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THE REASONS OF EMOTIONS SCHELER AND HUSSERL

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1) *Material a priori and emotional a priori*

IN the introduction of the second edition of his early work *Transcendental and Psychological Methods* in 1922, Scheler admits his own ties and that he is theoretically indebted to the «ontological and realistic meaning of the essential elements of the world of the spirit» in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*.¹ At the same time, however, he underlines his own detachment from Husserl's famous transcendental shift in 1913, which was stigmatised as being characterised by the «idealistic meaning» and by «conscience immanence».² Husserl countered these affirmations with his own accusations. In the conference *Phänomenologie und Anthropologie* in 1931, Scheler was criticised for having used *Logical Investigations* in the direction of ontological idealism, transforming the eidetic reflection into naive metaphysics «instead of following the internal tendency of the investigations aimed at the formation of subjectivity».³ Similarly, in a famous letter to Löwith written in February 1937, Husserl accused Scheler (together with Heidegger and the early pupils) of not having «understood either the authentic and profound meaning of the phenomenology, the transcendental meaning that is the only one possible, or how much depends on this meaning».⁴

¹ Cf. M. SCHELER, *Die transzendente und die psychologische Methode*, in *Gesammelte Werke* (published by Francke Verlag until 1986 and then by the Bonn publisher, Bouvier; named hereafter *GW* listed with progressive numbers), I, Bern/München 1971, 201.

² *Ibid.*

³ E. HUSSERL, *Phänomenologie und Anthropologie*, in *Husserliana XXVII* (hereafter called *Hua* and listed with progressive numbers), Dordrecht/Boston/London 1989, 180.

⁴ K. LÖWITH, *Eine Erinnerung an Edmund Husserl*, in L. VAN BREDA AND J. TAMINAUX (edd.), *Edmund Husserl 1859-1959*, Den Haag 1959, 48.

However, as Ulrich Melle observed, although it is difficult to estimate how much influence it actually had, it played an important role in Husserl's ethics, in particular during his period in Freiburg, in the revival and development of important concepts by Scheler including those – which play a key role in our analysis – of value, person, vocation (*Ruf*) and community; these concepts come from the earlier period of Göttingen but above all, that originate from the common matrix of Brentano's lesson.⁵ In the following reflections we shall try to see how, despite the evident differences and reciprocal controversial evaluations, reasons for a profound theoretical vicinity between Husserl and Scheler are actually to be found around the central issue of a *phenomenology of the emotions*.

In *Lehre von der Drei Tatsachen*, Scheler claims that the phenomenological fact, «is an *immanent given*, that is, one that is contained in an experience in which what is “understood” and what is “given” coincide»⁶ and in a very similar passage of *Formalismusbuch*, one can read that «only *in the coincidence* of “understanding” and “givenness” does

⁵ For more about Husserl's explicit allegations of contempt towards Scheler in contrast with the constant presence of Schelerian motives in the Freiburg period see: U. MELLE, *Schelersche Motive in Husserl Freiburger Ethik*, in G. PFAFFEROT (ed.), *Vom Umsturz der Werte in der modernen Gesellschaft*, Bonn 1997, 203-205. In a letter to Adolf Grimme dated 4 May 1917 Scheler claims that, «only Franz Brentano influenced me directly. (...) With the exception of my person that is connected from a philosophical point of view only extremely relatively to Husserl, the so-called “Phenomenology” is an overall work in which greatly different powers are at work», (quoted in G. CUSINATO, *Katharsis. La morte dell'ego e il divino come apertura al mondo nella prospettiva di Max Scheler*, Napoli 1999, 32). For an interpretation that tries to make Scheler coincide with Husserl's phenomenology, see: M. GABEL, *Intentionalität des Geistes. Der phänomenologische Denkansatz bei Max Scheler. Untersuchung zum Verständnis der Intentionalität*, Leipzig 1991. For criticism of Husserl in *Logik I*, withdrawn from publication by Scheler in 1906, see: G. MANCUSO, *Il giovane Scheler (1899-1906)*, Milano 2007, 198-219. Despite the continuous fluctuation between positive and negative judgements, see the emphasis given by Scheler in *Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart*, GW VII, 308, to *Investigation VI* and to the concept of categorial intuition, which was the *fruitful* beginning of the «spiritual association» with Husserl; on this subject see also: H. SPIEGELBERG, *The phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction*, The Hague /Boston/London 1982, 268-269; A. SANDERS, *Mensch - Subjekt - Person. Die Dezentrierung des Subjekts in der Philosophie Max Schelers*, Bonn 1996, 65-73.

⁶ M. SCHELER, *Lehre von der Drei Tatsachen*, GW X, 433; cf. ID., *Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, GW X, 398.

the *content* of the phenomenological experience *become known*».⁷ According to Scheler, the coincidence between understanding and givenness implies that the content of the phenomenological experience is an intuitive content, a direct understanding of what is *essential*. Even a perceptive illusion, such as a puppet being mistaken for a living being, can only occur on the bases of the premise of already being able to grasp the *essential* aspect, that of vitality. «An intuition of this kind is an “eidetic intuition”, in other words, a “phenomenological intuition” or a “phenomenological experience”».⁸ According to Scheler, the phenomenological experience is therefore an *understanding of essence*, essence proves to be the structure the thing needs, which appears in its typical characteristics: the characteristic structure of identity of the thing that emerges as it manifests itself as a *phenomenon*.⁹

In his 1907 lessons entitled *Idea of Phenomenology*, when discussing phenomenological reduction Husserl states that it must limit itself to «the sphere of pure direct givenness [...] to the sphere of what precisely in the sense it is understood is also given, and directly given in the most rigorous meaning, so that nothing of what is understood is not also given».¹⁰ We shall look more closely later at the different meaning and different development of the theme of reduction in Scheler and Husserl; for now, we shall merely underline the fact that what emerges for both is the central theme of eidetic analysis: the emergence of the *phenomenon* as a characteristic of objective necessity, of not being able to be anything other than what is expressed in its essential content.¹¹

⁷ M. SCHELER, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, GW II, 70. In a note on the quoted page in *Formalismus* Husserl had highlighted significantly the expression *immanent experience* (*immanente Erfahrung*), (cf. E. HUSSERL, *Randbemerkungen zu Schelers Formalismus. Édition et traduction de Heinz Leonardy*, «Études Phénoménologiques», 13-14 (1991), 10.

⁸ M. SCHELER, GW II, 68.

⁹ Cf. R. DE MONTICELLI, C. CONNI, *Ontologia del nuovo*, Milano 2008, 10-11.

¹⁰ E. HUSSERL, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen*, Den Haag 1973, 60-61.

¹¹ Cf. M. SCHELER, *Vom Wesen der Philosophie und der moralischen Bedingung des philosophischen Erkennens*, GW V, 75: «Husserl distinguishes – basically exactly in the same manner as myself later – the evident essential content of knowledge from real knowledge».

Seeing the phenomena means grasping the real givenness of the *actual thing* in the essential aspects of its different *manifestive structures*, such as, for example, as is the case when we intuitively understand that a landscape is perceived as *essentially different* in comparison to the same landscape we remember or a landscape we have simply imagined.

However, as regards the *relationship* between Husserl and Scheler, there is one significant difference that may already be highlighted: it regards the actual givenness of the essential reality as something that is pre-established *ideally*, in relation to the intuitive faculty itself, the intuitive-subjective ability it corresponds to. As claimed by Scheler, the *a priori* principle prevails, according to which, «the essentialities and their relationships are “given prior to” any experience»,¹² together with the assumption according to which, «*the order of foundation* in which the phenomena attain givenness [...] is based on their *essence* that is not already based on an intellect». ¹³ As regards the latter, I do not believe there is any significant difference to Husserl’s position whereas the same cannot be said as far as the former is concerned. What emerges from *Logical Investigations* and does not appear to be sufficiently clear in the first part of the *Formalismusbuch*, and more generally in Scheler’s *phenomenological realism* is the structural principle of *correlation between subject and object* that underlies the *manifestation* according to objective, necessary laws of the object, of the phenomenon, in its essential characteristics. As claimed by Husserl’s analysis, which he is to call transcendental after the famous shift in 1913, it is only on the basis of this *essential correlation* that the structural-intentional differences can emerge continuously between what is described as a subjective-noetic aspect and the objective-noematic aspect; for example, as occurs between the countless possible cases, when we distinguish between the mental process of a memory or a mental process of a perception of the same object, and between the different ways the object appears, as remembered in comparison to how it was originally perceived.¹⁴

¹² GW II, 68.

¹³ M. SCHELER, *Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, GW X, 383.

¹⁴ Scheler initially seems to be aiming at an *ontological* rigidity that ignores the crucial aspect of intentional analysis, as the essence is almost hypostatized as a reality in itself that has to be perceived intuitively. It must be said, however, that already in the

However, in the *phenomenological* sense, the first starting point that makes Scheler similar to Husserl is, without a doubt, the criticism of the formalistic aspect of Kant's *a priori*: according to Husserl, it is *the things themselves* that are *shown*, that *appear* in the *necessity* of their essential characteristics: for example, when we state that «*a colour cannot be something that has a colour, or a colour cannot be without a certain extension covered by it*».¹⁵ Here, phenomenological analysis is expressing a need that is anything but just formal. Saying that every colour belongs to an extension does not mean admitting a *formal* empirical generalisation but rather showing which conditions are necessary for us to *perceive* something as a colour and express ourselves *meaningfully* around it. In this sense, Kant's famous example of analytical proposition, «all bodies are extended»¹⁶ should actually be understood, in a radically different semantic contest, as a synthetic proposition *a priori*, because it is through this that an *a priori* necessary meaning is expressed – that of the extension of the bodies – in *synthesis* with the direct *content* of a perceptive experience.

As in Kant, the opposition is therefore not between the analytical and synthetic, but between form and material. Scheler states that, «the domain of the *evident a priori* does not coincide with that of the “*formal*”, the contrast between “*a priori*” and “*a posteriori*” has nothing to do with

second part of 1916 in *Formalismus*, as we shall see more clearly when discussing the subject of the *affective perception* of values, this rigidity gradually diminishes. For example, in this regard there is an important note in which, whilst criticising Mach's *formal materialism*, admitting the *contentual* relevance of the different essences, Scheler claims that, «furthermore, Husserl also believes that the “noema” and the “noesi” condition one another reciprocally in their qualitative modality» (cf. *GW* II, 408). Finally, in the introduction of the third edition of the *Formalismusbuch* in 1926, denouncing any misunderstanding that interpreted such *autonomy* of the values as a sort of *ideal reality in itself*, Scheler states explicitly in the introduction to the third edition in 1926 that he «dismisses on principle, like a body that is extraneous to the *field* of philosophy that paradise of ideas and values that exist “independently”, not only of the essence and possible *fulfilment* of spiritual and living *acts* – that exist “independently” not only of the human being and human consciousness, but also *from the essence and fulfilment of a living spirit in general*» (cf. *GW* II, 21).

¹⁵ E. HUSSERL, *Logische Untersuchungen* (hereafter LU), II/1, Tübingen 1980, 253.

¹⁶ I. KANT, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Kants Werke, Band III, Berlin 1968, 34.

that between the “formal” and “material”». ¹⁷ The a priori is no longer understood in its connection with the «“forms of judgement” from which Kant derives “categories” as “functional laws” of “thought”». ¹⁸ The opposition between a priori and a posteriori must therefore be distinguished from that of the formal and material which is, according to Scheler, a *relative opposition*: «for example, the propositions of pure logic and the propositions of arithmetic are *equally* a priori. [...] Nevertheless, this does not stop the former being “formal” compared to the latter and the latter material compared to the former» but that if the former are to be verified «a plus of intuitive material is necessary». ¹⁹ Accordingly, $2 \times 2 = 4$ is a general-formal proposition while $2 \text{ pears} \times 2 \text{ pears} = 4 \text{ pears}$ expresses one of any possible intuitive contents of the first proposition. ²⁰ Likewise, in assessing the weight of the material determination compared to the logical-formal dimension, in his 1914 lessons on ethics Husserl states that, «light can be shed on the universality of the formal logical laws by the fact that the algebraic terms of the laws are determined *materially*; therefore just like the arithmetical proposition $3 + 3 = 6$ which, when applied to the apples, becomes 3 apples + 3 apples equals 6 apples». ²¹

2) *Feeling the values*

This sort of a priori statue of *essential reality*, which *conditions* our object knowledge and the privilege it has with a *material logic* is then expressed in the continuation of the *Formalismusbuch* in which Scheler regards as the fundamental rational dimension: the dimension of the

¹⁷ GW II, 72.

¹⁸ GW II, 68.

¹⁹ Cf. GW II, 72-73.

²⁰ Cf. GW II, 73.

²¹ E. HUSSERL, *Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre*, Hua XXVIII, 39. However, it should be underlined that Husserl, unlike Scheler, to make his distance from Kant even clearer, also terminologically speaking, rarely uses the term *material a priori* or, in relation to it the expression of *a priori synthetic laws*, speaking instead *material laws* (cf. LU, II/1, § 11). In the rare places where the term material a priori does appear, cf. Hua XXVIII, 139 and *Formale und transzendente Logik*, Hua XVII, Den Haag 1974, 134, where Husserl calls material a priori *sachhaltiges Apriori*, highlighting its content aspect.

personal sphere of emotional reality. «The *emotional component* of the person, their axiological feeling, preferences, loving, hating will also have an *a priori original* statue, unchanged by “thought”». ²² Axiological knowledge is based on the *living relationship* with that world, a relationship that is *felt* through the function of preferring (*Vorziehn*) or postposing (*Nachsetzen*) the values on the basis of that personal order which is made possible by the fundamental acts of love and hate.

As is generally known, in Scheler’s phenomenological vision affective experience is transformed into direct, intuitive feeling, without any kind of mediation of object representations, an *intentional* feeling in which the world is disclosed directly before us, «a world that [...] manifests itself exclusively in its aspects of *value*. [...] The feeling in itself is already an “objectifying act” that requires absolutely no mediation of representation». ²³ Behind this stance is not only an implied criticism of Brentano, but also an echo of Husserl’s famous distinction in his *Fifth Logical Investigation*, between objectifying acts and non-objectifying acts in which every object corresponds to a representation of the object, whether real or imaginary. The non-objectifying acts, such as the class with desire and will, in which the *relative feeling to values* is also included, would be «debtors», with their intentional reference, to the representative capacity of the objectifying acts. ²⁴

However, after *Logical Investigations*, once the distinction between objectifying and non-objectifying acts had been abandoned, Husserl also saw the question of the intentionality of feeling in a similar way to Scheler: that of *feeling* the values directly. In his lessons *Grundfragen der Ethik 1902/1903* and then also immediately afterwards his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl had already stated that «feeling (*Gefühl*) is linked to manifestation, and its object appears as a value». ²⁵ Later, in his lessons in 1908-1909, *Über Grundprobleme der Ethik*, as part of the problematical relationship between intellect and feeling, feeling

²² GW II, 82.

²³ GW II, 265.

²⁴ Cf. LU II/1, 387-391; as regards the considerations that follow, bear in mind V. VENIER, *La norma fondamentale. Husserl e la fenomenologia dei valori*, «Thaumazein», 2 (2014), 271-274.

²⁵ Hua XXVIII, 410.

(*Gemüt*) is defined as a modality that is necessary to access values.²⁶ This admission of the particular nature of affective intentionality, in the fact it is able to relate *objectively* to values, thus going beyond the position taken in *Logical Investigations* once and for all, is explicitly stated in 1913 in the first volume of *Ideen*:

Der neue Sinn bringt eine total neue Sinndimension herein, mit ihm konstituieren sich keine neuen Bestimmungsstücke der bloßen “Sachen”, sondern Werte der Sachen, Wertheiten, bzw. konkrete Wertobjektitäten: Schönheit und Haßlichkeit, Güte und Schlechtigkeit; das Gebrauchsobjekt, das Kunstwerk, die Maschine, das Buch, die Handlung, die Tat usw.²⁷

Here Husserl is in total *agreement* with Scheler who believes there is an intentional tie between feeling and value, an essential relationship between values and their being carried out: according to Scheler, *feeling* values implies that «in conformance to their essence, values have to be able to manifest themselves in an axiological-emotional consciousness».²⁸

Both Scheler and Husserl therefore believe that there is a direct intention to values, for example in the value of the beautiful in relation to aesthetic enjoyment, a case in which «the I wants to obtain the aesthetic object in itself as it is a specific concrete value in itself, in total pure artistic pleasure».²⁹ A kind of relationship that is not expressed through judgement or evaluation. Instead the value is *perceived* directly as such, according to what Husserl calls an «interest of the emotivity»:

²⁶ Cf. Hua XXVIII, 249-255.

²⁷ E. HUSSERL, *Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phenomenologische Philosophie*, Hua III/1, Den Haag 1976, 239-240; cf. *ibid.*, 244: «all acts in general – also those of feelings or will – are “objectifying”, “constituting” originally the objects».

²⁸ GW II, 270. The reason that both Husserl and Scheler are in total agreement about this point, appears to be the fact that feeling is, as E. FRANZINI says in *Filosofia del sentimento*, Milano 1997, 158, «a horizon of constituting an objective sense, of founding the sense».

²⁹ E. HUSSERL, *Erste Philosophie. Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phenomenologischen Reduktion*, Hua VIII, Den Haag 1959, 104.

Das Interesse kann aber auch ein Gemütsinteresse sein, ein im weitesten Sinn wertendes Interesse, die Intention ein wertthema-tische, das Thema ein Wertthema, Gemüts-thema. [...] Der Wert selbst in seiner Wertwahrheit wird nicht wahrgenommen; was für da bloße Ding die Wahrnehmung leistet, leistet für den wert die Wertnehmung.³⁰

Furthermore, according to Scheler values are not reducible to an *ego* that carries them out as a sort of *interior necessity* of a *moral consciousness*, «in human relationships and in history we are constantly grasping values that do *not* manifest themselves and have never manifested themselves in our ego».³¹ On the contrary, values have their own total independence; they are also present in the *natural* world and even animals perceive the value of what is useful, what is harmful, pleasant or unpleasant.³² However, the decisive element that Scheler was to go on to develop of affective intentionality as an essential correlation to values is not yet clear in these statements; as we shall see, it underlies the *formation* of personal being as regards one's own world, comprising the ethos, its load bearing structure.³³ In *Formalismus* Scheler states that he has «also refused the theory according to which the being of values presupposes a “subject” or a “ego”, regardless of the fact that this is an empirical self or a so-called “transcendental ego”» and that the ego must be understood as a psychic reality that is exclusive to an interior experience, an egoità that as such, «remains an object of the axiological consciousness and is not necessarily the essentially necessary starting

³⁰ Hua VIII, 104.

³¹ GW II, 271.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ As G. Cusinato has pointed out, in the first part of *Formalismus*, «Scheler dwells excessively on the so-called “objectivity of values”», but one of the underlying ideas that is to gain importance in Scheler's work is the one why «the will of the individual acts on an articulate background» and «this articulation is understood in feeling (*Fühlen*) and preferring (*Vorziehn*)» values. In this manner the objectivity of the orientation to values, far from being a reality in itself, actually depends on the person's formation process in their ethical-affective sphere (cf. G. CUSINATO, *Orientamento al bene e trascendenza dal sé. Il problema dell'oggettività dei valori in Max Scheler*, «Verifiche», XL (2011), 43-44).

part of the conscious one».³⁴

Once again, this issue involves the relationship between Husserl and Scheler, and not just as regards terminology. According to Husserl, the description of the transcendental consciousness, which presupposes the action of phenomenological analysis, is the description of a *field of intentional relations* in its *absolute* actuality and therefore anything but any kind of *psychic substance*. Furthermore, this topicality is not to be confused with a sort of *ideal* absolute actuality; it continuously conceals a *passive* part that is always submerged and functioning in which the *intentional life* consists and its genesis is a fundamental *constitutive part* of the subjectivity itself: «everything that is actively present in the consciousness, and, in correlation, the active having-consciousness, devoting oneself-to, dealing-with, is always surrounded by an atmosphere of silent and hidden but implicitly functioning validity, by a *living horizon*».³⁵

This absolute nature, a sort of *transcendental primacy*, is therefore a long way from being a substantial dimension; it actually arises from the necessary intentional correlation between what is manifested and our experience of this.³⁶ According to Husserl, if something exists, it only does so in as much as for us, «the transcendent being» is only given through specific «connective experiences» of ours, and it is only with such connections that it can acquire any existential meaning and be clarified phenomenologically.³⁷ It is therefore a decisive fact on the

³⁴ Cf. *GW II*, 271.

³⁵ E. HUSSERL, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, Hua VI, Den Haag 1976, 152. Cf. V. COSTA, *Vita emotiva e analisi trascendentale* in V. MELCHIORRE (ed.), *I luoghi del comprendere*, Milano 2000, 117; cf. A. LAMBERTINO, *Max Scheler. Fondazione fenomenologica dell'etica dei valori*, Firenze 1996, 19-22.

³⁶ As S. LUFT observes in the *Einleitung des Herausgebers* to E. HUSSERL, *Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926-1935)*, Hua XXXIV, Dordrecht/Boston/London 2002, XLVIII, «the givenness of the world may not be apodictically the evident, the being of the world is always predictable and subject to possible corrections. However, the fact that the world is given to a self is apodictical. World and self belong to one another apodictically».

³⁷ Cf. Hua III/1, 92. In *La svolta in direzione delle cose* in «Discipline Filosofiche», XX/2 (2010), 223, S. BESOLI rightly observed the fact that «the emphasised ontological propensity of Scheler's phenomenological essentialism nourishes what Husserl

basis of which the phenomenological description is always in contrast with any *naturalisation* of the conscience; this is clearly confirmed by Husserl in the first book of *Ideen* when he says that the immanent being is «*undoubtedly an absolute being in the sense that nulla re indiget ad existendum. On the other hand, the world of the transcendent res refers entirely to consciousness. But not a logically conceived consciousness but rather a current consciousness*».³⁸

One of Scheler's main criticisms of Husserl in *Idole der Selbsterkenntnis*,³⁹ is that of having insufficient understanding of the psychic ego, having preferred the internal to the exterior perception and thus ending up confusing internal perception with reflection. According to Scheler, on the other hand, through reflection it is possible to thematise both the interior perception as a *psychic object* and the exterior perception regarding the physical dimension while, on the contrary, interior perception can never have exterior perception as its content.⁴⁰ Edith Stein convincingly showed how that meaning of the structure of the absolute givenness of the experience of consciousness we were referring to escaped Scheler entirely. It was precisely to avoid Scheler's evident confusion that in *Ideen I*, Husserl was to decide to abandon the use of the expression *interior perception* once and for all, and to use the term reflection in the *transcendental* meaning instead.⁴¹

3) *Ethical reduction and phenomenological reduction*

Husserl's work contains an aspect that appears coherently through his whole philosophical life: the indissoluble tie between ethics and knowledge in the incessant fatigue of giving a continuous, rigorous critical justification to one's own theoretical assumptions. This is an exer-

would have called dogmatism», breaking with the principle according to which each being is «relative to transcendental subjectivity» (cf. Hua XVII, 241).

³⁸ Hua III/1, 92.

³⁹ Cf. M. SCHELER, *Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis*, GW III, 246-247, note I.

⁴⁰ Cf. L. BOELLA, *Il paesaggio interiore e le sue profondità* in M. SCHELER, *Il valore della vita emotiva*, Milano 1999, 36-38.

⁴¹ Cf. E. STEIN, *Zum Problem der Einfühlung*, Halle 1917, 34; cf. Hua III/1, § 78 and V. VENIER, *L'altra persona. Note sul problema dell'empatia in Edith Stein e Max Scheler*, «Annuario Filosofico», 19 (2003), 328.

cise that, on the one hand is translated more and more into a personal style, whilst becoming on the other, a progressive unfolding of what Husserl regards as the fundamental ethical motive of each true vocation, a motive that *essentially* brings him closer to Scheler: the possibility of the radical assumption *in toto* of the meaning of one's own life in view of one's own authentic personal transformation; Husserl says:

endlich kann Ich auch mein gesamtes Leben universal überschauen und für mein ganzes Leben Entschlüsse fassen, und in ähnlicher Weise wie für beschränkte Lebensstrecken. So kann ich eine universale Kritik meines ganzen bisherigen Leben üben und in eins damit mein ganzes künftiges Leben gestalten wollen: sei es unter dem Gesichtspunkt eines mir unbesehen geltenden universalen Wertes, wie Macht, Erfolg u. dgl., sei es im obersten Sinne ethischer Selbstbesinnung, Selbstkritik und Selbstregierung.⁴²

This essential-personal aspect of radical criticism that holds together ethics and knowledge is also reflected in Husserl in the growing importance given to the exercise of the *epochè* through transcendental reduction. In this regard, in *Krisis*, there is an extremely significant step in which the value of the *epochè* is highlighted as that of the *gesture of rational freedom* through which the inexhaustable task of *phenomenological* understanding is concretised. An interminable task in the face of an always *functioning* reality, a reality that is stratified in the most hidden mazes of the *living* intertwining between subjectivity and *already-given world*: the *life world* in which we live intuitively, a *Heraclitean flow* in which we are a part and which we continuously experience, a world, in the end, that *has* to be grasped and understood critically.

Es ist nun aber notwendig, sich wirklich einsichtig zu machen, daß es nicht bei einer bedeutungslosen habituellen Enthaltung bleibt, sondern daß mit ihr der Blick des Philosophen in der Tat erst völlig frei wird, und vor allem frei von der stärksten und universalsten und dabei verborgensten inneren Bindung, von derjenigen der Vorgegebenheit der Welt. Mit und in dieser Befreiung ist gegeben die Entdeckung der universalen, in sich absolut geschlossen und absolut eigenständigen Korrelation von Welt und Weltbewußtsein. Gemeint ist auf der letzteren Seite das Bewußt-

⁴² Hua VIII, 154.

seinleben der die Weltgeltung leistenden Subjektivität, bzw. der in ihren fortdauernden Erwerben jeweils Welt habenden und auch immer aktiv neu gestaltenden Subjektivität.⁴³

However, the suspension of every *world thesis*, through phenomenological reduction, has to be distinguished from the radical self-reflection about one's own personal life. A radical critique that involves my entire previous life and therefore *keeps it suspended*, is directly involved, as we shall see later, with the radical possibility of personal renewal, a renewal that specifically regards the sphere of *my* actions of *my* having to be absolute in relation to *my* entire personal practical-rational sphere⁴⁴. In a critical note to his own concept of ethical *epoché* in the second part of *Erste Philosophie*, Husserl states that:

es ist von mir hier übersehen, daß die ethische *epoché* eine ganze andere Universalität hat als die phänomenologische. Sie betrifft alle und jede Geltung, die in personalen Akten meines bisherigen Lebens ins Spiel gesetzt war. Aber das sagt nicht: alle Geltungen überhaupt, die in mir ihren Ursprung hat z.B. die Seinsgeltung der Welt ist nicht betroffen. Aber nicht einmal alle in Ichakten überhaupt vollzogene Geltung.⁴⁵

This is an extremely important distinction and precision that shows how Husserl also believes there is an ethical-personal aspect linked directly *to the exercise of reduction*, despite the observed differences and Scheler's criticism. In a passage in *In Idealismus-Realismus* he states that

denn soll das Realitätsmoment aufgehoben werden, damit echtes Wesen zutage trete, soll jene "Entwirklichung" der Welt vorgenommen werden, die auf alle Fälle Bedingung ihrer Verwesentlichung ist, so muß vor allem klar sein, *was* denn Realitätsmoment

⁴³ Hua VI, 154. As E. FRANZINI points out in *Husserl e il mondo della vita*, in V. MELCHIORRE (ed.), *Forme di Mondo*, Milano 2004, 141-142, *epoché* is the modification of our attitude rooted in the common, *natural* meaning of the world, «*in which the world of life may be unfolded like a kingdom of subjective phenomena that have remained anonymous*».

⁴⁴ Cf. V. VENIER, *La norma fondamentale...*, 298-301.

⁴⁵ Hua VIII, 319.

selber *ist*, das wir durch die Reduktion abzustreifen haben, und *worin* dieses Moment gegeben ist.⁴⁶

One of the answers to this question is to be found in *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* in which Scheler defines man as the «aesthetic of life», the one who is able to put his own pulsional-vital tendencies between brackets and to suspend that gesture of self-affirmation in which individuals, just like animals, seek their own vital satisfaction, coming up against the *resistance* of that desire, a resistance from which the effectiveness of reality originates. According to Scheler, this *de-realization* procedure grants man, *beyond* the ties of the vital sphere, the liberation of his essential ideative abilities.⁴⁷ These abilities go back to what was defined in *Idealismus-Realismus* as knowing how to grasp the essence, the «being so» of things, their «*So-sein*» in contrast to their existence, their «*Da-sein*».⁴⁸ The essence, the *Sosein*, is always present as a correlate of an intentional act, in which it is understood in total coincidence between thought and intuition. The existence (*Dasein*), what is real, on the other hand, always remains extramental and is only accomplishable as *opposition*, as resistance to acts of a volitive nature.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ M. SCHELER, *Idealismus - Realismus*, GW IX, 206-207. In *Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie* (1913/14), Scheler, with a positive reference to Husserl, had also stated that «in a very essential point phenomenological philosophy is closely related to the so-called transcendental theory of knowledge. Its course continues in such a way that its results remain totally independent of the particular organisation of human nature, of the actual organisation of the bearers of the acts it is studying» (cf. GW X, 394; cf. W. HENCKMANN, *Schellers Lehre vom Apriori* in W. BAUMGARTNER (ed.), *Gewissheit und Gewissen*, Würzburg 1987, 123-124). For a detailed analytical reconstruction of Scheler's interpretation of transcendental reduction see also: W. HENCKMANN, *Das Intentionalitätsproblem bei Scheler*, in «Brentano Studien», 3 (1991), 217-225. On the double metaphysical and anthropological role of phenomenological reduction in Scheler as access to the essential world from the aspect of emancipation on the one hand, and from the constrictive-vital aspect on the other, cf. E. AVÉ-LALLEMANT, *Die phenomenologische Reduktion in der Philosophie Max Schelers*, in P. GOOD (ed.), *Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschehen der Philosophie*, Bern 1975, 165-169.

⁴⁷ Cf. GW IX, 40-45; cf. V. VENIER, *L'eterno confine*, Venezia 2012, 79-81.

⁴⁸ Cf. GW IX, 185-186.

⁴⁹ Such transcendency would be unthinkable for Husserl's transcendental phenomenology in which, on the contrary, there is a rigorous *immanistic* conception in which reality would make no sense without the direct intentional reference to the consciousness. As V. COSTA rightly says in *Il cerchio e l'ellisse. Husserl e il darsi delle*

Scheler states, «for me this principle is certainly the *last* and *decisive* conoscopic criterion that exists by far». ⁵⁰ Here Scheler goes back to the fundamental themes from *Vom Wesen der Philosophie*, in which the ideative ability, that of knowing how to distinguish between essence and existence, corresponds to a conception of an intentional kind of knowledge as a kind of ontological participation. ⁵¹ This is a knowledge that does not expect to assimilate the object in itself and neither does it expect to produce it. According to Scheler, the thinkability of the object is a relationship of essence, which leaves the existence unchanged: the *ens intentionale* is not to be confused with the *ens reale*. This relationship reaches its highest *value* when it relates to the other as a person and becomes the fulfilment of a shared act through sharing, *Mit-fühlen*.

According to Scheler, authentic reduction is therefore that *ascetic gesture* that is able to make the spiritual-essential world emerge from the remotion of the reality that reveals itself in the *experience of resistance* (*Widerstandserlebnis*), a *gesture* of radical de-realisation of the tendencies and forces that constitute the vital-pulsional center. When reality is abolished through its radical refusal, the asceticism of the living world dimension corresponds to the flourishing of the ideative sphere, in which the essential aspect of things may be grasped. In the ideative sphere reality is transcended; in other words, the factual, constrictive aspect is transcended of the existence in which reality arises from the *anguishing* fight of organic life with its own surroundings (*Umwelt*). The essential world thus reveals itself as a *cathartic* place in which the vital impulse may be cleansed of its irrational aspect. ⁵²

Scheler therefore believes that the ideative ability, the fundamental ability of understanding the essence of a thing, no matter what, is connected to the emotional experience of the perception of value in its stratifications in the personal value. In turn, the perception of value is the

cose, Soveria Mannelli 2007, 26, note 14: «from a phenomenological-transcendental point of view this would allude to a rift between the phenomenon and being, and if that were the case it would make no sense to speak of reality that, deprived of its reference to consciousness is phenomenologically nothing».

⁵⁰ M. SCHELER, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, GW V, 17. Cf. GW IX, 185-186.

⁵¹ Cf. GW V, 68.

⁵² Cf. G. CUSINATO *Katharsis...*, 70-77.

condition of a privileged access to reality: «the prehension of the value (*Wertnehmung*) always precedes perception (*Wahrnehmung*)».⁵³ The axiological *nuance*, the values, completely prevade our access to reality. How we determine our sense of our will and our action can therefore not prescind from the orientation towards values. Love and hate *guide* our understanding of values; they are always an underlying condition and according to Scheler they are therefore what *actually* allows the values a cognitive relationship with reality. «Wherever the lover precedes the acquaintance there is no reason for being (whether stars, plants, historical-effectual connections, divine things), the scrutiny of which has not gone through an emphatic phase before reaching that *a-valuative analysis*».⁵⁴ First and foremost man is *ens amans* and only then *ens cogitans*, love is *die Weckerin zur Erkenntnis und zum Wollen*, i.e. it awakens him to knowledge and desire.⁵⁵ According to Scheler,

darum war uns Liebe immer auch zugleich der Urakt, durch den ein Seiendes – ohne aufzuhören, dieses begrenzte Seiende zu sein – sich selbst verläßt, um an einem anderen Seienden als *ens intentionale* so teilzuhaben und teilzunehmen, daß beide nicht irgendwie reale Teile voneinander werden. Was wir “erkennen” nennen – diese Seinsrelation –, das setzt immer dieses Akt voraus: ein sich und seine Zustände, [...] Verlassen, ein sie *Transzendieren*, um mit der Welt in einen Erlebniskontakt der Möglichkeit nach zu kommen.⁵⁶

In such a relationship with the world, the authentic sense of love is also formed: love for the value of the person as «ethical love in a pregnant sense»,⁵⁷ the essential meaning of which is to take part in the es-

⁵³ GW VIII, 109-110.

⁵⁴ GW V, 81.

⁵⁵ Cf. *Ordo amoris*, GW X, 347-376.

⁵⁶ GW X, 356. In this essential passage of *Ordo amoris* G. CUSINATO sees, «calling into question the egological perspective» that makes it possible to leave one’s own individualistic dimension for the participative *conversion* to the other (cf. G. CUSINATO, *La totalità incompiuta. Antropologia filosofica e ontologia della persona*, Milano 2008, 200-201). Cf. also H. LEONARDY, *Liebe und Person. Max Schelers Versuch eines “phänomenologischen” Personalismus*, Den Haag 1976, 157-167.

⁵⁷ *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie...*, GW VII, 67. Cf. G. FERRETTI, *La trascendenza dell’amore. Saggi su Max Scheler*, Milano 2014, 53.

sence of the other, leaving him unaltered in his individual-personal irreducibility.⁵⁸

4) *Personal renewal and formation*

In his introduction of the second edition in 1921 of the *Formalismusbuch*, Scheler emphasises the importance of personal values: «all the values, including the real ones, and those of the community and impersonal organisations, have to be subordinate to the values of the *person*».⁵⁹ The authentic value of the person is closely connected to the theme of the part of one's individual formation in the continuous search for personal order, an order of values. In an important passage in *Formalismus*, it says that

das gesamte emotionale Leben als eine Ablauf kausal bewegter Zustände zu nehmen, die sinn- und ziellos in uns abrollen: dem gesamten emotionalen Leben jeden "Sinn" und intentionalen "Gehalt" absprechen, dies konnte erst ein Zeitalter, in dem die Verwirrung der Herzen – der *désordre du coeur* – jenen Grad erreicht hatte wie in unserem Zeitalter.⁶⁰

The passage immediately evokes the *incipit* of the contemporary text *Ordo Amoris* that was published posthumously, in which Scheler wondered whether it was possible to imprint *an objectively correct order* on the chaos of one's own affective world, on the gestures of love and of hate.⁶¹ An order which, according to Scheler, has to be recognised as the order of value preferences that regulates our own relationship with the world. This system comprises the *Ethos* of man. «Whoever has the *ordo amoris* of a man, has the man».⁶² Whoever knows the axiological

⁵⁸ *Sounding remarkably like Scheler*, in *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, Hua I, Den Haag 1950, 139, Husserl states that «if it were possible to gain access directly to the other in what is essentially theirs, then the other would merely be a moment that is essentially mine and, I and the other would be the same thing». Cf. V. VENIER, *L'esistenza in ostaggio. Husserl e la fenomenologia personale*, Milano 2011; S. GALLAGHER, D. ZAHAVI, *The Phenomenological Mind*, New York 2008, 186-187.

⁵⁹ *GW* II, 14.

⁶⁰ *GW* II, 267.

⁶¹ Cf. *GW* X, 347.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 348. About the meaning of the *ordo amoris* as the nucleus of *ethos*, cf. G.

dimension also knows the intimate essence. The *ordo amoris* is the fundamental *Bestimmung* of the human essence, the determination of the concrete possibilities in each individual life, the secret web that can be recognised as one's true *personal vocation*.⁶³

The ethical question whether there is a regulatory possibility for one's own world of values and own rational-emotional dimension and whether such a possibility can be translated into the fundamental motivation to follow one's own personal formation and the creation of an authentic vocation is the essential theoretical characteristic that Husserl and Scheler have in common.

The question of an *ordre du coeur* also appears in Husserl's works at the beginning of the course on ethics in 1914 that asks itself:

Wie soll ich mein Leben und Streben vernünftig ordnen, wie dem quälenden Zwiespalt mit mir selbst entgegen, wie dem berechtigten Tadel der Mitmenschen? Wie kann ich mein ganzes Leben zu einem schönem und guten gestalten und, wie der traditionelle Ausdruck lautet, wie die echte Eudaimonie, die wahre Glückseligkeit, erlangen?⁶⁴

Furthermore, one of the fundamental ethical themes «the general call (*der allgemeine Ruf*) of our tormented present»,⁶⁵ which emerges in the writings he published in the journal *Kaizo* in 1923-1924 is that of the radical need for personal renewal. This is the need for a path that is increasingly directed at conscious personal transformation, a path that must certainly and unequivocally be regarded as individual but also as the indispensable basis for any expansion in any kind of community form: «the renewal of man – of the individual man and of a shared hu-

FERRETTI, *Max Scheler. Fenomenologia e antropologia personalistica*, 259; cf. H. R. SEPP, *Max Schelers Begriff der Ethos*, in C. BERMES, W. HENCKMANN, H. LEONARDY (edd.), *Person und Wert. Schelers "Formalismus" – Perspektiven und Wirkungen*, München 2000, 89-90.

⁶³ Cf. V. VENIER, *La vocazione personale. Max Scheler e l'Ordo Amoris*, in G. CUSINATO (ed.), *Max Scheler. Esistenza della persona e radicalizzazione della fenomenologia*, Milano 2007, 163-176.

⁶⁴ E. HUSSERL, *Fünf Aufsätze über Erneuerung*, Hua XXVII, 11; cf. V. VENIER, *Governing emotions. Husserl and Personal Vocation*, «Phenomenology and Mind», 5 (2013), 99.

⁶⁵ Hua XXVII, 3.

manity – is the supreme theme of any ethics. Ethical life is, in its very essence, a life that is consciously subject to the idea of renewal, and it is by this that it is voluntarily guided and formed». ⁶⁶

What became more and more important for Husserl, probably from 1915 on when he began writing the second book of *Ideen*, was the determining role of motivation as a decisive component in the formation of identity and personal individuality in relation to values and their *direct preference*:

Was als Motiv wirkt, birgt in sich vielerlei intentionale Implikationen; hier liegt selbst eine Quelle wichtiger neuer Motivationen: dem eigentlichen Sinn und der Bewährung der Herausfindung der “Wahrheit selbst” nachgehen und sich in echter Vernunft durch sie bestimmen lassen. Da liegen die vorzüglichen Werte, davon hängt der Wert aller Motivationen und der aktuellen Taten letztlich ab. [...] Den höchsten Wert repräsentiert die Person, die habituell dem echten, wahren, gültigen, freien Entschließen höchste Motivationskraft verleiht. ⁶⁷

It is therefore not only the centrality of the perception of value in relation to the personal formation that progressively takes on more importance in Husserl’s phenomenology, but also the actual pervasiveness of the value in the world of cultural knowledge and formation:

Alle Kulturwissenschaften im spezifischen Sinn der Wissenschaften von der Kulturgebildeten haben statt bloßer Natur mit Prädikaten bloßer Natur gerade solche aus dem Gemüt stammenden, also auf das wertend und wollend gestaltende Subjekt zurückweisende Prädikate in ihrem thematischen Bereich. ⁶⁸

According to Husserl, there is therefore also an essential interweaving between reason, emotion, desire and will that pivot around the unifying theme of value. Husserl also believes that the value precedes and informs heterogeneous but interlinked experiences about itself, for example such as when we state that «what is beautiful is also good; each

⁶⁶ Hua XXVII, 20. Cf. U. MELLE, *Schelersche Motive in Husserls Freiburger Ethik*, 205.

⁶⁷ E. HUSSERL, *Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Zweites Buch*, Hua IV, Den Haag 1952, 268.

⁶⁸ Hua VIII, 25.

good, if it does not exist is a value of desire, if it can be created, is a value of will». ⁶⁹

In comparison to Scheler, in Husserl's work a practical-rational instance prevails that is subordinate to knowledge, but rather than present itself as an antinomy towards Scheler's fundamental emphasis on the affective sphere of values, we see it as a complementary theoretical aspect in which *feelings* and *reason* can merge into a real *phenomenology of emotions*. The emotive sphere, in which the value is favoured straight-away, for example that of the desire of pure satisfaction «is founded in the consciousness of having achieved its own objective». ⁷⁰ The value, the real order of values, therefore requires the exercise of knowledge, the ability of justifying one's own personal acquisitions to oneself and the others, whether regarding the affective, practical or cognitive sphere:

Aber verantwortet wird letztlich die Echtheit des Wertes und die Wahrheit im Erkennen der Erzielung, das in Urteilstellung und in seinen logischen Formen über Wert prädiert und einsichtig die zufällig vorliegende Wertanschauung auf generell einsichtige Wertnormen zurückbezieht und dadurch eine höhere Verantwortung, als Erkenntnisverantwortung, gewinnt. ⁷¹

However, the decisive motive is that of the value of individual formation in the interweaving between conscious will and personal renewal within a *practical* life that is completely rational in relation to the others. Also in cases in which action is in reference to intellectual knowledge, Husserl always sees ethics as the true thematic terrain. The search in itself and one's own self-motivation in its becoming and consolidation, is inevitable regarding the relation of the other: «in the *aim of true love*, understood as a seeking that loves and a creation that arouses its true Self, the *aim of the love for one's neighbour* is enclosed, which the neighbour actually needs in his seeking-him-self and recreating himself». ⁷² The ideal in itself, fulfilling one's own true *vocation* – if really

⁶⁹ Hua XXVIII, 48.

⁷⁰ Hua VIII, 25.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² E. HUSSERL, *Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorelesung Sommersemester 1920/1924*, Hua XXXVII, Dordrecht/Boston/London 2004, 241.

rational – has to refer to the *Lebensgemeinschaft*, the *Community life* where they can find confirmation, interweave and stimulate the individual motivations, the individual, personal *vocations*, «living a personal life means living as self and as us, sharing a common horizon».⁷³

According to Scheler, and not unlike Husserl, «man is an entity whose manner coincides with the decision that has not yet been taken, about what he wants *to be* and *to become*».⁷⁴ However, Scheler also believes that what is determined in the life of an individual is regardless of how he lives, acts, believes, and hopes with others (*der Form eines Miteinander-lebens, -handelns, -glaubens, -hoffens, -bildens*). «The idea of individual destination therefore includes reciprocal solidarity from the moral subjects that are responsible for both the blame and merits, not from the outside, but in itself».⁷⁵ The relational interweaving between people, with their own disfunctions, harmony and contradictions, represents the true background of the *ordo amoris* that involves the process of self-formation (*Selbstbildung*) of the personal being directly in relation to the *order* of one's own values. Both Husserl and Scheler offer the same background: that of the *essential search* of the meaning and the value itself of one's own personal existence. An untiring search that can only take place through the continuous attempt to *form and renew the governing of self and one's own authentic vocation*, a vocation that hides the crucial question of a *happy existence*, a *fulfilled existence*, in relation to oneself and to others.

ABSTRACT

Despite the clear differences and reciprocal controversial evaluations, extreme similarities are to be found in Husserl and Scheler's theory regarding the central ques-

⁷³ Hua VI, 314.

⁷⁴ GW IX, 150. Cf. L. LANDGREBE, *Geschichtsphilosophische Perspektiven bei Scheler und Husserl*, in P. GOOD (ed.), *Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschehen der Philosophie*, Bern 1975, 83. For more about the open and personal nature of the *order of values* and knowing how to *decide* for one's own *ordo amoris*, cf. M. S. FRINGS, *The Mind of Max Scheler*, Milwaukee 1997, 66-69.

⁷⁵ GW X, 352. Cf. E. SIMONOTTI, *Max Scheler. Universalismo e verità individuale*, Brescia 2011, 68-69.

tion of a *phenomenology of the emotions*. The essential theoretical characteristic that brings Husserl closer to Scheler is the ethical question as to whether it is possible to regulate one's own world of values and one's own rational-affective dimension, and whether such a possibility can be translated into the fundamental motivation for the course of one's own personal education and creation as an authentic vocation.