, the military governor at the head of the Jing-Yuan mutineers, Zhu Ci 朱泚, declared himself emperor of the Supreme Heaven 元天皇 and established the Han 漢 dynasty.¹⁹ The army mutiny was ended when a joint force of provincial and Tibetan troops intervened. Two years afterward, Tibetan soldiers plundered the prefectures of Jing 涇, Long 隴, Bin 邠 and Ning 寧, and reached Yanzhou and Xiazhou 夏州. The attacks were allegedly in retaliation against the Tang court because the troops had not received the expected rewards for their military services. The decade that followed the suppression of the

14 *Yuanhe junxian tuzhi* 13.3b.

15 *Ibid.* 13.3a.

16 *Ibid.* 13.3b.

17 *XTS* 53.1374.

18 On the military support from Uyghur and Central Asian troops in the Tang army suppression of An Lushan’s rebellion, see E. G. Pulleyblank, *The Background of the Rebellion of An Lushan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 13.

19 For a detailed chronicle of the rebellion, see David Graff, *Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300–900* (London, New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 235ff.

rebellious Zhu Ci marked the progressive dismantlement of the western frontier at the hand of the incursions of Tibetan armed groups. Tibetan raids occurred annually, progressively eroding the border until the complete conquest of the Gansu corridor in 787 and Beiting 北庭 in 790. Several garrisons were forced east by the Tibetan army, abandoning the fortified cities of Guanzhong.²⁰ The Central Asian (Turkic Tiele 鐵勒 and Sogdian) military units had lived on Tang soil since the beginning of the dynasty under the “loose rein” (*jimi* 羈縻) system of protected prefectures, often with high-ranking military positions.²¹

The Tibetan invasion of Anle Prefecture 安樂州, located southwest of Yanzhou and near the border, in the years 756 and 757 likewise forced Tuyuhun 吐谷渾 (later known as Tuhun 吐渾, or Tuihun 退渾) troops to migrate from the western border. The Tuyuhun moved eastward in several waves and in entire settlements (*zhang* 帳), colonising the region north of Dai and the Yellow River loop.²² Decades later, in 837, Tuyuhun units quartered at the northern garrison of Zhenwu 振武 were admitted onto Tang territory, to settle in Daibei. Their armed men were presumably enlisted into the garrisons in the same border area.²³ As a matter of fact, such resettlements received but brief mention in the official sources. This also holds true for the movement east of a Sogdian settlement, for which we have a reference only in the eleventh century *Zizhi tongjian* 資治通鑑 by the Northern Song historian Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019–1086). Around 786, amid the military campaigns against the Tibetan occupation of Yanzhou, the settlers of the “Six Hu [protected] prefectures of Hequ” (Hequ liuhu zhou 河曲六胡州), people from the old Sogdian settlement of Youzhou 宥州 in the Ordos region, crossed the Yellow River and were resettled in northern Hedong. Sima Guang reports that the “Six *hu* prefectures of Hequ all surrendered” in Shizhou 石州 to the Tang general Ma Sui 馬燧 (726–795) and were relocated an area between Shuozhou and Yunzhou.²⁴ As Edwin Pulleyblank has

20 *JTS* 150.5249–50; Nishimura Yoko. “Tōkōhan kahoku Shohanchin no Tetsuroku shūdan: Sadakei ōchō seiritsu no haikai 唐後半華北諸藩鎮の鐵勒集團: 沙陀系王朝成立の背景”, *Toyōshi kenkyū* 74.4 (2016): 678–715.

21 See Nishimura Yoko, “Cong Lingwu dao Daibei: Tang houqi huabei fanzhen zhong de Tiele, Sute, Dangxiang 從靈武到代北: 唐後期華北藩鎮中的鐵勒、粟特、黨項”, in Rong Xinjiang et al. (ed.), *Sogdians in China: New Evidence in Archaeological Finds and Unearthed Texts*, vol. 2 (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2016): 351–367.

22 Tuyuhun units that were settled in the western territory of Liangzhou 涼州 at the beginning of the dynasty were subsequently moved south to Shanzhou 鄯州 and then west to the area south of Lingzhou 靈州, in Anle Prefecture. Anle Prefecture was situated southwest of Yanzhou. Anle was subsequently returned to Tang administration under the name of Weizhou 威州 (*XTS* 64.1763, 37.972). 及吐蕃陷我安樂州, 其部眾又東徙, 散在朔方、河東之境 (*JTS* 198.5301). 吐蕃復取安樂州, 而殘部徙朔方、河東, 語謬為「退渾」(*XTS* 221a.6228).

23 天德奏生退渾部落三千帳來投豐州 (*JTS* 17b.564). See Gabriella Molè, *The T'u-yü-hun from the Northern Wei to the Time of the Five Dynasties* (Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. Molè 1970), XII.

24 河曲六胡州皆降, 遷於雲、朔之間 (*ZZTJ* 232.7477); Edwin G. Pulleyblank, “A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia”, *T'oung Pao*, Second Series, 41. 4/5 (1952): p. 342; Moribe Yutaka 森部豊, “Military Officers of Sogdian Origin from the Late Tang Dynasty to the Period of Five

noted, there is no further mention of the Sogdian settlement in northern Hedong until the second half of the ninth century, when the names of two Sogdian leading clans, Anqing 安慶 and Sage 薩葛, are mentioned in the sources as auxiliary units of the Daibei expeditionary troops.²⁵

The Tang authorities favoured the resettlement of mercenary groups to Daibei, a border region that by then was far less unruly than Ling-Yan, and to prevent the Tibetan army from recruiting them. When Fan Xichao established the Shatuo units in Yanzhou, some of the officials at the court in Chang'an warned against allowing a Turkic group that had been part of the Tibetan army to settle on Tang territory. The dissenters also pointed out the economic risks of increasing the population on the frontier as a bulwark against the Tibetan army, due to the disruptive consequences on the food supplies (especially grain) in the sparsely populated border area.²⁶ The court heard these arguments and thus, when Fan Xichao became military governor of Hedong in 809, decreed that the Shatuo troops follow him and settle under the governor's direct command in northern Hedong.²⁷ Fan Xichao selected twelve hundred of the best Shatuo warriors, granted them provisions and salaries, and created a Shatuo garrison 沙陀軍 under the subordinate command of Zhuxie Zhiyi as military commissioner 軍使. The Shatuo garrison was quartered at Yellow Flowers Hillock 黃花堆 in the Shenwu Plain 神武川 on the upper Sanggan River, southwest of Yun-


Dynasties", in É. de la Vaissière & É. Trombert (eds), *Les Sogdiens en Chine* (Paris: École française d'Extrême-Orient, 2005), pp. 243–254. First established in 679, Youzhou prefecture was abolished in 721 in the aftermath of Kang Daibin's 康待賓 rebellion and flight south with his people. The prefecture was restored in 738, when the fugitives were brought back to the region (*JTS* 38.1418–19). It stood north of the walled fortifications, three hundred *li* north of Yanzhou 鹽州. At the end of Xuanzong's reign, the administration of the settlements was entrusted to the Jinglüe garrison 經略軍, ending the prefecture system there. Accordingly, the garrison had control over the "foreign units" 蕃部 north of the Yellow River Loop and south to Xiazhou (*Yuanhe junxian tuzhi* 4.13a). In the course of the rebellion of An Lushan, one of An's Turkic military supporters, general Ashina Congli 阿史那從禮 convinced half a million armed men, including the Sogdian and Turkic soldiers, to join his army. His wish was to move closer to Lingwu 靈武, whither Suzong 肅宗 (r. 756–762) had been forced to escape that same year. The military intervention of the Tang army, aided by their Uyghur allies, led to the suppression of this attempt and the execution of several thousand supporters (*JTS* 120.3450.51; *XTS* 137.4600). The Old History of the Tang (*JTS*) reports that Youzhou was dismissed after 763, and there is no further information concerning its settlements until 786, when Sogdian groups were relocated to Yunzhou (see also Pulleyblank 1952, 341). Over the first two decades of the ninth century, the Youzhou prefectural seat was moved farther south, to the northern outskirts of the fortifications (*JTS* 38.1418–19). Youzhou was again established on the site of the Jinglüe garrison, by imperial decree (*JTS* 148.3996, *Yuanhe junxian tuzhi* 4.13a). It was also known as New Youzhou 新宥州 (*Yuanhe junxian tuzhi* 4.12a). By the second half of the ninth century, the garrison and Youzhou were being run by the Tangut Tuoba Sigong 拓跋思恭 (*ZZTJ* 254.8249).

25 *JTS* 19b.710.

26 *XTS* 218.6155. The two counties that constituted Yanzhou counted a population of about sixteen thousand (*XTS* 37.973).

27 *JTS* 237.7660–61; *XTS* 218.6155.

zhou,²⁸ becoming known as the Yinshan Northern Shatuo 陰山北沙陀.²⁹ It appears that several fortified camps (*zha* 柵, also called *xin cheng* 新城) were located to the Shenwu Plain, which the newly established Shatuo garrison became responsible to maintain.³⁰ To the rest of the troops and followings the governor allocated allotments in the Dingxiang Plain 定襄川, north of Shuozhou.³¹



Northwest of the Yellow River (Huanghe 黃河) loop, in Zhenwu 振武, another Shatuo settlement was garrisoned. It was led by Gele Abo 葛勒阿波, an uncle of Zhuxie Zhiyi. Gele Abo had arrived north of the Yellow River at about the same time that Zhuxie Zhiyi reached Lingzhou. In all likelihood, Gele Abo had also fled from the Tibetans and sought Fan Xichao's protection.³²

Zhuxie Zhiyi rendered military assistance to the provincial army, meaning that steady patron-client relations with the provincial military governors and with the

28 Du You 杜佑 [735–812], *Tongdian* 通典 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988), 179.4744.

29 *XTS* 218.6155.

30 *ZZIJ* 244.7870).

31 *JTS* 39.1487.

32 *XTS* 218.6155; *JTS* 14.426, *JTS* 237.7660–61; *Cefu yuangui* 170.2056.

army generals were crucial indeed. He supported Fan Xichao on a few occasions before the latter retired. Over the course of several expeditions, Zhuxie Zhiyi moved his armed men farther east and south and joined the troops of Li Guangyan 李光顏 (761–826), the Adie 阿跌 military chieftain³³ and military governor of Zhongwu 忠武. The military support of Zhuxie Zhiyi's troops was important in the suppression of Wang Chengzong's 王承宗 (d. 820) uprising of 809, who was defeated at Mudaogou 木刀溝 in Dingzhou 定州, southeast of Yuzhou (Hebei circuit).³⁴ Zhuxie Zhiyi must have distinguished himself highly in the military campaign, because he was granted the post of prefect of Yuzhou 蔚州刺史.³⁵ Zhuxie Zhiyi's assignment to this post, remote from the Shatuo settlement in Dingxiang, might well have been part of a court strategy to separate Zhuxie Zhiyi from his settlements in order to control the troops under his command. Similarly, the court dismissed Fan Xichao as Hedong military governor and installed Wang E 王鐸 (740–815) in his place, who then requested that the Shatuo be parceled out into ten units, or garrisons, attached to different prefectures, fearing the nascent strength of Zhuxie Zhiyi's troops.³⁶

In the years that followed, Shatuo mobile troops under the command of Zhuxie Zhiyi were dispatched to patrol the north-western border and to join military expeditions to the south. Around 814, a Uyghur cavalry unit of several thousand soldiers crossed the desert, headed for an attack on the Tibetan frontier. The unit reached the western fortresses and the Liugu pass 柳谷, putting the border garrisons on alert.³⁷ The court subsequently ordered Zhuxie Zhiyi to station troops farther west at the Tiande 天德 garrison, north of the Yellow River loop and west of Gele Abo's settlement.³⁸ For several years, the Tiande garrison had been under the military control of general Li Guangjin 李光進 (751–815), elder brother of Li Guangyan. Around 815, the court again ordered Zhuxie Zhiyi's troops to join Li Guangyan's army in the military campaign to suppress Wu Yuanji's 吳元濟 (783–817) uprising in Caizhou 蔡州, located in the plain region north of the Huai 淮 River basin on the banks

33 In 647, following other Tiele dignitaries, the Adie 阿跌 settled in the “bridle prefectures” established by Taizong for the “Jiuxing” Tiele tribes in Inner Mongolia, and then moved to Lingzhou in 713, when Adie armed men began acting as military retainers under the command of Tang generals. Li Guangyan's father, Li Liangchen 李良臣 (d. 762) died when Guangjing and Guangyan were young. Having grown up in Taiyuan with the family of the sister and her husband Sheli Gezhan 舍利葛旃, himself prefect of Jitianzhou 雞田州, and surrendered to the Shuofang army, Li Guangjin 李光進 became military governor of Zhenwu between 810 and 813 and for two years (813–815) military governor of Shuofang 朔方 and Lingwu 靈武. (810) 代州刺史阿跌光進為單于大都護、振武麟勝節度度支營田觀察押蕃落等使 *JTS* 14.433. See Su Hang 蘇航, “Tang houqi Hedong beibu de Tiele shili: Cong Jitian de bianqian shuoqi 唐後期河東北部的鐵勒勢力---從雞田州的變遷說起”. *Tang yanjiu* 16 (2010): 261–277.

34 *XTS* 218.6155, 161.4218.

35 *JTS* 39.1007.

36 *XTS* 218.6155.

37 *JTS* 148.3996; *ZZTJ* 239.7701–02.

38 *XTS* 218.6155.

of one of its tributaries, the Ru 汝 River.³⁹ Together they seized the Lingyun 凌雲 fortified camp (*zha* 柵)⁴⁰ in Henan. The court granted Zhuxie Zhiyi the civilian title of honorary minister of the judicial administration 檢校刑部尚書, in what was probably an honorific recognition without any real authority. Zhuxie Zhiyi's troops remained within Li Guangyan's army until 821, when the former was summoned to the court in Chang'an. There he and his soldiers were retained as palace guards and he was honoured with the title of general of the guards of the imperial insignia 金吾衛將軍.⁴¹

Zhuxie Zhiyi and the Daibei mobile troops (830–842)

We can presume that Zhuxie Zhiyi and his militia stayed in Chang'an for several years, until Liu Gongchuo 柳公綽 (765–832), the newly established governor of Hedong, lodged a request with the court in 830 that Zhuxie Zhiyi be appointed to guard the northern border.

Liu Gongchuo's governorship in Taiyuan (Jinyang) began most inauspiciously: in 830 a bad harvest had forced him to cut back on administrative expenses and military provisions,⁴² both items having become part of the prefectural budget after Xianzong's reforms in 819.⁴³ The prefecture also held full responsibility for patrolling the border communities and the horse trade with the Uyghurs. Liu Gongchuo then requested that the court appoint Zhuxie Zhiyi to govern the eleven abandoned forts between Yunzhou and Shuozhou, north of the Sanggan River watershed, and to guard the northern border at the head of a troop formation of three thousand soldiers, known as the Daibei expeditionary troops 代北行營. Zhuxie Zhiyi was appointed area commander of Yinshan 陰山府都督 and pacification commissioner of the Daibei expeditionary troops 代北行營招撫使, subordinate to the Hedong military governor.⁴⁴

The Shatuo garrisoned north of Mount Juzhu 句注, according to Liu Gongchuo's report to the court, were respected and feared by the Nine Surnames and Six Prefectures Hu, "Jiu xing liu zhou Hu" 九姓六州胡. Formally under Tang control, the nature of these settlements is nonetheless ambiguous, as is their affiliation to a military leader or patron. The designation "Liu zhou 六州" (six prefectures) presumably refers to the administrative divisions into which Sogdian units in the Ordos region

39 *JTS* 145.3951.

40 *Zha* were wooden fortified camps under the control of armed units. See *JTS* 15.456, 161.4219. Sima Guang uses the term *fu* 府, here meaning 'garrison', instead.

41 *XTS* 218.6155.

42 *XTS* 163.5022; *JTS* 165.4304; *ZZTJ* 244.7870.

43 On Xianzong's reforms, see Watanabe Shin'ichirō 渡邊信一郎 (translated by Matthew Fraleigh), "Local Financial Administration in the Latter Half of the Tang Dynasty: On Prefectural Financial Administration, Including the Metropolitan Prefecture", *International Journal of Asian Studies* 15.1 (2018): 1–38.

44 *XTS* 75b.3453, 218.6156; on the Daibei Mobile Encampment and its duties, see also Hu Yaofei 胡耀飛, "Cong zhaofu dao zhaotao: wan Tang Daibei xingying de fenqi yu zuoyong 從招撫到招討: 晚唐代北行營的分期與作用", *Minzu shi yanjiu* 12 (2015): 194–195.

had been organised by the seventh century. As seen above, units of Sogdians, Tuyuhun and Turkic Tiele relocated to northern Hedong because they were enlisted as military retainers.⁴⁵

According to the sources, Liu Gongchuo adopted a diplomatic attitude toward the Uyghur envoys travelling through Hedong. When the Uyghur commander Li Chang 李暢 appeared at the border to sell several thousand horses at the market in 831, under the pretext of a diplomatic mission to court, Liu Gongchuo declined to muster his troops, instead sending out a general alone on horseback to welcome the Uyghur visitor and escort him to Taiyuan where a banquet had been prepared. Li Chang was apparently moved by Liu's diplomacy and passed through the prefectures of Hedong peacefully.⁴⁶ Similarly, Liu Gongchuo afforded Zhuxie Zhiyi particular hospitality and generous compensation. The governor organised a large gathering in Taiyuan, to which Zhuxie Zhiyi's mother and wife were also summoned, and offered gifts. The *Old Tang History* indicates that Zhuxie Zhiyi served Liu Gongchuo loyally thereafter.⁴⁷ We can presume that the Shatuo troops were sustained in part by their own civil settlement and did not weigh heavily on the prefectural budget. Payments per mission, meanwhile, were agreed upon and dispensed by the provincial governor.

In its initial formation, Zhuxie Zhiyi's Daibei expeditionary troops enlisted the so-called "Shatuo san buluo" 沙陀三部落, a designation that appears in the sources more frequently than the former. "San buluo" has been read as a three-tribe confederation; in fact, the term designates a military formation of mounted armed men. *Buluo* refers to both the civil and military function of its elements,⁴⁸ and might even be a military term for a standard number of armed men, probably one thousand, a structure adopted by the Tang armies that dated back to formations found among the steppe nomads.⁴⁹ The ethnic composition of the units was quite heterogeneous and

45 See above and Nishimura Yoko, "Cong Lingwu dao Daibei: Tang houqi huabei fanzhen zhong de Tiele, Sute, Dangxiang 從靈武到代北: 唐後期華北藩鎮中的鐵勒、粟特、黨項", in Rong Xinjiang et al. (ed.), *Sogdians in China: New Evidence in Archaeological Finds and Unearthed Texts* (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe), vol. 2 (2016): 351–367. See also Pulleyblank, "A Sogdian Colony", p. 326, 341–342. As noted by Pulleyblank, Tangut units from east of the Yellow River moved into the Ordos in 799 and occupied the territories left by the Sogdians. They eventually moved farther west into the Gansu corridor ("A Sogdian Colony", p. 342). Moribe Yutaka calls them "Turkicised Sogdians", as they descended from Sogdians that had lived within the Turkic domain and had become skilled in archery and horsemanship (pp. 244–245).

46 *JTS* 165.4304. For a hypothesis on the reasons for Liu Gongchuo's diplomatic attitude towards Li Chang's convoy, see Shao-yun Yang's unpublished paper "Restrictions on Foreign Trade and Inter-marriage in Tang and Northern Song China", Paper for the 2020 AAS Annual Conference, Boston Panel: *After the Heavenly Qaghans: Multi-Ethnic Approaches to the Tang-Song Transition* (21 March 2020), pp. 3–4.

47 *JTS* 165.4304.

48 Skaff, *Sui-Tang China*, p. 33 n. 9; Atwood, "The Notion of Tribe", p. 608ff.

49 The term *buluo* is used in Dunhuang manuscripts dating to the period of Tibetan dominion to refer to the military units of 1,000 households into which the military settlement of Shazhou 沙

included Turkic as well as Sogdian elements. Another designation used in the official histories is “Shatuo, Sage,⁵⁰ Anqing⁵¹ three tribes” 沙陀、薩葛、安慶等部落, the latter two being names of the Sogdian leading clans.⁵² They presumably spoke a Turkic language, and it is possible that old Turkic was the lingua franca of the military group.

Shatuo troops acted jointly with other Central Asian troops enlisted in the Tang armies, such as the Tuhun (Tuyuhun) and Qibi 契苾. The latter originally belonged to the Tiele confederation, a heterogeneous Central Asian seminomadic polity that emerged at the edge of the Chinese empire and endured throughout the medieval period.⁵³ In 832, north of the Heishan mountain 黑山, the Zhenwu military governor Li Yong 李泳 recruited Qibi units and all four hundred tents/households (*zhang* 帳) of their civil settlement.⁵⁴ Five years later, Tuhun soldiers joined the Tang garrison in the same border area, followed by their three thousand families.⁵⁵ Information concerning these military groups is unfortunately limited to official reports concerning the outcomes of campaigns to suppress uprisings or other military disruptions. For instance, we know that between 837 and 841, ten thousand unmounted armed men and three thousand horsemen belonging to Shatuo, Tuhun, and Qibi troops under the joint command of then Zhenwu military governor Liu Mian 劉沔 (d. 846) crossed the Ordos and crushed the groups of Tangut (Dangxiang 黨項) that had been causing concern in Lingzhou. Ten thousand people were captured, and some of these may well have been enlisted as military retainers.⁵⁶ Although we have no further data on the formation, numbers or leaders of these military units, we can presume that they were recruited as retainers in the mobile armies under the command of provincial

州 was divided (see Gertraud Taenzer, *The Dunhuang Region during Tibetan Rule (787–848): A Study of the Secular Manuscripts Discovered in the Mogao Caves* [Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012], p. 50ff).

50 See “A Sogdian Colony”, p. 344.

51 For a discussion on whether the Anqing are Turkic or Sogdian, see “A Sogdian Colony”, p. 345.

52 代州北面行營都監押陳景思率沙陀、薩葛、安慶等部落與吐渾之眾三萬赴援關中 (*JTS* 19b.710); see Pulleyblank, “A Sogdian Colony”, pp. 343–344.

53 Under Taizong 太宗 (r. 626–649), Tiele units had switched their allegiance to their Tang patrons and settled into the “loose rein” (*jimi* 羈縻) system of protected prefectures and area commands of Lingzhou (Skaff, *Sui-Tang China*, pp. 121, 163; *JTS* 195.5196 and 199.5348; *XTS* 217a.6112–3; *ZZTJ* 198.6144–45). To their leading clans, the Huihe 迴紇, Qibi (with its variant Qibiyu 契苾羽), and Hun 渾, belonged high generals that paid service and made a career in the Tang army. A Tiele tribal group settled on the Yingsuo Plain 鷹娑川 northwest of Yanqi 焉耆 (Xinjiang) and south of the Duolange 多覽葛, the Qibi established patron-client relations with Tang Taizong in 633 and settled in the territories between Gan 甘 and Liang 涼 Prefectures (Gansu corridor). In 653, the military commander of Yuxi Prefecture 榆溪州 was renamed Helan Area Command 賀蘭都督 (*JTS* 109.3291; *XTS* 110.4117).

54 六年春正月乙未朔,以久雪廢元會。戊戌,振武李泳招收得黑山外契苾部落四百七十三帳 (*JTS* 17b.544).

55 See above in this article; *JTS* 17b.564.

56 *JTS* 161. 4233–34.

military governors, in ways similar to the Shatuo. Their chieftains wanted the protection of the Tang and the chance to gain official military titles. Indeed, the Tang army was characterised by professional mobility, implying that capable soldiers could be promoted in rank regardless of their ethnic background.

Zhuxie Chixin, 842–878

Zhuxie Zhiyi passed away a few years before the Uyghur refugee crisis at the northern border of Hedong. His son, Zhuxie Chixin 朱邪赤心 (d. 887) commanded the Shatuo armed men who played a role in the internal uprising that precipitated the fall of the Uyghur empire. In 839, against a payment of three hundred fine horses, Zhuxie Chixin led his troops in support of the rebellious Uyghur minister Jueluowu 掘羅勿 (Küräbir) in an attack against the Qaghan Hu Tigin 胡特勒 (r. 832–839). The latter had previously executed two of his own ministers, the Sogdian An Yunhe 安允合 and a Uyghur *tigin*, on charges of having plotted a rebellion. The Qaghan was defeated by Shatuo troops and committed suicide.⁵⁷ This event, together with a severe and prolonged famine and a disruptive invasion of Khirghiz troops that led to the killing of the newly established Hesa 廬駁 Qaghan (r. 839–40), are among the causes of the Uyghur flight to the northern border of China in 840.⁵⁸

The first armed Uyghurs appeared at the Tiande garrison in the autumn of 840 and asked to be admitted onto Tang soil. A second group appeared in Yunzhou shortly after. The ensuing events, negotiations and complex debates at court have been detailed by Michael Drompp in his well-known monograph. As stressed by Drompp, the court in Chang'an was not aware of the Uyghur internal unrest, and the coming of refugees caught court officers by surprise. At first, the court undertook measures to reinforce border fortifications and increase military patrols. Not until the autumn of 842 did the court decree a military resolution and subsequently launch a campaign against the refugee encampments.⁵⁹ The degree to which the Shatuo were involved in the Uyghur refugee crisis is merely specified in passing in the

57 XTS 217.6130, 218.6155; ZZTJ 246.7942; Michael Drompp, *Tang China and the Collapse of the Uighur Empire: A Documentary History* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 34–35. Sima Guang's critical commentary *Zizhi tongjian kaoyi* preserves an excerpt of the tenth century *Hou Tang Xianzu jinian lu* 後唐獻祖紀年錄 which portrays Zhuxie Chixin's involvement in the Uyghur disturbances in a more positive light and refrains from mentioning bribery. The Song historian, nevertheless, seems to doubt the plausibility of this account. The *jinian lu* says that the Uyghur Küräbir was planning to "return to allegiance" (*guiyi* 歸義) and for this reason he sent an envoy to grant Zhuxie Chixin a gift of three hundred fine horses, so as to reach him. Zhuxie Chixin then personally led his troops to Tiande and arrived at the entrance of the desert in order to accept their surrender. As the Uyghur treated him poorly, he attacked the Qaghan's armed men emerging victorious. When Qaghan Hu Tigin killed himself, Zhuxie Chixin reported to the court that a new qaghan had been established (ZZTJ 246.7942; Drompp, *Tang China*, p. 39, n. 2).

58 Drompp, *Tang China*, pp. 34–35.

59 Drompp, *Tang China*, on the negotiations and subsequent military intervention, see chapters 3 and 4.

sources. After the killing of Hesa Qaghan, it appears that the Shatuo immediately returned to the ranks of the Tang provincial army. A joint formation of three thousand Shatuo, Qibi, and Tuyuhun horsemen was selected from Liu Mian's provincial army. Liu had since been moved from Zhenwu to Hedong and the provincial army received the direct command of general Shi Xiong 石雄 (d. 848), deputy defence commissioner of Tiande 天德防禦副使, and Wang Feng 王逢.⁶⁰ The Shatuo cavalry was parcelled into two wings and received the command over the generals Qibi Tong 契苾通 (d. 879) and He Qingchao 何清朝.⁶¹ The newly installed Uyghur general, Li Sizhong 李思忠,⁶² was put in command of the Uyghur and Tangut units to protect the fortified camps. At the beginning of 843, Shi Xiong led several military forces from all over the empire in an attack on the Uyghur encampment in Zhenwu at Shahu Shan 殺胡山 ("Kill the Foreigners Mountain").⁶³ Most of the Uyghurs were either killed or imprisoned in the military operation.⁶⁴ As noted by Drompp, the collapse of the Uyghur Empire in the early 840s left a power vacuum in the border region that fostered growth in the groups of military retainers who had been active in the campaigns against the Uyghurs. These groups included the Shatuo, who profited greatly from this situation.⁶⁵

Another important factor that favoured the growth of the Shatuo troops in the second half of the century was a general shortage of manpower and resources in the provincial armies, which led to a series of uprisings in the military ranks. The Hedong provincial armies suffered from a shortage of manpower so severe that, according to the eleventh century *Zizhi tongjian*, even "warehouse guards and artisans had to be enrolled as soldiers" 守倉庫者及工匠皆出從軍.⁶⁶ In the winter of 843, a few months after the military campaign against the Uyghur encampment in Zhenwu, the court asked that the military governor of Hedong send some troops to Yushe 榆社 in response to a request for new troops by Wang Feng, the general in charge of the Yushe expeditionary troops 榆社行營 on the outskirts of Taiyuan. Liu Mian had been transferred to Yicheng 義成, and the newly established Hedong governor Li

60 ZZTJ 247.7971.

61 JTS 18a.593; *Quan Tang wen* 705.9169; Drompp, *Tang China*, pp. 271–72.

62 Li Sizhong, original name Wenmosi 溫沒斯 (Ormīzt) and allegedly a brother of the deceased Qaghan, was among the Uyghur chieftains who reached Tiande in the Autumn of 840. After requesting Tang patronage and leading two thousand six hundred armed men to the capital in Chang'an, he was invested with the title of military commissioner of the Return to Righteousness Army 歸義軍使 and was granted the imperial auspicious name of Li Sizhong 李思忠 (JTS 18a.591; on him see the detailed study of Michael Drompp, *Tang China*).

63 XTS 218.6155; Drompp, *Tang China*, pp. 113–14.

64 Drompp, *Tang China*, pp. 113–114; XTS 171.5195–96.

65 As noted by Michael Drompp, the Shatuo took the place of the Uyghurs "as military supporters of the Tang dynasty when China began to suffer from internal rebellions" (Drompp, *Tang China*, p. 204).

66 ZZTJ 247.7995.

Shi 李石 had no troops of his own.⁶⁷ During the Uyghur crisis, Liu Mian had quartered three thousand armed men at the Heng River (Hengshui) 橫水, north of Luoyang.⁶⁸ Upon Wang Feng's report, the court had decreed that half of the soldiers camped at Heng River be sent to reinforce the ranks of the Yushe garrison. The area commander, Yang Bian 楊弁, was put in charge of accompanying the soldiers to Yushe. On their way to the assigned quarters, the soldiers mutinied, entered Taiyuan, and demanded better provisions from Li Shi.

Under Liu Mian's governorship, the commission for each soldier had been two rolls of silk for each military expedition. After Liu Mian was dismissed from his post as military governor, however, the prefecture's military stores were left empty: according to Sima Guang, Liu Mian had used up all the silk to reward his followers. For this reason, Li Shi had no means of paying his soldiers after taking office in Taiyuan. He used his own finances to purchase provisions, and the commission was reduced to one roll of silk per soldier. This caused widespread discontent among Liu Mian's former troops. Yang Bian seized the chance to foment discontent and was proclaimed chief by the troops.⁶⁹

Led by Yang Bian, the troops robbed and pillaged the city market of Taiyuan, killed the local officials and occupied the administrative office. Yang Bian then sent his brother-in-law to establish a brotherhood covenant with Liu Zhen 劉稹 (d. 844), the latter having proclaimed himself Zhaoyi 昭義 military governor in Luzhou 潞州, one of the southern prefectures of Hedong. Meanwhile, Li Shi fled south to Fenzhou 汾州, southwest of Taiyuan on the western banks of the Fen River (Fenhe) 汾河. He happened to meet the general guarding the pass and informed him about the uprising in Taiyuan. Liu Zhen took the pass shortly afterward.⁷⁰ In the attempt to suppress the uprising, the court sent an imperial commissioner to Taiyuan. In response to a bribe from Yang Bian, the imperial commissioner reported to the court that Yang's army was so big that "from his headquarters to Liuzi the line of troops is more than fifteen *li* long" 自牙門列隊至柳子，十五餘里。⁷¹ According to Li Deyu's 李德裕 (787–850) biography in the *Jiu Tang shu*, the Tang minister was suspicious of the truthfulness of the report and asked the envoy how it could be possible that Yang Bian's army was so big when Taiyuan had a shortage of soldiers. Indeed, Yang Bian himself did not have that many soldiers under his command, nor did he have any means of sustaining them for long, and the mutiny was suppressed shortly after. The court

67 Li Shi is said to be a fifth-generation descendant of Li Shenfu 李神符, an uncle of Tang Gaozu (XTS 131.4512).

68 The sources are silent on this but, from information provided by the "Shatuo liezhuan", we could assume that some of the units quartered at River Heng were Shatuo horsemen of the Dai-bei mobile troops who had remained in the ranks of Liu Mian's army.

69 JTS 18a.599; ZZTJ 247.7995; XTS 131.4516.

70 ZZTJ 247.7995.

71 JTS 174.4527.

ordered Wang Feng to lead the troops of the Yushe garrison to Taiyuan, where Yang Bian was captured and executed.⁷²

According to the “Shatuo liezhuan”, at the time of the mutiny Shatuo troops were ordered to join the Taiyuan army and quarter at Yushe. The text states that they captured Yang Bian under the command of the Hedong army supervising commissioner 河東監軍, Lü Yizhong 呂義忠.⁷³ Although there is no further information concerning the involvement of Zhuxie Chixin in the uprising, nor in its suppression, he must have played his cards well because shortly thereafter he was named Daibei military commander 代北軍使 and prefect of Shuozhou 朔州刺史. This official recognition came on the heels of Zhuxie Chixin’s alliance with Shi Xiong’s troops to suppress the rebellion by Liu Zhen at the beginning of 845.⁷⁴ Shatuo troops were involved in several military campaigns against uprisings over the next few years. In February 850, following a successful campaign against the Nanshan Tangut 南山黨項,⁷⁵ Zhuxie Chixin was again named Yuzhou prefect 蔚州刺史 and Yunzhou defence commissioner 雲州守捉使.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, it was not until the suppression of Pang Xun’s 龐勛 (d. 869) rebellion in Xuzhou 徐州, located in the plain between the Yellow River and the Huai River,⁷⁷ that Zhuxie Chixin was endowed with the highest of honours.

An administrative assistant for supplies 糧料判官, Pang Xun had become the leader of a military mutiny that had taken place in a southern garrison in Guizhou 桂州 (present-day Guilin 桂林). Six years earlier, eight hundred soldiers from the Xuzhou army had been dispatched by imperial order to quarter at Guizhou garrison, on the agreement that they would be replaced after a three-year term of service.⁷⁸ As in the case of Yang Bian’s mutiny, a shortage in manpower triggered unrest and the soldiers rebelled against their extended tour of duty. Pang Xun, leading the rebel soldiers, headed back to Xuzhou. On their way they pillaged and looted villages and cities, besieging the city of Xuzhou.⁷⁹ The court resolved the siege in the same way it had responded to previous mutinies, by recruiting mobile troops. The Sogdian general Kang Chengxun 康承訓 (809–74) was named suppressing commissioner of the Xuzhou expeditionary troops 徐州行營招討使. Kang jointly commanded the Shatuo, Sage and Anqing cavalry units, as well as the Tuyuhun, Dada 達鞞 (Tatar) and Qibi units.⁸⁰ Zhuxie Chixin’s and his younger brother Chizhong’s 赤衷 harass-

72 *JTS* 174.4526–27.

73 *XTS* 218.6155.

74 *XTS* 214.6121; Drompp, *Tang China*, p. 319.

75 On the Nanshan Tangut, see Ruth Dannel, “The Hsi Hsia”, *The Cambridge History of China*, p. 161.

76 *XTS* 218.6156.

77 *JTS* 19a.664–67.

78 *ZZTJ* 251.8121.

79 *ZZTJ* 251.8120–21.

80 *ZZTJ* 252.8131.

ment were decisive in suppressing the uprising.⁸¹ According to Sima Guang, Kang Chengxun let the Shatuo vanguard cavalry run rampant (*zong* 縱) to attack, pillage and loot. Similar descriptions of the Shatuo's warfare occur in other military accounts, indicating that this destructive means of tackling unrest was systematically adopted by the Tang army and that the Shatuo troops were particularly expert at it.⁸²

The Datong insurrection and Daibei unrest

The early Qing historian Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1629–92) regards the Shatuo's involvement in crushing Pang Xun's rebellion as a turning point, the consequences of this action heralding the end of the Tang dynasty.⁸³ Wang's assessment is probably not an overstatement. Kang Chengxun was criticised by some at court for the way he had dealt with the rebellion and was demoted from his office shortly afterward.⁸⁴ Zhuxie Chixin, by contrast, advanced dramatically in his career and was named military governor of Datong 大同, with command over the Datong army. Formerly called Dawu 大武, the Datong garrison was located between Daizhou and Yunzhou and was one of the largest garrisons of Hedong.⁸⁵

At this point in his career, Zhuxie Chixin had reached the highest civilian and military post in the provincial ranks. He had direct command over an army that was bigger than the former Dabeii expeditionary troops. The latter remained officially subordinated to the Hedong military governor.⁸⁶ Some units of the expeditionary troops plausibly followed Zhuxie Chixin as part of the Datong army, but our sources suggest that not all Shatuo warriors remained loyal to him. Evidence from subsequent events shows that the Tang army still included Sogdian and Tuyuhun components, and even relatives of the Zhuxie-Li clan. The *Jiu Tang shu* mentions that the "Shatuo, Anqing, and Xuege (i.e. Sage) units" 沙陀安慶薛葛部落 attacked Zhuxie Chixin and his son in 878.⁸⁷ As we will see, the armed Shatuo led by the Sogdian general Li Youjin 李友金, related to his contemporary Li Keyong, switched their subordination to the military unit belonging to Li Zhuo 李琢, the defence commissioner of the Daibei expeditionary troops, as did the Shatuo led by the two Sogdian generals Mi Haiwan 米海萬 and Shi Jingcun 史敬存, commanding the Sage and Anqing units, respectively.⁸⁸

81 *XTS* 218.6156; *ZZTJ* 251.8131, 8140.

82 沙陀左右突圍，出入如飛，賊紛擾移避，沙陀縱騎蹂之，寨中諸軍爭出奮擊，賊大敗 (*ZZTJ* 251.8140); 官軍大集，縱擊，殺賊近萬人，餘皆溺死，降者纔及千人 (*ZZTJ* 251.8149). On the military practice of unleashing troops (*zong* 縱), see Shao-yun Yang "Letting the Troops Loose: Pillage, Massacres, and Enslavement in Early Tang Warfare", *Journal of Chinese Military History* 6 (2017): 1–52.

83 唐之亡不可救，五代之亂不可止，自康承訓奏使朱邪赤心率沙陀三部落討龐勳始 (Wang Fuzhi, *Du Tongjian lun* 讀通鑿論 [Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975], 27.959, 27.972–73).

84 *ZZTJ* 252.8154.

85 *ZZTJ* 251.8150; *JTS* 38.1387.

86 *ZZTJ* 253.8209; *XTS* 9.268; *JTS* 19b.702.

87 *JTS* 19b.700; *ZZTJ* 253.8209; see below in the text.

88 *JTS* 19b.707; *ZZTJ* 253.8209, 8226–27.

Shortly after his appointment as Datong military governor, Zhuxie Chixin was summoned to the court in Chang'an and made supreme general of the imperial insignia of the left 左金吾上將軍. Yizong 懿宗 (r. 859–873) decreed that the Zhuxie family be listed in the register of the imperial family clan and receive the imperial surname Li 李. Zhuxie Chixin was bestowed with the personal name Guochang 國昌 ("Glory of the State"). The Zhuxie family clan was granted a mansion in the prestigious Qinrenli 親仁里 neighbourhood on the outskirts of Chang'an, a location where many aristocratic families had their private mansions.⁸⁹ The court decision to keep Li Guochang at the capital in Chang'an may have been an attempt to exert control over him and the armed men close to him. His presence at court lasted only one year, however, and when a group of Uyghurs plundered the Tiande garrison in late 870, Li Guochang returned to command the frontier garrison as Zhenwu military governor.⁹⁰ He was also entrusted with patrolling the frontier prefectures of Ling and Yan as military governor of Fu-yan 鄜延.⁹¹

The court again tried to exert control over the military governor by appointing trusted men to leading positions within the army and the administration. Li Guochang systematically killed the officials sent by the court. When the court decreed that Li Guochang be transferred as Yunzhou prefect 雲州刺史 and Datong defence commissioner 大同軍防禦使, he defied the order on grounds of illness.⁹² With Li Guochang now leading a mutiny in Zhenwu after having defied imperial orders, the court attempted to rein him in by appointing trusted men to lead the surrounding provincial armies. Li Jun 李鈞 was then appointed Ling-Wu 靈武 military governor. The son of a former military governor of Hedong, with experience in dealing with Shatuo troops and bearing the title of pacifier of the Shatuo Liuzhou *buluo* 宣慰沙陀六州部落, Li Jun appeared to be just the right person for the task.⁹³ The decree issued for his appointment shows clearly how the court struggled to control Li Guochang.⁹⁴

The sources present discrepancies in the chronology of the ensuing events and of the mutinies that took place in northern Hedong between 873 and 878. The *Jiu Tang*

89 *XTS* 218.6156; *JTS* 19a.674–75; *ZZTJ* 252.8161.

90 *ZZTJ* 252.8161.

91 *XTS* 218.6156. The *Jiu Tang shu* places Li Guochang's appointment as Zhenwu military governor at the beginning of 870. Until 870, Li Guochang held the military post of Bandit suppression commissioner of the Hedong expeditionary troops' three Shatuo units, Jiang and Hun units 河東行營沙陀三部落羌渾諸部招討使, as well as the civilian titles of honorary advisor to the Heir Apparent 檢校太子賓客 and investigating censor 監察御史; upon the suppression of Pang Xun's rebellion, he was made honorary minister of work 檢校工部尚書, Chanyu great area commander 單于大都護, censor-in-chief 御史大夫, military governor of Zhenwu and Lin-Sheng surveillance commissioner 以河東行營沙陀三部落羌渾諸[675]部招討使、檢校太子賓客、監察御史朱邪赤心為檢校工部尚書、單于大都護、御史大夫、振武節度、麟勝等州觀察等使 (*JTS* 19a.674–75).

92 *JTS* 19a.681; *ZZTJ* 252.8164.

93 *JTS* 19b.692.

94 *Quan Tang wen* 86.901; *JTS* 19b.692.

shu cites early 874 as the date of death for the newly appointed Zhenwu military governor, Lu Jianfang 盧簡方 (793–874 or 878), whose position Li Guochang usurped.⁹⁵ By contrast, Sima Guang believes that Lu's appointment and subsequent death happened in 878, four years later.⁹⁶ Formerly employed as an official in the northern garrisons, Lu Jianfang had been transferred to the south when the court ordered him to return and render service in the troubled north. Lu Jianfang was first named defence commissioner for Yunzhou and Datong and then moved to govern the Zhenwu garrison.⁹⁷ His biography in the Old History notes that as prefect he developed military colonies (*tuntian* 屯田), trained soldiers, and gained the respect and fealty of the Shatuo settlers.⁹⁸ Lu Jianfang had just been assigned Li Guochang's post as Lin-Sheng surveillance commissioner and Zhenwu military governor, and was on his way to Lanzhou 嵐州 when Li Guochang defied the court's orders and led an armed mutiny in Zhenwu.⁹⁹ Lu died in the ensuing unrest, the exact circumstances of his demise being unknown.¹⁰⁰

In a similar manner, scholars long disagreed on the exact date of the slaughter of Yunzhou defence commissioner 雲州防禦使 and Daibei water and land transport commissioner 代北水陸發運 Duan Wenchu 段文楚, who perished in Yunzhou in the well-known Cockfighting Terrace 鬪雞臺 incident. The substance of the dispute was over whether the killing took place at the end of the Yizong reign, at the beginning of 873, or during the third or fifth year (875 or 878) of the succeeding Xizong 僖宗 reign (873–888).¹⁰¹ The archaeological recovery of Duan Wenchu's entombed

95 *JTS* 19a.682–83. There is evidence that some members of the powerful Fanyang Lu family established relations with the Shatuo. In particular, Lu Jianqiu 盧簡求, possibly a brother or a member of the same generation of Lu Jianfang, had close ties with the Shatuo Li (*JTS* 163.4272). Lu Jianqiu's son, Lu Rubi 盧汝弼, appears on Li Keyong's entombed epitaph as the drafter of the inscription and was appointed vice-governor of Hedong under Li Keyong. Ouyang Xiu states: "His father Jianqiu had been military governor of Hedong; as part of a famous Tang family Lu Rubi had great knowledge of the old affairs of the Tang 其父簡求為河東節度使，為唐名家，故汝弼亦多知唐故事 (*XWDS* 28.311). For this reason, Lu Rubi was appointed vice-governor of Hedong under Li Keyong and his son (Barengi, "Representations of Descent", p. 62, n. 29).

96 *ZZTJ* 253.8198.

97 *JTS* 19a.681.

98 大開屯田，練兵修鬪，沙陀畏附 (*JTS* 183.5369).

99 *JTS* 19a.682–83, 183.5369.

100 *Xin Wudai shi* 4.32.

101 Discrepancies occur even within the same source, as happens with the new Tang history, in which we find two dates: the fifth year of the Qianfu era 乾符 (878), and the third year of the same era in the "Shatuo liezhuan (*XTS* 9.967, 218.6156–57). The old history of the Tang backdates to December 872, in the last months of reign of Yizong (*JTS* 19a.681). Ouyang Xiu's *Xin Wudai shi* 新五代史 (4.32) has 873 (14th year of the Qiantong era). Sima Guang compares all the sources at his disposal and concludes that the *Tang mo san chao jianwen lu* 唐末三朝見聞錄 is the most reliable. The early tenth-century text has February 878 (*ZZTJ* 253.8196–98). For a detailed discussion on the reliability of these dates see Zhang Ming 張明, "Li Keyong de faji: men ji tai shibian shishi xinkao. Zhi Mo muzhi zai jiedu 李克用的發跡：鬥雞臺事變史實新考---《支謨墓誌》再解讀", *Zhonghua wenshi luncong* 3 (2018):

epitaph has clarified in which month he was killed, i.e. February 878. The date is confirmed by other epigraphic evidence in the form of the entombed epitaph of Datong defence commissioner Zhi Mo 支謨 (829–879).¹⁰² Duan Wenchu's killing is important not so much for the fact itself, but because of the significance attached to it as a turning point in the history of northern Hedong. The *Jiu Tang shu* simply says that “from that event [on], the Shatuo pillaged and plundered all the garrisons of Daibeï” 自是沙陀侵掠代北諸軍鎮.¹⁰³ As a matter of fact, the killing triggered military unrest that would change the power balance between the court and the Shatuo military governor Li Guochang and his son, Li Keyong. The latter makes his appearance in the sources as the material executor of Duan's murder and thereafter inserts himself as the new main player in the military history of Hedong.

It should also be noted that not all the Shatuo troops were initially involved in the Datong military uprising. Some Shatuo troops quartered in other garrisons may have remained under the command of the Tang army generals. At the beginning of 878, for instance, a dispatchment of five hundred Shatuo horsemen quartered in Xiangyang 襄陽 in the middle Han 漢 reaches, intervened to save the city of Jiangling 江陵, which had been put under siege by Wang Xianzhi 王仙芝 (d. 878) and his soldiers. The military governor Li Fu 李福 let the Shatuo cavalry loose and incited them to vigorously attack Wang Xianzhi's army at Jingmen 荊門¹⁰⁴ – where the Shatuo crushed them. Wang Xianzhi set fire to the outer city walls in retaliation and left.¹⁰⁵ As mentioned, the Datong mutiny is narrated with some chronological variation, presumably due to the attempts by historians to create coherent accounts based on at times fragmentary and contradictory sources. The varying chronologies may also affect the individual portrayal of the historical actors involved, yet for the purposes of this paper, the *Zizhi tongjian* chronology will be followed, where Sima Guang provides a convincing explanation of his historiographical choices.¹⁰⁶

Duan Wenchu's slaughter is vividly narrated by Sima Guang, largely based on an unofficial account collected in the *Tang mo sanchao jianwen lu* 唐末三朝見聞

93–400, here pp. 97–98. See also Nishimura, Nishimura Yoko. “Tōmatsu ‘Shi Mo boshimei’ to Sada no dōkō – kyū seiki no Daihoku chiiki 唐末「支謨墓誌銘」と沙陀の動向--九世紀の代北地域”. *Shigaku zasshi* 118.4 (2009): 525–526.

102 Zhang Ming analysed proofs from Zhi Mo's 支謨 entombed epitaph and confirmed February 878 as the most reliable date. Duan Wenchu's epitaph confirms this hypothesis as it states that 乾符五年二月七日，武威段公遇害於雲州 (p. 99). See also Hu Yaofei 胡耀飛, “Dou ji tai shijian zai tantao: cong duan wenchu muzhi lun Tang mo Hedong zhengju, 鬪雞臺事件再探討——從〈段文楚墓誌〉論唐末河東政局”, *Zhongguo zhonggu shi jikan* 中國中古史集刊, v. 3 (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2017): 257–286.

103 *JTS* 19a.682–83.

104 沙陀縱騎奮擊 (*ZZTJ* 253.8194–95); *JTS* 19b.701.

105 *JTS* 19b.701; *ZZTJ* 253.8194–95; for a discussion of the accounts provided by the different sources, see Hu Yaofei, “Dou ji tai shijian zai tantao”, pp. 278–79.

106 For the different variants, see the *Zizhi tongjian kaoyi* (*ZZTJ* 253.8196–98).

錄, an anonymous collection of historical anecdotes from the late Tang period.¹⁰⁷ Sima Guang's comprehensive chronicle highlights that the Datong military mutiny was preceded by several years of bad harvests and a severe famine that forced the provincial government to make drastic cuts to its military spending, especially on food supplies for the troops garrisoned in the border region. The soldiers affected blamed the imperial commissioners to control the granaries established in the northern prefectures and supervise water transport. Duan Wenchu, who had just taken office in Yunzhou, applied the court's laws and regulations in a particularly strict way.

In February 878, several Daibei military commanders and local notables including Li Jinzhong 李盡忠, vice commander of the Shatuo troops quartered in Yunzhou, and the commanders Kang Junli 康君立 (847–894), Xue Zhiqin 薛志勤 (837–898), Cheng Huaixin 程懷信, and Li Cunzhang 李存璋 (d. 922), plotted a rebellion and agreed to seek the military support of Li Guochang and Li Keyong. Li Guochang had made his name throughout decades as a capable general and now controlled Zhenwu. His son Li Keyong was vice commander 副兵馬使 of the Shatuo troops quartered in Yuzhou. Li Jinzhong and the other commanders sent Kang Junli to persuade Li Keyong to muster his troops, depose Duan Wenchu, and replace him in order to establish control over the transportation of goods. The *Zizhi tongjian* highlights Li Keyong's reluctance to intervene; the latter reportedly expressed the wish to report first to his father in Zhenwu. Since Li Keyong was not officially under his father's command, Sima Guang advances the idea that Li Guochang had factual control over most garrisons in Daibei. Kang Junli nevertheless persuaded him that the unrest among the soldiers was too pressing an issue to wait for Li Guochang's command.¹⁰⁸

The beginning of the military rebellion coincided with the appointment of a new Hedong military governor, Dou Huan 竇澣. The rebellious troops first occupied the garrisons to the west. They moved through Shiyao 石窯 and the Baibo 白泊 Valley, and reached Jingbian 靜邊 garrison, southeast of Zhenwu.¹⁰⁹ Probably followed by then by a crowd of civilians who formed a local militia (*tutuan* 土團),¹¹⁰ the deserting troops laid siege to the city of Yunzhou. According to the *Tang mo sanchao jianwen lu*, Li Jinzhong breached the city walls by luring generals away from the gates with gifts and rewards. Li Keyong arrived soon after, at the head of more than fifty thousand unmounted soldiers and cavalry, and set up camp at Cockfighting Ter-

107 Bibliographical catalogues attribute a *Tang mo wenjian lu* to Wang Renyu 王仁裕 (880–956); Sima Guang, by contrast, states that the author of the text is unknown. The historian draws substantially on it and uses the title *Tang mo san chao wenjian lu* (Glen Dudbridge. *A Portrait of Five Dynasties China: From the Memoirs of Wang Renyu (880–956)* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013], p. 34, n. 122).

108 *ZZTJ* 253.8195.

109 *ZZTJ* 253.8196; 五年春正月丁酉朔, 沙陀首領李盡忠陷遮虜軍 (*JTS* 19b.701). Jingbian garrison was located 180 li west of Yunzhou (*Yuanhe junxian tuzhi* 14.12b), 120 li southeast of Zhenwu garrison (*Taiping yuanyu ji* 太平寰宇記, 38.7a).

110 率泊川萬戶 (Nishimura, p. 518).

race, at the foot of the walls outside the city. The popular troops that had allied themselves with the army were offered cattle and alcohol as gifts. Duan Wenchu and his assistants were captured by Li Jinzhong inside the city, tied up and dragged over the southern walls to the outside. The armed crowd then tore them apart limb by limb, their bodies and bones trampled on with horses' hooves.¹¹¹ Li Keyong was then proclaimed the new Daibei water and land transport commissioner and "stepped forward accompanied by some one thousand unofficial soldiers on horses and on foot and holding bows and knives".¹¹² The court denied Li Keyong's appointment, naming Lu Jianfang as the new Datong defence commissioner¹¹³ and Zhi Xiang 支詳, Zhi Mo's brother and an official who had experience with rebellions in the south, as the Datong pacification commissioner 大同軍宣慰使.¹¹⁴

Meanwhile, Li Guochang convinced the court that he could intervene in persuading his son to accept imperial orders and step down. The court transferred Lu Jianfang to Zhenwu and named Li Guochang as Datong military governor.¹¹⁵ According to Sima Guang, the court was hoping to control Li Keyong through the intervention of his father. Li Guochang had other plans, and when he reached Datong, he united his armed forces with those of Li Keyong. Considering that he had just committed mutiny in Zhenwu, it seems highly improbable that the court was not aware of Li Guochang's scheme. The officials in Yunzhou were certainly aware of it, as attested by Zhi Mo's epitaph stating that "his [Li Keyong's] father concerned himself with family interests alone, plotted a family scheme, did not care for affairs of state" 其父但謀家計，靡顧國章。¹¹⁶ What happened next was thus largely foreseeable: Li Guochang once again defied the imperial order, killed the officials sent by the court, and allied himself with his son's troops.¹¹⁷

In the early summer, the joint forces of Li Guochang and Li Keyong seized Zhelu 遮虜 garrison, northeast of Honggu 洪谷, and subsequently attacked Ningwu 寧武¹¹⁸ and Kelan 崑嵐 garrison, the latter being located some hundred kilometres (220 *li*) west of Shuozhou.¹¹⁹ They now controlled most of the troops between Shuozhou and Yunzhou, as well as the roads that led east to Youzhou 幽州. As the Shatuo Li father and son led their troops south toward Jinyang, they encountered little resistance from the Hedong provincial army, which had been decimated by internal rebellions and a shortage of troops. The Hedong provincial armies were so sorely

111 ZZTJ 253.8195.

112 李九郎被土團馬步軍約一千人持弓刀送上 (*Tang mo wenjian lu*, ZZTJ 253.8196).

113 See above for the discrepancies on Lu Jianfang's appointment and death.

114 ZZTJ 253.8167.

115 ZZTJ 253.8198.

116 Nishimura, p. 518.

117 ZZTJ 253.8206-07.

118 The exact location of this garrison is not very clear. The *Zizhi tongjian kaoyi* mentions Song Bai's 宋白 *Xu Tongdian* 續通典, now lost. According to Song Bai, the Ningwu garrison was located 700 *li* from Youzhou, on the way to Guizhou 媯州 (Hebei) (ZZTJ 253.8206-07).

119 ZZTJ 253.8206-07.

lacking in soldiers that the military governor of Hedong at the time, Dou Huan, had to rely on the support of local civilians for defence, ordering the people to build a moat around Jinyang. At the same time, he appointed an officer of Sogdian origin, Kang Chuangui 康傳圭, as prefect of Daizhou and dispatched a unit of two thousand local militia (*tutuan*) to set up camp in Daizhou. As the troops reached the city walls, they refused to move forward, demanding further compensation. The army commissioner sent by Dou Huan to negotiate, Deng Qian 鄧虔, was slaughtered and his body carried into the garrison. Dou Huan personally entered the garrison in order to restore order; he borrowed fifty thousand strings of coins from the commercial elite and distributed the money to the rebellious troops. The court did not approve of Dou Huan's strategy and dismissed him, appointing Cao Xiang 曹翔 as Hedong military governor in his place, with Zhi Mo as deputy.¹²⁰

The Tang troops took back Yunzhou for a short period in the autumn and winter of 878 and regained control of the Daibei expeditionary troops. Meanwhile, Li Guochang and Li Keyong led their troops south, setting fire to the counties of Tanglin 唐林 and Guo 嶂, and entered Xinzhou 忻州, north of Jinyang 晉陽 (Taiyuan).¹²¹ When Cao Xiang took office in Jinyang, he executed those responsible for Deng Qian's killing. Some of the Tang provincial troops gathered at Jinyang in order to hold out against the Shatuo took the opportunity to request more rewards. In the eighth month of 878, Cao Xiang sent troops to rescue Xinzhou. Li Keyong had already attacked the Kelan garrison and captured its outer walls; Jinyang closed the gates and prepared to defend itself.¹²²

Upon Cao Xiang's death, some Tang provincial troops took the opportunity to loot and pillage Jinyang. The *Zizhi tongjian* generally has a keen eye for the plight of civilians in its war narratives, and this case is no exception. The historian focuses on the inhabitants of Jinyang, noting that, when Cao Xiang passed away, they killed several thousand soldiers who were sacking Jinyang, causing the troops to disperse.¹²³ Upon Cao Xiang's death, the court named Cui Jikang 崔季康 as the new military governor of Hedong. As Shatuo troops moved farther south to Shizhou 石州, Cui Jikang sent in rescue troops.¹²⁴ Meanwhile, the Tang troops still held control over Yunzhou. In an attempt to recover adjacent Yuzhou, in the winter of 878 the court ordered that the allied armies of Li Jun, military governor of Zhaoyi, and Li Keju 李可舉, military governor of Youzhou, move north to Yuzhou in a military expedition. Li Jun's troops enlisted some of the Daibei expeditionary troops units: the Anqing and Sage led by Mi Haiwan, together with Helian Duo's 赫連鐸 troops and Bai Yicheng's 白義誠 troops.¹²⁵

120 *JTS* 19b.701, 702; *ZZTJ* 253.8208.

121 *ZZTJ* 253.8208.

122 *ZZTJ* 253.8208.

123 *ZZTJ* 253.8208.

124 *JTS* 19b.700; *ZZTJ* 253.8209.

125 *JTS* 19b.700; *ZZTJ* 253.8209.

The Tang troops were defeated by Li Keyong's army at Honggu, west of the Fen River, and Kelan garrison switched its allegiance to the Shatuo. Li Jun died in battle; some provincial troops mutinied and again headed toward Daizhou. The sources vary in their narrative of the ensuing events. According to the *Zizhi tongjian* reconstruction, when the rebellious troops reached Daizhou, the local people suppressed the rebellion and killed many soldiers. The survivors escaped through the Yaming gorge (Yaminggu) 鷓鳴谷, northeast of Xinzhou, retreating south to Shangdang 上黨 (Luzhou).¹²⁶ The rest of the allied Tang troops headed to Jingle 靜樂, east of Lanzhou 嵐州 on the banks of the Fen River, and mutinied. Cui Jikang fled to Jinyang and was subsequently murdered.¹²⁷ According to the Old History of the Five Dynasties, *Jiu Wudai shi* 舊五代史, the reconquest of Yunzhou by Li Keyong and the defeat of the Tang troops ended with Li Keyong being officially appointed Datong's military governor, in analogy to his father.¹²⁸ This fact is not mentioned elsewhere, yet seems confirmed in Zhi Mo's epitaph, which stated that in the summer of 879 Li Keyong was named military governor of Yun, Shuo and Yu 蔚、朔、雲三州節度使.¹²⁹

However, the peace settlement between the Tang court and Li Keyong lasted for less than a year, as the court sent out another military expedition against Li Keyong to Yunzhou in the summer of 880. The military campaign was led by Li Zhuo 李琢 at the head of the Daibei expeditionary troops, together with the other troop leaders Helian Duo and Li Keju, the military governor of Youzhou. The *Jiu Tang shu* reports that Helian Duo sent out emissaries to persuade some of Li Keyong's generals to switch their allegiance to the Tang. The Shatuo general Li Youjin, together with the Sogdians Mi Haiwan and Shi Jingcun, switched his allegiance to Li Zhuo's command and opened the city gates to let the Tang troops in. Li Keyong, en route to the Xiongwu 雄武 garrison, returned to Yunzhou upon hearing this news. His troops were defeated by the allied Tang armies, his army decimated and scattered. Together with his father and siblings, Li Keyong fled northeast into Tatar 達鞏 territory.¹³⁰ The Tatar territory provided a large reservoir of fighting men from which Li Keyong recruited soldiers to reinforce the ranks of his weakened army. Helian Duo was then named Yunzhou prefect and Datong defence commissioner, Bai Yicheng was named Yuzhou prefect, and Mi Haiwan was named Shuozhou prefect.¹³¹ In the years after his return from Tatar exile, Li Keyong would be named Hedong military governor, a

126 *JTS* 19b.702; *ZZTJ* 253.8209–10.

127 *ZZTJ* 253.8212.

128 Xue Juzheng 薛居正 [912–981], *Jiu Wudai shi* 舊五代史 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976, hereafter *JWDS*), 25.333.

129 Nishimura, "Tōmatsu 'Shi Mo boshimei' to Sada no dōkō", p. 519.

130 *JTS* 19b.707; *XTS* 218.6157; *ZZTJ* 253.8231–32. The Tatars were a small confederation of tribes located in southern Manchuria. In the ninth century, Tatar settlements were also present beyond the northern frontier. Upon Li Keyong's return to Hedong, he enlisted numerous Tatar armed men in his troops.

131 *JTS* 19b.707; *ZZTJ* 253.8227, 8231–32.

post that he would keep for the next twenty years until 907, the official date of his death. The details of these two decades, concerning the return of Li Keyong and his role in the suppression of the Huang Chao 黃巢 rebellion, have been studied elsewhere in depth and will not be analysed here.¹³²

A buried epilogue of the Datong military unrest, and some concluding remarks

An invaluable and rare vantage point from which to observe the complex historical situation of Daibei is provided by the entombed epitaph of the Tang official Zhi Mo. Excavated in 2004 within Zhi Mo's tomb mound in Mengjin 孟津 county, at Mount Mang (Mangshan) 邙山 north of Luoyang 洛陽, the stone epitaph is composed of more than three thousand characters and constitutes an important documentary witness to the Daibei military unrest. Of the several official and unofficial narrative versions of the Datong military uprising, the one offered by Zhi Mo's entombed epitaph is undoubtedly the most heartfelt. Understandably so, as Zhi Mo himself was personally involved in the facts narrated and his sudden death in office is allegedly connected to the events he witnessed.¹³³

As attested by his epitaph, Zhi Mo enjoyed a long career as a border officer. In 862, Zhi Mo was transferred from his official post at the capital in Chang'an, as Aide of the Court of the National Granaries and Expert of the Special Reserves Vault,¹³⁴ to work as a censor 御史 at the Tiande garrison. The epitaph provides some

132 See Wang Gung-wu, *Divided China: Preparing for Reunification (883–947)*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd, 2nd ed., 2007.

133 Zhi Mo, courtesy name Zixuan 子玄, was a member of a large and important family with a long history of officialdom within the Tang administrative and military system that traced its origins back to Langye 瑯邪 (modern Linyi, Shandong) in the Latter Zhao 後趙 period. The primal ancestor, Zhi Yuanheng 支元亨, had been Commander of Pu'an Commandery 普安郡. The Zhi possibly belonged to a clan that originated within the Central Asian Yuezhi 月支 seminomadic polity, hence the surname. Several of Zhi Mo's family members were buried in the same area, and more than ten tomb mounds of the Zhi family have been unearthed in Mengjin county. The epigraphic sources list several of Zhi Mo's brothers and sisters (eight or twelve brothers and two sisters), who all died roughly in the same years. Of all of them, only his younger brother Zhi Xiang appears in the transmitted records. Nonetheless, neither he nor Zhi Mo have a biography in the dynastic histories. For more details on the Zhi family genealogy, see Dong Yanshou 董延壽, Zhao Zhenhua 趙振華, "Tangdai Zhi Mo ji qi jia muzhi yanjiu 唐代支謨及其家墓志研究", *Luoyang daxue xuebao* 21.1 (2006): 1–10; Zhang Ming 張明, "Li Keyong de faji: men ji tai shibian shishi xinkao. Zhi Mo muzhi zai jiedu 李克用的發跡: 鬥鷄臺事變史實新考---《支謨墓誌》再解讀", *Zhonghua wenshi luncong* 3 (2018): 93–400; Nishimura Yoko. "Tōmatsu 'Shi Mo boshimei' to Sada no dōkō – kyū seiki no Daihoku chiiki 唐末「支謨墓誌銘」と沙陀の動向--九世紀の代北地域", *Shigaku zasshi* 118.4 (2009): 513–550.

134 司農寺丞兼專知延資庫官事. A "special reserve vault" was "a storehouse in the dynastic capital for coins and other valuables used to provide for emergency military expenditures on the frontier" (Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985], p. 580).

hints of Zhi Mo's work as a border official.¹³⁵ Like Lu Jianfang before him,¹³⁶ Zhi Mo actively promoted military colonies:

[Zhao] Chongguo's plan to defeat the Qiang lay partly in the foundation of military colonies, in enlisting and training soldiers, and in fully exploiting the profits of water resources.¹³⁷ Hence [Zhi Mo] urged and induced all garrison generals and soldiers to value the dredging of old canals, to open up the fertile [lands] of the Yellow River, and to irrigate the fields for several hundred thousand mu.

充國破羌之策半在屯田、牽招養士之基、全資水利。因勸誘諸軍將士重浚古渠，擘出黃腴，溉田幾百萬畝¹³⁸

The epitaph adds that Zhi Mo's work was appreciated by his superiors and that he was named acting gentleman of the ministry of the storehouses 加檢校庫部郎.¹³⁹ After a short period of time spent in the south as prefect of Puzhou 濮州 and a three-year mourning period, Zhi Mo was called back by the court to serve in the troubled north, which was struggling with severe military rebellions and unrest.¹⁴⁰ In 878, shortly after Duan Wenchu's slaughter, Zhi Mo took office as vice governor of Hedong and was soon transferred to Datong as its pacification commissioner 大同宣諭.¹⁴¹ The epitaph provides information about Zhi Mo's reorganisation of the military defence in Yunzhou (Datong), following the reconquest of the Datong garrison at the hands of the Tang army in the autumn of 878.¹⁴²

At that time, due to the frequent slave raiding, pillaging, and massacres [by rebels], both public and private funds were exhausted. He [Zhi Mo] thereupon fixed problems and put [affairs] in order, joined the stitches, buried the dead, and cured the wounded; he encouraged Helian Duo and brothers, was generous in their treatment, generously fostered the Tuyuhun units, and ensured that these became trustworthy subordinates. The isolated garrisons were gradually pacified, and the neighbouring prefectures all harmonised.

135 The epitaph's transcription is based on Nishimura, "Tōmatsu 'Shi Mo boshimei' to Sada no dōkō", pp. 517 and 523.

136 *Supra*.

137 This is a reference to the Western Han general Zhao Chongguo 趙重國 (137–52 BC), famous for suppressing a Qiang rebellion (see Edward L. Dreyer, "Zhao Chongguo: A Professional Soldier of China's Former Han Dynasty", *The Journal of Military History* 72 (2008): 665–725).

138 Nishimura, "Tōmatsu 'Shi Mo boshimei' to Sada no dōkō", pp. 517–18.

139 *Ibid.*, p. 518.

140 *Ibid.*, pp. 517, 523, 525.

141 *Ibid.*, pp. 518–19. See also Zhang Ming, "Li Keyong de faji", pp. 95–97.

142 Zhang Ming, "Li Keyong de faji", p. 104.

時也，俘剽剿僂之餘，公私懸罄。遂彌縫整緝，瘞死醫傷，激勵赫連鐸兄弟，優其禮秩；厚撫吐谷渾部落，寘彼腹心。孤軍寔安，鄰鎮皆協¹⁴³

According to the epitaph, Zhi Mo personally sought the support of the Tuyuhun troops led by the Helian clan in order to execute the aforementioned reorganisation. It should be noted that there is no reference in the inscription to any intervention by the provincial armies. Quite to the contrary, the epitaph states that Zhi Mo's efforts to defend Yunzhou were in vain as the court's support failed to materialise. His last attempt to defend Yunzhou occurred when Li Keyong and his troops returned to Daibei in the winter of 878. Zhi Mo tricked them into believing that the defence was weak, there being no soldiers, so that the bandits could return and occupy the land.¹⁴⁴ Zhi Mo then

ordered his armoured cavalymen to strike him [Li Keyong] in the rear, upon which they got to his private manor and shot volleys of arrows at him. He was pierced through the chest and died.

命鐵馬尾襲抵其私莊，叢弧射之，洞臆而斃¹⁴⁵

The epitaph quotes that Li Keyong's body was loaded on a sedan chair, his death mourned by his troops.¹⁴⁶ His father Li Guochang, who called his son "a match for ten thousand men" 萬人敵 because of his skills in mounted archery, was afraid that the Tang troops would take advantage of the sudden loss and launch an attack: he "then took a caitiff blind from one eye that resembled [Li Keyong] in age and physical aspect and, deceiving people, said that Keyong was alive" 乃取一瞎虜，年貌相類者，詐人云克用存焉。¹⁴⁷ The epitaph continues:

At that time, they bribed high-ranking officials and colluded with them in deceit, factions within and without the court coming together, they set him up [i.e. the man blind from one eye] as the dead caitiff [leader], and by means of him coerced the state. Sir [Zhi Mo] on several occasions reported to the court, but at the end he was not listened to and was not trusted.

時寵賂上流，詭譎膠固，內外叶附，持此死虜，以脅國家。公前後陳奏，終不聽信¹⁴⁸

This paper will not discuss the reliability of the epitaph's version, which differs from Li Keyong's death by three decades compared to the official accounts (907); the alleged date is relevant only with regard to the consequences for Zhi Mo's life.¹⁴⁹

143 Nishimura, "Tōmatsu 'Shi Mo boshimei' to Sada no dōkō", p. 518.

144 公示之以怯，悄若無人，賊乃略地言旋，不為後慮 (Nishimura, "Tōmatsu 'Shi Mo boshimei' to Sada no dōkō", pp. 518–519; Zhang, pp. 106–107.

145 Nishimura, "Tōmatsu 'Shi Mo boshimei' to Sada no dōkō", p. 519.

146 暨茲輿尸，闔族喪氣 (Ibid., p. 519).

147 Ibid., p. 519.

148 Ibid., p. 519.

As reported in the epitaph, the court's disbelief at Zhi Mo's testimony resulted in Li Keyong's appointment (or that of his puppet substitute, according to the text) as military governor of Yu, Shuo, and Yun in the summer of 879.¹⁵⁰ This fact is not mentioned in any of the transmitted sources, with the exception of the *Jiu Wudai shi*, compiled in the second half of the tenth century.¹⁵¹ As the news that Li Keyong had been appointed military governor reached Yunzhou, the local military clans felt betrayed by the very patron they had served: the Tang court. It was as if the court had abandoned Daibei, and "the emperor was shocked and everyone, Chinese and foreigners alike, was astounded" 輦轂喧駭，華夷震驚。¹⁵² Zhi Mo certainly suffered the consequences of this event; his epitaph notes that he had just been ordered to leave Yunzhou, instead appointed to his former post as acting policy adviser. When his men heard that he was about to be promoted and transferred, they reacted as follows:

Consequently the soldiers of the three armies' Nine Surnames lined up and converged in a crowd, prostrated themselves and beating their breasts said: "The resentment of Guochang [Li Guochang] and his son [Li Keyong] was that our army came to the emperor's defence, causing them to fail to achieve their ambitions. Now that the court has entrusted its children (i.e. the people) to the bandits, how can you, Lord Attendant, bear to abandon us to our deaths, in order to seek the favours and glory of one official position?" Sir [Zhi Mo] pitied them and spoke to them, but they agreed to leave only after two days. He stayed for several days, thinking the matter over repeatedly, trying to decide whether to go or stay. He said to himself: "If I leave and betray the troops, I will incur rage as strong as water and fire; if I remain and provoke slander, my own flesh and blood kin will be in danger. I cannot betray my sworn allies like Li Ju did,¹⁵³ yet also cannot be like Ma Chao who

149 Zhang Ming maintains that the epitaph's account of Li Keyong's passing cannot be reliable on the basis of the argument that, in time of war, it could happen that generals were mistakenly reported as dead ("Li Keyong de fajì", pp. 106–108).

150 "In the summer of the sixth year, Ren Zunmo memorialised the emperor, firmly asserting that Keyong was alive, and loudly made this claim at court. The emperor then appointed [Keyong] as military governor of Yuzhou, Shuozhuo, and Yunzhou" 六年夏，任遵蕃入奏，固稱克用身在，大言於朝，遂除蔚、朔、雲三州節度使 ("Tōmatsu 'Shi Mo boshimei' to Sada no dōkō", p. 519).

151 Zhang Ming believes that this information might be correct because it is mentioned in the *JWDS* as well; see "Li Keyong de fajì", pp. 109–111.

152 "Tōmatsu 'Shi Mo boshimei' to Sada no dōkō", p. 519.

153 This is plausibly a reference to the Western Jin official Li Ju 李矩 (d. 325), a Jin official who held Xingyang 滎陽 and the surrounding area against the forces of Shi Le 石勒 (274–333) during the collapse of Western Jin dynasty in north China. He made alliances with a number of pro-Jin local elite leaders in the north, but finally abandoned them and tried to lead his forces south to the Eastern Jin court. Most of his followers deserted him *en route* and he died after falling from his horse (Fan Xuanling 房玄齡 [579–648], *Jin shu* 晉書 [Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974], 63.1709)

sacrificed the lives of a hundred kinsmen [by rebelling].¹⁵⁴ If I could just be buried in the ground (i.e. die) now; it would be [as much of a release] as if I ascended to the heavens as an immortal.” In the third decade of the eleventh month, he announced [that he wanted to retire on account of] illness. On the first day of the twelfth month, he died in office at the age of fifty-one.

於是三軍九姓之士排閣雲集，僕面拊膺云：「國昌父子怨當軍勤王，俾渠不得其志。今朝廷已將赤子委豺虎。常侍寧忍棄我輩性命，徇一官寵榮」。公憫而諭之，信宿方解。居數日，反復籌策，求其適歸。嘗獨言曰：「去則違衆，犯水火之怒；止則招謗，貽骨肉之憂。既不能作李矩之背同盟，¹⁵⁵又不能如馬超之捐百口。祇茲入地，即是升仙。」十一月下旬告疾。十二月一日薨位、享年五十一。¹⁵⁶

The designation “soldiers of the three armies’ Nine Surnames” 三軍九姓之士 supposedly collectively refers to the Sogdian Anqing and Sage units commanded by the generals Mi Haiwan and Shi Jingcun, as well as to the units commanded by the Tuyuhun commanders, who supported the Tang provincial armies in the military expedition to Yuzhou in the winter of 878.¹⁵⁷ The text reveals that the soldiers were enraged that Zhi Mo was willing to accept the court’s decision to be transferred, leaving them to the resentment of the Zhuxie-Li and their allies. Zhi Mo’s options, meanwhile, were really between bad and worse, as leaving would have provoked the wrath of his former retainers and staying would have meant disobeying the court’s orders.

The events that followed Zhi Mo’s death receive short shrift in the transmitted sources. It can be assumed that the Sogdian military clans, having lost the support of the court, returned to Li Keyong’s control for a brief period. But by the summer of 880, they again switched their allegiance to the Tang when the conflict between Li Keyong and the court resumed. As seen above, Li Keyong fled into Tatar territory, and the Sogdians were granted official posts in Shuozhou and Yunzhou by the Tang court.¹⁵⁸ After this, there is no further mention in the sources of the two Sogdian generals Shi Jingcun and Mi Haiwan. Helian Duo would go on to keep his post at the head of the troops as the Yunzhou defence commissioner 雲州防禦使 until 891, when he was defeated by Li Keyong and disappeared from the historical records.¹⁵⁹

154 Ma Chao 馬超 (176–222) was an Eastern Han general who rebelled against the Han court. His rebellion cost the lives of nearly his entire family, as they were captured and executed by Cao Cao 曹操 (155–220); see Pei Songzhi’s (Chen Shou 陳壽 [233–297], *San guo zhi* 三國志 [Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1964], 36.946).

155 *Ju* 炬 has been amended with 矩 based on the transcript in Dong Yanshou and Zhao Zhenhua, “Tangdai Zhi Mo ji qi jia muzhi yanjiu”, p. 3.

156 Nishimura, “Tōmatsu ‘Shi Mo boshimei’ to Sada no dōkō”, p. 519. See also Zhang, “Li Keyong de faji”, pp. 95–97.

157 *JTS* 19b.700; *ZZTJ* 253.8209; see above p. 32.

158 *JTS* 19b.707; *ZZTJ* 253.8227, 8231–32; see above p. 34; *ZZTJ* 258.8416.

159 *ZZTJ* 258.8416.

The transmitted and excavated sources provide only a glimpse of the unorthodox dynamics of enlisting, managing and recruiting Central Asian military retainers on the payroll of prefectural and provincial officials. Units of enlisted armed men such as the Shatuo were collectively referred to by the name of the leader to whose orders they responded. The term “Shatuo” thus mostly refers to the leadership (i.e. the Shatuo Zhuxie-Li clan), but defines two distinctive formations. Firstly, the sources use “Shatuo” in reference to the Daibei expeditionary troops, and this designation also included two army units under the leadership of Sogdian and Tuyuhun chieftains and indicated a fixed number of units and soldiers. With the onset of Li Guochang’s mutiny and the Datong military unrest, “Shatuo” came to refer more closely to a heterogeneous army, composed of official and “unofficial” troops (*tutuan*) that remained loyal to the Zhuxie-Li clan, as well as new manpower enlisted on the march such as the Tatars recruited from the northeast. Because alliances and affiliations could change relatively quickly, the usage of the term sometimes appears to have become blurred. One could say that in this second phase the Shatuo were a new military and political group under Li Keyong’s leadership. Both uses of the term referred to a group’s leadership, yet different ethnic elements were to be found within these groups. Ethnicity thus played little to no role in the “Shatuo” designation, as experienced armed men advanced within the ranks of the Shatuo regardless of their origins or cultural background. Belonging to the Shatuo was more of a military, political and constitutional matter; the idea of significant ethnic and cultural ties may have been emphasised (or even created) in later periods as a means of expressing political loyalty.

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