Scientific Paper

Transformations of cultural norms and values among the youth in Arab Mediterranean countries from a gender perspective

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Researching
Arab Mediterranean Youth:
Towards a New Social Contract
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Abstract

This paper examines the changes and continuities in cultural gender norms and values, gender roles, gender relations and the family, as expressed and lived by the younger generations in Arab Mediterranean countries. It aims at highlighting both the tensions and conflicts and the innovative meanings relating to gender that have been emerging; and to compare the experience and points of view of young people in different social positions (due to their gender, social class, place of residence) and in different countries. The analysis of the transformation of cultural norms and values from a gender perspective is connected with broader transformations of conditions of life and biographical transition to adulthood, before and after the popular mobilisations of 2010–2011. The first part of the paper discusses the process of change in life transitions, drawing on the existing literature and secondary data. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the analysis of the empirical findings collected through the ethnographic fieldwork and the survey in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Tunisia and Egypt.

Keywords: youth; cultural innovation; gender roles and relations; cultural norms, youth culture.

1. Introduction

This paper analyses young Arab Mediterranean people's values and attitudes towards gender relations and the position of men and women in the family and society from a comparative and gendered perspective. The analysis presented in this paper draws on qualitative and quantitative data collected during the three year SAHWA research project in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. The analysis illuminates young people's values and cultural representations, comparing different countries and highlighting the impact of gender in shaping young people's values and orientations.

How do young people in the region understand the roles of men and women in society, politics, and the family? What are their views and expectations on the relations between genders? To what extent and how are the models and ideas around femininity and masculinity changing for the younger generations in relation to the values of previous generations and traditional gender models?

The paper examines such issues from a gender perspective, emphasising the type of impact gender has on girls' and boys' attitudes and values, and on the pace and direction of their transformation. Furthermore, we do not only take gender as a perspective but interrogate it as a topic in itself, with analysis conducted on values related to gender models and relations.

In the first part of the paper, we contextualise the analysis and connect these changes in young people's values and cultures with broader transformations, drawing on data and extant literature on both changes in life transition, as well as changes in values and cultural norms among the youth in the Arab Mediterranean countries (AMCs). The second part of the paper is dedicated to the analysis of the empirical findings collected through the ethnographic fieldwork and surveys (SAHWA Youth Survey 2016) in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Tunisia and Egypt.

2. Structural and sociocultural changes in the region

The change in cultural norms and values among young people in the region is not a new phenomenon, although this process has been accelerated in the past decade at an unprecedented speed. The goal of this section is to contextualise youth cultural change in a broader setting, describing the social, economic and political circumstances in which such a change has taken place. More specifically, the section will discuss the data and studies on the transformation of life paths and transitions to adulthood for boys and girls (school to

work transition, marriage and parenthood, women's presence in the public sphere, labour market and education, marriage age and age of first child). Then, the section will turn to studies on the shorter-term changes in cultural values and norms that have been taking place in the AMCs over the past few years, and how they intersect with the broader, longer-term changes outlined above.

In the study of youth in the AMCs, the so-called Arab Spring represented a major watershed because it signalled a radical change in the behaviour of what was perceived to be a rather passive social category. If we look at the literature predating the events of 2010–2011, we can appreciate how a whole field of study revolved around the idea of "waithood", a structural condition characterising the life course of the vast majority of the AM youth. "Waithood" pointed to the ambiguity and delay that had become the main characteristic of the life transitions that mark the entrance to the world of adults, such as marriage, access to the labour market and parenting. While in the past such transitions were clearly articulated and followed a planned path, today they are delayed, thus leaving young people to "wait" (Singerman, 2007; SAHWA CP/01-2014).

Such a condition is caused by structural factors such as unemployment, the rise of the level of education among young women and men and the rise in the age of people having their first child.

Figure 1 shows the gender gap in the employment rate among the total population, and in the unemployment rates among young people (SAHWA BP04B). Figure 2 presents data on female education rates in the region (SAHWA BP04B). Figure 3 contains data on marriage and fertility (SAHWA BP04B).

Figure 1. Gender, employment and unemployment (2011–2014)

	Algeria	**Morocco**	**Tunisia**	**Egypt**	**Lebanon**
Employment rate[1]	Total: 40% Male: 66% Female: 12.3%	Tot: 45.79% Male: 69.1% Female: 23.7%	n/a	Tot: 43% Male: 69% Female: 17%	Tot: 43% Male: 64.69% Female: 20.39%

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[1] Source: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database, 2012. Employment to population ratio is the proportion of a country's population that is employed. Ages 15 and older are generally considered the working-age population.

Youth unemployment rate[2]	Youth, total: 28% Male: 19.1% Female: 38.2%	Youth, tot: 18.6% Male: 18.4% Female: 19.2%	Youth, tot: 42.3% Male: n/a Female: n/a	Youth, tot: 25% Male: 14.7% Female: 54.1%	Youth, tot: 16.8% Male: 14.6% Female: 22.3%

Figure 2. Female education rates (2006–2012)

	Algeria	**Morocco**	**Tunisia**	**Egypt**	**Lebanon**
Literacy rate[3] (total population)	Total population: 72.6% Male: 81.3% Female: 63.9%	Total population: 67.1% Male: 76.1% Female: 57.6%	Total population: 79.1% Male: 87.4% Female: 71.1%	Total population: 73.9% Male: 81.7% Female: 65.8%	Total population: 89.6% Male: 93.4% Female: 86%
Expected years of schooling[4]	Male: 13.4 Female: 13.8	Male: 11.6 Female: 10.6	Male: 14 Female: 15	Male: 12 Female: 13	Male:13.25 Female: 12.85

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[2] Sources: *CIA World Factbook*. Year: 2014, estimated; Tunisia, 2011.

[3] Source: CIA World Factbook. Year: Algeria, 2006; Morocco, 2012, estimated; Tunisia, 2010, estimated; Egypt, 2011, estimated; Lebanon, 2011, estimated. Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, "literacy" also encompasses "numeracy" – the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100.

[4] Sources: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. Year: 2010. Tunisia, 2011. Expected years of schooling is the number of years a child of school entrance age is expect to spend at school or university, including years spent on repetition. It is the sum of the age-specific enrolment ratios for primary, secondary, post-secondary non-tertiary and tertiary education.

Figure 3. Marriage and fertility rates in young female population (2000–2004)[5]

Table 5.1 Selected reproductive health indicators in the MENA region, 2000–2004

	Women married: 15–19 years old (%)	Women married: 20–24 years old (%)	Total Fertility Rate	Married women 15–49, using any method of contraception (%)	Married women 15–49, using modern contraceptives (%)
Algeria	4	30	2.8	64	50
Bahrain	3	30	2.5	62	31
Egypt	12	53	3.5	56	54
Iran	16	—	2.0	74	56
Iraq	—	—	5.3	—	—
Jordan	8	38	3.6	56	39
Kuwait	5	40	4.2	52	39
Lebanon	—	—	2.4	63	40
Libya	1	12	3.9	45	26
Morocco	10	37	3.3	58	49
Oman	15	58	6.1	24	18
Qatar	4	31	3.9	43	32
Saudi Arabia	7	39	5.7	32	29
Syria	11	42	3.8	47	35
Tunisia	1	14	2.1	63	53
Turkey	15	59	2.5	64	38
United Arab Emirates	8	40	3.5	28	24
Yemen	26	70	7.2	21	10
MENA	12	47	3.3	59	45

MENA: Middle East and North African region.

Source: Mensch et al., 2005: 39; Roudi-Fahimi, 2003: table 1, pp. 4–5; 2002 Women of Our World. Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C.

Broadly speaking, the data show a general delay in marriage, employment and a lower level of fertility among women – all signs that the transition to adulthood is delayed, thus

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[5] Source: Haghighat-Sordellini, Elhum. *Women in the Middle East and North Africa: change and continuity*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 64.

confirming the "waithood" condition affecting the youth in the AMCs (see also: SAHWA BP04B). Such waithood is gendered, as it happens because the economic and social processes delaying the transition to adulthood have a deeply gendered nature, with supposedly breadwinning men remaining unemployed and marrying later and young women postponing marriage and maternity because they study more, a consequence of both an improvement in gender equality standards and unemployment. Although these factors have a gendered nature, their result is that adulthood is equally postponed for both sexes.

Against the claim that waithood is actually changing the traditional pattern of transition to adulthood, Diane Singerman presents evidence from Egypt that young people have found "non-mainstream" ways to marry and transition to adulthood. This means that alternatives to "traditional" marriage exist and are used by young people if access to marriage is restricted to what Singerman calls "the economic imperative", namely economic constraints. More specifically, she refers to *misyar* and *urfi* marriages, which are "secret" marriages that include sexual intercourse but are not officially registered and therefore exclude celebrations, ceremonies and economic obligations. These forms of marriage are however socially minoritarian and heavily deprecated, as they are seen as only one step away from prostitution (Singerman, 2007)

The notion of "waithood" also infused the study on AM youth political attitudes, with the young people described as "passive" and disillusioned about any prospect of political change (Sika, 2012). The revolutions and revolts that have taken place in the region since 2010–2011 proved this view to be flawed at best, as young people were clearly important actors during the revolutions, expressing political agency and radical ideas (Gana, 2013; Khatib and Lust-Okar, 2014; Abdelrahman, 2015). Scholars probably missed such developments as they were not taking place in official or regime-sanctioned political platforms (tolerated political parties and tolerated trade unions, for instance) but rather in informal and unofficial spaces for mobilisation and political activism (Lust-Okar, 2011).

As well as structural conditions and political attitudes, the extant literature recognises that values and cultural norms have changed.

The literature on youth's changing values and norms in Arab Mediterranean countries is quite extensive and has been growing since the uprisings of 2010–2011 (for background see: SAHWA BP03-2015). The uprisings generated significant scholarly interest as they questioned the two dominant representations of young people in the AMCs – either as

"passive" (Sika, 2012), or as "a dangerous bulge" often portrayed as a threat to stability and/or a fertile ground for radical Islam (Al-Momani, 2011; LaGraffe, 2012). However, as the years have passed, a number of scholars have focused more consistently on the issues of norms and values, highlighting the changes and transformations that have been taking place in that domain (Joseph et al., 2013; Murphy, 2012; Hanafi, 2012; Singerman, 2013; Herrera, 2014). Although a significant part of the literature remains focused on the notions of "crisis" as central to its examinations, emphasising the difficult economic, social and geopolitical conditions in which the youth is submerged (Dalacoura, 2012; Al-Rasheed, 2011), others highlight the diversification of lifestyles, and consequently, values and social norms (LeVine, 2008) visible in the process of privatisation and autonomy of youth values.

These aspects are indeed quite evident in the value surveys that have recently been conducted, which highlight a shift in youth values. In particular, Mohamed Tozy (2014) and Sara Silvestri (2014) highlight how, according to the results of the survey they present, it emerges that when it comes to political participation the most important value is individual action, as opposite to collective action. Freedom is an important value and 81% of the respondents defined it as a primary requirement in society. Silvestri, in particular, highlights the progressive reinforcement of secular values among the youth.

Such an individualisation of activism mirrors a more general trend towards the individualisation of other values and the emergence of a sphere of autonomy when it comes to religion and cultural production. Already in 2008, Mark LeVine, through an examination of heavy metal bands across the region, argued that apparent incongruity of genres such as extreme heavy metal or gangsta rap becoming popular in the Muslim world is a reminder of the diversity of contemporary Islam. In other words, such diversity reveals that the borders between religious beliefs and seemingly secular practices in Muslim societies are increasingly porous thanks to the growing privatisation of religious values. In fact, politically marginalised young metalheads and their more activist religious peers share many of the same societal goals, namely greater autonomy and even democracy, the right of tolerance of divergent views, and the rejection of the hypocrisy, corruption and authoritarianism of their leaders.

On such grounds, what Sari Hanafi calls "the new subjectivities" have been able to flourish. In his work on subjectivity after the Arab uprisings, Sari Hanafi (2012) argues that the revolutions in North Africa have produced "new subjectivities" that have "reflexive

individualism" at their core. By this term, Hanafi means that new subjectivities reflect the fragmentation of previous social and economic systems, leaving room for a more individualised, autonomous subjectivity to emerge. However, Hanafi argues, this is not a neoliberal, competitive, anti-social subject, but "It is a type of individualism that involves the constant negotiation [...] with the existing social structure in order to realize a (partial) emancipation from it. This is an act of self-reference of an agent that recognizes forces of socialization but alters their place in the social structure and resists their disciplinary power" (Hanafi, 2012: 203). This trend towards autonomy and individualism is the common background in which youth from the AMCs has been mobilising and making demands of both the ruling regimes and their own societies before and after the revolutionary wave of 2010–2013.

3. Data and methodology

The analysis presented in this paper draws on qualitative and quantitative data collected during the SAHWA research project in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. Drawing on a mixed-method approach and on a comparative, multisite research design, the SAHWA research team has reached thousands of young men and women aged 15–29 from the aforementioned five countries.

More in detail, the qualitative and quantitative data gathered by local research teams consists of:

- The SAHWA Youth Survey 2016: an international youth survey exploring young people's conditions and attitudes in the social, cultural, economic and political fields. The survey sample includes 2,000 young men and women in each country and takes into consideration different social, cultural and economic backgrounds, rural and urban environments, and gender differences.

- The SAHWA Ethnographic Fieldwork 2016: multisite qualitative and ethnographic fieldwork including 25 focus groups, 24 life stories, 8 life stories videos and 12 focused ethnographies, involving more than 225 young people from the region.

For the purpose of this paper, this extensive corpus of data has been analysed through comparative lenses (underlining commonalities and differences between the five countries), and from a gender perspective. Gender, in interaction with other dimensions of social differentiation and inequality (age, social class, urban/rural residency, religion and ethnicity,

among others), is key to our analysis. We approach gender relations both as a matter of investigation – a relevant issue when it comes to the analysis of the changing youth conditions in the region – and as a transversal analytical dimension which cross-cuts all the thematic areas addressed by the research project (education, employment, social inclusion, civic and political participation, youth cultures, migration and mobility).

Bearing in mind the research questions detailed in the introduction, we have analysed the five country reports that synthesise the main findings of the qualitative and quantitative fieldwork in each national context (AUC, 2016; CAWTAR, 2016a; CREAD, 2016; LAU, 2016a; HEM, 2016a), as well as the empirical data gathered in the qualitative fieldwork. Moreover, we carried out a quantitative analysis on selected questions of the survey using SPSS software. The selected questions explore young people's values and attitudes in relation to gender roles, models and relations in a variety of fields (Figure 4). We clustered the multiple items into significant analytical dimensions, which are described in Figure 5.

Figure 4. SAHWA Youth Survey 2016: exploring young people's values on gender roles and relations

Q1: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Possible answers: agree strongly; agree; disagree; disagree strongly.)
1. Education is more important for boys than for girls.
2. The same upbringing should be given to both boys and girls.
3. In a family, men should make the decisions.
4. A married woman should have the possibility to work outside the house if she wants to.
5. Men and women should have the same job opportunities and receive the same salary.
6. Men should be the main financial providers in the family.
7. Women should have the possibility of going into politics.
8. Women are allowed to travel alone.
9. Women should enjoy the right to inheritance.
10. Women should receive the same inheritance as men.
11. Women and men should have the same rights when it comes to the decision to divorce.
12. When work is scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
13. It would be fairer if men contributed to housework and caring for children.

Source: SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 questionnaire.

Figure 5. SAHWA Youth Survey 2016: analytical dimensions describing young people's values on gender roles and relations

A. Gender equality & equal opportunities in education

Level of agreement with the following statements:
1. "Education is more important for boys than for girls";
2. "The same upbringing should be given to both boys and girls".

B. Women and men in the labour market
Level of agreement with the following statements:
4. "A married woman should have the possibility to work outside the house if she wants to";
5. "Men and women should have the same job opportunities and receive the same salaries";
12. "When work is scarce, men should have more right to a job than women".

C. Women in Politics
Level of agreement with the following statement:
7. "Women should have the possibility of going into politics".

D. Men's and women's roles and power in the family; Sociocultural models of masculinity
Level of agreement with the following statements:
3. "In a family, men should make the decisions";
6. "Men should be the main financial provider in the family";
13. "It would be fairer if men contributed to housework and caring for children".

E. Gender equality in the family code
Level of agreement with the following statements:
9. "Women should enjoy the right to inheritance";
10. "The part of an inheritance received by a woman should be equal to that received by a man";
11. "Women and men should have the same rights when it comes to the decision to divorce".

Source: prepared by the authors.

4. Young people's values and attitudes on gender roles and relations

As anticipated, the SAHWA qualitative and quantitative data provide interesting insights on young people's values and attitudes on gender roles and relations. This section discusses the main findings regarding the changes in social norms, attitudes and values of young people in relation to the roles and positions of men and women in the public and private spheres: in education, the labour market and politics, but also in the family.

This is a dynamic and variegated field: young people sometimes reproduce stereotypical representations of the roles of men and women, while at other times (or in relation to other aspects of life) they seem to advance innovative models fostering gender equality.

As we will show in detail in the following sections, gender equality enjoys diverse degrees of support, depending on the topic and the kind of power relations that are challenged or reproduced. For instance, we will see that young people widely support the idea of gender

equality in education, while they tend to reproduce more conservative models when it comes to the sexual division of labour and the related gender roles and models within the family. Moreover, youngsters' attitudes on the matter vary according to different social backgrounds at the intersections of class, level of education and gender. A clear gender gap emerges from our data, as girls tend to support ideas that relate to a more equal definition of men's and women's roles, social positions and opportunities more widely and/or more strongly than boys. Survey data in particular provide evidence of that, as the percentage of young women supporting gender equality is greater than that of young men, for each of the items analysed (see: Figures 1 and 2). Moreover, girls tend to express stronger support than boys, e.g. they often "agree strongly" with statements suggesting gender equality. Girls' and boys' views strongly diverge, as we will show, in relation to the issues of women's rights and equal opportunities in the labour market and politics, the idea of male authority within the family, and of gender equality in the family code. Young men's and women's attitudes tend to converge, however, in relation to the issue of education, the idea of the male breadwinner and the cultural construction of masculinity.

In the following sections, we discuss more in detail the findings related to young people's views and experiences of gender roles and relations in different domains and everyday life spheres.

4.1 Equal gender opportunities in education

Education is one of the main fields where deep transformations have taken place in the last decades in the region, with a deep impact on women and young people. Women have gained access to education, literacy, university enrolment, and to a variety of academic fields. Today, almost all the countries in the region report that nearly all of their children (both boys and girls) are enrolled in primary school. Female literacy rates and other indicators of female education are on the rise, even if they remain lower than the male equivalents.

The difficult transition from school to work, especially among young women, in part undermines the beneficial effects of greater equality in education. Women still face strong discrimination in their access to employment, even if they have high qualifications. The gap between high expectations and low opportunities seems to be one of the main contradictions faced by young women. Moreover, despite the growing inclusion of women in the labour market during the last decades, deep gender inequalities persist in the access to jobs and

when it comes to working conditions. For instance, horizontal segregation of men and women in the labour market, the gender pay gap, and the risk of harassment for working women are widely spread phenomena that are reflected in ethnographic and qualitative fieldwork in almost all investigated countries (Barsoum, 2017; CAWTAR, 2016b; HEM, 2016b: 9–13; HEM, 2016c; LAU, 2016b: 13).

The young people involved in our research belong to a generation that is living through important cultural and social transformations, such as increased opportunities and greater gender equity in education. School and education are the domains where young people are experiencing what togetherness and a fairer distribution of opportunities between young men and women look like.

It is not surprising therefore that the results of the qualitative and quantitative research show high levels of agreement with the idea of gender equality in training and education, and in relation to the ways in which girls and boys are raised by the family. A large section of the surveyed young people rejects the idea that "*Education is more important for boys than for girls*" (Table 1), while agreeing on the fact that "*The same upbringing should be given to both boys and girls*" (Table 2). Moreover, this is a field where the attitudes of girls and boys are quite similar, although differences still exist and vary in relation to the country considered.

Another key result concerns the relevance of education to young people's social inclusion, and especially to young women. The young people involved in qualitative interviews highlight the relevance and key role that education plays for young people in the region. Some interviewees focus on its relevance as a tool for the social and economic improvement of their own country; other interviewees underline the key role of education for their personal biography, as they get more chances for self-fulfilment through education. Although both young men and women report education to be a critical factor for their social inclusion and recognition, education represents the main pathway for young women's personal and social empowerment. Qualitative fieldwork, in particular, is rich in insights on this matter. The young women interviewed are deeply conscious of the importance of education for their personal and social empowerment. They believe that it represents a way to challenge social expectations of their role as women – which revolves around marriage – and to reinforce their ambitions and professional interests. Mirna's and Nordin's accounts are good examples of this.

Mirna, who is a 31-year-old woman from Lebanon, currently works as an administrative assistant in an air conditioning and refrigerating company. She has been working in this field for many years even though she obtained a degree in Primary and Pre-school Education. As she points out, "many people think that studying is convenient for women" and they believe that along with degrees in engineering and medicine, education is a field that is particularly "good for women". Nevertheless, jobs in education are described as intensely tiring and not comfortable for women. As a result, strongly influenced by social expectations, Mirna studied education but decided to be an employee in an administrative office in order to have fewer responsibilities. During the interview, she confirms that her educational choice was related to gender stereotyping and the social pressure she felt when she had to pick a university programme. Her account reveals a form of gender discrimination because with no social pressure she would have taken a course in Business Administration. While both young people and adults warmly welcome and encourage education for women, they also reproduce gendered patterns of choice when it comes to what educational branch is the most appropriate for girls and boys. It follows that social pressure strongly affect young people's choices.

Nordin – a 22-year-old man from Algeria – is currently unemployed even though he has a degree in Law. He is worried about his unemployment because this social status strongly limits his social inclusion particularly when it comes to the opportunity to get married soon. Indeed, he is engaged but is unable to bear marriage expenses and maintain his future wife. According to the traditions of his rural area, families usually find a bride through an arranged marriage. Nordin says that while he is not in love with his future wife she is the right choice because "she is a student and well educated", in addition to being a good girl from a good family that is well known in the village. In this case, a solid education for a young woman is an important element in the selection of the right bride and in gaining social recognition.

Qualitative data show that young women's positive performance in the education system often results from their ability to contest the gender discrimination they face within their family and the education system itself. For example, the Algerian country report shows that relevant inequality persists in relation to the families' investment in the education of girls and boys, and in relation to the strong family control over girls. These forces, however, tend to be counteracted or resisted by young women, who understand the key role played by

education in determining their social trajectories. They are aware of the lack of alternatives if they drop out from school and tend to do better than boys when it comes to staying in the educational system (CREAD, 2016: 3–10).

These examples show that despite the great progress, the field of education is not exempt from contradicting tendencies and conflicts. It follows that indicators on women's improved performance in education and young people's values regarding gender relations in this field should be taken as indicators of sociocultural changes that are currently underway rather than consolidated outcomes.

4.2 Women and men in the labour market and in politics

Focussing on the issue of women's and men's positions and opportunities in the labour market and politics, our data shows that young people in the region acknowledge the relevance and importance of having women active in both fields. Our interviewees underline the importance of having a job as a crucial tool for many reasons: to provide financial stability; to reward a specific educational path; to be socially included and transition to adulthood; to fulfil personal expectations in terms of self-realisation; as a form of emancipation (for young women above all); and as an essential element in getting married (for young men above all). Nonetheless, all interviewees argue that the huge level of unemployment among young people in the AMCs engenders different reactions among young people: frustration and sadness, sense of marginalisation within the society they belong to, resignation and pessimism, anger associated either with the desire to fight against the status quo, deviant behaviour and even suicide. Hekmet – 21 years old, from Lebanon – is particularly disappointed about being unemployed as he holds a degree in Chemistry. He places his own experience in a broader picture, in which the general condition of many other young people is the norm. He reports disappointment with the fact that almost nobody succeeds in getting a job in line with his/her educational choice. Therefore, young people are forced to choose either to leave the country, severing all ties to their family and friends, or to come to terms with uncertainty in everyday life and wait for a better future.

Respondents also suggest that politics and political engagement are important channels of public visibility and social recognition for young people. Many interviewees are already engaged in political and/or civil organisations: they believe that collective action may positively change their countries. The young women interviewed are more active on this

front. Syrine, Kaoutar and Fadma's experiences with civil engagement and politics are particularly relevant.

Syrine – a 19-year-old girl from Tunisia – is extremely resolute when it comes to pursuing her desires. She has just obtained her baccalaureate and will enrol at university. In her free time, she is extremely active: she attends conferences and workshops, she is involved in voluntary work, she hangs out at the library, reads books and meets friends; but mainly she acts in the theatre, her core passion, and dreams of becoming "famous beyond Djerba", the city where she lives. She admits to being ambitious, and she often bickers with her uncles and neighbours who think she is much too ambitious. She does not agree with "their way of thinking" especially when they criticise the fact that she is involved in "culture". She clearly hints that as a woman she is considered too ambitious and resolute, almost shameless. What is also relevant in her account is the fact that she links the opportunity/hope for fresh political and social development in Tunisia with women's determination and ambition, recalling that the first doctor in the Arab world was a Tunisian woman. In her view, Tunisia's future will be "prosperous" thanks to Tunisian women and concludes by affirming that "Tunisian women are the best in the Arab world".

Kaoutar – a 22-year-old woman from Morocco – is a social entrepreneur working in water filtering, a huge "problem for many African countries", she affirms. Her involvement in this issue and her awareness of social problems in general are the main feature of her personality and the main interests in her life. She is deeply convinced that "taking action" must be a sort of life philosophy for everyone not only to change his/her own life, but also the destiny of a country. This is especially relevant when it comes to the high levels of unemployment among young people. She is an activist who fights every day for her aims. Like Syrine, she is convinced that women have "big potential to help a whole society" because they are used to doing twice as much as men do since they have jobs and take care of the family too. Due to a widespread "mannish mind" she claims that "There is a favouritism for the man over the woman. The man has the right to do mistakes, while the woman has not. He can hurt a woman, but she is the one doing wrong".

Fadma – 27 years old, from Tunisia – works in a commercial company where she also is a syndicalist. As she says, she never dealt with politics until the revolution of 2011. Nevertheless, she joined the protests at the first signs of revolution and out of love for her country. Since she took action, she has dealt with problems of workers in her company,

becoming a trade unionist. We report her account, revealing her gradual approach to trade unionism and politics.

> [After Ben Ali was expelled] I participated in demonstrations and sit-ins. I stayed near Tunis Telecom, where our revolution had started. We were very oppressed and we faced many troubles in our jobs. It was a chance to defend and improve our situation. (…) So I found myself working in syndicalism. I didn't understand anything before, because I'm not into political activity. I protested just because I love my country. That's why I participated in the sit-ins and marches. During 2015 I became a syndicalist.

> (Fadma, female, 27, Tunisia.)

When she reports about the most significant current problems of the country, she mentions the situation of young people and then women. On this last point, she denounces that "The woman is also marginalized. She leaves her work very late, and receives low salary".

This is reflected in the survey. Although most of the respondents agree with general statements about women's freedom and presence in the public sphere, the idea of full equality between men and women is still met with resistance, especially when women's participation is seen in competitive terms – as detrimental to men's duties and privileges.

In fact, most of the young respondents agree on the fact that "*A married woman should have the possibility to work outside the house if she wants to*" (Table 4) and that "*Women should have the possibility of going into politics*" (Table 7), although country differences still matter when it comes to this second statement. The figures also show a high level of agreement with the statement "*Men and women should have the same job opportunities and receive the same salary*" (Table 5).

However, respondents divided along gender lines over the statement that women and men should have equal opportunities and salaries in the labour market: male respondents seem more reluctant to take up the idea. Moreover, the majority of male respondents and a smaller yet significant percentage of the female respondents think that "*When there is not a lot of work, men should have more right to employment than women*" (Table 12). According to the survey, young women also show high levels of agreement with this statement, although young men tend to agree more in all the countries (except for Morocco).

The survey results suggest that many young people in the region consider women's participation in the labour market more as a choice that women should be free to make if they wish to (or they should be prevented from doing so), rather than a right that women must enjoy on an equal basis with men. It is also important to link this result with the

persistence of the gendered division of labour and, in particular, with the resilience of the male breadwinner cultural model among the youth in the region (see: section 4.3). In this context, women's opportunities in the labour market tend to be framed as subordinate to the cultural requirement defining men as the financial providers for families and are accepted as long as they do not conflict with the dominant male cultural and economic functions.

4.3 Men's and women's roles and power in the family, and the issue of gender equality in the family code

Despite the social importance of having a family, marrying and parenting are not questioned by young people (as reflected in the National Case Studies: AUC, 2016; CAWTAR, 2016a; CREAD, 2016; HEM, 2016a; LAU, 2016a). Our research shows that there are tensions and a great diversity of positions and values among the young when it comes to the definition of women's and men's roles and the issue of gender power relations within the family.

Survey data allow a preliminary exploration of young people's values on this issue. Most of the young respondents agree or strongly agree with the statement "*Men should be the main economic providers in the family*" (Table 13). This is the statement that causes the least gender-based divisions among the respondents, as the male breadwinner model seems to be equally interiorised by both girls and boys. The level of agreement with the statement "*In a family, men should make the decisions*" is also high among the respondents (Table 3). However, the identification of men as a source of power and authority within the family generates significant divisions among both male and female respondents.

Qualitative data enrich the analysis and suggest that the widespread adherence to these norms of masculinity (male breadwinner and male authority in the family) poses specific challenges to young men, as they often find it difficult to fulfil them because of unemployment. Young male respondents look with anxiety upon their ability to live up to expectations in the future. This seems to amplify the sense of uncertainty perceived by both young men and women in relation to their future (the Lebanon national report provides interesting reflections and analysis on this point [LAU, 2016a: 23], although it appears to be a common trend in all the countries involved in the study).

It is not surprising therefore that all male interviewees – who are mainly unemployed or employed in seasonal and occasional jobs – see their condition as extremely problematic when it comes to the possibility of getting married and, as men, maintaining their wife and

children in line with social expectations. Wajdi – 23 years old, from Tunisia – reveals that one of the best memories of his childhood is the lack of worry about marriage. He is very frustrated and disillusioned when he describes the tragic future of young people in Tunisia due to the high level of unemployment.

In fact, the effects of young people's unemployment on life transitions is central in Nordin's account. He is worried about his condition since he is already 22 years old and engaged. He would like to get married as soon as possible in order to overcome his impression of being socially marginalised. However, without a job he is not able to bear marriage expenses, which are very high in Tunisia.

> [Marriage] has a high cost. Then the housing problem. If you want to get married then her family asks for a high dowry, then the dinner, the bedroom. These things are expensive. We start with the house. If she doesn't ask for anything, she will ask for a house alone. If she doesn't ask for anything, she will ask for a small house far from the family, so there will be no problems. You have the costs, the dinner, the bedroom, her clothes, jewellery, her dowry. They are problems. And then she asks for an air-conditioner! An air-conditioner, too. It's a lot of money. Some women ask for their own kitchen. All this to avoid family problems. I'll have to spend all this money just to avoid problems that come with marriage?

> (Nordin, male, 22, Tunisia.)

The survey also explored young people's attitudes to women's rights and legal equality in the family. In particular, the right to inheritance for women and equality of rights in the decision to divorce are the two items that gather consensus among young people (Tables 9 & 11). However, young women are more supportive of the latter principle than young men. When it comes to the portion of inheritance to be allocated to men and women, the principle of equal treatment meets little sympathy among young people and varies significantly depending on the country. Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia show low levels of agreement with the statement *"The part of an inheritance received by a woman should be equal to that received by a man"* (Table 10), with a small gender gap between male and female respondents. In Morocco, there is a split between 50% of respondents who agree or strongly agree with the statement, and 50% who do not agree; in Lebanon, there is a high level of agreement (69.5%) and a big gender gap between men's and women's views (20 percentage points).

Despite the existing national differences in the legal and cultural norms ruling gender relations within the family (e.g. diversity of family codes and legal traditions), the data report on young people's specific views of male and female rights and duties in the family,

as defined in the family legal code. Here, a trend similar to the one described in relation to the issue of gender equality in the labour market (see: section 4.2) can be observed. Young people throughout the region generally agree on women's rights, such as the freedom to divorce and to receive inheritance. However, when applications of the stated principle about women's equal rights conflict with largely shared gender cultural norms or with male privileges (e.g. the idea of the economic responsibility of the male family members; or the idea of the economic and legal dependence of women), less support is expressed by young people, included young women.

5. Concluding remarks

The overall objective of this work was to reflect on the changes and continuities in the cultural norms and values related to gender roles, gender relations and the family, as expressed and lived by young generations in the Arab Mediterranean countries. Our aim has been to highlight the tensions, conflicts and the new meanings of "gender relation and equality" arising from this field. Furthermore, the paper also compared the experiences and points of view of young people in different social positions due to their gender, social class, and place of residence.

The empirical data show how innovation and continuity in gender relations and norms, demands for change and resistance to change coexist and open up new opportunities – as well as new tensions and contradictions – for different sectors of young population. The research sheds light on these processes and shows how they are changing the living conditions, opportunities and aspirations of young women and young men in the region.

The gender perspective allows comparison to be made between the different subjective experiences of girls and boys from different social classes; it also encouraged us to take into account the dynamics affecting both contemporary masculinity and contemporary femininity in the region, as experienced by the young people involved in the research. As we all know, gender is a relational concept; the overcoming of girls and women's discrimination and the empowerment of young women in the region, which is one of the objective of the SAHWA project, is not reachable if we do not take a genuinely relational perspective as our lens of analysis.

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7. Tables

Table 1. Level of agreement with: "*Education is more important for boys than for girls*"

ALGERIA		Male	Female	Total
	Strongly Agree	18.0%	13.3%	15.8%
	Agree	27.9%	16.2%	22.4%
	Disagree	37.3%	33.1%	35.3%
	Disagree strongly	16.9%	37.5%	26.5%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
EGYPT		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	19.7%	15.4%	17.6%
	Agree	17.0%	14.1%	15.5%
	Disagree	35.6%	33.4%	34.5%
	Disagree strongly	27.7%	37.0%	32.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
LEBANON		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	3.2%	1.7%	2.5%
	Agree	12.7%	8.6%	10.7%
	Disagree	50.0%	43.1%	46.6%
	Disagree strongly	34.0%	46.5%	40.3%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MOROCCO		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	22.6%	25.7%	23.7%
	Agree	32.0%	24.0%	29.2%
	Disagree	33.1%	34.9%	33.7%
	Disagree strongly	12.3%	15.5%	13.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TUNISIA		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	14.9%	9.4%	12.2%
	Agree	18.8%	10.4%	14.6%
	Disagree	35.3%	35.7%	35.5%
	Disagree strongly	30.9%	44.6%	37.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Source: prepared by the authors using SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 data.				

Table 2. Level of agreement with "*The same upbringing should be given to both boys and girls*"

ALGERIA		Male	Female	Total
	Strongly Agree	32.8%	53.2%	42.3%
	Agree	49.4%	36.3%	43.3%
	Disagree	14.6%	8.1%	11.6%
	Disagree strongly	3.2%	2.4%	2.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
EGYPT		Male	Female	Total
	Agree strongly	61.5%	60.4%	61.0%
	Agree	35.5%	36.5%	36.0%
	Disagree	2.5%	2.3%	2.4%
	Disagree strongly	0.4%	0.8%	0.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
LEBANON		Male	Female	Total
	Agree strongly	36.2%	51.3%	43.7%
	Agree	54.2%	42.5%	48.4%
	Disagree	8.1%	5.3%	6.7%
	Disagree strongly	1.5%	0.9%	1.2%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MOROCCO		Male	Female	Total
	Agree strongly	27.8%	33.7%	29.8%
	Agree	46.6%	40.6%	44.6%
	Disagree	21.8%	19.6%	21.0%
	Disagree strongly	3.8%	6.0%	4.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TUNISIA		Male	Female	Total
	Agree strongly	51.1%	58.6%	54.9%
	Agree	42.8%	37.4%	40.1%
	Disagree	4.4%	2.3%	3.4%
	Disagree strongly	1.7%	1.7%	1.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Source: prepared by the authors using SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 data.				

Table 3. Level of agreement with: "*In a family, men should make the decisions*"

ALGERIA		Male	Female	Total
	Strongly Agree	50.3%	27.2%	39.5%
	Agree	33.6%	34.0%	33.8%
	Disagree	13.3%	29.3%	20.7%
	Disagree strongly	2.9%	9.6%	6.0%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
EGYPT		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	60.0%	39.9%	49.8%
	Agree	32.0%	37.1%	34.6%
	Disagree	6.1%	17.6%	11.9%
	Disagree strongly	1.8%	5.4%	3.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
LEBANON		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	34.7%	12.8%	23.8%
	Agree	45.8%	32.1%	39.0%
	Disagree	18.1%	48.6%	33.3%
	Disagree strongly	1.4%	6.5%	4.0%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MOROCCO		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	26.3%	25.2%	25.9%
	Agree	48.1%	43.7%	46.5%
	Disagree	21.0%	24.6%	22.3%
	Disagree strongly	4.6%	6.5%	5.3%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TUNISIA		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	51.6%	33.9%	42.7%
	Agree	35.0%	32.2%	33.6%
	Disagree	10.4%	25.8%	18.1%
	Disagree strongly	3.0%	8.2%	5.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Source: prepared by the authors using SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 data.				

Table 4. Level of agreement with: "*A married woman should have the possibility to work outside the house if she wants to*"

ALGERIA		Male	Female	Total
	Strongly Agree	14.1%	38.4%	25.4%
	Agree	41.9%	45.6%	43.6%
	Disagree	30.5%	10.6%	21.2%
	Disagree strongly	13.5%	5.4%	9.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
EGYPT		Male	Female	Total
	Agree strongly	14.6%	26.1%	20.4%
	Agree	49.2%	54.0%	51.7%
	Disagree	25.8%	14.9%	20.3%
	Disagree strongly	10.3%	5.0%	7.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
LEBANON		Male	Female	Total
	Agree strongly	16.7%	28.7%	22.7%
	Agree	71.7%	64.4%	68.1%
	Disagree	9.8%	6.2%	8.0%
	Disagree strongly	1.8%	0.6%	1.2%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MOROCCO		Male	Female	Total
	Agree strongly	22.5%	29.1%	24.8%
	Agree	47.5%	45.0%	46.6%
	Disagree	24.3%	18.9%	22.4%
	Disagree strongly	5.7%	7.1%	6.2%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TUNISIA		Male	Female	Total
	Agree strongly	32.9%	54.6%	43.8%
	Agree	53.7%	41.8%	47.7%
	Disagree	9.1%	2.3%	5.7%
	Disagree strongly	4.3%	1.3%	2.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: prepared by the authors using SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 data.

Table 5. Level of agreement with: "*Men and women should have the same job opportunities and receive the same salaries*"

ALGERIA	Male	Female	Total
Strongly Agree	12.5%	40.0%	25.3%
Agree	34.3%	39.2%	36.6%
Disagree	36.6%	14.4%	26.2%
Disagree strongly	16.6%	6.4%	11.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
EGYPT	**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
Agree strongly	17.8%	30.3%	24.1%
Agree	44.8%	50.0%	47.4%
Disagree	30.2%	16.2%	23.1%
Disagree strongly	7.2%	3.5%	5.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
LEBANON	**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
Agree strongly	17.3%	28.8%	23.1%
Agree	64.6%	64.9%	64.8%
Disagree	16.3%	5.8%	11.1%
Disagree strongly	1.8%	0.4%	1.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MOROCCO	**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
Agree strongly	23.6%	29.4%	25.6%
Agree	44.9%	47.3%	45.7%
Disagree	24.8%	17.2%	22.1%
Disagree strongly	6.7%	6.2%	6.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TUNISIA	**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
Agree strongly	31.8%	51.5%	41.7%
Agree	45.7%	41.9%	43.8%
Disagree	16.6%	5.2%	10.9%
Disagree strongly	5.8%	1.4%	3.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Source: prepared by the authors using SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 data.			

Table 6. Level of agreement with: "*Men should be the main economic providers in the family*"

ALGERIA		Male	Female	Total
	Strongly Agree	48.2%	49.4%	48.7%
	Agree	38.1%	34.6%	36.5%
	Disagree	10.6%	12.8%	11.6%
	Disagree strongly	3.1%	3.2%	3.1%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
EGYPT		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	75.4%	70.9%	73.1%
	Agree	23.0%	24.9%	23.9%
	Disagree	1.1%	3.5%	2.3%
	Disagree strongly	0.5%	0.7%	0.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
LEBANON		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	34.8%	36.2%	35.5%
	Agree	57.6%	54.7%	56.2%
	Disagree	7.3%	8.8%	8.1%
	Disagree strongly	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MOROCCO		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	23.7%	30.9%	26.2%
	Agree	49.5%	43.6%	47.5%
	Disagree	21.3%	18.4%	20.3%
	Disagree strongly	5.5%	7.1%	6.0%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TUNISIA		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	49.6%	54.6%	52.2%
	Agree	41.4%	36.9%	39.2%
	Disagree	7.5%	7.8%	7.6%
	Disagree strongly	1.4%	0.7%	1.1%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Source: prepared by the authors using SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 data.				

Table 7. Level of agreement with: "*Women should have the possibility of going into politics*"

ALGERIA		Male	Female	Total
	Strongly Agree	7.4%	19.4%	13.0%
	Agree	23.5%	37.2%	29.9%
	Disagree	44.1%	27.9%	36.5%
	Disagree strongly	25.0%	15.6%	20.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
EGYPT		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	12.3%	20.4%	16.4%
	Agree	42.5%	48.6%	45.6%
	Disagree	33.7%	26.7%	30.1%
	Disagree strongly	11.5%	4.4%	7.9%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
LEBANON		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	8.9%	18.8%	13.8%
	Agree	59.4%	61.8%	60.6%
	Disagree	23.9%	15.7%	19.8%
	Disagree strongly	7.9%	3.7%	5.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MOROCCO		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	20.3%	24.4%	21.7%
	Agree	47.1%	47.6%	47.3%
	Disagree	23.9%	18.7%	22.1%
	Disagree strongly	8.7%	9.3%	8.9%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TUNISIA		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	27.2%	38.4%	32.8%
	Agree	48.5%	49.3%	48.9%
	Disagree	15.3%	9.8%	12.6%
	Disagree strongly	8.9%	2.6%	5.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: prepared by the authors using SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 data.

Table 8. Level of agreement with: "*Women are allowed to travel alone*"

ALGERIA		Male	Female	Total
	Strongly Agree	6.4%	15.9%	10.9%
	Agree	15.0%	34.2%	24.0%
	Disagree	40.7%	32.8%	37.0%
	Disagree strongly	37.8%	17.1%	28.1%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
EGYPT		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	4.0%	5.0%	4.5%
	Agree	9.4%	19.0%	14.2%
	Disagree	30.4%	36.3%	33.4%
	Disagree strongly	56.3%	39.7%	47.9%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
LEBANON		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	7.0%	20.5%	13.7%
	Agree	49.3%	60.5%	54.9%
	Disagree	29.2%	13.1%	21.2%
	Disagree strongly	14.6%	5.9%	10.3%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MOROCCO		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	16.7%	23.5%	19.0%
	Agree	42.7%	47.1%	44.2%
	Disagree	28.2%	18.9%	24.9%
	Disagree strongly	12.5%	10.5%	11.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TUNISIA		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	20.8%	36.7%	28.8%
	Agree	34.8%	43.6%	39.2%
	Disagree	26.5%	13.4%	19.9%
	Disagree strongly	17.9%	6.4%	12.2%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: prepared by the authors using SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 data.

Table 9. Level of agreement with: "W*omen should have the right to receive inheritance*"

ALGERIA		Male	Female	Total
	Strongly Agree	43.6%	55.7%	49.3%
	Agree	44.8%	37.5%	41.4%
	Disagree	7.6%	3.7%	5.8%
	Disagree strongly	4.0%	3.2%	3.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
EGYPT		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	47.8%	49.3%	48.5%
	Agree	47.1%	43.3%	45.2%
	Disagree	3.2%	4.8%	4.0%
	Disagree strongly	1.9%	2.7%	2.3%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
LEBANON		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	20.0%	35.0%	27.5%
	Agree	76.5%	63.6%	70.1%
	Disagree	3.1%	1.2%	2.2%
	Disagree strongly	0.4%	0.2%	0.3%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MOROCCO		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	22.9%	28.6%	24.9%
	Agree	52.9%	47.9%	51.1%
	Disagree	18.4%	15.8%	17.5%
	Disagree strongly	5.8%	7.7%	6.5%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TUNISIA		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	53.1%	61.8%	57.5%
	Agree	43.2%	36.6%	39.9%
	Disagree	1.5%	1.0%	1.3%
	Disagree strongly	2.2%	0.6%	1.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Source: prepared by the authors using SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 data.				

Table 10. Level of agreement with: "W*omen should receive the same inheritance as men*"

ALGERIA		Male	Female	Total
	Strongly Agree	5.7%	11.6%	8.4%
	Agree	11.5%	16.0%	13.6%
	Disagree	36.8%	33.9%	35.5%
	Disagree strongly	45.9%	38.5%	42.5%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
EGYPT		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	4.9%	7.2%	6.0%
	Agree	9.5%	10.5%	10.0%
	Disagree	20.5%	22.1%	21.3%
	Disagree strongly	65.1%	60.2%	62.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
LEBANON		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	11.4%	26.3%	18.9%
	Agree	48.5%	52.9%	50.6%
	Disagree	30.3%	16.9%	23.7%
	Disagree strongly	9.8%	3.9%	6.9%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MOROCCO		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	13.8%	22.9%	17.0%
	Agree	31.4%	36.0%	33.0%
	Disagree	34.9%	27.4%	32.3%
	Disagree strongly	19.9%	13.8%	17.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TUNISIA		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	11.7%	14.9%	13.3%
	Agree	12.3%	18.9%	15.6%
	Disagree	31.0%	29.0%	30.0%
	Disagree strongly	45.0%	37.3%	41.1%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Source: prepared by the authors using SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 data.				

Table 11. Level of agreement with: "W*omen and men should have the same rights when it comes to the decision to divorce"*

ALGERIA		Male	Female	Total
	Strongly Agree	10.2%	26.4%	17.8%
	Agree	33.1%	42.6%	37.6%
	Disagree	34.4%	18.5%	27.0%
	Disagree strongly	22.2%	12.4%	17.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
EGYPT		Male	Female	Total
	Agree strongly	15.0%	25.0%	20.0%
	Agree	44.5%	47.1%	45.8%
	Disagree	21.8%	16.3%	19.0%
	Disagree strongly	18.8%	11.6%	15.2%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
LEBANON		Male	Female	Total
	Agree strongly	9.8%	24.2%	17.0%
	Agree	62.2%	64.1%	63.1%
	Disagree	19.3%	8.7%	14.1%
	Disagree strongly	8.8%	2.9%	5.9%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MOROCCO		Male	Female	Total
	Agree strongly	17.9%	25.2%	20.4%
	Agree	40.8%	50.1%	44.0%
	Disagree	28.2%	15.5%	23.7%
	Disagree strongly	13.2%	9.3%	11.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TUNISIA		Male	Female	Total
	Agree strongly	29.3%	38.3%	33.8%
	Agree	41.4%	45.6%	43.5%
	Disagree	14.9%	7.8%	11.4%
	Disagree strongly	14.4%	8.4%	11.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Source: prepared by the authors using SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 data.				

Table 12. Level of agreement with: "*When work is scarce, men should have more right to employment than women*"

ALGERIA		Male	Female	Total
	Strongly Agree	49.3%	34.6%	42.4%
	Agree	36.0%	36.0%	36.0%
	Disagree	8.8%	21.6%	14.8%
	Disagree strongly	5.9%	7.8%	6.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
EGYPT		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	48.9%	32.1%	40.4%
	Agree	38.5%	45.0%	41.8%
	Disagree	8.6%	17.4%	13.1%
	Disagree strongly	4.0%	5.5%	4.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
LEBANON		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	28.6%	18.0%	23.3%
	Agree	58.5%	52.4%	55.5%
	Disagree	11.9%	26.1%	19.0%
	Disagree strongly	1.0%	3.5%	2.3%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MOROCCO		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	25.2%	25.0%	25.1%
	Agree	44.2%	46.7%	45.1%
	Disagree	23.1%	20.9%	22.3%
	Disagree strongly	7.5%	7.4%	7.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TUNISIA		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	63.4%	49.0%	56.2%
	Agree	27.5%	33.2%	30.3%
	Disagree	6.2%	12.6%	9.4%
	Disagree strongly	2.9%	5.3%	4.1%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Source: prepared by the authors using SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 data.				

Table 13. Level of agreement with: *"It would be fairer if men contributed to housework and caring for children"*

ALGERIA		Male	Female	Total
	Strongly Agree	16.9%	31.1%	23.5%
	Agree	41.7%	43.9%	42.7%
	Disagree	25.4%	15.8%	20.9%
	Disagree strongly	16.0%	9.3%	12.9%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
EGYPT		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	6.2%	18.0%	12.2%
	Agree	47.0%	56.0%	51.6%
	Disagree	26.3%	13.8%	20.0%
	Disagree strongly	20.4%	12.1%	16.2%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
LEBANON		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	7.6%	19.9%	13.7%
	Agree	57.9%	59.9%	58.9%
	Disagree	30.4%	19.2%	24.9%
	Disagree strongly	4.1%	1.0%	2.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MOROCCO		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	17.9%	23.3%	19.8%
	Agree	47.6%	49.8%	48.3%
	Disagree	25.4%	18.5%	23.0%
	Disagree strongly	9.2%	8.3%	8.9%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TUNISIA		**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
	Agree strongly	43.6%	56.6%	50.1%
	Agree	42.9%	39.6%	41.2%
	Disagree	10.2%	2.5%	6.4%
	Disagree strongly	3.3%	1.3%	2.3%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Source: prepared by the authors using SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 data.				

Researching
Arab Mediterranean Youth:
Towards a New Social Contract
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The SAHWA Project ("Researching Arab Mediterranean Youth: Towards a New Social Contract") is a FP-7 interdisciplinary cooperative research project led by the Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB) and funded by the European Commission. It brings together fifteen partners from Europe and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries to research youth prospects and perspectives in a context of multiple social, economic and political transitions in five Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon). The project expands over 2014-2016 and has a total budget of €3.1 million. The thematic axis around which the project will revolve are education, employment and social inclusion, political mobilisation and participation, culture and values, international migration and mobility, gender, comparative experiences in other transition contexts and public policies and international cooperation.