

Individuals and Names of Individuals in the First Half of the Twelfth Century

The Growth of a Discussion around the “Singular Form”

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Introduction

Porphyry does not (and, in a way, should not) devote a chapter of his *Isagoge* to discussing individuals. However, the individual (*ἄτομον*; Boethius: *individuum*) pops up more than once to clarify points about the “Porphyrean pentad” of predicables: genus, species, difference, proprium, and accident.¹ Several pieces of information are provided. For instance, Porphyry informs us that an individual is predicated of one only, to mark a contrast with the other predicables (genus, above all), which are all predicated of many.² He also says that individuals are infinite, and that no science (*ἐπιστήμη*; *disciplina*) of them is possible.³ On more than one occasion, Porphyry provides examples of individuals; in the longest list, he says that Socrates is called an individual, as is this white thing, this person approaching, and the son of Sophroniscus (should Socrates be his only son).⁴ And, immediately after this, one finds the most famous Porphyrian passage on individuals—the claim that an individual “is constituted of proper features, the assemblage (*ἄθροισμα ἰδιοτήτων*; *collectio proprietatum*) of which

1 Porphyry, *Isagoge*, ed. Adolf Busse, *Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium* (Berlin: Reimer, 1887), 1–22 and Porphyry, *Isagoge. Translatio Boethii*, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello and Bernard G. Dod (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1966), 5–31. The term *ἄτομον* (literally, unsplittable) is used around thirty times, *κατὰ μέρος* (particular) around a dozen times, and *καθ' ἑκάστον* (singular) twice; see Jonathan Barnes, “Commentary,” in Porphyry, *Introduction*, trans. Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 78–80. For the “Porphyrean pentad,” see Barnes, “Commentary,” 31.

2 Porphyry, *Isagoge*, 2.17–18; see Riccardo Chiaradonna, “La teoria dell'individuo in Porfirio e l'ιδίως ποιόν,” *Elenchos* 21 (2000), 313–317, who highlights how different this is from Aristotle's position.

3 Porphyry, *Isagoge*, 6.11–16.

4 Porphyry, *Isagoge*, 7.19–21. Busse's text needs to be corrected here; see Francesco Ademollo, “Sophroniscus' son is approaching: Porphyry, *Isagoge* 7.20–1,” *The Classical Quarterly* 54 (2004), 322–325 and Barnes, “Commentary,” 150–151 (“it is reasonable to think that the four examples are all descriptions of the same individual”).

will never be found the same in anything else,” and that this is the reason for calling such an item individual.⁵

As is well-known, a new intellectual practice established itself in the Latin world in the late 11th and early 12th centuries—namely, the practice of commenting extensively on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, with the help of, above all, Boethius’s second commentary on the text.⁶ It seems safe to claim that, as a consequence of that, new logical analyses of issues concerning individuals emerged, especially in the most detailed and original commentaries. Examples of the questions discussed include: [a] Does the notion of individual belong to the subject matter of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*? [b] Is it really true that individuals are *not* predicated of many? [c] Does the property of being predicated of one only apply to *all* individuals or to *some* only? [d] Is the phoenix a species or an individual? [e] Do individuals constitute the Aristotelian categories, or not? And many others.⁷

Discussions of these problems in the 12th century involve interactions of elements not only from Porphyry’s *Isagoge* (and Boethius’s two *Isagoge* commentaries), but also from other authoritative texts, such as Aristotle’s *Categories*, Boethius’s second *De interpretatione* commentary, and Priscian’s *Institutiones*.⁸ In this paper, I would like to document the growth of a discussion related to the notion of individual, showing how it first emerged and then spiralled into increasing complexity. By bringing in new material, I also hope to contribute to the research on 12th-century views of individuality in logical commentaries that has been conducted by, for example, Jorge Gracia, Peter King, Julie Brumberg, and Irene Binini.⁹ The texts offer food for thought especially on the view

5 Porphyry, *Isagoge*, 7. 21–23; Chiaradonna, “La teoria,” 307–311; see also the articles collected in *Individuality in Late Antiquity*, ed. Alexis Torrance and Johannes Zachhuber (London: Routledge, 2014).

6 See John Marenbon, “The *Isagoge* in the Latin Tradition until c. 1200,” *Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 43 (2018), 151–188 and Caterina Tarlazzi, “The Latin Tradition of Studying Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, ca. 800–980. A Working Catalogue of Manuscripts, Glosses and Diagrams,” *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 87 (2020), 7–42.

7 For some of these, see Yukio Iwakuma, “Pseudo-Rabanus super Porphyrium (P3),” *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 75 (2008), 43–196.

8 I will refer to Boethius’s two *Isagoge* commentaries as *1Isag.* and *2Isag.*, respectively; see Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta*, ed. Samuel Brandt (Vienna: Tempsky, 1906). See also Julie Brumberg, “Sémantiques du nom propre: sources anciennes et discussions médiévales à l’époque d’Abélard,” *Histoire Épistémologie Langage* 29 (2007), 137–166.

9 See Jorge J.E. Gracia, *Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages* (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1984); Peter King, “The Problem of Individuation in the Middle Ages,” *Theoria* 66 (2000), 159–184; Brumberg, “Sémantiques,” and Irene Binini, “The Role of ‘Differentiae’ in Abelard’s Arguments for the Identity and Persistence of Substances,” in

that Gracia labels “Accidental Theory of Substantial Individuation” (connected to the “Standard Theory of Individuation” from the High Middle Ages)—with respect to its tenet that accidents are the principle of individuation, but also with respect to the function of proper names. (The reader will find something more on this in my conclusions). Finally, in line with the overall theme of the volume, I would like to investigate the background of the *Isagoge* commentaries stemming from the school of master Alberic—P20 and P25 especially will be illuminated.

Generally, today, Porphyry’s passage on the *collectio proprietatum* is considered the main discussion of individuals in the *Isagoge*. However, 12th-century commentaries normally have little to say about those lines.¹⁰ Much more interesting material is found in the analysis of a bit of text that, at first glance, may seem irrelevant: the beginning of Chapter 2, where the various meanings of the word *εἶδος* (*species*) are discussed, including *species* as *uniuscuiusque forma* (henceforth: *SUF*). In what follows, I will first introduce this Porphyrian passage (Section 1), then present the 12th-century interpretations of it (Sections 2–5). As will become clear, commentaries on *SUF* move from being rather uneventful to hosting increasingly deep philosophical analyses, involving various strategies and interactions with both Boethian concepts and the semantics of proper names based on Priscian.

1 Porphyry’s *uniuscuiusque forma* (*SUF*)

As is usual in the *Isagoge*, Chapter 2 begins by listing several meanings of the term under analysis (in this case, *εἶδος* or *species*), moving from non-technical and familiar ones to the most technical and philosophical. Two meanings of “species” are put forward. In Boethius’s Latin:

Species autem dicitur quidem et [1] de uniuscuiusque forma, secundum quam dictum est “primum [*but most MSS read Priami instead*] quidem species digna imperio.” [2] Dicitur autem species et ea quae est sub adsig-

Mereology in Medieval Logic and Metaphysics: Proceedings of the 21st European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, ed. Fabrizio Amerini, Irene Binini, and Massimo Mugnai (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2019), 109–133.

10 The most notable exception is Abelard’s exegesis in *Logica “Ingredientibus.” Glossae super Porphyrium* (henceforth: *LI Isag.*), ed. Bernhard Geyer, *Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften*, 4 vols (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919–1933), 1:63.4–65.30, which will be considered in Section 4.1 below.

nato genere, secundum quam solemus dicere hominem quidem speciem animalis cum sit genus animal, album autem coloris speciem, triangulum uero figurae speciem.¹¹

In the technical sense (= [2]), species is “that which is under a given genus,” in the way in which man is a species of animal. But species also has a non-technical meaning (= [1]): the “form of each thing” (ἐκάστου μορφῆ), that is, the “shape,” “aspect,” “outlook,” or “surface lineaments” of something.¹² In the Latin tradition, the rather opaque quotation from Euripides, “first (πρῶτον; *primum*) may his species be worthy of a kingdom,” was corrupted into “the aspect of Priam is worthy of a kingdom” (with *Priami* substituting *primum*)—a corruption further reinforcing the link between the “form” and an individual.¹³

How do late 11th- and 12th-century *Isagoge* commentaries behave when they reach these lines? To answer that, we should consider the full tradition of exegesis dating from this period. Luckily, a complete catalogue of commentaries on the *Isagoge* was drawn up by John Marenbon more than 30 years ago, with further updates added later.¹⁴ In the most recent version, 33 commentaries are listed, identified with the alphanumeric tags P1–P33.¹⁵ Once those that are lost or irrelevant are disregarded, we are left with fifteen commentaries discussing SUF, which can be split into four main groups:¹⁶

- [1] commentaries not influenced by Boethius’s *2Isag.*: P4, P5, P7;
- [2] commentaries influenced by Boethius’s *2Isag.*: P3, P13, P15, P33;

11 Porphyry, *Isagoge. Translatio Boethii*, 8.17–22 (Porphyry, *Isagoge*, 3.22–4.4). Here and throughout the article, annotations within square brackets are mine.

12 See Barnes, “Commentary,” 93–94.

13 Porphyry, *Isagoge*, trans. Barnes, 5 and Barnes, “Commentary,” 94n2; see also Porphyry, *Isagoge*, trans. Alain de Libera and Alain-Philippe Segonds (Paris: Vrin, 1998), 45n36, 71n8.

14 See John Marenbon, “Medieval Latin Commentaries and Glosses on Aristotelian Logical Texts, before c. 1150AD,” in *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions*, ed. Charles Burnett (London: The Warburg Institut, 1993), 77–127; repr. with a supplement in John Marenbon, *Aristotelian Logic, Platonism and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West* (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2000), 77–140; and Marenbon, “The *Isagoge*.”

15 See Marenbon, “The *Isagoge*,” 172–188.

16 No surviving copies remain of P1, P8, P22, P23, P26, and P27. P2, the *Excerpta Isagogarum* edited by Giulio D’Onofrio, dates to the early 11th century and is not, strictly speaking, a commentary. P29, the *Introductiones Porphyrii* edited by Yukio Iwakuma, is also not a commentary, but a short introduction to the subject matter covered in the *Isagoge*. P6 is a literal commentary that provides nothing, by way of exegesis, in addition to Porphyry’s own text. The remaining items are incomplete commentaries (P19, P21, P32), supplementary sets of notes (P9, P18, P24, P30, P31), or problem-question commentaries (P28) that do not discuss the passage in question.

[3] commentaries enriching and building on Boethius's *2Isag.*: *LI Isag.* (= P10), *Glossae secundum Vocales* or *GSV* (= P11), *Logica "Nostrorum petitioni sociorum"* or *LNPS* (= P12), P14, P16, P17;

[4] Albrican commentaries: P20, P25.¹⁷

Group [4] has been created for the sake of clarity, to show how Albrican commentaries relate to the discussion available in other commentaries. From a theoretical point of view, P20 (and, marginally, P25) could be absorbed into group [3].

It is hard to suggest a chronology (even a relative one). The commentaries' content is only a partial guide to their actual composition, and some items (such as P4, P13, and P33) seem quite independent of the others. However, based on this particular discussion and other elements assembled by other scholars, three main stages can be identified, at least for some commentaries and tentatively.¹⁸

Stage 1: a rather early state of exegesis is available in P5, P7, and the common layer of P3. The common layer of P3 has been dated by scholars to before 1090.

Stage 2: the additional layers of P3, *LI Isag.*, P14, and P17 are later than Stage 1 and roughly contemporary (possibly in the order: *LI Isag.* first and then P14/P17). *LI Isag.* is thought to date to 1117–1120.

Stage 3: *LNPS*, *GSV*, and P20 are later than *LI Isag.* Scholars date *LNPS* and *GSV* to the early 1120s or later, and P20 to the late 1130s or 1140s.

I shall now consider the key features of each group.

2 Commentaries Not Influenced by Boethius's *2Isag.*: P4, P5, P7

P5 and the closely related P7 belong to group [1], and their (literal) analysis is rather uneventful from a philosophical point of view.¹⁹ The passage on *SUF* is

17 For identifying P20 and P25 as connected to Alberic, I am following Marenbon, "The *Isagogae*," 167–168, 184–186. P21 is parallel to a portion of P20, but it does not cover the section on *SUF*. For more on P20 and P21 and their attribution to pupils of Alberic, see Enrico Donato's contribution to the present volume.

18 My absolute chronology depends on Marenbon, "The *Isagogae*."

19 P5 bears an attribution to Peter Abelard in the manuscript (by a hand, however, which is not that of the copyist), but the attribution has been challenged (see Marenbon, "The *Isagogae*," 176–177). An unsatisfactory translation of P5, *LI Isag.*, and *LNPS* into Italian has been published in Peter Abelard, *I commenti all'Isagoge di Porfirio*, trans. Simona Follini (Milan: Mimesis, 2022).

glossed by P5 with reference to “the beauty, both of women (such as Petronilla) and of men.”²⁰ P7 is even shorter and only states that *SUF* is equivalent to “beauty.”²¹ So, in contrast to most other commentaries, P5 and P7 show no influence whatsoever of Boethius’s *2Isag.*, though the reference to beauty may betray some influence from Boethius’s *1Isag. ad locum*.²² The incomplete P4 also seems unrelated to *2Isag.*, insofar as it is possible to tell. It says that *forma* here is a “collective name,” standing for “the aptitude of bodily members, thin legs, long and fat arms.”²³

3 Commentaries Influenced by Boethius’s *2Isag.*: P3, P13, P15, P33

Much deeper philosophical analysis of *SUF* begins when commentaries take Boethius’s *2Isag. ad locum* into account. Two important elements are available in Boethius’s exegesis.²⁴ First, *SUF* is explicitly linked to accidents. The “form of

20 P5, ed. Mario Dal Pra, *Pietro Abelardo: Scritti di Logica*, 2nd ed. (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1969), 12, on the basis of Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 13368, fol. 157^{vb}: “SPECIES DICITUR FORMA, id est ut pulchritudo tam mulierum, ut Petronillae, quam viro- rum.” Throughout this article, the lemmata from Porphyry that are being commented on are printed in small caps, quotations from Boethius’s commentaries are printed in italics, and punctuation may have been modified.

21 P7, ed. Yukio Iwakuma, “Vocales or Early Nominalists,” *Traditio* 47 (1992), 80, on the basis of Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14779, fol. 32^v: “SPECIES AUTEM (8.17). ... non solummodo genus est aequivocum, sed etiam species, quia et FORMA DICITUR SPECIES id est pulchritudo UNIUSCUIUSQUE, ET EA QUAE ponitur SUB GENERE.”

22 See Boethius, *1Isag.*, 63–64. In that passage, in addition to species as “the shape of each human being” and as “that which is placed under a genus,” Victorinus’s translation recorded a meaning of “species” as “the beauty of the face.” However, Boethius notes that it should not be counted as another meaning, distinct from the first. For Minio-Paluello, Victorinus may be paraphrasing here (see Aristoteles Latinus 1.6–7, 64, and cf. 62).

23 P4(b) edited in Iwakuma, “Vocales,” 109–110 on the basis of Pommersfelden, Schloßbibliothek, 16/2764, fol. 5^v: “Quo signo potest perpendi, quod species sit inventa ad designationem illius rei ad cuius et forma? SECUNDUM QUAM (8.18), quasi dicat: verba cuiusdam viri sapientissimi sint tibi signum, quod dixit PRIAMI QUIDEM SPECIES DIGNA EST IMPERIO, ubi debuisse dicere ‘forma Priami digna est,’ i.e. alterum pro altero, scilicet ‘species’ pro ‘forma.’ Et ‘forma’ est collectivum nomen, quia aptitudinem membrorum, scilicet gracilia crura et pinguia et longa brachia” (the text ends abruptly).

24 Boethius, *2Isag.*, 199.20–201.8: “Sicut generis supra significationes distinxit aequivocas, ita idem in specie facit, dicens non esse speciei simplicem significationem. Et ponit quidem duas, longe autem plures esse manifestum est, quas idcirco praeteriit, ne lectoris animum prolixitate confunderet. Dicit autem primum quidem speciem uocari uniuscuiusque formam, quae ex accidentium congregatione perficitur. Cautissime autem dictum est UNIUSCUIUSQUE, hoc enim secundum accidens dicitur. Quae enim unicuique indiuiduo forma

each <thing>” (or “the proper form of any individual”, §7), Boethius writes, is brought about “by the coming together of accidents”; it “does not come from a substantial form, but from accidents.” Second, Boethius mentions in some detail a third meaning of “species” (henceforth: *STM*), which Porphyry omitted “because of <its> obscurity,” for “it requires too high and learned a mind.”²⁵ Of this he says that it “comes from the substantial form,” and it is the “quality of a substance” (or “the quality showing the substance”). The example provided is *humanitas*. *STM* is different from both Porphyrian meanings (*2Isag.*, 200.7–12). The contrast with *SUF* is particularly strong: “species” in the first meaning is accidental and comes from accidents; *STM* is substantial and comes from the substantial form.²⁶

Influence from *2Isag.* is clearly detectable in P₃.²⁷ This was the most influential P-commentary from the late 11th- and early 12th-centuries, at least judging from the number of extant manuscripts (at least four, while virtually all other commentaries are single-copy) and connections to other commentaries (P₁₄,

est, ea non ex substantiali quadam forma species, sed ex accidentibus uenit. Alia est enim substantialis formae species quae humanitas nuncupatur, eaque non est quasi supposita animali, sed tamquam ipsa qualitas substantiam monstrans; haec enim et ab hac diuersa est quae uniuscuiusque corpori accidenter insita est, et ab ea quae genus deducit in partes. Postremumque plura sunt quae, cum eadem sint, diuersis tamen modis ad aliud atque aliud relata intelleguntur, ut hanc ipsam humanitatem in eo quod ipsa est si perspexeris, species est eaque substantialem determinat qualitatem; si sub animali eam intellegendo locaueris, deducit animalis in sese participationem separaturque a ceteris animalibus ac fit generis species. Quodsi uniuscuiusque proprietatem consideres, id est quam uirilis uultus, quam firmus incessus ceteraque quibus indiuidua conformantur et quodammodo depinguntur, haec est accidens species secundum quam dicimus quemlibet illum imperio esse aptum propter formae eximiam dignitatem. Huic aliam adiungit speciei significationem, id est eam quam supponimus generi. Nos uero triplicem speciei significationem esse subicimus, unam quidem substantiae qualitatem, aliam cuiuslibet indiuidui propriam formam, tertiam de qua nunc loquitur, quae sub genere collocatur. Credendum uero est propter obscuritatem eius quam nos adiecimus, quia nimirum altiore atque eruditore quaeeret intellectum, ea tacita praetermissaque ceteras edidisse.”

25 I call it third in comparison to Porphyry’s two meanings, but Boethius introduces it while commenting on the first meaning, and therefore in second position.

26 In contrast, in *2Isag.*, 200.12–18, Boethius almost expresses himself as if the difference between *homo* and *humanitas* were simply a matter of looking at one and the same thing from different perspectives. Several 12th-century commentators wonder how to take this: see *LI Isag.* (Appendix, Text 1), P₁₆ (Text 4), P₁₇ (Text 5) and P₂₀ (Text 6).

27 P₁₃ (Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Allgemein-Bibliothek der Stadt, Amplon. oct. 5, fols 1^r–8^v, 16^r–36^v) fol. 8^r and P₃₃ (Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, 831, pp. 344^b–359^b, 295^a–331^b) p. 300^{a-b} are also based very closely on *2Isag.*, from which they—in ways different from one another—cull passages on all three Boethian meanings of “species.”

P15, P16).²⁸ P₃ is an evolving text, with at least two layers of development: a first layer, common to the four manuscripts *O* (Oxford, Bodleian Library, Laud. Lat. 67), *A* (Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento 573), *P* (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 13368) and *S* (Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek 134); then, an additional, divergent layer in *A*, *P*, and *S* only, consisting of annotations and revisions peculiar to each manuscript. As italics in the quotation below show, the original (common) layer of P₃ clearly uses *2Isag*. Or rather: it uses a *selection* of *2Isag*., namely, what is available there for the exegesis of the two Porphyrian meanings of “species.”²⁹ The original version of P₃ shows no sign of STM:

Sicut autem superius generis significationes distinxit, ita nunc in specie facit, dicens non esse speciei simplicem significationem. Et ponit tantum duas significationes eius. Longe autem eius plures significationes esse manifestum est: quas idcirco praeteriit, ne lectoris animum prolixitate confunderet. Dicit autem primum speciei significationem vocari uniuscuiusque individui [^Afiguram vel] formam, quae ex accidentium congregatione perficitur. In eo vero quod dicit UNIUSCUIUSQUE individui, notamus eam formam esse accidentalem. Quaecumque enim forma individui est, secundum accidens est. Ea enim species, quae individuorum est, non ex substantiali forma sed ex accidentibus venit. Littera sic continuatur et legitur. Genus dicitur principium et collectio et illud cui supponitur species, sed SPECIES DICITUR FORMA id est compositio UNIUSCUIUSQUE individui. SECUNDUM QUAM significationem speciei a quodam poeta DICTUM EST “SPECIES QUIDEM PRIAMI DIGNA EST IMPERIO.” Secundum enim bonae formae dignitatem aliquem dignum imperio iudicamus. DICITUR AUTEM SPECIES ET EA QUAE EST SUB (8.19) ...³⁰

O, *A*, and *P* add nothing more. In contrast, *S* also says:

28 Edited—with the exception of manuscript *S*—in Iwakuma, “Pseudo-Rabanus.” An edition of the *S*-version, with translation and commentary, has appeared in Pietro Podolak, “Sankt Gallen Ms. 134 and the Unpublished Additions to Pseudo-Rabanus *Super Porphyrium* (P₃): An Edition of the Text with a Study,” *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 93 (2024), 129–237.

29 A similar use of *2Isag*. (though less detailed than in P₃), with no mention of STM, can be detected in P15 (Dublin, Trinity College Library 494, fols. 113^r–118^v), at fol. 116^r–v. P15 is almost entirely made of extracts from P₃ and P16 (in Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14558, fols. 83^{ra}–93^{ra}).

30 Iwakuma, “Pseudo-Rabanus,” 108.

Notandum est Porphyrium praetermittere quandam subtiliorem speciem quae conficitur ex coniunctione materiae et substantialis formae. Cum enim consideramus animal purum et substantiales formas, scilicet rationale et mortale, in compositione hominis speciei animalis convenire, ex conventu illarum trium illis tribus alia species efficitur quae “humanitas” vocatur, quae qualitati supponitur.³¹

This peculiar addition of *S* talks of “a subtler species,” omitted by Porphyry, which is “produced from the conjunction of matter and a substantial form.” For instance, the conjunction of “pure animal” (animal considered without added forms) *plus* the substantial forms rational and mortal builds up the species man, in the category of substance; but it also produces another species, *humanitas*, in the category of quality. The passage clearly depends on Boethius’s discussion of *STM*, but it also goes way beyond that, both by way of calling such a species “subtle,” and by interpreting it as the conjunction of genus (i.e., matter) and substantial form(s).³² As we shall see more clearly in Section 4 below, the analysis of *STM* prompted various interpretations which, in turn, came to influence the analysis of *SUF*. For the time being, two further remarks can be made. First, the terminology of “subtle species” is quite rare: in addition to the *S*-version of *P3*, it is found only in *LNPS*, *P17*, and *P20*, as well as in John of Salisbury’s *Metalogicon*.³³ Second, elsewhere in its analysis the *S*-version of *P3* calls *socratitas* the “sum which is made from the conjunction of species with accidents,” thereby replicating, at the level of individuals, the strategy used here for interpreting *STM*.³⁴

31 Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek 134, p. 83b (after the words *prolixitate confunderet* in *P3*, ed. Iwakuma, “Pseudo-Rabanus,” 108.6). I quote from the edition by Pietro Podolak (see Podolak, “Sankt Gallen Ms. 134,” 174–176), which includes some emendations to the manuscript.

32 *Subtilis* may hide a mistaken reading of the abbreviated *substantialis* (see also *P20*, Appendix, Text 6 § 6 below).

33 *LI Isag.*, 42.14–43.4 and *GSV* (Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, M63 sup, fols. 73^{ra}–81^{vb}, at fol. 76^{vb}) discuss *STM* but do not call it *subtilis*. They, together with *LNPS*, *P17*, and *P20*, are all quoted below or in the appendix. John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* 3.1, ed. J.B. Hall and K.S.B. Keats-Rohan (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991), 103.21–104.33 is discussing the best way of teaching Porphyry, with explicit reference to Peter Abelard’s teaching (see also 103.6; 105.75).

34 Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek 134, p. 82^b–83^a: “Vel potest dici quod ‘Socrates’ ibi significat socratitatem, quandam summam quae efficitur coniunctione speciei et accidentium.” Substituting *P3*, common version (ed. Iwakuma), 100.10–18: “alii vero dicunt—tamen notanda est.” These passages are commenting on Porphyry’s words *ALIA QUIDEM DE UNO DICUNTUR SOLO, SICUT INDIVIDUA SICUT SOCRATES* (7.3–4). A passage along the same

4 Commentaries Enriching and Building on Boethius's *2Isag.: LI Isag.*, *LNPS*, *GSV*, P14, P16, P17

Group [3] shows how the analysis of *SUF* deepens, incorporating further elements. It can be divided into three subsets: Abelard's *LI Isag.*, to be compared with the other Abelardian commentaries, *LNPS* and *GSV* (Section 4.1); P14 and P16 (Section 4.2); and P17 (Section 4.3), which, in turn, should be seen against the background of the early 12th-century grammatical tradition and of another passage of *LI Isag.*

4.1 *LI Isag.*, *LNPS*, and *GSV*

Abelard's exegesis of *SUF* in *LI Isag.* (Appendix, Text 1) combines elements similar to P5 (the reference to a beautiful aspect) with others, reminiscent of *2Isag.* (the reference to accidents). He begins by saying that "in the name 'species' two are included, namely, [1] the composition (*compositio*) of any individual, according to which we call someone terrible 'in aspect,' and [2] the philosophical species." He then expands on [1]. Such composition originates either [1.1] "from the coming together of quantitative parts" (that is, as is immediately made clear, bodily members); or [1.2] "from the information <of a subject> by means of accidents that appear <to sense perception>, so that someone is called beautiful or ugly." All in all, this analysis of *SUF* develops the original Porphyrian theme of someone's outlook. The term *compositio* and the reference to parts and bodily members should be noted, for they appear in other texts, too (*compositio*: *LNPS*, *GSV*, P16, P17, P20, P25; *membra*: *LNPS*, P17; *partes*: *GSV*, P20, P25).³⁵ The qualification of accidents as "apparent," that is, perceivable, also finds echoes elsewhere (*LNPS*, *GSV*, P20).³⁶

Abelard also discusses *STM* and Boethius's example, *humanitas*. Contrary to the S-version of P3 (for which it amounts to genus *plus* differences), *STM* is here the combination of substantial differences. *Humanitas*, in other words, is just another name for rationality and mortality, taken together (see Text 1 § 3). Abelard also records an alternative view (*AV*), according to which *STM* is a form that originates from the substantial differences but—one can infer—is

lines (with some interesting variations) is found in P14 (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 17813, fols 1^{ra}–16^{ra}, at fol. 5^{rb}): "Vel potest dici quod 'Socrates' sit ibi sumptum a socratitate, i.e. individuali forma Socratis, quae efficitur ex coniunctione speciei et accidentium."

35 See below, 83–84, 86, 95.

36 This shows a contrast to species in the third sense, which does *not* come to sense perception; see n. 38 below and Appendix, Text 2 and Text 6.

distinct from them (Text 1 § 5). This, again, seems different both from Abelard's own view and from the view of the S-version of P₃. A question is then raised: is *humanitas* a substantial or an accidental form? Judging from the replies, the query is aimed against AV.³⁷ Above all, Abelard seems willing *not* to admit that the inherence of substantial forms in matter (i.e., a genus) *necessarily* generates a form—be it humanity, or any other. For otherwise, so the argument runs, the necessarily-further-generated form would also inhere in matter, and thus generate another form, *ad infinitum*. Were forms generated by necessity at every adjunction, an infinite regress would be triggered.

From our perspective, the most important element in the analysis of STM in *LI Isag.* is the distinction between a collection of multiple elements (Abelard's view) and a form originating from such multiplicity, but over and above it (AV). As we shall see when analysing P₁₄ and P₁₇, this very strategy is at times also applied to SUF.

The other two Abelardian P-commentaries (*LNPS* and *GSV*) also analyze SUF as a "composition." They too say that it is a form that "comes from the natural composition of <bodily> members" (*LNPS*) or "is born from the disposition of parts" (*GSV*).³⁸ *LNPS*, moreover, is peculiar for mentioning not just three, but *four* meanings of "species," namely: [1] species as manner (*maneria*); [2] species as composition; [3] species in the philosophical sense (*species philosophica*); and [4] the "subtle species," with its example *humanitas*.³⁹ *LNPS* also adds the explanation that [4] is subtle because "it does not come to sense perception." As we have seen above, the reference to sense perception in the exegesis of SUF and STM is a distinctive feature of the Abelardian material and,

37 The first scenario (humanity is a substantial form) seems to invalidate AV, because the form would then contribute to generating itself ("If it is substantial, how could it be born from the coming together of substantial forms, given that it, too, is one of the substantial forms?"). In the second scenario, the form is accidental with respect to man and so "man could remain without it." Abelard seems more sympathetic to this option ("and maybe this can be conceded"). See also P₁₄ below.

38 *Logica "Nostrorum petitioni sociorum,"* ed. Bernhard Geyer, *Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften*, 4 vols (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919–1933), 4:541.36–542.8, on the basis of Lunel, Bibliothèque Municipale 6, fol. 24^b, 27^{ra}: "Et sciendum quod huius vocabuli 'species' diversae sunt significationes. 'Species' enim, hoc vocabulum, significat maneriam, significat compositionem, idest formam ex naturali membrorum compositione procedentem, significat iterum philosophicam {philosophicam *ms*: physicam Geyer} speciem, quae scilicet supponitur generi, significat quoque subtilem speciem. Subtilem vero speciem vocat Boethius humanitatem. Ideo subtilem vocat, quia cum aliae formae aliquantulum distinguantur per sensum, ut albedo per visum, oratio per auditum, sola humanitas non venit ad sensum, sed sola ratione distinguitur." For *GSV*, see Appendix, Text 2.

39 As we shall see, this is a feature connecting *LNPS* to P₂₀.

again, of P₂₀ (see Text 6 § 6). A similar idea is found in *GSV*: species in the sense of composition (SUF) comes to *sight*; species in the philosophical sense is perceived by *hearing* (because universals are utterances, that is to say, proffered sounds); species in the third sense (STM) does not come to sense perception (Text 2 § 6). *GSV* discusses Boethius's STM at length, introducing the notion of *nomen sumptum* into the analysis, and taking the word *humanum* into consideration next to *homo* and *humanitas* (Text 2 § 4). This quite unique linguistic development, however, bears no further impact on the analysis of SUF.

4.2. P₁₄ and P₁₆

Although their exegesis is quite different, P₁₄ and P₁₆ can be compared fruitfully. P₁₄ is linked to P₃ (in particular, to the S-version) and, via P₁₅, P₁₆ is also connected to P₃.⁴⁰ Moreover, the analysis of the meanings of “species” shows that P₁₄ and P₁₆ display some key similarities;⁴¹ that P₁₄ is extremely close to *LI Isag.* here, especially in the analysis of STM; and that P₁₆ may have some connection to the exegesis available in Abelardian material, as will appear below.

P₁₄ puts forward yet another interpretation of STM. It is a sort of bond (*vinculum, medium*) joining substantial differences and genus in the constitution of a species (in the second sense, e.g., man). Such a bond is needed due to the difference in nature between differences and genus.⁴² This interpretation of STM—almost as a glue between genus and differences—is distinct from those we have encountered so far, which were [1] a collection of substantial differences (Abelard's view in *LI Isag.*, also recorded as the view of “others” in P₁₄, Text 3, § 13); [2] a form originating from substantial differences (AV in *LI Isag.*); and [3] the conjunction of genus and substantial forms (S-version of P₃). It may, however, be a development of the latter.⁴³

40 The link between P₁₄ and P₃ (S-version) is one of the results of Pietro Podolak's edition of the latter (see Podolak, “Sankt Gallen Ms. 134”). See also n. 29 above.

41 Compare, for instance, their analysis of Porphyry's second meaning of “species,” with a similar idea conveyed by *principaliter* and *primo loco*: Appendix, Text 3 § 5 and Text 4 § 3–4.

42 Appendix, Text 3 § 7: “when substantial differences, which are of a completely different nature from the genus, reach the genus in order to constitute something substantially, some medium must necessarily intervene, and make things of such different nature connect firmly.”

43 P₁₄ (Text 3 § 8–12), discussing whether species in the third sense is substantial or accidental, is also very similar to *LI Isag.* (Text 1 § 6) and puts forward a similar infinite regress argument. In both *LI Isag.* and P₁₄, the issue seems to arise from taking STM as a form (in P₁₄, as a *substantial* form). P₁₄ may be taking *LI Isag.* into account here.

With respect to *SUF*, P14 applies the strategy of distinguishing between *a collection of multiple elements taken together* and *a form that originates from such a collection, but is something over and above it* (a strategy which, as we have seen, *LI Isag.* used for *STM*). In § 4 the view of some people is presented, according to which *SUF* is the collection of all the accidents of a certain individual. But this position is discarded in favor of P14's own view on *SUF*, as a form or quality *caused* by the coming together of accidents, but *different* from them. P14 also highlights that *SUF* is accidental, "because an individual has nothing substantial under the species."

P16, in turn, follows *2Isag.* closely, but with some interesting additions (see Appendix, Text 4). To begin with, it glosses *SUF* with the term *compositio*, just as *LI Isag.*, *LNPS*, *GSV*, P17, and the Albrician commentaries. P16 also discusses *STM*, with a lengthy section reproducing Boethius (Text 1 § 6–10, based on *2Isag.* quoted above, n. 24). This provides an occasion to discuss what the species *man* (Porphyry's *second* meaning of "species") is, advancing a rather sophisticated distinction among interpretations. For some, the species *man* is identical to "differences joined to a genus" (*differentias iunctas cum genere*)—in the example, animal, rationality, and mortality, all on equal footing, so to speak. For others, the role of the genus is to be emphasized, and the species *man* is "*animal* informed by rationality and mortality, not the three of them joined together."

All in all, P14 and P16 are peculiar for the many ontological nuances they put forward across the three meanings of "species:" [1] the individual form of a man (it can be a collection of accidents, or a property over and above that collection: P14); [2] the species *man* (a collection of genus and differences, or a genus informed by differences: P16); and [3] humanity (a collection of substantial differences, or a bond connecting differences and the genus: P14).

4.3 P17

In P17 (see Appendix, Text 5), the analysis of *SUF* reaches further degrees of complexity.⁴⁴ To begin with, P17 lists *five* different ways in which *SUF* (or "the singular form of an individual," § 1) may be taken (§ 6):

44 There are also developments on *STM* (or "subtle species"), with three interpretations mentioned: [1] it is "a substantial difference, such as the humanity of man"; [2] it is (said with respect to 1) "another form which is not substantial but adheres inseparably to the subject and is created in the conjunction of genus and difference"; [3] it is *homo*, which is considered from one perspective in *SUF* and from another perspective in *STM*. See Appendix, Text 5 § 2–4.

Some say that such a singular form, which is called species, is [1] the entire collection of accidents of Socrates; or [2] the collection of inseparable accidents only; or [3] a certain simple form which is inborn thanks to the others⁴⁵ and which, however, adheres inseparably to its subject, whereas the others vary; or [4] another simple form which is inborn naturally and which constitutes the individual state and, when it is destroyed, destroys it; [5] the composition of lines which comes from the disposition of bodily members.

These five views are—I would argue—positions we have encountered already, or developments thereof. In particular, views [1] and [2] can be grouped together, as they both identify *SUF* with accidents or with a subset of accidents, building on *2Isag*. View [5] seems to be a version of the exegesis available in P5 and (even more) *LI Isag.*, which links *SUF* to composition and bodily members. Views [3] and [4] inherit the attempts at introducing a form distinct from accidents. They agree in taking *SUF* as “simple” (which means, in contrast to views [1] and [2], *not* as a collection of accidents). However, they then differ in the connection to be established between the form’s origin and accidents: in view [3], the simple form originates from accidents; in [4], it is produced “naturally” (so, it would seem, not from accidents).

Two key features of accidents appear in this passage: their variability and separability from the subject. And, if *SUF* is to be connected to accidents, this is at odds with any firmer persistence of *SUF* itself. In different ways, both view [2] and view [3] try to address the problem while also keeping a connection between *SUF* and accidents: the former, by focusing on inseparable accidents; the latter by claiming that, although *SUF* is a form originating from accidents, it does not vary the way accidents do. View [4], in turn, goes further and—it would seem—severs any tie between *SUF* (understood as a simple form) and accidents. It should also be noted that view [4], in contrast to any other position we have encountered so far, explicitly assigns *SUF* a productive ontological role, that is, a role in the constitution (and destruction) of the *status* of an individual.⁴⁶

45 Both here and just below, I take “others” to refer to accidents.

46 *Status* is a term used throughout P17 (but also in the treatise *Quoniam de generali*) for describing each level of individuality and generality in an ideal Porphyrian tree going from individuals to the most general genus. For some first analysis, see Caterina Tarlazzi, *Individui universali. Il realismo di Gualtiero di Mortagne nel XII secolo* (Barcelona: FIDEM, 2018), 150–166.

Where do these developments, above all those evident in view [4], originate? A look at the rest of the passage may give us a clue—they point at influence from the grammatical tradition. In §§ 7–10, two questions are asked and replied to. The first is semantic: [Q₁] Which of the above five forms (= the five interpretations of *SUF*) is signified by a singular name? The second is ontological and concerns constitution and destruction: [Q₂] Is a certain accident alone enough to constitute or to destroy the expressed being (*expressum esse*) of Socrates?⁴⁷

The answer provided to [Q₂] is difficult to judge, because it is hard to cull the author's own view from it. His aim is to criticize the opinion of "some," who held that: "were all accidents that are contained under <the species> man removed from Socrates, Socrates would <still> remain in that same individual state." This is a view where accidents have no role in the constitution of an individual. Though phrased slightly differently, it is exactly what Abelard holds in *LI Isag.*⁴⁸ The author then introduces the Boethian-inspired term *socratitas* to indicate the individual form that constitutes Socrates in his individual state or (if destroyed) destroys him.⁴⁹ *Socratitas* is therefore assigned the role attributed to the simple form in view [4] above. In contrast to the previous passage, however, such *socratitas* is closely linked to accidents, and it would seem from § 10 that even the change of just one accident is enough to destroy it, with the consequence that "it should be conceded that, if the socrateity which constitutes the expressed being of Socrates is destroyed, Socrates is destroyed, in

47 Judging from § 10, *expressum esse Socratis* is equivalent to "Socrates in his individual state:" of either it is stated that socrateity constitutes it or that the destruction of socrateity entails its destruction. The phrase *expressum esse* (together with *expressa essentia* and *expressa substantia*) appears in several other commentaries from this period (such as C8/C14, D1, P14, P16, SC3, and so on), though not always with the meaning detected above. The terminology deserves further investigation.

48 See Abelard, *LI Isag.*, 64.20–24: "Dicimus itaque individua in personali tantum discretione consistere, in eo scilicet quod in se res una est discreta ab omnibus aliis, quae omnibus etiam accidentibus remotis in se una personaliter semper permaneret nec alia efficeretur nec minus hic homo esset, si omnia quoque separarentur accidentia, ut si hic calvus non esset vel hic simus." The rest of this Abelardian passage will be investigated below in Section 4.3. In other cases as well, P17 seems to know directly (and to criticise) *LI Isag.*, as I hope to show in a forthcoming contribution.

49 The term *socratitas* derives from the "contrived name" (King's translation of *factum nomen*) *platonitas*, which Boethius introduces in his second *De interpretatione* commentary to refer to the "singular and incommunicable" quality of Plato, in contrast to the quality of *humanitas*, which is common to all men. See Boethius, *Commentarii in librum Aristotelis ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ editio secunda* 2.7, ed. Karl Meiser (Leipzig: Teubner, 1880), 137.3–26; King, "The Problem," 168; Brumberg, "Sémantiques," 142–143. In the first decades of the 12th century, such terminology is also found outside the exegesis of *De interpretatione*; see, for instance, *ND5 ad XVII*, 14 discussed below, n. 58.

such a way that he would lose the prior individuality and, were it individuated through another form, he would not remain the same in number as Socrates.” It is not entirely clear, however, whether this is a position the author really puts forward as his own, or, rather, a counterfactual scenario of constant individual change that one would have to admit as a consequence of the (Abelardian) unacceptable position the author criticises.⁵⁰

View [4] is also the correct answer to [Q₁] (see Appendix, Text 5 §7), according to P₁₇. Support for this claim is found in a passage of *Priscian Minor* that talks of a property signified by a proper name.⁵¹ In that passage, Priscian considers the use of the interrogative *quis* when the expected answer for it is a proper noun. In such cases, *quis* is accompanied by a pronoun and by further qualifications, for instance, as in Virgil’s *Aeneid*: *Quis, pater, ille, virum qui sic comitatur euntem?* (“Father, who is that man, who accompanies the hero as he walks along?”), the answer to which is a proper name, “Marcellus.” The question reveals that both the substance of the man and some of his accidents are known to the speaker.⁵² So, what is enquired about is neither one nor the other, but rather what Priscian calls the property or the property of the name (*proprietas, proprietas nominis*).⁵³ A proper name, inasmuch as it is the correct answer to this sort of question, will therefore indicate the “property” which is being enquired about and that, so it would seem, is different from accidents. P₁₇ calls it the unknown quality (*ignota qualitas*), which the proper name determines (*certificat*).

This passage of P₁₇ is an example of 12th-century Priscian–Porphyry exegetical interactions—that is, the fact that Priscian was used in the context of commenting on Porphyry, and vice versa.⁵⁴ The pair [Q₁]–[Q₂] also shows a con-

50 See also the view “of others” referred to in Abelard’s *LI Isag.*, 64.33–39 (which, however, endorses constant change in *meaning* of proper nouns).

51 See Priscian, *Institutiones grammaticae* 17.24, ed. Martin Hertz, 2 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1855–1859), 2:122–123; quoting Virgil’s *Aeneid* 6.860–63 (and cf. 6.883). See also the analysis available in *ND*₅ on this, referred to below in n. 67.

52 Indicated, respectively, by the pronoun (*ille*) and by the further qualifications provided (*qui comitatur ...*).

53 See Priscian, *Institutiones* 17.24, 2:123.2, 5, 11; and cf. 2:129.12–17.

54 For references to Priscian in the context of commenting on Porphyry, see Caterina Tarlazzi, “Priscian for Porphyry, c. 1080–1200,” in *Ad placitum. Pour Irène Rosier-Catach*, ed. Laurent Cesalli, Frédéric Goubier, Anne Grondeux, Aurélian Robert, and Luisa Valente, 2 vols (Rome: Aracne, 2021), 2:611–617. For the use of Porphyry in the context of commenting on Priscian, see Anne Grondeux and Irène Rosier-Catach, *Priscien lu par Guillaume de Champeaux et son école. Les Notae Dunelmenses (Durham, D.C.L., C.IV.29)*, 2 vols (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 1:186–187, with special reference to *ND*₅ ad 17.24, 2:452–454 (see below, n. 67); see also *ND*₅ ad 17.14, 2:440 (see below, n. 58).

nection between semantic claims (in particular, concerning proper names) and ontological claims (especially concerning the role of accidents in the constitution and destruction of individuals). The link between the two lies in positing a proper quality (or property or form) which, on the one hand, is signified by a proper noun and, on the other, is connected to accidents in various and often problematic ways. We can detect such a connection in the influential grammatical tradition of this period, the so-called *Glosulae*-complex;⁵⁵ it also appears clearly in a passage of Abelard's *LI Isag.* (63–65), which seems to be the immediate background to this section of P17. To complete our analysis of P17, we should therefore take a look into both.

As for grammatical texts, key passages of Priscian talk of [a] a “proper quality” which is [b] “signified” by a proper name, and, in the *Glosulae*-complex, both notions (proper quality, signifying) are the object of further scrutiny and development.⁵⁶ [a] The quality signified by a proper name plays a role which is way more than merely linguistic: it is present “in” substances and it differentiates individuals among them.⁵⁷ It is also—at least in some passages—explicitly linked to accidents, as we shall see below, and, in *ND5*, to the Boethian-inspired notion of *socratitas*.⁵⁸ [b] With respect to signifying, *GPma* states that every

55 This includes: the *Glosulae in Priscianum maiorem* (*GPma*), in various versions; the so-called Guido-commentary on Priscian minor and the *Glosa Victorina* (which, together, form the *Glosulae in Priscianum Minorem* or *GPmi*); and the additional sets on Priscian's *Institutiones*, known as *Notae Dunelmenses* 1–5 (*ND1–5*). For the editions, see *Glosa Victorina super partem Prisciani de constructione*, ed. Karin Margareta Fredborg (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011); Grondeux and Rosier-Catach, *Priscien lu*; an edition of *GPma* is in progress, led by Anne Grondeux; the important section commenting on *Inst.* 2.18 is edited in Irène Rosier-Catach, “Les *Glosulae in Priscianum*: sémantique et universaux,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 19 (2008), 175–177.

56 The distinctive feature, or *proprium*, of a name with respect to other parts of speech is to signify a substance and a quality (*significare substantiam et qualitatem*): see Priscian, *Institutiones* 2.18, 55. To mark a distinction between appellative and proper names, Priscian further qualifies the quality as either common or proper/private (*propria, privata*). See *Institutiones* 2.22, 56–57 and 2.25, 58. For the meanings of “substance” and “quality” here, which correspond only partially to the Aristotelian notions, see Rosier-Catach, “Les *Glosulae*,” 132–133 and Grondeux and Rosier-Catach, *Priscien lu*, 1:184–186, with further bibliography.

57 See, for instance, *GPma ad* 2.18, 177, an. 1–2; and *Glosa Victorina ad* 17.24, 74.2046–50. The quality signified by a proper name is also referred to as property or as properties.

58 See *ND5 ad* 17.14, 440. *Socratitas* is the being such-and-such of Socrates (*talitas Socratis*). The overall aim of the passage is to make the point that what is *nominated* by a certain name is not matter without qualification (that is, the genus or species situated just above that name in an ideal Porphyrian tree) but, rather, matter with the relevant qualifications (for genera, the specific differences; for the last species, the fact of being qualified as “such”). In the case of the name “Socrates,” for instance, the substance signified is not sim-

name has two properties of signifying (*significationes*).⁵⁹ First, it signifies, by nomination, the substance on which it was imposed (signification by nomination or imposition). Second, it also signifies, by representing it, the quality (signification by representation).

According to *GPma*, the substance which is nominated is not without qualifications, but qualified—it is a substance with quality or a “substance affected by qualities” (*substantia qualitatibus affecta*) and, in turn, such a quality is either proper or common. The quality, however, is not *nominated* (i.e., signified by nomination) for *GPma*.⁶⁰ But this is not everyone’s position, and the issue of what is “nominated” by a name is a major exegetical question: is it substance only, or quality, or both, or none of the above?⁶¹ Many ideas are tried out. Indeed, after presenting its own position *GPma* immediately considers another view, held by “some,” according to which a name nominates *not only* a (qualified) substance, as *GPma* claims, *but also* the quality: it nominates “both jointly” (*utrumque coniunctim*). The example provided is that of a proper name:

For instance, the name “Socrates”—they say—is a name of both the substance and the accidents through which the substance is formed. In other words, they say that his whiteness, shape, being the son of Sophroniscus, and the other accidents which inform Socrates are parts which build (*partes componentes*) the primary substance that is called ‘Socrates.’⁶²

ply *homo*, but *homo talis*. Therefore, the *talitas Socratis* or *socratitas* is the quality signified by the name “Socrates.”

59 Edition in Rosier-Catach, “Les *Glosulae*,” 175–177, and analysis at 132–144; see also Brumberg, “Sémantiques,” 147–149; Grondeux and Rosier-Catach, *Priscien lu*, 1:184–197. A parallel discussion, not collatable word by word, but advancing a very similar sort of reasoning is also found in the *Tractatus Glosarum Prisciani* (also known as *GPma v*) in Vat. lat. 1486, partially edited by Margareta Fredborg, “*Tractatus glosarum Prisciani*,” *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 21 (1977), 21–44 (see especially 29–30); see also “the view of some” discussed in ms B (Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale 3921) in Anne Grondeux and Irène Rosier-Catach, “Les *Glosulae super Priscianum* et leur tradition,” in *Arts du langage et théologie aux confins des XI^e–XII^e siècles. Textes, maîtres, débats*, ed. Irène Rosier-Catach (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 168.

60 *GPma* ad 2.18, 176 an. 7: “Notandum est tamen quod nomen non significat substantiam et qualitatem insimul nuncupative, scilicet ita ut utriusque coniunctim vel utriusque per se nomen sit, sed substantiam tantum nominat, quia ei fuit impositum, qualitatem vero significat non nuncupative, immo repraesentando et determinando circa substantiam propter quam tamen notandam substantiae fuit impositum”; see also 177 an. 13: “dicimus ‘Socrates’ designare substantiam quandam qualitatibus affectam.” See also n. 58.

61 See *ND3 ad* 2.18, 2:213–215, and the editors’ comments at 1:191–197; see also the *Tractatus glosarum Prisciani*, 27–32.

62 *GPma* ad 2.18, 176–177, an. 9.

Not only is the quality signified by proper names understood with explicit reference to an individual's accidents. More importantly, a semantic claim concerning nomination (proper names nominate *both* the substance and the quality, i.e., the accidents of that substance) goes hand-in-hand with an ontological claim concerning the constitution of individuals (accidents are "constitutive parts" of primary substances). *GPma* rejects such an onto-semantic view with three arguments.⁶³ It is interesting to note that the first two are not semantic, but entirely ontological—they are based on what an accident and its support are.⁶⁴ And, at the end of the passage, when restating his own view on nomination, the author of *GPma* adds further ontological clarifications.⁶⁵ Although Socrates—it is said—does possess forms which man (or any other item superior to man in Porphyry's tree) does not, such forms *do not cause any growth in quantity* of Socrates with respect to man. They are "formal," not "constitutive," parts. Semantic and ontological claims seem to be two sides of the same coin: if you put forward a certain analysis of proper names, then—the text suggests—you also put forward a certain ontological claim on the role of accidents in the production of individuals. If the accidents are *nominated* by a proper name, then they are constitutive parts of the individual, and *vice versa*.

Analysing the nomination of names is a favored topic for highlighting such an onto-semantic connection, but it is by no means the only one. Productive roles of accidents are also discussed elsewhere.⁶⁶ The same goes for the idea that accidents cannot, with respect to the species, stand in the same relationship that differences have with respect to the genera they modify—the change produced by accidents must be lighter than that produced by differences.⁶⁷

63 See *GPma ad 2.18, 177, an. 10–12*.

64 See *GPma ad 2.18, 177, an. 10–11*. For instance, the first argument is: "si enim albedo esset pars constitutiva rei Socratis, cum ipse Socrates sit prima substantia et ita fundamentum, albedo erit fundamentum, quod est inconveniens. Numquam enim aliquod accidens vel per se vel cum aliis iunctum erit sustentamentum." As the *Tractatus glosarum Prisciani, 30*, puts it, this view on nomination is unacceptable: "quod animal et humanitas homo efficiantur, homo species et accidentia fiant Socrates, Socratis corpus et albedo coniuncta fiant alba res est impossibile, dicimus, cum accidentia in substantiam transire non possunt."

65 See *GPma ad 2.18, 177, an. 13*.

66 E.g., in the *Glosa Victorina, 36–37* (commenting on 17.14), where the view of "someone" is discussed that "substances are born from accidents as if from substantial forms" (*Dicit aliquis ab accidentibus nasci substantias sicut a formis substantialibus*); there are parallel passages in the Guido-commentary of *GPmi*. See Margareta Fredborg, "Introduction" to the edition of the *Glosa Victorina, xix–xx*.

67 See *ND5 ad 17.24, 452–454, especially 452*: "Ad quod videndum attendendum omnia superiora a generalissimo usque ad specialissima a suis inferioribus per aliud differre, id est

To complete our analysis, a passage of Abelard's *LI Isag.*, extremely close to P17, must be considered—namely, the section commenting on Porphyry's *collectio proprietatum*.⁶⁸ Abelard advances a peculiar interpretation of Porphyry's words here, but especially interesting for us is the view he criticizes.⁶⁹ He summarizes it as follows:

It should be noted that, on the basis of this passage (namely, where Porphyry says that individuals “consist of properties”), some prove that individuals are made through accidents, just as species are made through differences—except for the fact that differences inform substantially, accidents do not. And yet accidents produce individuals and—in these people's view—are also understood in an individual name, just as rational and mortal are understood in the name of the species. This is why Priscian says that proper names are put forward, when answering a question, in order to designate properties. Which he proves on the basis of this example. When Aeneas, having seen Marcellus, asks: “Father, who is that man, who accompanies the hero as he walks along?” and receives “Marcellus” as an answer, “Marcellus” was put forward as the answer not on the basis of the substance, which he could see, but on the basis of an *unknown quality*, which he could not grasp through sense perception. Boethius equally seems to agree with this, in his *Second Commentary on De Interpretatione*, when he refers to the property of Plato with the contrived name of “platonity.”⁷⁰

per rem facientem aliud, videlicet specificam differentiam, ut substantiam a corpore per corporeitatem, corpus ab animata {*an animato corpore corrigendum?*} per animationem, animatum corpus ab animali per sensibilitatem, animal a rationali animali per rationalitatem, rationale animal ab homine per mortalitatem. Sed specialissimae species non differunt a suis inferioribus, id est individuis, per aliud, immo tantum per quasdam considerationes.” *Considerationes* is an editorial emendation where the manuscript has a lacuna, followed by the letters *ones*. Another and perhaps more plausible emendation is *alterationes*, to mark a contrast with the previous *aliud*; see Boethius, *2Isag.*, 244–246, inspiring P3, 140–142; cf. *ND5 ad 17.34*, 466.

68 See above, n. 5. For some analysis of this Abelardian passage, see Gracia, *Introduction*, 198–210; Brumberg, “Sémantiques,” 153–156; and Riccardo Brighenti, *Individuals, Properties, Names in William of Champeaux and Abelard's Time. Logica 'Ingredientibus' 62–65 and Its Context* (Unpublished Master Thesis, Ca' Foscari, 2022).

69 In Abelard's interpretation, “properties” stands for “names taken from properties,” which build up a definite description of the individual: see *LI Isag.*, 63,8–18; cf. *LNPS*, 555.23–556.20; and P7, 87 (*COLLECTIO, idest descriptio*.)

70 Abelard, *LI Isag.*, 63,31–64.6: “Notandum vero quod ex hoc loco, ubi scilicet ait individua constare EX PROPRIETATIBUS, quidam convincunt ita individua per accidentia effici,

The view discussed here presents the same combination of elements we have encountered in the *Glosulae* tradition: a position about accidents constituting individuals (*individua per accidentia effici; accidentia individua faciunt*) going hand-in-hand with a semantics of proper names (*accidentia in nomine individuali intelligi*). Support is found in the quotation from Virgil discussed by Priscian (*Institutiones* 17.24) and in Boethius's invented name *platonitas*, two features we have encountered in P17, too.⁷¹

Abelard puts forward two arguments to criticize this position before stating his own view on the topic, according to which individuals would be different from each other even if all accidents were removed.⁷² As mentioned, Abelard's own position seems to be the view under attack in P17 (Text 5 §10). Abelard then introduces further developments of his rivals' views, based on the distinction between "this human" and "Socrates"⁷³ and, again, on a close parallelism between ontology and semantics.⁷⁴ According to "many"—he says—it is Socrates (not: this human) that is made from accidents, just as accidents are understood in the term "Socrates," not in "this human." In this context, Abelard mentions three out of the five possible interpretations of SUF evoked by P17: proper names designate the accidents of Socrates,

and [1] some say it designates *all* the accidents of Socrates, both separable and inseparable; [2] some say that it designates the *inseparable accidents*

sicut species per differentias, nisi quod differentiae substantialiter informant, accidentia vero non. Sed tamen et accidentia individua faciunt et ea quoque in nomine individuali intelligi volunt, sicut rationale, mortale in nomine speciali. Unde et Priscianus (*Institutiones*, 17.24) propria nomina ad designandas proprietates respondere dicit. Quod etiam ex hoc comprobatur, quod cum Aeneas viso Marcello quaereret: 'Quis, pater, ille virum qui sic comitatur euntem?' et responderetur: 'Marcellus,' non propter substantiam quam videbat, responsum est 'Marcellus' sed propter ignoratam qualitatem quam sensu percipere non poterat. Cui etiam Boethius consentire videtur in editione secunda *super Perihermeneias* (ed. Meiser, 137), ubi proprietatem Platonis ficto nomine platonitatem appellat."

⁷¹ See above, 88.

⁷² Abelard, *LI Isag.*, 64.7–13 (first argument); 64.14–19 (second argument); 64.20–24 (Abelard's own view). For the first argument, on priority and grounding, see also Abelard, *LI Isag.*, 13.5–15. The second argument is comparable to P17 (Text 5 §10), P20 (Text 6 §4), and *ND5 ad* 17.14, referred to in n. 58 above. For Abelard's own view, see above, n. 48.

⁷³ A distinction that, again, is likely to originate in the grammatical tradition, as the two expressions ought to be treated differently from that perspective. When giving his opinion on the topic (*LI Isag.*, 65.5–11), Abelard states that "in this discipline," namely, dialectics, the two cases do not differ.

⁷⁴ See Abelard, *LI Isag.*, 64.25–65.11.

only; and [3] some say that it designates *a form which originates from accidents* and which they call, properly speaking, *socratitas*.⁷⁵

He objects both to the idea that individuals are made by accidents, and that a proper name designates accidents.⁷⁶

It is clear that the *Glosulae* tradition, *LI Isag.*, and P17 are connected. The best explanation of the evidence, it seems to me, is that P17 is reacting to Abelard's *LI Isag.* It criticises Abelard's view and it both sides with and further develops the position Abelard criticizes. And behind both *LI Isag.* and P17 stands the grammatical analysis of names, especially available in the exegesis of *Institutiones* 2 and 17. But *LI Isag.* and P17 do not carry all the nuances of the Priscianic exegetical tradition, so it is hard to pinpoint which views they are referring to and developing. When Abelard says that, for some, "accidents are understood (*intelligi*) in a proper name," does he mean that they are nominated or signified, more generally? And, when he writes that, for his rivals, "individuals are made (*effici*) by accidents," does he mean that accidents are constitutive parts or formal parts? In the former case, he could be attacking the position *criticized* by *GPma*, in the latter, the view *endorsed* by *GPma*.⁷⁷

5 Albrican Commentaries (P20, P25)

To complete our survey, we should now consider the two *Isagoge* commentaries connected to Alberic that discuss *SUF*, namely P20 and P25. They behave in very different ways.

All in all, P25 has little to say on this passage and is quite disconnected from the exegesis surveyed above.⁷⁸ However, its claim that *SUF* "is a property that

75 Abelard, *LI Isag.*, 64.29–32: "hoc vero nomen quod est 'Socrates,' accidentis designativum dicunt, et quidam omnium accidentium eius sive separabilium sive inseparabilium, quidam inseparabilium tantum, quidam cuiusdam propriae formae ex accidentibus innatae, quam socratitatem proprie vocant."

76 See Abelard, *LI Isag.*, 65.1–4.

77 As noticed, already, by Brumberg, "Sémantiques," 155.

78 P25 in Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin–Preußischer Kulturbesitz, lat. fol. 624, fol. 74^{va} (normalised orthography): "De specie tractat hoc modo: ponit tres significationes huius nominis 'species,' unam vulgarem et duas philosophicas; et definit speciem secundum philosophicam acceptionem; et exequitur ea quae sunt posita in definitione; et dividit speciem; et ita finit tractatum speciei. SPECIES AUTEM DICITUR ET DE FORMA (8.17). Forma est proprietates quae inest ex compositione partium et ex situ accidentium. Et haec est vulgaris significatio huius nominis 'species.' QUAE PONITUR SUB ASSIGNATO GENERE EST SPECIES (8.19)." The discussion of *SUF* may also be mediated by P20, which has a sim-

inheres in something and derives from the composition of parts or from the arrangement of accidents” betrays the influence of Abelardian material (the term *compositio*, the mention of accidents and parts; see Appendix, Text 1 § 2).

P20, in contrast, very much connects to the previous material—and especially to *LI Isag.* (both 42–43 and 63–65) and *LNPS*. Just as *LNPS*, P20 mentions a fourth meaning of “species” as *maneria* (“sort,” “manner”), which is used to refer to species of herbs or groups of men (such as the Greeks or the Thebans) when the philosophical sense of “species” would not be appropriate (see Text 6 § 8).⁷⁹ P20 also discusses Boethius’s *STM* in detail, noticing that species in this sense can be called both *subtle* and *substantial* “because both can be read in different commentaries” (Text 6 § 6)—an interesting glimpse into the master’s background reading activity. The analysis of *STM*, too, is connected to the Abelardian material in various ways, for instance for the claim that *STM* is only perceivable with reason and intellect, not with sense perception, and that it results from the coming together of substantial forms. As we have seen above, these are typical features of the Abelardian interpretation of the Boethian notion.

With respect to *SUF*, P20 is similar to P25 in saying that it is “a composition (*compositio*) which exists in someone from the coming together of accidents and the disposition of parts” and from which the thing can be called “beautiful or ugly.” This formulation puts forward some key elements of the Abelardian interpretation of *SUF* (see Appendix, Text 1 § 2). P20 then goes on to introduce the combination of Boethian and Priscianic material we have encountered in *LI Isag.*, 63–65 (and in P17).⁸⁰ Boethius, the commentator says, refers to the proper form or quality of a thing with the term *socratitas*. And, according to some, “the proper quality is signified (*significari*) by proper names”—a claim supported by Priscian, according to which “proper names designate (*designant*) the proper quality.”⁸¹ But, just as Abelard’s *LI Isag.*, P20 criticizes such seman-

ilar formulation on composition, accidents, and parts. P25 then goes on to consider three counterexamples (couldn’t the definition of species also apply to Socrates, or to the universal substance, or to *vir*, i.e., a male human being, in contrast to female?), and provides a solution for each.

79 See above, 83. See also Jean Jolivet, “Notes de lexicographie abélardienne,” in *Aspects de la pensée médiévale: Abélard. Doctrines du langage* (Paris: Vrin, 1987), 125–128, and the chapter by Enrico Donato in this volume.

80 In my view at least, the connection with Abelardian teaching as exposed in *LI Isag.* is enough to explain P20. The possible connection with P17 would need to be proven with further evidence.

81 These rather vague references seem to be second hand. Boethius, as we have seen above, was actually talking about *platonitas*. As for Priscian, the reference in P20 is vague compared to, e.g., the reference to *Institutiones* 17.24 available in *LI Isag.* and P17.

tics of proper names. The critique of P₂₀ starts by mobilizing some of the themes of *LI Isag.*: the author contrasts the variability and possible destruction of the proper form with the persistence of the name (“Socrates is still called Socrates, even if its proper form varies”). But the reasoning then develops, with two further steps enforcing the critique. The first looks at the imposition of the name (the name was *not* imposed to signify the form of a thing, but to talk about the thing). The second neutralizes the alleged Priscianic support by providing an alternative interpretation of the authoritative text (Priscian’s claim that proper names designate a proper form means that, when we hear its name, we mentally grasp the thing in the form in which we saw it). In these further steps, new features are involved in the discussion, such as the notions of *impositio* and *intelligere*.

Conclusion

“Species” in the sense of *uniuscuiusque forma* was originally meant by Porphyry to be a non-technical, non-philosophical sense of the word. However, in 12th-century commentaries it grows into something technical and philosophical, hand-in-hand with deeper analysis of proper names and of the notion of the individual. To a certain extent, this trend is due to interactions with elements coming from the tradition of the *Isagoge* (above all, the third meaning of “species” of *2Isag.*, with Boethius’s example *humanitas* and complex exegesis). But, to a certain extent, it is also due to interactions with non-Porphyrian elements, which 12th-century commentators derive from their study of Aristotle, Boethius, and Priscian.

Comparing all P-commentaries on this topic allows for some new and unexpected links to be detected. For instance, here Abelard’s *LI Isag.* is very close to P₁₄ (which, in turn, is closely connected to the S-version of P₃), while P₁₇ seems to develop the exegesis available in *LI Isag.* The Albrician P₂₀ is clearly dependent on Abelardian teaching (as we now know it through both *LI Isag.* and *LNPS*).

It is certainly to be regretted that this often unpublished material could not be taken into account by Jorge Gracia in his milestone volume, *Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages*. Many of the texts above connect to what Gracia calls the “Accidental Theory of Substantial Individuation” (198–210), itself identical, in many respects, to the so-called “Standard Theory of Individuation” from the High Middle Ages. In Geyer’s reconstruction (which is based mainly on Abelard’s account), the key tenets of the Accidental Theory of Substantial Individuation is that “individuation is the result of acci-

dents” (204), and that the composition of an individual is the result of “having a material essence and a cluster of forms attached to it” (199). The texts gathered here further deepens and problematize this reconstruction.⁸² For instance: In which sense are accidents to be called the principle of individuation? Texts do highlight that accidents have a key role in the step leading from the last species to individuals, but many options are tried out (including: a collection of accidents; collection of a subset of accidents; a form coming from accidents; a form, not coming from accidents, which constitutes an individual status; the *socratitas* as the sum of *species* and accidents, and so on). And, while accidents are assigned a productive role (*efficere*), some texts also try to avoid this role being too strong (no production of *aliud* is in order, only of alterations; there is identity of species and individual). Abelard’s critical summary hints at more than one option, but still provides a rather simplified umbrella presentation of the variety of positions that were tried out in Abelard’s own time as the result—it would seem—of the increasingly complex exegesis of “species” as *uniuscuiusque forma*.

Acknowledgements

I thank Sofia Orsino, Pietro Podolak, Bianca Bosman, and Charles Girard, as well as the participants of the Copenhagen conference on Alberic and referees for their precious remarks and suggestions. This piece of research was funded by the European Union (ERC-2021-STG, PolyphonicPhilosophy, GA 101041596). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

Appendix

Punctuation has sometimes been modified. Ortography has been standardized. Annotations within square brackets and paragraph numbers are mine.

82 Including *LI Isag.*, 63–65, discussed above.

[Text 1] *Abelard, LI Isag. on the meanings of "species," ed. Geyer, 42.3–43.4 (on the basis of Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, M 63 sup., fol. 6^{va}–^{vb}; Geyer emends the ms on several occasions, and normally records it in his apparatus. I have only indicated cases in which his apparatus is to be improved)*

§1 Sicut autem generis aequivocationem monstravit, ita et speciei, ostendens scilicet hoc nomine "species" duo includi, scilicet [*Meaning 1*] compositionem cuiuslibet individui, secundum quam dicimus aliquem terribilem specie, et [*Meaning 2*] philosophicam speciem, de qua intendit. §2 [*Further analysis of meaning 1*] Compositionem autem possumus accipere sive ex conventu partium in quantitate, sicut ex membris coniungentibus Priamum, sive ex informatione apparentium accidentium, secundum quam⁸³ ipse maxime dinoscitur et speciosus vel turpis⁸⁴ iudicatur. Et hanc ultimam compositionem, quae ab accidentibus venit, Boethius magis videtur attendere, qui ait de Porphyrio, quod dicat speciem vocari uniuscuiusque figuram, "quae ex accidentium congregatione⁸⁵ perficitur" [*see 2Isag., quoted above, n. 24*]. §3 [*Boethius's "species" in the third meaning: STM*] Et attende quod idem Boethius praeter duas significationes speciei, quas Porphyrius ponit, aliam dicit esse, quam substantialem formam appellat, ut rationalitas et mortalitas in homine, quas "humanitatis" nomine vocat, eo videlicet quod humanam substantiam compleant, id est hominem advenientes animali perficiant sicut eius differentiae constitutivae. §4 [*Further analysis of Boethius's remarks on STM*] De qua quidem humanitate⁸⁶ ipse ita ambigue loquitur, ut eam speciem animalis esse videatur annuere, dicens [*see 2Isag., quoted above, n. 24*]: "Si vero sub animali eam intelligendo locaveris, deducit animalis in sese participationem separaturque a ceteris animalibus ac fit species generis." In quibus tamen verbis nihil aliud demonstrare intendit, nisi eandem humanitatem, quam prius speciem esse ostenderat⁸⁷ secundum naturam essentiae suae, in qua est qualitas, eandem esse formam substantiae humanae, quae tunc deducit animal participatione in se, quando substantiae animalis copulatur. Et quod ait: "separatur a ceteris animalibus," "separatur" impersonale ponit, ac si diceret: fit separatio per eam cuiusdam animalis ab aliis atque ita per eam fit species generis. §5 [*The view of others on humanitas*] Quidam autem hanc compositionem, quae humanitas dicitur, aliter accipiunt, quandam scilicet formam, quae innascitur, ita hanc

83 quam] *tacite correxit Geyer: quae ms*

84 turpis] *scripsi probante Podolak: t(ur)pris ms: terribilis legit Geyer*

85 congregatione] *tacite correxit Geyer: congregatiorem ms*

86 humanitate] *tacite correxit Geyer: humanitatem ms*

87 ostenderat] *correxit Geyer: ostndat ms*

substantialem, quia a substantialibus formis venit. §6 [Question: is humanitas *substantial* or *accidental*?] Sed occurrit quaestio, cum sit forma in homine, utrum substantialis an accidentalis. Sed si substantialis, quomodo ex conventu substantialium innascitur, cum ipsa quoque sit una substantialium? Quod si accidentalis, profecto posset homo sine illa permanere. Quod fortasse poterit concedi. Sic namque rationalitas et mortalitas ceteraeque formae substantiales hominis, per quas solas homo subsistit, ad animal possent adiungi in constitutione hominis, ut non necesse sit ex conventu earum | vel humanitatem vel aliam formam innasci. Alioquin et ex humanitate rursus alia forma et ex illa iterum alia usque in infinitum simili ratione nasceretur.

6^b

[Text 2] *Glossae secundum Vocales, edited from Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, M 63 sup., fol. 76^v88*

§1 [The two meanings of “species”] Quia vero de nominibus tetendit, sicut supra ostendit diversas significationes huius nominis “genus,” ita hic quoque facit huius nominis “species,” dicens hoc nomen “species” significare [1] philo⟨so⟩phicam speciem, vocabulum scilicet, [2] et⁸⁹ compositionem UNIVS-CUIUSQUE (8.17), hoc est alicuius. §2 [Species as composition] Vocat autem compositionem formam innatam ex dispositione partium, secundum⁹⁰ quam dicimus hominem⁹¹ speciosum.⁹² §3 [Meaning 3: Species as substantial form] Significat et “species” omnem illam formam ex qua substantiale vocabulum su⟨m⟩ptum est, ut rationalitas est species, id est forma substantialis, hoc est ex qua su⟨m⟩ptum est [in natura]⁹³ vocabulum⁹⁴ substantiale. §4 [Development on humanitas and “humanum”] Et nota quod unaquaeque forma quae facit hominem⁹⁵ est humanitas, id est forma faciens hominem; et similiter omnis forma faciens asinum est asinitas. Potest autem esse humanitas ita quod non sit homo, ut rationalitas,⁹⁶ mortalitas, et cetera. Non est enim⁹⁷ sump-

88 Although this edition is my own, I could take advantage of an unpublished edition by Yukio Iwakuma and followed his advice on several occasions, as the apparatus indicates. I have also registered some of the readings available in Carmelo Ottaviano, *Testi medievali inediti* (Florence: Olschki, 1933), 152–154.

89 et] *suppl. Iwakuma: om. ms, Ottaviano*

90 secundum] *corr. Ottaviano, Iwakuma: sed ms*

91 hominem] *corr. Ottaviano, Iwakuma: homine ms*

92 speciosum] *corr. Iwakuma (cf. Text 1, §2): sponsum ms, Ottaviano*

93 in natura] *seclusi cum Iwakuma*

94 vocabulum] *corr. Ottaviano, Iwakuma: vocabula ms*

95 hominem] *corr. Ottaviano, Iwakuma: homine ms*

96 rationalitas] *corr. Iwakuma: iteralitas (!) ms, Ottaviano*

97 enim sumptum] *corr. Iwakuma: assuptum ms, Ottaviano*

tum “humanum” ab humanitate. Non⁹⁸ “humanum”⁹⁹ hoc nomen su⟨m⟩ptum est nec in quid praedicari habet, cum excedat praedicamentum. “Humanum” accipitur possessivum, ut humanum caput, id est caput hominis. Quodsi “humanum” esset¹⁰⁰ sumptum, tale esset humanum caput: formatum humanitate. Accipitur “humanum” tantum¹⁰¹ valens quantum “homo”; unde Boethius in libro¹⁰² *Topicorum*: “humanae res providentia reguntur,”¹⁰³ id est homines. Et nota humanitatem et mortalitatem¹⁰⁴ excedentia et excessa esse, et item humanitatem et rationalitatem, etc. §5 [*Question: is humanitas the genus of the rationality which is in man?*] Quaeritur autem si humanitas sit genus rationalitatis quae est in homine. Sed non est genus illius, cum su⟨m⟩ptum sit tantumdem valens quantum “faciens humanum.” §6 [*Further remarks on the third meaning of “species”*] Nota hanc ultimam significationem speciei, pro forma videlicet substantiali, obscuriorem esse aliis duabus et magis difficilem¹⁰⁵ a Boethio [*see 2Isag., quoted above, n. 24*] dici,¹⁰⁶ ideoque Porphyrius de ea non tractasse in hoc opere, pro eo quod haec forma substantialis non veniat ad sensum quo cognoscatur, sicut facit compositio quae visu discernitur et philosophica quae auditu.

[Text 3] P14 on the meanings of “species” in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 17813, fol. 6^{ra-rb}

§1 Genus dicitur de collectione et de principio et de eo cui supponitur species, SPECIES AUTEM DICITUR ET DE FORMA¹⁰⁷ UNIUSCUIUSQUE et de eo quod est sub genere. §2 [*The first meaning of “species”*] SPECIES DICITUR DE FORMA UNIUS⟨CUIUSQUE⟩ i.e. singularis forma uniuscuiusque¹⁰⁸ individui, quae conficitur ex collectione accidentium, appellatur species. SECUNDUM QUAM for⟨mam⟩, i.e. in designatione cuius formae, DICTUM EST etc. §3 [*The singular form is accidental; but it is a quality different from accidents*] Nota hanc formam quae propria est unicuique individuo esse acci⟨den⟩talem, quia indi-

98 non] *scripsi*: n (?) *difficile lectu ms*: quia *Ottaviano*: et “humanum” hoc nomen sumptum ⟨non⟩ est *corr. Iwakuma*

99 humanum] *Iwakuma*: humanitas *corr. Ottaviano*: humanitatem *ms*

100 esset] *corr. Ottaviano, Iwakuma*: essent *ms*

101 tantum] *corr. Ottaviano, Iwakuma*: tamen *ms*

102 libro] *scripsi*: nero (?) *ms*: vero *legit Ottaviano*: secundo *corr. Iwakuma*

103 Cf. Boethius, *De differentiis topicis*, PL 64, 1188c.

104 humanitatem et mortalitatem] *scripsi cum Ottaviano*: humanitas et mortalitas *ms*

105 difficilem] *scripsi*: difficilis *tacite corr. Ottaviano*: difficilium *ms*

106 dici] *scripsi cum Iwakuma, Ottaviano*: dici sub titulo *praebet ms*

107 forma] *for ms, passim*

108 uniuscuiusque] *post correctionem ms*: uniusque *ante correctionem ms*

viduum nihil habet substantiale sub specie. Et quod sit accidentalis liber caute innuit, per hoc quod dicit UNIUSCUIUSQUE. Quae enim unicuique individuo propria forma est, ea non ex substantiali forma aliqua venit, sed ex accidentibus; cuius formae cum sit causa congregatio accidentium, tamen est quaedam qualitas diversa ab accidentibus. § 4 [*A different view: the singular form is the collection of all accidents*] Volunt tamen quidam illam for⟨mam⟩ singularem nihil aliud hic intelligi nisi omnium accidentium uniuscuiusque individui collectionem, utpote accidentia Socratis impressa ipsi Socrati simul collecta dicunt esse singularem for⟨mam⟩ Socratis, adhaerentes verbis Boethii in commento dicentis “si uniuscuiusque proprietatem consideres, i.e. quam virilis vultus, quam firmus¹⁰⁹ incessus et cetera quibus individua conformantur et quodammodo depinguntur, hoc accidens est species” [2Isag. *quoted above*, n. 24]. § 5 [*The second meaning of “species”*] DICITUR AUTEM. Non solum propria forma uniuscuiusque individui dicitur species, sed etiam ea res QUAE EST SUB ASSIGNATO¹¹⁰ GENERE idest quae ponitur sub genere superius definito,¹¹¹ non sub collectione vel principio. Et quia individuum supponitur generi, et tamen non est species, intelligendum est “principaliter.” Non enim individuum principaliter supponitur generi, sed mediante specie. § 6 [*Literal commentary of Porphyry’s examples*] SECUNDUM QUAM, scilicet significationem speciei. ALBUM accipitur pro albedine vel substantiali forma albedinis quae mit⟨t⟩at nos ad speciem. Similiter accipiendum est TRIANGULUM. FIGURA accipitur pro forma et formato; quando est nomen significationis, ut hic, accipitur pro forma; quando vero est nomen rei figuratae, sicut triangulae vel quadrangulae, accipitur pro formato. § 7 [*The third meaning of “species,” a sort of bond between genus and differences*] Tertiam significationem ap⟨p⟩onit Boethius, quae confici videtur ex aggregatione substantialium differentiarum venientium in proprium genus; et eas in constitutione speciei cum suo genere coniungit tanquam quoddam vinculum, quia quando substantiales differentiae, quae prorsus sunt diversae naturae¹¹² ab ipso genere, adveniunt generi ut aliquod substantialiter constituent, necesse est aliquod medium intervenire, quod res tam diversae naturae firmiter cohaerere faciat,¹¹³ velut humanitas quae in constitutione hominis rationalitatem et mortalitatem cum animali coniungit. Quam ideo Porphyrius praetermittit, quia “altiolem quaereret intellectum—ut dicit

109 firmus] *post correctionem, supra lineam ms: virilis in linea ms*

110 assignato] *scripsi cum Iwakuma: assignatio ms*

111 definito] *diffi()o in linea, to supra lineam ms*

112 naturae] *correx: naturam (!) ms*

113 faciat] *post correctionem ms: faciant, ut videtur, ante correctionem ms*

Boethius [2Isag. *quoted above*, n. 24]—atque eruditio¹¹⁴ quam¹¹⁵ esset intellectus generis.¹¹⁵ Vel quia hic tantum aequivocationem curavit ostendere, ad quam istae duae significationes sufficiunt. Et haec talis species diversa est et ab illa quae unicuique corpori accidentaliter insita est et ab ea quae genus deducit in partes. § 8 [*Discussion: some say that humanity is substantial, others that it is accidental*] Hanc ergo humanitatem quidam dicunt homini esse substantialem, quidam accidentalem. § 9 [*Against those who say that humanity is substantial*] Sed opponitur eis qui dicunt esse substantialem quod,¹¹⁶ cum ita sit, substantialis differentia per se non potest iungi cum animali, nisi aliqua alia sustantiali differentia vinciat; et eadem ratione illa¹¹⁷ alia aliam exiget, et sic in infinitum ratio procedit. § 10 [*Reply to the objection in § 9*] Solutio. Sicut ipsa alias secum trahit¹¹⁸ et inseparaliter iungit, sic et omnes aliae eam secum substantialiter coniungunt. § 11 [*Against those who say that humanity is accidental*] Rursus illis qui dicunt esse accidentalem homini opponitur quia tunc potest adesse et abesse praeter corruptionem hominis. Quod esse
6^{rb} non potest. Si enim amota fuerit, et res illae statim a se invicem disiunguntur, quae nisi ea mediante iungi non poterant; et ita destruitur homo, illa scilicet specialis¹¹⁹ natura; quare non videtur esse accidens hominis. § 12 [*Reply to the objection in § 11*] Ad quem responderi potest, quia non necesse est esse, ut remotis illis quae in aliqua¹²⁰ coniunctione sunt, statim coniunctorum dissolutio necessario consequatur, sicut in muri constitutione videmus quod necessaria est caementi¹²¹ mollicies et multa alia, quibus amotis murus tamen non dissolvitur. Sic et ipsa humanitas, licet actualiter ab homine non recedat, tamen si recesserit,¹²² hominis constitutio necessario non peribit. Et in hac sententia nulla occurrit infinitas, quia cum sit accidens, nullo extraneo vinculo quocum suo fundamento cohaereat indigebit.¹²³ § 13 [*Another view on humanity: cf. Abelard's LI Isag., Text 1 § 3*] Sunt alii qui dicunt nihil aliud esse humanitatem nisi omnes substantiales differentias hominis insimul aggregatas, et sic omnis oppositio sopita est.

114 quam] *correx*: quod *ms*

115 generis] *corr. Iwakuma*: generi *ms*

116 quod] *correx*: quae *ms*

117 illa] *supra lineam, alia manu ms*

118 post trahit *fere quattuor litteras erasit librarius*

119 specialis] *sp et spatium vacuum prima manu, (,)al(,) alia manu ms*

120 aliqua] *post correctionem alia manu ms*

121 post caementi *unam litteram erasit librarius*

122 recesserit] *post correctionem ms: recesserit (!) ante correctionem ms*

123 indigebit] *post correctionem ms: indigebat ante correctionem ms*

[Text 4] P16 on the meanings of “species” in Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14458, fols. 87^{vb}–88^{ra}

§ 1 Genus dicitur de collectione et principio et philosophico genere, sed species dicitur et de uniuscuiusque forma et de ea re quae ponitur sub genere. § 2 [*The first meaning of “species”*] Et de prima significatione dicit sic. SPECIES (8.17) haec vox DICITUR id est enuntiatur DE FORMA id est compositione UNIUSCUIUSQUE. Et posuit¹²⁴ exemplum, sic dicens: SECUNDUM QUAM significationem speciei DICTUM EST a quodam, scilicet poeta, SPECIES id est forma PRIAMI DIGNA EST IMPERIO. “Cautissime¹²⁵—ut dicit Boethius [*see 2Isag. quoted above, n. 24*]—dictum est UNIUSCUIUSQUE. Quae enim¹²⁶ unicuique¹²⁷ individua¹²⁸ forma est, ea species non ex substantiali forma, sed ex¹²⁹ accidentibus venit,” id est non est substantialis sed accidentalis. § 3 [*The second meaning of “species”*] DICITUR AUTEM (8.19). Poni aliam significationem speciei, sic.¹³⁰ Non¹³¹ tantum forma uniuscuiusque dicitur species, sed etiam DICITUR SPECIES EA res QUAE EST SUB GENERE superius ASSIGNATO id est sub philosophico genere. § 4 [*Further developments on the second meaning of “species”*] Intelligendum est “primo loco” propter individua, quae mediantibus speciebus etiam generibus supponuntur. Sed hoc satis non videtur valere. Individua enim generum considerata ut individua eorum, ipsis generibus ut species primo loco supponuntur. Melius autem potest sic intelligi illud esse speciem | quod ponitur sub genere, dicto genere respectu illius quod ei supponitur. Quod ipsum Porphyrium intellexisse possumus attendere, cum dixit ASSIGNATO. Genus enim secundum hoc quod assignatum¹³² est, id est genus in eo quod genus est, nihil aliud requirit habere sub se nisi solam speciem. Si quis vero in hoc quod dixit ASSIGNATO illud noluerit attendere, sup⟨p⟩leat extra quod diximus et soli speciei videbit convenire. § 5 [*Analysis of Porphyry’s examples*] Ideo de diversis praedicamentis exemplificat¹³³ in singulis praedicamentis genera et species esse intelligamus. Per ALBUM (8.21) proprium nomen albedinis accipe. Nam denominative acceptum ad ipsum corpus et non ad albedinem directo modo

88^{ra}

124 post posuit in *add. ms*

125 cautissime] caustissime *ms*

126 quae enim] *ex Boethio add. Iwakuma: om. ms*

127 unicuique] *supra lineam ms*

128 individua] *ms: individuo Boethius*

129 ex] *ex Boethio add. Iwakuma: om. ms*

130 sic] *corr. Iwakuma: si ms*

131 non] *corr. Iwakuma: quae (?) ms*

132 assignatum] *corr. Iwakuma: assignatur ms*

133 diversis praedicamentis exemplificat] *corr. Iwakuma: diversorum praedicamentorum exemplificare ms*

dirigitur. § 6 [*Boethius's third meaning of "species"*] Praeter has duas, ut dicit Boethius [*see 2Isag. quoted above, n. 24*], "est alia substantialis formae species," id est aliqua species quae est substantialis forma, ut est humanitas. De qua Boethius loquitur, sic dicens [*see 2Isag. quoted above, n. 24*]: "eaque¹³⁴ non est supposita animali, sed tanquam ipsa qualitas substantiam monstrans. Haec enim et ab ea diversa est quae uniuscuiusque corpori accidentaliter insita est, et ab ea¹³⁵ quae genus deducit in partes. Postremoque plura sunt quae eadem sunt, diversis tamen modis ad aliud atque aliud relata intelliguntur, ut hanc ipsam humanitatem in eo quod ipsa est si perspexeris, species est eaque¹³⁶ substantialem determinat qualitatem; si sub animali eam intelligendo locaveris, deducit in se animalis participationem¹³⁷ separaturque a ceteris animalibus ac fit generis species." § 7 Haec substantialis forma, id est humanitas quae est species, videtur esse differentia quae diversa est et ab ea quae unicuique accidentaliter insita est et ab ea quae deducit genus in partes, id est a philosophica specie. Potest tamen, ut Boethius dicit, "diversis modis" considerata esse species illa "quae deducit genus in partes," videlicet si eam consideremus in "eo quod ipsa est" in sua natura; item "si sub animali locaverimus eam, deducit animalis in se participationem separaturque a ceteris animalibus ac fit generis species." § 8 [*Various interpretations of Boethius's words*] Quod diversis modis secundum diversorum sententias exponitur. [*The interpretation of some*] Sunt enim quidam qui dicunt differentias iunctas cum genere transire in speciem. Verbi gratia animal et rationalitatem et mortalitatem, haec tria simul¹³⁸ iuncta, vocant hominem et esse dicunt speciem animalis. Cui sententiae Boethium dicunt consentire, cum dicit "si sub animali eam intelligendo locaveris, deducit in se participationem animalis separaturque a ceteris animalibus ac fit generis species." § 9 [*The interpretation of others*] Sunt alii qui dicunt animal¹³⁹ informatum rationalitate et mortalitate, et non illa tria simul¹⁴⁰ iuncta, vocari hominem et esse speciem animalis. Et secundum hanc sententiam sic potest intelligi quod dicit Boethius, "si sub animali eam intelligendo locaveris," quod fit tunc cum intelligitur diversa¹⁴¹ differentia illius, "deducit participationem animalis in se," id est participat ipsum animal cum informat ipsum genus ad constitutionem speciei, "et separatur ipsum," scilicet

134 eaque] *corr. Iwakuma: ea quae ms*

135 ea] *ex Boethio corr. Iwakuma: ora ms*

136 eaque] *corr. Iwakuma: ea quae ms*

137 participationem] *ex Boethio corr. Iwakuma: participatione ms*

138 simul] *corr. Iwakuma: similis ms*

139 animal] *corr. Iwakuma: animalis ms*

140 simul] *corr. Iwakuma: similis ms*

141 diversa] *scripsi: duv(er)sa sive divi(r)sa (!) ms*

animal informatum differentia, “a ceteris animalibus,” asino, bove, et aliis, et sic “fit,” animal scilicet informatum, “species generis.” §10 Nota humanitatem illam, de qua ita agit Boethius, differentiam parem homini.

[Text 5] P17 on the meanings of “species” in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3237, fol. 127^{ra-rb}

§1 [The various meanings of the word “species”] Ostendit autem in primis aequivocationem huius vocis quae est “species,” sicut fecerat de nomine generis. Et cum plura significet, hic tantum apponit duo significata, id est [1] singularem formam individui et [2] eam speciem quae supponitur generi. [3] Est autem tertia speciei significatio, quam reticet, quia nimis est difficilis ad investigandum, quae subtilis species appellatur. §2 [Further analysis of meaning 3, the “subtle species”] Et est dubium quid sit, cum de ea prolixè et obscure agendo nunc substantialem vocet Boethius qualitatem, nunc dicat eam generi relative suppositam, ut homo supponitur animali [see 2Isag. quoted above, n. 24]. §3 Dicunt autem quidam quod sit differentia substantialis ut hominis humanitas vel alia forma non substantialis sed inseparabiliter adhaerens in coniunctione generis et differentiae procreata. Quibus si opponatur quod eam dicit Boethius esse speciem animalis [see 2Isag. quoted above, n. 24], dicunt haec verba debere¹⁴² figurative intelligi. Item si opponatur eis quod dicit Boethius Porphyrium non agere de subtili specie [see 2Isag. quoted above, n. 24], cum agat de differentia in sequenti, dicunt [cum agat]¹⁴³ quantum ad praesentem locum Boethium hoc dixisse non quantum ad sequentem. §4 Dicunt alii quod ipse homo sit subtilis species et propter aliud appellatur species generi supposita (id est propter habitudinem relativam) et propter aliud subtilis species (id est propter constitutionem quam a genere suscipit). Secundum quam constitutionem non agitur hic de specie ut dicit Boethius, sed secundum relativam habitudinem. Quibus si opponatur quod subtilem speciem vocat Boethius substantialem qualitatem [see 2Isag. quoted above, n. 24], dicunt auctorem esse locutum improprie. §5 [Literal analysis of Porphyry’s text] Littera sic legitur. Genus dicitur in designatione collectionis et aliorum, SPECIES AUTEM etc. §6 [Five ways of interpreting meaning 1, species as “forma uniuscuiusque”] Dicunt autem quidam quod haec forma singularis quae species appellatur sit [1] tota collectio accidentium Socratis, vel [2] sola collectio inseparabilium, vel [3] quaedam forma simplex gratia aliorum innata et tamen inseparabiliter adhaerens licet alia varientur, vel [4] alia simplex forma naturaliter

142 debere] *post correctionem ms: deberet ante correctionem ms*

143 cum agat] *secl. Iwakuma, recte, ut videtur*

innata quae statum individualem componit et destructa destruit, vel [5] compositio lineamentalis quae ex dispositione membrorum provenit. §7 [*Question 1: which of the above is the form signified by a proper name? Reply: n. 4, supported by Priscian*] Potest autem quaeri quam de praedictis formis singulare nomen significet. Et puto quod formam simplicem significet quae statum individualem constituit et perempta perimit. Quod Priscianus in *Constructionibus* videtur voluisse, cum dicat per “quis” iunctum pronomini de ignota qualitate quaeri quam proprium nomen certificat, cum personae de qua quaeritur figura et magnitudo et alia extrinseca accidentia appareant [see Priscian, *Institutiones*, 17.24, 2:122–123]. §8 [*Objection to the reply given in §7, and solution to the objection*] Praedictae vero sententiae sic opponi potest. Descriptio et descriptum consignant. Quare hoc nomen “Socrates” et eius descriptio, id est “albus musicus etc.,” circa musicam et alia accidentia consignant. Et ita proprium nomen non solam formam sed multa significat. Solutio. Totalis descriptio et descriptum nomen circa solam formam consignant quam nulla pars descriptionis significat. Vel descriptio et descriptum dicuntur consignificare circa substantiam solam, non circa qualitatem. §9 [*Other replies to question 1 in §7, and objections to them*] Videtur autem aliis quod collectionem omnium accidentium [=1] vel inseparabilium tantum [=2] vel lineamentarem compositionem [=5] significet¹⁴⁴ nomen proprium. Quorum sententiae per praedictam auctoritatem infirmari possunt et aliis rationibus quas quilibet diligenter inspiciens poterit perspicere. §10 [*Question 2: Is a certain accident enough to constitute or to destroy the expressed being (expressum esse) of Socrates?*] Item solet quaeri utrum ad constituendum et ad destruendum expressum esse Socratis aliquod accidens solum sufficiat. Et affirmant quidam quod, omnibus accidentibus remotis a Socrate quae sub¹⁴⁵ homine continentur, Socrates in eodem statu individuali remaneat. Sed absurdum est socracitatem perimi et statum ex ea constitutum remanere, quamobrem concedendum est quod destructa socracitate quae expressum esse Socratis constituit, Socrates perimatur, ita scilicet ut priorem individualitatem amittat, et si per aliam formam individualem individuetur, non tamen idem numero cum Socrate remaneat. Et notandum est quod socracitas et haec albedo et aliae formae singulares simul iunctae in eodem tempore non diversa faciunt individua; si tamen in diversis temporibus adesset, unaquaeque diversum faceret individuum.

127^{rb}

144 significet] post correctionem ms: significat ante correctionem.

145 sub] sub so ante correctionem, postea so delevit ms

[Text 6] P20 on the meanings of “species” in Vienna, *Österreichische Nationalbibliothek*, 2486, fol. 49^{va-vb}

§ 1 [The various meanings of “species”] Hoc modo tractat, ostendendo scilicet diversas acceptiones “speciei,” deinde multis modis speciem definiendo.

§ 2 [First meaning] Accipitur ergo “species” pro FORMA UNIUSCUIUSQUE. In qua significatione species relativum non est. Forma autem, pro qua “species” hic ponitur, est compositio quae ex conventu accidentium et partium dispositione habet fieri in aliquo, ex qua res turpis vel formosa potest dici. Ex hoc enim quod res aliqua partes habet ita sitas, qualitates ut rubor et albedo in eo convenit, quarum¹⁴⁶ conventu speciosam formam vel turpem dicitur optinere.

§ 3 Huiusmodi formam vel compositionem Boethius vocat socratitatem [cf. *Boethius*, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ editio secunda 2.7, 137; *Abelard*, LI Isag., 63], quia huiusmodi forma propria qualitas rei est. Quam scilicet propriam qualitatem dicunt quidam a propriis nominibus significari. Quod videtur Priscianus velle, dicens quia propria nomina designant propriam qualitatem [cf. *Priscianus*, Institutiones 2.22, 56–57; 2.25, 58; *Abelard*, LI Isag., 63–65]

§ 4 [Argument against the claim that the socratitas is signified by a proper name] Sed quod ita sit stare non potest. Sive enim forma illa propria mutetur sive maneat etiam¹⁴⁷ si contingat eam destrui, non tamen minus proprium nomen rei convenit. Non enim Socrates minus dicitur Socrates, etsi propria eius forma mutetur; cui significandae si nomen impositum esset, ea mutata¹⁴⁸ amplius rei non conveniret. Quod autem nomen ad eam significandam impositum non sit per hoc probatur, quia cum nomen imponitur, nullius formae attenditur discretio,¹⁴⁹ sed ad hoc tantum¹⁵⁰ rei imponitur, ut per illud de ea fiat sermo. Quod autem Priscianus dicit propria nomina designare propriam qualitatem sic est intelligendum, quod scilicet ita forma propria rei adiuncta est quod cum¹⁵¹ nomen eius¹⁵² agnoscimus,¹⁵³ audito nomine, rem in ea forma ut vidimus eam intelligimus.

§ 5 [Second meaning] Est etiam alia significatio “speciei,” in qua accipitur pro universali quod generi supponitur et de subiecto praedicatur in quid. Et in hac significatione species est relativum et secundum hoc Porphyrius agit de specie. § 6 [Third meaning] Has duas

146 quarum] corr. Iwakuma: quare ms

147 etiam] iteravit in margine ms

148 post mutata] non scripsit et erasit librarius

149 discretio] post correctionem ms, in margine: dictio ante correctionem, in linea, ms

150 tantum] corr. Iwakuma: tamen ms

151 post cum] esset et scripsit et delevit librarius (et in rasura)

152 eius] in margine ms

153 agnoscimus] scripsi cum Iwakuma: gnoscimus, in rasura, ms

49^{vb} acceptiones ponit Porphyrius, Boethius vero tertiam adiungit in commento [see 2Isag. quoted above, n. 24], dicens “est tertia species subtilis” vel “substantialis” (quia utrumque in diversis commentis legitur) quae est propria forma speciei, de qua intendit auctor, et appellatur humanitas. Subtilis dicitur ista species, quia sola ratione et intellectu¹⁵⁴ et non sensu corporeo¹⁵⁵ nec per se nec per individua potest percipi. Vel | substantialis dicitur, quia quemadmodum propria forma cuiuslibet ex conventu accidentalium¹⁵⁶ conficitur, sic propria forma speciei ex conventu substantialium, ut humanitas ex hoc quod rationale¹⁵⁷ est et mortale et cetera est in homine; propria vero forma dicitur, quia quemadmodum propria forma rei alicuius dicitur quia illi soli convenit, sic ista propria forma speciei dicitur quia illi soli convenit. § 7 [*Analysis of Boethius’s claims on STM in 2Isag.*] De hac forma vel specie, scil. humanitate, dicit Boethius “quam si sub animali locavero, deducit generis in se participationem et separatur ab aliis animalibus et fit generis species” [see 2Isag. quoted above, n. 24]. Haec ita sunt intelligenda. *Locari sub animali* dicitur humanitas, etsi improprie, quia est forma adveniens animali ut materiae, qua adveniente animali fit haec species “homo”; vel *locari sub* eo dicitur, quia est in specie animalis, scilicet homine. Et *deducit in se generis participationem*, quia participat animali ut forma materiae.¹⁵⁸ Et *separatur ab aliis animalibus*, quia per adventum eius iam potest fieri animalis divisio talis: animal aliud homo, aliud non. Et *fit generis species* ipsa, scilicet¹⁵⁹ forma; vel melius potest dici *fit generis species* quia homo, per eam enim homo animalis fit species. De hac tertia acceptione speciei Porphyrius non facit mentionem quia inusitata erat, nec facile intellectui patebat. § 8 [*Fourth meaning: cf. LNPS*] Sunt autem praeter has tres aliae “speciei” acceptiones, quas etiam Porphyrius tacet, non quia ab usu recedant (ut cum dicimus haec species herbarum vel hominum, pro maneria scil. qualibet large, ut Graeci et Thebani duae species dicuntur, secundum quam Tullius [cf. Cicero, De inventione 1.32] hominem dicit genus), sed ne lectorem prolixitate perturbaret.

154 post intellectu] nec alii scripsit et delevit librarius

155 corporeo] post correctionem: incorporeo ante correctionem ms

156 accidentalium] post correctionem, in margine (fortasse alia manu) ms: accidentium ante correctionem, in linea, ms

157 ens sive animal subintelligendum est.

158 materiae] corr. Iwakuma: materia ms

159 post scilicet] in scripsit et delevit, et etiam id est in margine add. librarius

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