**Edited by**
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**Luigi Perissinotto**

PAOLOZZI
AND WITTGENSTEIN

The Artist and the Philosopher

Paolozzi and Wittgenstein

Diego Mantoan · Luigi Perissinotto
Editors

Paolozzi and Wittgenstein

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An Introduction to the Artist Who "Needed" Wittgenstein

Diego Mantoan and Luigi Perissinotto

1 A Precursor in Contemporary Art and Philosophy of Language

According to a deeply rooted and still widespread belief in the artworld, it appears that the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy on visual arts was first invoked—so to speak—in relation to Conceptual Art, both in its American matrix, as in the case of Joseph Kosuth's *Art After Philosophy* (Kosuth 1991), as well as in the English version through the artist collective

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This introduction has been mutually agreed on by the two authors, although it is possible to discern their authorship: Sects. 1, 3 and 4 were written by Diego Mantoan, while Sect. 2 was written by Luigi Perissinotto.

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Art & Language and its international magazine bearing the same name (Harrison 2001). It isn't difficult to understand the reasons for this association between Wittgenstein and the conceptual artists of the late 1960s and early 1970s, since there are at least three features derived from the writings of the Austrian philosopher that fit neatly into the purpose of this kind of art, such as: a prevailing interest in logical analysis, the methodological approach to language game and, eventually, the purpose of dematerialization. As a matter of fact, the model of linguistics introduced by the Viennese philosopher—complete with terms and phrases such as isomorphism, aspect–seeing, language–game, investigation, etc.—was immediately appealing for those British and American artists who endeavoured to further develop the field of artistic theory and practice. However, artists such as Joseph Kosuth and Lawrence Weiner in the USA, Mel Ramsden and Terry Atkinson in the UK were by no means the first who employed or applied Wittgenstein's thought in the realm of visual arts; nor do they seem the ones who succeeded in appropriately interpreting, through artistic means, the writings of the Austrian philosopher. These artists were indeed neither interpreters nor scholarly exegetes of Wittgenstein's writings; they rather used excerpts from the texts of the Austrian philosopher. Sometimes they even manipulated them, transforming the quotes into aphorisms for their own artistic concerns, particularly in reaction to Clement Greenberg, whose influence was perceived in the mid 1960s as suffocating both for art critics and artists (Battcock 1968; Alberro and Stimson 1999).

Although this book is not set to claim the presence or absence of originality and correctness in the way Conceptual Art approached Wittgenstein, it serves as a good starting point, because it immediately pictures the place and years of a peculiar encounter between an artist, Eduardo Paolozzi, and a philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein—both as a man and as far as his philosophy is concerned. Indeed, this "kind of happening" took place years before the generation of future conceptual artists had even entered art school (Spencer 2000: 150). This metaphorical—though very real—encounter came about after the philosopher's death in 1951 and slowly worked its way up in Paolozzi's readings and imagination for an entire decade, until it reached a climax in the explicitly "Wittgensteinian" works of the British artist at the beginning of the 1960s (Spencer 2000: 127, 147). Not only was Paolozzi the first and

perhaps still is the only artist who devoted a substantial part of his oeuvre to the Austrian philosopher, his works still impress even a philosophically qualified audience for the level of expertise and intuitiveness with which the writings of Wittgenstein are handled. For that reason, this book pursues a twofold aim: on the one side, to present the artist Paolozzi as a precursor in reading Wittgenstein in the field of contemporary art, influencing or forestalling the then-upcoming generation of conceptual artists; on the other side, to demonstrate how the reader Paolozzi may even be seen as a precursor as regards the interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Indeed, Paolozzi's rich artistic production about and *with* Wittgenstein is neither accidental nor spurious; on the contrary, it amounts to a true relationship, something very much like a deep friendship or a mutual partnership; that is, between two people that share certain belief and interests, lifestyles and preferences, moments and deeds. Like two people meeting and then walking side by side for quite a bit on the path of their reciprocal lives.

Such a twofold objective can hardly be accomplished in a monocular perspective; hence, as far as methodology is concerned, the book blends different approaches and alternates scholars from various disciplines—spanning from philosophers to art historians—such as to provide an integrated view on Paolozzi's oeuvre and on Wittgenstein's view or influence on visual arts. In fact, given this complex relationship between an artist and a philosopher, we believe it is unavoidable to cover a wide array of methodological stances—ranging from language philosophy to art theory, from contemporary art history to art criticism. As might already be clear from the table of contents, each contributor pursues a particular topic as seen from his or her peculiar research field, in order to jointly deliver the various aspects of a deep and fruitful relationship, both for philosophy and for contemporary art.

2   Paolozzi Featuring Wittgenstein

At a point in art history, when Eduardo Paolozzi's oeuvre is eventually being celebrated, years after his departure, thanks to his definitive studio reconstruction at the National Galleries of Scotland in Edinburgh

and to the first retrospective exhibition at the Whitechapel Gallery in London, it is about time to investigate the artist's predilection for Ludwig Wittgenstein—both for his writings and biography. Indeed, the articulated relationship between the British artist, credited as "godfather" of Pop Art, and the Austrian philosopher, who counts among the twentieth-century celebrity thinkers, has never been analysed thoroughly. Given the wide array of Wittgenstein-inspired works in Paolozzi's production, as well as his testimonies on the philosopher's influence on his art, for instance in the interviews with Richard Hamilton and William Lipke (Spencer 2000: 125–128, 147–150), it is quite surprising that no scholarly publication—neither art historical nor philosophical—has ever retraced and critically pondered the influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy on the idea of art in Paolozzi, but mostly on his artistic production over the years. As a matter of fact, the encounter with Wittgenstein—specifically with the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, as well as with writings of his disciple Norman Malcolm—originated the well-known series of screenprints titled *As Is When* (1964–1965), of which one edition finds today its place at the Tate Modern in London. However, the following chapters argue that the British artist drew inspiration also from the *Philosophical Investigations*, such that even later works bare the marks of a direct reference to Wittgenstein's thought or biography: so for instance the sculpture *Wittgenstein at Cassino* (1963) or the collages and screenprints of the mid 1990s that were subsumed under the title *A logical picture of facts is a thought (3) Tractatus '21–'22*.

Besides disclosing a deeper understanding of Paolozzi's artistic production, another reason to thoroughly explore his long-time fascination with Wittgenstein lies in the insight this research may provide as regards a reassessment of the philosopher's actual impact on visual arts and its theory in the second half of the twentieth century. Hence, in discussing Paolozzi's attraction to Wittgenstein, the book examines an early example—perhaps the earliest—of the Austrian philosopher's influence on a contemporary artist, as well as the interpretation that an artist may provide of his philosophical thought. In this perspective, Paolozzi as an artist is taken as a true reader or interpreter of Wittgenstein, pursuing his theories with artistic means. In doing so, the volume eventually discloses an unprecedented perspective on Wittgenstein's philosophy

applied to contemporary art, particularly his considerations on form, aspects, image and rules. The guiding star is, thus, the influence of Wittgenstein on Paolozzi, though investigated from a broader perspective than previously done. In fact, the purpose is to go beyond the mere works by Paolozzi with an explicitly "Wittgensteinian" title. Our hypothesis is that the artist remained fascinated also by the *Philosophical Investigations*, as well as by other texts and various episodes in the philosopher's biography. Compared to the state of the art, this book focuses on the entire oeuvre of Paolozzi—comprising the wide array of media and techniques employed: from sculpture to print, from film to music, from collage to environmental installations. Hence, the book aims at deepening the critical search on one of last century's most intriguing, though less analysed artists, further becoming a privileged occasion to reflect on the possible influence of a philosopher on an artist, as well as on the interpretation that an artist may provide as regards a philosophical thought.

3   A Choral Work of "Aspect-Seeing"

Conceived as a collection of essays, this edited volume exceptionally brings together philosophers and art historians of different geographic and generational backgrounds to discuss Wittgenstein and Paolozzi, giving voice to a variety of disciplinary approaches and shaping diverse topics that may arouse the interest of a twofold audience. As a matter of fact, the following chapters offer both a unique take on Paolozzi's oeuvre, reassessing his pivotal importance in the second half of the twentieth century—especially as far as medium diversity and the use of popular culture are concerned—and a convenient opportunity to explore Wittgenstein's thought related to visual arts and his influence on contemporary artists, that is, how artists received or interpreted his writings with creative means. Furthermore, the book is the result of an on-going scholarly discussion among experts on Wittgenstein and Paolozzi, selected after an international conference organised in Venice in 2016. The latter meeting helped to steer this communal research work, refining the chosen cross-disciplinary topic to create a fertile

combination of research perspectives and finding a coherent *fil rouge* around the necessity to look at the relationship between Paolozzi and Wittgenstein from various angles or—so to speak—"see" various aspects of it and perceive its constitutional fluidity or potential indeterminateness. Eventually, this group effort led to twelve original chapters and one translated, as well as extensively rearranged essay, published for the first time in English. Contributors come from prestigious institutions across Europe and bring together different age cohorts, thus allowing a cross-generational and likely long-lasting discussion on the relevance of Paolozzi in twentieth-century art history and the impact of Wittgenstein on the visual arts of the same period.

As regards the structure of this volume, we chose to distribute the essays in three separate though still cross-disciplinary parts, each one approaching or "seeing" the relationship between Paolozzi and Wittgenstein from a peculiar angle. Part I, titled *Aesthetic Grammar: From Wittgenstein to Paolozzi*, is set to investigate what can be extracted from the philosopher's writings for the use of an artist such as Paolozzi; hence, what of Wittgenstein's philosophy may have fascinated the British artist and influenced his artistic grammar. Silvana Borutti addresses the idea of an aesthetic, non-logico-formal understanding of meaning in Wittgenstein as a trigger for Paolozzi's working method. Wolfgang Huemer stresses the impression upon the artist made by Wittgenstein's philosophical style, conceived not as an abstract theory detached from ordinary life, but rather as a central element of our form of life. Alessandro Del Puppo attempts a first evaluation of the aesthetic grammar Paolozzi derived from Wittgenstein, shifting the focus from the formalistic nature of the medium towards a pragmatic approach to the object and to reality. As a closure to this part, Maren Wienigk looks at the technique of collage as a possible link between the mode of thinking and working of both Paolozzi and Wittgenstein, a sort of underlying structure.

Part II, titled *Paolozzi: On Reading Wittgenstein*, analyses the encounter between the British artist and Wittgenstein's philosophy, as well as his biography. The aim is to retrace the origins and development of Paolozzi's fascination with the Austrian philosopher, while looking at the entire scope of the artist's production—including media such as

sculpture, collage, print, film, music and installations—throughout his long career; hence, not only in the 1960s. Luigi Perissinotto opens the part by looking at the way this encounter happened, discovering in Paolozzi's *As Is When* series—as well as in other works—a true and expert "reader" of Wittgenstein. Rachel Stratton observes Wittgenstein's influence—particularly mediated through Richard Wollheim—on the British artist milieu at Paolozzi's beginnings retracing several of his works of the 1950s that show him already experimenting with a visual language keen on "family resemblances". Stefanie Stallschus analyses Paolozzi's animated films through the lens of Wittgenstein suggesting variable connections between the different propositions, and thereby allowing for new insights. Diego Mantoan closes this part retracing Paolozzi's Wittgensteinian habit of "Assembling Reminders for a particular Purpose", that is collecting objects and toys drawn from popular culture, eventually putting them together as an archive (in the 1970s) and later as environmental installations (in the 1980s and 1990s).

Part III, titled *Wittgenstein: On Influencing Art*, offers an ample perspective on further developments in art theory and contemporary art that relate directly to the influence of the Austrian philosopher. Indeed, the contributions help to ponder the relevance of Paolozzi's outcomes for the interpretation of Wittgenstein and for his impact on later developments in the visual arts. Michael Lüthy interrogates Wittgenstein on the definition of "aspect-seeing" to find what is essential to the experience of art, which is experiencing a change in aspect and evaluating the latter. Roberta Dreon draws on the post-Wittgensteinian reconfiguration of the definition of art and suggests considering Joseph Margolis' aesthetics as an insightful way of drawing a critical balance with a crucial reference to Wittgenstein's legacy. Eventually, the last two contributions look at historic examples, other than Paolozzi's, which overtly claim Wittgenstein's influence, thus embarking in a (philosophically) very problematic game of source referencing. Davide Dal Sasso scrutinises various artists, particularly in the field of Conceptual Art, to find the influence of two opposing Wittgensteinian teachings: the strengthening of form and its impoverishment. Francesco Guzzetti retraces the wide usage of language games in the international post-minimalist

research, seen also as a reaction to the influence of Clement Greenberg's criticism.

The final Appendix by Huemer and Mantoan presents a meticulous philological work on all quotes from Wittgenstein that can be found in the series *As Is When*, while the subsequent index may help the readers navigate through the chapters, as it has been prepared to retrace all artworks by Paolozzi and all writings by Wittgenstein discussed by the contributors.

4   Paolozzi, Wittgenstein and Beyond

In conclusion, it is important to acknowledge the growing scholarly literature on Wittgenstein and contemporary art, as well as on the aesthetics that can be derived from his writings. In this regards, very recent publications address the significance of Wittgenstein's philosophy for aesthetic understanding, especially in connection to contemporary currents in aesthetic thinking (Hagberg 2017), or the modernist *Geist* permeating Wittgenstein's work, both early and late (Matar 2017). Among other sources, new insight on Wittgenstein's influence on the visual arts is contained in recent proceedings of the International Wittgenstein Symposium, which analysed the topic of Wittgenstein and the Avant-garde, in order to address contemporary approaches to the aesthetics of nature and of arts (Majetschak and Weiberg 2017). There is further a collection of essays examining an influential thesis drawn from Wittgenstein, which is that the core of pictorial representation is not resemblance but rather "seeing-as" and "seeing-in", especially as found in the work of Richard Wollheim (Kemp and Mras 2016). Previous volumes include a collective exploration of the implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy for understanding the arts and cultural criticism, exemplifying the method of conceptual investigation and highlighting his therapeutic notion of philosophy (Turvey and Allen 2006). One should further mention Garry Hagberg's extensive critique of aesthetic theories from a Wittgensteinian perspective, hence stressing the relevance of his work and the use of language as a point of reference for interpreting art (Hagberg 1998). None of the above, however,

deals directly with an artist or artists that paired or "collaborated" with Wittgenstein, his writings and biography, as extensively done by Paolozzi. At a biographical level, there is however quite some literature on Wittgenstein's own personal interest in the visual arts, especially through his friendship with various artists, such as sculptor Michael Drobil: he experimented with photography, with sculpture and of course in architecture (Klagge and Nordmann 2003). It should further be noted that Wittgenstein's father was a notable Viennese collector and there was an important family connection with Gustav Klimt, thus several studies have highlighted the artist milieu young Ludwig had been exposed to (Janik and Veigl 1998). With regard to the many and articulated influences, both philosophical and experiential, on Wittgenstein's life it seems impossible not to mention the monumental biography written by Ray Monk, which still is one of the most profoundly faceted descriptions of the Austrian "genius" (Monk 1990). To complete the picture, the reader might get deeper insight into the man and scholar Wittgenstein thanks to the recent as well as rich collection of portraits and personal recollections of philosophers, students, friends and acquaintances that give a vivid depiction of his character (Flowers and Ground 2016).

As regards Paolozzi, unfortunately the list of books dedicated to the British artist is not particularly long, which is rather surprising given his relevance as a founding father of Pop Art, as well as his impressive international career, which included participations at the Venice Biennale and the documenta in Kassel, as well as solo exhibitions at the MoMA in New York and at the Tate in London. Likely the most complete and recent monograph, Judith Collins' book on Paolozzi meticulously retraces his entire career spanning over the artist's various stylistic innovations throughout the decades and capturing all different media he experimented with (Collins 2014). The author even acknowledges the influence of Wittgenstein on the British artist (Collins 2014: 148), although with a lack of critical insight: in the pages devoted to the series *As Is When*, for instance, the screenprints are described individually, but the rich Wittgensteinian references in the works are rather taken as ornaments, while the series is presented as a biographical survey on Wittgenstein (Collins 2014: 184–190). Eventually, Collins is

not aware of the thorough knowledge Paolozzi had of Wittgenstein's writings and misinterprets various aspects of specific screenprints, if not of the whole series: in the case of screenprint X, titled *The Spirit of the Snake*, she connects the entailed quotation of Wittgenstein—intuitively but mistakenly—to some sort of Eastern philosophy (Collins 2014: 187). To the contrary of Collins' interpretation, as will be shown in Part II of this book, Wittgenstein's excerpt on snakes, lions, elephants and wasps relates directly to the very Austrian philosopher Otto Weininger, not to some unspecified oriental philosophy. Thanks to the extensive retrospective exhibition curated by Daniel Herrmann at Whitechapel Gallery in 2017, later touring to the Berlinische Galerie, a well structured and richly illustrated exhibition catalogue on Paolozzi's entire oeuvre was finally published, shedding light also on various aspects that had not been analysed so far: for instance, his interest in science-fiction and the friendship with novelist J. G. Ballard, or his late interventions and assemblages at the Museum of Mankind (Herrmann 2017). However, the catalogue completely omits mentioning Wittgenstein as an important source of influence on Paolozzi, save indicating the screenprint series *As Is When*. Hence, there is virtually no bibliography dedicated to Paolozzi's fascination with Wittgenstein and, in the light of Paolozzi's progressive rediscovery and of the renewed scholarly interest in Wittgenstein's aesthetic implications, this represents today a matter of some urgency, in order to fill a visible gap in the academic fields of both philosophy and art history.

This collection of essays—we hope—shall thus come at a convenient time in the scholarly debate on Eduardo Paolozzi's work and on Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings, especially in connection to visual arts and aesthetics. We further trust that this choral effort may shed some light on the relationship between Paolozzi and Wittgenstein, eventually serving as a model for future cross-boundary research touching upon the fields of philosophy and contemporary art. However, if there was one single aim we wish to accomplish with this book, that would certainly be explaining why an artist such as Paolozzi—at the height of his success in conversation with Richard Hamilton—could ever claim that: "Some people need, perhaps, Greenberg, I need Wittgenstein" (Spencer 2000: 128).

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Part I

**Aesthetic Grammar:
From Wittgenstein to Paolozzi**

2

Aesthetic Family Resemblances Between Wittgenstein and Paolozzi

Silvana Borutti

In this chapter, I shall refer to aesthetic themes in the philosophy of Wittgenstein, such as *Abbildung* (depiction), *Darstellen* (showing) and *Dichten* (poetic composition); themes, which seem to present a family resemblance with certain aspects of the artistic work of Paolozzi.

I shall proceed in three stages. In a very brief introduction, I shall state how I generally understand Paolozzi's link with Wittgenstein. Secondly, I shall maintain that a central theme of Wittgenstein's philosophy is the aesthetic comprehension of meanings. Lastly, I shall try to look at some works by Paolozzi from a Wittgensteinian viewpoint, basing my approach on the idea of collage as a symbolic, creative and, at the same time, destructive act as expressed by the artist (Paolozzi [1977] 2013: 10).

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1   Introduction

How are we to consider the relationship between Wittgenstein and Paolozzi? If we certainly cannot speak of a direct influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy on Paolozzi, nevertheless some traces of Wittgenstein—the man and his philosophy—remain in the artist's works, as is evident from Paolozzi's own statements, which I would interpret in the following way: he declares himself he was attracted to the Wittgensteinian universe by the enigmatic character of his writings, but above all by the fact of having perceived family resemblances between their reciprocal life experience.

But this is not all. For Paolozzi, the relationship with Wittgenstein is something more than a mere congeniality of their lives; in my opinion, it is also an aesthetic gesture. If the artist sees a likeness between his own works and the "very name" of Wittgenstein, or rather, the "Wittgenstein style"—that is, the "coherent deformation" (Merleau-Ponty 1964) of the thinkable and the visible, which Wittgenstein projected into the field of philosophy with his life and work—then this likening is also an aesthetic gesture, or even a collage, of which we can find many indications. In the third part of my paper, I shall try to comment on this special "collage" between the philosopher and the artist, which I believe to have functioned as an incubator of Paolozzi's creativity.

2   Wittgenstein: The Aesthetic Understanding of Meaning

There is a nexus between the coherent deformation of the thinkable and the visible—to which we give the name "Wittgenstein"—and the creations of Paolozzi; but as we know, there is no theory of creativity in Wittgenstein, nor an aesthetics understood as a philosophical discipline, and still less a philosophy of art. There is instead a fundamental philosophical thesis, which seems relevant to me in this context: the idea of an aesthetic, non-logico-formal understanding of meaning; an idea previously expressed (I hasten to add) in the *Tractatus* and developed in the *Investigations*—and which, not by any chance, we often find discussed

by means of examples taken from pictorial, musical or poetic art. The aesthetic understanding of meaning is in general based on Wittgenstein's reinvention of the idea of representation—indeed, of the idea of the world's visibility. This reinvention is expressed in the *Tractatus* by the themes of *Abbildung* (depiction) and *Bildhaftigkeit* (pictorial character). Pictorial character—that is, the essence of the image-relation—is shown in every type of image, whether iconic (like hieroglyphs) or logical (like language): it is shown not as a copy, but as a representation of nexuses, as coordination between elements; it is shown as the *Gesetz der Projektion*, the law of projection. Wittgenstein considers all similitudes, material or immaterial, from hieroglyphs to alphabetic script, from musical thought to notation, to the grooves on the disc, as cases of *Bildhaftigkeit*:

> A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world. (Wittgenstein [1961] 1974: 4.014)

> In order to understand the essential nature of a proposition, we should consider hieroglyphic script, which depicts the facts that it describes. And alphabetic script developed out of it without losing what was essential to depiction. (4.016)

> The possibility of all imagery, of all our pictorial modes of expression, is contained in the logic of depiction. (4.015)

Drawing on Walter Benjamin's concept (2003) of "immaterial similarity", we can say that among these different types of depiction there is not an evolution from the sensible to the logical, but a correspondence, an immaterial similarity—that is, an immaterial "internal relationship"—which reorganizes and finalizes the meaning of the material on another level (D'Angelo 2011: 79). Pictorial character as the "immateriality of the material": an image-relation in which form comes to be shown.

The concept of image is developed in the *Philosophical Investigations* in the constellation of concepts linked to "seeing as": that is, the ability to recognize objects, in their form and their meaning, through a network of ideal correspondences and analogies. "Seeing as" is precisely the flash of an immateriality lighting up in a synoptic context:

> I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience "noticing an aspect". (Wittgenstein ([1953] 1963: II, 193)

> […] but what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and others objects. (Ibid.: II, 212)

What lights up is an "aspect" (*Aspek*t); that is, the form understood not in a purely logical sense: the aspect has an aesthetic—that is, manifesting life. It is an *eidos*[1]: an immaterial similarity, a sensible and, at the same time, ideal appearance. I do not analytically perceive an object's substantial traits, its properties, but through a comparison with another object, I perceive in a flash the perceptually relevant traits of the first object. "Seeing as" is therefore the metaphorical ability "to see something *as something*" (Wittgenstein ([1953] 1963: II, 213); it is the dynamic work of the image which makes us see the qualities of objects in a differential way.

Wittgenstein often illustrates philosophical description through the theme of "physiognomy": the face is not a collection of details, but a configuration of meaning irreducible to particulars. We do not see lines and details, but immediately see an expression, a significance; we do not see the thing, but the "face" of the thing. We understand when things are situated in a way of seeing; therefore, we understand aesthetically. The samples of which Wittgenstein speaks ([1953] 1963: I, 73) are objects, which attract other objects into their atmosphere, and which show the other objects' form in that they make imaginatively visible the internal, ideal, schematic relationship which links that totality of objects.

Now, the aesthetic basis of the understanding of meanings is, in my opinion, what Wittgenstein is recalling with the topic of *Dichten* in the famous passage from the *Vermischte Bemerkungen*:

> I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy ought really to be written only as a *poetic composition* [*dichten*]. (Wittgenstein 1980: 24)

It is significant that in Ms–115, 30, of the *Wittgenstein Nachlass* (Wittgenstein 2000) the phrase "philosophy should really only be composed" is preceded by a parenthesis which speaks not so much about philosophy as about the gesture of exposition (*Darstellung*) of philosophy as a compositional gesture. We read:

> (Die Darstellung der Philosophie kann nur gedichtet werden.)
> (Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur *dichten* […])
> The exposition of philosophy can only be composed.
> Philosophy should really only be composed.

It is *die Darstellung*—that is, the exposition of philosophy—which should properly only be composed (written as poetry). *Dichten* (from Lat. *dictare*, dictate, a meaning which comes more precisely to mean "compose" in late Latin, and becomes *tihten* in Middle High German: Grimm, J. and Grimm W. [1854–1961] 1971), poetic saying as a compositional gesture, which shows links in a whole, is the aesthetic way of understanding:

> We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other (any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another). In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by these words in these positions. (Understanding a poem [*Verstehen eines Gedichts*]). (Wittgenstein [1953] 1963: I, 531)

> Associations may vary, attitudes may vary, but change the picture ever so slightly, and you won't want to look at it anymore. (Wittgenstein [1967] 2007: 36)

Understanding the compositional nexus, which makes us see an aspect—that is, an individual and untranslatable meaning—is an experience, which Wittgenstein does not hesitate to liken to the poetic work of poetry and art. The work of art, bringing an aspect to light, compels us to look in a certain way and to change perspective: as happens, for

example, when the curtain rises at the theatre and we see a man performing an everyday action (Wittgenstein 1980: 4). The indeterminate becomes determined and emerges out of invisibility if a gesture or twist of seeing places it in the right perspective:

> But only an artist can so represent an individual thing as to make it appear to us like a work of art […] A work of art forces us – as one might say – to see it in the right perspective but in the absence of art, the object is just a fragment of nature like any other. (Wittgenstein 1980: 4)

The aesthetic gesture is finding the right rhythm of a poem, finding the right word and the poetic links, which it sets up. Seeing the aspect should be interpreted as "seeing in a new way"—but not in the sense of acquiring a new technique. In "From a lecture belonging to a course of lectures on description" (Wittgenstein [1967] 2007: 40), Wittgenstein speaks of an aesthetic experience in which what is transmitted to others is not so much a determined way of reading a poem, as the ability to read it by finding the right way, that "click" which enables us to experience the coherence of a rhythm. "Seeing the aspect" is the aesthetic character of understanding: it is not seeing a property, but seeing the new light, which certain nexuses or analogies throw on the whole. Therefore, we understand a work of art if we see new aspects through it. Paolozzi's citing, in *Parrot* (*As Is When* portfolio, 1965), of Wittgenstein's words as reported by Malcolm, succinctly expounds the topic of the aesthetic character of understanding in a field of significations:

> What I give is the morphology of the use of one expression. I show that it has kinds of uses of which you had not dreamed. In philosophy one feels forced to look at a concept in a certain way. What I do is suggest, or even invent, other ways of looking at it. I suggest possibilities of which you had not previously thought. […] I made you see that it was absurd to expect the concept to conform to so narrow possibilities. Thus your mental cramp is relieved, and you are free to look around the field of use of the expression and to describe the different kinds of uses of it. (Malcolm [1958] 1972: 50)

3 Paolozzi: Collage Between Sense and Nonsense

Although we should not rely unduly on the theories expounded by artists, I am taking the liberty of referring to what Paolozzi says about collage as a work of simultaneous construction and destruction. The publication which accompanies the exhibition at the Pallant House Gallery "Collaging Culture" in 2013 presents a significant piece of writing by the artist in this regard:

> Making collage can be a symbolic act, like life itself – a tangle unravelled. […] [in] a book on Rodin […] one photograph shows the large collection of legs, feet and heads made by Rodin to enable him to fabricate figures outside the limits of preconception. […] The Rathaus in Zurich dwarfed by a frog represents not only poetic ambiguity but also a personal hypothesis. Divine ambiguity is possible with collage […] The word collage is inadequate as a description because the concept should include damage, erase, destroy, deface and transform – all part of a metaphor for the creative act itself […] a process of endless destruction until finalization. (Paolozzi [1977] 2013: 10)

Starting with this thickening of themes proposed by Paolozzi, I shall first try to look at the performative resonances and correspondences between the gestures of the philosopher and the artist; then I shall dwell for a while on family resemblances between Wittgenstein and Paolozzi which can be more systematically organized; lastly, I shall try to highlight a correspondence between the two.

With regard to the first point, collage as process and act, Paolozzi says of his own collages (in a typescript from October 1968) that they are made using the techniques of cut-up and repositioning, resorting to the most diverse sources:

> The text, or word patterns, are formed by a cut-up and re-positioning technique, 'lifted' from the pages of magazines, novels, advertisement jargon, technological handbooks, critical and political writings etc. The collaged, or montaged, sheets are handed to a printer to be photographed,

distorted and separated into different colour sequences, then screened and finished to the artist's specification. In *Moonstrips Empire News*, fine art and popular culture, kitsch and technology intermingle on equal terms, creating vital new context and eliminating forever traditional barriers which have become meaningless, in a shrinking modern world. (Quoted in Collins 2014: 190)

Thus in the collage, *The Silken World of Michelangelo*, *Moonstrips Empire News* portfolio, 1967, we encounter beautiful art and Western popular culture (a bishop with his crook, popular costumes, Mickey Mouse, Michelangelo's David), the whole connected by a reciprocal dynamic of geometrical abstraction and colour.

Let us consider the gestures of collage: cutting out, mixing, placing and replacing, composing and recomposing (let us think, for example, of the illustrations which Paolozzi takes from magazines and ruined books, as he tells Whitford). We rediscover here a consonance with an important characteristic of Wittgenstein's relationship with writing. It is the theme of the *Zettel*: transcribing, repeating, physically cutting thoughts up into little pieces of paper with scissors and glue, and recomposing them, but also dismantling the final text in order to insert extraneous elements and redistributing the material according to other organizational hypotheses (Rosso 1988). Above all, we find the work of putting apparently different, contradictory, contrasting things together in a synoptic and serial way. It is a type of work which Paolozzi sometimes calls "amalgam", by which he means a fusion of different levels: "That's how I see myself, working on several levels" (Whitford 1993–5: 88).

Fusion can mean fusion of material and ideas drawn from different cultural levels and horizons, of "layers of cultures" (ibid.: 156) on which Paolozzi looks with an anthropologist's gaze (Blazwick 2017: 7), from African art to the art of psychopathology, from mechanical engineering to games with the cut-outs of childhood. Collage makes this way of seeing possible, a "seeing as" which remixes found or collected objects waiting for new symbolic life, new totems and icons of modernity. In his preface to a book of drawings by his pupil, John Munday, Paolozzi writes: "An architecture built up from the tools of a child. To search

for archetypes to aid a dream in metal" (Alloway and Paolozzi 1963: unpaginated).

The fusion of levels can be resolved geometrically, as in the silk-screen prints starting with the portfolio *As Is When* (1964), where images on many levels and of various dimensions compete for space (Collins 2014: 180). In *Wittgenstein the soldier, As Is When* portfolio, the dancing figure of the soldier Wittgenstein, with his famous rucksack containing the *Tractatus*, and the four imperially marching smaller figures, stand out from the background of striped wrapping paper. And then in *Wittgenstein in New York*, the encounter under the sky of the metropolis is between figures composed out of advertisements and mechanical elements, in contrast to the sobriety of the philosopher with his rucksack, which the text by Malcolm inserted into the screen-print is talking about.

The creative process of collage can make us reflect more systematically on family resemblances. The process calls on aspects of invention, in particular the tension and intimate exchange between formless and form, between creativity and destruction, which remain in the shadows if we think of invention as synthesis and teleological progression towards form. The techniques of collage expressed and realized by Paolozzi incorporate themes both of the logic of creation, which make me think of Francis Bacon (who was dear to Paolozzi), and of the logic of meaning, which remind me of Wittgenstein. As for the logic of creation, in all creative processes the beginning is not nothing, but the formless. However, the formless is not blank, absolute void, but is already a "giving" of the meaningless. Both in artists' autobiographical accounts (Bacon tells of working in a mist, a fog of sensations, emotions, ideas, from which the possibility of an image emerges unexpectedly), and in the logical reconstruction of the process of invention, the initial condition is given as the formlessness of chaos: scattered objects, fragments with incoherent outlines; and Paolozzi would add detritus and refuse. In traditional iconology, the pensiveness of personified Melancholy (icon of creation's reflectiveness) is surrounded by phantoms of fragmentation: from "rough drafts" which do not yet belong to a compositional whole that may make "figures" appear, and by "ruins"

which have lost the horizon of meaning in which they were included. Creativity is located in the space of this formlessness, simultaneously destructive and productive, in which chaotic and centrifugal destruction of the given poetics and the given subject-world order coexists with the centripetal construction of a new formal emergence. Form as "appearance" (Bacon's term: Sylvester 1993: 126) from deformation and disfiguring.

The destructive, chance process, which does not presuppose the transparency of an idea to be applied to the material, reminds us of that initial formlessness which Paolozzi feels as "crude": the crudity which he certainly picked up from, among others, Ernst's technique of *frottage*, but which he will certainly also have taken from Bacon (cf. Collins 2014: 54). Bacon feels the canvas not as a neutral prop, but as a surface of inscriptions and a germinating environment for the figure; so that from the end of the 1940s he painted on unprepared canvas which, he says, absorbs the painted material with a rougher, dragging effect, and captures the living figure as if in a trap (Sylvester 1993: 57). But in Paolozzi's feeling for the crude we certainly feel the echo of Wittgenstein: "We want to walk: so we need *friction*. Back to the rough ground!" (Wittgenstein [1953] 1963: I, 107).

The themes of the ambiguity, unpredictability and vagueness of the game of creation remind us of Wittgenstein's logic of meaning, a logic in which sense and nonsense are essentially linked in the autonomous, and indescribable because immanent (Gargani 2003), character of the achieved signifying form. In Wittgenstein the act of understanding conjoins sense and nonsense, and achieves that transition from occult nonsense (vagueness, opacity, indeterminacy) to open nonsense (understanding of a meaningful event), which Wittgenstein sets himself the task of teaching ([1953] 1963: I, 464; cf. Di Giacomo 2013). In understanding, the background of nonsense is not said, but comes to be visible. At the same time, the wonder and the pleasure provided by "pictures and fictitious narratives" make us glimpse the background of unsayable invisibility from which the work derives—to which Wittgenstein seems to be referring when he speaks of "The transition from patent nonsense to something which is disguised nonsense" ([1953] 1963: I, 524).

The contrastive technique of the analysis of meanings adopted by Wittgenstein can certainly be interpreted using the model of collage (cf. Wiesing 1991). In this connection, let us return to Paolozzi's theme of "tangle unravelled", that tangle of differences and contrasts, which is unravelled in the artistic gesture of collage. I would like to discuss precisely this emergence of an artistic object in a process, which we cannot reduce to a successful synthesis between form and material. We know from his own testimony that, as far as the creative process is concerned, Paolozzi always drew on the Avant-garde, from Dada to surrealism, and to great artists like Bacon and Giacometti, but always denied any definite relationship or explicit membership to a movement; if anything, he expressed hostility to belonging. Like Wittgenstein, who writes: "I don't believe I have ever *invented* a line of thinking […] What I invent are new *similes*" (1980: 19), Paolozzi is not afraid to declare influences, and makes no claim to originality. Naturally, there are his declarations of interest in the poem-collages of Tzara, in Roussel, in Duchamp, whom he admired for the pathos of his anonymous objects (Whitford 1993–5: 189); there is his explicitly declared and prevalent interest in surrealism (with which he was especially associated in Paris in the late 1940s) and the wonder of *objets trouvés* which took him back to his childhood *revêries* about the broken and reassembled objects which enlivened his games. Paolozzi seems to have taken from the Avant-garde what Benjamin sees in it: transitions (Benjamin 1999), the making of relationships, translation of experience and—above all—montages (Benjamin ([1935] 1969) of heterogeneous and contradictory materials, which make connections surprisingly emerge. But it must be emphasized that in Paolozzi the processes of connection and montage have an aesthetic goal, not the anti-aesthetic goal, which predominates in Duchamp (Desideri 2011): they aim decisively at the emergence of an aesthetic object. It is not for nothing that he tends to distinguish himself from Pop Art, thanks to his own "much deeper European roots" (Whitford 1993–1995: 147): the objects of the Pop artists, for all that they are aesthetically intensified, do not presuppose the struggle to connect different levels, which is what Paolozzi wants (ibid.: 88),[2] and which I would liken to the Wittgensteinian theme of making differences meet, with the aim of making the meaning emerge. This is a struggle,

which, by use of the imagination and the intellect, must come to produce "another reality" (as he said, quoting Arp: Whitford 1993–1995: 285).

Here I see the decisive consonance with Wittgenstein: not only with the theme of making meaning emerge in an exemplary object (Wittgenstein ([1953] 1963: I, §73), but also, and especially, with the theme of the unexpected decentring of the linguistic or artistic material towards the "complete expression". Earlier, in the *Notebooks 1914–16*, Wittgenstein had written, "Art is a kind of expression. Good art is complete expression [*vollendeter Ausdruck*]" (Wittgenstein [1961] 1969: 19 September 1916). And later:

> It is a prevalent notion that we can only imperfectly *exhibit* our understanding […] "Isn't it the case that the expression of understanding is always an incomplete expression?" That means, I suppose, an expression with something missing – but the something missing is essentially *inexpressible*, because otherwise I might find a better expression for it. And "essentially inexpressible" means that it makes no sense to talk of a more complete expression. (Wittgenstein 1974: I, §6)

> I surrender to a mood and the expression *comes*. (Wittgenstein [1953] 1963: I, §335)

Read in context, Wittgenstein is saying in this last sentence that the expression does not suddenly appear out of a thought, but is the meaning brought to completion in the form of the linguistic material. We recognize the meaning at the end, as a result: the meaning is not complete, but rather "completed", brought to completion. For Wittgenstein, language is decentred in a flash of light towards expression, or towards understanding: the aesthetic character of understanding is in this flash of light (*aufleuchten*).

Now, in my opinion, the *vollendeter Ausdruck* is also the outcome of good art for Paolozzi: that outcome which emerges through difference as an immaterial similarity (or an immateriality of the material), which supports the collage and is shown in its composition. Therefore, it is not so much the Dadaist freedom from sense, as that concurrence of sense and nonsense, of clarity and opacity, which acts in the

differentiating and compositional work, through which the artwork is at a stroke decentred into completion. I would speak of his works as "active objects" (Desideri 2016), which incorporate that energetic and expressive principle through which art, for Wittgenstein as for Paolozzi, says itself.

Notes

1. Note that the etymological connection between *Aspekt* and the verb *ad-spicio* (to look at) suggests that *Aspekt* is a good choice for translating the Greek *eidos*: that is, form that makes itself seen, that displays itself (*darstellen*) (in the material) in the flash of an eye (*übersichtliche Darstellung*, perspicuous representation): Wittgenstein ([1953] 1963: I, 122).
2. He tells about Pop painters: "they're still looking for objects […] in the fine-art tradition" (Paolozzi [1971] 2017: 165).

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3

The Philosopher as Artist: Ludwig Wittgenstein Seen Through Eduardo Paolozzi

Wolfgang Huemer

1   Wittgenstein's Fascination for Artists

In the cultural history of the last century, Ludwig Wittgenstein plays an exceptional role. His works not only had a substantial influence on philosophers, they also had a strong impact beyond the circles of academic philosophy; in particular, they found a significant resonance in the artworld. Other philosophers of the twentieth century often appear too abstract, overly technical, or engaged in highly specialized discussions, which can discourage readers who do not have a professional training in philosophy. Wittgenstein's work, on the other hand, has fascinated and inspired artists, poets, and composers. Terry Eagleton put it elegantly when he said that:

> Frege is a philosopher's philosopher, Sartre the media's idea of an intellectual, and Bertrand Russell every shopkeeper's image of the sage […]. But Wittgenstein is the philosopher of poets and composers, playwrights

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and novelists, and snatches of his mighty *Tractatus* have even been set to music. (Eagleton 1994: 153f)

What is it that makes Wittgenstein so attractive to a broader audience? To some degree, his popularity can be explained by his unusual biography. He was descendant of one of the richest families of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but renounced his heritage; he wrote a philosophical treatise that was to become most influential, but abandoned his academic career to become an elementary school teacher. For a short while he worked as a gardener in a monastery, then as an architect to project a house for his sister. When he came back to work in philosophy, he substantially revised his old position and started off in a very different direction. He returned to Cambridge to teach philosophy, but toyed with the idea to emigrate to Russia and left for longer periods to stay in a lonesome cabin in Norway. In short, Wittgenstein did not pursue a linear academic career.

Many facts of his biography have become accessible to a broader audience shortly after Wittgenstein's death in 1951; first through obituaries—many of which did not omit to mention little anecdotes of Wittgenstein's life to illustrate his personality (cf. for example Russell 1951)—and later, in 1958, through Norman Malcolm's biography (Malcolm 1958), which contains a reprint of G. H. V. Wright's "Biographical Sketch" (von Wright 1955). It soon became common knowledge that Wittgenstein did not correspond to the widespread image of the armchair philosopher (or, even worse, of the philosopher who raises from his desk only punctually at 5 p.m. to have a short afternoon walk). His biography rather provides material for a film.

It would be reductive, however, to explain Wittgenstein's success beyond the sphere of academic philosophy only on the basis of his biography. The circumstances of his life might have attracted the attention, which then led many to engage in studying his philosophical work, as it was the case with Eduardo Paolozzi, for example.[1] However, the situation is somewhat paradoxical: Even though it was the *philosopher* Ludwig Wittgenstein who fascinated a broader audience, it is difficult, if not impossible, to mention a particular philosophical thesis or argument that could explain this fascination.[2] More than any specific

philosophical issue I think it was the way in which he shared his reflections with the reader, i.e., the literary form he had chosen to express his philosophical perspective that attracted a broader audience and invited them to engage in studying his philosophical works. Wittgenstein explicitly states in the prefaces to both books he published or prepared for publication during his lifetime, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*, that he struggled for a long time to find the most adequate literary form to express his thoughts. Even an untrained eye can see at first glance that the literary form of the works—very much like their author—did not fit into the ordinary academic conventions of the time.

The first thing one can notice when opening the *Tractatus* is that it consists of short sentences that are enumerated in a hierarchical system, which not only serves to make the relations between the sentences explicit, but also communicates a sense of logical order and precision.[3] The style is hermetic, the text consists of short, aphoristic statements that make apodictic assertions. Moreover, the author does not make a minimal attempt to explain or motivate his views, nor does he share his reasons for holding them with the reader, who looks in vain for an argument. In this way, the author does not leave any space for discussion or doubts. On the contrary, already in the preface he states "the *truth* of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems" (*TLP*: preface). This is the tone of a self-confident person who does not have an urge to explain himself to others which, in turn, can be seen as an expression of the solipsistic position proposed in the book (cf. *TLP*: 5.62).

The *Philosophical Investigations*, on the other hand, present themselves in a very different style. The author often dispenses his ideas to an anonymous interlocutor, who is never introduced or described and does not have a name. The author simply uses the second person singular ("you") to address the interlocutor. This "quasi-dialogical" structure involves the reader and invites her to weigh the ideas expressed against her own views on the topic—or the position defended in the *Tractatus*. The form, thus, conveys Wittgenstein's goal to encourage the reader to reflect autonomously on the topics discussed and to "stimulate someone

to thoughts of his own" (*PI*: preface). Moreover, Wittgenstein no longer speaks about the truth of the propositions expressed in the book. He rather presents "a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of […] long and involved journeyings. The same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches we made" (*PI*: preface). This leaves ample space for revisions, doubts, and discussions. Moreover, Wittgenstein presents his theses in a very hesitant manner, such that they are often challenged by the anonymous interlocutor. The author who opened his *Tractatus* with the apodictic statement "The world is all that is the case" (*TLP*: 1) introduces the main thesis of his new theory of language with the following words: "For a *large* class of cases—though not for all—in which we use the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (*PI*: §43).

The very fact that the literary form changes so drastically shows the discontinuity in Wittgenstein's thought that has been emphasized so much among early interpreters. On the other hand, the fact that the stylistic dimension continues to play a central role shows that, notwithstanding the discontinuities, there are important continuities in Wittgenstein's philosophical perspective. Most importantly, the focus on style distinguishes Wittgenstein's work from that of almost all academic philosophers of the twentieth century for whom the literary style of philosophical works plays at best a marginal role: typically, it is considered an ornament that could render the reading of a text more pleasant, but does not contribute to its meaning or significance. It should thus not come as a surprise that readers who do not focus exclusively on philosophy, but have broader cultural interests, are attracted by this aspect of Wittgenstein's work.

2   Wittgenstein and Aesthetics

If what I have said so far is correct, it is not primarily the content, not a particular thesis or argument, but rather the form of Wittgenstein's philosophy that has caught the attention of artists, writers, and composers.[4] In particular, it is hardly plausible that Wittgenstein's contribution

to aesthetics could have caught their attention. It is well known that Wittgenstein has not become famous for his work in aesthetics, nor has he ever made an attempt to formulate a systematic *theory* of art, the nature of artworks, or aesthetic experience.[5] All we have is a short booklet that contains *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*,[6] but, as the editor Cyril Barrett explains in the foreword:

> Nothing contained herein was written by Wittgenstein himself. The notes published here are not Wittgenstein's own lecture notes but notes taken down by students, which he never saw nor checked. It is even doubtful if he would have approved of their publication, at least in their present form. (Wittgenstein 1966: vii)

There are, I think, good reasons to share Barrett's doubts: Wittgenstein was very hesitant to publish his work, he used to rewrite and refine his texts again and again, changing the exact wording or the order of his remarks numerous times. Moreover, Wittgenstein always raised suspicions against a theory of art, although the motives have changed over time: while he affirmed in his *Tractatus* that there can be no meaningful propositions in aesthetics (cf. *TLP*: 6.421), he often voices a suspicion against theories *tout court* in his mature philosophy (cf., for example, *PI*: §109).

However, there are two aspects in Wittgenstein's views on aesthetics that seem relevant. First, Wittgenstein does not conceive of aesthetics as a discipline detached from a general philosophical investigation. In the first lecture, he suggests (according to the notes taken by his students) that "[i]n order to get clear about aesthetic words you have to describe ways of living" (Wittgenstein 1966: 11). Moreover, some commentators recently argued that for Wittgenstein the aesthetic dimension of life was fundamental (cf. Hagberg 2014). Charles Altieri, for example, suggested that Wittgenstein's remarks on aesthetics "clarify a full range of powers we use to explain why expressive activity of all sorts can play important roles in human behavior" (Altieri 2015: 94). In the light of these interpretations we can state that for Wittgenstein aesthetics was not an abstract theory, nor an academic discipline detached from ordinary life, but rather a central element of our form of life that is of crucial

importance when it comes to form or refine our repertoire to express who we are and to define who we want to become.

Second, Wittgenstein's perspective on aesthetics is not expressed by what he *said* in his *Lectures on Aesthetics* or in other places; it is rather *shown* in the corpus of his writings.[7] Our judgments on art, music, and literature are a way to express our perspective behind the background of a shared environment, they allow us to communicate what is important to us and, thus, to make emerge a precise articulation of ourselves—and we find this aspect in many of Wittgenstein's later writings that contain numerous observations on art, music, and literature—or better: on artists, composers, and writers. Many of these sporadic remarks—which have been made accessible in *Culture and Value*, first published in 1977—have the character of short side remarks. Wittgenstein generally only *mentions* composers, writers, or artists, but does not discuss their works. In most cases, he expresses short, succinct judgments, but does not bother to explain or justify them.

At one point, Wittgenstein affirms that two words with which one is well familiar are distinguished "not merely by their sound or their appearance, but by an atmosphere as well". He illustrates this point with "names of famous poets and composers" and suggests that "the names 'Beethoven' and 'Mozart' don't merely sound different; no, they are also accompanied by a different *character*" (Wittgenstein 1980: §243). It seems to me that this point suggests a particular reading of Wittgenstein's remarks: he often uses the "character" of the names mentioned, the "atmosphere" they evoke, to draw a detailed map of a rich cultural landscape that allows him to locate himself as well as to display the perspective and the standpoint he adopts towards it. It seems to me, in other words, that the finely articulated web of cultural references in which Wittgenstein does not further elaborate his take on the poet or composer in question, also serves the purpose of letting an elaborate self-portrait emerge. Wittgenstein so provides a key for those readers who are able to recognize it.[8]

Wittgenstein's scattered remarks on composers, writers, and artists, thus, can have a very particular effect on readers who are open to them: they invite to understand the text not primarily as presentation of an abstract philosophical argument formulated by an anonymous author,

but rather as an encounter with a concrete and recognizable personality. A reading along these lines can easily arouse a feeling of acquaintance or familiarity with the (implied) author.[9] In Wittgenstein's mature philosophy, this feeling can be enforced by the quasi-dialogical style that allows the reader to witness an inner dialogue or to identify with the interlocutor. In both cases, the feeling of familiarity and acquaintance is intensified. In Wittgenstein's early philosophy, notwithstanding the differences in style, we can observe a similar effect: the apodictic character of the propositions and the absence of arguments show that Wittgenstein does not want to explain himself to the rest of humanity, but rather writes for those who already share his views. In the first line of the preface to the *Tractatus* he states: "Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it—or at least similar thoughts" (*TLP*: preface). In this way, he creates a sense of "we and the others", as it were: either one is already familiar with the thoughts expressed—and, thus, sympathetic to the perspective developed—or else one is excluded from the circle of those who can understand the work.

3   Paolozzi and Wittgenstein: *As Is When*

So far, I have argued that Wittgenstein's fascination for a broader audience is related to stylistic elements of his works that make a concrete and recognizable personality emerge. I would now like to suggest that this aspect is particularly important in Eduardo Paolozzi's perspective on Wittgenstein. I will focus mainly on the series of screenprints *As Is When* from 1964 to 1965.

The series consists of 12 prints, all of which contain texts by or about Wittgenstein.[10] In interviews Paolozzi explained that his attention was drawn to Wittgenstein first by Maurice Cranston's obituary in the *World Review*, by an article from Erich Heller in *Encounter,* and by Malcolm's *Memoir* (cf. Spencer 2000: 147).[11] The passages on Wittgenstein often recall anecdotes of Wittgenstein's life that illustrate his philosophical mentality, but do not focus on those of Wittgenstein's personality traits that captivated Paolozzi: his restlessness and his being "a strange

man, a tormented lonely man, who was a foreigner", who "inherited a lot of money which he renounced, and embraced the doctrine of poverty" (Spencer 2000: 127f). Paolozzi explains that his fascination with Wittgenstein was not focused on his biography, "the actual work is the key" (Spencer 2000: 128). Among quotes reproduced on the prints, we find passages where Wittgenstein uses strong or unusual pictures or metaphors (VIII, X, XI, and, to some extent, the quote from *Blue and Brown Books* on II). Others refer to or express Wittgenstein's early picture theory of language (IV and the quote from Newman on II). On VII and IX he presents Wittgenstein's (later) philosophical method—which, incidentally, also seems programmatic for works of Paolozzi like the *Krazy Kat Arkive*.

In short, Paolozzi's interest in Wittgenstein focused on his philosophical work, but was triggered by his unusual biography, in which he recognized several analogies to his own. Moreover, in interviews he repeatedly states that "I wanted to identify myself with" Wittgenstein (Spencer 2000: 127 and 147) and conceived of the prints as a "kind of combined autobiography" (Spencer 2000: 147). This illustrates that Wittgenstein's writings aroused in Paolozzi a feeling of closeness and familiarity that I have discussed in the preceding section. For him, Wittgenstein was not a distant, abstract philosopher, but a concrete and tangible person, who was, in a sense, present in his studio: "My own Wittgenstein works were a kind of collaboration with Wittgenstein" (Spencer 2000: 150).

4   The Philosopher as Artist

Paolozzi, thus, perceived Wittgenstein as a collaborator in his artistic production, which invites to conceive of Wittgenstein's works as works of art of a particular kind—and, in fact, they contain elements that we usually do not find in philosophical works, but in works of art. Let me mention just three of these elements that can be found in the *Tractatus*. First, for Wittgenstein the harmony between form and content was important. We have seen above that he had struggled hard to find his own, personal style that was adequate to express

his philosophical perspective. In a letter to von Ficker, he says of the *Tractatus* that the work was "strictly philosophical and literary" (Wittgenstein 1969a: 33).[12] Second, Wittgenstein breaks the readers' expectations, which typically engage with philosophical texts in order to gain new insights or to get acquainted with new arguments. Moreover, working through a philosophical book requires concentration and patience, but promises a cognitive gain that outweighs these efforts. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, states that the goal of his book was not to offer knowledge or arguments—he states that the reader either has already known what is said in the book or else he will not understand it—but to provide pleasure: "[i]ts purpose would be achieved if it gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it" (*TLP*: preface). Third, Wittgenstein states at the end of his work that the propositions contained in it are meaningless. Very much like in other artworks, thus, the material of which the work is created—the propositions—point beyond themselves and can in this way constitute a new dimension of meaning, which is not *said* or stated explicitly, but *shown* in the work.

There is, thus, a sense in which we could call Wittgenstein an artist. It would be wrong, however, to think of him as a poet; his works are not *literary works of art*. This misunderstanding could be invited by Wittgenstein's famous passage that "really one should write philosophy only as one writes a poem". It would entail, however—as Wittgenstein points out—that he was a failed artist, i.e., "someone who cannot quite do what he would like to be able to do" (Wittgenstein 1998: 28). I rather think that we should consider Wittgenstein's to be works of art *sui generis*; *philosophical works of art*, as it were. They are designed to provide pleasure to those who "read and understood" them, which indicates that Wittgenstein has a very specific form of aesthetic pleasure in mind: the pleasure one feels when one realizes that the philosophical problems that have disturbed us are only the result of a misunderstanding of our language. The goal Wittgenstein pursued with his philosophical works of art was, thus, to make "propaganda for one style of thinking as opposed to another" (Wittgenstein 1966: 28).

Notes

1. As Paolozzi once famously asserted in an interview with Richard Hamilton for his first solo exhibition at the MoMA in New York: "Some people need, perhaps, Greenberg, I need Wittgenstein" (Paolozzi in Spencer 2000: 128).

2. One might argue that Wittgenstein's strong interest in language was most compelling for many readers—and in particular for writers and poets, but also for artists (cf. Huemer 2013b). Eduardo Paolozzi, for example, explains his interest for Wittgenstein with the following words: "I think that for the first time I have a necessity to embrace some kind of language in relationship to the processes I'm involved with. And I find his [Wittgenstein's] is the most sympathetic language" (Spencer 2000: 128). Wittgenstein's interest in language, however, is ubiquitous in his work and can hardly be broken down to a single thesis or argument.

3. This, incidentally, was one of the aspects Paolozzi seems to have appreciated in Wittgenstein: "I liked the idea of linking art and philosophy. Because one of the ten reasons for making a series of prints around the writings of a philosopher was that I just felt that somehow everybody had a sense of precision in their work" (Spencer 2000: 147).

4. I do not want to suggest that we can make a clear-cut distinction between these two elements; especially in the work of Wittgenstein, where the literary style contributes to the meaning of the text, this does not seem promising. I do want to emphasize that it was not primarily a specific philosophical thesis or argument, but rather Wittgenstein's philosophical style that attracted a broader audience.

5. This does not mean that there cannot or have not been promising Wittgensteinian theories in aesthetics, however. For an interesting recent approach cf., for example, Sedivy (2014).

6. The lectures were first published in 1966, the year after the completion of Paolozzi's series *As Is When*.

7. Wittgenstein hints at this aspect in an early letter to Ludwig von Ficker: "the *Tractatus* actually consists of two parts: the one I have written and the other one, that contains all the things I have *not* written. And this second part is the important one. For in my book the ethical is confined from within, as it were; and I am convinced

that *strictly* it can be confined *only* in this way" [My translation: "Ich wollte nämlich schreiben, das Werk bestehe aus zwei Teilen: aus dem, der hier vorliegt, und aus alledem, was ich *nicht* geschrieben habe. Und gerade dieser zweite Teil ist der Wichtige. Es wird nämlich das Ethische durch mein Buch gleichsam von Innen her begrenzt; und ich bin überzeugt, dass es, *streng, nur* so zu begrenzen ist" (Wittgenstein 1969a: 35)]. Since for Wittgenstein "Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same" (*TLP*: 6.421) his affirmation definitely also holds for aesthetics.

8. I provide a more detailed argument for this reading in Huemer (2013a, c).

9. It might, of course, also provoke the opposite reaction: the reader might just feel repelled by the (implied) author's personality and, in consequence, also by the work—which can explain why Wittgenstein's work has evoked very ambivalent reactions in the philosophical community.

10. Seven screenprints contain quotes from Wittgenstein's works (I, IV and XI from the *Tractatus*, III and X from the *Notebooks*, II from the *Blue and Brown Books*, and IX from the *Philosophical Investigations*). Screenprint II also contains quotes from a book review of Malcolm's *Memoir* by Newman that appeared in *Scientific American* and a quote from Russell's obituary in *Mind*, and the remaining five screenprints V, VI, VII, VIII, and XII contain quotes from Malcolm's *Memoir* (the quote of V stems from G. H. V. Wright's biographical sketch reprinted in this booklet and VII notes from a lecture by Wittgenstein recorded there). All quotes are reproduced in the appendix to this volume.

11. Interestingly enough Paolozzi did not mention James R. Newman's book review of Malcolm's *Memoir* that appeared in *Scientific American* (Newman 1959). This omission surprises, since Paolozzi used the title and a passage from this text (where Newman paraphrases G. H. V. Wright's "Biographical Sketch") in print II. Given that Paolozzi liked to read the *Scientific American* (cf. Spencer 2000: 139), it is plausible that Newman's review drew his attention to Malcolm's book and thus played a crucial role in reviving his interest in Wittgenstein in the late fifties.

12. My translation from the original German: "das Werk ist streng philosophisch und literarisch".

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4

Paolozzi and the Diverse Manners of Ornamenting Wittgenstein in the Arts

Alessandro Del Puppo

1   Introduction

Despite the reference to a famous album engraved by Giovan Battista Piranesi, I'm afraid this chapter's title might seem irremediably frivolous. Nevertheless, I will basically try to address two issues, which in my hypothesis correspond to the two moments of Wittgensteinian assimilation in the art of the 1960s. The first level obviously refers to Eduardo Paolozzi's work, which I would like to further distinguish in two different points. The second level, within the main narrative of modernism, links Wittgenstein's thought to the wider criticism of American abstract painting and leads to the analytic propositions of conceptual art.

Of course—and I think that the scepticism implicit in the chapter title does bear witness—I'm not convinced that the works of an artist can teach something special or meaningful regarding the philosopher in

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question. On the contrary, I think it is quite the opposite. This is one of the reasons, I also argue, of the peculiar rarity—if not of the total absence—of references to Paolozzi's work in Wittgenstein's huge bibliography. The artistic examples in Wittgenstein—be they intelligently instrumental or instrumentally intelligent—can clarify something about the art outside the history of art and despite art historians. I will therefore proceed by taking into consideration Wittgenstein's observations about Tolstoj, recalled by Norman Malcolm (2001: 98): "it seems to me that his philosophy is true especially when he is latent in the story". As an art historian, I will therefore point out a few places in art history where it is possible to trace some philosophical latency, and of course leave the rest of the task to philosophers (cowardly, I know, as it is the most difficult part).

2   Two Interpretive Levels

It is well known that Wittgenstein's figure marks Paolozzi's production: notably, the in polychromatic sculpture *Wittgenstein at Cassino* and in the 12 serigraphs of the *As Is When* series, which in his 65-copy edition and in the print volume undoubtedly constitutes the most known artwork devoted to the Wiener philosopher. There are also some other sculptures, subsequent serigraph portfolios (such as *Moonstrips Empire News*), and a very late example such as *A Logical Picture of Facts Is a Thought (3) Tractacus '1-22'* of 1994. Considering this body of works, I would first like to distinguish, as I said, two interpretive levels.

The first level is illustrative. It focuses on the most clearly figurative aspects of Paolozzi's work and allows us to establish links between the narrative aspects of those images. These links relate to biographical coincidences, such as the captivity of Wittgenstein at Cassino, not far from Paolozzi's father hometown. There is also a feeling of identification with the figure of the Austrian philosopher as regards to their common sense of extraneousness and cultural isolation or, eventually, to the idea of Franciscan poverty, when Paolozzi explicitly recalled that Wittgenstein "embraced the doctrine of poverty" (Paolozzi 2000: 128).

Recent studies have clarified many references between *As Is When* and Wittgenstein's biography (Potts 2014). These studies were based on the sources used by Paolozzi—like the biography written by Malcolm, which is explicitly quoted in *Wittgenstein in New York*—as well as on Paolozzi's writings. But it is also true that there are some cases where the work was initially conceived without any particular reference to the philosopher. Indeed, this is precisely the case of Paolozzi's first work dedicated to Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein at Cassino* (1963–1964): a polychrome sculpture, initially intended simply as "a figure between two buildings" (Paolozzi 2000: 127) and later renamed after reading Malcolm's book.

Indeed, art historians usually take delight in comparing different sources and perhaps to point out that, for example, in *Wittgenstein at the Cinema Admires Betty Grable*, Paolozzi finds amusement in citing the recognisable contour—round ears and bent body—of Mickey Mouse. The visual reference to Betty Grable in this case seems to be bore only in the detail of the above figure—a right arm that seems to hold a gun: an allusion, perhaps, to the pose we see in the poster of *The Beautiful Blonde from Bashful Bend*, a Hollywood movie of questionable quality, accompanied by the no less controversial *language game*: "She had the greatest Six Shooters in the West".

Of course, some may complain about the flat and mechanical shapes of Paolozzi's Wittgenstein, and the treatment—rather brutal—reserved to his body features. I'll try to respond to these understandable objections in two ways. First, there is a kind of continuity between these figures made on silkscreen, by means of collages of images and texts, and the informal sculptures produced a decade before. The latter sculptures (e.g. *Cyclop*, 1957; *St. Sebastian*, 1957) presented tormented surfaces made out of objects of everyday use pressed against clay blocks. It is an inventive practice based—in Paolozzi's on words—upon a process of comparison and reaction to his previous works; an attempt of mechanical translation, where "one idea leads to another" (Paolozzi 2000: 137). Further doing real-life images, going beyond the simple modelling of an object, "trying to make some kind of presence" (Paolozzi 2000: 138). Secondly, I would like to highlight that

Wittgenstein got lucky with Paolozzi, if we only think of how badly other philosophers like Friedrich August von Hayek or Bertrand Russell, for instance, were depicted in the official paintings preserved at the National Portrait Gallery in London.

3   From Collage to Silkscreen and Sculpture

I'll simply begin from *Tortured Life*, the second plate of *As Is When*. It is an example of a narrative picture, usually explained by the affinities between the author and the philosopher, supported by the title which, in its entirety, states: *The Tortured Life of an Influential Modern Philosopher: The Late Ludwig Wittgenstein*. This finds validation in the explicit allusions to the "strange man, tormented lonely man" in Paolozzi's interview with Richard Hamilton. But if we look at the original collage, we can say something else. It is clear that the silkscreen printing implied the problem of how to maintain the subtleties of collage composition, the refinement of textures, and the search for some three-dimensional qualities, almost as a bas-relief. Paolozzi was fully aware of this. In fact, he wrote with great clarity that it was necessary to challenge the uniform colour fields of the silkscreen, to obtain a two-level geometry. In addition, as is clear from the simple examination of the many impressions of *As Is When*, Paolozzi pledged to vary the colour register, playing not only with the different colour combinations, but also with the density and fluidity of the individual colours.

Paolozzi's 1964 notebooks demonstrate the simultaneous development of the *As Is When* collages together with sculptures made of prefabricated aluminium elements welded together. The most eloquent case in this regard is *Parrot*. This picture can of course be understood as an example of deduction—more or less detailed—from several of Wittgenstein's famous passages (1953: 344). However, the illustrative or narrative allusions are just as important as the technical and formal aspects that can be better understood from a comparison with the sculpture that bears the same title—which, from this point of view, is to be considered a reformulation in other terms:

After the screen is made up, certain geometrical ingredients, such as variations of the square or the curve, the stripe, the circle, could be applied by the transfer process to the geometric solids of the sculpture. (Paolozzi 2000: 139)

The natural transmutation from one work to another, and from one technique to another, was declared by Paolozzi himself in a note sent to the art critic Peter Selz in anticipation of his New York exhibition of 1964: "the application of screen-printed geometry transfer method to a large rather geometric aluminium sculpture shaped like a Parrot" (Paolozzi 2000: 130). What do these works then have in common? I would answer, the attempt to overcome the constraint of prefabricated materials and casts, or impressions, to convey a poetic image: "[I] try to submit the discipline of standard materials plus castings to a poetic image". All these features, in the artist's own words, had the intent of "clarity & precision" and "directness" (Paolozzi 2000: 137–138).

The main aspect is therefore the technique—and certainly not the aesthetics—of collage. The creative potential of collage is increased, and not reduced, by the limits of the manipulation of its components. Indeed, making a collage or, similarly, a sculpture meant aggregating parts, like the mounting of a ship, an airplane or an engine:

One is able to manipulate, to move, and use certain laws which are really blocked off if you try to do a pencil drawing, say, and then fill in the coloured areas. (Paolozzi 2000: 139)

Paolozzi also praised the use of ordinary elements derived from industry:

I am using anonymity in the sense that the actual raw materials, when they arrive and lie around the floor of the workshop, are things that nobody would give a second chance […] part of the battle now is to try and resolve these anonymous materials into a poetic idea. (Paolozzi 2000: 140)

There is a beautiful photograph of Paolozzi outside the Alpha Engineering Works' warehouse, looking at many industrial elements spread on the floor: tubes, rings, curves, fittings… in short, his personal

"grammar". I would like to associate this image to the well-known Wittgenstein excerpt from the *Blue Book* (1958: 4): "But if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use". I think Paolozzi wanted to demonstrate more or less the same thing with the visual arts—and, specifically, with his sculpture and his collages. A form, just like a proposition, is fully understood when it is used.

There is, finally, the last aspect to be stressed. It is illusory to believe that this game and these rules correspond to an essence; in our case, particularly to the essence of painting or sculpture or both. Paolozzi— who was an extraordinarily lucid and self-conscious author as regards his own works—expressed it very clearly in the interview with Hamilton, with an epigraphic acumen that became almost proverbial: "Some people need, perhaps, Greenberg. I need Wittgenstein" (Paolozzi 2000: 128). So it comes down to Clement Greenberg. Already in 1963 Paolozzi made a sculpture, *Towards a New Laocoön*, which in its title clearly refers to one of Greenberg's most influential articles. All this, in the end, leads us to the United States, into the domain of the art critic that created the foundations for the judgement of taste in the search for the ultimate essence of visual arts.

4   Wittgenstein and High Modernism

In 1964 Paolozzi held an important solo exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. The checklist of the exhibition testifies that, among other artworks, there were the polychrome aluminium sculpture of *Wittgenstein in New York* and some pieces from the *As Is When* series—only five prints, of which two in different impressions. Their presence, I believe, had an impact. The importance of the relationship with Wittgenstein was clearly reiterated in the press release and relaunched countless times. And somebody, with all due evidence, picked up the message. A few months after Paolozzi's exhibition, one of Greenberg's brilliant students, Michael Fried, prepared a text for the exhibition *Three American Painters*. The three painters were Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski and Frank Stella. Like all brilliant and

intelligent pupils, Fried cultivated a dissidence to some of his mentor's positions, which he judged—quite rightly—at the same time intransigent and imprecise: How could Greenberg's essence be better defined, then? The intrinsic problems of modernist painting were mostly focused on the nature of the medium. It was therefore necessary to examine the "grammar"—explicitly, for Fried, in the sense of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*—of some essential elements in the reflection on art. Problem, solution, logic and validity were the terms with which Fried intended to favour the pictorial structure (subject to rational decisions, and hence clearly defined) instead of the experience or the perception of the colour (which ultimately is based on arbitrary or feeble definitions).

A year later, in a text dedicated to the painting of Frank Stella, entitled *Shape as form* (1966: 18), Fried decided to quote Wittgenstein from *Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief* (1966: 36).

The craving for simplicity. People would like to say: "What really matters is only the colours". You say this mostly because you wish it to be the case. If your explanation is complicated, it is disagreeable, especially if you don't have strong feelings about the thing itself.

Fried could find comfort in some observations with which Wittgenstein concluded his aesthetic examination: "the chief impression is the visual impression". Once again, what matters was, in essence, the image. Symbolic associations could more or less vary, "but change the picture ever so slightly, and you won't want to look at it anymore". Further Fried wrote:

Frank Stella's new paintings investigate the viability of shape as such. By shape as such I mean not merely the silhouette of the support (which I will call literal shape), nor merely that of the outlines of elements in a given picture (which I will call depicted shape), but shape as a medium within which choices about both literal and depicted shapes are made, and made mutually responsive. And by the viability of shape, I mean its power to hold, to stamp itself out, and in – as verisimilitude and narrative and symbolism used to impress themselves – compelling conviction.

Part of Wittgenstein's thinking thus became the leading argument for the emancipation from formalistic and existentialist aesthetics, related to the traditional concept of beauty and taste—that is wholesale Greenberg—towards a pragmatic approach to the object. *Work* instead of *artwork*, this is what these new artists and critics wanted to draw attention on. Their objects addressed "how the world is"—to use the words of the *Tractatus* (6.432). They addressed form and structure, rather than colour; sequence and repetition, instead of composition; evidence and denomination, rather than evocation; concept and function, rather than morphology. Rosalind Krauss recalls that in the 1950s young critics and artists were:

> […] alternately tyrannized and depressed by the psychological whine of 'Existentialist' criticism. It had seemed evasive to us – the impenetrable hedge of subjectivity whose prerogatives we could not assent to. The remedy had to have, for us, the clear provability on an 'if x then x'. (Krauss 1972: 48)

Put in these terms, the question seems a little too mechanical, but this is a sign of those times and a trace of the path that the visual arts began to undertake. Quoting Wittgenstein and addressing *clear provability* meant rejecting Greenberg and the subjectivity of *taste*.

In 1969, when Joseph Kosuth brandished the quote "The meaning is the use" as a slogan—which is a bit like saying "less is more"—within an anthology of minimalist artists such as Donald Judd, Sol Lewitt, Ad Rehinardt, he was simply raising an issue that Paolozzi had already raised, as we have seen. However, at that point, it was taking a different shape. A shape radicalised in a strictly and punitive minimalist-conceptual way. It gained, or was thought to gain, an uncanny clarity. But I also think that it lost something of that playful inventive—as well as a kind of irony against minimalist style, implicit in artworks like *100%F*art*—that Paolozzi was so good at transferring to us, up to this day.

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Assembled Pieces: Collage Techniques in the Work of Eduardo Paolozzi and Ludwig Wittgenstein

Maren Wienigk

1 Paolozzis Scrapbooks

In 1979, Paolozzi published the text *Locus Solus* (Paolozzi 1979: 7–8). This work shares its title with a novel by the French author Raymond Roussel, who was also an influence on the surrealists. During the time Paolozzi spent in Paris between 1946 and 1947, he came into contact with surrealism, Dada, art brut, art informel and tachism. He was very impressed by Tristan Tzara's collection, and met Alberto Giacometti, Fernand Léger, Georges Braque, Constantin Brâncuși and Jean Dubuffet (Spencer 2000: 333). He came across Mary Reynolds's collection, which he described as "pre-war Dada and Surrealist: fortuitous and ephemeral, somewhat dusty, pathetic and absurd" (Roditi 1960: 156). He also saw the *Exposition Internationale du Surréalisme* at the Galerie Maeght in 1947 (Konnertz 1984: 36).

Locus Solus was published in the catalogue for the exhibition *Work in Progress*, hosted by the Kölnischer Kunstverein in 1979. The text

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differs only slightly from Paolozzi's 1977 text *Collage or a Scenario for a Comedy of Critical Hallucination*, and thus it is also a product of collage (Spencer 2000: 251). *Locus Solus* is longer than the original text and was published two years later, in 1979. Paolozzi writes that "Making collage can be symbolic art, like life itself—a tangle unravelled" and that "Divine ambiguity is possible with collage". He gives the following example: "Figures from a Turkish landscape trapped by cruelty may be released and find themselves perplexed and frightened in a French nursery flanked by the mechanical sphinx". Another example: "The Rathaus in Zurich dwarfed by a frog represents not only poetic ambiguity but also a personal hypothesis". In the final paragraph of the text, he calls for a broader definition: "The word 'collage' is inadequate as a description because the concept should include 'damage, erase, destroy, deface and transform'—all parts of a metaphor for the creative act itself" (Paolozzi 1979: 8).

The main sources for collages are scrapbooks—and scrapbooks are themselves collages (Grasskamp 2008: 49). Scrapbooks form the foundation of Paolozzi's artistic oeuvre. During his childhood in Edinburgh, the practice of keeping scrapbooks was widespread. The scrapbooks contained cut-out, copied or enlarged pictures from comics and magazines. "But cutting images out of magazines was not a daily event", Paolozzi recalled, explaining that "The really precious images—strong signs and metaphors—were secured in scrapbooks like exotic and rare butterflies mounted in the Natural History Museum" (Spencer 2000: 53). Paolozzi continued this practice of keeping scrapbooks, collecting images from old books or catalogues that held a particular significance for him (Fig. 1).

The term "collage" comes from the French word "colle", which means "glue". Collage is more than just a technique; it can be understood as the essence of modernity. On this point, the essay paraphrases Franz Mon, a German author working in the concrete poetry genre, who wrote about the principle of collage and described very clearly what is special about it (Mon 1968: 13–14). The essay also refers to Eberhard Roters, who wrote about the historical development of collage in the visual arts (Roters 1968: 15–41). The elements of a collage are taken from a civilized environment, exhibit traces of artistic intervention and

Fig. 1 E. Paolozzi, [title unknown: page from a scrapbook], 1950s, Printed papers on paper, London: Tate (©Trustees of the Paolozzi Foundation, licensed by VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2018, Photo: ©Tate, London 2018)

engage with social themes. There are various possibilities for composition: seemingly extrinsic material, montage, deconstruction, integration, disintegration, covering, constellation, confrontation. Collage transports perceived reality into a wholly constitutive world of art. If reality is imagined as something made by human beings, it might find its highest expression in the concept of collage. Social processes are reflected in methods such as tearing, burning, cutting, crumpling and rubbing off. Collage combines these poles: constructed objectivity and subjective activity. Collage as an artistic method includes collecting material, damaging drafts, erasing pieces, destroying previous works, defacing everything and transforming meaning. Concerning his collages, Paolozzi remarks (in the same text as mentioned above): "Dreams and poetry can be fused without the usual concessions to graphic limitation" (Paolozzi 1979: 7). The fused and integrated layers of a collage are not only different materials; they are signs of divergent states of reality.

Allegoric trompe-l'oeil still lives, where various objects were presented so realistically that viewers might be tempted to reach out and

touch them, could be considered a predecessor to collage. The technique of collage combines painted, illusory things with actual materiality. Trompe-l'oeil works in the form of assemblage or picture puzzles, which were painted by artists such as Giuseppe Arcimboldo and Joos de Momper (Roters 1968: 16). Collage then became an important medium for the surrealist and Dadaist movements in the early twentieth century. It was used for works on paper, cardboard and flat surfaces and as an editing technique in the emerging art of filmmaking. Marcel Duchamp, Francis Picabia, Max Ernst, Hannah Höch, and Raoul Haussmann reflected on their times and condensed political, social and avant-garde content—themes about the future and cities, machines, myth and mankind in various combinations—in the medium of collage; similar developments can also be observed in films by Charlie Chaplin, Sergei Eisenstein, and Fritz Lang. The American performance artist Allan Kaprow pointed out that collage was the first medium to stimulate an impure, anti-classical and anti-traditional way of thinking; one just has to accept what is given. Collage as a medium was, quite simply, a perfect match for the mood of post-war London (Schneede 1970: 9).

In 1952, Paolozzi gave a lecture at the ICA. It was not a lecture in the usual academic sense. Paolozzi showed some pages from his scrapbooks; it was the first time he did so in public. He presented them on an epidiascope, rapidly flitting between images without any order or structure. The atmosphere was paradoxical: Paolozzi was convinced of the correlations he saw in his collected pictures but noticed that these correlations were not at all evident to the audience. This series of collages, named *Bunk!* (a quote from Henry Ford: "History is more or less bunk"), became one of the founding statements of British pop art. Paolozzi showed that advertising, found material, scientific diagrams and almost everything else he came across was important for his art (Stonard 2008: 238). The collages in this lecture were more or less ignored for almost 20 years, until in 1972 some parts were published as the screenprint portfolio *Bunk!*, which embodies Paolozzi's demand that the concept of collage should "include damage, erase, destroy, deface and transform—all parts of a metaphor for the creative act itself" (Paolozzi 1979: 7).

Aspects of collage are similar to a certain way of thinking and working philosophically, such as that practiced by Wittgenstein. The Austrian philosopher collected notes on small pieces of paper. He was almost afraid to publish; he rearranged and deleted paragraphs, and altered and reordered his thoughts over and over again. In the preface to *Philosophical Investigations*, he describes his texts as "a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings" (Wittgenstein 1958a: ix[e]). He explains that he has "written down all these thoughts as *remarks*, short paragraphs, of which there is sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject, while I sometimes make a sudden change, jumping from one topic to another" (Wittgenstein 1958a: ix[e]). He draws the conclusion that "this book is really only an album" (Wittgenstein 1958a: ix[e]). Wittgenstein collects *pictures*. Instead of taking an external perspective, observing from a privileged vantage point, he takes the internal perspective of a participant. This enables a myriad of points of view and opens up many different aspects. For example, he arranges phenomena side by side instead of successively, so that correlations need not be explained: one is able to actually see them (ein-sehen). Here, one must remember that Paolozzi could see his correlations in the *Bunk!* series, and also how deeply he wished that the audience could see these correlations as well. Allow me to point out one example concerning language-games. In § 23, Wittgenstein combines and collects together many different activities to illustrate different varieties of language games (Wittgenstein 1958a: 11[e]–12[e]). At the level of form, the process of writing and editing the *Philosophical Investigations* involved activities similar to preparing a collage. And Wittgenstein uses collage-like techniques at the level of content too.

2 *As Is When*

The screenprint portfolio *As Is When* contains rich figuration and abstraction, areas of colour and blank spaces, development and negation of fore-, mid- and background. Twelve silkscreens produced between 1964 and 1965 and published by Editions Alecto show Paolozzi's

preoccupation with the life and the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Paolozzi shared recollections of his interest in Wittgenstein in an interview with William Lipke. In 1951, he read an article in the *World Review*, with, as he put it, "a fair amount of biographical notes". In 1956, he came across an article about Wittgenstein by the British essayist Erich Heller in the magazine *Encounter* (Spencer 2000: 147). But, as Paolozzi recalled:

> [the] thing that triggered me off was the 'Memoir' (by Norman Malcolm) which I found devastatingly moving somehow. […] I got terribly concerned, and certain motes of sympathy from me, such as his being a foreigner in England, his kind of reaction to the Establishment in England, such as Trinity College, were rather similar to mine in a way. But you probably know the sympathetic things about Wittgenstein; about how he disliked the professional world of *Mind*, his feelings of repugnance after a lecture and how he would then go to the cinema. And some of these incidents I actually used in the theme. I wanted to identify myself with Wittgenstein through the prints; make a kind of combined autobiography." (Spencer 2000: 147)

In addition to the 12 prints, there is the cover, a poster, an imprint and the printed text "Wild Track for Ludwig. The Kakafon Kakkoon laka oon Elektrik Lafs". What appears to be an oversized text is a collage as well: the headline is a broken, incomplete anagram of "Laocoön", and "wild track" is a cinematic term for additional sound. The text was assembled out of fragments from articles about Bedouins, the Laocoön Group and the history of its restoration, a film production, aerial warfare and Wittgenstein's biography (Kirkpatrick 1970: 106). Using fragments of articles in the same way as images somehow create a suite of fantastical nonsense. Aeroplanes, horse races, boat races and the like have a certain popular value in the work of Paolozzi.

Paolozzi always worked in both two- and three-dimensional mediums: he was a graphic artist and a sculptor. On the one hand, he remarked "What I like to do in my prints is the kind of thing which might be ridiculous if I attempted to make it into a sculpture" (Paolozzi 1983: 39). On the other, he said "In a way a lot of the print-making I do is just a reflection of some of the sculptures I make"

(Paolozzi 1983: 39). To give an example: when the screenprint *Parrot*, from the *As Is When* portfolio, is compared to the sculpture with the same name, the comparison oscillates between what is lost in the flatness and what is gained in the redaction and the possibility of seeing all the surfaces at once. The screenprint as an artistic medium is very young. In the imprint, Paolozzi explains the technique and his collaboration with his printer Christopher Prater. There is an ongoing debate about whether screenprints are originals or reproductive tools.

Of the 12 screenprints, two examples are deeply connected to Wittgenstein: the prints *Tortured Life* and *Wittgenstein in New York* (Figs. 2 and 3). The second print in the portfolio, *Tortured Life*, is combined out of square forms, circles and curved bands, which are themselves patterned and supplemented by lines and stripes, rectangles and triangles. The left half appears compact, locked, inactive, while the right half seems light and dynamic. The left half could also be seen as a head with a camera eye, and other elements could be associated with cinematic techniques: a roll of film, gelatin strips and a screen. The layering of head and camera, of eye and lens, combines an organic and a constructive approach. At the bottom, there are three passages, which appear coherent but are from three different sources. The first quotation is taken word for word from James Newman's *Science and Sensibility*. It begins with:

> Wright, one day in a trench on the east/ern front, while he was reading a maga/zine in which there was a picture of the/possible sequence of events in an auto/mobile accident. The Picture, he said,/served as a proposition whose parts cor/responded to things in reality; and so he/conceived the idea that a verbal propo-/sition is in effect a picture, "by virtue of a/similar correspondence between its parts/and the world.' In other words, the struc/ture of the proposition "depicts a possi/ble combination of elements in reality, a/possible state of affairs." The Tractatus (Newman 1961: 56)

James Newman paraphrases from G. H. von Wright as well as from Norman Malcolm (von Wright 1958: 8; Malcolm 1958: 68–69). Paolozzi himself does not mention Newman in the imprint, but it is plausible that the printer Christopher Prater had the publication by

**Fig. 2** E. Paolozzi, *Tortured Life*, from *As Is When*, 1964, Screenprint on paper, London: Tate (©Trustees of the Paolozzi Foundation, licensed by VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2018, Photo: ©Tate, London 2018)

Fig. 3 E. Paolozzi, *Wittgenstein in New York*, from *As Is When*, 1964, Screenprint on paper, London: Tate (©Trustees of the Paolozzi Foundation, licensed by VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2018, Photo: ©Tate, London 2018)

Newman in his personal library, and that the artist and printer jointly decided to use this quotation. The second quotation comes from Brian McGuinness: "the proposition: 'There is no hippopotamus in this room at present?' When he refused to believe this, I looked under all the desks without finding one; but he remained unconvinced" (McGuinness 1988: 89). McGuinness, however, is quoting Bertrand Russell (*Mind* 60, no. 239, 1951). Moreover, in the source the phrase about the hippopotamus is a declarative sentence, not a question. The third quotation is from Wittgenstein himself: "Let us ask the question: 'Should we say that the arrows → and ← point in the same direction or in different directions?' At first sight you might be inclined to say 'of course in different directions'. But" (Wittgenstein 1958b: 140). In the static left half and the floating right half, one might perhaps see—though this is only a tentative suggestion—a juxtaposition of Wittgenstein's early and late periods.[1]

The sixth print, *Wittgenstein in New York*, shows a skyline formed by variations of the Rockefeller Center, two cross sections of bodies, a flag, a plane, a spiral, a clock, a petrol pump, a motor, a cross section of a tractor, a cylinder and a propeller, as well as triangles and squares. It is accompanied by the following quotation: "I went to New York to meet Wittgenstein at the ship. When I first saw him I was surprised at his apparent physical vigour. He was striding down the ramp with a pack on his back, a heavy suitcase in one hand, cane in the other" (Malcolm 1958: 84). The figures come from variations of images by Fritz Kahn, who in 1926 published the popular medicine book *Das Leben des Menschen* and the accompanying poster *Der Mensch als Industriepalast* (cf. Debschitz and Debschitz 2009). This illustration was also published—with English subtitles—in the technical magazine *Radio-Craft*. Paolozzi uses it in the collage *Man Holds the Key* from the *Bunk!* series and in the print *Perception through Impression* from the 1970s series *Conditional Probability Machine*. The left cross section—also using illustrations from Fritz Kahn—comes from an American advert for a painkiller named Bufferin. Incidentally, in 1966 Andy Warhol shot a short film called *Bufferin*, where he used the strobe cut technique for the first time. Christopher Prater remarked "The screenprinting medium is brutal as compared to lithography where one can get subtle effects of graduation of tone" (Prater 1967: 293).

3 Collage: A Link In-Between

This chapter attempted to show how collage may be seen as a possible link between the artistic practice of Eduardo Paolozzi and the philosophical work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. This argument was based on three main points. Firstly, Paolozzi remarked: "collage is a metaphor for the creative act itself" (Paolozzi 1979: 8). Secondly, Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* exhibits similarities to the artistic method of collage in terms of both form and content. Thirdly, in the screenprint portfolio *As Is When*: A Series of Prints Based on the Life and Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1965) Paolozzi uses the method of collage in a twofold manner: at the level of content (mixing biographical facts, anecdotes and philosophical thoughts from Wittgenstein) and at the level of technique (combining handmade collage and screenprinting).

Collecting, selecting—in albums and scrapbooks—and contrasting elements and ideas using collage, as well as mounting, deconstructing, disintegrating, over-layering and confronting pre-existing materials using techniques such as cutting, tearing, burning, etc. makes the collage method a key defining feature of modern artistic works. The idea of collage connects these methods in a way analogous to certain philosophical principles. Collage as an artistic method includes a whole range of activities such as collecting material, damaging drafts, erasing pieces, destroying previous works, defacing everything and transforming meaning. These techniques are similar to a certain way of thinking and working philosophically. What is essential is the constitutive flatness, the coexistence of phenomena side by side in the two-dimensional space; the flatness of this medium compared with perspective painting, this two-dimensionality, allows it to emphasize "as well as" rather than "either/or".

Note

1. See Burr (1992: 318), who also refers to Laocoön: "The images reflect an abstract representation of the central figure of Laocoon and his older son to his left as depicted in the original sculpture."

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Part II

Paolozzi: On Reading Wittgenstein

6

Paolozzi Reads Wittgenstein: Moments in a Research Process

Luigi Perissinotto

1   Premise

At the beginning of the 1990s, while I was looking for an image for a book cover on Wittgenstein I was about to finish writing, I happened to stumble rather randomly upon Eduardo Paolozzi, particularly upon one of his 12 screenprints (number V titled *Wittgenstein the Soldier*) from the series *As Is When* (1964–1965). From that moment on, my interest in Paolozzi and in his relationship with Wittgenstein never faded. I even tried writing to Paolozzi to ask him about the genesis and meaning of this relationship—although with little success, to speak the truth. Indeed, in replying to my letter in 1992, he simply stated that Wittgenstein had been important to him years ago, but was by now—so to speak—completely out of his picture. However, this did not diminish my interest, convinced as I was and still am of at least two things:

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(a) that Wittgenstein wasn't a mere spark or pretext, a simple repertoire of images and quotes for Paolozzi—I dare say, furthermore, that it is impossible to fully understand Paolozzi's work, or at least the wide range of his production in the 1960s, without working out his relationship to Wittgenstein; (b) that Paolozzi—as an artist and like an artist—recognized various aspects or traits of Wittgenstein's thought and let them come to light in a period when they were still concealed or invisible to the majority of the philosopher's readers and interpreters with a philosophical background. In this sense, one could say that Paolozzi's work fully belongs to the general story of Wittgenstein's critical reception. For this very reason, when addressing the relationship between Paolozzi and Wittgenstein, it is hardly enough to speak in general terms of an effect or influence on the artist, while it would be sufficient in many other cases.[1] At least, this is what I believe and what I feel needs to be claimed.

2   Paolozzi Meets Wittgenstein: Context, Mode and Spirit

As suggested by the programmatic subheading of my chapter, what I would like to do here, in brief, is describing the main issues and topics that a research on Paolozzi and Wittgenstein cannot avoid to address—especially if developed along the lines of the aforementioned premise. Anyway, they are issues and cruxes in the research I am currently trying to focus on and to analyze progressively. I would discern three aspects in this research. The first one concerns the reconstruction of the cultural environment where Paolozzi met Wittgenstein. What should be initially verified is, whether and to what extent Paolozzi's Wittgenstein coincided with the image of Wittgenstein that was accepted and widespread among philosophers reading and interpreting him in the 1950s and 1960s. In order to do so—that is, in order to understand the level of originality Paolozzi's meeting with Wittgenstein or of the possible mediation or conditioning by means of the then prevailing philosophical interpretations—it is necessary to retrace at least to some extent the history of Wittgenstein's reception in the twentieth century, which is far from linear.

However, the most relevant aim for this research is perhaps the second aspect of this reconstruction, which is based on Paolozzi's direct testimony and statements on the mode and spirit of his encounter with Wittgenstein.[2] As will be shown, Paolozzi never stopped highlighting what an impression the man Wittgenstein had made on him and how he was led to identify himself with some traits of the philosopher's life, disposition and lifestyle. Hence, in an excerpt of his famous interview with Richard Hamilton (Spencer 2000: 125–128), right after mentioning to the interviewer who questioned him about his relationship with Wittgenstein that he was struck by the "very slim book"—which was *A Memoir* by Norman Malcolm (1958)[3]—and by what is told "about this strange man, a tormented lonely man", Paolozzi added straight away in an epigraphic style that there might have been on his part a sort of identification with this strange, lonely and tormented man: "Here there might be a bit of identification" (Spencer 2000: 127–128).

However, for Paolozzi this identification was only an aspect of his relationship with Wittgenstein—and likely not the most important one. As a matter of fact, he never forgot that his encounter with the Austrian philosopher was first of all the meeting with a language and a philosophy—rather than with the philosopher's life—and that what really mattered wasn't what he felt for Wittgenstein, but—so to speak—the way Wittgenstein acted on his oeuvre. Hence, immediately after speaking of his identification with Wittgenstein, Paolozzi carried on by introducing an adversative particle ("but") and specifying "the key thing" is "the actual work":

> I think that for the first time I have a necessity to embrace some kind of language in relationship to the processes I'm involved with. And I find his is the most sympathetic language. Some people need, perhaps, Greenberg, I need Wittgenstein. (Spencer 2000: 128)

In conclusion, while Paolozzi had certainly identified himself to some extent and in some way with the man Wittgenstein, anyway—as an artist—he evidently needed the philosopher Wittgenstein and his language.

It goes without saying that this entire part of research is only justifiable—and this is the third and last aspect of the chapter—if it works as a prelude to a systematic analysis and close-up to the "Wittgensteinian" works of Paolozzi, especially—though not exclusively—to the series *As Is When*. The particular aim is to understand how much of these works is borrowed from Wittgenstein, but also what of Wittgenstein and which Wittgenstein lives and acts in them. In this chapter I will, of course, concentrate on the works of the 1960s,[4] as well as on the passages and places in Wittgenstein's writings that struck Paolozzi and "entered" his works in the form of titles, but especially as parts of the works themselves. Particularly, I shall try to demonstrate that Paolozzi was impressed by several Wittgensteinian passages that in the 1960s seemed rather enigmatic— if not at all odd—to readers of philosophical background. As will be shown, this is certainly true for two screenprints of *As Is When* that will be discussed thoroughly in the following pages: screenprint X, titled *The Spirit of Snake*; screenprint XI, which bears the title *He Must, So to Speak, Throw Away the Ladder*; eventually also screenprint IX, titled *Assembling Reminders for a Particular Purpose*, which will only be quoted briefly.

3   Wittgenstein and Paolozzi: "A Kind of Combined Autobiography"

It seems useful to start from various testimonies, which catch Paolozzi speaking of his encounter with Wittgenstein. According to the artist's own tale in an interview with William Lipke in 1966 (Spencer 2000: 147–150), he first acknowledged Wittgenstein in 1951, the year the Austrian philosopher died.[5] Indeed, by the end of that year the magazine *World Review* had published an article by Maurice Cranston devoted to Wittgenstein, which contained "a fair amount of biographical notes" (Spencer 2000: 147). However, this first encounter bore neither evident nor immediate fruits:

> It didn't look to me as though one could use a philosopher as a theme at that time. So I sort of pigeon-holed the idea, as one pigeon-holes ideas now that are to be used later on. (Spencer 2000: 147)

Again according to Paolozzi, the second stage of his itinerary towards Wittgenstein was reading an essay by Erich Heller (1959: 40–48) published as an English translation on the magazine *Encounter* (Paolozzi specifies 1956 as the publishing year, though it was instead 1959). The third stage, however, was undoubtedly the most relevant, marked by the reading of a small book, the aforementioned *A Memoir* by Malcolm:

> I think the thing that triggered me off was the 'Memoir' which I found devastatingly moving somehow. (Spencer 2000: 147)

As this interview clearly suggests, as well as the prior one with Hamilton does, Paolozzi was profoundly struck—I dare say, even seduced—by the man Wittgenstein, like so many did before and after the artist. In Paolozzi's case an important role was played by the discovery of a strong and deep consonance between events in his own life and others in the life of Wittgenstein. In some ways, Wittgenstein was a kind of mirror for Paolozzi, which reflected the artist's own image more distinctly and neatly. Hence, it comes to no surprise that he even confessed that through his works he intended to identify himself in Wittgenstein and eventually get to the composition of "a kind of combined autobiography" (Spencer 2000: 147).

What was it, though, in the life of Wittgenstein that struck Paolozzi and which similarities did he spot in his own life? Paolozzi puts several on the list[6]; for instance, Wittgenstein was like him a foreigner in England[7] and, again like him, sometimes mistrusted and even rejected the English establishment.[8] Paolozzi recalls for instance how Wittgenstein disliked Cambridge and the English academic lifestyle; and further the disgust he felt for the kind of professional philosophy that found his apical expression in *Mind*, the most famous—then and now—English philosophical journal. However, he also recalls that Wittgenstein, although of a rather strange and very rich Viennese family, chose to renounce his paternal inheritance after World War I and adhered to—as Paolozzi would strangely put it—"the doctrine of poverty" (Spencer 2000: 128). Paolozzi was also impressed by the fact that Wittgenstein had studied engineering in Manchester and that he got from there first to mathematics and then to logic. This becomes clear

when remembering how much Paolozzi—both in his life and works—was fascinated by machines, mechanic diagrams and mechanisms; he once even asserted, although with a good amount of irony, that of all the things he possibly liked of England there was "the aeronautical world, the world of the motor car" (Spencer 2000: 128).

Again resting upon the remembrances of Malcolm, Paolozzi recalled that Wittgenstein felt so disgusted after his lectures he needed to run to the cinema to contrast this feeling. Indeed, Malcolm wrote:

> Wittgenstein was always exhausted by his lectures. He was also revolted by them. He felt disgusted with what he had said and with himself. Often he would rush off to the cinema immediately after the class ended. […] He insisted on sitting in the very first row of seats, so that the screen would occupy his entire field of vision […]. He wished to become totally absorbed in the film no matter how trivial or artificial it was […]. He was fond of the film stars Carmen Miranda and Betty Hutton. Before he came to visit me in America he demanded in jest that I should introduce him to Miss Hutton. (Malcolm 1958: 26–27)[9]

There are at least two things to point out in this long quote that Paolozzi especially liked. The first one is that Wittgenstein would resort precisely to the "totally absorbed" spectator experience, in order to describe the difference between living inside an image and looking at it "from outside" as if it was something "lifeless and isolated":

> Let us imagine we are sitting in a darkened cinema and entering into the film. Now the lights are turned on, though the film continues on the screen. But suddenly we are outside it and see movements of light and dark patches on a screen. (Wittgenstein 1967: §233)

Paolozzi may hardly have known this; rather, it is plausible he was struck by Malcolm's final comments on Wittgenstein's cinematic preferences. Considering Paolozzi's intense and obsessive relationship with various media and materials of popular and mass culture, it isn't hard to imagine how he must have been fascinated in reading Malcolm's testimony at discovering that Wittgenstein's taste favoured—instead of

cultured cinema or art films[10]—popular films, American movies filmed for the general audience (especially *westerns* and *musicals*); or at discovering that—instead of reading *Mind*—Wittgenstein preferred by far reading *detective stories*, in particular the most "popular" ones published in the USA by Street & Smith (Malcolm 1958: 32–33).

This could further explain, at least to some extent, why Paolozzi in the aforementioned quote decided to differentiate his need of Wittgenstein with the necessity–by far more widespread at the beginning of the 1960s—that many artists and critics had as regards Greenberg. It goes without saying that Paolozzi didn't want to overturn—aided by Wittgenstein—the hierarchy instituted by Greenberg between *Avant-Garde and Kitsch*,[11] that is between art and popular culture; he rather intended to challenge—also by means of Wittgenstein—the very idea that such a hierarchy had to (or could) be traced.

As becomes now evident, as well as it was explicitly told by the artist to Hamilton and Lipke in the aforementioned interviews, the aspects that tie the life of Wittgenstein to Paolozzi's were well exploited in the twelve screenprints included in the portfolio *As Is When*—together with a few sculptures of the same period, especially the aluminium sculpture *Wittgenstein at Cassino* of 1963—thus contributing to set the draft of the eagerly wanted "combined autobiography". Urged by Lipke, Paolozzi explains for instance what in his own life linked him to *Wittgenstein at Cassino*:

> The sculpture called *Wittgenstein at Cassino* is my connection with him in the sense that my parents came from near Cassino, and he was a prisoner of war there; had written most of the *Tractatus*[12] by that time and had it in his knapsack. (Spencer 2000: 147)[13]

As regards *Wittgenstein at Cassino*, however, in the interview with Hamilton Paolozzi adds something that deserves to be highlighted: namely, that the title came after the work; that is, only after having accomplished the work he convinced himself—so to speak—to bestow the title *Wittgenstein at Cassino*:

> But sometimes, the title has come after the work, you know; for example, there are two sculptures called *Wittgenstein at Cassino*; I found that having made the sculpture, which was titleless, having read the life of Wittgenstein, that I wanted to identify myself with this particular man; and I found that the sculpture itself, which is symbolically a figure between two buildings, you know, in a sense, tied in for me completely and almost totally, with the idea of this particular man at this particular point in his life, which tied in with me, being at this particular point in my life. (Spencer 2000: 127)

Here Paolozzi is certainly trying to oppose the temptation to interpret his "Wittgensteinian" works as some sort of—more or less extemporaneous—illustrations of several episodes in Wittgenstein's biography. A sculpture such as *Wittgenstein at Cassino* is not *about* Wittgenstein at Cassino; it rather is the "place" where the life of the philosopher meets upon the artist's life and where these two lives somehow clarify each other.[14] The character "between two buildings" is Wittgenstein, but it is Paolozzi too, who felt like Wittgenstein trapped and suspended as a foreigner "between two buildings"—that is, between two languages, cultures, lifestyles.[15]

4   Paolozzi Reads Wittgenstein

In any case, what was the prevailing image of Wittgenstein in the period in which Paolozzi encounters his life and works? We may start with a text used by Paolozzi in 1967 from the London art and literature magazine *Ambit*.[16] The text I am referring to is part of a collage titled *Moonstrips-General Dynamic F.U.N.*, which is related to a set of two portfolios—one edited in 1967 (*Moonstrips Empire News*) and then the other one in 1970 (*General Dynamic F.U.N.*)—and was drawn from the aforementioned article by Cranston of 1951, which begins as follows:

> Ludwig Wittgenstein, who died in Cambridge last April, was probably the greatest of the twentieth-century philosophers, although he was quite unknown to the general public. (Paolozzi 1967: 8)[17]

This was certainly true in 1951, though one must add that Wittgenstein was then almost unknown not only to the general public, but even to the majority of professional philosophers; furthermore, many in Europe and outside Europe would have considered grossly exaggerated the statement that Wittgenstein likely was "the greatest of the twentieth-century philosophers"—although attenuated by the word "probably".

In the coming years, at the beginning of the 1960s, when Paolozzi worked on *Wittgenstein at Cassino*, on *The World Divides Itself into Facts* (another aluminium sculpture of 1963 titled after proposition 1.2 of the *Tractatus*) and on *As Is When*, things had changed, at least to some extent. In 1953 the *Philososophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein 1953) were published posthumously and in the following years his literary executors disseminated with due regularity several relevant texts from the philosopher's immense bequest.[18] In those same years a few monographs had appeared: for instance in 1958 the little sympathetic book by David Pole (1958) and in 1959 the important work on the *Tractatus* by Elisabeth Anscombe (1959),[19] his disciple and literary executor.[20] In all of these works there are—more or less explicitly—two dominant convictions, which would be contested only later on in the 1970s: (a) that there had been two distinct and counterposed Wittgensteins, the neopositivistic one of the *Tractatus* and the one of the *Investigations* who gave birth to the so-called "Ordinary Language Philosophy"; (b) that Wittgenstein was to be fully considered an English philosopher, although he was born in Vienna and insisted in writing in German.[21] Those who questioned this latter belief were indeed very few; among these outsiders was certainly Heller, foremost because of his birthplace, who in the English version of his essay—which Paolozzi had read—compared Wittgenstein to writers and intellectuals of Viennese and Habsburg tradition such as Robert Musil or Franz Kafka.

As far as we know, the writings of Wittgenstein that Paolozzi surely knew about and used were the *Tractatus*, the *Investigations* and the *Notebooks 1914–1916*; aside from the references to Cranston, Heller and Malcolm (plus von Wright, author of the *Biographical Sketch* included in the *Memoir* by Malcolm), Paolozzi didn't explicitly mention any of *The Blue and Brown Books,* the critical literature

on Wittgenstein.[22] In a way, one could say that Paolozzi's reading of Wittgenstein was direct or unsophisticated, meaning that he was not very conditioned by the running interpretations of his time. Hence, it is by no means a chance that he didn't feel obliged to chose between the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*: apparently, for Paolozzi and for his oeuvre they are "the same"; furthermore, it probably isn't an accident that Paolozzi always displayed Wittgenstein's texts not only in the English translation, but also in the original German version—except for screenprint I (*Artificial Sun*) and screenprint VIII (*Futurism at Lenabo*).[23] Hence, to the contrary of many English interpreters of his time, Paolozzi (almost) never forgot that Wittgenstein was not English and that English was neither his mother tongue nor the language of his philosophy.

Anyway, it probably was this direct or naive gaze that allowed Paolozzi to see things many readers—who were much more philosophically oriented (or conditioned)—did not see at the time. Some examples deserve to be listed. The first one concerns the aforementioned screenprint X, which bares—already in the title *The Spirit of Snake*—some of Wittgenstein's less English and much more Viennese writings. Indeed, Wittgenstein's annotations that Paolozzi registers on this screenprint date back to October 15, 1916,[24] and are to be intended as a sort of cut and thrust with Otto Weininger—specifically with the section *Animal Psychology* in the chapter on *Metaphysics* in his *On Last Things*, a book that Wittgenstein loved very much (Weininger 1912).[25] English readers of Paolozzi's time certainly didn't know that Weininger was so important to Wittgenstein,[26] as well as they surely ignored the existence of Weininger himself. It comes to no surprise, then, that these "strange" notes on snakes, lions, elephants, flies and wasps not only couldn't be understood, but probably were not even considered and thus analyzed. However, the debate with Weininger and his "theory of the human being as *microcosm*"[27] outlined in these pages of the *Notebooks* would later prove instrumental for the *Tractatus*. It certainly is a fact that—without Weininger—proposition 5.621: "The world and life are one", and particularly 5.63: "I am my world. (The microcosm)", wouldn't have been written; although the *Tractatus* would then reproach to Weininger himself (or also to Weininger) for not seeing "the solipsism, when its

implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism" (Wittgenstein 1921–1922: 5.64).[28] That Paolozzi perceived the relevance of this passage can be proved also by screenprint III (*Experience*), where he reported (in German on top and in English on the bottom margin) four annotations from *Notebooks 1914–1916* of November 9, 1916, of which the third one deals exactly with the aforementioned coincidence between solipsism (idealism) and realism: "All experience is world and does not need the subject" (Wittgenstein 1961: 89).[29]

Although he probably ignored this "Weiningerian" background, between the 19 annotations of October 15, 1916, Paolozzi chose by great intuition exactly those 5 annotations for his screenprint X, where Wittgenstein reminds us how misleading it might be to assert as an idealist (or solipsist) "that spirit of the snake […] is *your* spirit", if one doesn't immediately ask "why I have given a snake just this spirit" (Wittgenstein 1961: 85). If it is true that the spirit of the snake is my spirit, it is also true that the snake isn't—so to speak—something inert or indifferent. If I gave the snake this exact spirit, which is different from the one I gave or could give to the lion or the wasp, this happened because I recognized in the snake precisely something of myself, something of my spirit, which is different for instance from that which I could see of myself or of my spirit in the lion or the wasp.

Indeed, similar statements could be made about the encounter of the artist Paolozzi with the philosopher Wittgenstein: if Paolozzi projected himself in Wittgenstein, this happened exactly because he recognized in Wittgenstein himself or something of himself. This is probably the reason why only in screenprint X there is—on the bottom left side—Wittgenstein's face (the first time horizontally and the second time vertically); furthermore, it comes to no surprise that in this screenprint—made of rather dull colours and characterized by winding lines—accordance prevails on any oppositional tension (subject/world; world/experience; man/animal; open/closed).

The second example concerns screenprint XI, which borrows its title (*He Must, So to Speak, Throw Away the Ladder*) from proposition 6.54 of the *Tractatus*,[30] the latter being transcribed in its entirety on the left (in English) and right (in German) margin of the print. Both in the title and in the work the attention goes to that image of the ladder

which, once used, must be thrown away; an image with many ances-
tors, both ancient (e.g. the pirronian scepticism and the mystical tra-
dition) and modern, and that was used by thinkers that Wittgenstein
was well acquainted to, such as Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche
or Fritz Mauthner.[31] Certainly, it comes to no surprise that also Paolozzi
was attracted by this proposition, which impressed and even struck
many philosophers who found it as seductive as difficult to accept.
If the entire *Tractatus* really was nonsense, thus—as Ramsey ironi-
cally observed in 1929—we should "take seriously that it is nonsense,
and not pretend, as Wittgenstein does, that it is important nonsense"
(Ramsey 1990: 1). Nor should it anyway seem strange that such a cul-
turally strong image as the ladder succeeded in capturing the attention
of the artist Paolozzi.[32]

   In any case, over many decades proposition 6.54—together with the
equally famous proposition 7 ("What we cannot speak about we must
pass over in silence")—was confined among the oddities of a work
that, if it deserved to be read, this certainly wasn't the case for its final
paradox, but rather for its original ideas on the world as a "totality
of facts" or on thought as a "logical picture of facts" (Wittgenstein
1921–1922: 1.1 and 3) etc. The situation changed radically during
the 1990s, when a new generation of interpreters started arguing that
the key to the entire *Tractatus* was to be searched precisely in prop-
osition 6.54. Despite Ramsey's belief, according to these so-called
"neo-Wittgensteinian" interpreters Wittgenstein had never demanded
that the nonsense of the *Tractatus* be seen as a (philosophically)
important nonsense; on the contrary, he led us to understand that his
propositions—although they seem reasonable and appear to contain
essential truths about the world, about logic, etc.—are plainly nonsen-
sical: they are not propositions, even though they have its very appear-
ance.[33] The aim of all this is rather therapeutical: "[t]he experience of
coming to realise this [=that the propositions in question are plainly
nonsensical] should, Wittgenstein hopes, curb any subsequent urge
to philosophise" (Tejedor 2015: 3), where "to philosophize" means:
searching by means of philosophy, seen as a sort of super-science

(the likes of metaphysics), the kind of truth about the world, thought and language (we don't possess yet).

How does then screenprint XI fit into all of this? It appears to picture the moment, when the ladder is about to be thrown away; it isn't the ladder we climbed up anymore (or onto which we think we climbed up); however, it is still there—or even better—its parts are still there, which seem in a kind of vortex—like a jigsaw puzzle—trying to come together again and reforming that ladder we want to throw away. Hence, the ladder is not disposed off without resistance and its pieces in comforting colours stick out of a dark and rather inhospitable background. In a sense, screenprint XI persuades us to ask ourselves, whether it is really possible to throw away the ladder or, even, whether we actually want to dispose of it. Perhaps we are neither ever on the ladder nor beyond it, but at least—as philosophers and artists—we are constantly, that is *immer wieder,* throwing it away. This screenprint thus appears to define a transition and not a condition: we are always in the mode of "throwing away".

At this point, however, we might be led to think that what we see are not ladder pieces, but the ladder itself: a ladder that we cannot climb on and thus cannot dispose of; or maybe we may believe there never was a ladder; at a deeper glance, in fact, the pieces of this apparent game of joints cannot fit together. Be that as it may, what should be highlighted in this screenprint is how Palozzi comprehended, as an artist, the internal tension of proposition 6.54; he nearly glimpsed at what Wittgenstein would later observe in a paragraph of 1929—which Paolozzi couldn't possibly have known—and that almost appears as a link between the *Tractatus* and the subsequent *Investigations*:

I might say: if the place I want to reach could only be climbed up to by a ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place to which I really have to go is one that I must actually be at already. / Anything that can be reached with a ladder does not interest me. (Wittgenstein 1998: 10)

5   Paolozzi and Wittgenstein: "Almost a Kind of Happening"

In the often mentioned interview with Hamilton, right after enumerating several noteworthy aspects of Wittgenstein's biography, we know Paolozzi adds that, in any case, the most relevant thing to him is having found in Wittgenstein's language the answer to a necessity he had never felt before: "a necessity to embrace some kind of language in relationship to the processes I'm involved with" (Spencer 2000: 128). In its plain and strict sense this statement might refer to the use he made of Wittgenstein's writings by inserting excerpts from the *Notebooks 1914–1916*, the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* in the screenprints of *As Is When*. But this is exactly the point: how did he properly use them?

As I have shown, for Paolozzi these texts don't stand alone, that is prior to and outside of his works. While the screenprints of *As Is When* are not merely illustrating Wittgenstein's texts, even the latter must not be considered, so to speak, the artworks' philosophical ancestors. The screenprints, as well as the coeval "Wittgensteinian" sculptures, art not applications (whatever kind of they might be) of Wittgenstein's philosophy, nor did Paolozzi ever try to find in Wittgenstein a sort of philosophical legitimacy for his art. However, if Wittgenstein's texts are part of his works, because they are inscribed in them, the texts are not—so to speak—melted together as with the usual technique of collage. Hence, they are not turned into Paolozzi's language, but rather let Wittgenstein's language resonate in Paolozzi's work, whatsoever their origin: cut out from an edited book, as is the case of screenprint IV (*Reality*), or written in block letters along a stripe, like in screenprint I (*Artificial Sun*).[34] That is precisely why Wittgenstein's texts never access the centre of the work, but rather stay on its outskirts or at the margin. As Paolozzi mentioned, indeed, he discovered he could give his works "an extra edge […], by using Wittgenstein, connecting his language with each print" (Spencer 2000: 127). It is almost as if he bared in mind what Wittgenstein wrote in the *Tractatus* about the good and bad exercise of the will:

If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts – not what can be expressed by means of language. / In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole. (Wittgenstein 1921–1921: 6.43)

Henceforth, to Paolozzi Wittgenstein's language works like the good exercise of the will: it doesn't enter the work, but it helps the work growing "as a whole". For this very reason, when recalling Wittgenstein's language, Paolozzi doesn't contradict himself in asserting shortly after that: "when one is working, one is assembling a sculpture, that side by side with this activity, there is no flow of words which match this situation" (Spencer 2000: 127). This interpretation is clearly confirmed in those same years by the statement on his collaboration with Jim Dine and by the comparison he makes between Wittgenstein:

Maybe the word collaboration is really a kind of substitute or symbol for another state of things. An orthodox interpretation of the word collaboration, assumes that something is discussed at great length by two individuals; that decisions are made; that a plan is worked out. This, I don't think, was the case [with Jim Dine]. Rather, it was a kind of spontaneous human situation, almost a kind of happening. My own Wittgenstein work was really a kind of collaboration with Wittgenstein. (Spencer 2000: 150)

Here Paolozzi is apparently suggesting that, in a way, his "Wittgensteinian" works are both his works as well as Wittgenstein's; or, to curb this enthusiasm, they were born listening to Wittgenstein and, so to speak, sitting side by side.

Notes

1. As regards the complexity of the idea of influence, see Janik (2006: 11–21), where to find a comment on an annotation of Wittgenstein explaining in which way he had been influenced by a series of thinkers: "I think I have never *invented* a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by someone else & I have done no more than passionately take it up for

my work of clarification. That I show Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa have influenced me" (Wittgenstein 1998: 16).

2. Speaking of "encounter", of course I don't mean a real meeting, that—although theoretically possible (Wittgenstein died in 1951, when Paolozzi was 26 years old)—never happened, but an encounter with Wittgenstein's works and writings available at the time, which described his character and thought.

3. Paolozzi is here referencing the often-republished book by Norman Malcolm, friend, disciple and interpreter of Wittgenstein.

4. As regards later works referencing Wittgenstein the following should at least be mentioned: the 1994 collage (and various screenprints) titled *A Logical Picture of Facts Is a Thought (3) Tracatus '21–'22* . "Paolozzi took a portrait photograph of Wittgenstein and spliced it with other elements, including Greek and Aztec spiritual reliefs and the face of John Lennon. In a satisfying concordance with this procedure, Wittgenstein himself had experimented with photography, producing photographs of a composite nature, which overlaid an image of himself with that of his sisters" (Collins 2014: 217). The final reference is related to Wittgenstein's interest in the "composite portraiture" technique of Francis Galton (1812–1911).

5. Wittgenstein was born in Vienna on April 26, 1889, and died in Cambridge on April 29, 1951.

6. In this regard, see also Collins (2014: 148): "The more Paolozzi learned about him [Wittgenstein], the more he felt sympathetic to the man, such as his being a foreigner, his dislike of the Establishment, and his love of the cinema". Anyway, it is important to stress that even for Collins the relationship with Wittgenstein became truly relevant for Paolozzi in the early 1960s, when he convinced himself that "he could use a philosopher and his ideas as a theme in his work".

7. As shown before, even in the interview with Richard Hamilton Paolozzi insists on this point, that is the fact that Wittgenstein "was a foreigner" (Spencer 2000: 128). Of course, it should be noted that Paolozzi belonged to an Italian immigrant family, while Wittgenstein came from a very rich and high bourgeois family in Vienna and that he initially moved to England not for work, but for studying engineering in Manchester and later philosophy with Bertrand Russell at Trinity College in Cambridge. However, Paolozzi was not interested

in class differences, but rather in that sense of foreignness that makes people—be they rich or poor—plain foreigners. It might be of some interest that in Wittgenstein's opinion a philosopher is in himself or herself a foreigner: "The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas (*Denkgemeinde*). That is what makes him into a philosopher" (Wittgenstein 1967: §455).

8. According to Malcolm, Wittgenstein felt "a great distaste" not just for the English establishment, but even "for English culture and mental habits in general" (Malcolm 1958: 28).

9. This excerpt from Malcolm appears on the lower side of screenprint XII: *Wittgenstein at the Cinema Admires Betty Grable.*

10. "A foolish & naïve American film can in all its foolishness & *by means of* it be instructive. A fatuous, non-naïve [affected] English film can teach nothing. I have often drawn a lesson from a foolish American film" (Wittgenstein 1998: 65–66).

11. This is obviously the title of Greenberg's probably most famous essay (Greenberg 1939).

12. Imprisoned on the Italian front in November 1918, after being kept in Verona and later Como, Wittgenstein was eventually sent to prison camp at Cassino in January 1919; he stayed until August of that same year. On this period see McGuinness (1988: 267–277). Paolozzi's remark that in this period Wittgenstein "had written most of the *Tractatus*" is misleading, because the *Tractatu*s was substantially finished in August 1918.

13. It might be of some interest that the reference to Cassino returns in three sculptures (in bronze) titled *The Manuscript of Monte Cassino* (1991) and commissioned by the City of Edinburgh, which are placed on Picardy Place in front of the Metropolitan Cathedral of St. Mary, a place linked with Paolozzi's childhood. Explaining the reasons for the Latin text (it is a text of an anonymous author sent to Paul the Deacon, the Benedictine monk of the eighth century A.D. who wrote the *Historia Langobardorum*) running alongside the three sculptures (the foot, the ankle and a big hand) Paolozzi noted that this text should serve as "a double link between the Cathedral and the origins of not only my father and grandfather but to many Italians who came from these regions to make Scotland their home" (Spencer 2000: 321–322); see also Collins (2014: 260–261).

14. In fact, these considerations on the relationship between works and titles are coherent with Paolozzi's later statement about the strange tendency "to find a connection between the title and the object" (Spencer 2000: 147).

15. It cannot be excluded that—in enclosing the character in-between two buildings—Paolozzi was thinking of a then uncontested belief, which is that there had been—so to speak—two philosophically different Wittgensteins: a "first" Wittgenstein, the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921–1921), and a "second" Wittgenstein, the author of the *Philosophical Investigations* (published posthumously in 1953).

16. As recalled by David Brittain, Paolozzi's contribute to *Ambit* "took the form of a series of ambitious collages that sought to fuse two of these two passions—image-making and literature—into a new form: 'visual literature'" (Brittain 2009: 4).

17. One shouldn't forget that during his life Wittgensetin published only the *Tractatus* and just a few other short texts and that what was known of his philosophical activity after the *Tractatus* derived from his teaching and from several dictations circulating as typewritten documents among his disciples and friends.

18. In 1956 the first edition of *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (Oxford: Blackwell); then in 1958 *The Blue and Brown Books* (Oxford: Blackwell), which will originate the essay by Erich Heller recalled by Paolozzi in his interviews; in 1961 a new translation of the *Tractatus*, which was the translation adopted by Paolozzi; again in 1961 the *Notebooks 1914–1916* (Oxford: Blackwell).

19. This work is still read and discussed today.

20. Other monographs published in the same period are: Stenius, E. 1960. *Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (Oxford: Blackwell), a work that introduces the long series of kantian interpretations of Wittgenstein; Griffin, J. 1964. *Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Pitcher, G. 1964. *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall); Black, M. 1964. *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

21. As a matter of fact, by no chance Wittgenstein received nonchalantly an ample chapter in one of the most widespread histories of English philosophy of the twentieth century: Warnock, G. J. 1958. *English Philosophy Since 1900*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

22. Although there is a paragraph of his interview with Hamilton where Paolozzi points out he know about books being published "which are trying to assess and criticize Wittgenstein; this is the very latest literature on philosophy which is concerned with attacks on Wittgenstein, which makes it pretty up to the minute, I would think…" (Spencer 2000: 128). It's almost certain that Paolozzi is referring to Gellner, E. 1959. *Words and Things: A Critical Account of Linguistic Philosophy and a Study in Ideology*. London: Gollancz, a book that became famous exactly because of its attack against Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language Philosophy or, as Gellner preferred to name it, "Linguistic Philosophy".

23. This is true for the following screenprints: III (*Experience*), IV (*Reality*), IX (*Assembling Reminders for a Particular Purpose*), X (*The Spirit of Snake*), XI (*He Must, So to Speak, Throw Away the Ladder*).

24. On the margin of the screenprint Paolozzi displays the original German version and the English translation of the following of Wittgenstein's annotations, which are here reported in the English translation: "Only remember that the spirit of the snake, of the lion, is *your* spirit. For it is only from yourself that you are acquainted with spirit at all. / Now of course the question is why I have given a snake just this spirit. / And the answer to this can only lie in the psycho-physical parallelism: If I were to look like the snake and to do what it does then I should be such-and-such. / The same with the elephant, with the fly, with the wasp. / But the question arises whether even here, my body is not on the same level with that of the wasp and of the snake (and surely it is so), so that I have neither inferred from that of the wasp to mine nor from mine to that of the wasp" (Wittgenstein 1961: 85).

25. For the English translation by S. Burns see Weininger, O. 2001. *On Last Things*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press. That this text was particularly dear to Wittgenstein can be deduced by a letter to his older sister Hermine of November 18, 1916, which can be read in Wittgenstein (1996). In the 1960s little was known about the relationship between Weininger and Wittgenstein, nor was the connection thus evident between various annotations of the *Notebooks* and several pages from Weininger. As regards the relationship between Wittgenstein and Weininger see Stern and Szabados (2004), especially about this point the essay by Stern: Weininger and Wittgenstein on "Animal Psychology": 169–197.

26. In the mentioned annotation of 1931 Wittgenstein puts Weininger at the eighth place (the order is probably chronological) in the list of thinkers that influenced him and helped him in his "work of clarification" (Wittgenstein 1998: 16).

27. "The fundamental thought and the presupposition of the book, the basis on which rests *all* that follows, is the theory of the human being as *microcosm*. Because the human being stands in relation to all things in the world, so all these things must surely exist in him. This thought about the microcosm is being taken seriously for the first time in this book: *according to it, the system of the world is identical with the system of humankind*" (Weininger 2001: 96). According to Weininger, all of this "is entirely in harmony with the thesis of all philosophical idealism, that in the objects of the external world we only have appearance before us, and not 'things in themselves'" (Weininger 2001: 97).

28. It is a proposition forestalled precisely in the annotations of October 20, 1916: "This is the way I have travelled: Idealism singles men out from the world as unique, solipsism singles me alone out, and at last I see that I too belong with the rest of the world, and so on the one side *nothing* is left over, and on the other side, *the world*. In this way idealism leads to realism if it is strictly thought out" (Wittgenstein 1961: 86).

29. The other annotations reproduced on screenprint III are: "Is belief a kind of experience? Is thought a kind of experience? […] The act of will is not an experience". This screenprint, which is very articulated and appears like a big mechanism composed of many other mechanism, reminds us in an irresistible manner of the following passage in the *Blue Book*: "It is misleading […] to talk of thinking as of a 'mental activity'. We may say that thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs" (Wittgenstein 1958: 6).

30. "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up on it.) / He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright" (Wittgenstein 1921–1921: 6.54).

31. Allow me, please, to refer about all this to Perissinotto (2008: 149–169).

32. Paolozzi certainly wasn't the only artist who was inspired by proposition 6.54 and to the image of the ladder, which is contained in it.

33. Taking proposition 6.54 of the *Tractatus* seriously or literally is an attitude belonging to so called "resolute" or "neo-Wittgensteinian" interpretations of the *Tractatus*, which see in Cora Diamond and James Conant two of the most influent representatives. See in this regards for instance the essays collected in Crary and Read (2000).

34. Screenprint I (*Artificial Sun*) bares in the lower side, only in its English translation, the first proposition of the *Tractatus*: "The world is all that is the case", written in block letters and followed by the indication (again in block letters) "Tractatus logico-philosophicus Ludwig Wittgenstein"; while the fourth screenprint (*Reality*) includes even eight printed propositions of the *Tractatus* (in the original German version on top left and in the English translation by Pears and McGuinness on the bottom left): 2.063: "The sum-total of reality is the world"; 2.1: "We picture facts to ourselves"; 2.11: "A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of state of affairs"; 2.12: "A picture is a model of reality"; 2.13: "In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them"; 2.131: "In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects"; 2.14: "What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way"; 2.141: "A picture is a fact". Screenprint XI, as we know, bares proposition 6.54.

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7

"Ragged" Perception in Eduardo Paolozzi's Figures from the 1950s

Rachel Stratton

1   Introduction

"Some people need, perhaps, Greenberg, I need Wittgenstein" (Paolozzi 1964). This claim, made by Eduardo Paolozzi in an interview with Richard Hamilton, affirms Paolozzi's deference to the philosopher. By the mid-1960s Clement Greenberg had consolidated his hegemony over Modern art criticism and his concern for a pure engagement with the medium continued to set the agenda for abstract painting in the USA and in Britain. Paolozzi, in likening his reliance on Wittgenstein to Greenberg's autocracy over contemporary art, emphasized the primacy of language and language games to his artistic process and downplayed purely formal concerns. Paolozzi's assertive desire to establish a new "grammar of forms" (Paolozzi 1958) corroborates the conception of his art as language. While the interview with Hamilton was conducted around the famed series of screen prints *As is When* from 1964,

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Paolozzi's lifelong intellectual affair with Wittgenstein began as early as 1951 (Paolozzi 1966). Yet Wittgenstein's impact on Paolozzi's oeuvre from this formative decade of his career remains obscure, only subject to scholarly attention at the point he began explicitly referencing the philosopher in the *As Is When* series.

The three examples I will go on to discuss—*The Return* (c.1952) (Fig. 1); *AG5* (1958) (Fig. 2) and a page from the journal *Uppercase* (1958), showing four photographs of Paolozzi's sculptures (Fig. 3)— all reflect the artist's epistemological concerns to produce intertextual object-essays that brought together disparate elements from mass-media, industrial machinery and technology. These examples convey Paolozzi's obsession with depicting the lone figure and reflect Lawrence Alloway's description of the artist's "consuming interest in the psychological and physiological limits of man" (Alloway 1956: 133), which had been tested to breaking point by the horrors of the Second World War. Paolozzi's engaged study of Wittgenstein and his philosophy of language also speak to Alloway's assertion, demonstrating the artist's experiments with the point at which meaning is forged and broken in the perceptual process.

All three examples illustrate Paolozzi's dedication to the collage process, which he honed while in Paris between 1947 and 1949. Here, he had rubbed shoulders with the great and the good of the French Surrealists and witnessed first-hand a fractious group struggling to assert itself after the tumult of the Second World War. He returned to the vibrant intellectual and artistic community that circulated around the Institute of Contemporary Arts, where a young generation gravitated with shared concern for a visual culture that reflected contemporary society. Paolozzi brought back with him important lessons from his Surrealist mentors and began experimenting with collage as a synchronic mode of thinking and constructing meaning. Guided by conceptual rather than aesthetic concerns, he and his peers set out to disrupt the perceived metaphysics of their artistic nemesis Herbert Read (Banham 1960).

Fig. 1 Eduardo Paolozzi, *The Return*, 1952, Collage, pencil and gouache, 33 × 25.5 cm (Jonathan Clark Fine Art. ©2017 Jonathan Clark & Co)

Fig. 2 Eduardo Paolozzi, *AG5*, 1958, Bronze, $103 \times 82 \times 32$ cm (Leeds Museums and Galleries (Leeds Art Gallery) UK/Bridgman Images. ©Trustees of the Paolozzi Foundation, Licensed by DACS 2018)

Fig. 3   Theo Crosby, pages from *Uppercase* journal, 1958, printed ink on paper (British Library Collection. ©Trustees of the Paolozzi Foundation, Licensed by DACS 2018)

2   The Concept of Seeing

The posthumous publication in English of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* in 1953 (Wittgenstein 1953) sparked a resurgence of interest in the philosopher, among artists, critics and writers in Britain. Wittgenstein had become a figure shrouded in mystery, having retreated from public life soon after publishing his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in 1921 (Wittgenstein 1922). In the remaining thirty years of his life, he became increasingly critical of academic and political establishments and adopted a hermetic lifestyle, which afforded him a Romantic status among the young generation of cultural producers to which Paolozzi belonged. They looked to a new order, away from the stuffy academism

of Oxford and Cambridge Universities, more in keeping with that of C. P. Snow's "Two Cultures" (Snow 1959). Wittgenstein's later work provided a philosophical grounding that shifted the analytical tradition of British philosophy away from rigid logic and prioritized context-specific language use, thus it contributed to the theoretical agenda of Paolozzi and his milieu.

The *Philosophical Investigations* were widely reviewed in the popular press and garnered attention in journals read by Paolozzi throughout the 1950s.[1] Given that the artist claimed an interest in Wittgenstein from 1951, discussions of the philosopher's late and completely different publication would certainly have been on his radar. A young Richard Wollheim wrote an extensive review for the *New Statesman and Nation* in July 1953, in which he described the *Philosophical Investigations* as "a strange brilliant work, a book that will always be one of the great curiosities in the literature of philosophy" (Wollheim 1953: 20–21). Later in the decade, two surveys of Wittgenstein were published in *The Listener* (Anonymous 1957) and (Heller 1960), commending the *Philosophical Investigations* as an "exciting" contribution from the "greatest philosopher of this century" (Anonymous 1957). Wittgenstein's two publications were also discussed at length in a BBC radio broadcast in 1960 (Third Programme 1960).

By 1951, when Paolozzi became interested in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Wittgenstein 1922) he was already experimenting with a linguistic approach to composition, as evinced by the fragmented structure of *The Return* (c.1952). Characteristic of his collages made from covers of *Time* magazine, the assemblage of personalities resembled visual quiz games published in popular magazines (Kitnik 2012: 34). The playful tone undermines the highly fraught politics being played out by these Cold War figureheads and the denial of their individual identity serves to subvert their macho politics. The figure is discombobulated and difficult to cohere into a single form. It disrupts attempts to organize the sense data into a single object that can easily be identified using language. *The Return* foreshadows Paolozzi's subsequent experiments with language, meaning and perception, and thus makes Wittgenstein's discussion of the concept of seeing (Wittgenstein 1953:

196–203) in the *Philosophical Investigations* particularly pertinent to discussions of his oeuvre in the 1950s.

Wittgenstein's discussion of how language and perception interact resonates with the experiment Paolozzi carried out in *The Return*, to discern with the point of perceptual entropy. Wittgenstein highlighted the insufficiency of the verb "to see" to describe the multitude of complex cognitive and imaginative processes involved in our different uses of the word (Good 2006). To "see" something, he suggested, connotes differently from describing "what is seen", or "seeing [something] as" another thing (Wittgenstein 1953: 199–203), particularly in the last example, where the process is guided by memory, as much as the organizing of sense data on the retina. In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein described the concept of seeing as a "tangled impression" (Wittgenstein 1953: 200), describing the act of looking at a landscape as a dynamic and subjective process:

> […] my gaze ranges over it, I see all sorts of distinct and indistinct movement; *this* impresses itself sharply on me, *that* is quite hazy. After all, how completely ragged what we see can appear. (Wittgenstein 1953: 200)

Paolozzi also appears to have been playing with the ragged nature of visual perception in *The Return* by employing a compositional structure that resisted the viewer's attempts to unify the image into a *gestalt*. He transforms the process of seeing into a battleground between the individual parts and the whole. For the contemporary viewer, the fragments of these celebrity faces sparked visual recollections that pushed some fragments to the foreground of the visual impression, as Wittgenstein described (Wittgenstein 1953: 200), however in this case the effect is entropic rather than unifying. The striations that bisect the face in a double axis through the centre of the page further disrupt attempts at cohesion.

The Return coincided with Paolozzi's appointment as a technician in the Textiles department at the Central School, where he met the psychologist and art writer, Anton Ehrenzweig (Williamson 2015). The two struck up an intellectual exchange that had a significant

impact on Paolozzi's thinking and practice in the early 1950s. They shared a passion for Wittgenstein's philosophy, and Paolozzi's copies of the philosopher's texts were later found in Ehrenzweig's library (Williamson 2015: 60). Another mutual interest was *Gestalt* psychology, which Wittgenstein also looked to in elucidating the concept of seeing (Wittgenstein 1953). The fact that Paolozzi was engaging with Wittgensteinian philosophy alongside *Gestalt* psychology further recommends the concept of seeing as a particularly relevant section of the *Philosophical Investigations* for the artist.

What the *Time Head* collages show is that when Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* became accessible to Paolozzi in 1953, the artist approached it with similar concerns about the subjectivity of human perception. From 1953, Paolozzi's work demonstrates less of the political satire exemplified by *The Return* and almost exclusively consist of amorphous figural sculptures, which I suggest convey his Wittgensteinian approach to language. *AG5* (1958) typifies the ambiguous, irregular forms of Paolozzi's figural sculptures from the 1950s. Although the silhouette unmistakably signifies as a bust, the viewer is forgiven for allowing other associations to enter their appreciation of the object. Alloway celebrated this ambiguity by claiming, in the commentary to Paolozzi's *The Metallization of a Dream*, that Paolozzi's sculptures held "inexhaustible meaning" (Paolozzi 1963: 49), which likened his figural forms to "a planet, an asteroid, a stone [or] a blob under a microscope" (Alloway 1956: 133); their plural meanings making them apt symbols for an age of technological possibility.

3   Family Resemblances and Aspect Perception

Paolozzi's multivalent visual language had its counterpart in Wittgenstein's emphasis on the imprecision of language in common usage (Wittgenstein 1953: 200). According to contemporary reviewers, the imprecise nature of language and Wittgenstein's conventionalist ideas about truth formed the principle thesis of the publication. Wollheim's review from 1953, for example, described the presentation

of language in the *Philosophical Investigations* as "necessarily imprecise" and "amorphous" emphasizing that there is no one "criterion for meaning" (Wollheim 1953: 21). Rather, the *Investigations* made the claim that language gained meaning through usage and only by drawing out the "family resemblances" between the different "senses" of a word or sentence could the meaning of language be understood (Wollheim 1953: 21). Paolozzi's experiments with figural forms throughout the 1950s points to a parallel agenda.

The "grammar of forms" (Paolozzi 1958) that Paolozzi began constructing in the 1950s adopted this idea of gaining meaning through analogy and resemblance. In a double-page spread published alongside Paolozzi's essay in *Uppercase* 1 (Crosby 1958), Theo Crosby the editor of the journal, placed four of the artist's figural sculptures side by side, allowing the edges of the photographs to form a natural frame around each (Fig. 3). The bold graphic design invites recognition of the works as a group rather than as individual entities and encourages comparison between them. While the two works on the outside are photographed in the style used by museums, as though floating in emptiness, the central pair is presented in outdoor settings, the only indicator that the works exist in the round. The white backgrounds of the outer pair invite contemplation of the roughly moulded surfaces and articles of old machinery frozen into the bronze by the lost wax method, while the central figures dialogue with their surroundings. In the photograph on the inner right, the irregular surface of the sculpture is brought out by the rhythmic pattern of the brick wall behind it, the orderliness of which is, in turn, echoed by the punctuated linearity of the four pieces. The works play off of one another, drawing out aspects of similarity and difference, particularly in stance and surface texture. Crosby's design deliberately brought out these "family resemblances" (Wollheim 1953: 21), placing the artworks within a system where meaning was imbued through relation.

The images in *Uppercase* conversed with the text they accompanied, inviting readers to consider the sculptures as multivalent forms that morphed and shifted according to their context. Paolozzi described poetically his "preoccupation with the metamorphosis of the figure" (Paolozzi 1958: unpaginated):

> That is a CRACKED COLUMN resembling a PETRIFIED TOWER
> DISINTEGRATING FIGURE with a SHATTERED HEAD
> a CRACKED TOWER like a SHATTERED FIGURE
> the METAMORPHOSIS OF A COLUMN INTO A FIGURE
> INTO A TOWER A MAZE OF PARTS AND PERSONS
> like an avant garde POWER PLANT. (Paolozzi 1958: unpaginated)

The rhythmic repetition of Paolozzi's block-like, vertical forms echo the colonnade he referred to in the text and the framed edges of the photographs emphasize the angularity of the group, reinforcing their architectonic qualities.

Paolozzi's illustrated essay in *Uppercase* (Paolozzi 1958) indicates his commitment to fostering imaginative metamorphosis through the visual language of art. The ambiguous definition of his sculptural forms along with Crosby's design layout and the text itself, prompted the reader-viewer to consider the works in multiple, shifting contexts—as a figure, a column, a tower, a power-plant and so forth—putting into effect a process of imaginative metamorphosis. Paolozzi's open sculptural forms offered a visual language that amassed multiple associations and celebrated pluralism, providing a counterpoint to the absolute identity of nouns in verbal and written language structure (Korzybski 1933). Works such as *AG5* require constellations of descriptive nouns to capture the subject, but even Alloway's list is insufficient to fully explicate the work.

Paolozzi's figural sculptures visually manifest Wittgenstein's discussion of aspect perception by exploring the role of the imagination in the process of seeing. In the famous duck-rabbit illusion (Wittgenstein 1953: 199), the stimulus remains the same but what one "sees" alters depending on the viewer's aspect. In Wittgenstein's view, "seeing as" or aspect perception differed from normal "seeing" because it privileged human will. He wrote that, unlike plain seeing, "seeing an aspect and imagining are subject to the will" (Wittgenstein 1953: 213e) and, consequently, they had the capacity to reveal uniquely human qualities and shed light on human drives, desires and behaviours. This was the crux of the matter for both Wittgenstein and Paolozzi. The open "grammar of forms" (Paolozzi 1958: unpaginated) in *AG5* and in the images from

Uppercase, invest the power of meaning construction to the viewer's imagination, encouraging a stream of metaphoric and associative meanings to arise.

4   Perception and Identity

Wittgenstein's interest in the role of will in the perceptual process and Paolozzi's visual experiments in this arena, reflect a prominent area of psychological research in the late 1940s and the 1950s. As an avid reader of *Scientific American* and other similar journals (Paolozzi 1965: 138) Paolozzi kept abreast of the latest research in perceptual psychology. Contemporary studies claimed that visual perception offered an illuminating gateway to human functioning, because it was guided by learned and inherited behaviour (The Dartmouth Eye Institute 1945). For artists and writers of this post-war period, these findings were of social import, as they implied that conditioned perception could alter human behaviour. One high profile study from The Dartmouth Eye Institute boldly claimed that their perceptual studies aided "personal and group readjustment in a rapidly changing world" (The Dartmouth Eye Institute 1945: 7) which ultimately contributed to the future of democracy. They hypothesized that visual perception was the key to training individuals in creative and imaginative ways of thinking, which ultimately strengthened the Western democratic structure from the bottom up (The Dartmouth Eye Institute 1945). This utopian idea relied on visual language that actively engaged viewer perception and encouraged creativity through open forms and relative compositional structures.

The "grammar of forms" (Paolozzi 1958: unpaginated) that Paolozzi drew from in the 1950s betrays this didactic purpose, as his open and amorphous figures invite analogy and metaphor. The mind must abstract from the materiality of the bronze object to "see" *AG5* as a rock or a planet and hold multiple associations simultaneously. In *AG5*, as in the four sculptures reproduced in *Uppercase*, the viewer's experiences and memories are brought to bear, particularly where facial features begin to emerge from the shadowy crevices of the roughly moulded surfaces.

This, which Wittgenstein described as the "dawning of an aspect" (Wittgenstein 1953: 193) is imagination imposing its will to anthropomorphize, imbuing personality and life into the figures to increase their emotive potential. Wittgenstein claimed that perceiving facial expressions revealed much about the perceiver's own emotional state and experience. The face, he claimed was "the picture of the soul" (Wittgenstein 1953: 178) and where facial expression was ambiguous, as in Paolozzi's works, the imaginative will fill in the gaps. To that end, viewing Paolozzi's sculptures became an exercise about discovering one's own and group identity.

Wittgenstein's philosophies yielded a variety of conceptual implications for Paolozzi at different points in his long career. The three examples discussed illustrate that in the 1950s Paolozzi was particularly experimenting with a visual language that refused singular categorization and attained meaning through "family resemblances" (Wittgenstein 1953: 65–67). I have argued here that the publicity surrounding the publication of the *Philosophical Investigations* in 1953 made this late work particularly significant to Paolozzi's 1950s oeuvre. In Wittgenstein's discussions about perceptual experience, the artist found a theoretical framework to support his early visual experiments, paving the way for the complex dialogue between artist and philosopher that played out in his *As is When* series (1964).

Note

1. The critic David Sylvester collected contemporary reviews of the *Philosophical Investigations*. These are now in the Archives at Tate Britain: David Sylvester Collection, TGA 200816/4/4/20.

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Poetic Metaphor: Paolozzi's Animated Films and Their Relation to Wittgenstein

Stefanie Stallschus

1   Premise

Paolozzi was a passionate moviegoer. He saw his ongoing engagement with cinema as part of his visual education. Besides popular cinema, he was also interested in film history, especially science fiction film and the film experiments of the early Avant-garde. It is not surprising, therefore, that his work contains numerous iconographic allusions to cinema. Furthermore, he was fascinated by the formal principle of montage and its ability to create associations between heterogeneous elements. This led Martin Kemp to discuss Paolozzi's use of montage in the context of the ancient tradition of mnemotechnics: according to Kemp, cinema for Paolozzi operated like a "memory theatre" in which knowledge is staged and translated into living memory (Kemp 1996: 101).

Even more concrete, however, is the reference to cinema in his films. Paolozzi produced several films in which he found a way to stage

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imagery that arose out of his interest in popular culture.[1] While these films were too "inaccessible" to become a popular success in their own right, Paolozzi often screened them to accompany his exhibitions. For the artist, they played an important role in the theoretical clarification of his conception of art, which was based on the appropriation and transformation of well-known images from visual culture.

For this process of clarification, the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, particularly his picture theory, became an important point of reference. Biographical parallels may have played a further role in Paolozzi's interest. There is no longer any doubt, however, that Paolozzi looked closely at the available texts of the philosopher, and discussed them in detail with art theorist Anton Ehrenzweig (Williamson 2015: 60, 90). In the following chapter, I will examine Paolozzi's specific interest in Wittgenstein's philosophy in relation to the artist's animated films and his practice of poetic metaphor. In this way, Paolozzi provided an artistic interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy that focuses on the dynamics and the intermediality of the image.

2   Dynamic Pictures in the Film *History of Nothing*

Paolozzi was an enthusiastic collector with an inexhaustible passion for popular culture. According to the artist, he had already started collecting advertising images as a child. In the end, his private collection of pop culture contained more than 40,000 items (van der Wateren 1989). It included not only printed materials, such as magazines, comics, and posters, but also three-dimensional objects, such as dolls, model airplanes, masks, and much more. Items from this collection, whether images or objects, were used like modules or prefabricated components that were combined by the artist to form larger compositions. Once these modules had been discovered, they could be repeatedly reused in new contexts. This method was developed very early on in the collages for his scrapbooks and later applied to exhibitions, sculptures, films, poetry, and other media. Modular construction was a common topic in the post-war period; for Paolozzi, however, it was a way of mediating

between art and popular culture. It enabled him to bring together a wide range of phenomena and to create ever-changing relations and associations.

Between 1960 and 1962, Paolozzi took up a teaching post at the Hochschule für bildende Künste in Hamburg, where he initially taught a course in early Avant-garde art, with a focus on Surrealism. For the practical part of the course, he bought a large number of old German books containing striking illustrations, which he and his students used to experiment with various collage methods. Paolozzi, for his part, produced a series of collages on paper, which formed the basis of the animated film *History of Nothing*.[2] For the production of this film, he collaborated with the student Denis Postle in London. The finished film was shown as part of the final student exhibition in Hamburg in May 1962.

The collages used in the film feature bizarre combinations of human and technological elements. Thematically, the film explores technological development, its influence on everyday life and aesthetic experience. The effect is sometimes comical (when an apparatus is decorated with curious anthropomorphic details), sometimes uncanny (when a machine merges with a bourgeois living room). More than once, one sees the motif of a mirror reflecting strange human–mechanical hybrids. Such images raise questions about the effect of technology on our conception of self. This is a familiar topos in science fiction literature, but here it is de-familiarized through the use of historical elements from the turn of the century (resulting in an unusual mixture of past and future), so that the work acts as a kind of postmodern reinterpretation of this topos.

Paolozzi described the film as a homage to Surrealism. Here, he may have been thinking of Fernand Léger's film *Ballet mécanique*, which had made a deep impression on him during a stay in Paris at the end of the 1940s. In both films, there is a similar use of fragmentation and close-up, even though the visual source material in each film is different. The frequent use of close-ups is an important stylistic device in Paolozzi's film; it is used to heighten the uncanny effect of the coming-to-life of the machines that was already suggested in the collages. Despite its simplicity, the animation technique is extremely effective.

The camera travels over the individual sheets, zooming into the image, and presenting the details one after the other to create rhythmic sequences. Crucial to the effect of these sequences is also the soundtrack consisting of noises and expressive music that suggests movement in the images. Thus, the sound of an engine evokes an airplane circling in the sky, while the quick metallic rhythm of a xylophone suggests the movement of mechanical apparatuses. It is as if these strange machines had been liberated from their usual function and assumed an autonomous life of their own.

In this way, the film, by guiding the viewer through a sequence of images, simultaneously guides the viewer in his or her own reception of the presented images. It does this, on the one hand, by training the viewer's perception for the different levels of meaning generated by the imagery through processes of re-contextualization. This leads to a number of semantic shifts—when for example a machine takes on the appearance of a face, a city takes on the appearance of a mechanical system, or a machine takes on the appearance of a human figure. On the other hand, the film sensitizes the viewer to the multiple coding resulting from the hybridization of different symbol systems. Here, Paolozzi presents pictures as dynamic phenomena whose meaning varies depending on their use and context.

In this regard, Paolozzi's interest in shifts in meaning and other semantic operations can be related to Wittgenstein's much-discussed remarks on aspect-seeing, that is, the sudden noticing of a certain aspect of an object that had not initially been perceived. This kind of perceptual experience was dealt with extensively by Wittgenstein in a passage of his *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein 1967: 193–229). Here, the philosopher initially turns his attention to an everyday phenomenon: the perception of similarities in different faces—once the similarity has been discovered, once a new aspect emerges, the same image is perceived differently: "I call this experience 'noticing an aspect'" (Wittgenstein 1967: 193). Aspect-seeing, for Wittgenstein, is closely related to the "experience of meaning", since in both cases the same thing can be understood in different ways (Wittgenstein 1967: 214). He thus talks about "seeing something as something", and notes that "something is conceived in one way or another"

(Wittgenstein 1967: 175, 213). Such experiences of changes in aspect are significant aesthetically as they increase complexity in the perception of an object and provoke meta-reflections on the perception of the image (Lüthy 2012).

Paolozzi's film was a kind of art experiment, and even a clarification of his understanding of pictures. It was therefore of central importance to Paolozzi, and he repeatedly returned to it. First, he made several prints that explicitly refer to it. His two artist's books from the early 1960s contain several pages of description of the project, along with the shooting script and various stills. In addition, he used documentation of the project as a way of presenting his work to the public (Paolozzi 1964: np (6)).

The film gradually acquired a programmatic importance for Paolozzi because its associative use of images had developed into an artistic strategy. This can be seen clearly in the artist's book *Metafisikal Translations*, which presents a notation of the film prominently on the first few pages (Paolozzi 1962: np (4–9)). The book was produced six months after the film in a screen-printing process, and several parallels can be drawn between the two projects. For instance, motifs from the Hamburg collages also appear in it—although the theme has now shifted to the machine as an aesthetic object. The film is presented on three double pages, including the shooting script, several strips of film, and the texts "Notes on the Film", and "Comment". Subsequently, a full-page photographic screen print of a woman and a robot serves as a transition to the book's main section in which images alternate with individually stamped texts.

What is special about the film texts is their fragmentary style, further emphasized by the white breaks in the letters. By interrupting the flow of reading (and by leaving space for individual interpretation), the gaps between these fragments of text resemble the abrupt cuts in the film. The reference to the film at the beginning of the book is probably intended to prepare the reader to look at the text in a non-traditional way. As with filmic perception, the reader should be ready for rapid changes and semantic shifts resulting from the order of the text fragments. Even the title, *Metafisikal Translations*, makes clear that this book is about a process of translation—from one text to another,

or from one medium to another. The book marks an important turning point because it was during this period that writing became increasingly important to Paolozzi. Nevertheless, he dealt with language in a manner very similar to the way he had experimented with images: by combining fragments so that their contents could be seen and interpreted differently.

In a 1966 interview, when asked what led him to work with film, Paolozzi replied: "I'm only using what other people call art as trying to find some system of poetry, or what other people might call poetic metaphor" (Paolozzi 1966: 148). With the concept of "poetic metaphor", Paolozzi is referring to a recently published philosophical study by Marcus B. Hester, who drew a parallel between the visual aspect-seeing of Wittgenstein and metaphorical aspect-seeing in the arts (Hester 1964, 1966). With metaphor, Paolozzi identified a central theme of his own practice: his aim to work with systems of relation between heterogeneous objects. Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-seeing, which draw so strongly on visual phenomena, while also creating a link to language, must have been of particular interest to Paolozzi, since it was precisely in this period that he began to look more closely at the poetic space between image, language, and music, for which film would become a useful tool.

3   Intermediality in the Film *Kakafon Kakkoon*

Paolozzi's third short film, *Kakafon Kakkoon*, was made in 1965.[3] It was based on a series of brightly coloured screen prints produced in collaboration with Christopher Prater of Kelpra Studio, and which made art history when they were published as a portfolio under the title *As Is When* in May 1965 (Collins 2014: 184–191). The cover of the portfolio announced a series of prints "based on the life and writings of Wittgenstein", and Paolozzi later explained in an interview that he was fascinated both by the enigmatic writings of the Austrian philosopher and by the biographical parallels between each other's lives (Paolozzi 1994).

The combination in the twelve main pages of, on the one hand, figurative and abstract motifs based on found materials with, on the other hand, biographical or philosophical quotations gives rise to a highly complex work on the relationship between art and reality, material and idea. The thirteenth sheet with experimental poetry by Paolozzi points in the same direction. The poem consists of a bewildering array of found newspaper articles to connect diverse reflections on art, film, music, science, and war.

As has been pointed out by Brook Pearson, there is much to indicate that the sequence of prints is intended to be understood as a proto-filmic work on Wittgenstein's philosophy (Person 2011). The first and the last prints both refer directly to cinema: *Artificial Sun* contains abstracted elements of the apparatus and space the cinema; *Wittgenstein at the Cinema Admires Betty Grable* depicts the philosopher enjoying an immersive film experience. Several prints feature stylized elements that recall film projectors, strips and rolls of film, as well as film containers: for example, in the layered structure of *Experience* or in the multiple frames of *Reality*. This iconography is not new in Paolozzi's work; the materials and processes of analogue film had already appeared in notes for his earlier film (Stallschus 2016: 67–74). In this instance, however, the allusions to the cinema seem to function as a leitmotif. In this respect, the series can be considered as a conceptual film that is gradually realized in the viewer's mind as he or she looks at the prints one after the other and synthesizes separate bits of information into a mental representation. This interpretation raises a further question, however: if the series is set up as a proto-film in the print medium, why did Paolozzi subsequently turn it into an actual animated film; why would he insist on a reification of the printed idea of this film?

As so often with Paolozzi, he extended and developed his project by translating it into a different medium. Paolozzi began to work on the film shortly after the completion and public presentation of the portfolio. This time, he hired a professional cameraman, Denny Densham, to shoot it. As in the earlier film, the animation technique is based on a simple visualization of the source material, but here the technical realization is of a higher order. The animation's theme is already announced in the opening titles.

The film begins with the hymn-like music of a choir; the screen is bathed in a vibrant orange (Fig. 1). At a certain point, a circular shape begins to pulsate as if to the music. A close-up of a photographic portrait of Wittgenstein fades in and fills the entire screen. This is followed by the film's title, and then an abstract sequence with various circular shapes of different colours. The camera effectively draws attention to the portrait and plays with the expectation of a biopic. Particularly when compared to the screen print that the portrait is taken from, it becomes apparent how much the scale changes with the film. The portrait is taken from *The Spirit of the Snake*, in which it is a tiny detail hidden at the lower edge of the print where it catches one's eye only after extensive viewing (Fig. 2). In the film, on the other hand, the portrait is shown as an extreme close-up. And in the following sequences, too, the camera travels very close to the sheet, thereby heightening the immersive quality of the pictorial space that is already present in the prints. These have an unusually large format, which far exceeds the perceptual field of the viewer, and which can only be surveyed as a whole with difficulty, so that the numerous visual details and the comparatively small text tend to guide the viewer's gaze into the picture.

The removal of distance is beneficial to the biographical approach, although one learns little about the unusual life of the Austrian philosopher. Instead, individual experiences in Wittgenstein's biography are given special emphasis in the interaction of image and sound. These include his involvement in World War I as a soldier, which is illustrated by a tracking shot that passes over the shadowy forms of soldiers, accompanied by a satirized military march. Another biographical


Fig. 1 Eduardo Paolozzi, *Kakafon Kakkoon* (3 film stills), 1965, 16 mm, b&w, sound, 11 min (©VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn, 2018)

Fig. 2 Eduardo Paolozzi, *Spirit of the Snake*, from the portfolio *As Is When* (1965), screenprint on paper, 78.7 × 53.0 cm, Kupferstichkabinett der Staatlichen Museen Berlin (©VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn, 2018)

detail is Wittgenstein's stay of several months in New York, which is illustrated in the film with a modern city skyline and a relaxed swing number. The examples show how the images are narrativized through music, which assumes an important function in the perception and interpretation of the images. In the screen prints, the interpretation of the images is strongly influenced by textual quotations, which in the film, in contrast, are given neither visual nor acoustic consideration. Their place is taken by the film music composed especially for the film by Elisabeth Lutyens, an old friend of Paolozzi's. Lutyens was known for her atonal compositions and in 1953 had already composed a motet with excerpts from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, sung in German. The latter work is probably the reason why Paolozzi asked her to collaborate on his feature project. He returned the favour a year later by making his poems available for the libretto of Lutyens' composition *Akapotik Rose* (Lutyens 1972: 222–223, 294, 297).

These biographically inspired sequences alternate with completely abstract sequences, which take up a great deal of space in the film. Here, close-ups of figures and patterns are shown consecutively, frequently to a point in which the camera zooms out to reveal a complex visual structure. The combination of close-ups, intense colours, and expressive rhythmic music creates a hallucinatory atmosphere that recalls the experiments in visual music of the early Avant-garde. But what is the purpose of these abstract, ornamental sequences? On the one hand, they can be understood as an illustration of Wittgenstein's philosophy, which makes use of a fragmentary form of text (Frank 1989: 33–34, 40–44). Wittgenstein's fragmentary style breaks with the usual linear form to repeatedly return to an initial problem from a broad range of perspectives: his arrangement in favour of a potentially open-ended process, suggesting variable connections between the different propositions, and thereby allowing for new insights. The individual shots, which consist in each case of self-contained elements, which are nevertheless integrated into larger net-like structures with numerous points of connection to their surroundings, act as a very convincing visualization of this thought-in-fragments.

On the other hand, these abstract sequences can be understood more generally as a way of drawing attention to patterns and structures as

such. The film takes us straight and very close to tiny details that later and gradually reveal their embeddedness into larger relations. The relational arrangement of elements is dealt with—at great length—by Wittgenstein in the development of his picture theory. Indeed, this theory is invoked in several prints of Paolozzi's series: in *Tortured Life* for instance he quotes a biographical anecdote. While at the front during World War I, Wittgenstein was inspired by a picture of a car accident he found when browsing through a magazine: "The picture, he said, served as a proposition whose parts corresponded to things in reality, and so he conceived the idea that a verbal proposition is in effect a picture". Hence, Wittgenstein was interested in the functional relation between the illustration and reality; the picture is defined in this perspective according to its structural similarity to the world. However, the focusing on this function results in the distinction between language and image becoming negligible. In the fourth screen print, *Reality*, Paolozzi quotes a few sentences from proposition 2 of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* that emphasize the model character of the image in order to draw out structural correspondences between image and reality: "2.13 In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them. 2.131 In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of the objects. 2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way". Hence, the relation between picture and world should be thought of not as a relation of similarity, but as a shared structure. This perspective of a conjunction through structure leads to an undermining of the hierarchical separation between world, language, and image (Goppelsröder 2010; Mersch 2011: 116–122).

Wittgenstein's very special concept of picture here, which—while withdrawing from its illustrative function—carries out under this condition a transmedial opening, must have been of particular interest to Paolozzi, especially in a period of his career in which his conception of his work successively expanded to include an idea of intermediality through his growing engagement with language, music, and film. In its onomatopoeic dimension, the film's title, *Kakafon Kakkoon* also suggests such an overcoming of the divisions between the separate arts. The title is taken from a poem included in the print portfolio called "Wild Track

for Ludwig // The Kakafon Kakkoon Laka Oon Elektrik Lafs", which thus combines the idea of tribute with an associative line of over-coded sound poetry that leads from cacophony to the Laocoön Group to an electric laugh.

The reference to the ancient sculpture is particularly important also because of the burgundy box containing the sheets of the portfolio bearing a silver image of Mickey Mouse in front of the Laocoön Group (Fig. 3). Paolozzi quoted the famous sculpture in various contexts, including his preceding film, *History of Nothing*. Here, Paolozzi is also referring to an old aesthetic debate about the differences between the arts that had been triggered by this sculpture in the eighteenth century. Inspired by Johann Joachim Winckelmann's question why, in this sculpture, Laocoön was not crying out, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing argued with an aesthetic differentiation between spatial and temporal arts, between art and literature, which due to their different expressive means are forced to speak to the viewer differently. This problem was subsequently taken up in numerous contributions by writers, scholars, and philosophers.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, this debate was taken up again in American literary criticism, and then linked with a reflection on modern art in the writings of Clement Greenberg. Greenberg defends a media-specific method and the recourse to aesthetic autonomy as a strategy of differentiation from the mass media and entertainment industry. Paolozzi, who saw a creative potential in the mass media, cannot but reject Greenberg's modernist position. Therefore, the artist repeatedly employed the Laocoön theme as a kind of theoretical model against modernism. Thus, the American Mickey Mouse appears as a youthful hero who casually walks away from the suffering old man from Europe (the picture on the front of *As Is When*). In another instance, the immobile stone figure of the Laocoön is encountered in a dynamic view through the windscreen of a car (in the film *History of Nothing*). In Paolozzi's art, the Laocoön theme becomes a symbol of eclecticism, and hence the precise opposite of Greenberg's postulate.

This interest in intermediality is the main reason why Paolozzi experimented with film. For Paolozzi, film becomes a means of expression that allows him to leave behind the modernist notions of a pure

Fig. 3 The burgundy box of the portfolio *As Is When* (1965) with the image of Mickey Mouse and the Laocoön sculpture, Kupferstichkabinett der Staatlichen Museen Berlin (©VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn, 2018)

medium and a normative concept of art. Perhaps it is possible to understand now why Paolozzi once said: "I have a necessity to embrace some kind of language in relationship to the processes I'm involved with. And I find his [Wittgenstein's] the most sympathetic language. Some people need, perhaps, Greenberg, I need Wittgenstein" (Paolozzi 1965: 128). For Paolozzi, Greenberg and Wittgenstein embody two opposing positions. Wittgenstein becomes his guide for an art that is turned to the world, which means an openness to popular culture and an aesthetics of intermediality.

Notes

1. Paolozzi produced a total of six films. Besides the two animated films discussed here, there is also a lost found-footage film (1953–1954), a documentary about Newcastle (1963), and two drawn animated films (1971/1983). He also collaborated on a number of films, among other things as actor and set designer.
2. *History of Nothing* (1960), 16 mm, b&w, sound, 12 min., British Film Institute National Archive.
3. *Kakafon Kakkoon*, 1965, 16 mm, b&w, sound, 11 min., British Film Institute National Archive.

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Assembling Reminders for a Particular Purpose: Paolozzi's Ephemera, Toys and Collectibles

Diego Mantoan

1 What Does a Philosopher Do?

When reading Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, Scottish artist Eduardo Paolozzi was evidently struck by a sentence, which—taken alone—appears capable of summarizing the essence of the entire treaty of the Austrian philosopher; furthermore, it stands as his maxim of philosophical working, as the final truth about what a philosopher really does. The sentence reads: "The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose" (Wittgenstein 1953: §127). The fact, that Paolozzi felt a special connection to this particular paragraph, is clearly testified by the place it takes in the screenprint series *As Is When* (1964–1965), which can generally be seen as the artist's elaboration of the philosopher's writings—or as a kind of "collaboration" with the Austrian thinker. The aforementioned excerpt is both partially included in the title of screenprint IX (*Assembling*

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Reminders for a Particular Purpose) as well as in its entirety in the screen-print itself both in German and English on the top and bottom edges. It should be noted that this screenprint clearly breaks the flow of the series of twelve prints. As a matter of fact, at a graphical level it is the first one to be entirely composed of an abstract pattern: indeed, the previous eight screenprints are either figurative—meaning they contain explicit elements of mechanical, natural or human figures (IV, V, VI); or para-figurative—that is, the abstract pattern is symbolizing something, like a man (II) and a parrot (VII); or, at least, they contain some elements derived from figurative patterns (screenprint I, III, VIII). What's more, this is the only screenprint of the series that holds a direct citation from the *Philosophical Investigations*,[1] plus it displays both the name of the philosopher (on the bottom edge) and the title of his celebrated posthumous work (on the top edge) in capital letters.

   The screenprint appears like a book cover, but it is not, because it doesn't really illustrate Wittgenstein's excerpts.[2] On the contrary, it rather is to be taken as a *manifesto*, both capable of subsuming the meaning of the *Philosophical Investigations*, as well as—presumably—Paolozzi's own belief about intellectual and creative work. The abstract pattern on screenprint IX displays intertwining lines, overlapping areas, mirroring shapes, interfering curves, submerging and again re-emerging colour fields. As in an exploded diagram, Paolozzi appears to register the diverse processes going on in a philosopher's mind, as intended by Wittgenstein: collecting, assembling, comparing, adding, substituting, disposing of ideas and concepts etc. Paolozzi seems to hint at the fact, that they are perhaps the exact same processes of an artist's work, or at least they represent what he was doing as an artist.[3] One's mind runs immediately to the collage technique exploited by the Scottish artist in the 1950s (Heath 2017: 72), but I believe Wittgenstein's paragraph 127—especially the words "assembling reminders"—touched upon a much deeper nerve. Indeed, Paolozzi had been assembling and collecting all sorts of reminders since a very young man, mostly toys, comic strips, magazines, props, trivia and objects pertaining to mass culture (Collins 2014: 18). His enormous collection was united under the name *Krazy Kat Arkive* and later donated to the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, but it also formed the basis of several environmental installations in the last decades of his artistic activity, such as at the Museum of Mankind

for the British Museum (1985) and at the Hayward Gallery (1996) in London. Given the size of this collection and the repeated public displays of some of its parts—Paolozzi called them alternatively shops, works, stores or archives (Gale 1996: 6)—it is rather baffling that this production has usually been overlooked or addressed to as secondary by monographs and catalogues about the artist: as regards the two aforementioned exhibitions and the *Krazy Kat Arkive*, for instance, Judith Collins in her comprehensive monograph makes only a blunt comment, clearly disregarding their relevance (Collins 2014: 6, 160), while the recent retrospective catalogue edited by Daniel Herrmann mentions only Paolozzi's collaboration with the Museum of Mankind, however intended as some sort of untimely surrealist extravagance (Maddigan Newby 2017: 240–242).

Hence, in this chapter I will instead try to highlight the centrality of these works in Paolozzi's production and the relevance that the practice of "assembling reminders" holds in his understanding of the artist's profession, further constituting another aspect of affinity with Wittgenstein. In order to do so, I will examine three aspects that are instrumental to understand Paolozzi's habit—if not obsession—of being in a "collecting mood", assembling any kind of items of popular culture: the first one concerns the likely origins of this attitude, grounded in his childhood years, as well as in the influence of Parisian Surrealism and American mass culture (Patrizio 1989: 15); the second step is discussing the birth of the *Krazy Kat Arkive*, which represents the first attempt to organize and possibly even find a displaying solution for his collectibles; the third aspect, finally, is going over several environmental installations created with these assembled objects, especially his late project for the *Spellbound* exhibition at the Hayward Gallery, which was confronted by critics with harsh comments.

2 Paolozzi's Lure of Preserving and Assembling

Art historians and critics fairly agree on the origin of Paolozzi's curious habit of collecting any sort of objects, cuttings, items or toys pertaining to popular culture or consumerism: it is an obsession grounded in

his early childhood years, when he grew up in Edinburgh as the oldest son of an Italian shopkeeper—a confectionary and ice-cream parlour—being surrounded by advertising, consumer goods and packaging (Herrmann 2017: 9). Helping his parents in the shop and being a foreigner in Scotland wasn't an easy life, but they had the privilege of free tickets for Leith cinema, since their shop advertised for their showing times; hence, since the age of three he accompanied his mother weekly to the movies and was exposed very early to American films, absorbing a completely different culture from his austere life (Collins 2014: 18). The artist himself confirmed this derivative assumption in many interviews and conversations throughout his career (Spencer 2000: 147–150). Frank Whitford notes in the catalogue for Paolozzi's Tate exhibition in 1971 that he was a "voracious reader of comics, magazines and cheap novelettes" and that he would still "scan the counters at Woolworth's for garish toys and useless novelties and jealously guarded a collection of cigarette cards given him by his father's customers" (Whitford 1971a: 8). He further commented:

> Indeed, he rarely throws anything away and his mania for keeping printed ephemera, toys and books of all kinds throws light, not only on his working-methods, but also on the workings of his imagination. / What he enjoyed most were precisely those pursuits which his middle-class and cultured contemporaries had been educated to despise as cheap and nasty [...]. (Whitford 1971a: 8–9)

So it all started with collecting cigarette cards his father's customers would give him at the shop, showing images of cars, planes, ships and trains, which led young Eduardo to keep any sort of ephemera in a box under his bed: from cut-outs of comics and magazines to wrapping paper and advertising material (Collins 2014: 18). In a recorded conversation Paolozzi stresses the fact that such reminders were part of a "kind of street cultures" of poor families; hence, comics and cheap magazine constituted the "folklore", the "street literature" that everybody in his milieu would discuss at length (Whitford 1994: 20, 148).

While the origin of his interest in such ephemera might now be clear, his habit of preserving such things appears to be due to a specifically

Scottish attitude, which—so to speak—attempts to counter the sort of *disposable culture* typical of American consumerism. In this regard, a catalogue of 1989 reports: "Significantly, he has described his native Edinburgh as the city which threw nothing away. Hence Paolozzi's fascination for America, the culture which threw everything away" (Patrizio 1989: 5). Paolozzi was intrigued by the imagery and the objects of consumer culture, particularly for their fleeting, non-lasting nature; hence his interest in keeping a record of passing images and forms that shape people's everyday life. Indeed, for his solo show at the Tate in 1971, Paolozzi planned to have an open train car full of objects he had collected over his life, precisely to safeguard their memory:

> Well, the hopper does have all kinds of meanings, a social meaning about – what society throws away, rejects, refuses, is just as interesting as what society accept, and in a strange way the waste processes working on a kind of dynamic level – the rejection process being as interesting as the selection part. (Paolozzi in Whitford 1971b: 11)

His fascination for selecting and assembling rejected things—be they popular items or printed ephemera—clearly constituted the basis for Paolozzi's collage series and screenprint series in the years to come, as testified by *As Is When*. The decisive sparkle for his collecting habit was further influenced by his first-hand experience of Parisian Surrealism in 1947 (Whitford 1971a: 7, 22). There he met upon the concept of *objét trouvé*, which he extended in a radical way and applied to his peculiar collection, in order to spontaneously juxtapose things extracted from different time–space contexts, although all mutually belonging to street culture or consumerism at large (Ballard 1971).[4] What really interested Paolozzi were the new and unpredictable connections the viewers made between the items he had randomly assembled (Maddigan Newby 2017: 238).[5] Paolozzi's habit reached a height already in the so-called *Bunk*! lecture in the spring of 1952 for the Independent Group at the Institute of Contemporary Art in London, when he projected—in a sort of *tour de force*—his assemblages and collages of diverse popular material (Herrmann 2017: 12–15). To the spectators this onslaught of images came in an indiscernible order, while for Paolozzi it represented

the very act of "assembling reminders for a particular purpose": that is, collecting items of consumerism culture and allowing new combinations among these elements (Stonard 2008: 238–249).

3   Collecting Reminders of Popular Culture: The *Krazy Kat Arkive*

For many decades Paolozzi kept collecting a wide array of ephemera pertaining to mass culture, which often served as inspiration for his sculptures and prints. By the early 1970s they were so many they had completely invaded his studio,[6] as commentators then reported:

> For years Paolozzi has collected toys, novelties, model kits, clockwork toy robots, garden gnomes and plastic grotesque figures. They cluster around his studio like a brigade of mute midgets. […] Once again, in order to allow people to consider them as art objects in their own right, Paolozzi sometimes transforms them by having them professionally painted or chromed. (Whitford 1971a: 27)

With regard to this collection, about that time Paolozzi was apparently concerned with two issues: on the one hand, how to drag individual collectibles into the art discourse; on the other hand, how to preserve the collection as a whole. The principal means to have these ephemera turned into artworks was to make them look like artworks, especially by giving them the material aesthetics of traditional sculptures (e.g. by painting or chroming them; having them cast in chalk or metal). It appears that in the early 1970s Paolozzi didn't dare yet to insert them directly into the art context—to the contrary of Jasper Johns and Robert Rauschenberg. Hence, he decided to have the objects preserved altogether as a collection, retaining value in its entirety as a testimony of twentieth-century popular culture. Aided by Robin Spencer at St. Andrews, in 1972 Paolozzi founded the *Krazy Kat Arkive*, devolving a large part of his collection to the university (Hill 1994: 3). While the name is taken from a George Herriman cartoon of the 1920s, the definition of archive clarifies it was intended as a repository

of objects, rather than a museum-like installation (Gale 1996: 6). The collection comprised books and comics, toys and robots, clippings and posters, photographs and cards, high street ephemera and advertisements; they are several thousand items assembled by the artist personally since the 1930s and they perfectly reflect his interest in twentieth-century popular culture. The dominant theme of the collection is the image of man (and woman) in the machine age, though frequently trespassing into science fiction and including also works by Paolozzi himself.

Little satisfied with the care for the collection received at St. Andrews, in 1985 he decided to sell it to the Victoria & Albert Museum (Whitford 1994: 261–262), where it is still cherished after at the Department of Art and Design and partly on display at Blythe House in Kensington. From November 1988 to July 1989 Paolozzi further staged an exhibition at the V&A entitled *Small Things* featuring objects of domestic household and thus raising attention for his *Krazy Kat Arkive of Twentieth Century Popular Culture*. Altogether, over forty thousand items are now stored at the V&A and sorted according to media and dates—from approximately 1900 onwards, though being particularly strong for the period covering the 1950s and 1960s (National Art Library: 1007997406). So far, the archive has been acknowledged mainly as a collection of objects, which retain value only as part of popular culture and mass design of the previous century. Given Paolozzi's protracted collecting activity, however, the archive must also be seen as one singular creative act, although delayed over a number of decades; hence, every assembled object is—in the artist's intention—part of one and the same entity, which is popular culture and consumerism at large. Very much like in a collage or assemblage; the individual collectible cannot be taken on its own, but in relation to the other assembled objects, although each one represents a *pars pro toto* in the context of popular culture. As a matter of fact, the *Krazy Kat Arkive* portrays Paolozzi's lure of popular culture, which constantly connected his creativity and artistic production beyond the specific medium employed (Gale 1996: 6).

4   Re-Activating Objects: Lost Kingdoms and Cinema Cabinets

1985 was also the year Paolozzi eventually decided to publicly display parts of his immense collection, letting some of the items enter a site-specific installation, which opened to a period of experimentation with museum installations. In the mid 1980s, the British Museum embarked in its first cooperation with a contemporary artist and chose him to intervene at the ethnography galleries, then housed at the Museum of Mankind in Mayfair.[7] From 1982 onwards Paolozzi was invited to visit the museum storage to get acquainted with the ethnographic collection; he was soon drawn to ephemeral objects that—in his view—had the potential to be reused or reactivated, particularly if combined together with his own works and other found objects (Maddigan Newby 2017: 237). The result of this selection process was the exhibition *Lost Magic Kingdoms and Six Paper Moons from Nahuatal* (1985–1987) whose hundreds of items in vitrines pictured a sort of sci-fi dream. The response to this piece was however very harsh, especially on the side of critics and colleagues: American artist, anthropologist and Slade teacher Susan Hiller, for instance, attacked Paolozzi's creative choice at a conference held in 1986 at the Museum of Mankind, reproaching the *colonialist* tendency to juxtapose and de-contextualize ethnographic items (Einzig 1996: 31–37). Despite the critical reception of his contemporaries, as far as the aims of this chapter are concerned, *Lost Magic Kingdoms* is an important attempt to spatially realize what Paolozzi had been doing for years with collage and screenprints:

> I see the exhibition as being absolutely central to my own work. It is about redeeming things, reclaiming things and looking at things in a new way. Above all it is about sources of inspiration. (Paolozzi in Oakes 1985: 35)

That this installation practice was to be central for the Scottish artist in the years to come is further testified by the aforementioned *Small Things* exhibition at the V&A (1988–1989), as well as by the *Props for a Musical about the 'Life & Death of Hieronymus Bosch'*, which were part of the 1990 *Arche Noah* exhibition in Munich (Kemp 1996: 107).

In this regard, the last and perhaps most comprehensive of Paolozzi's installation pieces was created on the occasion of the 1996 blockbuster exhibition devoted to the centenary of British cinema and organized at London's Hayward Gallery in collaboration with the British Film Institute. Curated by Ian Christie and Philip Dodd, *Spellbound: Art and Film* brought ten renowned artists and filmmakers together—among them celebrity directors such as Ridley Scott, Terry Gilliam and Peter Greenaway, as well as rising stars like Damien Hirst, Douglas Gordon and Steve McQueen—to make new works in response to the anniversary of the moving image (Dodd 1996: 33). Together with Paula Rego, Paolozzi was considered the British veteran artist who had in the past engaged with cinema fiction and popular narratives; hence, he was invited—upon his intervention at the Museum of Mankind—to recreate a Parisian cinematheque at the time of his arrival in Paris in 1947, such as to recollect his encounter with Surrealism (Hilty 1995).[8]

The resulting installation was titled *The Jesus Works and Store: An Attempt to Describe an Indescribable Film*, which consisted of a contemporary cross between a cabinet of curiosities and a film prop store (Figs. 1 and 2). It was a large hall (the first gallery room on the right) packed with cinematic ephemera and film souvenirs, Pop artefacts and toys, bits and parts of his sculptures and various consumer objects: all charged with a personal significance but underlied with an abiding sense of classical aesthetics, these items referenced the dreams and desires conveyed by mass culture (Gale 1996). One could find the Tin Man from *The Wizard of Oz* or recognize a statuette of *Robocop*, discover the rats of Murnau's *Nosferatu* or stumble upon the robot from Fritz Lang's *Metropolis*, which Paolozzi displayed even in later occasions (Collins 2014: 285). Like *Lost Magic Kingdoms*, the *Spellbound* installation was not well received: critics stigmatized the utter sense of confusion aroused by the seemingly disordered display of useless objects (Romney 1996).[9] What this harsh critique missed to see, though, was the fact that Paolozzi's installations were the embodiment of pop collage and a radicalization of surrealism: an assemblage of our own consumerist culture and an act of resilience against disposing of objects produced by popular culture. As usual, the Scottish artist didn't want to dictate a specific new order of seeing, he was rather offering fragments of sight,

Fig. 1 Eduardo Paolozzi, Installation view. Spellbound, Hayward Gallery, Southbank Centre, London 1996 (Image ©John Riddy)

visual recollections that orbited around an aura of suggestiveness. The likes of his collage works and screenprints, Paolozzi's installations allow the viewer to access parallel universes of the visual and conduct multiple dialogues of a subversive nature between high and low (Kemp 1996: 107). Firmly grounded in his childhood memories, the artist aimed at freedom of meaning, at a temporal and spatial displacement for the viewer to afford noticing different aspects and connections between the items of mass culture. As a matter of fact, he commented on his *Spellbound* exhibit as follows:

> [it] was in a sense a lost autobiography – a lost childhood; a world of cigarette cards and cinemas. Something quite subliminal. It was naive art with a whiff of the psychotic. That relationship between childhood experience and art is lovely open territory. It's fascinating how things change when you see them in a different context. (Paolozzi in Gale 1996: 6)

Fig. 2 Eduardo Paolozzi, Installation view. Spellbound, Hayward Gallery, Southbank Centre, London 1996 (Image ©John Riddy)

5   Paolozzi's Last "Wittgensteinian" Works

Drawing to a conclusion, I hope this chapter shed some light on a prolific strain of Paolozzi's production, which—despite having him occupied for over a decade—was so far insufficiently considered by art historians and often dismissed as an *opus minor*. On the contrary—far from being sporadic—his installation pieces were central to Paolozzi's practice and entirely pertain to his habit of experimenting new ways of expression, in order to propagate his poetic and his understanding of art by other means. With regard to the creative method as well as to the aesthetic outcome of these projects, there is indeed absolute analogy with Paolozzi's collages of the late 1940s and 1950s, as well as

with the screenprints of the 1960s and 1970s: they all derive from a meticulous process of collection, selection, connection and juxtaposition of images or items drawn from mass culture; hence, Paolozzi's installation pieces are—so to speak—the physical embodiment of his previous works. One might wonder, why it took him so long to let the "real", unaltered objects—which filled his other artworks, as well as his studio—enter the art field, while other Pop artists had done so two decades earlier, either by inclusion of consumer products in the artwork (e.g. Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns) or by their physical reproduction (e.g. Andy Warhol and Claes Oldenburg). I shall attempt a twofold explanation: to the one hand, Paolozzi was trained at quite traditional art institutions in the 1940s, where he was rigidly introduced to fine art techniques. Although he constantly tried to push the boundaries of art, he apparently resisted for a long time to supersede canonical media with entirely new modes of expression (Hare and Patrizio 1985: 42; Whitford 1971a: 7). Rather than provocatively *dragging* something completely external into the art discourse, Paolozzi liked to experiment with new media to test their artistic potential and see how they could *fit* into the realm of art. The case of *As Is When* makes a good example, because of the outcry it provoked in the British printers community: the latter didn't contest Paolozzi's aesthetic or creative outcome, which absolutely looked like fine art; instead, it maintained that screenprinting was a commercial technique and should not have been used for fine arts (Collins 2014: 191–192). Hence, to Paolozzi it didn't make sense to drag a single, "real" object into the gallery space, because he—as an artist—first needed to rework it for an artistic purpose. On the other hand, Paolozzi always experimented with upcoming techniques and new media: in the 1980s, it was about time for him to venture in environmental installations, particularly after a decade of pioneering work in this field by artists such as Joseph Beuys and Judy Chicago (Kimmelmann 1998). Indeed, when Paolozzi was contacted in 1982 for the prospective show at the Museum of Mankind, there had been previous experiments of contemporary artists engaging at environmental level with canonized museum spaces even in London (Maddigan Newby 2017: 237). Time was ripe for Paolozzi to plan an articulated installation and fill an entire room with his assembled items, instead of

putting one object at a time in a vitrine and present it as an artwork. Consequently, his installation pieces from the 1980s and 1990s must be seen as his personal take on installation art, as his experiments with this new technique, in order to reach an outcome that paralleled his creative achievements with previous media.

Eventually, with regard to Wittgenstein, these installation pieces perfectly fit into Paolozzi's creative habit and artistic methodology already employed for his explicitly "Wittgensteinian" production. They are an extension of what Paolozzi does as an artist, that is: collecting, assembling, preserving, selecting, comparing and connecting various images, items and memories for a particular purpose. As a matter of fact, what can be said of Paolozzi's collages and screenprints perfectly apply to his environmental installations too:

> It takes the right frame of mind to interpret such images and to perceive their rich layers of meaning. It also demands a new kind of non-linear interpretation, for Paolozzi was, and still is dealing with visual experience in a way close to the manner in which a multitude of disparate images bombard us in everyday life. (Whitford 1971a: 47)

In the end, the habit of collecting ephemera drawn from popular culture—which at Paolozzi's time already and entirely pertained to mass consumerism—connects the artist even more deeply to Wittgenstein's philosophy. As a matter of fact, in this chapter I constantly—though covertly—hinted at an aspect that eventually needs to be made explicit or even radicalized: Paolozzi's lure of any kind of banal object or superficial item belonging to our everyday surrounding clearly parallels Wittgenstein's interest for the daily uses of ordinary language, which are frequently of humble nature and likewise commonplace, at least at a first glance; and these ordinary objects—the same as ordinary language—conceal several layers of meaning, such that at some point they hold more relevance than so-called high art or, in Wittgenstein's case, than the idealistic forms of logic. The result both for Paolozzi and Wittgenstein is that art, on one side, and language, on the other side, don't subsist in an ideal and separate world: to the contrary, they are among us, here and now; they exist, when we look at things and words

in a different way; they exist, when we use them with care, attention and, perhaps, even much more respect than usual. From this perspective, Paolozzi's collection of items and subsequent installation pieces become not only his last Wittgensteinian works, but also his most radically Wittgensteinian ones. Hence, going back to my opening question—as derived from Wittgenstein's quote on screenprint IX—what does a philosopher do then? The answer could echo the Austrian philosopher's maxim: it is, what an artist does too—or at least, what Paolozzi as an artist believes an artist should be doing—and that is "assembling reminders for a particular purpose". Since we now know, what the mentioned reminders are, what would that particular purpose be? The answer to that, as both Wittgenstein and Paolozzi might put it, is: seeing things in a new way, noticing different aspects of what we already know, making unpredictable connections and opening up to surprising relationships. And that is so, because—again paraphrasing Wittgenstein on screenprint IX—the artist, like the philosopher "simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain" (Wittgenstein 1953: §126).

Notes

1. Also screenprint VIII contains a citation from the *Philosophical Investigations*; however, it is referred to as a quote from Norman Malcolm's biographical work on Wittgenstein *A Memoir* (Malcolm 1984: 27f).
2. The English quote on screenprint IX (*Assembling Reminders for a Particular Purpose*) reads:

   126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. One might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions.

   127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose.

3. It may be interesting to note what Paolozzi thought of abstract background patterns: "And I think when you have a kind of underlying geometry, which even trots through some of the prints, it's kind of a framework for suspending ideas on" (Whitford 1971b: 13).

4. It appears relevant to highlight what Paolozzi stated in a radio interview for the Radiovision educational programme with Frank Whitford as regards the temporal and spatial dimension of collage following a long period of assembling the most diverse things: "So in a way one's using the collage, where the time-space thing is being manipulated, so that some of the images are separated by thirty years of yellowing in portfolios, waiting for the day" (Whitford 1971b: 5).

5. Indeed, as regards spontaneity and intended construction in his collages and assemblages, Paolozzi asserted: "The use of *objects* [wrong spelling] *trouvés* as the raw materials of sculpture makes it possible to suggest a kind of spontaneity that is of the same nature as that of much modern painting, even if, as in my case, this spontaneity turns out to be an illusion" (Whitford 1971a: 17).

6. Paolozzi's studio has been reconstructed at the Scottish National Gallery in Edinburgh and thus provides an outlook of the huge variety and apparent disorder of objects it contained, although almost all items pertaining to popular culture are now stored at the *Krazy Kat Arkive*.

7. The venue was at 6 Burlington Gardens and run between 1970 and 1997, while it was later purchased by the Royal Academy.

8. It appears relevant to stress the fact that until the end of 1994 Paolozzi is not mentioned consistently by the organizers. In the working list of artists under consideration, dated 12 November 1993, his name is not included; however, in a meeting with Ian Christie for the project 'Art and Film' on December 10, 1993, Paolozzi is mentioned explicitly for his installation at the Museum of Mankind (Spellbound: Box3/File1). Paolozzi was approached by the curators towards the end of 1994, thus a fax by Greg Hilty to Philip Dodd on December 13, 1994, contains an outline of Paolozzi's project after the first meeting with the artist (Spellbound: Box2/Folder1).

9. The articles taken into consideration to analyse the reception of Paolozzi's *Spellbound* work include the following critical statements: "By far the most disappointing piece here is an installation created by the sculptor Eduardo Paolozzi […]." (Dorment 1996); "Paolozzi has the measure of Spellbound: multi-reference stacked high." (Feaver 1996); "For

many visitors, though, the most beguiling project in Spellbound will be Eduardo Paolozzi's Jesus Works and Stores." (Jackson 1996); "Paolozzi and Greenaway hide behind excess, chaos and mess, and are really only interested in their own over-blown solipsistic narcissism" (Romney 1996). Allow me, please, to refer about all this to Mantoan (2015: 332–343).

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Part III

Wittgenstein: On Influencing Art

10

Experience and Interpretation: An Art Theoretical Commentary on Wittgenstein's Conception of "Aspect"

Michael Lüthy

1 Introduction

In this chapter, I would like to treat one of Ludwig Wittgenstein's central terms: that of "aspect". The term is the focus of Wittgenstein's reflections on perception, which he develops in his later work, *Philosophical Investigations*. I am interested in what this term manages to achieve, not so much for aesthetics in general, but more precisely for aesthetics of art. This achievement, as I see it, has not yet been adequately appreciated—probably also because Wittgenstein has never been an important reference point for art aesthetics. I believe, however, that we can discern a quite special capacity in Wittgenstein's concept

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of "aspect": namely to be able to explain what exactly is going on in the moment of the "aesthetic experience," and even more precisely: in the moment of experiencing art. This moment, after all, combines two sides. On the one hand, it is a particular experience of a *subject*, and at the same time, it is the experience of a certain *object* in its peculiarity and distinctiveness. It seems to me that the central question of every theory of aesthetic experience, namely how exactly the subject and object are mediated to one another in the moment of such an experience, can be answered with the help of Wittgenstein's concept of aspect.

According to Wittgenstein, the term aspect has two meanings. It is what *lights up* in the artwork under certain conditions, and at the same time, it is what the viewer *notices* in the artwork under certain conditions. Aspect is neither a quality of the object alone nor a mental achievement of the viewer alone. Rather it is something in-between, due to the productive interplay of viewer and object. The way in which Wittgenstein does not restrict himself to explaining what the subject is carrying out, but emphasizes the particularity of the experience as dependent on the particularity of the aesthetic object, gives his approach a unique profile among theories of aesthetic experience. This profile is interesting precisely from the perspective of art theory, since this is concerned, and much clearer than philosophical aesthetics, with the particularity of the artistic object in each case—a particularity that, strictly speaking, is doubled: the particularity of art in relation to other aesthetic objects and the particularity of a certain artwork in relation to other artworks.

2   Pollock—According to Kambartel

Before explicating this in more detail, however, I will turn to an example from art, which I want to use to approach Wittgenstein's concept of aspect: Jackson Pollock's *Number 32* from 1950, which hangs today in the Kunstsammlung Nordrhein-Westfalen in Düsseldorf (Fig. 1). To get to the relevant qualities of Pollock's painting for my context as directly as possible, I will draw on a famous analysis of *Number 32*, one that is as brief as it is sharp. It appeared, written by Walter Kambartel, in 1970 in the Reclam series *Werkmonographien zur bildenden Kunst*.

Fig. 1 Jackson Pollock, *Number 31*, 1950. Installation shot (by the author). Düsseldorf: Kunstsammlung Nordrhein-Westfalen (authorized bpk Bildagentur)

In his analysis, Walter Kambartel first goes into the fundamental problem of describing and interpreting non-representational *informel* painting—which includes for him Pollock's picture. For this art form, according to Kambartel, lacks binding descriptive categories: we encounter here an "incapacity for words," the expression of which would in part be the peculiar concept of the "*informel*" itself (Kambartel 1970: 3). Kambartel, however, intends nonetheless to make binding statements about the picture. In order to do so, he discusses three characteristics that emerge from this painting, which for him are exemplary of Pollock's art as a whole (Kambartel 1970: 4). Kambartel's process here is pertinent because each of the three *characteristics* that he works out are three *interpretive perspectives* on the painting, and in each of these interpretive perspectives we can notice something in the painting that Wittgenstein would have called "*aspect*."

The first of these interpretive perspectives, which Kambartel discusses in the first chapter of his analysis, is the *large image format*. Pollock's picture emphasizes, according to Kambartel, the continuity of the

expansion of the image in contrast to the individuality of the limitation of the image. The expansion of the picture's field exceeds the viewer's field of perception, with the consequence that the discrepancy between the field of vision and the field of the image causes the picture to seem like a "wall" (Kambartel 1970: 9). But the picture does not seem like a wall because of any particular material surface, for instance of relief—such as in the paintings of Antoni Tàpies or Emil Schumacher—but due to the picture–viewer relation evoked by its large size. What is striking is not that the viewer sees something that looks like a wall, but that he is situated in relation to it as if to a wall because of the size of the picture. Kambartel's remarks on Pollock's large image format are consolidated in the following passage:

> The antinomian identity of picture and wall intended by Pollock is conditioned by the large image format in two respects, in that it unites in itself first the phenomenal unfathomability of the wall and second the categorical restriction of the picture. If on the one hand, the picture is dependent on the unfathomability of the format in order to appear as a wall, on the other hand, it needs the restriction of the format in order to claim to be a picture in terms of category. (Kambartel 1970: 10)

The second of Kambartel's chapters is given to the structure of what is painted, which Kambartel examines under the heading of *polyfocal all-over*. Kambartel here describes the "decompositional internal structure" of the picture, the "pluralism of equivalent points of view," which allows the picture to emerge without beginning, middle, and end (Kambartel 1970: 16–18). He conceives the effect of this all-over as a "rational non-determinable non-perspective spatial continuum," as an immaterial space, since the viewer tends to see the un-primed canvas on which Pollock dripped black enamel paint as if it didn't exist at all (Kambartel 1970: 17). The detail of an approximately 40 × 60 cm central section of the painting allows us to see this optical disappearance of the canvas and the emergence of a non-perspective space. Here we can see that this space comes about in particular through the fact that the thinner lines are perceived as deeper in space, while the thicker ones seem to be nearer to the eye, although they all lie on the same

level—the surface of the canvas. Kambartel's remarks in this section, however, are primarily concentrated on the feature that the all-over structure of the black lineaments as a whole is neither iterative nor chaotic. It demonstrates aspects of order as well as aspects of disorder and can thus be as clearly distinguished from a standardized wallpaper pattern as it can be from mere contingency. The second chapter is consolidated in the following formulation:

> If, therefore, Pollock's all-over cannot be converted into the probability of iteration nor the probability of contingency, however it may be defined, it is precisely this alternative refusal to adapt that forms the basis for the antinomial aggressiveness of the phenomenon. (Kambartel 1970: 23)

The last chapter of Kambartel's text turns to *action painting*. What gets thematized here is the "liberation of the painting process," which appears in Pollock's painting as the abstraction "of all syntactic and semantic expressive values of color and forms," in order to focus "solely on the expressive possibilities inherent to the painting process" (Kambartel 1970: 25). In the scope of action painting the extended field of the picture appears like an "arena" in which the artist has operated, with the consequence that, in Pollock's painting, it seems to be less about a picture than about an event (Kambartel 1970: 26).[1] Nevertheless, this event becomes a "fact" in the shape of the picture, since the picture does not allow us to see the act of painting either at the level of individual traces of action nor at the level of an overriding performative context (Kambartel 1970: 2, 30). The third chapter is consolidated in the following formulation:

> Not the action made absolute as such, but the dialectic of the antinomial connection between action and fact, from painting process and picture, is the actual object of action painting. (Kambartel 1970: 27)

So runs—briefly summarized—Kambartel's argument. His analysis is a structuring of what is presented to the senses, carried out in three steps. This structuring links the visible with fitting terms and concepts, for instance, *all-over* or *action painting*. These terms, or concepts,

open up interpretive perspectives that allow for individual structural moments to emerge in the perceptual object of the picture. As a whole, this is a process of understanding, which concerns both the relationships in the artwork as well as the structuring activity of the viewer. The connection between both can be shown, for instance, in Kambartel's remark that conceiving *Number 32* as a wall would lead to a different relation to the painting than to a conventional panel painting, or in his description of the—ultimately failed—effort by the viewer to discover organizational criteria in the all-over of the traces of paint. Since Kambartel's analysis is a process of understanding, the "incapacity for words" attested to in the painting merely remains a first impression, which is overcome by defining the formal determinations, contents and contexts of the painting. The structural terms chosen by Kambartel, *large image format*, *all-over*, and *action painting*, stand between the particularity of this artwork and general principles, which are characteristic of Pollock's work as a whole and furthermore of a certain direction in American post-war art. The basis for understanding Pollock's paintings are thus relations: *structural* relations within the artwork, *spatial–situational* relations between the painting and the viewer, and finally *conceptual* relations between this artwork and other artworks brought in for comparison.

3   Wittgenstein's Concept of Aspect

The peculiarity of such an understanding process, which foregrounds the relations recognized in artwork as well as the relations between this artwork and the context in which it states, is what I would now like to examine more fundamentally with regard to Wittgenstein's remarks on "aspect." The remarks that I will be turning to can be found, as I have mentioned, in the *Philosophical Investigations*,[2] but also in a number of related texts.

   Seeing an aspect, according to Wittgenstein, is noticing an aspect in something that previously had not been seen in *that* way. If we notice an aspect, or, to put it otherwise, if an aspect lights up in something,

then, according to Wittgenstein, seeing *and* thinking are changed (PI 1997: 193–194). Wittgenstein is concerned with undermining the dualistic conception of seeing and thinking. It is not the case when an aspect is noticed, that first seeing is changed and then thinking—or vice versa. Both changes happen much more simultaneously. If someone says that he now sees *this*, it is no longer a report about the object, but about a modification, which integrates the seeing, the interpreting and the object comparably. If a child tinkering with a box calls out that it is a house, not only does he express a different conception of the box, but the box has *become* a house at this moment (RPhPs 2/1980b: no. 473; LW 1982: no. 687).[3] Aspect, according to Wittgenstein, is neither an intelligible object of thinking nor a physical object of perception. To see it means to see something that one cannot point to.

When we notice an aspect of what we are perceiving, we have, strictly speaking, the experience of a *change* in aspect, for noticing aspect is the exchange of a previous conception with a new one—for instance the conception "box" with the conception "house." What is significant for Wittgenstein in this differentiation is that it indicates seeing as a whole as a kind of understanding, even if we are not always aware of it. As soon as we have had the experience of a change in aspect in the perceived object, we can say that what we had seen previously was an *aspect* of the object, and not the object itself. As soon as something else suddenly appears in something, three interweaving modifications are completed: the transformation of seeing into a conscious act, the separation of perceived object and aspect, and the redefinition of the object as a modification of seeing and thinking at the same time.

For Wittgenstein, such experiences of aspect change have something "incomprehensible" about them (RPhPs 2/1980b: no. 473f). What is incomprehensible is the astonishing multiplication not only on the side of the conceptions that we gain from the object but also on the side of the object itself. Obviously, of course, nothing has changed materially—the box is still a box and not a house—and yet the object has suddenly become something else. In the aspect change, both perception and object are doubled, in full awareness of the consistency of things. Wittgenstein's concise formulation for this reads:

> The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a *new* perception, and at the same time of the perception's being unchanged. (PI 1997: 196e)

The paradoxical experience of the aspect change cannot, according to Wittgenstein, be summarized by reporting that one has seen something in its many facets. What is *seen* is not the variety itself but in each case only this or that or a third thing. The experience of a change of aspect, as Wittgenstein adds, is dramatized in those cases in which the individual aspects are "incompatible" with one another, for instance, when something appears both shallow and deep at the same time (RPhPs 2/1980b: no. 475; RPhPs 1/1980b: no. 877).

At this point, I would like to take a step back to bring Kambartel's reading of Pollock back into play. For using his reading, we can not only show what can be understood by *seeing* aspect but also what Wittgenstein describes as that astonishing experience of a *change* of aspect. In each of Kambartel's three interpretive perspectives, we notice certain aspects of the painting, for instance when the painting sometimes appears to us like a wall and sometimes as an immaterial depth of field. Nothing about the physical object has changed, and yet it becomes something else, and not only in singular respects but as a whole, when it is once seen as a wall and once as an immaterial depth of field. In Wittgenstein's sense, it is in fact here a transition between mutually incompatible aspects, for how could it be possible that something is a wall and an immaterial depth of field *at the same time*? Kambartel's logical term, which he uses in his brief Pollock monograph for this incompatibility, is "antinomy." With regard to the large image format, he speaks of the painting as an "antinomial identity of picture and wall." Like something unlimited, Pollock's painting appears as a wall *on* whose surface the gaze glides; like something limited, on the other hand, it appears as a picture that we are supposed to look *into*. With regard to the all-over structure of the black lines, in turn, we alternate, according to Kambartel, between a conception that perceives it as standardized structure and a perception of chaotic contingency, which results, again according to Kambartel, in the "antinomial aggressiveness" of the phenomenon, which lies in its

continual evasion of categorization. And finally, with regard to action painting, Kambartel considers it significant that it leads to an "antinomial connection of action and fact," that is, between a temporal painting process and a fixed image. Obviously, therefore, Kambartel sees the essential trait of experiencing Pollock's painting in allowing our conception of it to permanently flip over into other contradictory conceptions so that neither does the *picture* become stabilized under any particular aspect nor does our *understanding* of the picture come to rest. Correspondingly Kambartel summarizes his three analytical chapters as follows: The principle of Pollock's painting, that is, the one that integrates the three interpretive perspectives, can be viewed most easily in the "permanent aggressiveness as a sustained refusal of adaptation" (Kambartel 1970: 2, 31).

4　Aspect Change and Art

I may now come back to Wittgenstein's explanation of the term aspect. The aspect under which we understand something can define what has been perceived in a particular representational way, for example when we understand the triangle (shown in Fig. 2) alternately as a geometrical drawing, as a mountain, or as a fallen body, or when we see—as in


Fig. 2　Triangle (by the author)

Wittgenstein's famous example—the drawing (schematically reproduced in Fig. 3) as a rabbit or as a duck (PI 1997: 194, 200). In other cases, however, aspect does not so much *determine* the object as *structure* it. As an example of this other case, Wittgenstein cites a "jumble of meaningless lines," in which a "landscape" suddenly appears (Z 1967b: 34).[4] This landscape, which suddenly lights up in the lines, is due, according to Wittgenstein, to a phrasing of the eye, which organizes some lines—not necessarily all lines—differently. If the aspect of the jumble of lines changes into a landscape, then, in Wittgenstein's words, "parts of the picture go together which before did not" (LW 1982: no. 515; PI 1997: 208). Here divergent representational determinations do not tip into one another, as in the triangle or the Duck–Rabbit head, but a new aspect—the landscape—emerges out of the other—the jumble of lines. When the aspect is about such structuring of what is perceived, we shift, according to Wittgenstein, to a quite different meaning of the term "aspect," to a "very specific language game using the expression 'to see something *this* way'" (LW 1982: no. 654). Wittgenstein names the difference between the two language games right away in the first entry


Fig. 3   Duck–Rabbit (by the author)

of that chapter in the *Philosophical Investigations* that is dedicated to seeing aspect:

> Two uses of word "see". The one: "What do you see there?" – "I see *this*" (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: "I see a likeness in these two faces" […] What is important is the categorial difference between the two 'objects' of sight. (PI 1997: 193e)

In the first case, the object of seeing is an object that one recognizes in what is perceived; the triangle or the Duck–Rabbit head could serve as an example of this. In the other case, the object of seeing is something that I cannot point to because it means something *in between*, for instance, the similarity between two faces. In as much as this in-between is no object, Wittgenstein puts this term in quotation marks. For aspect does not name any object here, but rather a *relation* between two objects.

To explain this last case further Wittgenstein almost exclusively draws on examples from art. They come less from the area of visual arts and much more from music and literature, which were Wittgenstein's favourite arts. The conception of seeing aspect is correspondingly expanded, with "seeing" in each case meaning as much as "perceiving," regardless of which sense and which sense material is concerned in particular. In one of these examples, Wittgenstein cites the "important and remarkable fact" that a musical theme played at a quicker tempo can change its character. In the piece of music that one has so far heard as pieces constantly tearing away from one another, the parts suddenly fit one another and it is now experienced as an organism (CV 1980a: 74e; LW 1982: no. 677).[5] Here the relationality of aspect can be clearly seen. Experiencing the piece of music as an organism means recognizing a connection between its parts that had previously not been perceived. Wittgenstein illustrates this structuring activity of viewing or hearing with formulations that sound like excerpts from aesthetic conversations: "You have to hear this bar as an introduction;" "you must phrase the theme like this;" "one says, perhaps to an architect: 'This distribution of the windows makes the façade look in that direction;'" or we use the expression, "This arm interrupts the *movement* of the sculpture," and

suggest, "The movement should go like *this*," while making an appropriate gesture (PI 1997: 202; RPhPs 1/1980b: no. 19).

In Wittgenstein's expansive considerations of "aspect," dispersed over a number of his writings, art stands at the upper, complex end of a scale of examples that begins at the very bottom with simple geometrical schemes. At the same time, however, art also stands at the beginning of Wittgenstein's line of thought. In the first of the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, which paved the way for the aspect theory of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein poses the following questions, which he also immediately answers:

> For how have we arrived at the concept of 'seeing this as this'? On what occasion does it get formed, is it felt as a need? (Very frequently, when we are talking about a work of art.) (RPhPs 1/1980b: no. 1)

This initially only establishes that art is one of those situations in which seeing aspect frequently appears and gets thematized. Wittgenstein goes one significant step further when he, at another point, declares that *change* of aspect is the essential criterion of art:

> But the application [of the expression' I see it now like *this*, M.L.], after all, is completely different in aesthetics and descriptive geometry. In aesthetics isn't it essential that a picture or a piece of music, etc., can change its aspect for me? – And, of course, this is not essential for that topological demonstration. (LW 1982: no. 634)

How can we understand this claim? Where does the *essential* of the change in aspect lie in a work of art? What distinguishes the tipping between the various ways of conceiving the same triangle or between a rabbit and a duck from the change in aspect in an artwork, for instance when we perceive a piece of music "as if from far away",[6] or the traces of Pollock's act of painting as an immaterial depth of field?

With a geometrical figure like a triangle it may indeed be striking that it can also be conceived of as a mountain, but for the geometrical understanding of the scheme such a change in aspect is inessential. Its function consists in representing certain geometrical circumstances, for instance,

the relationships of the angles to one another. This function remains untouched by the possibility that the triangle can switch over into the image of a different object. But aspect change is essential, one might object, in the Duck–Rabbit head, although this is no work of art. For the function of this drawing, as opposed to the representation of the triangle, precisely does not consist in representing a certain circumstance, in this case, a rabbit or a duck. Rather, the function of the drawing consists in allowing these two conceptions, which in any respect strive to move away from one another, to flip over into one another. The goal of the Duck–Rabbit drawing is to allow for the paradox of aspect change to be experienced in a particularly intense way. So what distinguishes aspect change in the Duck–Rabbit head from that in a work of art?

The Duck–Rabbit head can be distinguished from works of art in that aspect change here remains peculiarly "empty of content" (Majetschak 2005: 249). The transition from rabbit to duck is indeed striking, but no meaning unfolds that leads beyond the phenomenon of the transition itself. The drawing precisely does not show us that a rabbit is sometimes also a duck. For our understanding of what rabbits and ducks are, the transitional image is therefore completely irrelevant. Formulations such as "If you see it like *this*, then you're seeing it right," which Wittgenstein makes for works of art, make no sense with the Duck–Rabbit head—indeed, they miss the point entirely. For the function of this figure within the framework of Wittgenstein's considerations of aspect consists in making a correct understanding impossible. For Wittgenstein, the Duck–Rabbit head is a kind of "emblem of resistance" against stabilizing interpretation (Mitchell 2008: 50).

I would like to summarize the state of the argument so far. What is essential to the experience of art, according to Wittgenstein, is not *seeing* an aspect, but experiencing a *change* in aspect—of "sudden change" ["*Umschlagen*"], of "change" ["*Verwandlung*"], or of a "fluctuation" of the perceived object, as Wittgenstein calls the phenomenon with a different shading in each case (LW 1982: no. 179; RPhPs 2/1980b: no. 526; RPhPs 1/1980b: no. 871)—that is, the paradoxical experience of a new perception with a simultaneous awareness that nothing material has changed in the object of perception. The comparison with the

transitional image of the Duck–Rabbit head, for which this is also the case, shows, however, that this criterion alone is not sufficient to be able to profile the experience of art. In order to do so, we have to understand the *particular* aspect change of art. Let us look more carefully then at what Wittgenstein has to say about this.

5   "Fitting"

Wittgenstein initially emphasizes the variety of interpretations that artworks open up. At the same time, he points out that these interpretations, in contrast to those of geometrical figures or the Duck–Rabbit head, cannot be deduced from sense qualities, but merely emerge from them. Since it is a matter of *organizing* what is perceived, there are no individual elements that can be found in the work that, for example, would be responsible for the fact that a jumble of lines would be perceived as a "landscape" or that a piece of music would be taken "as if from far away." In principle, we can always come across new aspects that lead to a constant transformation, a "fluctuation" of the artwork that cannot be detained. On the other hand, however, artworks present normative demands about how they wish to be seen. This is made clear in Wittgenstein's examples of communication about artworks, in which, according to him, sentences like "You have to see it like *this*, this is how it is meant," or "*Now* it's right" play a prominent role (PI 1997: 202e, 204e).

The following distinction is therefore decisive: While the point of the Duck–Rabbit head consists in its aspects being opposing but *equivalent*, in artworks the aspects are *evaluated*. For here there are aspects by which a qualitative increase is attributed to what is perceived. The criterion for such aspects is a quality that Wittgenstein positions quite centrally in his reflections. It is the quality of "fitting". "If I see it *this* way," writes Wittgenstein, "it fits *this*, but not *that*" (LW 1982: no. 654). In a similar way we speak of the "necessity" by which one musical theme succeeds another, accompanying the expression with a gesture (CV 1980a: 57e). At any rate, such gestures, according to Wittgenstein, indicate the difficulty of being able to conceptually grasp the "fitting" of the elements

or the "necessity" of a musical sequence in the respective works, which is why we compensate for this with a gesture. The gesture of the hand, which repeats the gesture of the music, takes the place of the missing words (PI 1997: 610; Z 1967b: no. 158; CV 1980a: 52e). For the paradigm of "fitting," the "rightness" of one structuring over another, is, according to Wittgenstein, "obscure" (CV 1980a: 57e).

What stands out here, then, is the *emergence* of aspect. The aesthetic configuration that I suddenly notice emerges from the sense qualities, without my being able to derive them from it. The call: "You have to see it like *this*, *this* is how it is meant!" in these cases does not refer to a representational recognition, for instance of a rabbit, but to a *different way of viewing* what has already been perceived. This other way of viewing cannot be deduced from the object of perception, nor can it be proved to be the correct one; one can merely make a case for it:

> I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently […]. I have changed his way of looking at things. (PI 1997: 144)

The experience of fitting associated with this new way of viewing, and giving this new way of viewing its power of persuasion, now has, as other remarks by Wittgenstein make clear, yet other dimensions than those that we have spoken of so far. So far it has been a matter of structurally organizing what is perceived, of the "ordering veil" (RPhPs 1/1980b: no. 961) that the aspect extends over the object. What appears at the same time, however, when an aspect lights up and rearranges the relations within the object of perception, are the relations of the object *to other objects*, which are opened up when it is seen in *this* way (PI 1997: 212e). Also, that can be observed in Jackson Pollock's *Number 32*. If I take the picture to be a non-representational pattern, it comes into relation with other patterns familiar to me from art and non-art. A corresponding conception of Pollock's painting caused contemporary art criticism to attack it as decorative bulk stock, which is why, in reverse, Kambartel insists on the non-iterative structure of the painting, which is exactly what distinguishes it from wallpaper. If, on the other hand, I perceive the picture as a representation, be it

of a depth of field or of the forces of nature, it is no longer wallpaper that is relevant as a comparable object, but altogether different objects, for instance Claude Monet's late pictures of water lilies (Fig. 4).[7] Interestingly, by establishing a relation between Pollock and Monet, which in fact became something of a topos in art criticism during the 1950s, the conception of the painting of *both* artists became modified— causing new aspects to appear in both of their work. The experience of Pollock's paintings led to the fact that Monet's late work was no longer primarily seen as the extension of Impressionism, but as the predecessor of Abstract Expressionism. Under the influence of Pollock's *Big Canvas Painting* Monet's water lilies were suddenly seen as the completion of a transition from picture as composition and as view through to picture as homogenous texture and as field. In reverse, from the perspective of Monet's late work it became possible to conceive of Pollock's drippings not only as a trace of action that refers back to the artist, and no longer recognizing his canvases as merely arenas for an existential painterly dance, but to see the paintings as a novel form of landscape painting. In other words: the formal aspect under which something is seen and the relations produced between the work of art and other objects become intertwined. If we notice a new trait in a work of art, it places it into a new context, and if a work of art is placed into a new context, this leads to perceiving certain aspects in it in the first place.

Compared with the triangular schema or even the Duck–Rabbit head, which does not make any significant demands on our ability to

Fig. 4 Claude Monet, *Le bassin aux nymphéas avec iris*, 1914/1922. Oil on canvas, 2 × 6 m. Kunsthaus Zürich, Donation Emil G. Bührle, 1952 (copyright Kunsthaus Zürich)

see the aspects in each case, seeing such aspects, as I have just cited with regard to Pollock's and Monet's paintings, require a certain connoisseurship. According to Wittgenstein, this connoisseurship has two shades. On the one hand, it requires practice in seeing pictures—or hearing music or reading poetry—in order to separate the structural qualities that are relevant to a work of art from the aesthetically irrelevant ones. This is one of the tasks of any art critic whose procedure Wittgenstein imitates in his example sentences—"You have to see it like *this*," "The movement should go like *this*," etc. The second requirement is knowledge. According to Wittgenstein, if I speak of the fact that a certain musical passage answers another, I have to be familiar with musical answers (CV 1980a: 52e). I must, according to Wittgenstein, be familiar with the specific language games of art, which ultimately means being familiar with the cultural frames within which the work emerged (CV 1980a: 52e; Wittgenstein 1967a: 25ff). Wittgenstein brings practice and knowledge together into a concept of fluency. Only someone who is capable of fluently playing these language games can say that he sees the relevant aspects; even more: only among those who are in the know does it make sense to say that they have *experienced* these aspects (PI 1997: 203e, 208e). Only someone well-versed in French–American modernist painting can come on the idea of comparing Pollock and Monet—with the interpretive consequences just outlined for the painting of both artists.

The experience of "fitting," however, endows even more relations than those just discussed. In the moment of an aspect lighting up, writes Wittgenstein, it is as if it fits "into the world of our thoughts and feelings" (CV 1980a: 47e). How can this be understood? In Wittgenstein aspect is founded neither in the perceived object nor in the observing subject, but is the result of their productive interplay. An aspect only lights up in a work of art when the observer appropriately manages to structure the object of perception, which for Wittgenstein requires familiarity in dealing with the relevant works of art, but also aesthetic sensibility. The work of art thus fits "into the world of our thoughts and feelings" because in each aspect under which a viewer sees the object, the way the object appears and the way the viewer conceives of it must agree, or, to put it a different way, because seeing as a *sense*

percept and thinking as a *concept* assigned to what is perceived must coincide.

Wittgenstein reveals one last dimension of "fitting" by speaking of the fact that understanding the internal organization of a work of art can cause it to be understood as the result of an artistic intention. Wittgenstein formulates this as follows:

> 'Of course, that's how it must be!' It is just as though you have understood a Creator's *purpose*. You have grasped the *system*. (CV 1980a: 26)

If we combine these different statements, which explain the lighting up of an aspect as an experience of "fitting," then what is affected in the aspect is:

1. the form of the work of art, which is seen in *this* way;
2. the external objects that relate to the work of art under *this* aspect;
3. the world of the one perceiving, in which what is perceived, understood in *this* way, fits in, and finally;
4. the artist's intention, which is *now* comprehensible.

Wittgenstein thus combines, as we can see, all the essential dimensions of understanding art: Whoever can "fittingly" relate the form, the context, the artistic intention, as well as the subjective meaning that a work of art gains for a self, can say of himself that he has understood the work of art.

6   Experience and Interpretation

Wittgenstein sees works of art as offers and promises, but also as demands on our perception. They are not entities that can be separated from the viewer, but that seek their relation to him. They get their shape in the interplay between their sense configuration, which they offer to the spectator, and the way that they are seen by him. Whoever has that experience of "fitting," due to practice, knowledge and aesthetic

sensibility, has the experience that a connection is created between subject and object that integrates both. This makes Wittgenstein's conception of aspect an answer to the fundamental question of aesthetic experience, what the relationship between an artistic object and the observer's perception actually is. It is an answer that defines this relationship between object and viewer as a productive interplay of both. Wittgenstein's considerations—but just as much Kambartel's interpretation of Pollock, which I brought in for illustration—make it clear that the aspect, lighting up in the object of perception and being noticed in it by the viewer, is the *medium* of the aesthetic experience, in as much it *interlinks* the subject and the object of the aesthetic experience. Aspect is like an immaterial "picture," which emerges in the interplay of object and individual perception, and which can neither be reduced to a quality of the object nor to the subjectivity of a particular way of conceiving. Aspect is an endowed relation, and, according to Wittgenstein, it is a relation that "fits."

Wittgenstein's considerations make it clear that not only do we have different experiences with each work of art, but that this difference in each case is formative both for the experience as well as the understanding of the work of art. For even if Wittgenstein defines the phenomenon that a work of art can change its aspect as essential to the experience of art, aspect change is in no way already the actual contents of the aesthetic experience. Rather, aspect change is merely the starting point for a complex process of understanding, which has to interrelate the various aspects that come to light in the work of art and to define them in their relations to one another. Therefore the aspects that come into play—and thus also the changes between them—are specific to each work of art. The experience that a particular lineament is both iterative as well as contingent, both a wall as well as an unlimited depth of field, both an expression of a subject as well as a representation of the forces of nature, can be made in *this* way and in this combination only with Pollock's painting.

Since for Wittgenstein the experience of art not only opens up certain faculties in the subject, but is expressly related to a particular work of art in each case, which is opened up in its particularity in this

experience, it is clear that the *experience* of the work of art already spills over into its *interpretation*. Wittgenstein's concept of aspect is therefore dual. It is, as Wittgenstein himself emphasizes, a concept of experience (PI 1997: 193e). At the same time, however, it is—and this is what makes it relevant for the discipline of art history—a concept of art historical hermeneutics.

Notes

1. Kambartel is referring here—even with literal citations—to Harold Rosenberg, "The American Action Painters", which first appeared in: *Artnews* 51 (1952) 8, 22f. and 48–50.
2. Reference to Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* is hereafter abbreviated: (PI 1997).
3. Reference to Wittgenstein's *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* is hereafter abbreviated as: (RPhPs 1980b), followed by Arabic numerals for the volume; while reference to Wittgenstein's *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology* is hereafter abbreviated as: (LW 1982).
4. Reference to Wittgenstein's *Zettel* is hereafter abbreviated as: (Z 1967b).
5. Reference to Wittgenstein's *Culture and Value* is hereafter abbreviated as: (CV 1980a).
6. An oblique reference to Schumann's piece for piano, "Wie aus der Ferne" ["As if from far away."] (RPhPs 1/1980b: no. 250).
7. Reference is made especially to the dyptich *Le bassin aux nymphéas, le soir* (The Waterlily pond in the Evening; c.1916–22); technique: oil on canvas, each section 200×300 cm; Inv., no. 1952/1964. Zurich and Kunsthaus.

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11

On a Certain Vagueness in the Definition of Art: Margolis' Aesthetics and Wittgenstein's Legacy

Roberta Dreon

It is a really strange thing that Ludwig Wittgenstein has been ascribed such a crucial place in the development of contemporary aesthetics, even though the Austrian philosopher produced little writing on the philosophy of art. Yet when Morris Weitz presented his thesis about Wittgenstein being the new starting point for any future progress in this field—in 1956, namely three years later the publication of the *Philosophical Investigations*—he was not wrong from a historical point of view.[1] At least Wittgenstein's scattered thoughts about the structure, range and boundaries of conceptual definitions played a crucial role in the field of analytic aesthetics, where philosophers were discussing the definition of art, either in order to deny the possibility of a general definition or in order to give a positive answer.

My suggestion here is to consider Joseph Margolis' aesthetics as an insightful way of drawing a critical balance of the whole venture of the definition of art with a crucial reference to Wittgenstein's legacy. Margolis represents an intellectually intriguing case because of his peculiar

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philosophical trajectory: he began his career in the aesthetic field by taking part in the debate on the ontology of art, which eventually led him to approach the philosophy of culture and philosophical anthropology. His seminal essay *Works of Art as Physically Embodied and Culturally Emergent Entities* was published in 1974, while one of his more recent books on this topic carries the significant title *The Art and the Definition of the Human: Toward a Philosophical Anthropology* (2009).

In order to assess the influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy on Margolis' aesthetics, I will start from an essay entitled *The Importance of Being Earnest About the Definition and Metaphysics of Art*, where the American philosopher reconsiders the whole debate on the definition of art. In this article, published in 2010, Margolis argues that Wittgenstein's stance in the *Philosophical Investigations* did not lead him to deny the possibility of defining art in general. On the contrary, the Austrian thinker acknowledged a wide variety of contextual definitions while strictly avoiding the generalization or systematic extension of any one of them. In a few words, according to Margolis Wittgenstein's legacy teaches tolerance of the considerable degree of informality and vagueness characterizing our ordinary ways of dealing with concepts, instead of censoring all definitional attempts because they fail to be clear and distinct.

My task will be to ask Margolis himself, if his definition of art can be interpreted in this way—to discover to what extent it can be considered an answer to Wittgenstein's solicitations or how far it departs from it and why. This general issue involves a double inquiry, to understand the sense of Margolis' engagement in the analytical debate on the definition of art and to focus on the elements in his early formulation, which had a sort of disruptive effect on his aesthetics, by reshaping it into a more comprehensive philosophical anthropology.

1   Defining *Definition* and Framing the Debate on the Definition of Art

When Margolis says that Morris Weitz never tried to define definition (Margolis 2010: 2), his statement should be understood obliquely—as often is the case with Margolis' provocative style. In *The Role of Theory*

in Aesthetics the author clearly has an idea of definition—an idea that has to be rejected in the artistic field, according to his perspective based on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. Nevertheless, Margolis' point is that Weitz assumes that this is the *only* possible concept of definition, and this is the reason why Weitz himself claims that we must reject any attempt to define art *tout court*.

It is an idea clearly derived from modern philosophy, according to which a definition consists in listing an exhaustive and limited set of necessary and sufficient properties that must be satisfied in order to define something as such. These properties are what is common to the various occurrences of a specific concept. This conception of definition involves the complementary assumption that a definition of something is either true (if it specifies all the necessary and sufficient properties that have to be ascribed to a specific concept) or false (if it is not the case): from this point of view, no third, intermediate chance can be given to a strict binary logic of true and false, as Margolis has argued in other essays (Margolis 1976). Moreover this kind of definition is supposed to be clear and distinct, namely, it is assumed that the boundaries of the concept under examination are sharply cut so that each definition is exclusive: it allows us to precisely establish what is covered by a particular concept and what remains outside of it. A definition, in this sense, is a sharpened tool for distinguishing something from something else, by avoiding any overlapping of their conceptual boundaries, any fuzzy limits.

According to Weitz, this idea of definition does not conform to art only because different theories of art have empirically failed when applied to new artworks that challenged previous assumptions. The argument he derives from Wittgenstein's investigations on the use of the word *game* is that this failure is based on the logical structure of the concept of art. In other words, it is the grammar of the word *art*, which prevents any definition of art. Weitz claims that *art* is an open concept, namely a concept lacking a limited set of necessary and sufficient conditions: there is no uniquely common trait among the different usages of the word *art* and an innovative work of art can always open a new context of use for the concept of art, pushing us (or, better, artists and art experts) to decide whether to expand the concept and include the

new case or not. Hence, according to Weitz's reading of Wittgenstein on games, the aesthetician should abandon the enterprise of defining art: rather, his philosophical task should consist in investigating the different uses of the word *art* and the correct conditions in which the concept may be applied.

This is why, according to Margolis, Weitz and the whole debate on the definition of art have misunderstood Wittgenstein: the reason lies in their assumption that either a definition is possible in the sense criticized by Weitz or that we have to reject the whole definition game. It is this simple dualistic alternative that Margolis wishes to criticize as unfaithful to Wittgenstein's spirit. According to Margolis, while showing the different uses of the word *game*, the Austrian philosopher was endorsing a different idea of language that was essentially tolerant towards more or less informal or vague definitions, as well as towards the frequently only approximately envisaged contexts of use. Wittgenstein was fighting against the ideology according to which language is ideally perfect:

> The point of all of this is that Wittgenstein is attempting to free us from the utopian constraints of early analytic philosophy favored by Frege, Russel, Wittgenstein himself (in the *Tractatus*), and the self-entrapping mistakes of dependent movements like those of logical positivism – false forms of rigor that deform philosophy. (Margolis 2010: 8)

According to Margolis, Wittgenstein was open to many kinds of definitions "within the scope of ordinary usage" (Margolis 2010: 6) that despite being informal—or by virtue of their informality, as Margolis himself argues in his second *Venetian Lecture* (Margolis 2017: 63–96)[2]—work successfully in most human contexts. A crucial feature of the *Philosophical Investigations* is the fact that their author always insists on the contextual background in which a specific utterance is rooted: he remains open to "special purposes" that can be connected to certain definitions—also to "essential" definitions—and "nowhere generalizes in the way Weitz does" (ibid.).

Consequently, the lesson we, as aestheticians, can learn from Wittgenstein is not to simply abandon the aim of defining art. We can

search for a definition of art whose boundaries are more or less precise according to the specific purpose we are pursuing—indeed, sometimes our ordinary conversations already imply a definition. Margolis' explicit bias for a kind of "robust relativism" (Margolis 1976)[3]—involving a wider, more complex series of possibilities between false and non-false—leads to a reading of Wittgenstein as favouring a tolerant, pluralistic and practice-specific use of linguistic definitions with reference to the multiple varieties of artistic games we humans share. The point is that we cannot neglect the links between our definition and the specific context, as well the particular aim we are pursuing—even when the special situation we are dealing with is represented by the philosophical venture of defining art.

According to Margolis, this failure to contextualize the concept of art is precisely one of the main weak points in the whole debate on the definition of art. This deficiency regards many intertwined levels—artistic, historical and social planes. Margolis' starting point for this argument is constituted by the examples chosen by Weitz and above all by Danto. Morris Weitz mentions Virginia Wool's *To the Lighthouse* and Joyce's *Finnegans Wakes*, which is to say "well-known artworks that once worried the flexibility of our classificatory schemes but that have now been safely reconciled with them" (Margolis 2010: 2). On the other hand, Margolis emphasizes that Arthur Danto chooses Andy Warhol's Brillo Box[4] as his main reference for his famous essay *The Artworld* instead of the more troubling *Fountain* by Duchamp. This makes a capital difference because, as Margolis infers from Thierry de Duve's analysis, "Duchamp threw the artworld and the aesthetician's sense of the 'artworld' into disarray; Warhol petitioned for admission to the established artworld" (Margolis 2010: 3). Something similar was affirmed in the 1970s by Peter Bürger, who went so far as to announce the death of the avant-garde movements for this reason. While Duchamp rejected the idea of an artistic institution as an autonomous realm, the artistic movements of the 1950s and 1960s were trying to find a place in that allegedly independent realm (Bürger 1984: 109). That is to say that Danto's attempt to define art based exclusively on conceptual or philosophical resources—independently of any social and historical context—is largely dependent on a form of life where the arts are

experienced as something autonomous and self-referential, basically isolated from the other practices and activities characterizing our ordinary lives.

Radicalizing Margolis' suggestion, I would say that the analytic debate on the definition of art would never have been developed if we ourselves were not the product of a form of culture based on the so-called autonomy of art—dating back more or less to the second half of the eighteenth century—and if in the first half of the twentieth century some artists had not tried to challenge this autonomy. Hence, one of the main problems with the whole debate on the definition of art from Weitz onwards is that it has neglected the historical and cultural context out of which the request for an art definition arose. In other words, the philosophical venture in question seems to ignore the fact that its central issue could emerge only within a cultural form whereby we no longer kneel before our Madonnas and saints, but appreciate their pure aesthetic value in museums by means of a few intermediaries—aestheticians and art critics—who can reassure us with regard to their aesthetic significance.[5] A second important—and neglected—component of the form of life favouring the question "What is art?" has to do with the fact that the alleged artistic autonomy championed by aestheticians and artists at the end of the eighteenth century was strongly challenged by the economic force of industrial production. Duchamp was ironically trying to focus our attention exactly on this point by means of artistic tools: this is the reason why the need to define art became urgent—not in the alleged ideal artistic version of the City of God, mentioned by Danto (Danto 1964: 582), but in the Earthly City of human culturally specific *Vorgänge*.[6]

2   Works of Art, Embodiment, Emergence and Cultural Contexts

From the historical debate on the ontology of art, which we have explored with explicit reference to Wittgenstein, let us now return to Joe Margolis' first formulation of his theory about the arts. Was it a definition? What kind of definition was it? What were the aims he

was pursuing by means of such a definition and what were its—at least partially—unforeseen consequences?

Works of Art as Physically Embodied and Culturally Emergent Entities, published exactly ten years after Danto's *The Artworld*, might be described as a paper that was already critical in relation to the analytical ways of answering the questions on the ontology of art. While in the 1970s, Margolis was still using lexical and argumentative resources basically derived from the analytical tradition, it seems to me that in those years he wanted to suggest a different way of approaching the issue from within the debate on the definition of art.[7] However, I think that some of the crucial features he introduced in his definition could not be satisfactorily dealt with through traditional analytical tools and led his philosophical inquiry towards unexpected outcomes. The analogy between works of art and human beings, the idea of emergence and the issue of the cultural tradition were laden with wider consequences, such that in the following decades they pushed his inquiries from the limited field of art ontology to those of the philosophy of culture and philosophical anthropology.

For the purpose of this paper, I think that a good way to read Margolis' essay is through a steady comparison with Danto on the one hand and Wittgenstein on the other. Margolis' main purpose in defining works of art as "physically embodied and culturally emergent entities" is explicitly constituted by the need to acknowledge that works of art are real: they are a (more or less important) part of our real world, they can affect the world we live in, they contribute to shaping and changing some aspects of our reality and they can act on us and elicit further changes. Why should we deny that they are real because they do not conform to the standard of physical entities?

We are not obliged to espouse a form of "excessive idealism that finds nothing in the public world that could count as a work of art and an excessive (or reductive) materialism that denies that anything exists that is not merely and entirely physical" (Margolis 1974: 187).

By adopting the paradigm that being real means being physical, Danto is compelled to negate that artworks are real and yet he claims that they exist on an ontological level, different from that of the physical world. Nowadays I could imagine Margolis asking in a somehow

subversive mood: Why should we adopt such an oversimplified and misleading image of being real? Why should we be intolerant with the many nuances of being "real" we refer to successfully, although rather informally, in our ordinary linguistic exchanges?

In 1974, with a more analytically oriented style and vocabulary, Margolis argued that a work of art is embodied in a physical entity or in some physical features because this acknowledgement allows us to identify the extension of an artwork in an unproblematic way. Hence, saying that a work of art is embodied in a physical object implies that the identity of the artwork is indissolubly connected to the identity of the physical object and not supervenient upon it, as is the case according to Danto's interpretation. Nevertheless, works of art are culturally emergent entities, which is to say that they also have further properties in addition to those that can be ascribed to the physical entities in which they are embodied, namely properties that are dependent on a given cultural context. These culturally emergent properties constitute the intensions through which a specific work of art can be identified as such. In this paper, Margolis seems to assume that physical entities have context-free properties, while later he will come to question this point. Nevertheless, through the idea of cultural properties as the intension for identifying the embodied extension of an artwork, a strict interplay and mutual determination between physical and cultural properties gained ground as a characteristic feature of artworks.

There are also other elements pushing towards further developments. Of course one of them is represented by the concept of "emergence" that towards the end of his essay Margolis defines "as concerned with the question of the enabling circumstances under which entities of given kinds first exist relative to a backdrop of entities of other sorts" (Margolis 1974: 195). It is, of course, a very provisional and merely formal characterization of emergence: later (for example in Margolis 2010) it will become clear that the "enabling circumstances" producing a new form of organization and a feedback action on the previous physical or biological circumstances are connected to the transformation introduced by the completely contingent but definitive acquisition of natural languages and shared practices in the human naturally cultural form of life.

Correlatively, the other element pushing towards a philosophy focused on the relations between nature and culture in the human world is represented by Margolis' stress in the 1974 paper on the similarity between works of art and persons. It is clear that this analogy is already very important for Margolis—in any case, it is much more relevant than Danto's very short reference in *The Artworld* to the common irreducibility of both persons and works of art to the parts they are composed of (Danto 1964: 576). On the contrary, it has to do with the emergence of a novel form of being out of previous ontological resources and without the intervention of any transcendental force—only the completely contingent forces of human enculturation are at stake, but they make a crucial difference in the world we share with non-human forms of life and also with inanimate modes of organization.

A third important element deserving attention is constituted by Margolis' reference to "the cultural context", "cultural traditions", "the traditions of a given culture" and also "cultural habituation", which imply a clear reference to Wittgenstein's "forms of life". However, only later will Margolis explicitly recover Wittgenstein's "inchoate notion of *Lebensform*" (Margolis 2017: 98). The relevance of this family of words becomes more evident when it is compared to Danto's conception of the "artworld". As it is well known, Danto states that the identification of something as a work of art rather than an indiscernible physical object is logically dependent on an artworld, namely "an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art" (Danto 1964: 580). It is clear that the artworld is not a given culture: it completely lacks the inclusive, pervasive and social character of a cultural tradition, its primarily practical and habitual features, its bottom-up configuration and its largely impersonal and shared structuring. Danto's artworld is an over-intellectualized condition of possibility for something to be identified as an artwork, depending on the top-down decision to add a new strategic predicate to the list of possible properties making something artistically valuable.

When Margolis says that something can be qualified as a work of art only within a cultural context, he means something similar to the idea of culture defined by anthropology, which he later characterized

as a *sittliche* practice and *Lebensform*. This makes a great difference because, while Danto's preference for the *artworld*[8] contributes de facto to reinforcing the ideology of the autonomy of art, Margolis' constant reference to the *cultural* emergence of artworks reminds us that artistic practices and products are basically connected to a human form of life even when they are critical of a particular culture—in other words, a *Lebensform* is a way of interacting with a given environment that is already significant and socially shared before a peculiar work of art can be produced, experienced or defined as such.

To conclude my analysis of this essay, it is true that Margolis was trying to produce a kind of definition: this aim is explicit from the very title of his article. But what kind of definition was he suggesting? Even if it might seem at first that his characterization of artworks conforms to the idea of definition criticized by Weitz, it does not: Margolis did not seek to list a complete series of properties that could be exclusively and exhaustively attributed to artworks. Embodiment and emergence are of course crucial features from his point of view. We could even say that they are necessary conditions for something to be a work of art, but for sure they cannot be considered sufficient conditions: the assumption that the relevant properties of an artwork are dependent on a historical and cultural context implies that with reference to a work of art we cannot know a priori what crucial properties it will acquire, but we can identify them from time to time in a completely contingent way.

Furthermore, both embodiment and emergence are not properties that are supposed to be ascribed exclusively to works of art. Quite the opposite! Artworks share embodiment and emergence with persons and—as will become clear in Margolis' following essays—with the complex variety of entities composing the human cultural world. Seen from a traditional point of view, Margolis' definition of an artwork as a physically embodied and culturally emergent entity seems to be too broad: every artefact, social object or institution could be qualified in such terms.

I do not know whether in the 1970s Margolis was completely aware of all the implications of his definition. In any case, Margolis' definition turned out to be an unsharpened tool when seen from the *esprit de géométrie* inspiring most analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, it seems

to be a fruitful definition if it is seen for what it is, namely a definition serving specifically philosophical purposes: those of placing artworks in connection with placing ourselves, to quote the title of one of his later paper.

3   Developing the Anthropological Consequences of the Concept of Art

I think that most of the subsequent philosophical inquiries carried out by Joseph Margolis can be regarded as a development of the consequences entailed by his (consciously) vague definition.

We have already seen how one of the problematic aspects involved in Margolis' first definition is that it is too inclusive: it can be applied to the whole cultural world and not only to artworks. However, Margolis turns this limit into a positive result: his somehow general definition of art shows a basic continuity between artworks and cultural entities and leads us to inquiry into their being different forms of human utterances. Artworks are very similar to human speech as well as to human movements: all of them are embodied in physical entities or features, but they are what they are—artworks and not only flat painted canvas, words and not simply meaningless sounds, acts and not mere sequences of mechanical events—because they belong to the human cultural world. Consequently, Margolis' additional developments in the aesthetic field are centred on the role played by these cultural utterances in the constitution of the human self. We could say that the question "What is art?" is reversed into the issue "What is the artistic (and linguistic) contribution to the shaping of the human animal out of pre-human primates?"

This shift from an ontology of art to its implications for an understanding of the human constitution as a completely natural, albeit disruptive, phenomenon can well be illustrated by focusing on the adverb "culturally" used in Margolis' original definition and its further development. Stating that something is culturally emergent means that it is impossible to say what it is before its configuration takes place within a

specific cultural context. To understand whether something is an avant-garde artwork or a serialized commercial product—as well as to draw a distinction between a religious ritual and the aesthetic quality of a psalm—we have to consider the specific culture in which it emerged. This culture is contingent but not arbitrary, in the sense that it is already there before any subjective or intellectual decision can be made on the ontological status of the investigated object or event. Hence, although it sounds different in tone, Margolis' definition involves a Wittgensteinian request: if you wish to understand if a given object is an artwork, look and see what that specific group of humans do with it, how they use it within their different practices, including linguistic ones.

Certainly, Wittgenstein would not have used Margolis' general formula, whose status is effectively uncertain. It is a kind of general—in the sense of widely open, inclusively vague—definition that could be understood as an operative or preliminary and provisional assumption, that is one that must always be specified in relation to a given cultural situation.[9]

However, contextualism is only a part of the issue. The point is that Margolis ultimately questions the relation between a cultural form of life and the nature of the persons or selves taking part in it. In his third Venetian lecture (Margolis 2017: 98) he explicitly stretches Wittgenstein's rather vague concept of *Lebensform* in this sense: it is not only the collective, shared mode of living we have in common and we are dynamically configuring and re-configuring from within. A form of life should be understood as the whole process of internal and external constitution of human selves, whose shaping takes place in a common space, via mutual reactions and interactions (Dreon 2017: 26). To be honest, this radicalization of Wittgenstein's concept seems to me to be closer to the social psychology developed by Dewey and Mead (Dewey 1988; Mead 1934, 2011) than to the thought of the Austrian philosopher, whose reticence to adopt an explicit stance is well known. Anyway, this is the reason why Margolis argues that defining art involves a philosophy of culture, i.e. that a philosophical inquiry is required into the role played by culture with respect to our emergence as a peculiar form of living being. We have to pose the question of why human animals are naturally disposed to produce and share cultural utterances—be they

artistic, linguistic or even of another sort—as well as to walk, eat, drink and play.[10]

This is the point of departure for Margolis' interpretation of human beings as hybrid artefacts—namely as members of the biological species *Homo sapiens* that have been profoundly reshaped by the linguistic and intellectual capacities they have acquired in a completely contingent way, enabling them to share collective (not merely associative) practices and to make reference to themselves, i.e. to their individual experience (Margolis 2004, 2009, 2017). From this perspective, we can make better sense of the analogy between the arising of a statue out of a piece of white marble and the configuration of one's own identity and reflectivity out of a pre-personal, already shared common experience.[11] The deviant ontology of works of art[12] no longer appears deviant if it is understood against the background of the complete yet irreversible appearance of humans as cultural agents, capable of acting on and reconfiguring the natural world from within.

In any case, this move towards a philosophical anthropology leads Margolis far away from the strictly analytic space of the definition of art. On the contrary, it brings him closer to one of the basic insight in western aesthetics, namely Friedrich Schiller's idea that the arts should be understood as having to do with the mixed structure of our humanity.[13]

To conclude with a final balance, Margolis is very incisive in showing that a definition of art involves a much wider background, including a more or less explicit interpretation of the peculiarities of the human being and the cultural world. An only context-independent definition of art is impossible, as is an exhaustive characterization of the cultural background out of which a specific artwork arises—a form of life is always at least partially opaque and its borders are always relatively vague. Nevertheless, Margolis' philosophical venture also shows that we are compelled to broaden the margins of the definition so much that the question arises of whether it is still worthwhile to debate a philosophical definition of art as a singular noun, beyond the everyday usage of the term *definition*. The situation seems to be similar to that characterizing John Dewey's approach to the arts insofar as it leads us back to the basic features of human experience. His emphasis on the continuity

between artworks and human interactions with a natural and naturally social environment might seem unsatisfactory if it were presented as providing a definition of art. However, Dewey never made any claim of this sort and his reflections were explicitly guided by other questions, essentially unrelated to the question "What is art?"

Evidently, Margolis reached analogous conclusions by following a different philosophical path, including a crucial transition through the theoretical framework of the analytical debate. This is probably the reason why he never gave up on the issue of definition, while profoundly redefining it.[14] Yet, he probably ought to have done so—not because of the consciously vague status of his definition, but rather because his question does not seem like the right one to pose.

Notes

1. As a matter of fact, Weitz clearly states in his theses that: "My model in this type of logical description or philosophy derives from Wittgenstein. It is also he who, in his refutation of philosophical theorizing in the sense of constructing definitions of philosophical entities, has furnished contemporary aesthetics with a starting point for any future progress" (Weitz 1956: 30).
2. It has to be said that precisely in the second of his *Venetian Lectures* (Margolis 2017: 63–96), Margolis will criticize also Wittgenstein in this sense, because according to him in *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein had suffered a residual claim to amend ordinary language from its enchantments.
3. On Margolis' relativism see Margolis (1976) and Zilioli (2007).
4. Nevertheless, we must remember that in *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art* Danto focuses on Duchamp's. *In Advance of the Broken Arm* (namely, an example of the serially produced tool for shovelling snow).
5. My reference is of course to the very famous passage from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Margolis makes just a short reference to Hegel in this paper. However, given his open bias for Hegel's philosophy, I believe that his thoughts about this subject are not foreign to the so-called "end of art" thesis.

6. Margolis himself points out Wittgenstein's preference for the informal word "*Vorgänge*" (Margolis 2010: 7).

7. For some information on Margolis' philosophical career, see his *Interview* (Margolis 2014) but also Gronda (2015) and Dreon (2017). Very briefly, he could probably be defined as a sort of free agent, from an intellectual point of view: he was educated in the analytical tradition, but soon became unsatisfied with it because of a certain narrowness he found in this philosophical approach; later he came to closely focus on phenomenology and classical German philosophy, ultimately adopting a pragmatist view in philosophy.

8. See also the Danto–Dickie debate in Danto (1992) and Dickie (2012). For a completely different concept of artworld, see Becker (1982).

9. See also Margolis' second lecture in Margolis (2017), where he emphasizes the mongrel, vague, informal character of ordinary language as a positive feature not to be rectified.

10. Of course I am paraphrasing Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, § 25.

11. On this point see Pryba (2015: 229).

12. See Margolis (2000), where the ontology of artwork is considered deviant in comparison to physical things. However, at a certain point the American philosopher will also problematize the status of physical things because they belong to the human world and consequently have to be considered as at least partially cultural. This discourse goes in the direction of Margolis' constructivist realism.

13. "Nature commences with man no better than with her other works; she acts for him where he cannot yet act as a free intelligence. But this fact creates him a man, that it does not rest satisfied with the results of mere nature […]" (Schiller 1845: 7).

14. For some illuminating remarks on the difference between neopragmatism and classic pragmatism, see Cometti (2010).

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12

The Sides of Limit and the Possibilities for Artistic Creation: On the Influence of Wittgenstein's Philosophy on Contemporary Art

Davide Dal Sasso

The paper addresses the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy on contemporary art. The presented hypothesis highlights two teachings in particular that can be drawn from Wittgenstein's philosophy: one is linked to the work of investigation and analysis that aims at clarifying the dimensions and the essence of an object of investigation; the other concerns the identification of the limit and the relationship with the possibility of overcoming it. Both teachings are dealt with considering the question of form, the possible symmetry between the philosophical and the artistic work, and paying attention to the two productive directions of contemporary art: the former characterised by the strengthening of form, and the latter marked by its impoverishment.

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1   Two Wittgensteinian Teachings

Among the teachings that can be drawn from Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy, there are two in particular that I think were pivotal to its influence on contemporary art. The first teaching is closely tied to Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy. The examination of the limits and imperfections of language, crucial to address the enigmas that it contributes to generate,[1] can be considered as a philosophical work developed through meticulous scrutiny and analysis of the problems that it progressively tackles. A work that originates in his will to reach the heart of philosophical issues, and that has two features in particular: (i) it aims at encircling the problem that is examined, namely in order to investigate it 'from side to side' and define it; (ii) its purpose is to overcome the surface of the problem and gain access to its deep core. I propose to call it the 'teaching of analytical depth', and I recapitulate it as follows: addressing an enigma means detecting its proportion, trying to overcome its surface so as to fully grasp its essence.

  The second teaching concerns the identification of the limit and, more precisely, the opening to the possibility or impossibility that determines and follows it. This is a key issue in Wittgenstein's philosophy, which is profoundly intertwined with his own remarks, and which can be captured if we think in particular of the distinction he traces between saying and showing. In his *Tractatus* he sees logic as a mirror image of the world (6.13) assuming that its propositions say nothing (6.121) but show something (cf. Wittgenstein [1922] 1988). What can be said is what can be expressed; what cannot be expressed is what can be shown. To say, therefore, is to express something, depict it (considering that an image can depict possible situations); to show is to make something evident, exhibit it. The relationship between the limit and this double opening, in direction of possibility or impossibility, can be examined in the light of Wittgenstein's remarks on the nature of proposition and language, and above all the very nature of limit: it is a sign of impossibility but, unexpectedly, of possibility too. The issue can be summed up in the words of Luigi Perissinotto (2008: 58): '[u]ltimately, one could say that for *Tractatus* what cannot be said is all that makes it possible for something to be said (thought, depicted)'.[2]

All the same, the clarification of this issue cannot overlook the influence of the picture theory of language on Wittgenstein's philosophy. In this regard, two matters in particular ought to be analyzed. First, the opening to possibility or impossibility concerns the question of expression. As Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) propose, the latter can be addressed by recognizing in Wittgenstein's philosophy the idea of 'language as a universal means', whose ultimate problem is the ineffability of semantics and its relationships.[3] The limits of language, the impossibility to say and the possibility to show, can be taken as a consequence of the ineffability of semantic relations, and the inexpressibility of simple objects and logical forms. Second, the 'logical form', a central notion in Wittgenstein's reflection on the relationship between language and world, can be usefully clarified considering the interdependence between depicting and mirroring. According to Hintikka, language can be the image of the world insofar as it may mirror the logical form of the world, and this would be the result of the very logical form of a sentence and not of its possible function as image.[4]

The remarks about the relationship between language and the world allow to see the limit's role in relation to the issue of expression. However, Wittgenstein's philosophical work is carried out insisting on another relationship where the limit is equally important: the one between thought and language. The drawbacks of language—that philosophers are often met with when they give voice to their thoughts—reveal the problem of expression[5]: the latter concerns neither the possibilities and limits of words alone, nor just the possibilities and limits of thought.

The second teaching therefore concerns the possibilities of expression, and more precisely the deep connection between limit, possibility and impossibility—a relationship that in turn is defined by form, for it is an indispensable structural element that affects its overcoming or preservation. My proposal is to call this the 'teaching of possibility', and summarize it as follows: identifying the limit and its proportion opens to two directions: either stop at the impossibility or proceed with alternatives and, often, unexpected possibilities.

2   Possibility and Impossibility

Let us consider the second teaching and the relationship between possibility and impossibility. What cannot be said can nonetheless be shown to the extent that individuating the limit excludes the possibility of saying, and namely opens to the possibility of showing. The core of the question is the following: identifying the limit and examining its scope means either admitting the impossibility or opening up to alternative possibilities to those that one assumes to have. Concerning this interpretation, it could be argued that it works better for Wittgenstein's last philosophy rather than for his early one. However, this objection is the result of a limit's identification and the choosing to stop at the impossibility, not taking into account other possibilities.

In presenting a summary of the main irresolute approaches, James Conant (2004) defends a unitary conception of Wittgenstein's philosophy and notes that it should not be interpreted as if its main idea is that there is always something that cannot be done.[6] His view of the various readings of Wittgenstein's philosophy—resolute and irresolute—offers a clarification on the approaches that guide them, and ultimately also allows to recognize a kind of movement in Wittgenstein's thought, which supports the thesis on the continuity between his former and latter philosophical production. Such a movement, in agreement with this interpretation, could essentially be described as a transition from impossibility to possibility. From the identification of limit, which consists of analyzing its nature and thinking of it as a component of the impossibility, to its overcoming in direction of an imaginative perspective. Namely, as Stanley Cavell (1979) writes, establishing connections to see other possibilities through imagination, and recognizing the potential expressive successes or failures in our relation with others.[7]

The movement of thought lies in the analysis of limit, or better, following Conant's argument, in the ability to address the pressure of certain philosophical puzzlements not only by identifying the limit, but also by moving beyond it, and thus succeeding in thinking of both sides.[8] For this to happen, a double acknowledgment is required: of the limit and its overcoming. This undertaking is not relegated to the

individual sphere alone. Rather, it necessarily belongs to the relational one too, viz. to the attempt to express the thought through language and interaction with the external world. On this subject, Cavell offers a precious image of the form of life as a mutual unification of the social and natural, two different but complementary needs: one is expressive (the relationship amongst people), the other is logical (the relationship between grammar and words).[9] The close bond between the two kinds of necessity refers to the imaginative ability that makes it possible, namely to the possibilities that may arise precisely because drawing the limit also means opening up to the prospect of its overcoming. The very nature of the limit determines the relationship between possibility and impossibility: being a resistance, a boundary signal, the limit is also the trace that urges to start over.

3   Form and Its Outlines

In passing from the first to the second phase of his philosophy, Wittgenstein deals with the question of dogmatism and identifies a constraint due to form. In the *Tractatus*, with the notion of 'form' he indicates 'the possibility of structure' (2.033), a sort of 'transcendental structure': form makes structuring something possible. But in order to be able to grasp its essence, one cannot only stop at the semblance: form must be overcome. Philosophers are often persuaded to follow nature, while they follow the outlines of form through which they look at it, Wittgenstein writes (cf. Wittgenstein ([1953] 1981), I, §114: 48e). Dogmatism is thus the result of a philosophical approach that emphasizes the structure, the outlines that establish the reference grid of form. The question of form concerns both teachings: delving into an enigma involves overcoming its surface, going beyond form, and thus gain access to its deep core. Identifying the limit can mean either stopping the investigation altogether or finding other ways, namely other possibilities, and go beyond the outlines of form. Abstract or tangible, form originates constraints. In this sense, dogmatism can be conceived of as a way of rigidly adhering to form and, in particular, to its outlines.

The two teachings presented, of depth and possibility, are related to the dimension of form insofar as they can give rise to approaches that aim at questioning its primacy, both in philosophical inquiries and artistic productions. The hypothesis I would like to draw rests on this symmetry. The artist does not do philosophy. Yet, her/his work can share with philosophy more than we would be willing to believe. She/he addresses the limits her/his work imposes, and finds a way to carry it out; a research of possibilities that her/his imagination concurs to direct. Traditionally, her/his choices are closely related to the potential offered by the creation of forms, which are conceived as the universal means to make art. In other words, in her/his work the interest towards depiction is pivotal, since her/his aim is to create a form that represents something. However, two productive directions define twentieth century art: the strengthening of form and its impoverishment. To some artists, form is a priority; to others, it is an element that can be relegated to contingency. Form is crucial in traditional artistic kinds (e.g. painting, cinema, dance, theatre, sculpture etc.); it becomes of secondary importance when artists emphasize the practice that makes it possible—as in conceptualist works.

4   Between Saying and Hiding

Wittgenstein and his philosophy have influenced many operative artists since the second half of the twentieth century. Such influence can be preliminarily described as follows. Strengthening form often means rigidly following its outlines, studying its enigmas in search of possibilities within it. Impoverishing form means working on expression through the search of possibilities to go beyond form, instead. My hypothesis is that the two Wittgensteinian teachings are both decisive in the two different ways of making art, to the extent that the two directions originate in enigmas of (artistic) form rather than of language. Their influence is thus different in each of them in relation to the artists' work on form and, more precisely, to the search of possibilities within or beyond it.

In order to clarify this framework, some examples can be made. Among the artists that work on the strengthening of form we can

mention Eduardo Paolozzi and Derek Jarman. Paolozzi works on composition and the possibility of revealing its opposite, i.e. decomposition, through the very structure of some of his works.[10] His *As Is When* series is a sort of disassembled film whose individual frames aim to visually translate moments of Wittgenstein's life and philosophy.[11] To give a visual form to certain moments of Wittgenstein's life and philosophy is also Jarman's objective, who creates a 'logical film' that may disclose unexpected perspectives.[12] The film is composed of scenes that can be considered as 'visual transpositions' of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations and of certain phases of his life. The logic of the film is due to the possibility to offer a narrative structure in which his life and thought are interwoven. So that a concept, a dissertation or an event may be visually transposed in an effective way, Jarman produces images that are characterized by the contrast between figure and background and by a considerable economy of stage presences. The scenes of the film are indeed composed in turn by images in which the colours excel on the dark backgrounds: actors and props are therefore constantly in the foreground and this also contributes to highlighting the stage economy of the film. Despite the economical trait, Jarman's is still a work on form that aims at strengthening it. Indeed, if we correctly interpret his idea of a 'logical film', we can realize that this result was achieved precisely through a work on form, namely both on the film's narrative structure and on the images used to convey it.

The influence of the two Wittgensteinian teachings on the artists who work on strengthening forms is at the origin of a method we could call the 'picture method'. It consists of a work on the enigmas of form, which however does not aim at overcoming its outlines. These are rather strengthened for they are crucial for artists that try to show something which, all the same, remains concealed in the forms they produce. According to the picture method, form works as depiction of something.

Let us consider the other productive direction. Usually, the influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy is invoked in relation to what has been called 'conceptual art'. The reasons for this association are due to three features of this kind of art: the interest in analysis and language; the philosophical approach; the purpose of dematerialization. These features define the initial (idealistic) phase of conceptualist practices

and then change in the next (materialist) phase. What is relevant to note is that the reception of Wittgenstein's philosophy amongst conceptualists differs in relation to these two phases. During the former, artists mainly worked on language in keeping with what I call the 'analytical method'; in the latter, during the 70's, artists followed what we might call the 'pragmatic method'. The analytical method characterizes, for instance, Joseph Kosuth's oeuvre. The artist insists on the connection between art and logic, conceiving art in light of the analogy with analytical propositions.[13] The pragmatic method is, among others, central in Mel Bochner's work, which revolves around the role of materiality and things,[14] and in Bruce Nauman's work. Nauman learnt from Wittgenstein how to think about things, focusing on an aspect he sees in Wittgenstein's philosophy: the point where logic and language break down.[15] Nauman's approach allows us to recognize the transition from the first to the second phase of conceptual art, namely from analysis to practice. Like pop artists, the first conceptualists tried to apply the picture method. But rather than working on form (the production of images), they apply it through the analysis of language. During the materialist phase, conceptualists focused on the practices, on the ways of making art (e.g. Adrian Piper speaks about 'meta-art').[16]

Therefore, Wittgensteinian teachings indeed play a role in transitioning from analysis to practice in some conceptualists' works to the extent that they allow them to free themselves from the constraints of an image (cf. Wittgenstein ([1953] 1981), I, §115: 48e) and work on the possibilities of expression. Form acts as mirror of something that can be expressed in a certain way. Theirs is a work about the limit. A work based on the acknowledgment of the possibilities to overcome it. In this sense, the following excerpt could be one of their statements:

> [… p]erhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and I am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning. (Wittgenstein 1980: 16e)

To do this, conceptualists operate in a sectorial way, articulating their analysis and putting it into practice. This means reducing their pieces to materials, bodies, industrial and natural objects and, above all, trying

to show art's underlying structures and communicate the ideas and projects from which works originate.

Making conceptual art means favouring expression over depiction. By employing conceptualist practices, artists try to say something through a work on the *ways to create* form, rather than on its immediate achievement. The overcoming of form and its outlines offers different possibilities to work on expression. As Wittgenstein writes, '[i]t is a great temptation to try to make the spirit explicit' (Wittgenstein 1980: 8e). Conceptualists seem to share this idea, insofar as their works—not being constrained by form—may express the human condition.

Notes

1. During the Cambridge lessons (1930), the theme of the enigmatic nature of philosophy is central, as the following transcription shows. "Philosophy is the attempt to be rid of a particular kind of puzzlement. This 'philosophic' puzzlement is one of the intellect and not of instinct. Philosophic puzzles are irrelevant to our every-day life. They are puzzles of *language*. Instinctively we use language rightly; but to the intellect this use is a puzzle" (Lee 1980: 1).
2. The English translation of this excerpt is mine; for more details see Perissinotto (2008: 54–59).
3. On these issues see Hintikka and Hintikka (1986), in particular Chapter 1.
4. Alternatively to the picture theory of language, Hintikka propose a theory of language as mirroring. For further details see Hintikka and Hintikka (1986: Chapter 5, §§1, 2).
5. Wittgenstein investigates the subject of expression in several phases of his philosophy as, for instance, in §§450, 451, 452 of *Zettel* (1980: 80).

6. See Conant (2004).
7. In this regard, Cavell writes: "[i]magination, let us say, is the capacity for making connections, seeing or realizing possibilities […]. Imagination is called for, faced with the other, when I have to take the facts in, realize the significance of what is going on, make the behaviour real for myself, make a connection" (Cavell [1979] 1999: 353–354).
8. Cf. Conant (2004: 181–182).
9. See Cavell (1988).
10. An example is his sculpture *Head of Invention*, 1989.
11. In this regard, Brook Pearson writes: "[t]he whole series functions as an interpretation of the transitionary point between Wittgenstein's 'earlier' and 'later' philosophy and, I think, suggests a way of reading the earlier Work by Wittgenstein as an introduction to the development of 'language games'" (Pearson 2011: 105).
12. The film *Wittgenstein* was directed by English filmmaker Derek Jarman in 1993. The literature theorist Terry Eagleton wrote the original screenplay that Jarman reworked developing the narration through a structure that favours in particular the relationship between words and images. For more details, see Eagleton and Jarman (1993).
13. See Kosuth (1969).
14. See Bochner (1967).
15. Quoted in Lewallen (2007: 42).
16. See Piper (1973).

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13

Wittgenstein in New York (and Elsewhere) in the 1960s: From Eduardo Paolozzi to Mel Bochner

Francesco Guzzetti

The writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein were broadly studied in the United States in the 1960s (Garver 1987). At that time, minimalist artists addressed new tenets of object and space in art, and the conceptual artists who followed them pushed the examination further and reconsidered artistic practice through the philosophical concern for the logical function of language and thought.

Scholars have already thoroughly analyzed the influence of the writings of the Viennese philosopher on minimal and conceptual art (Kiel and Toopeekoff 2016); nevertheless, I aim to contribute to the study about how American artists received Wittgenstein's philosophy. I will first address the interest in Wittgenstein by the British artist Eduardo Paolozzi, who was a generation their senior, and the way how American

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artists could easily become aware of it in the mid-1960s. Then, I will focus on Mel Bochner and his landmark article "The Serial Attitude," published in *Artforum* in 1967. By examining Bochner's reference to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* in that essay and in his work at that time, in order to show how precocious and influential his approach was within the general interest in Wittgenstein's philosophy of conceptual artists.

1   Eduardo Paolozzi in New York

The 1965 issue of *Arts Yearbook* marked a turning point in the debates on minimalist sculpture, as Donald Judd published there the famous survey "Specific Objects" (Judd 1965). It also included an interview by Richard Hamilton to his fellow artist and friend Eduardo Paolozzi. The published text is the short version of the conversation which took place in early 1964. The two artists expanded on the analogy threading the techniques and media in Paolozzi's practice—writing, drawing, collage and sculpture—and focused especially on the use of language as an assemblage of meanings and crisscrossing references. The version of the interview published in *Arts Yearbook* doesn't mention the name of Ludwig Wittgenstein, even though the original transcription records Hamilton's inquiry on Paolozzi's fascination for the Austrian philosopher (Paolozzi 2000: 125–128). In fact, by the time of the interview, Paolozzi had already created the two sculptures titled *Wittgenstein at Cassino* and was working on *As Is When*, the series of silkscreen prints devoted to Wittgenstein. The sculpture and the first four recently completed prints of *As Is When* were included in the exhibition of the artist organized by Peter Selz at the Museum of Modern Art in New York (September 21-November 10, 1964). In light of the consistent attention to the philosopher conveyed by those works and expressed in notes and letters received from the artist (Paolozzi 2000: 128–132), Selz acknowledged the importance of Wittgenstein's linguistical analysis in Paolozzi's work even in the wall-text of the exhibition:

> [...] his new sculpture, his silk screen prints, his collages, book and film are not only superb formal achievements in their own right, but they

also demonstrate that a human and intuitive approach is still possible in a cybernetic world. Significantly, he invokes the name of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the influential Cambridge philosopher, who inspired both logical positivism and the linguistic or analytic movement in recent thought.[1]

Despite the absence of the philosopher's name, the vocabulary used by Paolozzi in the published version of the interview with Hamilton bears witness to his deep examination of Wittgenstein's thought, such as in the explanation of his effort, in making sculptures and collages, "to get away from the idea […] of trying to make a Thing—in a way, going beyond the Thing, and trying to make some kind of presence" (Hamilton 1965: 160). In addition, Paolozzi referenced Wittgenstein's concepts in his examination of collage:

> [in collage] One is able to manipulate, to move, and use certain laws which are in a way blocked off if you try to do a pencil drawing, say, and then fill in the colored areas. It's the same too if you use a direct analogy […]. The emphasis really is on the idea of directness, the way I see collage. (Hamilton 1965: 160–161)

The linguistical notion of analogy as a form of logical correspondence between the real experience of the world and its visualization, which was applied to collage, was reminiscent of the correspondence between the logics of language and the visual elaboration of picture theorized by Wittgenstein.[2] Since then, the artist used to quote and appropriate phrases and words from books on and by Wittgenstein to develop his own concerns about art (Paolozzi 2000: 147–150). In the original transcript of the interview with Hamilton, Paolozzi explained the reason of his interest in Wittgenstein as a response to his search of a proper language to align with his artistic experimentation: "I think that for the first time I have a necessity to embrace some kind of language in relationship to the processes I'm involved with. And I find his is the most sympathetic language. Some people need, perhaps, Greenberg, I need Wittgenstein" (Paolozzi 2000: 128). Paolozzi's approach to Wittgenstein as an alternative source to Greenberg is extremely relevant. It tells of Paolozzi's awareness of the situation of contemporary art and criticism.

Moving away from the model of interpretation of modernism and medium specificity elaborated by Greenberg and his followers, Paolozzi's consideration was prescient of what was going on in the new avant-garde art scene in New York in the mid-1960s. As scholars have already analyzed, the Minimalist artists at that time responded to Greenberg's criticism and sought other sources upon which to establish a new conception of the artistic practice (Battcock 1968). It's no surprise then Wittgenstein was much in favor among the Minimalist artists, as major critics such as Barbara Rose and John Perreault witnessed in crucial essays. In her article "A B C Art", Barbara Rose listed the sources of inspiration of the younger generation of artists and included "their knowledge of Wittgenstein, whom I know a number of them have read" (Rose 1965: 66). Two years later, in the crucial issue of *Arts Magazine* devoted to Minimalism and published in March 1967, John Perreault reconsidered the early legacy of the whole Minimalist experience as "a Quixotic search for an essence, perhaps more among art writers than artists, in spite of Wittgenstein (a philosopher much in favor with Minimalists)" (Perreault 1967: 30).

The logical positivism of Wittgenstein and the examination of the basic structures and the combinatorial logic of language culled from his writings stand among the major bequests of Wittgenstein's thought to the American artists of the younger generation. As the work and the concerns of Paolozzi had already demonstrated, the tenets of art could be radically reconsidered through the model of the linguistics of the Viennese philosopher. Terms and phrases such as *isomorphism*, *language-game*, and *investigation* were in fact immediately appealing for the American artists who endeavored to expand artistic theory and practice much further than the traditional conception and even beyond the latest accomplishments of Minimalism.

2   Conceptual Wittgenstein

As Paolozzi distinguished *Thing* from *presence* in the conversation with Hamilton, so minimalist and post-minimalist artists thoroughly discussed the object-like status of artwork beyond the canon of Greenberg

and his followers (Goldstein and Rorimer 1995; Alberro and Stimson 1999). In their search for a new status of the artwork, artists extensively referenced Wittgenstein's essays. Significantly, in a key article published in 1966, Lucy Lippard termed as *rejective art* the essential visual self-containment of the artwork sought by the young artists, and included the philosopher among the most remarkable sources of inspiration:

> […] there were plenty of precedents to be found in other areas of aesthetics to which the artists were exposed. McLuhan, Robbe-Grillet, Wittgenstein, Beckett, Fuller, Borges, and others provided fine points of departure for philosophizing on the subject. The distance of all these figures from the field of art criticism was important, and necessary, if the new art is to be taken as literally as intended. (Lippard 1966: 33)[3]

The short-circuit between the logical process of language and the visualization process of creating pictures established by Wittgenstein already in the *Tractatus* was deeply fascinating for artists investigating the visual or conceptual tenets of art. Wittgenstein's comparison entailed a twofold relationship between the subject and the object of experience, that artists deliberately aligned with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's studies on perception. The famous essay *The Primacy of Perception* was a source of remarkable quotations, such as "There is no vision without thought. But it is not enough to think in order to see. Vision is a conditioned thought" (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 175), that Lippard included in the article on perspective in contemporary art published in 1967 (Lippard 1967: 28). The quotation might sound quite familiar to Wittgenstein's sentences, such as the well-known statement 5.6 of the *Tractatus*, saying "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (Wittgenstein 1960: 149, 1961: 115). The statement was listed by the artist Mel Bochner among the quotations he parsed in his article "The Serial Attitude," published in *Artforum* in December 1967. Bochner graduated at Carnegie Institute of Technology in Pittsburgh in 1963 and studied philosophy for a semester between 1963 and 1964 at Northwestern University in Chicago, which was the major American center for studies in phenomenology at that time and promoted the translation of Merleau-Ponty's writings (Field 1995: 15–74).

The philosophical studies inspired Bochner's approach. The exploration of the relationship between the viewer and the object and the analysis of the notion of perspective recur through his writings, and inspired the artist's work as well. In 1966, Bochner began to use photograph to record the sculptures he had made before from multiple points of view and assembled the shots in grids depicting any possible side of those geometric structures (Field 1995: 95–106). Published shortly after Sol Lewitt's "Paragraphs on Conceptual Art" (LeWitt 1967), Mel Bochner's "The Serial Attitude" stands among the founding essays of conceptual art. In parsing the work of fellow artists, the author analyzed seriality as the logical principle of ordering thoughts and experiences in the creative process as well as in the final artwork. For Bochner, seriality entails three distinctive elements determining the new "conceptual" works:

> 1. The derivation of the terms or interior divisions of the work is by means of a numerical or otherwise systematically predetermined process (permutation, progression, rotation, reversal). 2. The order takes precedence over the execution. 3. The completed work is fundamentally parsimonious and systematically self-exhausting. (Bochner 1967: 28)

The artist applied much of Wittgenstein's vocabulary and thoughts to other artists' as well as his own concerns, turning complex and often problematic definitions and statements of the *Tractatus* into conceptual instruments to shed light on essential elements of contemporary art. He derived from Wittgenstein a specific array of keywords which he included in a list of terms defining the new art. He especially quoted from the philosopher the words *grammar*—"That aspect of the system that governs the permitted combinations of elements belonging to that system"[4]—*isomorphism*—"A relation between systems so that by rules of transformation each unit of one system can be made to correspond to one unit of the other"—and *probability*—"The ratio of the number of ways in which an event can occur in a specified form to the total number of ways in which the event can occur" (Bochner 1967: 31). Bochner engaged in the reformulation of Wittgenstein's vocabulary and hid his signature concepts in the descriptions of the artworks. It's the case of the series of *Numbers* by Jasper Johns, in which the artist's depiction

and repetition of the exact sequence of numbers from 0 to 9 "until all the available spaces on the canvas were filled" is described as "self-exhausting and solipsistic" (Bochner 1967: 28). Bochner has often internalized Wittgenstein's concepts in his artistic practice, too, as the series of photographs composing the work titled *Sixteen Isomorphs* (1967) demonstrates. The work shows the twofold meaning of isomorphism for Bochner. As a system of binary references between reality and its representation at large, isomorphism is first paired to perspective as a visual device bridging the actual object and the perceiving viewer. Then, the mutual relationship entailed by the notion of isomorphism is connected to the status of photography as a medium recording reality in pictures (Fields 1995: 114–119). In the *Measurement* and *Boundary Pieces* which he developed in the late 1960s, Bochner has repeatedly addressed and expanded on the conception of limit elaborated in the *Tractatus* (5.6–5.641). By comparing the size of his body to the dimension of the room or visualizing the perimeter of the room through inscriptions on the walls, Bochner aligned the limits of the experience of real space to the limit of the visual and linguistic representation of it. The visualization of the limit triggers a process of consciousness which is reminiscent of the status of metaphysical otherness that, in Wittgenstein's reflection, the philosophical ego reaches while elaborating the limits of experience.

The occurrence of the statement 5.6 of the *Tractatus* among the quotations included in "The Serial Attitude" becomes significant in light of Bochner's artistic experimentations at that time. The quotation published in the article says "the limits of my language *are* the limits of my world" (Bochner 1967: 30). It seems a mistranscription of the original sentence saying "the limits of my language *mean* the limits of my world", which appears in every English edition of the *Tractatus*. Nevertheless, at closer inspection Bochner has not quoted his source incorrectly. The translation of Wittgenstein's founding essay was broadly discussed by the British-American scholar and philosopher Max Black in his *Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, first published in 1964 and frequently reprinted in the following years. The companion was intended to provide an extensive commentary to each statement of the *Tractatus*. Through glossaries, detailed explanations and cross-references to Wittgenstein's and other philosophers' texts, Black tried to unravel and clarify the most

problematic arguments of the book. In his revision of the whole text, Black proposed to translate the German verb *bedeuten* as *be* instead of *mean* in the statement 5.6, to enhance the exact correspondence between real world and the status language that the Austrian philosopher had endeavored to establish rather than deriving the limits of the world from the limits of language, as the use of the verb *to mean* may entail (Black 1964: 307–311). By reading "The Serial Attitude" and the companion back to back, it becomes clear that Bochner perused the book by Max Black. Especially the abovementioned list of definitions of terms such as *grammar*, *isomorphism* and *probability* has been drawn almost literally from the companion (Black 1964: 247–248).

The broad reception of the companion authored by Max Black, as the reviews in journals and the early reprints demonstrate, certainly favored its circulation in the artists' community. In addition, Black was professor at Cornell University at that time and taught classes on philosophy of logic, linguistics and mathematics. Cornell University was a lively environment for the artists gravitating in the New York area, and a major venue hosting artistic events such as the exhibition *Earthworks* in 1968.

Among others, a review of the *Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus* was published in *Mind*, the journal of philosophy that artists like Bochner often read at that time (Kenny 1966). *Mind* provided the source of some quotations included in the first article of the series titled "Art after Philosophy," that Joseph Kosuth published in Studio International in 1969 (Kosuth 1969: 134)[5] Kousth's interest in philosophy, and in Wittgenstein especially, has been analyzed within the study of the philosophical sources of conceptual art. The artist paid attention specifically to Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (Kosuth 1969: 134, 1971: 53), as other artists, such as Bruce Nauman and David Antin, did with different interpretations (Antin 1967; Raffaele and Baker 1967: 75; Sharp 1970: 27; Ammann 1986).

Besides these artists, Mel Bochner has certainly played a key role in the elaboration of philosophical thoughts. As Dore Ashton remarked in a bitter letter sent to *Studio International* after the publication of "Art after Philosophy," perhaps Kosuth owed part of his philosophical

concerns to him (Ashton 1970). Bochner has frequently addressed philosophical issues through his career, and Wittgenstein's thoughts has still played a key role, as the illustrations for *On Certainty* witness (Wartenberg 2015). Despite the broad recognition of the fundamental role of "The Serial Attitude" in founding and framing conceptual art, research has yet to be conducted on the article and the sources of the philosophical debate that informed it, such as Black's *Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, in order to examine and fully explain the reasons and the context of the wide acknowledgement of Wittgenstein's texts among the readings favored by post-minimalist and conceptual artists in the second half of the 1960s.

Notes

1. *Eduardo Paolozzi*, New York, The Museum of Modern Art, September 21–November 10, 1964, MoMA exh.# 748, Press Release no. 47, September 21, 1964, Archives of the Museum of Modern Art (digitized at the link: https://www.moma.org/calendar/exhibitions/3454).

2. See the biographical sketch authored by Georg Henrik von Wright and included in the memoir of Norman Malcolm, that Paolozzi extensively consulted to elaborate the prints of *As Is When*: "…the idea of language as a picture of reality occurred to Wittgenstein. […] one might reverse the analogy and say that a proposition serves as a model or picture, by virtue of a similar correspondence between its parts and the world. The way in which the parts of the proposition are combined – the structure of the proposition – depicts a possible combination of elements in reality, a possible state of affairs" (Malcolm 1958: 8).

3. Lippard partly recalled Barbara Rose's essay "A B C Art", where the critic already focused on sources such as Robbe-Grillet's so-called *object novel* and Wittgenstein; see Rose (1965).

4. The notion of grammar was first inspired by LeWitt's "Paragraphs on Conceptual Art", which Bochner also quoted in his article (LeWitt 1967: 80; Bochner 1967: 30).

5. For instance, Kosuth opened the article by quoting the review of the Pears-McGuinness translation of the *Tractatus* authored by James O. Urmson (Urmson 1963: 299).

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Appendix: The Quotes in Paolozzi's Screenprint Series *As Is When* (1964–1965)

Wolfgang Huemer and Diego Mantoan

The chapters by Wolfgang Huemer,[1] Luigi Perissinotto,[2] and Rachel Stratton[3] drew the attention toward the actual Wittgensteinian sources used by Eduardo Paolozzi in preparation of his screenprint series *As Is When* (1964–1965). Indeed, Paolozzi resorted to a wide array of materials, both *by* Wittgenstein and *on* the Wittgenstein by his friends and disciples. Furthermore, the Austrian philosopher's quotes can at times be found in German as well as in English. Hence, it appears rather important to trace the original material used in the series, because the artist partly transcribed the quotes and partly used the original printed material, like in a collage. They further give an idea of the way Paolozzi got acquainted with the philosopher's biography and works, thus shedding light on the profound reasons for his identification with Wittgenstein, as well as for the understanding the Scottish artist had for the latter's philosophy. This philological work—which appears rather unprecedented in its completeness—was not easy to conduct, particularly because of the difficulty to retrace the specific magazines or editions used by Paolozzi, which now date back several decades. As a matter of fact, the sources almost entirely pertain to the 1950s, while just some are of the early 1960s. They also needed to be at hand for Paolozzi, either in Great

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Britain or in Germany, since he stayed for a professorship in Hamburg in 1953 and then again 1960 (Whitford 1994: 119–128).

With regard to *As Is When*, seven screenprints contain direct quotes from Wittgenstein's works: I, IV, and XI from the *Tractatus logico–philosophicus*, III and X from the *Notebooks*, II from the *Blue and Brown Books*, and IX from the *Philosophical Investigations*. Screenprint II also contains quotes from a book review of Malcolm's *Memoir* by Newman—that appeared in *Scientific American*—and a quote from Russell's obituary in *Mind*. The remaining five screenprints V, VI, VII, VIII, and XII contain direct quotes from Malcolm's *Memoir*, although the quote in V originally stems from G. H. v. Wright's biographical sketch reprinted in the aforementioned booklet and VII has notes from a lecture by Wittgenstein again recorded there. Interestingly enough Paolozzi did not mention James R. Newman's book review of Malcolm's *Memoir* that appeared in *Scientific American* (Newman 1959). This omission surprises, since Paolozzi used the review title and a passage from this text—where Newman paraphrases G. H. v. Wright's "Biographical Sketch"—in print II. Given that Paolozzi liked to read the *Scientific American* (Paolozzi 2000: 139), it is plausible that Newman's review drew his attention to Malcolm's book and thus played a crucial role in reviving his interest in Wittgenstein in the late 1950s.

The following paragraphs present the exact transcripts of the Wittgensteinian quotes in the twelve screenprints of the series *As Is When*. Annotations by the author and bibliographical references are in between square brackets. Eventually, the sources of these quotes are referenced in the final bibliography, though sometimes they are second or third editions.

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I: Artificial Sun

The world is all that is the case. (Wittgenstein, TLP: 1) [Wittgenstein 1961b: 7]
[Paolozzi adds:] "TRACTATUS LOGICO–PHILOSOPHICUS LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN"

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II: Tortured Life

The tortured life of an influential modern philosopher: the late Ludwig Wittgenstein. [Newman 1959]

[Column 1 and 2:]

Wright, one day in a trench on the eastern front while he was reading a magazine in which there was a picture of the possible sequence of events in an automobile accident. The picture, he said, served as a proposition whose parts corresponded to things in reality; and so he conceived the idea that a verbal proposition is in effect a picture, 'by virtue of a similar correspondence between *its* parts and the world.' In other words, the *structure* of the proposition 'depicts a possible combination of elements in reality, a possible state of affairs.' The *Tractatus* [Newman 1959: 149f]

[Column 3:]

the proposition: "There is no hippopotamus in this room at present". When he refused to believe this, I looked under all the desks without finding one; but he remained unconvinced. [Russell 1951: 297]

[Column 4:]

"Let us ask the question 'Should we say that the arrows → and ← point in the same or in different directions?'—At first sight you might be inclined to say 'Of course, in different directions.' But" [Wittgenstein 1969: 140]

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III: Experience

9.11.16. Ist der Glaube eine Erfahrung? Ist der Gedanke eine Erfahrung? Alle Erfahrung ist Welt und braucht nicht das Subjekt. Der Willensakt ist keine Erfahrung. [Wittgenstein 1961a: 89]

9.11.16 Is belief a kind of experience? Is thought a kind of experience? All experience is world and does not need the subject. The act of will is not

an experience. [Wittgenstein 1961a: 89e] [The full stop after 9.11.16. is omitted in Paolozzi's screenprint]

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IV: Reality

Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus, 2.063–2.141

2.063 Die gesamte Wirklichkeit ist die Welt.

2.1 Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen.

2.11 Das Bild stellt die Sachlage im logischen Raume, das Bestehen und Nichtbestehen von Sachverhalten, vor.

2.12 Das Bild ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit.

2.13 Den Gegenständen entsprechen im Bilde die Elemente des Bildes.

2.131 Die Elemente des Bildes vertreten im Bild die Gegenstände.

2.14 Das Bild besteht darin, daß sich seine Elemente in bestimmter Art und Weise zu einander verhalten.

2.141 Das Bild ist eine Tatsache.

2.063 The sum–total of reality is the world.

2.1 We picture facts to ourselves.

2.11 A picture presents a situation in a logical space, the existence and non–existence of states of affairs.

2.12 A picture is a model of reality.

2.13 In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them.

2.131 In a picture the elements of the picture are representatives of objects.

2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its elements are relataed to one another in a determinate way.

2.141 A picture is a fact.

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V: Wittgenstein the Soldier

At the outbreak of the war, Wittgenstein entered the Austrian army as a volunteer, although he had been exempted from service because of a rupture. He served first on a vessel on the Vistula and later in an artillery workshop at Cracow. In 1915 he was ordered to Olmütz, in Moravia, to

be trained as an officer. As previously mentioned, he fought on the East front. In 1918 he was transferred to the South front. Upon the collapse of the Austro–Hungarian army in November, he was taken prisoner by the Italians. It was not until August of the following year that he could return to Austria. During the major part of his captivity, he was in a prison camp near Monte Cassino in south Italy. When Wittgenstein was captured he had in his rucksack the manuscript of his *Logisch–philosophische Abhandlung*, [von Wright 1955: 533]

VI: Wittgenstein in New York

I went to New York to meet Wittgenstein at the ship. When I first saw him I was surprised at his apparent physical vigour. He was striding down the ramp with a pack on his back, a heavy suitcase in one hand, cane in the other. [Malcolm 1984: 68]

VII: Parrot

What I give is the morphology of the use of an expression. I show that it has kinds of uses of which you had not dreamed. In philosophy one feels *forced* to look at a concept in a certain way. What I do is to suggest, or even invent, other ways of looking at it. I suggest possibilities of which you had not previously thought. You thought that there was one possibility, or only two at most. But I made you think of others. Furthermore, I made you see that it was absurd to expect the concept to conform to those narrow possibilities. Thus your mental cramp is relieved, and you are free to look around the field of use of the expression and to describe the different kinds of uses of it. [Quote from a lecture from Wittgenstein, reported by Malcolm (1984: 43)]

VIII: Futurism at Lenabo

It is worth noting that Wittgenstein once said that a serious and good philosophical work could be written that would consist entirely of *jokes*

(without begin facetious). Another time he said that a philosophical treatise might contain nothing but questions (without answers). In his own writings he made wide use of both. To give an example: 'Why can't a dog simulate pain? Is he too honest?' (Philosophical Investigations, §250) [Malcolm 1984: 27f]

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IX: Assembling Reminders for a Particular Purpose

PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

126. Die Philosophie stellt alles bloß hin, und erklärt und folgert nichts.—Da alles offen daliegt, ist auch nichts zu erklären. Denn, was etwa verborgen ist, interessiert uns nicht. 'Philosophie' könnte man auch das nennen, was *vor* allen neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen möglich ist.

127. Die Arbeit des Philosophen ist ein Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen zu einem bestimmten Zweck.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. One might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions.

127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose. [Wittgenstein 1953: §§126, 127]

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X: The Spirit of the Snake

Bedenke nur, daß der Geist der Schlange, des Löwen, *dein* Geist ist. Denn nur von dir her kennst du überhaupt den Geist. Es ist nun freilich die Frage, warum habe ich der Schlange gerade diesen Geist gegeben. Und die Antwort hierauf kann nur im psychophysischen Parallelismus liegen: Wenn ich so aussähe wie die Schlange und das täte, was sie tut, so wäre ich so und so. Das Gleiche beim Elefanten, bei der Fliege, bei der Wespe. Es fragt sich aber, ob nicht eben auch hier wieder (und gewiß so)

mein Körper mit dem der Wespe und der Schlange auf einer Stufe steht, so daß ich weder von dem der Wespe auf meinen, noch von meinen auf den der Wespe geschlossen habe. [Wittgenstein 1961a: 85]

Only remember that the spirit of the snake, of the lion, is *your* spirit. For it is only from yourself that your are acquainted with spirit at all. Now of course the question is why I have given a snake just this spirit. And the answer to this can only lie in the psycho–physical parallelism: If I were to look like the snake and to do what it does then I should be such–and–such. The same with the elephant, with the fly, with the wasp. But the question arises whether even here, my body is not on the same level with that of the wasp and of the snake (and surely it is so), so that I have neither inferred from that of the wasp to mine nor from mine to that of the wasp. [Wittgenstein 1961a: 85e]

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XI: He Must, so to Speak, Throw Away the Ladder

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, daß sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt, wenn er durch die — auf ihnen — über sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Er muß die Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.) Er muß diese Sätze überwinden, dann sieht er die Welt richtig. Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß mann schweigen. [Tractatus logico–philosophicus: 6.54, 7]

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XII: Wittgenstein at the Cinema Admires Betty Grable

Wittgenstein was always exhausted by his lectures. He was also revolted by them. He felt disgusted with what he had said and with himself. Often

he would rush off to a cinema immediately after the class ended. As the members of the class began to move their chairs out of the room he might look imploringly at a friend and say in a low tone, 'Could you go to a flick?' On the way to the cinema Wittgenstein would buy a bun or cold pork pie and munch it while he watched the film. He insisted on sitting in the first row of seats, so that the screen would occupy his entire field of vision, and his mind would be turned away from the thoughts of the lecture and his feeling revulsion. Once he whispered to me 'This is like a shower bath!" His observation of the film was not relaxed or detached. He leaned tensely forward in his seat and rarely took his eyes off the screen. He hardly ever uttered comments on the episodes of the film and did not like his companion to do so. He wished to become totally absorbed in the film no matter how trivial or artificial it was, in order to free his mind temporarily from the philosophical thoughts that tortured and exhausted him. He liked American films and detested English ones. He was inclined to think that there *could not* be a decent English film. This was connected with a great distaste he had for English culture and mental habits in general. He was fond of the film stars Carmen Miranda and Betty Hutton. Before he came to visit me in America he demanded in jest that I should introduce him to Miss Hutton. [Malcolm 1984: 26f]

Notes

1. Chapter 3: 'The Philosopher as Artist: Ludwig Wittgenstein Seen Through Eduardo Paolozzi' by Wolfgang Huemer.
2. Chapter 6: 'Paolozzi Reads Wittgenstein: Moments in a Research Process' by Luigi Perissinotto.
3. Chapter 7: '"Ragged" Perception in Eduardo Paolozzi's Figures from the 1950s' by Rachel Stratton.

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