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**The Unity of the
Manifold**

Heidegger's Interpretation of the Synthesis
between Husserl and Kant

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INTRODUCTION

Steven Galt Crowell [2001, p. 203] suggests to approach Heidegger's thinking as a "phenomenology of the "meaning". According to Crowell, in fact, the "thematization of meaning distinguishes phenomenological philosophy from traditional epistemology and metaphysics and [...] it frames Heidegger's first formulation of the question of being as the question of the "meaning of being" (*Sinn von Sein*) (my emphasis). He also notes that "in the early Freiburg lectures, Heidegger generally does not distinguish rigorously between being and meaning: to ask after being is to ask after the 'being-meaning of a being' (*Seinsinn eines Seienden*). To grasp the being of an entity is to grasp the 'full meaning in which it is what it is. Full meaning = phenomenon' (GA 61, p. 53)". But how exactly are we to understand this equivalence between "being" and "meaning"?

As a matter of fact, as soon as we ask about the connection between meaning and being, a question arises as to what distinguishes a phenomenological approach to the problem of the meaning from other more "traditional" perspectives. Certainly, for Heidegger (as stressed also by Sheehan [2015]) *being* and *meaningfulness* are equivalent.¹ But however important this remark may be, in my view the more urgent question to address concerns Heidegger's idea of meaning *in general*. Addressing this question will make more intelligible the sense of the equation between meaning

¹ See for example p. 118: "Heidegger equates 'the question of the meaningfulness of things' with 'the question of the being [of things]'. It is important to note that the thesis according to the which 'being' and 'meaningfulness' are the same does not mean that for Heidegger 'being' has 'meaning', as things can have meaning, but means precisely that for Heidegger the question concerning the meaningfulness, the phenomenon of meaning, is to be understood as 'being' or in relation to the concept of "being".

and being. Hence before asking about the sense (and the consequences) of Heidegger's 'universalization' of the problem of the meaning in terms of "being", one has first to see how, in general, Heidegger conceives meaning.

The working hypothesis of this investigation runs as follows: Heidegger's phenomenology of meaning can be considered as an elaboration of Husserl's idea that the constitution of the object is always possible through an interplay between unity and manifold.² Broadly speaking, in Husserl's phenomenology Heidegger finds the idea that the identity of the sense is the result of a complex process of constitution, in which every 'moment' indicates or pre-delineates other aspects (or other objects) as parts of a *specific* structural whole (a 'type' of object or a possible region of objects). This holds true in every context of experience: when we perceive, when we judge, when we make experience of something completely strange and new.³

In my view Heidegger's phenomenology of meaning, and in particular Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of Kant,⁴ are

² Claudio Majolino [2012] defends the originality of Husserl's phenomenology by emphasizing the idea of sense as unity and manifold. According to Majolino, Heidegger's criticism of Husserl's identification of being and being-object fails in catching the authentic sense of Husserl's notion of object, precisely as unity of a manifold. However, I think that Heidegger *does* recognize the originality of Husserl's notion of object. If Heidegger criticizes Husserl's notion of object it is always as a *particular* form of unity of manifold. Heidegger's interpretation is unfair towards Husserl for many reasons. And perhaps his criticism of Husserl's objectivism is more dogmatic than Husserl's objectivism. But Heidegger's criticism is so *that* naïve to overlook that being-object for Husserl means being a unity of manifold.

³ We may encounter things we know nothing about; however, more or less explicitly, we always 'know' from where to start. This is the sense, roughly speaking, of the difference between knowing something and understanding something.

⁴ With "Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of Kant" I refer mainly to three texts: GA 21 (henceforth *Logic*), GA 25 (henceforth *Interpretation*), GA 03 (henceforth *Kantbuch*). Heidegger's texts, especially *Logic and Interpretation*, show clear evidence to support this claim. Quite rightly Kontos [1994] emphasizes, among other concepts, Heidegger's use of the Husserlian notion of "regional ontology". According to our hypothesis, the phenomenological background of Heidegger's interpretation is to be found, in particular, in the notion of synthesis and in the problem of the object as unity of manifold. As we shall see, this problem

far more intelligible when considered as possible elaboration of Husserl's idea of passive (pre-predicative) synthesis.⁵ Despite various and important differences (especially from a methodological point of view), Heidegger's thinking during the twenties still remains phenomenological⁶; and the reason of this is that at the heart of his phenomenology there is the problem of the synthesis, the idea of sense as unity of manifold.⁷ This idea of synthesis as unity of manifold is the actual *phenomenological* background of Heidegger's *phenomenological* interpretation of Kant and, more in general, of the idea of phenomenological ontology elaborated in *Being and Time*.

Let me now make an important terminological remark. In this investigation the term synthesis will be employed in a broad sense. With this term I will not refer exclusively to some sort of activity of unification of a merely empirical manifold (which is indeed one of the Kantian notion of synthesis); neither I intend to refer to an intellectual synthesis, as judgment for example.⁸ If used in this strict (and more traditional) sense, one could not speak, as Husserl does, of

also gives more intelligibility to the continuity between Heidegger's first interpretation of Kant (*Logic*) and the later interpretation of the *Kantbuch* and the *Interpretation*. Dahlstrom [1994] observes: "It is worth noting, however, given the controversy over the merits of the two editions, that Heidegger's first Kant-course concentrates exclusively on the second, revised edition of KrV. Moreover, the explicit focus of this course is time and not the productive imagination" (p. 295). In my view, both *Logic*, *Interpretation* and *Kantbuch* deal with the same problem, the problem of the unity of the manifold. Heidegger's interpretation of the imagination in the later texts, especially in the *Kantbuch*, can be considered as a further elaboration of the same problem.

⁵ Quite interestingly, on different occasions Husserl identifies Kant's productive synthesis with his concept of passive constitution. See, for example, the appendix 22 of Hua XI, where Husserl says that Kant's productive synthesis of imagination "is nothing other than what we call passive constitution". See also Appendix 15.

⁶ Several scholars have acknowledged and defended the phenomenological character of Heidegger's philosophical production around the years 1919-1929. Crowell [2001] is thus right when he speaks of "phenomenological decade".

⁷ On Husserl's notion of synthesis, especially in relation to Kant, I have considered, in particular: Iso Kern [1964], Dominique Pradelle [2012], Julia Jansen [2015], Daniele de Santis [forthcoming].

⁸ As we shall see, while for Heidegger the predicative synthesis is a derivative form of synthesis, the idea of synthesis as operation enacting the unity within a mere manifold constitutes a phenomenological *impossibility*, since we are *never* given a 'mere manifold': we are always-already given a pure manifold as originally unified.

“passive synthesis”. A passive synthesis, to borrow from Merleau-Ponty, would be just a contradiction in terms.⁹ However, if understood in a broader sense, one can use the term of synthesis to indicate *any* form of relation between unity and manifold whatsoever. As we shall see, this ‘formality’ or ‘neutrality’ of the synthesis is something quite positive, for it allows us to distinguish different forms of objectivity, that is, different forms of object as unity of manifold. Heidegger’s well-known analysis of the ‘hammer’ is meant precisely to show that a “tool” is a form of object (unity of manifold) quite different from the object of a categorial judgment (S is p). In principle, the notion of synthesis must allow us to see ‘more’ forms of objects, namely forms of meaningfulness and sense which are not experience of meanings in a strict sense.¹⁰

Therefore, one might say that a central goal of a phenomenological interpretation of the synthesis lies precisely in the possibility of this ‘broad’ or ‘formal’ notion of synthetic. As we shall discuss, in Heidegger’s view Kant already makes use of the term synthesis in this broad sense, notably when he speaks of a “synthesis in the intuition”, meaning a form of unity already given *within* the manifold of the intuition and *before* any intellectual activity. Indeed Kant gives to Heidegger the opportunity to confront explicitly the

⁹ Merleau-Ponty [1962, p.96]: “A passive synthesis is a contradiction in terms if the synthesis is a process of composition, and if the passivity consists in being the recipient of multiplicity [...] What we meant by passive synthesis was that we make our way into multiplicity, but that we do not synthesise it. Now temporalisation satisfies by its very nature these two conditions”. I have quoted this passage entirely because, as will shall see, in Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant the synthesis is presented precisely as a “way into multiplicity”, as a being “within” the temporal manifold.

¹⁰ Let me also note that in the light of this ‘formal’ notion of synthesis as condition of the sense we can also reconsider Heidegger’s idea (I quote from Sheehan [2015]) that “there is nowhere else for a human being to live except in meaning”. Sheehan also quotes a very interesting passage where Heidegger says that “I live factually always as a *prisoner of meaningfulness*”. As I said, in the light of the formal notion of meaning as unity of manifold these claims can be considered in a different light, since they would only suggest that human beings cannot experience something *completely* meaningless, in the sense, for example, merely empirical sensations.

problem of the synthesis, overcoming the apparent contraction between synthesis and intuition (and passivity).

Let me note that in Heideggerian scholarship a systematic account of Heidegger's interpretation of this concept is still lacking,¹¹ despite the fact that Heidegger himself locates in this concept a key-problem of a phenomenological interpretation of Kant. In *Interpretation* [138/195] we read that "under the title 'synthesis' Kant brings together a series of quite different phenomena without differentiating them sufficiently from one another and without allowing them to emerge from their common root".¹² He also says that "to bring order into this tangle of confusing ambiguities is the main intention of our interpretation". It is important to stress that not only Heidegger says that he intends to "bring order" into the confusing multiplicity of meanings to which the term synthesis refer, but he also complains about the fact that Kant *did not allow* these meanings to "emerge from their *common root*".

This remark is crucial for it suggests that the multiplicity of forms of synthesis, indeed, springs from a common root, which is for Heidegger the "original temporality". In the *Interpretation* [. 354/240] Heidegger states: "To say 'synthesis is related to time' is already actually a tautology" (*Zu sagen, die Synthesis ist zeitbezogen, ist eigentlich schon eine Tautologie*). This statement does not only represent the apex of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's synthesis but it also reflects a pivotal decision of Heidegger's *Being and Time*: the notion of "original temporality" as sense of the *Dasein* and the idea of temporality as transcendental horizon of the the sense of the *Being*.

Indeed Heidegger presents the paragraphs of *Being and Time* devoted to the notion of original temporality as a "more original"

¹¹ Only a few scholars have paid attention to this issue, but they do not treat it extensively or in depth (see Declève [1970], Köhler [1993], Weatherston [2002]).

¹² In a similar way, Husserl (see. Hua XI, appendix 15 and 22) speaks of a "profound but obscure doctrine of the synthesis of productive imagination".

interpretation (and a *repetition*) of the previous existential analysis of structures of existence and meaningfulness.¹³ Now, the working hypothesis of this investigation is that the relation between temporality and synthesis is far more rich and complex than it might appear. I do think that the problem of the unity and manifold sheds a different light on the idea of temporality. More precisely, Heidegger's concept of time, its role and its limits, can be better understood if temporality is considered as a form of unity and manifold and if temporality is investigated in its complex relation (of foundation, of correlation) with synthetic structures of meaning and sense. Accordingly, in the first and second part of this thesis I shall provide an interpretation of Heidegger's notion of meaningfulness as unity of manifold, while in the third part I shall focus on Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's concept of synthesis as "time-related synthesis".¹⁴

Let me sketch out the contents and the articulation of the thesis.

1. The first part is entitled "The Logic of Ideality". Here I reconstruct Heidegger's 'genealogy' of ideality as universality or generality (...) of a content, as self-identity or sameness of 'what is in common'. As we shall see, in Heidegger's view, in order to account for the identity of meaning and proposition, Husserl (at least in the first edition of his *Logical Investigations*) adopts this dogmatic notion of ideality. In this perspective one cannot grasp the authentic sense of the identity of the sense as unity of manifold. A brief consideration

¹³ The § 66 is entitled "The Temporality of the Dasein and the Tasks of a More Original Repetition of the Existential Analysis Arising from it".

¹⁴ As it is well-known, Heidegger had planned to provide a more systematic account of temporality (*Temporalität*) as transcendental horizon of the sense of the *Being* in the unpublished third part of the first section of *Being and Time*. As it has been shown by Köhler [1993], the thematic of this section was precisely the idea of temporal schematism. Even though Heidegger never wrote this section, he nevertheless points to at least two other texts as possible elaborations of this unpublished section: Ga 24 and the *Kantbuch* (see Heidegger's preface to the fourth edition).

of Husserl's later and more radical account of meaning will allow us to appreciate how, in a phenomenological perspective, the identity of the sense is to be sharply distinguished from the identity of a general content (the identity of what is in common among different individuals). On the contrary, differences in perceptions or interpretations can be found only as long as these perceptions or interpretations refer to the *same* sense.

Heidegger's interpretation locates the origin of this concept of ideality in a specific modification of the being as structural moment of state of affairs. In fact, as I argue, there are for Heidegger two main senses of the "being": as identity of an intentional relation of *coincidence* between intended and intuited; as relation of homogeneity between ideal contents or meanings. I also show how in his 'genealogy' of ideality Heidegger does make use of Husserlian arguments.

Heidegger's criticism of Husserl's idealistic account of proposition and meaning is important since Heidegger elaborates his notion of meaningfulness precisely *in opposition* to a "propositional" or "logical" perspective, in which – to put it very roughly – the *synthetic* structure of the *sense* is reduced to a *syntactical* relation between ideal *meanings*. However, this does not mean at all that grammar does not play any positive role in Heidegger's phenomenology. Chiurazzi [2009], for example, calls the attention to the role that prepositions play in Heidegger's conceptuality and argumentation.

2. These considerations are at the center of the first paragraphs of the second part, which is entitled "The Grammar of the Manifold". With this title I want to suggest, first of all, (A) the idea that grammar plays a positive role in Heidegger's elaboration of the problem of meaningfulness, as showed by his interpretation of Husserl's categorial intuition. (B) Secondly, the term 'grammar' is here employed in a broad and, as it were, metaphorical sense, in order to emphasize the fact that for Heidegger the "manifold" has *its own*

grammar, namely a specific structure, quite different from the structure of the proposition, which is only one possible form of unity of manifold. In this sense, with this title I want to suggest that for Heidegger, in order to address philosophically the problem of the manifold, one has also first 'to learn' its specific grammar.

In the first paragraphs I take into account Heidegger's interpretation of Husserl's categorial intuition. Here I argue that categorial intuition, in the specific sense of an intellectual act of synthesis, indicates to Heidegger a fundamental and essential aspect of every synthetic act in general, notably the presence of a "surplus of intentions" as a moment of meaning that one cannot reduce to any material content. Thus, I suggest to look at Heidegger's notion of sense as a further elaboration of Husserl's categorial intuition beyond the sphere of acts of judgment and meaning in a strict sense.

In the central section of this part I turn my attention to Heidegger's concepts of meaningfulness and understanding, focusing in particular on the concepts of *Verweisung*, *Zeigen*, *Als-Struktur*. I provide an interpretation of these concepts as "formal indicating" structures, namely as structures that do not define *specific* forms of objects, but only 'pre-delineate' *possible* forms of unity and manifold. I provide evidence to support this idea interpreting some passages in which Heidegger deals with the complex relation between "indication" and "sign". Besides, I provide a detailed account of the possible variations of the as-structure (hermeneutic and apophantic as; assertion as manifestation, assertion as predication). In this context I stress how, in order to account for different possible forms of "as", Heidegger makes an original use of Husserl's mereology.

This part ends with the consideration of Heidegger's claim concerning the temporal nature of the as-structure. In order to understand the meaning and the implications of this claim, I suggest to consider Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's three-fold synthesis

of apprehension, reproduction and recognition (to which I devote the last paragraphs of the third part of the thesis).

3. The third part is entitled “The temporal Synthesis”. In the first paragraphs I highline two aspects in particular of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s *Deduction*: the idea that pure categories originate in temporality; the idea that the task of the *Deduction* lies in the definition of what a category is *in general*. Thus, in the central part I take into account Heidegger’s definition of category *überhaupt* as temporal synthesis of pure manifold. In these paragraphs I address three main questions: what does it mean “pure manifold”? What does it mean “synthesis”? What kind of synthesis does the “temporal manifold” allow?

To address the first question, I take into account Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s pure intuition as “principle of order”. Here interesting questions arise concerning the relation between non-conceptual “manifold” (space and time) and conceptual “multiplicity” (empirical concepts). I emphasize how also in his interpretation of pure intuition Heidegger makes use of whole-part relations.

In order to address the problem of what “pure synthesis of pure manifold means”, I discuss Heidegger’s interpretation of the difference between pure intuition (pure manifold of space) and formal intuition (the geometrical representation of spatial relations as intellectual synthesis). I suggest that, to a certain extent, for Heidegger pure categories (that is, categories that make possible the object as unity of manifold), just as formal intuitions, are to be understood as modifications (or variations) of a pure manifold. A question raises as to how temporality, as a *particular* kind of manifold, allow *particular* form of categorial (and yet not intellectual) modifications.

To address this question, in the last paragraphs I take into account Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s three-fold synthesis of

apprehension, reproduction and recognition. As it is well-known, both Heidegger and Husserl (see *Ideas* § 62) agree on the fact that the first version of the *Deduction* in the first edition of the *KrV* is far more phenomenological and radical than the second. I provide some arguments to support the claim that Heidegger's and Husserl's preference for this text have similar reasons (=the concept of synthesis). In the last paragraphs I provide a commentary of Heidegger's interpretation of the three-fold synthesis. In particular, I focus on two problems: the idea that these three syntheses are moments (or parts) of the same structure (the original temporality as a whole); the idea that the synthesis of recognition (that Heidegger labels, by reference to Husserl, "synthesis of identification") is the condition of both apprehension and reproduction.

In the light of this analysis, I conclude with some critical remarks on Heidegger's idea of temporality and on the relation between temporal synthesis and structures of meaning.

I. THE LOGIC OF IDEALITY

§ 1. The Idealism of the Truth as Actuality

In the first paragraphs of *Logic* Heidegger gives a short presentation of Husserl's criticism to psychologism. Then, in the §§ 8-9 he focuses on the "presumptions" of such criticism.¹⁵ According to Heidegger the "root" of this criticism lies in the difference between "ideal" and "real". This distinction is defined as the *positive position* that lies behind Husserl's criticism. In fact, says Heidegger, in his *Prolegomena* Husserl "had already beforehand gotten a firm grip on the basic distinction of being as empirical and as ideal" [*Logic*, 54/45].¹⁶

Quite interestingly, Heidegger presents the difference between ideal and real in ontological terms. For example, he says that behind (*im Hintergrund*) real and ideal there are "distinctions" and "fundamental concepts" that belong *aus dem Felde der grundsätzlichen und universalen Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins* [*Logic*, 50/42].¹⁷ On other occasions he speaks of the ideal as a region (*Bezirk*) of being. What does it mean to approach this difference by reference to the terminology of being? Broadly speaking, we can say that Heidegger's criticism of the notion of ideality is basically a criticism of a certain *form* (or *meaning*) of the being. The aim of this

¹⁵ The title of the § 8 is: "The presuppositions of Husserl's critique: a specific concept of truth as the guiding idea"; the title of the § 9 is: "The roots of these presuppositions". As indicated by Walter Biemel, who edited this text, the title of the paragraphs (until the...) are from Heidegger.

¹⁶ "Every genuine critique has to speak from a positive position. In the present case, that means that Husserl could point out the error of psychologism and demonstrate it to be absurd, only insofar as he had already beforehand gotten a firm grip [54] on the basic distinction of being as empirical and as ideal".

¹⁷ "Nur soviel – die Besprechung des Psychologismus und die Kritik desselben macht deutlich, dass im Hintergrund fundamentale Begriffe und Unterscheidungen aus dem Felde der grundsätzlichen und universalen Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins stehen".

section, as I have already said, is to show how the difference between ideal and real being is possible as possible modification of the meaning of the being in the state of affairs.

Let us then turn our attention to Heidegger's presentation of Lotze's philosophy in *Logic*. The target of Heidegger's criticism is the notion of ideality as *Geltung*, validity. Heidegger defines this notion a "magic word (*Zauberwort*), a tangle of confusion, perplexity, and dogmatism (*ein Knäuel von Verwirrungen, Ratlosigkeit und Dogmatismus*)" [*Logic*, p. 79/66]. In Heidegger's perspective, this notion is neither original nor universal. On the contrary it shows the absence in Lotze of a preliminary and methodological consideration of these concepts. Heidegger indeed makes clear that the universality of the notion of validity is a *dogmatic one*. Lotze does not give any explicit and univocal definition of the *meaning* of this notion.¹⁸ But there is more. There is another reason to reject the notion of validity. In fact, according to Heidegger's interpretation, more fundamental and original than the notion of validity is the notion of *Wirklichkeit*; the notion of actuality, indeed, can be understood as the *common root* of both ideal and real. Heidegger finds an argument for this point in a passage of Lotze's *Logik*. In this place (but not only here) Lotze uses the term "actuality" to characterize both the actuality "laws" and "ideas" (*Gesetzen, Ideen*), and the actuality of things (*Wirklichkeit der Dinge*) [*Logic*, p. 76/63]; Heidegger quotes Lotze's *Logik*, III, pp. 511-

¹⁸ *Logic*, p. 80/66: "Why does "validity" cast such a spell? Answer: because the term is even more ambiguous (*Vieldeutigkeit*) than we have shown up to now, and this ambiguity allows the term to be very broadly applied according to the context. The reason is not that its referent has been unambiguously fixed as a universal phenomenon and that its universal relations have not been discovered. No, it's because the vagueness of the word and its referent allows such an unquestioned, broad application. (*Nicht weil das damit Gemeinte eindeutig als universales Phänomen gesichert und in seinen universalen Bezügen aufgedeckt wäre, sondern weil die Unklarheit des Ausdrucks und des damit Gemeinten eine solche unkontrollierte weite Verwendung erlaubt*). Its broad employment is not because the function of its referent is clear and based on principles, but because of the concealed ambiguity of the term itself. (*Die Weite des Gebrauchs liegt nicht in der geklärten, prinzipiellen Funktion des Gemeinten, sondern in der verdeckten Vieldeutigkeit des Ausdrucks*)".

512]. Likewise, in the third book of Lotze's *Logik* the expression *Wirklichkeit* indicates different forms of presence.

Now, the notion of *Wirklichkeit* plays a crucial role in Heidegger's criticism of Lotze, precisely because it gives expression to that specific 'form' of being that characterizes both ideal and real. No matter how strongly one defends the difference between ideal and real, they are both a form of *Wirklichkeit*. One might argue that Heidegger's interpretation oversimplifies Lotze's notion of ideality. Of course, we cannot address this problem. Rather, we are interested in the meaning of Heidegger's insistence on the notion of actuality; we are interested in seeing how, in Heidegger's interpretation – however unfair this interpretation might be from a philological point of view – the *Wirklichkeit* affects the difference between ideal and real as a whole.

It must be noted that by criticizing Lotze's notion of actuality, Heidegger is also criticizing himself, since he did make use of this concept in his early writings. In fact, as Heidegger recognizes in *Logic*, in his work on Scotus [*Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*, see. Ga 1] he makes use of the expression *Wirklichkeit* in order to indicate the "being" [*Logic* p. 63/53]¹⁹.

In order to understand Heidegger's interpretation I suggest we narrow our focus on the relation between Heidegger's and Lotze's terminology. What is important to stress, in particular, is the difference between Heidegger's and Lotze's use of the notions of "being" and "actuality". To a certain extent, this relation between *Sein* and *Wirklichkeit* can be described as a relation between whole and part. While in Heidegger *actuality* is a part (or a possible mode)

¹⁹ "In an earlier investigation of medieval ontology, I too followed Lotze's distinction and used the term 'actuality' for 'being' But I no longer think that is correct". But Heidegger uses this term already in *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein Kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik* (1913), where he defines ideal and real "ganz verschiedene Wirklichkeitsbereiche". In relation to this term Crowell [2011], p. 97, n. 7, notes that "*Wirklichkeitsbereich* (realm of reality) is Heidegger's usual term for the categorial 'sort' to which different objects and object domains (*Gegenstandsgebiete*) belong".

of *Being*, in Lotze, on the contrary, *Being* is only a mode of *actuality* (as the as the *most universal* region). In Heidegger's view, Lotze's use of the notion of *actuality* and *being* is, respectively, *broad* and *narrow*; as Heidegger notes, in Lotze *Sein gleich Wirklichkeit der Sinnendinge, Vorhandenheit, Realität*.²⁰ To sum up, Lotze's idealism presents two problems: 1) a broad and universal use of the notion of *Wirklichkeit*; 2) a too narrow notion of *Sein*.

However, it is important to stress that the difference between Heidegger and Lotze is not just terminological or conceptual, but essentially methodological. Heidegger's concept of *Being* is not just more universal than Lotze's *actuality*. As a matter of fact, Heidegger's use of the notion of *Being* might be better defined as *formal* (or better: formal indicating), while Lotze's use of the notion of actuality might be better defined as *general*. In In this sense, Heidegger's and Lotze's use of these terms *can* be described in terms of whole and par, but *only* under one condition: Heidegger's *Being* is not a whole in the same sense in which Lotze's *actuality* is, because Lotze's actuality, as we are going to see, is a general concept.

Let us look closer at the difference between these two perspectives. In a very interesting passage of *Logic* [p. 64/63] we read:

Lotze used "actuality" in a very broad sense [...] "Actuality" is the formal-universal (*formal-allgemeine*) concept, and "being" is a particular formalization of actuality (*eine bestimmte Formalisierung*). But in our terminology—and I say this to avoid confusion—I use "being" in the exact opposite sense, and in connection with the genuine tradition of Greek philosophy broadly speaking (*in dem weiten Sinne*).

20 Here some examples (my emphasis):

Logic, p. 63/53: «Lotze gebraucht den Terminus *Sein gleich Vorhandenheit*...».

Ibidem.: "...*Sein*..[ist] in dieser *Einschränkung, gleich reales, Sein Realität gebraucht*".

Logic, p. 70/58: "Lotze steht dabei ganz unter dem Banne seines *verengten Seinsbegriffes (Sein gleich Wirklichkeit der Sinnendinge)*..";

Logic, p. 62/52: "Lotze [...] gebraucht den Ausdruck *Sein in dieser verengten Bedeutung, wonach Sein besagt* soviel wie *Wirklichkeit der Dinge, Sein gleich "Realität" (Vorhandensein)*".

There, “being” can mean both empirical reality *or* ideality *or* other possible modes of being. I use “actuality” (*Wirklichkeit*) in the opposite sense [to Lotze], as meaning empirical reality.

On the one hand, Heidegger defines Lotze’s actuality as a *formal-universal* concept, while on the other he defines Lotze’s notion of being as a *bestimmte Formalisierung* of the actuality. In Heidegger’s perspective the expression actuality is used in the “opposite sense”, namely to indicate the reality. Then Heidegger says that the expression being is used by him “in the exact opposite sense”. However, this does not mean *at all* that Heidegger’s Being is, *just like* Lotze’s actuality, a “formal-universal concept”: Being, for Heidegger, is not universal. As we read in this passage, the term being is used by Heidegger *in dem weiten Sinne*: as a broad concept, and not as a concept *broader* (more universal than Lotze’s actuality). What is important to stress here is precisely the difference between the *universality* of Lotze’s notion of actuality (as *formal-allgemeine* concept) and the universality of Heidegger’s notion of being (as a *broad* notion). Therefore we can say that there are at least two reasons why the expression being is used by Heidegger “in a opposite sense”: 1) the being *is not* a particular mode of actuality, but the actuality is a particular mode of being; 2) the being is not universal in the same sense of Lotze’s actuality. The opposition between Heidegger’s and Lotze’s conceptuality is not a *symmetric* one.

Heidegger’s definition of actuality as a *formal-allgemeine* is very interesting from a phenomenological point of view. I am thinking, in particular, to the distinction (presented by Husserl in the § 13 of *Ideas I*) between *Formalisierung* and *Generalisierung*, as different form of *Verallgemeinerung*. As we learn from Ga 60, Heidegger was very familiar with this distinction and, most important, it is in relation to this distinction that Heidegger develops his notion of formal indication (which plays a crucial role in Heidegger’s phenomenology).

Very likely then, defining Lotze's actuality a *formal-allgemeine* concept, Heidegger has in mind Husserl's distinction between *Formalisierung* and *Generalisierung*.²¹ In the second part of this thesis we shall see how what kind of role Heidegger's formal indication plays within his phenomenology and, in particular, in his account of the structures of meaning. Heidegger's approach to the problem of categories as unity of manifold entails precisely a rejection of every formalization and generalization. For these reasons, this notion is particularly important in our perspective.

Seen in this light, it might be possible that Heidegger, defining Lotze's actuality as a formal-universal concept, wants to suggest that the alleged universality and formality of this concept rests upon a dogmatic universalization of one specific mode of being. Thus the question we have to address is: of which 'mode of being' is actuality a generalization?

But let us see first see *how*, indeed, the notion of actuality affects the difference between ideal and real as a whole. In *Logic* the difference between ideal and real is presented as an *opposition* between two different forms of actuality. As Heidegger says, the ideal is "das Immerseiende", "das Bleibenden *gegenüber* dem Wechsel seiner Gestalten", the "Allgemeine *gegenüber* der Vielheit seiner Besonderungen" (*Logic*, p. 58/48). These oppositions are nothing but different forms of actuality as presence of a content in the consciousness. It is in fact by reference to a consciousness that it makes sense to speak about something *permanent, identical or universal*. This is why Heidegger defines *Seinsbezirke* of the real and the ideal as *Erfassungsart*: the difference between real and ideal is not ontological but it refers to the actuality as mode of being-given

²¹ There are several studies devoted to this problem. Among these, I find particularly important, especially in our perspective, Stefano Bancalari [2005] and Laurent Villevielle [2013]. Both these authors emphasize the Husserlian background of Heidegger's formal indication (the difference between generalization and formalization). Villevielle also shows the essential role that this notion plays in crucial paragraphs of *Being and Time*.

contents. Heidegger provides a further characterization of this difference by reference to the distinction between $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ and $\alpha\lambda\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$: “what is permanent about a sensible object is the element that is apprehended by [intuitive] reason, $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$. [...] By contrast, the multiple things of the real world are accessible to sensibility— $\alpha\lambda\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ —and so each is designated as the $\alpha\lambda\theta\eta\tau\acute{o}\nu$. Here again, ideal and real being are characterized in terms of the specific mode of access that we have to them, and not in terms of their being: “..auch ist wieder ideales und reales Sein charakterisiert aus der bestimmten Zugangsart dazu, nicht aus dem Sein und seiner Seinsart selbst”. In this perspective, the ideality cannot claim any ontological validity, since it does not indicate a determination of things itself, but a *Zugangsart*.

Now, in Heidegger’s view, this notion of ideality plays a *paradigmatic* in the definition of the truth of the proposition. The *truth* of the proposition (its *identity* and its *validity*), in fact, is understood as *Selbigkeit* and *Beständigkeit* of a self-identical propositional content. Heidegger writes [*Logic*, p. 55/46]:

Therefore, a proposition is always a self-identical thing that maintains (*durchält*) its identity in face of the multiplicity of empirical acts of positing judgments (*der real vorkommenden Urteilssetzungen*) with their empirical circumstances and properties . And this changing mental act is differentiated from the abiding propositional content (*Satzgehalt*) not only as a matter of fact but also, at bottom, arbitrarily (*grundsätzlich beliebig*). What are differentiated are the identity and permanence of the proposition versus the variability and change of the positings (*Selbigkeit und Beständigkeit des Satzes – gegenüber Unterschiedenheit und Wechsel des Setzungen*); on the one hand, the temporal course (*zeitlicher Ablauf*) of the mental act while the judgment is being performed (*im Urteilsvollzug*); and on the other hand, the non-temporal subsistence of the ideal meaning (*der unzeitliche Bestand des idealen Sinnes*) that is judged. But we also know this correlation (*Zusammenhang*) from other regions of objects (*Gegenstandsbezirke*). We speak of “color” in contrast (*gegenüber*) to a changing plurality of colours; and we speak of “red” in contrast to these or those red things, a limitless profusion of different

shades of red, each one having this determination of “red.” Or the “triangle” that is to be found (*vorfindlich*) in a series of different triangles, whether drawn, painted, thought of, or imagined *..(phantasierten)*. So we have the idea “triangle” as self-identical, just as we have the idea.

Heidegger says that the “correlation” or connection (*Zusammenhang*) between identity and manifold, that characterizes the definition of the proposition, is something that “*we also know*” from other “region of objects” (*Gegenstandsbezirke*); Heidegger makes the example of the red. Thus, it might seem that there is some sort of general correlation (the opposition between ideal and real) and that we can find such connection in relation to different regions of objects, in this case, in relation “propositions” and “colours”; *just as* the ideal and self-identical red can be defined in contrast to these or those real reds, *so too* the proposition is a “self-identical thing that maintains its identity in face of the multiplicity of empirical acts”. To be sure, Heidegger wants to avoid any assimilation of the identity of the proposition with the identity of concepts like the concept of red; indeed the proposition is a *different kind of object*. However there is more at stake here. In fact, as I shall argue, the very form of connection between identity and manifold (the ideas of red and the manifold individual shades of red) can be understood as the *result* of a ‘propositional’ or ‘logical’ interpretation of the truth. For the moment, however, we focus only on the first aspect of Heidegger’s interpretation, namely the dogmatic extension of the “connection” between unity and manifold to the realm of the proposition.

When we define (as for Heidegger Lotze does) the identity of the proposition in relation to this connection between unity and manifold, the proposition itself cannot claim any objective validity. The truth is defined in relation to the actuality (ideality) of the proposition. In this sense Heidegger speaks [see. *Logic*, p. 65/45] of a formal pre-conception (*formale Vorbegriffe*) of truth as the “abiding, the stable. Truth = permanence = what always is”.

Heidegger [*Logic*, 80/66-67] then distinguishes three different aspects or meanings of Lotze's validity: (a) validity as objective validity, (b) validity as presence of content in the consciousness and then (c) validity as *Verbindlichkeit* (validity in the sense of something "binding for all the knowers"). Now, according to Heidegger, Lotze's notion of validity is, first of all, *Wirklichkeit von Inhalten und Sätzen "im Bewusstsein*, and only on this basis it refers to objects (as objective validity). *Der Satz gilt nicht etwa, weil er gültig ist an Objekten – Geltung im ersten Sinn ist nicht fundiert in der Geltung qua Objektivität*. Against this idea of validity as actuality and permanence of content in the consciousness, Heidegger speaks of an *objective* and *positive* notion of validity, in which "Bleibende ist zunächst nur im Bewusstsein, seinem Sachgehalt nach aber sind es Bestimmtheiten und gesetzliche Zusammengehörigkeiten von dem, was wir naiv die Dinge draussen nennen". The *permanence* of the content in the consciousness is here the *consequence* of the validity and not the other way around. To put it differently, the validity does not rest upon the "connection" between ideal unity and empirical manifold, but upon the *gesetzliche Zusammengehörigkeiten* of things itself. In this light, the difference between these two forms of truth seems to be a difference between two forms of actuality, with the essential difference that according to the first (and dogmatic) concept of truth, the *actuality* is the source of the validity, while according to the second concept of truth the *actuality* is just its consequence.

§ 2. Husserl and the Ambiguity of the Ideal: Universality and Validity

In *Logic*, the *explicit* target of Heidegger's criticism is Husserl's confutation of psychologism in *Prolegomena*. According to Heidegger in these sections of the *Logical Investigation* Husserl seems to hold a

conception of truth as *ideal being*, as universality and identity of a content. In *Logic* Heidegger defines Husserl's position a *merkwürdige Versehen*, a remarkable oversight, and traces this oversight back to the equivocity of the notion of ideality. In particular, Heidegger speaks of a *Verwechslung*, *Doppeldeutigkeit* and *Vieldeutigkeit* of the notion of ideality. Heidegger claims that this ambiguity in the notion of ideality was "already present" in Lotze's interpretation of Platon's *Ideenlehre*.

As it has been noted, Lotze's interpretation of Plato did have great influence on Husserl (who labelled it as "genial").²² However, Lotze was not the only source of Husserl's idealism of *Logical Investigations*. In *Logic* [86/72] Heidegger suggests that "the roots of the presuppositions at work in the critique of psychologism" can be thought also in relation to another source, just as important as Lotze's interpretation of Plato: Bolzano's theory of propositions in themselves (*Sätze an sich*). However, in *Logic* Heidegger focuses only on Lotze.

As I said, Heidegger speaks of an ambiguity in the concept of ideality. More precisely, in *Logic* [61/52] Heidegger presents this ambiguity in relation to two slightly different oppositions: (1) on the one hand we have the opposition between (1.a) ideality as validity of proposition, *Satzgültigkeit*, and (1. b) as *Bestand des allgemeinen Wesens*; (2) on the other hand, ideality means (2.a) *nichtsinnlichem Sein* and (2.b) *Allgemeine, Gattung, Wesen*.²³

22 On the differences and similarities between Husserl's and Lotze's idealism see Daniele De Santis [2016].

23 *Logic*, pp. 61/52: "Husserl's remarkable oversight was possible only because, fascinated as he was by the ideal and the Platonic idea, he synthesized the two meanings—propositional validity and the subsistence of the universal essence—into one meaning, and then spoke simply of the ideal in contrast to the empirical. (*Dieses merkwürdige Versehen war nur möglich, weil Husserl, gleichsam fasziniert vom Idealen und der Idee, diese – in dem doppelten Sinn als Satzgültigkeit und als Bestand des allgemeinen Wesens – in eins zusammenfasste und schlechthin vom Idealen sprach gegenüber dem Realen*) [...]."

"This very confusion, which is the basis here of the equivocity of "idea," both as non-sensible being and as the universal (*Doppeldeutigkeit der Idee als nichtsinnlichem Sein und als Allgemeinem*), the genus— this confusion is already

As we can see, on the one hand (1.a; 1.b) we have two ‘positive’ meanings of ideality, as *Satzgültigkeit* and as *nichtsinnlichem Sein*; on the other we have two negative (and most problematic) meanings of ideality, as “the subsistence of the universal essence”, *Bestand des allgemeinen Wesens* and as *Allgemeine, Gattung, Wesen*. Husserl’s error consisted precisely in assuming this negative notion of ideality as “universality”. According to Heidegger, indeed, Husserl was so eager to defend the autonomy of ideality from the *Psychologism* that he ended up by assuming a dogmatic notion of ideality as universality. Let me quote again an important passage from *Logic* [62/52]:

Husserl’s remarkable oversight was possible only because, fascinated as he was by the ideal and the Platonic idea, he synthesized the two meanings—propositional validity and the subsistence of the universal essence—into one meaning, and then spoke simply of the ideal in contrast to the empirical. This oversight merely illustrates what the critique of psychologism was really aiming at: to establish the ideal over against the empirical.

This passage shows us something very important: Husserl’s “remarkable oversight” consists in conflating the *validity of the proposition* with the *subsistence of the universal essence*. As we shall see in more detail in the following paragraphs, the validity of proposition is, indeed, *ideal*, but not in the sense of the subsistence of an universal essence, as identity of what is in common; the proposition is also a form of identity, a form of unity of manifold, but according to a *different* (and for Heidegger more original) sense of the identity . From this point of view, what the point of Heidegger’s criticism is to avoid the confusion between *two different notions of*

basically sketched out (*vorgebildet*) in the theory from which Husserl, within certain limits (*in gewissen Grenzen jedenfalls*), took his essential orientation, namely, Lotze’s doctrine of the world of ideas and his interpretation of Plato’s doctrine of ideas in book 3 of his *Logik*. This oversight merely illustrates what the critique of psychologism was really aiming at: to establish the ideal over against the empirical”.

identity: the identity of the proposition and the identity of an ideal content. We shall see that Husserl himself recognizes this point; and one might even say that Heidegger's criticism to Husserl is possible only thanks to Husserl more elaborated account of of ideality. But as I said, in this lecture Heidegger focuses on Husserl's notion of ideality in his first volume of the *Logical Investigations*. Here Heidegger complains about the fact that in Husserl's criticism of psychologism the identity of the proposition is understood as "the ideal in contrast to the empirical". In other words, the problem lies in a conception of validity and ideality as *actuality* and *self-identity* of a propositional content. For Heidegger "the guiding thread of Husserl's critique of psychologism" is the concept of the ideal "in its triple meaning of the *self-identical*, the *permanent*, and the *universal*. Thus Heidegger also says [58/49]: "*accordingly (demnach)* Husserl says that just as the self-identity of the triangle (or better, the idea of triangle) is permanent in contrast to the real presentations of triangles (*sich durchhält gegenüber den realen Darstellungen von Dreiecken*), so too the self-identity of adjudged propositions is permanent in contrast to the real multiplicity of the positings of those propositions (*der realen Mannigfaltigkeit seiner Setzungen*)". As we have already seen, the problem lies in the *dogmatic extension* of the "connection" between ideal and real (in the sense of the opposition between actual identity and manifold) to the 'region of object' of the proposition.

It must be noted that Heidegger also suggests, *en passant*, that this notion of ideality affects also Husserl's "theory of meaning".²⁴ As a matter of fact, in Ga 17 [p.66] we read: "Die konkreten Untersuchungen der Logischen Untersuchungen beschäftigen sich mit Bedeutungen. Diese werden gesehen als ideale Einheiten

²⁴ *Logic*, p. 60/51: "Now we simply want to clarify how ideal being—the idea in Plato's sense—determines Husserl's positive orientation in such a broad and almost uncritical way that it led him into a fundamental error that he soon saw for himself and abandoned. We have already dealt with this without being explicitly aware of it (cf. *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. 2, Husserl's doctrine of meaning)".

gegenüber der Mannigfaltigkeit der sie im Bedeuten vollziehenden Akte. Diese Einheit des Sinnes ist eine ideale Einheit der Geltung. Auf Grund dieser idealen Einheit von Sätzen entstehen ganz bestimmte Gesetzmäßigkeiten eigener Art”.²⁵ This problem has been variously recognized by Husserlian scholars. Donn Welton [1983, p. 66], for example, notes that Husserl does characterize the “relationship between meaning and acts as a connection between individual and species”; “meaning must be a species in order to account for its ideality, [...] for (a) the repetition of the signs with the same intentional content in different acts, (b) the presence of conceptual import from signs even in the absence of reference, and [and] the sharing of the same priority by different speakers or hearers. But this analysis probably confuses *being ideal* with *being a species*, and then confuses acts of signification *having* an essence (which they do, no matter how ‘ideality’ of the their meaning is characterized) with signification (as ideal) being an essence”.

The reason why I stress this point is that this account of the ideality of the meaning, *no matter* when and how Husserl abandoned it, affect in depth Heidegger’s account of meaning and sense. On the one hand, Heidegger’s concept of sense can be understood in part as a form of opposition to this ‘idealistic’ account of meaning (*Bedeutung*); on the other hand, as we shall see Heidegger’s concept of sense and meaningfulness can be seen as a further elaboration of Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition and of the concept of sense presented in *Ideas I*. In *Being and Time* [§33, footnote] Heidegger himself speaks – in relation to the some paragraphs of *Ideas I* – of a

²⁵ *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus*, [Ga 1, p. 114]: “Bei seiner Kritik der ‘absolutistischen Logik’ geht Maier von einer Unterscheidung Husserl’s, die ich nicht als ganz glücklich bezeichnen möchte, aus. Die Urteilsakte sollen ‘Besonderungen’, ‘Unterfälle’ desgeltenden Urteilssinnes sein, dieser somit das ‘Allgemeine’, die Spezies darstellen. Nun gehören aber doch Sinn und Akt in ganz verschiedene Wirklichkeitsbereiche, die nicht in das Verhältnis des Allgemeinen zum Besonderen zu bringen sind, ein Verhältnis, das wohl *innerhalb* der beiden verschiedes Welten gesetzt werden kann.”

“more radical” theory of meaning.²⁶ But I shall say more about this problem in the next part.²⁷

Thus the notion of ideality as universality affects both the identity of the meaning *and* the identity of the proposition. However, let me stress this point again: this very notion of ideality (as self-identical, as universality of what is in common) depends on a certain interpretation of the identity and truth of the proposition. The fact that the self-identity of the proposition is understood *just as* the self-identity of the idea of triangle (namely, as identity among, or against manifold realizations), is essentially connected with a *propositional* idea of truth. In Heidegger’s perspective the *possibility* of the ideality lies in a certain *logical* interpretation of the phenomenon of the truth. But let us I keep the focus on Heidegger’s claim that Husserl

²⁶ The footnote reads: “Vgl. zur Bedeutungslehre *E. Husserl*, Log. Unters. Bd. II, 1. und 4. - 6. Untersuchung. Ferner die radikalere Fassung der Problematik, Ideen I, a. a. O. §§ 123 ff., S. 255 ff”.

²⁷ According to Welton Husserl’s idealistic position “is initially corrected by Husserl’s transcendental turn, which first stabilizes his effort to remove the features of acts as described from the realm of the real”. Welton stresses that in this perspective the meaning becomes a “part” (an interdependent moment) of the structure of the act”. “..the signifying acts themselves are no longer instances of ideal meanings, for the simple reason that the signifying component is now viewed as a part of their (transcendental) structure. As a result, the *a priori* connection of act and meaning becomes a correlational *a priori* of noesis and noema”.

Nicholas de Warren [2014], defines the relation between ideal and transcendental perspective as an ambiguity that “consists in the difficulty of distinguishing between the noematic nucleus as the subject of predication (as the ideal of sense within the noematic object) or as the subject of the ‘actual object’ This difficulty can equally be expressed as the challenge of distinguishing between the problem of sense within a context of signification (logic of judgment and semantic meaning) and within a context of reason (logic of truth and evidence), but also, of relating the problem of the noema within each context to the other”. De Warren rightly emphasizes the radicality of Husserl’s transcendental notion of sense and defines it (by reference to Derrida) as “anarchic”: “the noema does not have an origin in the different regions of being nor can its sense be captured through traditional oppositions such as “real-ideal,” “actual-possible,” and “individual-generality.” As Derrida notes, the noema is anarchic not only due to its lack of origin within a determinate region of being; it is anarchic in its disorderly movement, or differentiation, in traversing and crossing-out different regions of being”.

because of his fascination for Lotze's ideality, defined the validity of the proposition as universality, actuality and identity of a content.

Heidegger [*Logic*, 59/49] finds an argument for this claim in two passages from *Prolegomena* [respectively, §50, p. 187 /192; §51, p. 190/194].

(a) Every truth presents an ideal unity (*ideale Einheit*) in contrast to a potentially infinite, endless multiplicity of correct statements, each with the same form and matter.

(b) Truth is something ideal (*eine Idee*) whose particular instance is actually experienced (*aktuelles Erlebniss*) in an evident judgment.

Another passage to which Heidegger refers [p. 61/51] is from § 62, where Husserl says that the truth

is individualized (*vereinzelt*) in the lived experience of the evident judgment. If we reflect (*reflektieren*) on this individualization, and if we perform an ideating abstraction, then instead of the object [of the mental act of judgment], the truth itself becomes the object of our apprehension. In so doing, we apprehend truth as the ideal correlate (*ideale Korrelat*) of the transient subjective act of knowing and as a unity (*als die Eine*) over against the unlimited plurality of possible acts of knowing and of knowing individuals [and thus over against all its realizations, *Realisierungen*].

The ideative abstraction, then, abstracts from what is given among different acts of judgment, and takes into consideration only the truth as "ideal correlate". But what does it mean, here, "ideal"? Heidegger has no doubts: the truth, as *correlate* of the proposition, is the "ἕνεος of the act". The problem, thus, lies in how Husserl thinks the correlate of the truth, its ideality as universality of a general content. Heidegger emphasizes Husserl's use of the terms "abstraction" and "ideation", but it must be noted that Husserl

introduces this terms only in the second edition.²⁸ Heidegger seems to take advantage of this terminology in order to strengthen his claim. However, it must be also noted that in Heidegger's perspective, Husserl's introduction of this lexicon is curious; as we shall see, in fact, according to Heidegger Husserl abandoned his idealistic account of the proposition *just after* the *Logical Investigation*, namely *before* the introduction of this lexicon in the second edition of the text (in the 1913). Besides, also Husserl recognizing the limits of his first account of meaning and proposition, and refers to a radical shift of perspective to the years right after the *Logical Investigations*. The fact is that Heidegger takes here for granted that with "abstraction" and "ideation" Husserl means the intuition of a universal content, and therefore the truth is ideal correlate as genus of the act. But as we shall see in other contexts (see GA 20) Heidegger does recognize that "ideation" and "abstraction" can have a more broad sense (to the point that there is a "pure abstraction" as intuition of formal categories).

Heidegger then says [61/51]:

In contrast with performances of judgments, the content of the judgment is the ideal or the idea (*.. das Ideale gegenüber den Urteilshaltungen*), i.e., the universal that is seen by way of abstraction or in Husserl's terms, "ideation" of the exemplary case as the thing's "whatness." (*das durch Abstraktion – Ideation am exemplarischen Fall als sein Was herausehen wird*). It is seen from out of a plurality or (the plurality not being necessary) from out of one individual instantiation: from this table here, we see table in general.

A few pages later, [73/61] Heidegger summarizes Husserl's position, showing the consequences of his idealistic account of the proposition.

²⁸ In the first edition, instead of «Vereinzelt im Erlebnis des evidenten Urteils» we read «ist Erlebnis im evidenten Urteil»; instead of «auf diese Vereinzelung und vollziehen wir ideirende Abstraktion» we read only «auf diesen Akt».

Lotze says: Truth, as a true proposition, is valid; but validity is the form of actuality pertaining to ideas; and the idea also (*zugleich*) has the property of being universal in contrast to the sensible particulars (*sinnlichen Besonderungen*). So in keeping with that, propositions—valid ones—are ideas; they are likewise the ideal in the sense of the universal for the particulars in the propositions—the “positions.” So if we reduce Husserl’s error to a syllogism, it consists simply in the fact that he proceeded as follows:

The major: *Idea = validity = proposition.*

The minor: *Idea = universal = form = genus.*

Conclusion: *Proposition = universal, identical with idea, and thus: Proposition = genus to the posited judgments.*

The problem, as we can see, lies in the *minor*; ideal means the same as universal, *therefore* the proposition is “ideal” (namely, valid) insofar as it is universal.

One might say that Heidegger’s interpretation is quite unfair to Husserl (as it is unfair to Lotze). Daniele De Santis [2016] for example notes that Heidegger’s premise *Idea = validity = proposition* “fails in catching what is peculiar to Husserl’s conception in opposition to Lotze’s”. De Santis rightly argues that “in the case of Husserl the equivalence should be *Satz gleich Geltung gleich Idee* because Husserl, unlike Lotze, does not seem to ascribe validity to Ideas outside the propositions in which they occur as subjects”. In Husserl’s perspective, the validity of the universal rests upon the evidence of the judgment (in which it occurs as object).²⁹ With a very clear formulation De Santis says: “Husserl’s early idealism, then, holds Ideas to have primarily, not an intuitive, but a *dianoetic* nature”.

We shall see that Heidegger is well aware of the fact that in Husserl’s phenomenology the validity of the judgment, so to speak,

²⁹ “As a consequence, when Husserl claims “that there is a fundamental categorial distinction in the conceptual unity of being” (and “of object in general”) between “ideal being and real being, being as species and being as individual”—these δύο εἶδη τῶν ὄντων extend on all of the above meanings of “object”: there will be individual as well as specific state of affairs; individual as well as specific properties; individual as well as specific forms”.

rests on the intuition as source of evidence, and not in the intuition as actuality and universality of a content. The problem is that for Heidegger Husserl's notion of ideality in *Prolegomena* appears to reintroduce a naïve idea of intuition and evidence and a dogmatic notion of identity and validity of proposition. Besides, I will argue that Heidegger's insistence on Husserl's notion of universality has deeper reasons, not philological but philosophical.

§ 3. The Universal and the Logic of the *A priori*

As we have seen, Heidegger's criticism to Lotze is centered on the notion of *Wirklichkeit*, and *therefore* on the notion of universality as actuality of a content. In fact, only as a form of actuality the identity and ideality of the proposition can be defined as universal. To put it differently: in this context universality is, along with permanence and identity, only one form of ideality as actuality. However, when it comes with Husserl there seems to be some sort of shift in Heidegger's focus, in the sense that the target of his criticism is not much the actuality as much as the universality.³⁰ However, the difference (or the nuance) between these two levels of the problem (namely, the criticism of ideality as form of actuality; the criticism of ideality as form universality) invites us to ask about the *target* and the *motivations* of Heidegger's criticism.

Broadly speaking, one might say that by focusing on the notion of universality Heidegger wants to show that Husserl's fascination for the ideality might be more than *incidental* mistake but something that permeates his phenomenology as a whole. The problem, to put

³⁰ In fact, as noted by Rochus Sowa [2007], Lotze "had a great influence on Husserl's doctrine of essence" precisely in relation to the "the traditional guiding idea of the conceptual universal as *what is in common*". According to Sowa, Lotze "postulates that regardless of its kind and level, *every universal is that which is in common*". According to Sowa, Husserl did not pay attention to the fact that the term "general" is not an "innocuous expression [but] also carries a false interpretation, namely false interpretation of the logical phenomenon of universality which one has in mind in an unclear manner while using this expression to refer to the conceptual universal".

it roughly, is no longer the universality as form of validity of propositions, but rather, the validity of universality as such, the validity of universal objects (or ideas) as objects and correlate of universal *state of affairs*.

The text of *Logic*, indeed, suggests that there is more going on in Heidegger's criticism of ideality. Heidegger says [*Logic*, p. 49/59] that "in one regard (*im einer Hinsicht*) Husserl himself basically overturned (*grundverkehrt*) and quietly dropped this interpretation right after his *Logical Investigations*. But nonetheless (*trotzdem*) he continues [Heidegger uses the present tense] to hold on to the determination of truth as ideal being".³¹ Heidegger seems to imply that for Husserl the discussed notion of ideality *is still* a *Leitfaden*. Besides, he says that Husserl's position were overturned only *im einer Hinsicht*. One might wonder what might be a 'partial overturning'.

Let me note that Heidegger's use in *Logic* of the expression "Gattung", "Art", "Wesen" to designate the notion ideality as universality might also suggest that the target of his criticism is not just Husserl's *Prolegomena*. These terms, in fact, characterizes Husserl's idea of phenomenology as "eidetic science", that is, Husserl's phenomenology *after* the *Logical Investigations*. From this point of view, it is quite interesting what Heidegger says in his lecture of 1923/24 [Ga 17 p. 58]. We read here that Husserl defines the meaning as "ideale Einheit, eine species, gegenüber den konkreten Einzelheiten (Akten), so, daß Husserl davon spricht, daß die ideale Bedeutung die Gattung für die Einzelheiten". Heidegger says that this position is "heute längst verlassene" and that it is to be traced back

31 We read in *Logic*: "As we shall see later, this interpretation is worthy of note—both the interpretation of the judgment's content as ideal being, and the interpretation of its relation to acts of judgment as the realizations of that content. In one regard, Husserl himself basically overturned and quietly dropped this interpretation right after his *Logical Investigations* (*im einer Hinsicht grundverkehrt und von Husserl selbst stillschweigend schon unmittelbar nach seinen Logische Untersuchungen aufgegeben*). But nonetheless, he continues to hold on to the determination of truth as ideal being".

to Brentano (“von Brentano überkommene”). This passage is interesting because it suggests that Lotze’s actuality *is not the only source* of Husserl’s notion of ideality as universality. But while in *Logic*, as we have seen, Heidegger mentions Bolzano as another significant source of Husserl’s ideality *in general*, in this earlier lecture he mentioned Brentano as a direct source of the ideality *as universality*.

This amounts to say that the focal point of Heidegger’s criticism is the notion of ideality in the specific sense of universality. From this point of view we can also note that while in *Logic* Heidegger takes for granted that *Wesen* indicates something universal (*Gattung*, *Art*, *Allgemeine*), in the lecture of 1919/20 the equivalence between *Wesen* and *Gattung* is presented *as a problem*. Heidegger, in fact, notes that in Husserl’s phenomenology “der Sinn des Eidetischen ist zu stark abgetrennt und mit der Idee der generalisierenden Verallgemeinerung verknüpft worden”; and he also says that “‘Wesen’ wird mit ‘Gattung’ gleichgesetzt” [Ga 58, p. 241]. In a letter to Rickert [27/01/1920] Heidegger shows some perplexities concerning a certain *aristotelischen Prägung* concept of essence (meaning, very likely, the overlapping between *Wesen*, genus and species).³² In these contexts, Heidegger is not *yet* complaining (as he does in *Logic*) about the equivalence between *ideal* and *essence or universal*; he is complaining about the equivalence between *essence* and *universal*. At this level the term essence is *not yet negative*, it does not mean the same as “universal”. Thus in Ga 20 Heidegger distinguishes between the “pure” and “apodictic” evidence of the *Wesenverhalt* (“...der reinen und absoluten Evidenz, die ‘Apodiktizität’ als Einsehen der Wesensverhalte”) and the “assertive” evidence of individual *Sachverhalt*. What is important to note here is that Heidegger *does not* characterize the essential state of affairs as

32 “Schließlich blieb ich beim Wesensbegriff hängen und merkte, daß damit besonders in der stark aristotelischen Prägung nicht das letzte gesagt sein kann“.

universal, but as *pure*. Also here Heidegger does not take for granted the equivalence between “essence” and “universal”. To be more precise, in Ga 20 Heidegger does not even speak of essential state of affairs (*Sachverhalt*), but of essence-relation (*Wesenverahlt*). The reason why I stress this point is that the core of Heidegger’s criticism of universality is precisely the structure of *Sachverhalt*, for the structure of state of affairs is that of a relation between “thing and its determinations”, a relation between ideal contents.

Now, in order to fully understand Heidegger’s criticism of universality, it must be noted that Heidegger does recognize that in phenomenology the universal is nothing like a mere empirical or discursive concept. In the § 12 of Ga 60 – where Heidegger presents his notion of formal indication as criticism of Husserl’s formalization and generalization – we read that in the generalization “die Stufenfolge der ‘Generalitäten’ (Arten und Gattungen) ist sachhaltig bestimmt. Die Anmessung an den Sachzusammenhang ist wesentlich”. Heidegger’s terminology is very indicative: the universality is an *essential* (*wesentlich*) one, it is *sachhaltig bestimmten*: it does not depend on the actuality of contents in the consciousness. The fact is that, as I have suggested, for Heidegger the problem is not about the pureness of the universality, but about the validity of the universality in general. To say it with Ga 60: why in philosophy the universality should be the important determination of phenomena? The question is important since in Heidegger’s mind Husserl’s eidetic analysis are permeated, on a formal ontological level, by some commitment for the universality, a one that compromises the analysis of the being of intentionality.

In Ga 20 [190/140], in the text that also contains Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl’s determination of the region-consciousness, we find an explicit example of how, in Heidegger’s view, a more radical conception of being also involves a more radical conception of the *a priori* as different from any form of universal content.

The more radical conception of being as such will bring a modification of the concept of the apriori, but this will be accompanied by a modification of our way of apprehending the apriori as well, of ideation. As before in phenomenology corresponding to its apriori, which was not truly understood but conceived in conjunction with the Greek concept of being, so likewise is ideation, in its corresponding logic, conceived as a logic of the experience of this sort of being, a logic which is then apprehension of the general, generalization.³³

In this important passage Heidegger presents his phenomenology as a “*radikaleren Fassung von Sein überhaupt*”; this new and *more radical* concept of being introduces a fundamental shift of paradigm in the concept of the *a priori*, which is no longer conceived as something universal; accordingly, the “grasp of the *a priori*” (*Apriori-Erfassung*) is no longer defined in terms of *generalization*, or as a grasp of the ideas. This is why Heidegger does not characterize his analysis in terms of *ideation*.

In the passage I have quoted Heidegger establishes a link between the ideation and a *griechischen Seinsbegriff*. However, he does not say *which* Greek philosopher or philosophy lie behind this concept of being. From what we have seen, one might suggest that Husserl’s concept of ideality can be traced back at least to two ‘Greek’ sources: a Platonic one (mediated by Lotze) and an Aristotelian one (mediated by Brentano). But Heidegger is not clear on this point. Like in other texts, in fact, Heidegger brings Husserl’s philosophy back to some traditional sources without providing much arguments for this claim. In this case Heidegger refers to a Greek concept of being, in other contexts, to the Cartesian idea of *mathesis universalis*. In any case,

³³ “Mit der radikaleren Fassung von Sein überhaupt wird sich der Begriff des Apriori modifizieren, zugleich aber auch der Sinn der Apriori-Erfassung, der Ideation. Wie bisher in der Phänomenologie entsprechend ihrem Apriori, das man nicht eigentlich verstand, sondern im Anschluß an den griechischen Seinsbegriff faßte, so ist die Ideation im Sinne der entsprechenden Logik als eine Logik der Seinserfahrung dieses spezifischen Seins gefaßt, welche Logik dann Erfassung des Generellen, Generalisierung ist“.

however unfair Heidegger's interpretation might be from a *philological* point of view, it does have a *philosophical* meaning. What is then the philosophical meaning of Heidegger's definition of ideation as related to a "Greek concept of being"?

In the passage we have quoted the ideation is defined as a *Logik der Seinserfahrung*. I think we can find here a first indication of the 'logical' nature of the ideality. In our perspective, Heidegger's criticism of ideality as *logic of being* presupposes, first of all, the idea (that Heidegger takes from Husserl's *Logical Investigations*) that the "being" is a *syntactical category*; therefore, Heidegger's 'genealogy of ideality' as 'logic of being' presupposes that syntactical function can be modified in a such a way that the structure of state of affairs becomes a relation between ideal contents. To put it differently: the genesis of ideality must be located, for Heidegger, in a modification within the structure of the state of affairs.

As I have suggested, Heidegger, rightly or wrongly, believes that Husserl's analysis of the being of the intentionality (*Being and Time's Dasein*) is permeated by a dogmatic form of idealism. *Logic* tells us what kind of idealism Heidegger has in mind. In his presentation of Husserl's transcendental reduction [Ga 20, § 12], Heidegger emphasizes that the consciousness is understood by Husserl as an ideal content, as a possible object of reflection.³⁴ Husserl considers the consciousness "seinem Wesengehalte nach", as *Wesensstruktur*; the consciousness is understood in terms of universalities (*Art, Gattung*, species, eidetic singularity), as ideal contents. The most important point of Heidegger's criticism, I think, is precisely the idea of "content", the idea of essence as content (*gehaltliche Struktur, Wasgehalten*).³⁵

³⁴ *Prolegomena*, p. 143/130: «Wiederum wird nicht das Seiende an ihm selbst Thema, sondern das Seiende, sofern es möglicher Gegenstand der Reflexion ist».

³⁵ I do agree with Øverenget [1998] when he argues that the target of Heidegger's criticism is not the *transcendental* but the *eidetic* reduction; but I think that this holds true only as long as, in Heidegger's view, the eidetic reduction is

I have insisted on this point because I do think that Heidegger's reflection on the 'logic of ideality' plays a crucial role in the definition of his phenomenology; and in this reflection Husserl, as I have noted in the introduction, plays a twofold role: on the one hand, Husserl is a positive source of Heidegger's genealogy and criticism of ideality; on the other, Husserl is the target of this criticism.

§ 4. Husserl and the Identity of the Sense

I have suggested that in Heidegger's perspective the origin of ideality is to be found in a certain interpretation of the identity and ideality of the proposition. Precisely in relation to this problem we can see in which sense Husserl plays a twofold role. As Heidegger notes, Husserl himself abandoned his idealistic position, even though, as we have seen, a certain form of idealism persists in his phenomenology as a whole. Now I would like to focus for a moment on Husserl's self-criticism. I have no intention of providing any account of this problem; I only want to emphasize some aspects important in Heidegger's perspective.

In a nutshell, right after the *Logical Investigations* Husserl came to see more clearly that the ideality of the proposition is based on a specific form of identity, a one that one must not confuse with the self-identity of a content. Therefore, he came to questions the paradigmatic role of the notion of ideality that Heidegger criticizes. For example, in the *Preface* that Husserl wrote for the second edition of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl admits that in his II *Logical Investigation* he does not distinguish between fundamental different types of ideas, and therefore between different forms of ideation.

affected by a dogmatic idea of universality as validity of a content. I cannot deal with this question in this context. But I think that an analysis of Ga 20 might show that the target of Heidegger's criticism is not even Husserl's eidetic reduction. For Heidegger, on the contrary, is the fact that the eidetic reduction is still focused on the *gehaltliche Struktur* of the consciousness and therefore it cannot get the *Wesenszusammenhang* of the pure consciousness.

Here refers, says Husserl, only to ideas like the “red” (this is precisely the example that Heidegger makes).

Let us now consider Husserl’s revision of his theory of proposition. In *Logic* Heidegger says that Husserl abandoned his earlier position “soon” (*bald*) and “already immediately” (*schon unmittelbar*) the *Logical Investigations*. In fact, Husserl’s letter to Ingarden of 21/12/1930 refers this correction to the years of Gottingen.³⁶ Following Iso Kern’s indication [1964, p. 388, n. 2], we can also quote a letter to Ingarden (8-4-18), where Husserl says: “Die Unabhängigkeit des Seins eines Satzes von dem zufälligen Urtheil u. Urtheilenden besagt noch nicht, daß das ideal-Identische ein Spezifisches ist”. Another text indicated by Kern is the § 57 b) of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Here Husserl distinguishes the “irreality” (*Irrealität*) of “significations” from the “different ideality of universal essences or species”, as “*particular cases*” of the irreality in general. To put it briefly: every ideal-universal is *un-real* but not every *un-real* is ideal in the sense of the *universal*.

A more detailed analysis of this problem can be found in the § 64 d) of *Experience and Judgment*. We read here that “the irreality of objectivities of understanding (*Verstandesgegenständlichkeiten*) must not be confused with generic universality (*Gattungsallgemeinheit*)”. Also here Husserl makes a distinction between ideal *as not real* and ideal *as universal*: the objectivities of the understanding are not real and nevertheless they are not universal. In this text Husserl defines the interpretation of the ideality of the proposition as universal being a “temptation”. He says that since “any number of affirmative acts, of no matter how many subjects, affirm this one and the same proposition, can have one and the same sense,

36 I am grateful to Daniele De Santis for having called my attention to this important document.

it is a great temptation to think that the proposition belongs to the various acts of which it is the sense by virtue of its generic universality, as, for example, many red things belong to the generic essence 'redness'. Just as all these things have red in common and the red apprehended by an ideating abstraction is a general essence, so will the ideal identical proposition, which indeed is common to the many acts, be a general essence, and this means a generic essence.

The "temptation" (*Versuchung*) consists in the fact that one can interpret the *identity* of the proposition as something *common* to many acts, just as the identity of the red is common to many shades of red. As we have seen, the target of Heidegger's criticism in *Logic* is precisely this confusion between sameness of a content and identity of a proposition. Here Husserl makes clear that *although* the identity of the proposition is "indeed common to many acts", nevertheless *it is not the identity* of something universal (in the sense of a generic essence). Husserl, then, recognizes that the identical proposition can be something universal, *but* he *also* recognizes that this generality is of a special kind.

Certainly, the proposition is general insofar as it refers to an infinite number of positional, but it is not general in the sense of generic universality, i.e., *the generality of an "extension"* which belongs specifically to the generality of a species, to a kind or genus, and, at the lowest level, to a concrete quiddity (*konkreten Washeit*).

The universality of the proposition does not depend on the "extension", on a conceptual *Umfang*; it is not the universality of genus, species and concrete quiddity. Husserl is very clear: the proposition is "*identical as the correlate of an identification and not general as the correlate of a comparative coincidence* (Aber der Satz selbst ist für alle diese Akte und diese Aktmodalitäten Identischen als Korrelat einer Identifikation und nicht Allgemeines als Korrelat einer vergleichenden Deckung)".

The identity is not the identity of a *sameness*, of something general; it is the identity of the *identification*. It is here important to stress that the identity of the proposition is, as it were, 'original': the proposition is identical and therefore also universal, and not the other way around. The identity is not the consequence of a comparison, is not *ideal unity* of what is in common among different acts, but it is *the unity of a sense*: the "identical sense does not become particular in individuals", as in the case of a "generic universal", for "sense does not have particulars under it". The peculiarity of the sense lies in the fact that "in order to apprehend the proposition $2 < 3$ [...] we do not have to deal comparatively with the acts of judgment which judge that $2 < 3$; we do not have to perform a generalizing abstraction; and, accordingly, we also never find the proposition to be on the order of a genus.." (my emphasis).

We can say: the fact that we refer to the *same thing* is not the *consequence* of the fact that (numerically) different acts contains (qualitative) similar contents. In this sense, the universality of the proposition is *a consequence of its identity*. Different realizations are nothing but numerical (and potentially infinite) possibilities the identical and ideal sense; in the other perspective, the identity and ideality of the sense depends on the possibility, for a content, to be found in different acts. I have stressed this point because I think that Heidegger's notion of sense as unity of manifold can be understood as a radicalization of this idea of ideal identity of the proposition.

§ 5. Heidegger and the many Identities of the Truth

Heidegger's account of the truth of proposition presupposes Husserl's difference between the ideality of the proposition, as "correlate of an identification", and the ideality of contents, namely the sameness "as correlate of a comparative coincidence". Heidegger's genealogy of universality and ideality would not be

possible without Husserl's distinction between these two forms of identity.

Let us turn our attention to the § 10 of *Logic*, where Heidegger presents the *phenomenological* notion of truth as intuition. Heidegger finds this positive concept of truth in the Husserl's VI logical investigation. According to Heidegger in this context "we have a situation that is *the very opposite of the situation with Lotze*" (my emphasis); hence, we can deduce that we have a situation that is the very opposite *also* of the position of Husserl's *Prolegomena*. Heidegger refers, in particular, to §39, where Husserl defines the truth in terms of *identity, evidence* and *fulfillment*. This definition of truth makes clear that in phenomenology the idea of intuition has only validity in relation to the idea of *evidence* and *identity* (as correlate of a judgment).

In the § 10 of *Logic* Heidegger draws a distinction which seems to correspond to Husserl's distinction between the sense as correlate of an *identification* and the sameness as correlate of a *comparative coincidence*. The first form of identity, that Heidegger also calls *Wahrverhalt*, is presented as an *intentional relation* of coincidence between *intended* and *intuited*, while the second is presented as an ideal *relation between contents*. Both these relations are relations of identity; but only the first can be defined a "relation of truth".

We read in *Logic* [109/89]: "Truth is identity or sameness (*Identität, Selbigkeit*), although obviously (*freilich*) not in a universal sense (*offenbar nicht überhaupt*), for *not every form of identity is truth* (*nicht jede Identität is schon Wahrheit*). But in this case, truth is interpreted in terms of identity (*im Hinblick auf Identität*), and specifically as the identity of the intended and the intuited (*Gemeinten, Angeschauten*)". Some lines after, Heidegger says that "to be sure we leave open the question whether this [the notion of truth as identity] is the final answer (*Ob das freilich die letzte Antwort ist, bleibt dahingestellt*) In any case this is the determination (*die*

Bestimmung) of truth that we have been looking for, namely, the interpretation that Husserl provides through his investigations into knowing as intentional comportment, or more precisely, knowing as intuition”.

From these passages, it seems that the definition of the truth as identity is subjected to two conditions. (1) First of all, the claim that “truth is identity or sameness (*Identität, Selbigkeit*)”, is *valid*, but not in a universal sense (or “not in general”: *offenbar nicht überhaupt*), for *not every form of identity is already truth (nicht jede Identität ist schon Wahrheit)*. (2) Secondly, it is not sure that the definition of truth as identity is the “final answer” to the problem of truth in general. In the first quotation Heidegger rejects the idea that *every identity is truth*; in the second, he suggests the idea that *every truth is identity*. The first statement implies that there can be forms of identity which are not forms of truth; the second statement implies that there can be forms of truth that are not forms of identity. Of course, the two problems are essentially different: the first has to do with the identity as it is the form of propositional truth, the second has to do with the truth in general, as a form of relation of which the proposition is only one possibility. Let me rephrase this point by starting from the second aspect: (1) the definition of the truth as identity is not universal; in fact, it remains open the question whether there can be *truth, ma not in the sense of the identity*; (2) however, *if* we define the truth as identity, we have to keep in mind that not every identity is truth.

As to the first aspect, it is difficult to understand the sense of Heidegger’s remark. Indeed, if we understand the identity in a strict sense, as correlate of the proposition, then not every truth is identity. However, if we understand the identity in a broad sense, then every truth is identity, for every articulation of the sense is always a unity of manifold. Even the possibility of contrast, absurdity (a more Heideggerian example might be the experience of a broken tool, an

object that ‘fails’ our ‘expectations’), all these forms presupposes a synthesis of identification (in Heidegger’s perspective: the as-structure).³⁷

But let us focus, for the moment, on the other aspect of the problem, namely the claim that the truth is identity but not every identity is truth. With this remark, in fact, Heidegger wants to distinguish between the identity as coincidence between intended and intuited and the identity in the sense of the sameness of an ideal content. The identity in the first sense refers to an *intentional* notion of identity, as ‘formal’ relation between the intended and the intuited: the truth is “die bestimmte Relation (*Identität*) eines bestimmten *So-Wie* (*so gemeint wie angeschaut*)”.³⁸ Heidegger makes the example of the true assertion “the chalkboard is black”. In this case the “chalkboard” is given just as it is intended, as “black”. The truth, then, is defined as a relation between intended and intuited; let me note that this form of relation only says *how* the intend is intuited, namely in the form of the *So-Wie*.

Now, in *Logic* [see 112/92] Heidegger seems to imply that these two forms of identity refers to two different forms of presence, two different forms of “subsisting” (*Bestehen*). Heidegger asks this question: when we talk about the truth *what* is “subsisting supposed to mean here”?³⁹ In other terms: according to which of ‘subsisting’

³⁷ Husserl himself in the VI Logical Investigation, says: “Einseitig haben wir bisher den Fall der Evidenz, also den als totale beschriebenen Akt bevorzugt. Der Evidenz entspricht aber mit Rücksicht auf den korrelaten Fall des Widerstreits die Absurdität, als Erlebnis des völligen Widerstreits zwischen Intention und Quasi-Erfüllung”.

³⁸ “With this we have now determined truth itself. To put it formally: Identity is a relation. And truth as an identity is a relation between the meant and the intuited. Therefore, truth is the specific relation (of identity) of a certain “just-as”: something is meant *just as* it is intuited”.

³⁹ “What is the status of this subsisting? In any case, when we talk about truth as identity, we are talking about a relation, and specifically one that does *not* subsist between the thing and its determinations”. Let me note that Husserl uses the term “Bestehen” in the § 39 of the VI *Logical Investigation*: “der engere Seinsbegriff das Sein von absoluten Gegenständen betreffen und dasselbe vom “Bestehen” der Sachverhalte abscheiden”. In Husserl, then, this term refers to the difference between relational and not-relational acts as two different forms of

do we say that truth “subsists”? The question arises as to the “subsisting of the identity” (“Die Frage entsteht nun, was hier ‘Bestehen’ heisses soll, das Bestehen der Identität als solcher, d.h. des Verhältnisses von Gemeintem und Angeschautem [...] Wie steht es mit diesem Bestehen?”); but more in general, the question arises as to the status of the identity *as a relation* (“Jedenfalls ist bei der Wahrheit als Identität die Rede von einem Verhalt”), namely, as relation that can be understood in a *twofold* sense: as relation between intended and intuited (the black chalkboard, the chalkboard perceived just-as I intend it is intended, as a black chalkboard), or as a relation between contents. Now, understood in this second (and negative) sense, the identity is a relation between *thingly* contents. The truth in the first sense is instead defined an *ausgezeichnet* relation, an outstanding or eminent form of identity. Heidegger calls this relation *Wahrverhalt*. This term – that we find also in Ga 20, as we shall see – is particularly important, for it brings to the fore the problem of the definition of the truth as a relation of identity; this term is absent from *Being and Time*. The reason of this absence, I think, is to be found in the fact that in *Being and Time* (and in part already in *Logic*) Heidegger addresses the problem of the truth as intentional *relation* and as relation of *identity* with another concept: the *Als-Struktur*. In the next part I will take into account this notion precisely as it constitutes a peculiar form of relation or synthesis.

Now, in this passage Heidegger makes clear that the truth as identity is a relation *but not* a relation between “things and its determination”, between “chalkboard” and the “black” (“Jedenfalls ist bei der Wahrheit als Identität die Rede von einem Verhalt, und zwar einem Verhalt, der nicht besteht zwischen der Sache und ihren Bestimmungen, also kein Verhältnis, das besteht zwischen der Tafel

“subsisting”. In Heidegger the term seems to refer to two forms of relational act, as relation of coincidence between judgment and intuition (‘the chalkboard is black’) and as relation between contents (‘the being-black of the chalkboard’).

und dem Schwarz"). However, as pointed out also by Dermot Moran [2000], it is not clear if Heidegger is saying that the relation of truth is *a relation, but not a subsisting one*, or if he is saying that the truth is *a subsisting relation, but not a relation between subsisting contents*. (I will say more about this question later). On the one hand, in fact, Heidegger seems to imply that the identity as such is "subsisting" ("..das Bestehen der Identität als solcher.."); on the other hand, he seems to leave unanswered the question whether the relation of truth and the identity is a "subsisting" relation *at all*. He just says that, "in any case" (*jedenfalls*), the truth as identity is a relation, but not a relation between contents. As we shall see, in Ga 20 [p. 70/51] Heidegger seems to understand the difference between these two forms of identity as a difference between two forms of subsisting-relations. To put it roughly, it seems that what really matters is not the *subsisting* of a form of relation, but the subsisting of *a form of relation* as relation between contents.⁴⁰ This nuance is very important for us. In our perspective, as I have said in the introduction, we want to verify in what extent Heidegger's ontological categories can be understood not only as temporal forms (for example, the *Vorhandenheit* as form of 'presence'), but also as synthetic structures, as forms of relations.⁴¹

⁴⁰ In Ga 20 Heidegger says (Ga 20, p. 70/51): "Truth can be designated in a threefold way. The *first* concept of truth is this *being identical of presumed and intuited*. Being-true is then equivalent to this being-identical, *the subsistence of this identity*".

⁴¹ Kisiel comments Heidegger's use of this term in Ga 20 (see the note at p. 52 of his translation of this lecture) observing that "*Bestand* is a 'stock' word in the vocabulary of Heidegger both early and late; in general, it serves as his focus on the classical problem of permanence and change, and the traditional conception of being as constant presence. But the immediate context relevant here is Husserl's anti-psychologistic distinction between the persistent sameness of ideal being (sense) and the temporal variability of the real acts which intend such sense, as is evident from the following semester's course on *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*. Heidegger raises the question of the ontological status of a relation which subsists purportedly between the real and the ideal. [...] *Bestand* seems also to carry the connotation of 'subsistence', i.e., the type of being proper to the 'ideal being' of categories". In our perspective the question is slightly different: Heidegger's use of the term *Bestand*, to be sure, refers this context (the the "distinction between the persistent sameness of ideal being (sense) and the

But before we deal with the question concerning the sense of this relation between contents as *relation*, let me say something more about the definition of the truth as “identity” and as “relation of identity”. “Intuition”, “evidence”, “coincidence”: all these terms indicates the truth as *form of identity*. But how exactly are we to understand, positively, the definition of truth as intentional identity? How many forms of identity is there truth as identity?

In Ga 20 Heidegger describes the notion of *Wahrverhalt* as the correlate of an act of the identification; Heidegger stresses that this identification is something “we live in”; we live in this “act” [see Ga 20, 70/53]; the truth is a “living act”;⁴² I live “in the performance of the act (*im Vollzuge des Aktes*)”.⁴³ Husserl, indeed, in § 39 of the *VI Logical Investigation*, says that “diese Übereinstimmung wird in der Evidenz *erlebt*, sofern die Evidenz der aktuelle Vollzug der adäquaten Identifizierung ist”. One might say that Heidegger, takes Husserl’s

temporal variability of the real acts”); however, I think that what Kisiel defines as “the question of the ontological status of a relation which subsists purportedly between the real and the ideal” has *a priority* the “distinction between the persistent sameness of ideal being (sense) and the temporal variability of the real acts”.

⁴² “This is the phenomenological sense of saying that in evident perception I do not thematically study the truth of this perception itself, but rather live *in* the truth (ich in evidenten Wahrnehmung nicht die Wahrheit dieser Wahrnehmung selbst thematisch studiere, sondern *in* der Wahrheit lebe). Being-true is experienced as a distinctive *relation*, a *comportmental* relation [*Verhalt*] between presumed and intuited specifically in the sense of identity (Wahrsein wird erfahren als ein ausgezeichneter *Verhalt*, ein *Verhalt* zwischen Vermeintem und Angeschautem, und zwar im Sinne der Identität). We call this distinctive relation the *truth-relation*; *being-true* consists precisely in this relation. Truth in this sense is seen with respect to the correlate of the act of identification, that is, by way of intentionality with reference to the *intantum*” (Diesen ausgezeichneten *Verhalt* bezeichnen wir als *Wahrverhalt*; in ihm liegt eben das *Wahrsein*. Wahrheit wird in dieser Kennzeichnung im Hinblick auf das Korrelat des Aktes der Identifizierung gesehen, d. h. von der Intentionalität her in bezug auf das *Intantum*”).

⁴³ Ga 20, 69/52: “..in the living act of concrete perceiving and in the demonstration of what is presumed, this perceiving lives in the apprehension of the matter as such, in the performance of the act (*im Vollzuge des Aktes*). In the coming into coincidence of the presumed with the intuited, I am solely and primarily directed toward the subject matter itself (bin ich primär und einzig auf die Sache selbst gerichtet). In the next section we shall that the characterization of the truth as *Vollzug* raises some methodological problems concerning the definition of the correlate of the truth. Husserl, indeed, says that “diese Übereinstimmung wird in der Evidenz *erlebt*, sofern die Evidenz der aktuelle Vollzug der adäquaten Identifizierung ist”.

description seriously; his phenomenology of everydayness can be seen as an attempt to show in which sense, first and foremost, we “live” in the identity of intended and intuited, in which sense we live remains ‘within’ the *Vollzug* of our acts meaning. Thus Kisiel is quite right when he links Heidegger’s presentation (in Ga 20) of truth as *lived* and *unthematic* identity with the claim (in *Being and Time*) that the truth is something we exist or live in. “To ‘live *in* the truth’ here means to live in the state of identity and continuity between the signified and the intuited, a state which we continually experience but do not grasp. This is indicative of what it means ‘to be in the truth’”.⁴⁴

As to the definition of the identity of truth as a *relation* (*Verhalt*) In the § 44 of *Being and Time* Heidegger defines the truth in terms of “relation” and operates a distinction between “identity” and “relation”. In this context he makes use of the term *Beziehung*. Heidegger asks: “What does the term coincidence (*Übereinstimmung*) mean in general? The coincidence⁴⁵ of something with something has the formal character of the relation (*Beziehung*) of something to something. Every coincidence, and thus ‘truth’ as well, is a relation. But not every relation is an coincidence. A sign points to what is shown. Showing is a relation, but not an agreement

⁴⁴ Kisiel, the translator and editor of Ga 20, comments the passage I have quoted above in this way: “[the] formulation [of the truth as something “we live in”] serves to link this commentary by Heidegger [...] with his own sense of truth in *Being and Time*. To “live *in* the truth” here means to live in the state of identity and continuity between the signified and the intuited, a state which we continually experience but do not grasp. This is indicative of what it means “to be in the truth” (*Being and Time*, H. 221) without knowing it thematically, whereby we understand the structures of our world as ‘self-evident,’ as a matter ‘of course’ in a straightforward living of them without considering them thematically”. Kisiel rightly notes that “the formula recurs in the very next semester’s course on *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* [...] but now with regard to the prepredicative structures of handy things in whose *disclosure* ‘we already live’ The habitual realm of ‘static unions’ of which Husserl speaks on the basis of acts of naming and predication is thus shifted to the prepredicative acts (comportments) of “having to do with” things which *fulfill* their expectations in their functions and so establish a practical network of stable *signifying* relations involving ‘for,’ ‘in order to,’ and ‘for the sake of’”. I shall devote the next part of the thesis to these sections of *Logic*.

⁴⁵ Joan Stambaugh translates *Übereinstimmung* with “agreement”; in this context I prefer to keep using the term “coincidence”.

between the sign and what is shown". "coincidence has the formal character of the 'just-as'".

In the light of what we have seen, we can say that the identity can be understood in two different ways. One can understand the identity as a the formal relation of the "just-as" (*So-wie*); one can understand the identity in a more broad sense, as indicating every form of 'lived' identification between intended and intuited. The logic of ideality has its roots in the first notion of identity.

§ 6. The Complexity of the Truth as Relation

The relation between the truth as *relation of identity* and the truth as *relation between contents* is defined by Heidegger as a difference between *Wahrverhalt* and *Sachverhalt*. While the first term is an Heideggerian neologism, the second is not: on the contrary, it is used by Husserl precisely in the context of the problem of the truth.⁴⁶

We can say that the notion of *Wahrverhalt* brings to the fore the problem of the *relational structure* of the truth and of the identity of *sense as a form of intentional relation*. Instead, the notion of *Sachverhalt* appears as negative and derived structure. However, this difference is far from being clear; in particular, the notion of *Sachverhalt* is used by Heidegger (in *Logic* and in GA 20) in two different senses.

If we understand Heidegger's use of this term we can also see in which sense the origin of ideality lies in a certain 'logic' or in a logical notion of truth.⁴⁷ In order to do this, we have, as it were, to deconstruct the very distinction between *Wahrverhalt* and *Sachverhalt* as a *two-fold* distinction between two forms of relation

⁴⁶ The term has a long history within the Brentanian school. On this problem see Robin Daryl Rollinger, *Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano*, *Phaenomenologica* 150, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999.

⁴⁷ The term *Sachverhalt*, which is here used in opposition to *Wahrverhalt*, is usually translated as "state of affairs"; in order to appreciate Heidegger's strategic use of this expression, we will mostly leave the term in German, leaving this term to many possible translations as indicating manifold possible forms of "relation" (*Verhalt*).

of identity (the *Wahrverhalt* as intentional relation of identity and the *Sachverhalt* as ideal relation between contents). In the light of what we have seen, in fact, *Wahrverhalt* and *Sachverhalt* indicate three (and not two) forms of relation: 1) the *Warhverhalt* as intentional relation in a formal sense, indicating different forms of truth; 2) the *Warverhalt* in the sense of relation of truth as identity; 3) the *Sachverhalt* as ideal relation of identity between contents. Now, what Heidegger's two-fold distinction between *Warverhalt* and *Sachverhalt* does not tell us, is according which sense of relation and identity the *Sachverhalt* is as relation of coincidence or a relation between contents. To put it differently, Heidegger's use of this notion in *Logic* does not explain the relation between (2) intentional relation of identity and (1) ideal relation between contents. Besides, Heidegger's use of this notion is somewhat unfair, not only because it does not make justice of what Husserl means with this term, but also because his criticism of Husserl's use of this notion, in part, is possible only as radicalization of what Husserl really means by using this expression.

I think that Daniel O. Dahlstrom [2001] is right when he defines Heidegger's difference between *Wahrverhalt* and *Sachverhalt* as a "whimsical wordplay on two different "states" (*Verhalten*), namely, that of a thing and that of truth"; he also says that with this wordplay "Heidegger initiates his criticism of Husserl's conception of truth" (I will devote to this problem the next paragraph). To be sure, this "wordplay" between states or relations is somewhat whimsical; Heidegger, in fact, takes the expression *Sachverhalt* in *literal* sense, as *sächliche Verhalt*, as an object-like (or better: a thing-like relation).

Let me give a very sketchy account of what this notion is about. Of course I am not interested in providing any detailed account of it. I will only emphasize some aspects important for our problem. First of all, it must be noted that in the *Logical Investigations* [see *Prolegomena*, § 67] the notion of *Sachverhalt* belongs to what

Husserl calls “the pure or formal object-like categories” (*die reinen oder formalen gegenständlichen Kategorien*), like object, unity or plurality (these categories are therefore distinguished from the “categories of meaning”, *Bedeutungskategorien*, like concept, sentence, and truth). As “formal object-like” category, the notion of *Sachverhalt*, as noted by Barry Smith [1989] “can be applied to all matters without restriction [and therefore] comes to be ranked alongside the formal concept of *object*”⁴⁸. From this point of view, always following Smith, it has to be stressed that “state of affairs” and “proposition” are not the same, as Heidegger seems to imply in *Logic*. “Husserl argued for a view of *Sachverhalte* as objectual judgment-correlates analogous to objects as the transcendent targets of presentations”.⁴⁹ The problem is precisely the relation between a formal notion of object, *as possible correlate* of a judgment, and the object as it is actually intended *in the judgment*. As we shall see, Heidegger’s use of this notion, however unfair it might be, aims to stress the difference between the object as intentional correlate of many possible acts, and the object as correlate of the specific act of judgment.

But let us see more closely the way in which the notion of *Sachverhalt*, despite Heidegger’s use of this term, indicates something very different from a relation between contents. As we have said, state of affairs indicates the object as object of a *possible*

⁴⁸ Smith [1989] notes: “Husserl goes beyond his Brentanist predecessors also in his treatment of ontology. Setting out from Meinong’s idea of a ‘theory of objects’, Husserl initiates a new discipline of ‘formal ontology’, within which the formal concept of *Sachverhalt* - ‘formal’ because it can be applied to all matters without restriction - comes to be ranked alongside the formal concept of *object*. It is more than anything else this Husserlian discipline of formal ontology, as developed by Husserl’s disciples in Munich, which led to Reinach’s conception of logic as a science of states of affairs”.

⁴⁹ As noted by Smith: in the *Logical Investigations* “*Sachverhalt* and proposition are squeezed apart, and a conception of *Sachverhalte* as objectual truth-makers explicitly defended. Husserl argued for a view of *Sachverhalte* as objectual judgment-correlates analogous to objects as the transcendent targets of presentations. Moreover, he saw that *Sachverhalten* can serve as correlates not only of acts of judging but also of special kinds of nominal acts (for example when we say *that S is p* ‘is welcome’, ‘is probable’, ‘has as consequence that ...’, etc.)”.

judgment, the object *qua* intended by the judgment. Ideas, for example, are object of “universal state of affairs”. Now, this notion of “object” is not to be confused with the *real* object; rather, it indicates the object *as it is intended*, and as intended according a certain quality of the act (or, in a more Heideggerian way, as intend according a certain “relation of truth”): in this case, as object of the act of “judging”. The *same* real object can be intended in different ways, namely through different state of affairs. But the state of affairs (and this is the second important point) must not be confused with the *content* of the act neither. Let us consider Husserl’s famous example, in the § 17 of the V Logical Investigation (significantly entitled: § 17. *Der intentionale Inhalt im Sinn des intentionalen Gegenstandes*), of the proposition “the knife is on the table”; to be sure, this proposition is *about* the knife; however, the object of the proposition, namely its *Sachverhalt*, is not the *knife itself*, but *the fact* (to which the judgment refers) that “the knife is on the table.”⁵⁰ As Husserl makes clear, the “primary” (*primär*) object of the judgment is not the knife as *subject-representation*, but *the fact* that the knife is on the table.⁵¹ Husserl’s example of ‘wishing’ is even more clear. When I say: “I wish that the knife were on the table”, I do not wish “the knife” or the “the table”; I wish *that* the knife were on the table. We can rephrase in this way: what I wish is not the ‘meaning’ I am actually using (knife, table) in order to say what I wish, but what I really wish (*that* the knife were on the table).⁵² I do not wish

⁵⁰ “In dem Satze das Messer liegt auf dem Tische [ist] das Messer zwar der Gegenstand, über den geurteilt wird ... ; aber gleichwohl nicht der primäre Gegenstand [des Urteils], sondern nur derjenige des Urteilssubjekts. Dem ganzen Urteil entspricht als voller und ganzer Gegenstand der geurteilte *Sachverhalt*”.

⁵¹ As stressed by Christian Beyer [1996 p. 165. the “knife” as subject of the proposition is called by Husserl *sekundären Gegenstand* while “the primäre *Gegenstand* des Urteils ist dagegen ein “Sachverhalt” - der Sachverhalt, dass das Messer auf dem Tisch liegt”.

⁵² Husserl writes: “Dem ganzen Urteil entspricht als voller und ganzer Gegenstand der geurteilte Sachverhalt, der als identisch derselbe in einer bloßen Vorstellung vorgestellt, in einem Wunsch gewünscht, in einer Frage gefragt, in einem Zweifel bezweifelt sein kann usw. [...] Und dieser Sachverhalt ist offenbar

something (something that can be found in *what* I say, in the content) but I wish a certain 'situation', a situation to which what I say refers. The state of affairs is the proof of the fact that what we call "sense" is, so to speak, always *oblique* and *indirect*, for it exceeds the *literality* of the meanings (as ideal unities of a discourse). In the next section we shall see that this is precisely what Heidegger finds in Husserl's categorial intuition.

I insist on this point because Heidegger's critical (and negative) use of the expression *Sachverhalt*, to be sure, aims to show that there is a more original truth than the truth of the proposition; but this criticism does not involve a rejection of the idea that every truth requires, just as the proposition, a *synthetic* moment, a *relational* structure.⁵³ In this sense, it is true that Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology, as noted by Sylvain Camilleri [2017], involves a rejection of the state of affairs, and can be read as an attempt to think a *more dynamical form of relation* (Camilleri refers here to the *hermeneutische Situation*). However, Heidegger's criticism has a more 'methodological' meaning. Heidegger wants to question the paradigmatic function, in philosophy, of assertion and objectifying acts. In this sense, we can say with Camilleri (my emphasis) that "le véritable dépassement de Husserl s'effectue encore ailleurs, en l'occurrence dans la refonte décisive du concept même d'état de choses, officieusement déclaré trop statique pour qualifier le plan ontologique sur le fond duquel l'expérience de la vie facticielle évolue et déploie sa mobilité".⁵⁴ In the next part I shall argue that

nicht zu verwechseln mit dem bezüglichen Urteil oder gar mit der Vorstellung des Urteils - ich wünsche ja nicht das Urteil oder irgendeine Vorstellung".

⁵³ This idea characterizes Heidegger's thinking since his early writings. In Ga01, p. 381, for example, we read that, „nur in und durch die Bedeutungszusammenhänge können wir etwas von Gegenständen und Sachverhalten wissen“. „Gleich ursprünglich wie der Gegenstand überhaupt ist der Gegenstands-Sachverhalt; mit jedem Gegenstand hat es eine Bewandnis, und sei es nur die, daß er sich selbst und verschieden von einem anderen ist“.

⁵⁴ Camilleri (p. 149) for example, have argued (in relation to the earlier Heidegger, that Heidegger's notion of "hermeneutical situation" (*hermeneutische Situation*) can be read as a "replacement" of Husserl's notion of state of affairs. Il

Heidegger's as-structure can be seen as a radical form of categorial intuition, as a form of synthetic act (not in a predicative sense).

As I said, Heidegger's criticism of state of affairs aims to challenge the paradigmatic role of assertion and objectivizing acts. Indeed, acts like assertions, more than not acts like wishing or desiring, can be mistaken for ideal relation between meanings. In *Logic* [130/110] Heidegger mentions this difference in relation to the Aristotelian distinctions between the various forms of logos, indicating various forms of "speech, as including wishes, commands, and questions". Heidegger takes, as examples, these sentences: "please pass me the scissors", "get off this land!", "was there another storm today?".⁵⁵ From a phenomenological point of view these acts are interesting for they show what the "intentional sense" is really about, as *sense* that cannot be reduced to *what is said* as *ideal* and *actual* content. We read in *Logic*: " 'Please give me the scissors that are on the table', when in fact there are no scissors on the table, what I say does not correspond with what is the case. My speech is objectively false. I am deceived, and my utterance expresses that deception. That act of speech says something false—but is my *request* false? Obviously not. Is it true? No, not that either". Heidegger leaves open the question concerning the status of this difference; he says that "we shall try to

n'est pas du tout anodin que Heidegger glisse dans le même passage d'un mot vers l'autre (GA60, 14). Nous devons en effet y voir une nette percée de la phénoménologie herméneutique se séparant lentement mais sûrement de Husserl". "Plus spécifiquement, voyons que la refonte heideggérienne de l'état de choses en situation s'autorise d'une critique de la théorie qui, chez Husserl, soutient sa conception du *Sachverhalt*. Cette théorie n'est autre que la « logique *a priori* de l'objectité » déjà mentionnée plus haut (GA60, 14)". "La situation n'est ni une catégorie ontologico-formelle, ni un corrélat intentionnel d'acte, ni un fonds ontologique mondain – comme Husserl a pu le soutenir des *LU* aux *Ideen* –, mais l'« expression du soi », c'est-à-dire une « expérience de la vie » non disloquée, « sans objectivation » d'aucune sorte, structurée dès son origine par une signifiante et conservée dans son monde (GA58, 258)".

⁵⁵ Heidegger says that Aristotle's division "has been strongly challenged—by Bolzano for example Bolzano [Heidegger refers to *Wissenschaftslehre*, vol. 1, §22, pp. 87ff] and in a certain sense even by Husserl—to the effect that even sentences expressing wishes, commands, and questions are thought to have the property of statements".

see whether discussing the phenomenon of truth can lead us to a foundation on which we can at least correctly pose (if not resolve) the much-debated question about the expression of objectivizing and non-objectivizing acts". But he recognizes the importance of this problem: "getting a clear resolution of the question is a basic presupposition for any scientific grammar"; and we read in a footnote that "unless this question is clarified, the optative and the imperative cannot be conceptually understood in contrast to the indicative". The distinction between positing and not-objectivizing acts (and between indicative and not-indicative forms), therefore, appears to be a kind of 'grammatical structure' that must be discussed in relation to the more fundamental problem of the truth; the very idea of defining certain acts *by opposition* to the indicative reveals a dogmatic approach to the problem. Even though Heidegger rejects this grammatical opposition, I think that in Heidegger's perspective all objectivizing acts derives from not-objectivizing acts; in other terms: every 'thesis' depends on a 'synthesis'.

§ 7. *Pars pro toto*: the logical Origin of Ideality

Now that we have seen what the notion of state of affairs is about, we can go back to Heidegger's wordplay (the distinction between *Sachverhalt* and *Wahrverhalt*) and consider Heidegger's use of the first notion. In *Logic* we read:

We are talking about the relation of the intended propositional content ["This board is black"] to what is intuited [this chalkboard]. So there are two issues: (A) In the proposition as such, there is the so-called propositional relation (*Satzverhalt*) in which the thing is intended according to its state of affair (in dem die Sache nach ihrem Sachverhalt gemeint ist); and equally, the state of affair (*Sachverhalt*) is also present in the thing that is intuited. (B) But further, *in identity taken as truth*, there is also a relation, that of the intended with regard to the intuited. We call this the "truth-relation" (*Wahrverhalt*), because it is a special relation, a relation of truth.

Heidegger speaks of a *Verhältnis des Satzgehaltes zum Angeschauten*, a relation concerning the *content* of the proposition *and* what is given in the intuition. This relation is *not yet* a relation between the “thing” (chalkboard) and its “determinations” (the black); it is the *intentional* relation about the *intended* and the *intuited*. Heidegger then distinguishes two relations, both present in this intentional relation: the *propositional relation*, *Satzverhalt* (as relation according to the which the *Sachverhalt* is intended); the relation as relation of identity, as intentional relation of truth in the eminent sense. What I think Heidegger is trying to show with this rather confusing sequence of terms (*Sachverhalt*, *Satzgehalt*, *Satzverhalt*) is this: *since* in this relation of truth, as *relation of identity* between the propositional content (*Satzgehalt*) and the intuited (*Angeschauten*), the propositional content is intended *according* a propositional relation (*Satzverhalt*), namely – as the following lines show – as a relation having the form $S=P$, the propositional content *is also* a relation between contents (a relation between the chalkboard and the black). While the truth is relation because it is *intentional* identity, the propositional relation is a relation because it is a *proposition*. We can say: every identity is a relation, and therefore the truth as identity is a relation; but since not every relation is a truth, the propositional relation is not a relation of truth.

The aim of Heidegger’s argument is to avoid a confusion between these two forms and levels of relation (intentional and propositional). According to Heidegger, in fact, the definition of truth as state of affairs leads to such confusion. In the following lines Heidegger also says that “Husserl himself called this relation between the intended and the intuited a *Sachverhalt* and, *in accordance with its own structure*, he brought it into line with the other content-relation, $S = P$, “This board is black”. The problem with this definition, remarks Heidegger, is that

in the $S = P$ content- relation, the members of the relation are the thing and the thing's determination, whereas in case B, the relation is between the intended as such and the intuited as such. Now if you take this truth-relation of Case B in the very broadest sense, it has the same kind of being as the proposition—ideal being—and so the identity of the intended and the intuited can be understood as ideal being! And so, by a remarkable path, we have come back to where we started.

In the one case, the proposition as one member of the relation is ded on the intuition-truth of identity, whereas in the other case, identity itself as a state of affairs has the same kind of being as a proposition or a propositional state of affairs: ideal being.

Let us first focus on the first part of the quotation. Heidegger says that Husserl, interpreting the truth as *Sachverhalt*, conflates these two dimensions; he conflates the relation of truth with a relation between contents. In particular, the problem lies in the fact that the relation of truth, which is a relation because it is an identity between intended and intuited, is taken as a relation in the sense of the propositional relation $S=P$. Heidegger's interpretation is far from being clear.

On a first note, Heidegger's claim is, to say the least, surprising. As we have seen, in fact, in Husserl's perspective state of affairs, as primal object of the proposition, is *not* what Heidegger calls here the propositional content as relation between contents (chalkboard, black). The *premise* of Heidegger's line of reasoning is that Husserl, *defining* the truth as *Sachverhalt*, he also, "in accordance with its own structure, brought it into line with the other content-relation, $S = P$, "This board is black". Heidegger's line of reasoning runs as follows: Husserl defines the truth as state of affairs; since state of affairs has the structure $S=P$, he also defines the relation of truth as a relation between contents, between subject (the chalkboard) and predicate (the blackness).

But there is more. In the second part of the quotation Heidegger goes on saying that if we understand the relation of truth in this second sense (as relation between subject and predicate), then the truth has “the same kind of being as the proposition—ideal being—and so the identity of the intended and the intuited can be understood as ideal being! And so, by a remarkable path, we have come back to where we started”. Very likely, saying that we have come back to where we started, Heidegger means that we are back to Husserl’s idealistic position of *Prolegomena*. As the passage suggests, the reason of this lies in the *ideal* nature of the identity; in this sense, the problem is not the confusion between two forms of relations (as the first part of the quotation suggests, by distinguishing the relation as propositional relation and the identity as relation of truth), but the confusion between two forms of identity (as we shall see: the identity between subject and predicate and the identity as relation of truth).

But let us first focus on the first aspect of Heidegger’s claim (Husserl’s definition of truth as *Sachverhalt*). What is unfair of Heidegger’s claim, as I have suggested, is not the idea that Husserl defines the truth by reference to state of affairs, but the *consequences* that Heidegger draws from this definition. Husserl, indeed, does define the truth as *Sachverhalt*; but as we have seen, he does so according to a very different notion of state of affairs (the one I we have seen before). For example, at the very beginning of the § 39 of the VI *Logical Investigation* (in a passage that I have partially quoted above) Husserl does claim identify truth and state of affairs (..so ist die Wahrheit als Korrelat eines identifizierenden Aktes rein *Sachverhalt* und als Korrelat einer deckenden Identifizierung eine *Identität*) but he also says that “..the ‘being’ here in question [in the sense of identification and coincidence] is not to be confused with the ‘being’ covered by the copula in the affirmative categorical judgment. Self-evidence is a matter of total coincidence, whereas the

‘being’ of the copula corresponds generally, if not invariably to partial identifications (i.e., judgments of quality)”. On the one hand, then, we have the coincidence between subject and predicate (“die Übereinstimmung zwischen Subjekt und Prädikat”); on the other hand, we have the coincidence of the evidence (“die Übereinstimmung, welche die synthetische Form des Aktes der Evidenz ausmacht..”. *The identity of the act of identification is not the identity between predicate and subject*. It might be possible that defining the truth as state of affairs Husserl reduces the idea of truth to a *too narrow* notion of identity (the identification as correlate of the act of judgment); I shall argue that Heidegger’s as structure is a form of truth as identification, but not limited to categorial cats. However, to be sure Husserl *does not* confuse act of the identification and the identity in the sense of predication; therefore, his definition of truth as state of affairs has nothing to do with a relation between contents or meanings.

Dahlstrom [2001] is then right noticing that “it is not immediately clear what the basis of Heidegger's complaint could be” and defining “at first surprising” the fact that Heidegger “rebukes Husserl for not emerging from the shadows of the Lotzean concept of truth, traceable as it is to a definite, even if unclarified concept of being”. “The immediate focus of Heidegger's criticism is Husserl's *use of the expression* 'state of affairs' for the objective correlate of the intuition” (my emphasis). As we have said, in fact, the *premise* of Heidegger’s criticism is a *certain interpretation* of the expression *Sacvherhalt*, an interpretation which is not Husserlian at all.⁵⁶ It

⁵⁶ According to Dahlstrom [2001] “one might think that this criticism is misplaced for two [...] reasons”: 1) the term state of affairs “is employed by Husserl in this context in a quite general way that does not exclude objects of straightforward, sensory intuitions and the not relational (nominal) intentions corresponding to them; 2) “In the second place, the two expressions for truth [i.e., the truth as identity and as state of affairs] in Husserl 's elaboration of his first concept of truth should not be equated, at least not without further ado”. As to the second point, I do agree with Dahlstrom: Heidegger’s reading is quite unfair, for Heidegger says nothing about the relation between these two levels. Indeed, as I

seems very difficult to see why Husserl's definition of truth as state of affairs should lead us into an *idealistic* path. On the contrary, in the light of what we have seen so far, it seems that precisely Husserl's notion of state of affairs prevents such mistake.

How can we explain, then, Heidegger's criticism? In Dahlstrom's mind, "it is obvious to Heidegger that Husserl does not fall prey to the simpleminded logical prejudice [...] according to which the actuality of truth is equated with the validity of a judgment. Nevertheless, while recognizing the greater sophistication of Husserl's account of truth, Heidegger regards Husserl's characterization of truth as a "state of affairs" as an indication of the *same sort of ontological commitment* that underlies the Lotzean concept of truth as "the actuality of a true sentence".

Now, the question arises as to the sense in which the definition of the truth as state of affairs entails a "same sort of ontological commitment". In which sense is the definition of the truth as state of affairs a "sort of ontological commitment" *similar* to the Lotze's actuality? In which sense this commitment is, as it were, not the *same*, but of the *same sort* of that underlining Lotze's idealism? Let me note that addressing this problem we might find an answer to the question concerning the ambiguity of Heidegger's criticism of Husserl's ideality, as a criticism that does not address only to the "actuality" but also (and first of all) the "universality", as a form of ideality that, as we have suggested [§3], has its roots in a certain "logic of being", notably in the logic of state of affairs. The question

have already noted, the opposition between *Wahrverhalt* and *Sachverhalt* is too schematic. As to Dahlstrom's first point, I partially disagree. Dahlstrom is right when he notes that "Heidegger [in Ga 20 and in a footnote of Logic] announces with considerable fanfare" the difference between relational and non-relational truth (as truth in a narrow and broad sense)", while in the passage we have quoted he "ignores and contradicts" Husserl's distinction. However, in our perspective the meaning of this distinction is a problematic one, for both relational and not-relational acts involve a *theory of meaning* shaped on the structure of proposition. In other words: within an idealistic account of truth and meaning the difference between relational and not-relational acts become irrelevant, as it were.

we address now is this: How does the definition of the truth as state of affairs lead us, through a “remarkable path”, “back from where we started”, namely to the “ideal being”?

When Heidegger says that “identity itself as a state of affairs has the same kind of being as a proposition or a propositional state of affairs: ideal being” (“Identität selbst als Sachverhalt hat die Seinsart eines Satzes oder Satzeverhaltes: ideales”), one has to ask what *ideal* is supposed to mean here. In Heidegger’s perspective, as we have already seen, the expressions “ideal being” or “ideal” indicate different things. First of all, the expression “ideality” can indicate “validity of the sentence” or “not sensible”; understood in a more negative sense, “ideal” means “universal”: *Allgemeine, Wesen, Art, Gattung, genus*. Furthermore – and Heidegger is not clear on this point – this second and negative notion of ideality (as universality) can be understood in many different ways (and in relation to different sources), for example, as actual identity of what is in common or as object of an universal and true state of affairs).

A first answer is to be found Lotze’s idea of truth and ideal being as “actuality” of a content. However, I think that speaking of ideal being Heidegger refers to a more general notion of ideality as universality, as related to the structure of state of affairs. As I have already noted, Heidegger’s claim that “Identität selbst als Sachverhalt hat die Seinsart eines Satzes oder Satzeverhaltes: ideales”, gives us an important indication. What is “ideal” is the “identity itself”, the identity in the sense of the state of affairs, the identity insofar as it has “*the mode of being* of a proposition or a propositional relation”.

From this point of view, Dermot Moran [2000 pp. 39-65] poses a very good question. He first recognizes that in his definition of state of affairs as ideal, Heidegger “criticizes to Husserl for never thinking through the manner in which the state of affairs ‘obtains’ or ‘subsists’”; then he asks if this criticism “is a matter of the *internal*

structural relations of the states of affairs or something to do with truth as *what actually stands or obtains*".⁵⁷ In our perspective the problem lies in what Moran calls "internal structural relation of the state of affairs"; it is in fact this structure of meaning the condition of possibility of the ideality as a form of presence. In the passage of *Logic* we are reading, in fact, the problem of ideality is defined in relation to the "structure" of the *Sacheverhalt*. Heidegger's stress goes on the fact that that, according to the *structure of the proposition*, the members of the relation of truth are the *thing and thing's determination*. This claim is of the most importance for the question concerning the relation between synthetic structures of meaning and temporal synthesis. I will say more about this problem in the next parts, in relation to Heidegger's difference between apophantic and hermeneutic-as and in relation to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant.

A few lines before the passage I am commenting on, Heidegger compares the phenomenological concept of truth with Lotze's. Heidegger's focus is no longer on the similarities between Husserl and Lotze but on their differences. On the one hand, the propositional relation is only a part, one term of the intentional relation between intended and intuited; on the other hand, the propositional relation is the whole relation at play. In the first case "the proposition *as one* member of the relation is founded on *the intuition-truth of identity*"; "if this relation of identity between the

⁵⁷ Moran [2000]: "In these lectures, Heidegger agrees with Husserl that something new is given in categorial intuition, a *new objectivity* is given in the complex categorial act. Furthermore, in his 1925 lectures, Heidegger characterizes the objectivity given as a 'state of affairs', *Sachverhalt*, an ideal objectivity, not a real part of the act (HCT §6 63; GA 20 85–86), the recognition of which enriches our ordinary sense of reality. Heidegger, following Husserl, speaks of these 'ideal unities' as having an immutable and invariant identity (HCT §6 68; GA 20 92). But Heidegger also criticizes Husserl for never thinking through the manner in which the state of affairs 'obtains' or 'subsists' (*bestehen*, HCT §6 54; GA 20 72). Is it a matter of the internal structural relations of the states of affairs or something to do with truth as what actually stands or obtains? Heidegger is justified in pointing to serious ontological deficiencies in Husserl's account here. Heidegger tries to rethink this situation through his own account of manifestation and truth and through his analysis of the various meanings of 'is' in the 1927 lecture series".

intuited and the intended holds, then *eo ipso* the *relatum* also holds in the sense that what is intended can itself now be designated as true". Thus Heidegger says that "now we have a situation that *is the very opposite of the situation with Lotze*". In Lotze "the proposition is valid, is true, and because the proposition is valid, therefore it is objectively valid". "Because truth in the sense of identity *subsists*, therefore the proposition *is valid*. When we speak here of "subsisting," we mean the term precisely in Lotze's sense, for Lotze says: "*When relations subsist, we say they are actual.*"

According to Heidegger's interpretation, then, in Lotze what "subsists" is not the relation of truth, the being of the relation of coincidence between proposition and intuition, but a relation between contents. The subsisting of the propositional relation depends on the subsistence of their contents, on the possibility of finding 'always' (as constantly present) the same relation.⁵⁸ The truth becomes here a relation that can be valid regardless to the intentional relation in which these meanings are originally given.

The criticism, therefore, addresses a form of relation that can be intentional (the identification) or ideal (relation between contents). To be more precise, it can be both: and the problem is precisely the fact the being-true (and evident) of the state of affairs *can be* understood in an ideal sense. This structure *allows* this peculiar modification. But how is this modification possible? How is possible that the proposition, as a *part of the intentional whole*, becomes the whole in we decide what is truth? In order to address this problem I shall refer to some pages of Ga 20. In fact, in this context Heidegger

⁵⁸ Dahlstrom [2001] says that "states of affairs, it bears reiterating, are literally part-whole relations obtaining between a thing and its properties" and that "they seem to enjoy a kind of ideal status". To this we can add that the reason why these whole-part relations enjoy iteration and ideality, namely the reason why, for these relations, the possibility of iteration *matters*, is that these whole-part relations has a certain logical structure. As we shall see, for Heidegger every form of unity of manifold is basically a whole-part relation, and state of affairs is a whole-part relation based on the grammatical structure S is p.

explains, better than he does in *Logic*, the relation between *Wahrverhalt* and *Sachverhalt*; besides, this text will allow us to point out some problems that shall deal with in the second part.

§ 8. The Ambiguity of the Being

As we have seen, in *Logic* Heidegger takes for granted that the state of affairs, according to the formal structure “S=P”, are also relation between contents; it takes for granted that the intentional relation of state of affairs is “brought into line” with the relation S=P. Heidegger’s account of the notion of state of affairs in Ga 20 is more detailed and, as it were, positive. To begin with, in this text Heidegger does not take for granted the identification between state of affairs and relation between contents. Besides, in this context Heidegger explains the genesis of a relation between contents as a certain *modification* of the *meaning* of the “being”.

Heidegger [see Ga 20, 70/53] takes the Husserlian example of the assertion “the chair is yellow”. He says that “the asserted content of this assertion, is the being-yellow of the chair, a content which is also called the judged state of affairs”.⁵⁹ The problem is that this state of affairs “is subject to a twofold distinction”, and this twofold distinction depends on two different meanings of the expression “being”.

(a) On the one hand, says Heidegger, “I can stress the being in the *being-yellow* and so mean that the chair is *really* and *truly* yellow. You may have noted how we can use 'really' and 'truly'. This a *subsistence* of truth, of the *truth-relation*, subsistence of identity”. According to this first sense, a state of affairs is a relation of truth, and not a relation between contents: what is intended is *the fact* that the chair is yellow. Here the stress goes on the ‘state’, on the

⁵⁹ “Das Ausgesagte als solches, der ausgesagte Gehalt dieser Aussage ist das Gelbsein des Stuhles, welchen Gehalt man auch als den geurteilten Sachverhalt bezeichnet”.

'situation' the assertion refers to, on the being-truth of the *fact that* "the chair is yellow". Let me also note that in this passage the relation of truth is defined in terms of *Bestehen*. This confirms that the object of Heidegger's criticism is, first of all, a form of relation (relation of truth, relation between contents).

(b) On another hand, instead of focusing on the fact that the chair is yellow, I can stress the being as relation of identity between predicate and subject. Heidegger says that now I "reduce the judgment to the formula $S = P$, this emphasis refers formally to the being-P of *S*". While in first case the word "being" gives expression to the *being true of a state (Verhalt)*, and indeed (as Heidegger remarks) this expression is *interchangeable* with adverbial forms like "actually" or "truly",⁶⁰ in the second case the "being" refers to the being of a *relation (Verhalt)*, understood as a thing-like relation (*Sachverhalt*): the being has here the meaning of the copula. Heidegger makes very clear that this concept of being "does not refer to the subsistence of the truth relation"; "I do not want to say that the judged state of affairs truly is, but to express the being-P of *S*, the pertinence of the predicate to the subject". This "second concept of being [...] refers to a structural moment (*Strukturmoment*) of the state of affairs itself."⁶¹ The *state of affairs as a relation of the subject matter [Sachverhalt als Verhalt]* has the formal structure $S = P$ ". In this situation, the relation of identity, which is formally a relation, is conflated with the formal relation $S=P$.

Heidegger's definition of the being as a "structural moment" is worthy of attention. In the next section we shall see that this structural moment corresponds to a specific meaning of the apophantic-as (and, in relation to his interpretation of Kant, to a

⁶⁰ "I can stress the being in the *being-yellow* and so mean that the chair is *really* and *truly* yellow. You may have noted how we can use 'really' and 'truly' interchangeably".

⁶¹ "Mit diesem zweiten Begriff von Sein ist nicht wie im ersten der Bestand des Wahrverhaltes gemeint, sondern ein Strukturmoment des Sachverhaltes selbst".

specific form of synthesis, the predicative-apophantic synthesis). Very likely Heidegger uses the expression “structural moment” in a Husserlian sense. According to Husserl’s whole-part theory a “moment” is a non-independent part of the whole (see Robert Sokolowski [2010], p. 23).⁶² In this sense, in the state of affairs as S=P-relation the “being” is a “structural moment” that depends on the “whole” of the proposition. But originally, this structural moment is a moment of an intentional whole.

As Heidegger explains, state of affairs can be understood not only as a *new objectivity* having the structure of a whole-part relation, but also, and *most importantly*, as a whole-part relation whose members are a subject and a predicate. This is the notion of state of affairs that Heidegger in *Logic* criticizes as a *propositional whole*. Heidegger writes in Ga 20 that “the new objectivity, the state of affairs, is characterized as a specific relation whose members give what is articulated in them in the form of subject and predicate.”⁶³ For Heidegger the structure of the state of affairs is problematic precisely

⁶² “Moments are parts that cannot subsist or be presented apart from the whole to which they belong; they cannot be detached. Moments are *non-independent parts*”.

⁶³ Pages later (see. Ga 20, 85/63), in a the paragraph called “acts of synthesis”, Heidegger defines better this problem. He takes the example of “the simple perception of an entity”, like the perception of the yellow chair, in which “the real parts and moments included in it do not stand out in relief”. We can bring into relief this moment: “the simple accentuation of the q, of the ‘yellow’ in the perceived chair, in the S, that is, in the whole of the subject matter perceived as a unity”. “Simply drawing out the color *as a specific property* in the chair first makes the q, the ‘yellow,’ present as a moment [...] Accentuating q as something which is in S however also involves accentuating S as a whole containing the q within itself”. This becoming visible of the *moments of the whole* (the yellow of the yellow chair) and of the *whole as containing the moments* (the chair that is yellow) is, Heidegger says, what “we call the state of affairs”. The state of affairs is a “new objectivity [...] characterized as a *specific relation whose members give which is articulated in them in the form of subject and predicate*”. The articulation of the state of affairs, then, is that of “subject” and “predicate”; it is a *new objectivity* precisely because it is a *relation*, because what is intended is intended in a certain way, through a syntactical category. What is important to stress here is that “the sequence of accentuating.. “does not ultimately and authentically depict *how such an accentuation of a state of affairs is carried out*...What is primary is not first drawing q out, then S as the whole, and finally taking them together”. What is primary, says Heidegger, “*is the relating itself*, through which the members of the relation as such first become explicit”.

because it allows the transformation of an *intentional whole* (as relation that can be differently articulated according different structures) into a *propositional whole* (relation between whose members are a subject and a predicate). As we shall see in more detail in the next part, the sense in which relation of truth and relation between contents are different kind of *Ganzheit*.⁶⁴ What links these two structures, what mediates them, is the structural moment of the being; the sense of the being as a moment is different according the intentional whole and the propositional whole.

Thus the problem lies, as Heidegger says, in the *Sachverhalt als Verhalt*, in the state of affairs insofar as it it “has the formal structure (die formale Struktur $S = P$). To sum up, the two meanings of the being are: 1) being as Bestand des Wahrverhaltes; *als Wahrverhalt*, as Bestand und Stehen des Sachverhaltes im Wahrverhalt; 2) *Sein als Verhältnisfaktor des Sachverhaltes*; as *Sein der Kopula*; as *Strukturmoment des Sachverhaltes*. The *Sachverhalt*, as *Verhalt*, has the formal structure of predication; in this structure the being appears as *Verhältnisfaktor*.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Sokolowski [2010] provides an account of how categorial objects (as a whole-part relations) are formed; this account is very close to that of Heidegger. Sokolowski takes the example of a damaged car, and explains what is “needed to establish a categorial object. We interrupt the continuous flow of perception; we go back to the whole (the car), and we now take it precisely as being the whole, and simultaneously we take the part we had highlighted (the abrasion) as being a part in that whole. We now register the whole as containing the part. A relation between whole and part is articulated and registered. At this point we can declare, “This car is damaged.” This achievement is a *categorial intuition*, because the categorial object, the thing in its articulation, is made actually present to us. We do not just have *the car* present to us; rather, *the car's being damaged* is made present. What happens in this third stage is that the whole (the car) is presented specifically as the whole, and the part (damaged) is presented specifically as a part. The whole and its part are explicitly distinguished. A relation between them is distinctly registered. An articulation is achieved. A state of affairs clicks into place. We have moved from sensibility to intellection, from mere experiencing to an initial understanding. We have moved from the single-rayed intentionality of perception to the many-rayed intentionality of judgment. We have entered into categorial thinking”.

⁶⁵ “.. gemeint ist das *Sein der Kopula* - der Stuhl ist gelb. Mit diesem zweiten Begriff von Sein ist nicht wie im ersten der Bestand des Wahrverhaltes gemeint, sondern ein Strukturmoment des Sachverhaltes selbst. Der *Sachverhalt als Verhalt* hat die formale Struktur $S = P$ ”; “In dem Ausdruck: ‘der Stuhl ist gelb’ sind beide

Now, the reason why Heidegger insists on this point is that (as we read) “these two concepts of truth and the corresponding two concepts of being were established in the initial elaboration of phenomenology and have persisted in further developments”; however, these two meanings “have never been worked out phenomenologically”. Heidegger also says that these considerations are “important to keep in mind since we shall later raise the *fundamental question of the sense of being* and thus come to face the question of whether the concept of being can really be originally drawn in this context [...] and whether truth is primarily a phenomenon which is to be originally conceived in the context of assertions or, in the broader sense, of objectifying acts” [73/54].⁶⁶

This passage is very rich. On a general note, Heidegger is here saying that the question of being is a question concerning the “sense” (*Sinn*); however, he also says that this sense of the being (the being *as a sense*) is not originally related (and understandable by reference) to assertions and objectifying acts. On the contrary, precisely in the context of objectifying acts, the sense of the being becomes ambiguous and problematic. It arises the question why Heidegger’s phenomenology of the sense, despite the ambiguity of the being, is defined a question concerning the (sense of the) being. However, I said in the *Introduction*, in order to pose this question we first have to understand what meaning and sense are in general.

Bedeutungen von Sein gemeint - *Sein als Verhältnisfaktor des Sachverhaltes als solchen und Sein als Wahrverhalt*, genauer: *Bestand und Stehen des Sachverhaltes im Wahrverhalt*”.

⁶⁶ “Diese beiden Begriffe von Wahrheit und entsprechend die beiden Begriffe von Sein sind in der ersten Ausbildung der Phänomenologie gewonnen worden und haben sich in der weiteren Entwicklung durchgehalten. Es ist wichtig das festzuhalten, weil wir später die *grundsätzliche Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein* stellen und vor die Frage gelangen, ob man überhaupt ursprünglich den Begriff von Sein an diesem Zusammenhang des Wahrseins und des entsprechenden Wirklichseins schöpfen kann, und ob Wahrheit primär ein Phänomen ist, das am Aussagen, bzw. im weiteren Sinn an objektivierenden Akten ursprünglich zu fassen ist oder nicht”.

As we have seen, in Heidegger's mind, despite these two concepts of being (being as propositional *Verhältnisfaktor* and as *Wahrverhalt*) "have never been worked out phenomenologically", they were nevertheless "*established* in the initial elaboration of phenomenology and have persisted in further developments". For Heidegger this confusion not only was *established* in the initial elaborations of phenomenology (namely in the *Logical Investigations*), but *persisted* in further developments (namely, in *Ideas I*). This remark is interesting, especially if we recall how Heidegger presents Husserl's idealism in *Logic*. He says in fact that "in one regard (*im einer Hinsicht*) Husserl himself basically overturned (*grundverkehrt*)" his idealistic position "right after his *Logical Investigations*"; but he also says that "nonetheless (*trotzdem*) he continues to hold on to the determination of truth as ideal being". If our interpretation is right, the reason why Husserl has never completely abandoned a sort of *ontological* commitment for the ideality is to be found in a unclarified and ambiguous notion of being, in the paradigmatic role of a 'logical' conception of 'being'.

We have already noted that in Heidegger's perspective the consequences of Husserl's fascination for ideality are twofold, for it affects both the concept of truth and the theory of meaning. It has been noted (for example by John J. Drummond [2009]) that Husserl's analysis of *noema* is shaped on the structure of proposition. In a similar perspective, Welton [1983] observes that "the paradigm from which Husserl's logistic phenomenology extracts the basic structures of intentionality is the predicative act". In a similar perspective Benoist speaks of "privilège phénoménologique de la forme-noyau substantive, qui ne me paraît en toute rigueur être rien d'autre qu'un effet rétro-actif de syntaxe (et du privilège, en lui-même tout à fait arbitraire, de la forme prédicative classique dans l'analyse husserlienne de la syntaxe) sur le plan qui est supposé être asyntaxique". According to Benoist in phenomenology the very idea

of identification still reveals a predicative prejudice: “[la] problématique d’identification et de détermination de l’objet qui demeure bien celle du jugement assez grossièrement transposée”. I have quoted this passage because, as we shall see, the notion of identification as unity of manifold, the very idea of object as unity of manifold determinations, does play a crucial role. Question arises as to the conditions of identification and as to the condition of the manifoldness of forms of identification and identity, as not only related to the predicative form (to which Benoist refers).

II. THE GRAMMAR OF THE MANIFOLD

§ 9. Categorical Intuitions

Heidegger's interpretation of ideality might appear unfair towards Husserl. However, Heidegger seems to recognize a real difficulty in Husserl's account of meaning as relation between universal meanings and singular acts. Heidegger's phenomenology can be understood as reaction to this account of meaning and, more in general, as an attempt to re-think the possibility of the sense as related to synthetic condition, which constitutes the very possibility of something like identical meanings and contents. Something like an ideal meaning is only possible as an 'abstract' of an intentional and synthetic whole. In the elaboration of this idea understanding of meaning and sense Husserl's categorial intuition is important for two reasons: on the one hand, it shows that structures of meaning like state of affairs always involves a synthetic moment of sense that one cannot reduce to any perceptual content. On the other hand, it shows that acts like state of affairs are founded on more complex structures of sense.

In different texts Heidegger establishes an essential link between his ontology and Husserl's categorial intuition. In Ga 20 he defines the categorial intuition (along with intentionality and *a priori*) the greatest discovery of phenomenology. In the late document *Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie* (1963), Heidegger says that "the difference between sensuous and categorial intuitions, worked out in that *Investigation*, revealed to me its importance for the determination of the 'manifold meaning of Being'". However, the reasons of this claim is not at first clear. The alleged relevance of Husserl's categorial intuition for Heidegger's phenomenology and ontology has been differently interpreted. According to Dahlstrom [p. 80], "the reason for this greater emphasis [on categorial intuition] is undoubtedly Heidegger's strategy; his exposition of Husserl's discoveries is designed to demonstrate how Husserl uncovers the

basis and the limitations of the logical prejudice". As we have seen, in fact, Heidegger's 'genealogy of ideality' presupposes the notion of categorial intuition and he elaborates the idea of truth as identity precisely in relation to Husserl's concept. At the same time, however, we have also noted that in Heidegger's view Husserl remains committed to an idea of truth and identification still orientated in the sense of predicative and objectifying acts. This is maybe way, as noted by Einar Øverenget [1998, p. 35], in *Being and Time* "...Heidegger displays total silence when it comes to the role of the notion of categorial intuition in his project". Thus Øverenget argues "that Husserl's distinction between sensuous intuition and categorial intuition [...] furnishes a ground that is of capital importance for the peculiarly Heideggerian approach to the *Seinsfrage*". Øverenget even says that "without this distinction Heidegger would have had no access to the appearance of Being and thus no way of distinguishing it from the appearance of beings. In short, what will later be known as the *ontological difference* (a term hardly employed in BT but which nevertheless is to be found in the marginal notes in Heidegger's own copy) springs out of Husserl's distinction between sensuous and categorial intuition".

But how, exactly, the difference between sensuous and categorial intuition can help us to understand Heidegger's ontological difference? In what follows, I shall not try to address this question; in fact, this would require an examination of Heidegger's ontological difference (not only as *ontologische Differenz*, but also as *ontologische Unterscheidung*, as pre-ontological distinction between *Sein* and *Seiende*). Instead I will ask about the meaning, in Heidegger's perspective, of Husserl's distinction between sensuous and categorial intuition, focusing in particular on the notion of "category". I am not here interested in providing a detailed account of Heidegger's interpretation of Husserl's VI Logical Investigation.

Heidegger's interpretation of Husserl's categorial intuition in Ga 20 will be considered in relation to the question of the synthesis.

What links the notion of categorial intuition to our question is the idea, to put it roughly, that for both a Kantian and an Husserlian perspective *categories* are synthetic forms. The concept of categorial intuition brings to the fore the problem of what a categories in general as synthetic form.⁶⁷

A first, general definition of what a category is for Heidegger can be found precisely in Ga 20 [97/71]:

Categorial acts constitute a new objectivity (*Gegenständlichkeit*). This is always to be understood intentionally and does not mean that they let the things spring up just anywhere. '*Constituting*' does not mean producing in the sense of making and fabricating; it means *letting the entity be seen in its objectivity (Sehenlassen des Seienden in seiner Gegenständlichkeit)*

Thus, we can define categories as *forms of constitution*. Heidegger also explains that these "forms" are nothing like "constructs of acts but objects which manifest themselves in these acts". (Let me note that in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant the *Gegenständlichkeit* of the object is defined precisely in relation to a "pure category").

In another passage of Ga 20 [p. 89/66], Heidegger emphasizes that "by understanding what is present in categorial intuition we can come to see that the objectivity of an entity is really not exhausted by this narrow definition of reality, that objectivity in its broadest sense is much richer than the reality of a thing, and what is more, that the reality of a thing is comprehensible in its structure only on the basis of the full objectivity of the simply experienced entity".

⁶⁷ As Heidegger recalls [Ga 22, p. 156], the nature of categories is twofold. On the one hand, categories are modes of being, on the other, categories are modes of logos (in the sense of assertion). The expression "category" refers to "Unterscheidungen innerhalb des Seienden hinsichtlich seines Seins". On the other hand, these distinctions are understood as modification of the idea of being.

Even the most simply experience is, in Heidegger's perspective, *categorial*: what is real, what is given in a strict sense, is always disclosed or constituted according a certain 'categorial form'.

As noted above, Heidegger in *Being and Time* does not make any use of the notion of categorial intuition. However, we do find the notion of category. Here Heidegger presents two categories: *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit*. [see. § 18]. With these two terms Heidegger refers to "Seinsbestimmungen des nicht daseinsmäßigen Seienden": 1) das Sein des zunächst begegnenden innerweltlichen Seienden (*Zuhandenheit*); 2. das Sein des Seienden (*Vorhandenheit*). In what follows I shall try to show how these two terms indicate different possible structures that can be understood precisely in relation to different forms of synthesis (i.e, hermeneutic-as, apophantic-as).

Let us now turn our attention to Heidegger's presentation, in the § 6 of Ga 20, of the notion of categorial intuition. Heidegger says:

The discovery of categorial intuition is the demonstration, first, that there is a simple apprehension (*ein schlichtes Erfassen*) of the *categorial*,* such constituents in entities (solcher Bestände im Seienden) which in traditional fashion are designated as *categories* and were seen in crude form quite early [in Greek philosophy, especially by Plato and Aristotle]. Second, it is above all the demonstration that this apprehension is invested in the most everyday of perceptions and in every experience (*dieses Erfassen in der alltöglichsten Wahrnehmung und jeder Erfahrung investiert ist*).

Theodor Kisiel, the editor of the English translation, underscores the terms "categorial" and "categories", explaining his decision in a footnote that reads:

I have underscored these two terms because student notes indicate that Heidegger highlighted their distinction in his summary review of this lecture hour. The basic point is that categories are already 'seen' in perception, for example,

though not *as* categories but such that the simple perception of an object is in its way *absorbed and engrossed* in categorial apprehension. Categorial intuition here is intuition of that which is then *conceptually grasped as a category*. There is therefore a distinction between the *categorial*, that which can eventually be grasped as a category, and the *category* as a concept.

I find Kisiel's remark very helpful and worthy of being further articulated:

(a) Firstly, the expression "categorial intuition" refers to the fact that perception always involves an apprehension of a category. As Heidegger puts it in a very famous passage of this text, we do not say what we see, we see what we say. (I shall refer to this passage in the next paragraph). Categories in this sense, then, are what is "already 'seen' in perception", *even though* they are not seen "as categories". This leads us to the second notion of categorial intuition. (b) In this second sense, "categorial intuition" is the "intuition of that which is then *conceptually grasped as a category*". In what follows I shall call these two concepts of categorial intuition, respectively: 1) "categorial perception", where the *adjective* categorial indicates a character of perception; 2) "intuition of category", where the expression "category" refers to the *objet* of a thematic intuition.

However, right after the passage I have quoted, Heidegger says that with this explicitation *ist nur erst die Wortbedeutung geklärt*. "What matters is to exhibit this kind of intuition itself, to bring it to givenness as intentionality, and to make clear *what* is intuited in it and *how*". It must be seen, in particular, *what kind* of categories are *already* involved in *every* experience, and therefore what *kind* of intuition gives us access to these categories as "constituents in entities (*Bestände im Seienden*)". To answer to this question we must pay close attention to the text of Ga 20. On a first note, it must be noted that in his presentation Heidegger has clearly in mind the § 52 of the VI Logical Investigation. In this context Husserl distinguishes

two forms of categorial acts. Both these acts are founded on a simple act, even though in a different way.

Broadly speaking, founded acts, as writes Heidegger, are not “only a formalized *repetition* (*Wiederholung*) of the simply giving act”.

84/63: Quite generally, the following can be said of the relationships (*Verhältnis*) of the founded acts to the simple founding acts: The founded acts, the categorial acts, are indeed directed toward (*richten sich auf*) the objectivities co-positd (*mit-gesetzen*) in them from the simple acts, the founding acts, but in a manner which does not coincide with the intentionality of the simply giving act, as if the founded categorial act were only a formalized repetition of the simply giving act. This implies that the founded acts *disclose* the simply already given (*vorgegebenen*)⁶⁸ objects *anew* (*neu erschließen*), such that these objects come to explicit (*expliziten*) apprehension precisely in what they are.

Categorial acts disclose new objects. This, for Heidegger, means that “these objects come to explicit apprehension precisely in what they are”. As we shall see, the idea that categorial acts disclose the object *anew* or disclose *new objects* can be differently understood. To this regard, as I have anticipated, Heidegger follows Husserl and draws a distinction between two kinds of categorial acts. Heidegger makes clear the importance of this distinction when he says: “two groups of such categorial, founded acts shall be considered in order to bring out the essential elements (*das Wesentliche*) of categorial intuition: 1) *acts of synthesis*, 2) *acts of universal intuition*, or better, *acts of intuition of the universal*, or in more rigorous terminology, *acts of ideation*”. Thus, in order to understand “the essential” (*das Wesentliche*) of the categorial intuition we must keep in mind this distinction.

The distinction between acts of synthesis and acts of ideation is important for two reasons. However, as Heidegger presents it, this

⁶⁸ The English translation omits “vorgegeben”.

distinction between acts of synthesis and acts of ideation is far from being clear. This depends, in part, on the fact that Heidegger's presentation is highly interpretative.

Let us start with this very general and preliminary remark.

(A) On the one hand, categorial acts in the first sense, namely acts of synthesis, are important for they bring to the fore the question of the synthesis, the question of the nature and the 'place' of the synthesis. For sure, categorial acts in Husserl's sense belong to a framework (assertion and objectifying acts) that Heidegger would label as 'derived'. But this is in part why they are worthy of attention: categorial acts invite us to ask *if* the synthesis takes place *only* in acts of synthesis in a strict sense. As I have already suggested in the first part, Heidegger strongly criticizes predicative acts, precisely because he wants to grasp a more 'relational' notion of meaning and truth.

(B) On the other hand, acts of ideation bring to the fore the methodological problem concerning the specific kind of intuition that gives access to the *a priori*. In Ga 20 Heidegger makes this very important remark: the "consideration of acts of ideation at the same time gives us the transition to the third discovery of phenomenology we shall discuss, the *characterization of the a priori*".⁶⁹ As we have already seen, Heidegger criticizes the identification between ideality (*a priori*) and universality; besides, he says that with the elaboration of the question of being, *also* the characterization of the specific *Erfassung* of the *a priori* as ideation.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ "The decisive character of the discovery of categorial intuition [can be summarized in a threefold way]: [1.] There are acts in which ideal constituents show themselves in themselves, which are not constructs of these acts, functions of thinking or of the subject. [2.] The possibility of this kind of intuition and of what presents itself in it provides the basis for bringing out the structures of these ideal objects, for working out the categories. In other words, the discovery of categorial intuition for the first time concretely paves the way for a genuine form of research capable of demonstrating the categories".

⁷⁰ Einar Øverenget [1998 p. 62] notes: "Before Heidegger discusses acts of ideation, he analyzes acts of synthesis. This order is not accidental but reflects the necessity of approaching founded acts step by step. In this context this means that we must start with the founded acts of synthesis which co-intend their founding

Let us now focus on how Heidegger actually deals with this distinction. With an act synthesis, we can say, the *same* object is disclosed in a *new way*. By means of syntactic categories like “and”, “or”, “is”, a given object is *articulated*. State of affairs are the typical example. In state of affairs the category of being (“is”) allows us to see *this* (yellow) chair *as yellow*. Now these syntactical objectivities (the “is”, the “and”, the “or”) are ideal and *a priori*, but not in the sense of something universal; the identity of the proposition, as we have seen, is nothing like the sameness of a general content. In a passage that Heidegger emphatically quotes, Husserl says that the “source” of concepts like “state of affairs” and “being (in the copulative sense)” is not to be found in a reflection upon judgments but in these fulfillments themselves”; these concepts, as Heidegger explains, are not to be found *in the acts* as objects, but in the objects of these acts, in the correlates of these acts. “The categories ‘being’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘this’, ‘one’, ‘several’, ‘then’, are nothing like consciousness, but are correlates of certain acts”. “The categorial ‘forms’ are not something made by acts, but rather objects that in these acts become visible in themselves”.⁷¹

As we shall see, Heidegger finds in Kant’s schematism a very similar methodological problem (categories are forms of synthesis which are not to be found in what is given, forms of objectivity which cannot be obtained by way of *Verallgemeinerung*), with the

objectivity and then proceed to acts of ideation which, although founded, do not actually coin tend the founding objectivity”. I agree on the idea that Heidegger’s presentation is not accidental; but I am not sure about the exact meaning of this order.

⁷¹ One might argue that in his criticism of Husserl’s transcendental reduction Heidegger plays against Husserl the notion of categorial intuition. Heidegger in fact (as I have already suggested in § 3) believes that Husserl’s transcendental reduction, as is its also an eidetic reduction, involves a kind of ‘reflective’ *Einstellung*. We might say that in Heidegger’s view, within the transcendental reduction acts are not understood in relation to their objects (the being-in-the-world), in relation to their *correlates*, but as contents of an act of reflection.

essential difference that in this context Heidegger makes explicit the temporal origin of these categories.⁷²

Let us now turn our attention to the acts of ideation. These acts do not just constitute the (same) object anew: they give a *new* object. Heidegger stresses the fact that these acts do not intend *directly* the object. While in the first case the act intends the object (this yellow chair), but in a new way (as being yellow), in the second case, what the act intends is not, as it were, how *this* very object is (yellow), but something “universal”, something that we can find *also* in this object. Heidegger says: “this ‘seeing from’ (*Heraussehen*) of the idea is a founded act, since it is based upon an already given apprehension of individuation (*vorgegebenen Erfassen von Vereinzelung*). But the objective (*das Gegenständliche*) here, which ideation allows us to see anew (*was die Ideation neu sehen läßt*), the idea itself, the identical unity red: this objective is not the individuation, this particular red. The individual is indeed founding, but in such a way that it is precisely not cointended, as it is in the ‘and’ of conjunction, which cointends both this and that, raises this ‘a’ and ‘b’ up into the new objectivity. (*das ‘und’ das eine und das andere mitmeint, dieses ‘a’ und ‘b’ mit in die neue Gegenständlichkeit hebt*). Here, however (*dagegen*), the founding objectivity is *not* taken up into the content of what is intended in ideation”.

What can we obtain from this presentation of the difference between “acts of synthesis” and “acts of ideation”? Can we draw any

⁷² Ga 20, p. /58: "This chair is yellow and upholstered." This S is P and Q. Our question is whether this assertion finds its complete fulfillment in what is perceived. Is every intention within the full intending and asserting perceptually demonstrable in the subject matter? In short, is the perceptual assertion which gives expression to perception demonstrable perceptually? [...] To direct our question more precisely into the particulars of this assertion: Are the 'this,' the 'is,' the 'and' perceptually demonstrable in the subject matter? I can see the chair, its *being-upholstered* and its *being-yellow* but I shall never in all eternity see the 'this,' 'is,' 'and' as I see the chair. There is in the full perceptual assertion a *surplus of intentions* whose demonstration cannot be borne by the simple perception of the subject matter.

conclusion concerning the alleged importance of the difference between categorial and sensuous intuition for Heidegger's phenomenology? The question is difficult because an intuition can be defined "categorial" according different senses: according different senses of "category" (a synthetic form, something universal), but also considering whether or not the intuition co-intend the singular.⁷³ It is therefore highly difficult to tell what 'kind' of categorial intuition Heidegger has here in view.⁷⁴

It is now important to note that when Heidegger speaks of "universal", he refers not only to the universal in the sense of a general idea, like the red for example. In fact Heidegger presents the ideation also in this way [p. 91]: "The acts of universal intuition give what is seen in the matters first and simply (*die Akte der*

⁷³ It is in this sense that we must distinguish the categorial intuition as 'pure' intuition of a formal category, that is, as a form of ideation that intends a formal object, and the categorial intuition as intuition (and explication) of an individual through a formal category, namely a categorial perception. Bernet [1988] notes that "intuition catégoriale n'est que très exceptionnellement l'intuition de la pure catégorie formelle; le plus souvent ce n'est rien d'autre qu'un acte qui établit explicitement des relations impliquées dans la perception: relation synthétique entre objets sensibles ou relation ideative entre l'objet sensible et son concept".

⁷⁴ From this point of view I *partially* disagree with Costa. Costa [p.142] says: "...ci sono due diversi tipi di atti categoriali: quelli *della sintesi* (per esempio 'la penna e la matita'), che collegano un oggetto ad un altro o esplicitano qualcosa di un oggetto (per esempio 'il tavolo è verde') e quelli dell'*ideazione*, che collegano un oggetto sensibile con il suo significato, permettendo così all'ente di manifestarsi nel suo essere. Sono questi ultimi che diverranno decisive all'interno del discorso di Heidegger, perché essi rappresentano il presupposto dei primi. Non vi è infatti dubbio che, perché possano esservi atti della sintesi, della disgiunzione ecc. devono essere già date delle identità oggettuali, e dunque enti nel loro essere". Costa makes a distinction between categorial acts of synthesis and acts that *connects* the sensible object with its meaning, letting the object be seen. He rightly notes that precisely these acts are important for Heidegger, since categorial acts of synthesis already presupposes that the being is disclosed in its meaning. However, I do not think that in Heidegger's perspective the act that discloses the object in the first place and its meaning can easily be defined as an act of ideation. The problem of Heidegger's interpretation of categorial intuition is, to put it very roughly, precisely this: on the one hand, he is interested in synthetic acts; on the other hand, his idea synthetic acts has nothing to do with categorial forms in strict sense. The fact that categories given in perception are not syntactical and predicative does not entail that they are universal and Costa's interpretation, speaking of ideation, might suggest this idea. This amounts to say that Heidegger's categories cannot be easily defined by reference to the difference between acts of synthesis and acts of ideation; or, better, this is possible, but only under certain conditions.

allgemeinen Anschauung geben das, was man zunächst und schlicht an den Sachen sieht). When I perceive simply, moving about in my environmental world, when I see houses, for example, I do not first see houses primarily and expressly in their individuation, in their distinctiveness. Rather, I first see universally: this is a house. This ‘as-what’, the universal feature of house.. (*Wenn ich schlicht wahrnehme, mich in meiner Umwelt bewege, so sehe ich, wenn ich Häuser sehe, nicht Häuser zunächst und primär und ausdrücklich in ihrer Vereinzelung, Unterschiedenheit, sondern ich ehe zunächst allgemein: das ist ein Haus. Dieses Als-was, der allgemeine Charakter von Haus..*). Seen in this light, the ideation seems to indicate that kind of perception characterizing our everydayness, since our perception is always perception of something universal: not in the sense of a theoretical *Heraussehen* of the idea, but as the simple perception of something as it appears “in general”.⁷⁵ Thus, what is seen is not *the* individual house, neither a *general* idea of house (the house as *the general*), but *a* house *in general*, a house *überhaupt*. This idea of generality plays an important role in *Being and Time*, in relation to different structures.

However, besides the idea of categorial perception as perception of something general there is *another* form of categorial perception, which has to do with the synthetic structure of meaning. The relation between these two levels is complex and Heidegger, as we shall see, does not say much about this problem. However, I think that this second aspect or concept of categorial intuition has *a priority* in Heidegger’s idea of sense as unity of manifold.

It must now be noted the presentation of categorial intuition that Heidegger gives in the § 6 d is somewhat incomplete. In the § 6a in

⁷⁵ According to Bernet [1988], this presentation of acts of ideation and ideas as Als-was, das Aussehen von etwas, constitutes a “dérapiage par rapport a l’orthodoxie husserlienne”.

fact Heidegger makes some important remarks. These remarks presuppose the § 52 of the VI Logical Investigation.

In this specific context Heidegger is referring to what I suggested to call “intuition of category”. Heidegger distinguishes between *pure* categorial intuition, *mixed* categorial intuition and *abstraction* as different forms of ideation. “Ideation constitutes a new objectivity: *generality*. Now, intuitions which exclude not only everything individual but also everything sensory from their objective content are *pure categorial intuitions*, in contrast to those which still include sensory components, *categorially mixed intuitions*”. In this sense, Heidegger draws a distinction between different forms of ideation: ideation in the sense of *abstraction* (“color”, “judgment”); *mixed* categorial ideation (being-colored, axiom of parallels); *pure* categorial abstraction, that refers to pure concepts (unity, plurality, relation).

As we shall see, in Heidegger’s perspective categories involved in (categorial) perception are neither strictly formal (forms of categorial connections) nor general (ideas in a broad sense); this means that the ‘intuition’ of these categories as objects is neither a pure categorial nor a *mixed* intuition. I shall argue that Heidegger’s categories of meaning are, to a certain extent, formal. More precisely, categories of meaningfulness are formal-indicating, they cannot be obtained by way of generalization or formalization because they do not ‘contain’ under themselves a set of *homogeneous* concretions. A formal indicating category, as we shall see, merely pre-delineates a possible forms of unity of manifold, as form subjected to factual, and yet ontologically relevant variations.

§ 10. The Necessity of the Forms

In his article *Intuition catégoriale et voir comme* [2001] Benoist discusses the alleged parallelism between Husserl’s categorial intuition and Wittgenstein’s *seeing as*. Against this idea, Benoist

draws a sharp distinction between two notions of categorial (a strict concept and a broader one). Taken in its broad sense, categorial intuition can be understood as a “seeing as”; however, understood in its strict and Husserlian sense, categorial intuition involves a more radical and *strong* notion of categoriality (as category of meaning). Benoist’s article allows us to shed more light on the role of Husserl’s categorial intuition in Heidegger’s phenomenology. I agree with Benoist’s argumentation, but I would like to discuss a minor aspect of his article. According to Benoist, in fact, the idea of comparing Husserl’s categorial intuition and Wittgenstein’s “seeing as” depends on what Heidegger calls hermeneutical model (p. 597); he speaks of “une vulgate dans la phénoménologie continentale (hormis peut-être chez les heideggeriens les plus endurcis, décidés à enfermer Husserl dans la figure d’une espèce d’intuitionnisme naïf) selon laquelle Husserl aurait entrevu le caractère tout uniment catégorial de l’intuition”.⁷⁶

Let us first see what Benoist intends with the distinction between the two meanings of the categorial. The first sense that Benoist underlines is indeed quite ‘Heideggerian’. We read that

notre perception est toujours constituée, informée de sens, catégorisée — pour parler comme Kant, qu’elle ne va pas sans concept. Ce sur quoi on attirerait notre attention, ce serait alors sur le caractère toujours déjà categorial de notre intuition.

Pas d’expérience qui ne passe au tamis de la catégorialité, et qui, comme telle, n’apparaisse alors comme expérience de telle ou telle chose comme telle ou telle. L’important dans le «voir comme» wittgensteinien comme dans l’intuition husserlienne en tant que toujours aussi intuition catégoriale (on verra comment il

⁷⁶ “Une vulgate court dans la phénoménologie continentale (hormis peut-être chez les heideggeriens les plus endurcis, décidés à enfermer Husserl dans la figure d’une espèce d’intuitionnisme naïf), selon laquelle Husserl aurait entrevu le caractère tout uniment catégorial de l’intuition: il n’y aurait pas d’intuition, pour Husserl, qui ne soit catégoriale. En un sens très affaibli de la catégorialité, au sens où pour Husserl il n’y aurait pas d’intuition sans structure et, par là-même sans signification, c’est très certainement, comme nous l’avons vu, vrai. Mais si cela veut dire que toute intuition est, au sens précis que ce terme prend chez Husserl, intuition catégoriale, c’est absolument faux”.

faudra revenir sur cette formule, au point de la retirer même), c'est précisément l'«en tant que», Als-Struktur, qui a toujours été au centre des dispositifs catégoriaux classiques: les catégories n'ont jamais eu d'autre sens que d'articuler l'en tant que, le comme (als) de l'objet.

Quite interestingly, Benoist defines this concept of categoriality using an Heideggerian term: “Als-struktur”. Benoist also speaks of “Als-was”, and recalls that this expression is used by Husserl to indicate the *matter* of the intentional act.⁷⁷ Let me just note that Heidegger does make use of this expression, and precisely in his presentation of the concept of categorial intuition. In a passage that I have already quoted, we read: “[in the perception] this ‘as-what’, the universal feature of house, is itself not expressly apprehended in what it is”. Heidegger uses this expression also in Ga 63 [p. 86]: “Das Als-was und Wie des Begegnens sei als *Bedeutsamkeit* bezeichnet; diese selbst als Seinskategorie interpretiert”.⁷⁸

We can now consider the second notion of categoriality: “on dira qu'il y a catégorialité stricto sensu à partir du moment où on a affaire à une matière grammaticalement organisée, déterminée par des composantes formelles qui contribuent activement à sa structuration et auxquelles précisément ne correspond aucune intuition sensible”; “la copule «est» [...] devient ici le paradigme même de la catégorialité. La pointe de la thèse de l'intuition catégoriale est l'idée

⁷⁷ “Ce als que l'on retrouve dans [...] le concept de matière, qui constitue le noyau du ‘sens d'appréhension’ husserlien: ‘la matière est cette propriété résidant dans le contenu phénoménologique de l'acte qui ne détermine pas seulement que l'acte appréhende l'objectité, mais aussi à quel titre [als was] il l'appréhende, quels caractères, quels rapports, quelles formes catégoriales il lui attribue’.

⁷⁸ “Was besagt Welt als Worin des Seins? Die Beantwortung läuft durch folgende *Stationen anschaulicher Vergegenwärtigung*: Welt ist, was begegnet. Das Als-was und Wie des Begegnens ist in dem beschlossen, was als *Bedeutsamkeit* bezeichnet wird. Bedeutsamkeit ist nicht eine Sachkategorie, die sachhaltige Gegenstände gegenüber anderen zu einem eigenen Bereich zusammenschließt und gegen einen anderen abgrenzt. Sie ist ein Wie des Seins, und zwar zentriert in ihr das Kategoriale des Daseins von Welt. Mit »Dasein« wird gleicherweise das Sein von Welt wie vom menschlichen Leben bezeichnet - warum, wird sich zeigen. P. 92: “Das Als-was und Wie des Begegnens sei als *Bedeutsamkeit* bezeichnet; diese selbst als Seinskategorie interpretiert”.

qu'il y a une intuition possible d'une telle forme, *non pas prise à part, à l'état isolé, mais en tant qu'elle informe un certain contenu sensible, dans sa fonction catégoriale — dont il peut y avoir plusieurs variantes du reste, conditionnant différents types de rapports au sensible, suivant le type de catégorialité qui est considérée.*"

The next step of Benoist's argumentation is the idea that the categoriality "au sens faible du terme presupposes the categoriality *stricto sensu*: ce que nous suggère alors Husserl, c'est tout simplement que, *dans le 'scope' de ce comme, en tant qu'opérateur de catégorialité au sens faible du terme, tombe toujours un complexe en réalité catégorialement (au sens fort du terme) déterminé, c'est-à-dire ayant une forme syntaxique déterminée — par exemple attributive*. Je ne vois pas le papier blanc comme blanc (comme s'il y avait là une propriété isolable, qui adviendrait à l'objet de l'extérieur, en dehors de toute forme catégoriale), mais bien plutôt comme du papier blanc — la propriété fonctionnant toujours comme un adjectif, et déterminant alors notre perception comme telle. *Le «comme» du sens d'appréhension ne paraît ici plus pouvoir échapper à une articulation catégoriale au sens fort du terme*".

I have insisted on this point because I think that also for Heidegger (and *especially* for him) what Benoist calls categoriality "au sens faible du terme" presupposes the categoriality "stricto sensu". Of course these categories are not grammatical forms. In other words, Heidegger would agree with Benoist by saying that "*le 'comme' du sens d'appréhension ne paraît ici plus pouvoir échapper à une articulation catégoriale au sens fort du terme*". The problem lies in the definition of this strong notion of categoriality.

In other words, the fact that Heidegger's notion of categoriality is not *strictly* Husserlian does not entail that it is not a strong notion of categoriality (a synthetic form). Our hypothesis, on the contrary, is that Heidegger does have a strong concept of categoriality, in the

sense that perception always involves a synthetic constitutive moment.

In order to strengthen our interpretative hypothesis, we can first of all consider this passage from Ga 22p. 272 [trans. Morchen, p. 272].

Unterschied zwischen sinnlicher und kategorialer Anschauung (Husserl Logische Untersuchungen, VI. Untersuchung, s. o. S. 123, Anm. 5; freilich nicht ohne Tendenz, den Zusammenhang mit *Kant* herzustellen). "Die Tafel ist Schwarz". Die Aussage erfüllt sich an dem Gegenstand nicht ganz; 'die' und 'ist' kann ich nicht empfinden an der schwarzen Bedeutungen, die nicht sinnlich aufweisbar sind; unsinnlich, kategorial. Ich habe dem Gegebenen, der Schwärze, schon einen bestimmten Sinn, den der Eigenschaft, zugesprochen. *In einer schlichten Wahrnehmung ist sowohl die sinnliche als auch die kategoriale Anschauung (Erfassung als Ding und in seinem Sein) beteiligt.*

Heidegger says very clearly that "in einer schlichten Wahrnehmung ist sowohl die sinnliche als auch die kategoriale Anschauung (Erfassung als Ding und in seinem Sein) beteiligt". In this context he cannot be referring to a broad notion of categoriality. Heidegger stresses one aspect in particular of what he calls (in GA 20): "surplus of intentions": "die Aussage erfüllt sich an dem Gegenstand nicht ganz". In Heidegger's perspective every act of meaning as such entails a surplus of intention in this sense (and for Heidegger every act in general is an act of meaning). In Ga 20 Heidegger makes clear that even the (apparently) simple naming already involves a synthetic form. Simple naming is just "less complicated", but never "simple" in an absolute sense. In Heidegger's perspective every perception is "expressed".

But perhaps such a demonstration is still possible in the less complicated expression of a simple naming, a so-called nominal positing (*in einem einfacheren Ausdruck, einer schlichten Nennung, einer nominalen Setzung*) of the kind "the

yellow upholstered chair." But upon closer inspection we find a surplus even here (*Aber auch hier ergibt sich bei näherem Zusehen, daß ein überschuß vorliegt*). I can see the color yellow but not the *being-yellow*, being-colored; and the expressive element 'yellow,' that is, the attribute, in its full expression in fact means "the chair being yellow." And this 'being' in this expression and in the one above in the form 'is' cannot be perceived. 'Being' is not a real moment in the chair like the wood, the weight, hardness, or color; nor is it something on the chair like the upholstery and screws.

'Being,' Kant already said, whereby he meant *being-real*, is not a real predicate of the object. This also holds for being in the sense of the copula. There is obviously no adequation between what is expressed and what is perceived (*Offensichtlich besteht auch keine Adaequation zwischen Aussage und Wahrgenommenem*). In content, what is perceived falls short of what the assertion asserts of it. The assertion expresses something which is simply not found perceptually (*Die Aussage drückt aus, was wahrnehmungsmäßig gar nicht vorfindlich ist*).

In my view, Heidegger's insistence on the idea of "surplus of intentions" does not make any sense unless we refer it to a strong (even though not strictly Husserlian) notion of categoriality. To be sure, also categories in the sense of general meanings (a house in general) entail a surplus of intention, but only categories in a strict sense introduce a radical difference between what is *expressed* and what is *perceived*. Only in relation to these categories we can really say that there is "no adequation between what is expressed and what is perceived".

As I said, for Heidegger every perception is already categorial in the sense that it involves a "surplus of intentions". This holds true not only in relation to the specific case of assertions ("Die Tafel ist Schwarz") or in relation to nominal positing, but for every act in general. In a very interesting passage of *Logic* [145/121] we find a kind of 'hermeneutic' version of the act of nominalization. Heidegger says that "speaking indicatively" about something, for example "this table here, that window over there, the chalk, the door"— already entails a disclosure" (*im hinweisenden*

Ansprechen..liegt darüber schon Aufschluss). Then Heidegger asks: “what does this disclosure consist in? Answer: the thing we encounter is uncovered in terms of the end-for-which of its serviceability (*das betreffende Seiende entdeckt ist ays dem Wozu seiner Dienlichkeit*). It is already posited in meaning—it already makes sense (*es ist schon be-deutet*). Do not understand this to mean that we were first given a something that is free of meaning, and then a meaning gets attached to it. Rather, what is first of all ‘given’—and we still have to determine what that word means—is the ‘for-writing’ the ‘for-entering-and exiting’, the ‘for-illuminating’, the ‘for-sitting’”. Speaking indicatively of “the door” already involves a surplus of sense; of course the door is given as a “door in general”; the question is: what is a door “in general”? How do we answer to the question “what is a door in general?”? What characterizes the door as a door *in general* is the fact that the door is *for* entering, but this ‘for’ is not to be found in the perception of a door. In this sense, a simple intuition (*this door*) is not *first of all* categorial in the sense of a general determination (*this door as a door überhaupt*); it is categorial for it entails a synthetic category, a moment of sense that one cannot find in what is perceived.

As we shall see, what we have called, maybe a bit improperly, synthetic category (the ‘what- for’ of the door) is defined by Heidegger *Verweisung*. To be sure, this structure is not a grammatical one. Heidegger would never *accept* this denomination, Still, what Heidegger calls *Verweisung* functions as a form of synthesis and connection (*Zusammenhang*) that articulates what is given by means of a surplus of sense. Let us take Heidegger’s example of the assertion “the hammer is too heavy”. One might ask: what does it mean, in the assertion “the hammer is too heavy!”, the “too”? As a matter of fact, the “too” *means nothing, unless we also says for who and for what* the hammer is “too heavy”. In other terms, to understand the meaning of the “too”, we must look at *what* the act

refers to (and not at the *content* of the act). In the light of our previous considerations concerning the ambiguity of state of affairs, we can note that in Heidegger's perspective the "too" has a precise function, for it makes less equivocal the structural moment "being"; the "too" emphasizes that the 'being heavy' is not a quality that belongs to the hammer. In the assertion "the hammer is too heavy!", the "too" (along with the exclamation mark) has the function of making less ambiguous, and so to speak, less predicative, the "is" as structural moment of the assertion.

Before we move into the next paragraph I would like to consider Pradelle's remark on Heidegger's interpretation of categorial intuition. According to Pradelle [2015], Heidegger's interpretation of categorial intuition "ne se limite pas à l'intuition des catégories formelles, mais englobe toute intuition d'essence ou ideation". What does it mean that Heidegger's interpretation is not limited to "formal categories"? In which sense can we say that Heidegger's interpretation "englobe toute intuition d'essence ou ideation"? Pradelle says that "en tant que mise en forme catégoriale, la perception concrète est rendue possible par un logos implicite qui peut être rendu explicite par l'intuition eidétique".

Let us see how Pradelle actually explicitates the claim that Heidegger's interpretation of categorial intuition "englobe toute intuition d'essence ou ideation". Pradelle seems to read the pre-ontological understanding of the being as form of eidetic knowledge: "*l'eidos n'est donc pas fondé sur l'objet singulier, mais co-appréhéné (miterfaßt) en toute perception concrète de singularité : c'est l'eidos qui éclaire le sens de l'objet apparaissant et permet d'appréhender ceci comme cela, l'objet singulier comme relevant d'une région – une maison comme maison, une nuance de rouge comme rouge, etc. Il y a ainsi un primat de la pré-compréhension de l'essence sur toute expérience de l'individuel [...] l'intuition eidétique est condition de possibilité du percevoir-comme..., et ainsi de*

l'intuition de l'individuel [..]". It is in this perspective that Pradelle reads the ontological difference (but I think better say distinction, *Unterscheidung*): "*la difference ontologique se situe par conséquent au coeur même de la relation intentionnelle*". The difference between Husserl and Heidegger lies, according to Pradelle, in the different sense in which the two thinkers understand the relation between universal and individual. In Heidegger, "la possibilité de donation d'un étant individuel repose en effet sur l'ouverture préalable d'un horizon de donation possible, et cette dernière, à son tour, sur la pré-compréhension du sens d'être propre à un tel horizon. Par exemple, la donation d'un *Zeug* singulier n'est possible que sur fond de compréhension de la *Zeughaftigkeit*, c'est-à-dire de l'être de l'ustensilité en general". Therefore Pradelle speaks of "abandon du rapport de fondation de l'eidétique sur l'individuel au profit de l'implication de la saisie préalable de l'essence en toute appréhension de singularité".

Pradelle stresses both the similarities and differences between Husserl and Heidegger. On the one hand, Heidegger's position can be understood as a radicalization of Husserl's idea that "toute expérience d'objet repose sur la visée intentionnelle du sens ontique (*Seinssinn*) de l'objet, et, loin d'être un contact immédiat avec l'être de l'objet, est médiatisé par une donation de sens (*Sinngebung*), laquelle relève de l'initiative de la conscience pure et déborde infiniment l'intuition effective: bref, que l'être (mondain) est précédé par le sens". On the other hand, he recognizes the *limit* of this approach: "assimiler de la sorte les positions husserlienne et heideggérienne sous le titre général de primat du sens sur l'être et de la compréhension vis-à-vis de l'expérience effective est cependant une simplification abusive, qui masque une différence essentielle: [...] la connaissance eidétique (ou catégoriale au sens large) relève d'une histoire de la formation du sens (*Sinnbildung*) qui reconduit aux expériences passées que le sujet a faites des singularités et, en

dernière instance, à des expériences premières où a eu lieu l'instauration originaire (*Urstiftung*) du sens d'un objet de tel ou tel type [...].⁷⁹

I do agree with Pradelle's reconstruction. The point I want to stress, however, concerns the specific sense of Heidegger's 'anti-Husserlian idea of sense'. Pradelle reads Heidegger's categorial intuition as "l'ouverture préalable d'un horizon de donation possible", and defines it in terms of "eidos". If we understand "eidos" in a broad sense, as Heidegger does, as intuition of something 'in its generality', Pradelle's remark is quite correct. If we understand eidos as specific intuition of universal content, then Pradelle's remark might be dangerous.. I think that the example made by Pradelle, the *Zeughaftigkeit*, proves that what he calls "l'ouverture préalable d'un horizon de donation possible" can be better understood in terms of synthetic category. The kind of categoriality that characterizes the intuition of a tool – the possibility of finding, discovering or producing tool – depends a synthetic (and not universal) category, on a holistic or mereological structure as we shall see.

§ 11. The Categories of the Discourse

So far, I have emphasized the fact that Heidegger's idea of categorial intuition cannot be understood as the intuition of something universal. However, Heidegger's idea of categorial intuition cannot be understood as an act of synthesis either, *even though* categorial perception always involves synthetic forms (the

⁷⁹ "En d'autres termes, l'entrelacs qui *de facto* unit l'expérience d'individu et d'idéalité typique ne doit pas masquer l'*ordre génétique de jure* : en-deçà de la saisie du sens idéal ou des généralités typiques, [...] Tout à fait central est, chez Husserl, ce primat du rapport de *Fundierung* du général sur l'individuel, et de la saisie de ce dernier sur celle de l'essence : [...] l'expérience des catégories et des généralités non seulement se fonde sur..., mais encore dérive génétiquement de l'expérience des objets singuliers".

what-for the the tool).⁸⁰ The problem, as I have noted, lies in the fact that these forms are no longer forms of predication. From this point of view, Heidegger's characterization of perception in terms of categorial intuition might generate some ambiguities. Strictly speaking, in fact, categorial intuition comes into play as a objectifying act that discloses the *same* object *anew*. Categorial intuition discloses what is already given *in a different way*. These acts do not constitute the object in the first place. We must note that within this framework the very difference between simple and complex acts is merely 'functional', for both these acts are complex. As Heidegger says in *Logic* [145/122]: "Yes, the thing that is understood can be apprehended directly as it is in itself (*schlicht an ihm selbst vernommen*). But this directness regarding the thing apprehended does not inhibit the act from having a developed structure (*schliesst nicht an seine verwickelte Struktur des Nehmens*)". The so-called simplicity of perception is itself 'constituted'; it is constituted by the non-expressiveness of what Heidegger calls "as-character": "Die Unausdrücklichkeit dieses [Als-Charakter] macht eben die genannte Schlichtheit aus". Thus the difference is not about synthetic and not-synthetic acts, but (if we take the term synthesis in a very broad sense) between different forms of synthetic acts. As we shall see, Heidegger's distinction between hermeneutic-as and apophantic is meant to show what, in terms of meaning, gets lost in this shift from one dimension to another. The question to be addressed now is this: how does *this* framework affect the analysis of categories? What kind of categories of synthesis do constitute the meaningfulness of the world?

⁸⁰ Øverenget [1998, p. 94] notes that "what is new with this notion of categorial intuition is not the idea of apprehending the categorial; it is instead the fact that this does not call for a special capacity, but that it is to be found in every experience". I do agree with the idea that categorial acts are to be found in every experience. I cannot express my self on the first part of Øverenget's remark, namely the idea that this idea is totally "new".

In Ga 20 [p. 89/66], following Husserl, Heidegger makes a distinction between forms of unity and multiplicity that belong to categorial acts (like conjoining and disjoining) on figural unity of perception (Heidegger refers to the notion of figural moment of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic*). These two forms of unity and synthesis must not be confused. However, in Heidegger's perspective both these forms of unity are somewhat derived. Heidegger's categories cannot be understood by reference to the difference between categorial structures and forms of sensibility. This *does not exclude* that categories that Heidegger uses in his interpretation of the meaningfulness (for example: the as-structure; the what-for; the *Verweisung*; the idea of *Ganzheit*)⁸¹ does not derive from other 'sources'. From this point of view, it is important to note – since I have mentioned the idea of figural unity of perception – that Heidegger's concept of synthesis, both in relation to structures of meaning and temporality, is always a whole-part relation. Mereology seems to be the very 'grammar' of the manifold as original totality and unity.

In a very curious passage of Ga 20 [p. 413/298] Heidegger takes into account the expressions "and" and "or", expressions that he refers to the the "phenomena of 'either-or', 'as well as', 'the-one-and-the-other-and-the other' (*die Phänomene des 'Entweder-oder', 'Sowohl-als-auch', 'das-eine-und das-andere-und-das-andere*). This phenomena shows a "define structural buildup (*eine bestimmte Aufbaustruktur*)". Heidegger notes that the "and" cannot always be understood "in the sense of the purely theoretical enumerative 'and'

⁸¹ As noted by Costa [2003, p. 205]: Si può pensare che Heidegger esaspera questa *priorità* dell'intero sulle parti. Non ci sono elementi che giungono a coscienza senza essersi resi afferrabile come un intero, che però per Heidegger non significa semplicemente una configurazione percettiva, *ma il darsi di un senso*". Everything is given, is given within (and as moment of) a whole as totality of sense. However, this whole, as long it indicates a *sense*, must be understood in a formal indicating way, namely as a structure differently articulated according different possibilities.

(im Sinne des rein theoretischen aufzählenden). Heidegger makes this example: “When I say, ‘I love my father *and* my mother’, the ‘and’ here in no sense has the meaning of counting them together, as when I say, ‘the chair’ and ‘the table’. Rather the ‘and’ here is a specific ‘and’ – the ‘and’ of loving” (*ein spezifisches, ‘Und’ – hier des Liebens*). Then Heidegger explains that this relation must be understood by reference to Dasein’s “I can” (*kann*). In a nutshell, first and foremost, we encounter the “and” as the possibility of caring for something or someone. “The ‘and’ thus first has an absolutely primary sense which is oriented towards care, towards the ‘I can’”. “To put it more precisely, however, what is primary here is not the ‘and’ but the ‘either-or.’ It is only because there is an ‘either-or’ that there is an ‘as well as’ and an ‘and’ of concern”. Heidegger says that “unfortunately” in this context he “cannot deal with the more precise structures of these correlations (*Zusammenhänge*)”. What is then the meaning of this more original structure “either-or”, as structure that characterizes the “I can” more originally than the forms like “and” and “or”?

In Ga 61 Heidegger seems to exclude any possible interpretation of intentional life in grammatical terms. In these pages Heidegger distinguishes between a verbal-transitive and intransitive sense of *Leben*. We read (Ga 61, 85): “Die intransitiv-verbale Bedeutung ‘leben’ expliziert sich, konkret vergegenwärtigt, selbst immer als ‘in’ etwas leben, ‘aus’ etwas leben, ‘für’ etwas leben, ‘mit’ etwas leben, ‘gegen’ etwas, ‘auf’ etwas ‘hin’ leben, ‘von’ etwas leben. Das ‘etwas’, was seine Beziehungsmannigfaltigkeit zu ‘leben’ anzeigt in diesen scheinbar nur gelegentlich aufgerafften und aufgezählten präpositionalen Ausdrücken, fixieren wir mit dem Terminus ‘Welt’.”. However, Heidegger also says that “hier und im weiteren betreiben wir keine Grammatisierung, da ja die grammatischen Kategorien ihren Ursprung in solchen des lebenden Sprechens, des immanenten Sprechens des Lebens selbst haben”.

As far as I can see, Heidegger's mature phenomenology does not say anything about a possible positive role of grammar. This might come as a surprise, considering the importance – rightly emphasized by Chiurazzi [1999] – of grammatical structures in Heidegger's analysis in *Being and Time*. Heidegger's scepticism towards grammar and language is motivated, first of all, by the idea grammatical analysis gives priority to the discourse as assertion. In *Being and Time* (§ 34) we read: "the basic stock of 'categories of meaning' which were passed over in subsequent linguistics, and are fundamentally still accepted as the criterion today, is oriented toward the discourse as assertion. (*Der in die nachkommende Sprachwissenschaft übergegangene und grundsätzlich heute noch maßgebende Grundbestand der »Bedeutungskategorien« ist an der Rede als Aussage orientiert*)". Thus Costa [2003, p. 266] is right when he notes: "ciò che Heidegger vuole raggiungere è dunque una teoria del significato e dell'espressione irriducibile al giudizio e all'asserzione [...] Non si tratta per Heidegger di costruire una teoria dell'esperienza e del significato che faccia a meno del linguaggio, ma di sviluppare *una teoria dell'esperienza linguistica che precede la teoria del giudizio*, e dunque di mostrare l'esistenza di risorse di senso irriducibili all'ambito logico".

However, in order to fully understand Heidegger's criticism, one must consider which *particular* aspect of the assertion Heidegger has in view. As a matter of fact, Heidegger says that "...since the logos came into their philosophical view predominantly as an assertion, the development of the fundamental structures of the forms and constituents of discourse was carried out following the guideline of *this logos (am Leitfaden dieses Logos)*. Grammar searched for its foundation in the 'logic' of this logos. But this logic is based on the ontology of what is present (*Die Grammatik suchte ihr Fundament in der 'Logik' dieses Logos. Diese aber gründet in der Ontologie des Vorhandenen*)". The problem, as Heidegger makes clear, lies in the

connection between the assertion, as *guideline* for the analysis of the discourse, and the *logic* of this kind of discourse, as based on the ontology of *Vorhandenheit*.

Against this paradigmatic role of assertion, that also involves a reduction of the object in a broad sense to something *vorhanden*, Heidegger displays a broad notion of discourse (and, in part, a broader notion of assertion as “pointing out”). Thus in *Logic* [134/113] we read that “the basic movement is not from language to speaking but from speaking to language”, even though “the first explorative questioning of that started from both sides at once, that of language and that of speaking and oscillated between the two with no fixed point of reference”. In the footnote we read: “This is important because all of Greek logic, and consequently our own logic right up to today, takes its orientation from this, the spoken sentence”. What Heidegger’s notion of discourse (*Rede*) wants to avoid is precisely the restriction of acts of meaning to acts of assertion. Positively, the notion of discourse refers to different forms of “expression of perceptions”; in Ga 20 we read: “*assertions are acts of meaning*, and assertions in the sense of a formulated proposition are only specific forms of expressness, where expressness has the sense of expressing lived experiences or comportments through meaning. It is essentially owing to phenomenological investigations that this authentic sense of the expressing and expressedness of all comportments was made fundamental and placed in the foreground of the question of the structure of the logical”. From this point of view, Heidegger’s definition of expression (*expressiveness*) as “expressing lived experiences or comportments through meaning” is, in its formality, crucial, for it decides nothing as to what can be “expression”, and it does not reduce expression and discourse to any empirical or particular form of language. One might say that Heidegger’s notion of discourse intends to avoid any form of absolutization of specif structures of synthesis and meaning.

§ 12. The Manifold of Indications and the Identity of the Object

We can now try to better define Heidegger's concept of meaning. As it is well known, instead of talking about "meaning" (*Bedeutung*) Heidegger talks about "significance" (*Bedeutsamkeit*). With this term Heidegger indicates the constitutive character of the world as a structure of "connection of indications" (*Verweisungszusammenhang*).⁸²

Let me make a remark on the translation of the term *Verweisung*. We can translate this term as both "reference" (as does Joan Stambaugh) and "indication", as suggested by Welton. Both these solutions have their own advantages. For example, reference is a good translation because it gives expression to the idea that what makes things meaningful is *our* 'being referred' to them. On the other hand, the term "indication" conveys that the constitution of the sense is always synthetic, and in this 'process' we are 'ruled' by indications or connections. Hereinbelow I will use both these translations, according to the aspect I find more important to stress.

In order to understand Heidegger's notion of meaning, we must consider three notions in particular: *Beziehung*, *Verweisung*, *Bedeutsamkeit*. The relationship between these terms is quite complicated and this complexity is also indicative of Heidegger's formal indicating approach to the problem of meaning. Broadly speaking, all these concepts refer to the character of manifoldness that characterizes the world.

In a passage of Ga 61 [p. 85] which I have already quoted, Heidegger talks about the "life" as an "intransitiv-verbale Bedeutung", that articulates itself in manifold ways ("in" etwas leben,

⁸² § 18: Den Verweisungszusammenhang, der als Bedeutsamkeit die Weltlichkeit konstituiert

“aus” etwas leben, “für” etwas leben, “mit” etwas leben, “gegen” etwas, “auf” etwas “hin” leben, “von” etwas leben). Heidegger says that “das ‘etwas’, was seine *Beziehungsmannigfaltigkeit* zu ‘leben’ anzeigt in diesen scheinbar nur gelegentlich aufgerafften und aufgezählten präpositionalen Ausdrücken, fixieren wir mit dem Terminus ‘Welt’ “. Now, Heidegger’s mature concept of the world is nothing but a further specification of these *Beziehungsmannigfaltigkeit*.

In *Being and Time* the world is characterized by the term *Bedeutsamkeit*, which indicates the totality of “connections of indications”. In § 17 of *Being and Time* we read that “Verweisung und Verweisungsganzheit in irgendeinem Sinne konstitutiv sein werden für die Weltlichkeit selbst”. “Das Bezugsganze dieses Bedeuten nennen wir die *Bedeutsamkeit*”.

However, as I have suggested, the relationship between *Bedeutsamkeit*, *Verweisung* and *Beziehung* is not an easy one, and it is crucial to understand how these terms relate to each other. For example, in Ga 20 [278] Heidegger defines meaningfulness as the “root” in which different structures have their “phenomenal genesis”. These structures are indicated by the notions of *Verweisung*, *Zeichen*, *Beziehung*. Heidegger also says that “auf der jetzigen Stufe der Analyse muß daher versucht werden, dieses Phänomen *Bedeutsamkeit* weniger im Verfolgen seiner eigenen Strukturen zu fassen als durch Abgrenzung gegen verwandte”. The fact that Heidegger suggests grasping these different phenomena *durch Abgrenzung*, and not according to their *proper* structure, is an indicative of a real difficulty in defining them.

The relationship between these structures is difficult, and this despite what Heidegger says in the passage of Ga 20 I have previously quoted (where the meaningfulness is defined as the “root” of the other structures). This is why Heidegger’s terminology is far from being stable. How are we to understand this relation? In Ga 20

Heidegger talks about an “interconnection” (*Zusammenhang*) between the “phenomena of meaningfulness, sign, reference, relation” (this is the sub-paragraph title [p. 277]). This connection is such that we cannot easily establish a ‘priority’ of a structure over another. The problem lies in the fact that these terms refer to different ‘contexts’ and have different ‘functions’. Heidegger makes use of the notion of formal indication precisely to show the different dimensions of sense to which each term refers. From this point of view, the term “indication” or “reference” does have *a priority*, because it “refers to a formal concept; deformed, there are different senses of reference”. Then he defines “the reference ..] as a part of the structure of encounter belonging to the world, which we shall now more accurately designate as ‘to mean’ (*bedeuten*). The structure of the encounter thus specified in the references as *meaning* shall be called ‘meaningfulness’ (*Bedeutsamkeit*)” [274/271]. The notion of *Verweisung* indicates then different senses of “indication” or “reference”, of which meaningfulness – according to Heidegger – is here only one possibility. Indeed Heidegger says that

The term reference points formally to a structure which finds its expression in various phenomena. A sign is a kind of reference, and so is a symbol, symptom, trace, document, testimony, expression, relic. These phenomena of reference cannot be pursued in detail here, not only because they require comprehensive analyses but because we still do not have the basis for such an analysis, if it is to maintain a unified orientation. We want to arrive at this basis precisely with the interpretation of world and Dasein's in-being (Ga 20, p. 275/202).⁸³

⁸³ “Der Titel Verweisung zeigt formal eine Struktur an, die sich an verschiedenen Phänomenen ausprägt. Zeichen ist eine Art von Verweisung, Symbol, Symptom, Spur, Dokument, Zeugnis, Ausdruck, Überrest. Diese Verweisungsphänomene können hier nicht im einzelnen verfolgt werden, nicht nur weil sie umfassende Analysen verlangen, sondern weil wir für eine solche, sofern sie einheitlich orientiert bleiben soll, den Boden noch nicht haben und gerade mit der Interpretation von Welt und In-Sein das Dasein gewinnen wollen”

Let us explain how this formal indicating notion operates in this context. Heidegger says that this interconnection “may first be formally indicated” with some “propositions”. These propositions have meaning “*only* if they have themselves arisen from the clarification of the *phenomena* themselves, and are understood in this way rather than as mere formulas”. The reason why Heidegger makes this remark is that the notion of formal indication might be mistaken as a form of formalization; as we have seen Heidegger develops the notion of formal indication as a criticism to Husserl’s notion of universality (he explicitly says that the sense of the formal of the formal indication has nothing to do with both generalization and formalization, as forms *Verallgemeinerung*). As a matter of fact, Heidegger’s use of the notion of *Verweisung* sounds somewhat “formal”. We read:

[..] every reference is a relation but not every relation is a reference. Every sign, or better, 'indication,' is an ontic reference, but not every reference is a sign. This at the same time implies that every sign is a relation, but not every relation is a sign. Moreover, every sign *means*, which here signifies that it has the mode of being of meaningfulness. Meaning, however, is never a sign. *Relation is the most universal formal character* of these phenomena. Sign, reference, meaning are all relations. But just because the phenomenon of relation is the most universal, it is *not* the origin of these phenomena, that out of which the relationships which organize their particular structures can in turn be understood [279/204]

Let us start by considering this claim: “*Relation is the most universal formal character* of these phenomena. Sign, reference, meaning are all relations. But just because the phenomenon of relation is the most universal, it is *not* the origin of these phenomena, that out of which the relationships which organize their particular structures can in turn be understood”. Heidegger recalls that a universal definition does not say anything about the origin of a

phenomenon, about what makes intelligible the particularity of *each* structure (the origin as “das, woraus die Aufbauverhältnisse ihrer jeweiligen Strukturen wieder verstanden werden können”). The notion of relation (*Beziehung*) has this negative role of determining every phenomenon in the same formal way. Still in these pages [291/213] the relation is defined as “a formal structural element” (*das formale Strukturelement Beziehung*) which is always to be found (“accessible”, *zugänglich*) in “indications” and “signs”. This “element” is accessible “specifically by way of a disregard [...] of the concretion (*Konkretion*) and material content of these phenomena”. This “apprehension of pure relations” is a “supreme way”, and at the same time “the emptiest way of objectifying entities”.⁸⁴

In *Being and Time* we find a similar rejection of a formalizing approach to the problem of meaning, as it cannot grasp the “concretion” of these phenomena. As we shall see in the next paragraph, in *Being and Time* Heidegger shows that the structure of sign cannot be defined by reference to any universal-ontological structure, precisely as a “concretion” of the ontological structure of the indication; the sign is a type of indication that, as ontical concretion of an ontological structure (indication), produces a new type of structure. This is why we must suspect of every formal-universal definition.

But still, in *Being and Time* [§18] the target of Heidegger’s criticism is not the notion of *Beziehung* but the notion of *Relation*. However, the sense of his criticism remains the same. Heidegger stresses that

⁸⁴ “..with regard to the phenomenon of relation and its relationship of being to reference, sign and meaningfulness, it must be said that, as the formal structural element, relation is accessible at all times in references and signs. It is accessible specifically by way of a disregard, not only of the concretion and material content of these phenomena, but also that it is itself an indicating and referring of the relational kind, in order to let us see only the empty in-order-to. The apprehension of pure relations as such is a supreme way, but at the same time also the emptiest way of objectifying entities. It is a making present which does not go along with references and sign-taking in a primary way; rather, it only looks at and thus takes in the whole as a whole of relations”.

the *Verweisungszusammenhang* constitutive of the *Bedeutsamkeit* cannot be understood as a system of formal relations; when formalized, these interconnections of indications completely lose their meaning. These indications are what Heidegger calls here “Um-zu”, “Um-willen”, “Wo-mit”; these forms, according to their very phenomenal content (*ihrem phänomenalen Gehalt nach*), do not allow and reject (*widerstreben*) every mathematical *functionalization*. (*mathematischen Funktionalisierung*).⁸⁵

On the difficult relationship between the formal-indicating structure of indication and its different possible concretions I will say more in the next paragraph. Now we must address the question of *how* this notion actually informs the structures of meaning; in other terms, we must see why the notion of *Verweisung*, more than other concepts, can tell us something (in a ‘formal’ and yet also ‘definite’ why) about the structure of meaning in general.

As we have seen, the term indication “*points formally* to a structure which finds its expression in various phenomena. A sign is a kind of reference, and so is a symbol, symptom, trace, document, testimony, expression, relic”. In which sense are all these different phenomena forms of “indications”? What kind of concrete

⁸⁵ *Being and Time*, § 18: “Den Verweisungszusammenhang, der als Bedeutsamkeit die Weltlichkeit konstituiert, kann man formal im Sinne eines Relationssystems fassen. Nur ist zu beachten, daß dergleichen Formalisierungen die Phänomene so weit nivellieren, daß der eigentliche phänomenale Gehalt verloren geht, zumal bei so ‘einfachen’ Bezügen, wie sie die Bedeutsamkeit in sich birgt. Diese ‘Relationen’ und ‘Relate’ des Um-zu, des Um-willen, des Womit einer Bewandnis widerstreben ihrem phänomenalen Gehalt nach jeder mathematischen Funktionalisierung”. See also Ga 20, p. 273/200: “To be sure, the contrast between the *concepts of substance and function*, to which the epistemology of the Marburg School attaches particular importance, has without question permitted us to see something significant, but in the first place only in the investigation of the objectivity of nature as object of the mathematical sciences of nature. [...] Accordingly, the authentic reality of nature is constituted in these functional relations expressed, for example, by a set of differential equations of mathematical physics. This is where the objectivity of nature and so the being of nature is given as valid knowledge. Therefore, the concept of function, the mathematical in the broadest sense, has a primary prerogative in the constitution of the world when compared to the concept of substance”.

phenomena does this term indicate or pre-delineate? Heidegger says that “introducing *meaningfulness* formally through *reference*, a misunderstanding is thereby averted to which this expression is again and again readily prone, namely, that the term '*meaningfulness*' says something along these lines: the environmental things, whose being is said to reside in meaningfulness, are not only natural things but also have a meaning, they have a certain rank and value”. How exactly this term prevents this misunderstanding? A preliminary answer might be the following: with the notion of *Verweisung* Heidegger wants to emphasize the synthetic and, so to speak, ‘relational’ structure of meaning.

This point is emphasized very well by Welton. Welton [2000 p. 368] reads Heidegger’s “indication” in the background of Husserl’s phenomenology of association: “While both Husserl and Heidegger use the notion of indication as the key notion of world, there are important and subtle differences. For Husserl, indication (*Anzeige*) operates by a movement of “one pointing [*hinweisen*] to yet another” in such a way that an item that is lifted out or prominent establishes anticipations of what is similar. Identity is primary; difference is derived [...] As a result, horizons are built up by “unifying synthesis” [...] For Heidegger, indication (*Verweisung*) is a constant movement of deferring, such that the similarity between objects, and the identity of an object, results from its place in a web of functional oppositions and contrasts. Accordingly, the horizons are nexuses of *differential schemata*”.

Heidegger seems, in fact, to locate the idea of unity of manifold in a sort of functional web; this recasts a different light on the problem of association in general. What is important to note, however, is that this “movement of deferring” is at the origin of the identity of the object, as a complex of indications that precedes every indication that can be found in what is given in a strict sense. I shall discuss this

point more extensively in the next part, in particular in relation to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's three-fold synthesis.

In order to appreciate Heidegger's radicalization of the notion of synthetic constitution of the object as a manifold of indications (in the sense of the what-for, in order-to), I will refer now to the lecture Ga 27 [pp. 89-101]. This lecture is very interesting for it shows what kind of "connections" and "schemes" Heidegger's idea of object involves, and most importantly, it shows the *secondary* role that perception plays in the constitution of the identity of the object as tool.

In particular, Heidegger makes a distinction between two forms of identity: *Gleichheit* and *Selbigkeit*. To put it roughly, the first term refers to the essential *impossibility* of an intersubjective *perception* of something identical. The second notion of identity refers to the possibility of having an experience of something as the same object. Let me stress again that the difference concerns, on the one hand, the impossibility of *perceiving* an object as identical, and on the other hand, the possibility of *experiencing* (or, in a more Heideggerian way, understanding) the same object. In this sense, this difference shows us that what makes possible an intersubjective experience of an object as the same, is not its being constituted through a synthesis of manifold *perceptions*, but its being constituted according the *same forms of synthesis* (according to the same category or scheme). Even when we consider the same object as different according different perspectives and perceptions, we are still referring to the same object as it is constituted by the same form of synthesis (the object as object of manifold perceptions). Let us turn our attention to Heidegger's argumentation.

Heidegger asks the question: "Gibt es überhaupt dergleichen, daß Menschen sich in gleicher Weise zu etwas verhalten?". He takes the example of the assertion "this chalk is white". Heidegger stresses that the object of the assertion cannot be *das Gleiche*; in fact, differences

in the spatial orientation already prevents us from perceiving the object as the same (“Von allem übrigen abgesehen zeigt schon allein die räumliche Orientierung, in der wir je verschieden bei der Kreide sind, daß jedes Sein bei jedes einzelnen ein verschiedenes”). This impossibility is not just “factual” (*faktisch*) but “essential” (*wesensmäßig*). I cannot overcome this relativity by simply taking the place of another person, because, in that case, the object would be temporally different (“Gewiß kann jeder von uns den Platz eines anderen einnehmen, aber doch nie zu gleicher Zeit. Der Zeitpunkt ist notwendig ein verschiedener, und wenn er der gleiche ist, dann ist notwendig der Platz verschieden”). Thus, if one asks if factually (*in der Tat*) we can see or *perceive* the same chalk, the answer is no.⁸⁶

But what does this essential impossibility tell us? What Heidegger’s argumentation aims to show is that this impossibility, no matter how essential, is not so ‘relevant’. He says: “Nun sagen wir *doch aber* mit *verständlichem* Sinn, daß wir alle ‘miteinander’ uns zu der Kreide verhalten”. It is quite understandable that, even though the object is not *gleich*, we still refers to it as the same *thing*. The fact is that this statement – a counter-sense, if we assume that perception is the paradigmatic form of sense – is not only *understandable*, but it does provide us an important indication about our experience, namely the fact that “die Verschiedenheit der Anblicke, die diese Kreide für jeden von uns bietet, stört uns nicht”. Differences in perceptions do not disturb us: we do not pay attention to them.

The question, then, is the following: what does constitute the fact, quite understandable and yet not self-evident, that we do perceive the same object, and this despite the essential fact that we have different perceptions of it? The answer lies in the fact that things are

⁸⁶ “Aber sehen wir denn in der Tat die gleiche Kreide? Sieht jemand auf der hintersten Bank eine Kreide, die derjenigen gleich ist, die ich sehe? Ich behaupte, nein!”

first of all encountered within a “context” (in this case, the *Dienlichkeit zu..*, the being useful for..), that is, according to “particular relations”. Perception is *always already* determined in relation to a *Ganzheit von Bewandtnisbezügen* (Being and Time’s *Bewandtnisganzheit*), which pre-delineates what is ‘relevant’ and what is not, what matters (in this case, the being useful for) and what does not (in this case, perception). In this sense, what is first encountered is not a manifold of perceptions, but a manifold of objects (they all can be seen in a classroom for example).⁸⁷ In another lecture (Ga 24, p. 414), Heidegger also says that the “Diesheit” of a “useful thing”, its *individuation*, does not lie in spatial and temporal determinations, but in relation to the a context of connections of useful things.⁸⁸

This does not mean at all that there cannot be differences within this totality: the professor ‘sees’ the chalkboard differently than a student at his first day. However, in this lecture Heidegger does not take into account these differences (I shall return on this matter later, taking into account Heidegger’s example, in GA 56/57, of the

⁸⁷ “Diese Dinge sind nicht einfach nur mehrere räumlich neben einanderliegende, sondern sie stehen in einem Zusammenhang, der Dienlichkeit zu ... Im Medium dieses Zusammenhangs haben sie unter sich spezifische Beziehungen. Durch diese Aufgabe ist aber im vorhinein der Saal im ganzen bestimmt: eine Ganzheit von Bewandtnisbezügen durchherrscht die Mannigfaltigkeit der Dinge, die hier vorhanden sind, und die scheinbar selbstverständliche und von uns gar nicht erst ausdrücklich beachtete Art, wie all die Dinge hier vorhanden sind”.

“In unserem - auch unaufmerksamen - Aufenthalt bei den Dingen haben wir immer schon eine Mannigfaltigkeit vor uns nicht nur Kreide, sondern Schwamm, Tafel, Katheder, Kleiderhaken, Mützen, Bänke, Türen”. Ga 27, p. 77: “Die Mannigfaltigkeit dieses Seienden, so wie es sich uns direkt bekundet, ist nur deshalb für uns zu erfassen, weil wir und sofern wir im vorhinein schon dergleichen wie Hörsaal verstehen, aufgeklärt sind darüber”.

⁸⁸ Ga 24, p. 414: “Das Zeug begegnet immer innerhalb eines Zeugzusammenhangs. Jedes bestimmte Zeug trägt jenen Zusammenhang bei sich, und nur mit Rücksicht auf ihn ist es *dieses*. Die spezifische *Diesheit* eines Zeugs, seine *Individuation*, wenn wir das Wort in einem ganz formalen Sinne nehmen, wird nicht primär durch Raum und Zeit bestimmt in dem Sinne, daß es an einer bestimmten Raum- und Zeitstelle vorkommt, sondern der Zeugcharakter und der Zeugzusammenhang ist dasjenige, was ein Zeug als je dieses bestimmt. Wir fragen nun: Was macht den spezifischen Zeugcharakter eines Zeugs aus? Der Zeugcharakter wird konstituiert durch das, was wir die *Bewandtnis* nennen”.

different experiences of the lectern). Besides, in the passage I have quoted, Heidegger seems to recognize a certain role to perception. He says that “die Verschiedenheit der Anblicke, die diese Kreide für jeden von uns bietet, stört uns nicht”. But he also adds: “Wie soll sie auch stören, wenn am Ende gerade die Verschiedenheit der Anblicke mithilft, damit wir miteinander die Kreide selbst wirklich sehen”. On the next page, we read: “Jetzt stellen wir nur fest, daß uns die Mannigfaltigkeit und Verschiedenartigkeit der Anblicke, in denen sich dieselben Dinge für uns darbieten, nicht stört, *sondern* daß diese Verschiedenartigkeit vielleicht eine wesentliche Funktion hat”. What Heidegger leaves open is the possibility that *Mannigfaltigkeit* and *Verschiedenartigkeit* of the aspects might have an *essential* function. What kind of *essential* function can the multiplicity of the aspects have here? I think that what the passage suggests is the relationship between perception and experience, which is not just one of ‘background’ and ‘foreground’. While perception does not constitute the sameness of the object (the diversity of the aspects does not matter), it does play another role on another different level, which is not related to the sameness of the object.

§ 13. Ontological Categories and ontic Concretions: the Example of the Sign

As we have seen, the notion of *Verweisung* refers to the synthetic structure constitutive of what Heidegger calls the being “at hand”, *zuhanden*. However, as I have suggested, this category (a *Seinsbestimmungen des nicht daseinsmäßigen Seienden*) can include manifold different structures of object. This is why the notion of *Verweisung* must be understood as a formal-indicating notion, that characterizes our experience of every object in a broad sense.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ *Being and Time*, § 18: “Was soll aber dann Verweisung besagen? Das Sein des Zuhandenen hat die Struktur der Verweisung – heißt: es hat an ihm selbst den

In what follows I shall emphasize Heidegger's formal-indicating approach to the problem of meaning. To do this, I shall return on the problem of the interconnection "reference", "significance" and "relation".⁹⁰ My aim is to show how, despite the paradigmatic function of tools in Heidegger's existential analytic, the category of *Zuhandenheit* can indicate different forms of objects, and this precisely because of the formal-indicating function of the notion of *Verweisung*.

As we have already seen, in his presentation of the relation between reference, significance and relation Heidegger makes use of 'formal' or 'universal' definitions. Now we shall see in what extent a phenomenological analysis of these structures cannot be accomplished by way of formal or general definitions. Let me recall the passage of Ga 20 we have quoted above.

Every reference is a relation but not every relation is a reference. Every sign (*Zeichen*), or better, *Zeichung*,¹ is an ontic reference, but not every reference is a sign. This at the same time implies that every sign is a relation, but not every relation is a sign. Moreover, every sign *means*, which here signifies that it has the mode of being of meaningfulness. Meaning, however, is never a sign. *Relation* is *the most universal formal character* of these phenomena. Sign, reference, meaning are all relations. But just because the phenomenon of relation is the most universal, it is *not* the origin of these phenomena, that out of which the relationships which organize their particular structures can in turn be understood.

Heidegger says: every reference is a relation, but not every relation is a reference; every sign (*Zeichen, Zeichung*) is an *ontic* reference, but not every reference is a sign. Then "sign" is explicitly presented as something that has the mode of being (*Seinsart*) of

Charakter der Verwiesenheit. Seiendes ist daraufhin entdeckt, daß es als dieses Seiende, das es ist, auf etwas verwiesen ist".

⁹⁰ In this paragraph I shall translate *Verweisung* with "reference", in order to avoid a confusion between "indication" (*Verweisung*) and the *Zeichung* of this sign, translated here as "indicating".

meaningfulness. Besides every sign is a relation, but not every relation is a sign. Thus, we have a first formal and universal term, the “relation”. According to what we have seen above concerning Heidegger’s criticism of the notion of relation (as empty formalization), the relation between “reference” and “sign” should be different from the relation between “relation” and “reference”; in fact, while “relation” is a formal concept, the second is a formal-indicating concept. Thus question arises as to the relation between “reference” and “sign”. To put it differently, the question to be answered concerns the specific sense in which a formal indicating concept (the concept of reference), as different from a formal or universal concept (relation), *predelinates* but do not *determines* possible forms of unity of manifold (in this case, the “sign” as type of “reference”). From this point of view, Heidegger’s characterization of the interconnection between relation, sign and reference is somewhat misleading. However Heidegger makes use of it also in the § 17 of *Being and Time*:

Every reference is a relation, but not every relation is a reference. Every “indicating” [Zeigung] is a reference, but not every reference is an indicating. This means that every “indicating” is a relation, but not every relation is an “indicating”. Thus the formal, universal characteristic of relation becomes apparent. If we investigate such phenomena as reference, sign or even signification, nothing is to be gained by characterizing them as relations. Finally, we must even show that “relation” itself has its ontological origin in reference *because* of its formal character.⁹¹

⁹¹ “Jede Verweisung ist eine Beziehung, aber nicht jede Beziehung ist eine Verweisung. Jede “Zeigung” ist eine Verweisung, aber nicht jedes Verweisen ist ein Zeigen. Darin liegt zugleich: jede “Zeigung” ist eine Beziehung, aber nicht jedes Beziehen ist ein Zeigen. Damit tritt der formal-allgemeine Charakter von Beziehung ans Licht. Für die Untersuchung der Phänomene Verweisung, Zeichen oder gar Bedeutung ist durch eine Charakteristik als Beziehung nichts gewonnen. Am Ende muß sogar gezeigt werden, daß “Beziehung” selbst *wegen* ihres formal-allgemeinen Charakters den ontologischen Ursprung in einer Verweisung hat”.

Heidegger makes very clear that *nothing is to be gained* by a characterization of the structures of indication and sign in terms of relation. Besides, Heidegger stresses that the relation itself, *because* of its formal character, has its ontological origin in an *Verweisung*. (Heidegger, probably, refers to the fact the operation of formalization still presupposes a sort of reference; formalization abstracts *from* any content, it 'moves' *from* a particular content *to* a formal category).

Now, the question is: granted that the formal proposition "every 'indicating' is a relation, but not every relation is 'indicating'" is a *useless* proposition, how are we to understand the proposition "every 'indicating' is a reference, but not every reference is an 'indicating'"? One might say that there are only two possibilities: either this second proposition is a mere formula, a formal definition as the first one; or it is a formal-indicating definition, and then the notion of "reference" *informs* the notion "sign" in a *peculiar* way. Now, as we have seen, on several occasions Heidegger makes very clear that the notion '*Verweisung*' cannot be a mere formalization. However, more difficulties arise in relation to the (possible) universality (generality) of this concept. To put it differently: granted that we cannot define *Verweisung* and *Zeigen* as relation, in which sense do we define a *Zeigen* as *Verweisen*? In which sense is the "sign" a *kind* of "reference"?

Some lines before the passage I have quoted Heidegger writes:

Indicating can be defined as a "kind" of referring. Taken in an extremely formal sense, to refer means to relate or referring. But relation does not function as genus for "species" of reference which are differentiated as sign, symbol, expression and signification.⁹²

⁹² "Zeigen kann als eine "Art" von Verweisen bestimmt werden. Verweisen ist, extrem formal genommen, ein *Beziehen*. Beziehung aber fungiert nicht als die Gattung für "Arten" von Verweisungen, die sich etwa zu Zeichen, Symbol, Ausdruck, Bedeutung differenzieren".

What this passage does not tell us, is how we are to understand the relation between *Verweisungen* and *Zeichen, Symbol, Ausdruck, Bedeutung*. Heidegger does make clear that “relation”, as formal term, does not function as a genus for different “species” of *Verweisungen (Zeichen, Symbol, Ausdruck, Bedeutung)*. But he does not say if *Verweisung* (as formal indicating term) is a species (or a genus). We have already noted that the whole point of Heidegger’s notion of formal is to find an alternative form of conceptuality, a form of conceptualization indicating (predelineating) but not strictly determining possible forms of unity of manifold.

We must recall that in *Being and Time* Heidegger’s analysis of the structure of sign is motivated by a precise aim: to show the *complexity* of the structure of *Verweisung*, the manifold sense in which the category *Zuhandenheit* has the structure of *Verweisung*. In particular, Heidegger takes into account this notion because it has an ontological peculiarity. Heidegger says explicitly that “with the intention of grasping the phenomenon of *reference* more precisely”, “we shall attempt an ontological analysis of the kind of useful thing in terms of which ‘references’ can be found *in manifold sense* (in einem mehrfachen Sinne, my emphasis). Heidegger notes that “the word sign names different *kinds* of sign” (*verschiedene Arten von Zeichen*)”. Not only, then, there are different kinds of reference, but there are also different kinds of sign. We read: “If the analysis is limited to an interpretation of the sign as distinct from the phenomenon of reference, even within this limitation, the full multiplicity of possible signs cannot be adequately investigated.⁹³ Let us take a look at this multiplicity of kinds of sign. Heidegger makes a

⁹³ “Wenn die vorliegende Analyse sich auf die Interpretation des Zeichens im Unterschied vom Verweisungsphänomen beschränkt, dann kann auch innerhalb dieser Beschränkung nicht die geschlossene Mannigfaltigkeit möglicher Zeichen angemessen untersucht werden”.

distinction between two categories: 1) “Unter den Zeichen gibt es Anzeichen, Vor- und Rückzeichen, Merkzeichen, Kennzeichen”; 2) “Von diesen ‘Zeichen’ sind zu scheiden: Spur, Überrest, Denkmal, Dokument, Zeugnis, Symbol, Ausdruck, Erscheinung, Bedeutung”.

Strictly speaking, “sign” refers to the phenomena indicated in the first group. Indeed, in Ga 20 the “sign” is defined as a specific form of “reference”, different from “Symptom, Spur, Dokument, Zeugnis, Ausdruck, Überrest”.⁹⁴

I shall not provide an account of Heidegger’s interpretation of the sign. Important for us is the relation between “reference” and “sign”. At the end of the §17 Heidegger says that in the light of his analysis of the sign, the relation between sign and reference is three-fold.

1) the sign, as a possible concretion of the what-for (*mögliche Konkretion des Wozu*), is founded on the structure of the useful thing (*Dienlichkeit*) and therefore on the *Verweisung* “Um-zu”. Heidegger says very clearly that the sign is a useful thing and as such it has the structure of a *Verweisung*.

2) “As the character of useful things at hand, the indicating of the sig belongs to a totality of useful things, to a referential context (*Verweisungszusammenhang*)”.

3) “Signs are not just at hand along with other useful things, rather, in their handiness, the surrounding world becomes explicitly accessible to circumspection”. Heidegger then says that “the reference cannot itself be comprehended as a sign if it is ontologically to be the foundation for signs. Reference is not the ontic specification (*die ontische Bestimmtheit*) of something at hand since it, after all,

⁹⁴ Ga 20, p. 275: “Der Titel Verweisung zeigt formal eine Struktur an, die sich an verschiedenen Phänomenen ausprägt. Zeichen ist eine Art von Verweisung Symbol, Symptom, Spur, Dokument, Zeugnis, Ausdruck, Überrest. Diese Verweisungsphänomene können hier nicht im einzelnen verfolgt werden, nicht nur weil sie umfassende Analysen verlangen, sondern weil wir für eine solche, sofern sie einheitlich orientiert bleiben soll, den Boden noch nicht haben und gerade mit der Interpretation von Welt und In-Sein das Dasein gewinnen wollen”.

constitutes the handiness itself". Heidegger stresses the fact that the reference cannot be understood as a sign, for the sign, ontologically speaking, is founded on the reference. Likewise, the reference is not an ontic determination (*ontische Bestimmtheit*) of something at hand, a kind of quality, for handiness itself (what makes possible, in the first place, something like a quality) it is constituted by the reference. The reference, then, as ontological structure, has a kind of *priority*. We are interested in seeing how this structure, in its priority, *determines or predelineates* the structure of the sign.

Heidegger says that the sign, "as a useful thing", is "constituted by reference. It has the character of in-order-to, its specific serviceability; it is there in order to indicate" ("Als ein Zeug ist dieses Zeigzeug durch Verweisung konstituiert. Es hat den Charakter des Um-zu, seine bestimmte Dienlichkeit, es ist zum Zeigen"). This is why "the indicating of the sign can be taken as a kind of 'referring'". (Dieses Zeigen des Zeichens kann als 'verweisen' gefaßt werden). *However*, Heidegger makes a crucial remark. "But here we must note that this 'referring' as indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign as a useful thing" (Dabei ist aber zu beachten: dieses 'Verweisen' als Zeigen ist nicht die ontologische Struktur des Zeichens als Zeug"). Let me stress that Heidegger is not saying: 'the reference as indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign'; or 'this structure is not what constitutes the *sign as sign*'. He says: 'referring' as indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign *as useful thing*: "das 'Verweisen' als Zeigen gründet vielmehr in der Seinsstruktur von Zeug, in der Dienlichkeit zu".

Indeed, the structure of the sign remains that of *Verweisung*; as *every other useful thing*, the sign is "useful for..". If the sign has something to do with *Verweisung*, then, it is *as useful thing* and not because the sign is a *Zeigen*. *Zeigen* cannot be a *species* of the *genus Verweisung*; tools and signs, as useful things, have the structure of *Verweisung* in the *same* sense; signs are not "references"

(*Verweisungen*) because they “indicate” (*zeigen*). But how do we have to define the character of reference of the sign? Heidegger speaks of an “ontic concretion” of the “reference”.

The “referral” of indicating is the ontic concretion of the what-for of serviceability, and determines a useful thing for that what-for. The referral “serviceability for”, on the other hand, is an ontological, categorical determination of the useful thing *as* useful thing.⁹⁵

Heidegger stresses that the *Verweisung-Dienlichkeit-zu* is an ontological-*categorical* determination that characterizes every useful thing as such (tools and signs). On the other hand, the *Verweisung-Zeigen* is a *ontische Konkretion des Wozu einer Dienlichkeit*. Thus we must distinguish, on the one hand, the ontological-categorical structure *Verweisung-Dienlichkeit-zu* (useful thing), and on the other, the concretion of this structure. The sign, as useful thing, presupposes the categorical structure of reference. At the same time, the sign is in itself a concretion of this structure.

Hence if we say that a sign is kind of reference, we must refer to the reference as categorial determination of useful things. We cannot define the sign a *Verweisung* because it *indicates* something. We can define sign as a *Verweisung* because it is a *useful thing*. Its ontological structure of “useful thing” defines the sign as reference. Signs are “useful” because they “indicate”, because they are concretion of a reference. The particularity of the sign lies in its being a *concretion* of an ontological structure;⁹⁶ signs are useful for as long as they “refers

⁹⁵ Die “*Verweisung*” *Zeigen* ist die ontische Konkretion des Wozu einer Dienlichkeit und bestimmt ein Zeug zu diesem. Die *Verweisung* “Dienlichkeit zu” ist dagegen eine ontologisch-kategoriale Bestimmtheit des Zeugs *als* Zeug. Daß das Wozu der Dienlichkeit im *Zeigen* seine Konkretion erhält, ist der Zeugverfassung als solcher zufällig.

⁹⁶ “Die Zeugverfassung des Zuhandenen wurde als *Verweisung* angezeigt. Wie kann Welt das Seiende dieser Seinsart hinsichtlich seines Seins freigeben, warum begegnet dieses Seiende zuerst? Als bestimmte *Verweisungen* nannten wir Dienlichkeit zu, Abträglichkeit, Verwendbarkeit und dergleichen. Das Wozu einer

to” something. Every useful thing is useful for something (the hammer *for* hammering) but only signs are useful because they refer to something (an arrow *for* pointing *to* a direction); in this sense, signs are ‘references’ in a twofold way: as kind of useful things (ontological-categorial determination), as useful things that refer to something (ontical concretion). What is interesting is the articulation of this difference between a categorial determination (signs and tools are useful and therefore kinds of reference) and the ontical concretion (signs are useful, because they are an ontical concretion of a categorial determination). Heidegger’s analysis of the sign want to show precisely the fact that the *concretion* of a categorial structure can ‘generate’ a new kind of this structure. Heidegger says that reference as useful thing and reference as the indicating of the sign are *so* different that *precisely* when they fall together a new kind of useful thing is possible: “Beide fallen so wenig zusammen, daß sie in ihrer Einheit die Konkretion einer bestimmten Zeugart erst ermöglichen”.

Heidegger’s discussion of the relation between sign and reference is then interesting because it shows how a ontological-categorial structure (*Verweisung*), if understood in a formal indicating way, allows us to define different forms of ontical structures, according different ‘factual’ (and not merely empirical) concretions of this ontological category.⁹⁷ It might be also interesting to note that in this

Dienlichkeit und das Wofür einer Verwendbarkeit zeichnen je die mögliche Konkretion der Verweisung vor”.

⁹⁷ From this point of view, Costa [2003 p. 236] makes an interesting remark on Heidegger’s notion of *Verweisung*. In his view, the notion of “reference” cannot account for the different connections between the manifold objects of our experience. It is true that Heidegger’s idea of world as totality does not account for the problem of how different structures connect each other. On the other hand, I think that Heidegger’s notion of “reference” is (as formal indicating) broader and richer than Costa, if I understand him correctly, believes. He argues: “Si tratta di chiedersi se la nozione di mondo come totalità di rimandi aventi nella struttura del mezzo la loro radice, come è abbozzata in *Essere e Tempo*, possa in generale dare ragione di tutto ciò, cioè di quello che costituisce l’esperienza umana nella sua totalità. La penna mi serve per scrivere, il bianchetto per cancellare. Ma l’astronave

paragraph Heidegger brings to the fore an interesting problem, concerning the meaning of signs in what he calls “primitive Dasein”.⁹⁸

Heidegger says that “one could be tempted to illustrate the distinctive role of signs in everyday heedfulness for the understanding of the world itself by citing the extensive use of ‘signs’, such as fetishism and magic, in primitive *Dasein*”.⁹⁹ This possibility is motivated by the consideration that the primitive everydayness is free from every theoretical attitude; the primitive use of sign “remains completely within an ‘immediate’ being-in-the-world”. However, when “when one looks *more closely*, it becomes clear that the interpretation of fetishism and magic under the guideline of the idea of sign *is not sufficient at all* to comprehend the kind of ‘handiness’ of beings encountered in the primitive world”. The essential difference lies in the fact that within the primitive world there is a “*merkwürdige Zusammenfallen des Zeichens mit dem Gezeigten*”: this remarkable coincidence refers to an identity incomparable with any identification or objectification (for these two relations already presuppose some sort of distinction between sign and thing). Heidegger says that “the sign has not yet become free from that for which it is a sign” (*ein Noch-nicht-frei werden des Zeichens vom Bezeichneten*).

che va nello spazio, il televisore, la maniera in cui mi rapporto alla mia finitudine, che connessione hanno con la penna? In che senso il rimando mezzo-scopo riesce a connettere tutti questi enti in una totalità coerentemente connessa? In realtà questo problema non trova risposta in *Essere e Tempo*, tranne quella che tutti questi strumenti mettono capo all’essere umano. Ma se accettiamo questa risposta, allora è la nozione di mondo come totalità coerente che viene meno, che viene sostituita da un antropologismo di cui difficilmente si potrebbe fare un uso filosofico”.

⁹⁸ We cannot deal here with Heidegger’s notion of “primitive Dasein”. Suffice to say that Heidegger’s notion of *Dasein*, as formal indication notion, has a positive role in relation to the possibility of an anthropological analysis of the primitive world. In this context, that idea of a “formal ideal of world” constitutes the condition for a ‘comparison’ between different structures of world: different according a *factual* difference, neither ontological nor ontical.

⁹⁹ “Man könnte versucht sein, die vorzügliche Rolle der Zeichen im alltäglichen Besorgen für das Weltverständnis selbst an dem ausgiebigen ‘Zeichen’ gebrauch im primitiven Dasein zu illustrieren, etwa an Fetisch und Zauber”.

Heidegger suggests that the signs that we find in fetishism and magic present a different kind of concretion, they are reference in another sense. In this context, it seems that the sign coincides with itself not as concretion of a reference, or maybe: the ontical concretion of a reference *does not constitute an useful thing*, the sign as indicating is not a useful thing, the concretion of the reference is not the what-for of the sign: “daß Zeichen überhaupt nicht als Zeug entdeckt sind”, signs are not yet discovered as tools. The *Zusammenfallen* of sign and reference, that characterizes the sign as a useful thing, has then a *different meaning*, it delineates a different structure. In this sense we cannot explain ‘our’ use of signs – the sign as concretion of a reference; the sign as *Zusammenfallen* of ontical *Verweisung* (reference) and ontological *Verweisung* (what-for) – by reference to fetishism in magic, for in this case the sign as ontical concretion of a *Verweisung* (reference) does not constitute something useful: it is not *for* this reasons that signs are ‘made’. Signs does not stand there “in order to” indicate something. They indicate or refer to something in another sense. The important point is precisely that the ontological category of “reference”, as formal indicating, allows us to see different forms of “concretions”. As long as an ontological or categorial structure is “concrete” it is subjected to variations: the coincidence between categorial structure (reference) and ontic concretion (sign) can be ‘factually’ articulated in different ways. In fetishism and magic the sign is not yet understood as a useful concretion of a reference and perhaps reference itself is not yet discovered as a useful thing at all.

Let me also note that this question is not just important in relation to the specific problem of the primitive world; on the contrary, this problem shows the limit of the useful thing as of universal guideline for an ontological analysis. Heidegger indeed says: “perhaps this ontological guideline (handiness and useful things), too, can provide nothing for an interpretation of primitive world, and *certainly for an*

ontology of thingliness” (Vielleicht vermag auch dieser ontologische Leitfaden (Zuhandenheit und Zeug) nichts auszurichten für eine Interpretation der primitiven Welt, erst recht allerdings nicht die Ontologie der Dinglichkeit) [my emphasis].

Heidegger’s analysis of the relationship between sign and reference sheds a different light on the idea of categories as formal indicating structures of unity of manifold. These categories, in fact, are not some sort of universal concept, determining once and for all the individual. These categories predelineates structures of synthesis that seems to be different according different possible of concretions (the useful-sign; the peculiar use of signs in magic). I will say more about this problem in the *Conclusions*, in relation to the relation between temporality and structures of meaning.

§ 14 The “As-Structure” as Form of the Explication

We have seen that according to Heidegger the identity of the object is always constituted in relation to a totality of “indications” (or “references”). We have also seen that there can be manifold forms of “indications”. However, no matter how these forms are articulated, the object is always given as a unity of manifold. What Heidegger calls “as structure” gives expression to this identity, namely to the identity of the sense. For this reason, we can already note that this concept has a kind of priority over other forms of synthesis. This synthetic structure is not a form of *Verweisung* itself, but indicates the ‘focal point’ to which manifold indications refer. As we shall see, this structure deeply affects Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s threefold synthesis); more in general, there is a close and essential relationship between Heidegger’s as-structure and his very idea of temporality. For this reason, it is first of all important to understand what this notion is about, what kind of synthetic structure this notion indicates.

Roughly speaking, this term has the universal function of describing our relationship with things, objects in both a broad sense (tools, for example) and in a strict sense (object of thematic knowledge). In *Logic* [145/122], Heidegger clarifies that the “non-explicitness” (*Unausdrücklichkeit*) of the “as” is precisely what constitutes the act’s so-called directness (*Schlichtheit*): “this directness regarding the thing apprehended does not inhibit the act from having a developed structure”.

We have already touched upon this concept [§10]; more precisely, we have encountered the expression “as-what”, *Als-etwas*. As far as I can see, Heidegger uses this term only once in *Being and Time*. While the “as-structure” indicates the *whole relation* in which something is disclosed *as something*, the term “as-what” indicates the totality of *indications or references* that constitute something as something: something (is encountered) *as something for... in order to...* ; the *hammer* is encountered *as for hammering*.

As I have previously said, there is a close relationship between as-structure and temporality. In § 69b of *Being and Time*, Heidegger says the “as” is founded “in der ekstatisch-horizontalen Einheit der Zeitlichkeit”. Now, according to the general assumption of this thesis, which aims to investigate Heidegger’s concept of unity of manifold not exclusively in relation to the idea of temporality, I shall try to determine more precisely this relation of foundation between “as-structure” and “temporality”; in so doing, I shall emphasize some aspects of this structure not strictly related to temporality, or aspects that might play a significant role in the very definition of temporality.

From this point of view, it might be worthy to note that right after the passage I have quoted, in which Heidegger states the temporal genesis of the as-structure, we also read that “in our fundamental analysis of being, and indeed in connection with the interpretation of the ‘is’, (which as copula ‘expresses’ the addressing something as something) we must again make the as-phenomenon thematic and

define the concept of the 'schema' existentially". Unfortunately, neither *Being and Time* nor other lectures exhibit this specific analysis of the relationship between "as" and "is. In the Conclusions, in the light of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's threefold synthesis, I will say more about the problem of the definition of what a "scheme" is, especially in relation to temporality and structures of meaning.

In what follows I shall try to underline some aspects of this concept relevant for our problem. Let me start by recalling two important occurrences of this concept. The first one is to be found in Ga 17 (*Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*). Heidegger is defining perception as it always involves "distinctions"; we perceive this as "red" and not as "black". In this sense, perception is always already "critical" and always involves a logos. Then, Heidegger distinguishes between "kritische" and "aufweisendes" as. Another important occurrence is in Ga 19 [pp. 601]. Here the as-structure indicates the "phänomenale Struktur der Ansprechbarkeit als solcher: 'Etwas als Etwas' in der ein nur Vorgegebens eigentlich in die Präsenz gebracht wird. Diese 'Als', der Als-Charakter, ist die eigentlich logische Kategorie, 'logische' nicht im traditionellen Sinn, sondern in Sinn dessen, was im logos konstitutiv gegeben ist, sofern er Ansprechen von etwas ist. At the margin of "logische" Heidegger writes *nicht auf den teoretische Satz hier nur bezogen oder gar eingeschränkt*.

The term is absent (except for one occurrence of the term 'as what') in Ga 20. It is peculiar since this lecture can be seen as a first draft of *Being and Time*. Yet, the "as-structure" reappears again in *Logic*. Here this structure is presented in all its importance and universality. The account of *Logic* is almost identical with that in *Being and Time*. In both these texts, Heidegger distinguishes between a "primordial" structure, that he calls "hermeneutic as", and a "derivative" structure, that he calls "apophantic as". This very

distinction is already a proof of the universality of this structure, as structure that characterizes – to put it roughly – *both* perception and judgment.

The question concerning the universality of the “as” is particularly important for us. One might ask: to what extent is every object always encountered “as something”? What does this structure entail as to what can be encountered and what cannot? However, in order to answer to these questions we need first to take a closer look to the as-structure.

A good point of departure for this analysis is certainly the distinction between understanding (*Verstanding*) and interpretation (*Auslegung*). As we shall see, in fact, Heidegger defines the as-structure as that structure that *constitutes* the interpretation. If we want to determine the universality of the as (and eventually, the character of this universality), it is therefore important to see what the notion of interpretation is about.

Before starting, let me make a remark about the translation of the term *Auslegung* as “interpretation”. This translation is somewhat misleading, since it suggests the idea that interpretation is, so to speak, a subjective act, a possible form of relation among others, as if understanding, in itself, were not (yet) interpretation. For this – and for other reasons – I follow here Welton and translate the term with “explication”. This remark on the translation of the term *Auslegung* allows us to suggest a first important point. Even though Heidegger begins § 32 of *Being and Time* saying that the explication is an *Ausbildung* the understanding, this distinction does not refer to different structures or levels of understanding, as if the explication were a ‘more developed’ form ‘understanding’. Rather, the difference refers to different ‘aspects’ or ‘moments’ of the same concrete structure (the hermeneutic-as). Roughly speaking, what Heidegger calls “understanding” indicates the “sense” as “existential” structure of the *Dasein*, while the “explication” is presented as an

Ausbildung of this structure. Now the 'point of contact' between these two dimensions is precisely the notion of *Sinn*. On the one hand, the sense is the *upon-which* of the understanding, on the other hand the sense is *what can be* articulated in the explication. The sense is, strictly speaking, what is articulable, the 'articulable' moment of the understanding as understanding-explicating. In § 32 of *Being and Time* we read: "The *concept of meaning* includes the formal framework of what necessarily belongs to what explication that understands articulates (*Der Begriff des Sinnes umfaßt das formale Gerüst dessen, was notwendig zu dem gehört, was verstehende Auslegung artikuliert*)". What is understood is always understood as something, as long as its sense is *articulated*; therefore we can say that something has sense. Thus, the "understood" is not the "sense" itself (the upon which of the projection), but always the 'object'.¹⁰⁰

"In explication understanding appropriates what it has understood understandingly". "In ihr [in the interpretation] eignet sich das Verstehen sein Verstandenes verstehend". What does it mean that in the "explication" the "understood" is *appropriated*? We can say that the understanding, as *explicating*, develops or articulates the sense in such a way that what is 'already' understood becomes more understandable, more 'own': more appropriated because 'coherent' with the 'sense' as the upon-which of the project that makes understandable something in the very first place. Now we can see why the translation of *Auslegung* as interpretation is somewhat misleading, for it suggests that explication is a specific *act* in which the object is considered 'more properly' and, most importantly, as something that appears in a different light. It is precisely to prevent

¹⁰⁰ "Wenn innerweltliches Seiendes mit dem Sein des Daseins entdeckt, das heißt zu Verständnis gekommen ist, sagen wir, es hat *Sinn*. Verstanden aber ist, streng genommen, nicht der Sinn, sondern das Seiende, bzw. das Sein. Sinn ist das, worin sich Verständlichkeit von etwas hält. Was im verstehenden Erschließen artikulierbar ist, nennen wir Sinn".

this idea that Heidegger says that “in explication understanding *does not become something different*”. Then, *Auslegung* is not about ‘interpreting’ what is *already understood*; it is about *ausbilden*, shaping something according to the possibilities that sense has already opened and that can be further articulated. In this sense, the explication is *already* adequate.

It is now important to stress that in this context the articulation of the sense is presented not only in terms of *Auslegung* but also in terms of *Ausdrucklichkeit*, expressiveness. As we have seen in Ga 20, Heidegger puts a lot of emphasis on the expressiveness of perception; perceptions are always already expressed: I do not see the house, I see a house in general. However, in this paragraph also “relations of indications” (*Verweisungsbezüge*) are defined in terms of *Ausdrücklichkeit*: “Das Sehen dieser Sicht ist je schon verstehend-auslegend. Es birgt in sich die Ausdrücklichkeit der Verweisungsbezüge (des Um-zu), die zur Bewandnisganzheit gehören, aus der her das schlicht Begegnende verstanden ist”.¹⁰¹

Heidegger says that “the ‘as’ constitutes the structure of the explicitness of what is understood, it constitutes the explication”. If our interpretation is correct (that is, if understanding always involves an articulation of the sense in its expressiveness), then we can draw the conclusion that the as-structure is the universal form in which the “sense” is appropriate and articulated in terms of what (each time and in each context) it is to be understood. Furthermore, Heidegger also defines the as-structure as “apriorische existenziale Verfassung des Verstehens”.

¹⁰¹ Thus, the notion of “expressiveness” is not only about general meanings, expressions, but also about indications or connections: in this sense, the term expressiveness covers the two meanings of categorial intuition (or better, categorial perception) that I have indicated in the first paragraph of this section [...]: the perception of the universal, the perception articulated through a synthetic form.

In this perspective we can say that the as-structure characterizes every act of understanding as such, insofar as every understanding is also an elaboration of the sense, an appropriation of the understood in accordance with the sense. As Heidegger notes, “die ontische Unausgesprochenheit des ‘als’ darf nicht dazu verführen, es als apriorische existenziale Verfassung des Verstehens zu übersehen”. “Der umsichtig-auslegende Umgang mit dem umweltlich Zuhandenen, der dieses *als* Tisch, Tür, Wagen, Brücke ‘sieht’, braucht das umsichtig Ausgelegte nicht notwendig auch schon in einer bestimmenden *Aussage* auseinander zu legen. Alles vorprädikative schlichte Sehen des Zuhandenen ist an ihm selbst schon verstehend-auslegend”.

So far, we have followed Heidegger’s presentation of the structure of understanding and the explanation. In this context, any claim concerning the universality of the as-structure and its actual configuration rests upon the ‘positive cases’ that Heidegger provides us: we always see something as something; a hammer as a hammer, a house as a house in general, a door as a door for entering. From this point of view, instead of saying “always”, one might use a Heideggerian term, *zunächst und zumeist*. Now the question is: in which sense does the as-structure characterize every “seeing”? What kind of modifications are possible within the as-structure? Before tackling this question, let me make a brief remark on Heidegger’s notion of sense. Heidegger says [§32] that “*nur Dasein kann daher sinnvoll oder sinnlos sein*. Das besagt: sein eigenes Sein und das mit diesem erschlossene Seiende kann im Verständnis zugeeignet sein oder dem Unverständnis versagt bleiben”. In English we read: “its own being and the beings disclosed with that being can be appropriated in an understanding or they can be confined to incomprehensibility (*Unverständnis*). What is not appropriate ‘remains’ incomprehensible (*Seiende kann im Verständnis zugeeignet*

sein oder dem Unverständnis versagt bleiben). How does this 'something incomprehensible' show itself – how do we encounter it?

§ 15. The Conditions of the Sense

Before tackling the question concerning the role of the as-structure in the 'articulation' of the incomprehensibility, we can turn our attention to what Heidegger explicitly says about the possibility/impossibility of a 'seeing without as'. In both *Being and Time* (§32) and *Logic*, Heidegger suggests that the as-structure is so *original* that it is *almost* impossible to *imagine* (not to mention to experience) something like an "als-freie Erfassen".

Let me quote these two very clear passages.

Still in § 32 of *Being and Time* we read:

Das schlichte Sehen der nächsten Dinge im Zutunhaben mit... trägt die Auslegungsstruktur so ursprünglich in sich, daß gerade ein gleichsam *als-freies* Erfassen von etwas einer gewissen Umstellung bedarf. Das Nur-noch-vor-sich-Haben von etwas liegt vor im reinen Anstarren *als Nicht-mehr-verstehen*. Dieses als-freie Erfassen ist eine Privation des *schlicht* verstehenden Sehens, nicht ursprünglicher als dieses, sondern abgeleitet aus ihm.

Let me stress on two aspects: first of all, Heidegger characterizes this possibility as a *Privation des schlicht verstehenden Sehens*; it is not a positive experience, a phenomenon and a possibility (no matter how 'rare' and difficult to be experienced "first and foremost"), that has its own legitimacy. It is a "derived" experience, which is not "original" as "simple seeing". It requires a specific *Umstellung*. This "reorientation" is explained in this way: das Nur-noch-vor-sich-Haben von etwas liegt vor im reinen Anstarren *als Nicht-mehr-verstehen*.¹⁰²

¹⁰² The English translation reads: "When we just stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us *as a failure to understand it anymore*". By introducing the term 'failure', Heidegger's argument appears as contradictory.

In this sense, this possibility is taken into consideration here only as artificial and, *as such*, derived and unoriginal.

In *Logic* [145/122], Heidegger also emphasizes the artificial character of this derived experience. Heidegger says that “this experience (if it is possible at all) is a peculiar inversion of the natural order”; this possibility can be carried out only “reductively”, by “pulling back” from an as-structured experience. “We have to designate it as an artificially worked-up act. Most importantly, such an experience is possible *per se* only as the privation of an as-structured experience. It occurs only *within* an as-structured experience and by prescinding from the “as”— which is the same as admitting that as-structured experience is primary, since it is what one must first of all prescind from”.

From what we have seen so far, the as-structure must characterize also what Heidegger calls *Unverständnis*. This could be quite interesting. In fact, it might indicate that the as-structure is so original that even what cannot be understood is still articulated, as a sense, in terms of as-structure. In other terms, it might indicate that the sense (the upon-which of the projection) even when it fails to understand and cannot appropriate the understood according to its projection, is still articulated in terms of “something as something”.

Heidegger takes into consideration something very close to the possibility of incomprehensibility in § 14 of the 1919 lecture (Ga 56/57). At this early stage of his thinking, he has not yet developed the notion of “as-structure” and his idea of phenomenology is far from being defined. However, some tenets of his notion of meaning are already present. In these pages, Heidegger makes an interesting example. What he wants to show, basically, is that the objective knowledge does not account for what experience really is, insofar as what is encountered is always encountered within what Heidegger

Heidegger’s point is precisely the opposite: an *Als-frei Erfassen* is possible only as an artificial possibility and not as an existential possibility, as failure is.

calls here *Umwelt*. Heidegger makes the example of the pure *Erlebnis* of a lectern and considers this *Erlebnis* from three different perspectives: the ones of a the teacher, a farmer, and a Negro of Senegal (sic). (We leave aside the question concerning the quite racist background of Heidegger's variation on the experience of the lectern).

I ask you all, each isolated I-self who is sitting here, to do the same. Indeed we wish to a certain degree to enter into a unitary experience. You come as usual into this lecture-room at the usual hour and go to *your* usual place. Focus on this experience of 'seeing *your* place', or you can in turn put yourselves in my own position: coming into the lecture-room, I see the lectern. We dispense with a verbal formulation of this. What do I see? Brown surfaces, at right angles to one another? No, I see something else. A largish box with another smaller one set upon it? Not at all. I see the lectern at which I am to speak. You see the lectern, from which you are to be addressed, and from where I have spoken to you previously.

If I enter a classroom and look at the lectern, I do not see "surfaces" and "angles", I see a lectern (my lectern, if I am the professor). For example, I see the lectern as "too high" (Heidegger was short). Heidegger also stresses on the fact that "in pure experience (*reinen Erlebnis*) there is no 'founding' interconnection (*Fundierungszusammenhang*); (...) all that is simply bad and misguided interpretation, diversion from a pure seeing into the experience. I see the lectern in one fell swoop, so to speak, and not in isolation, but as adjusted a bit too high for me".

Then Heidegger makes the second example, the one of a farmer from the Black Forest.

It is different if a farmer from deep in the Black Forest is led into the lecture-room. Does he see the lectern, or does he see a box, an arrangement of boards? He sees 'the place for the teacher', he sees the object as fraught with meaning. If someone saw a box, then he would not be seeing a piece of wood, a thing, a natural object.

The peasant will not see a “box”, something that he could make use of, but he sees the ‘place for the teacher’, the place where teachers speak. In any case, he would not be seeing a piece of wood, a natural thing, or lines and surfaces.

Now Heidegger takes into account a third example, which is the one which constitutes the whole point of Heidegger’s argumentation. Heidegger says: “*But (aber)* consider a Negro from Senegal suddenly transplanted here from his hut”. Heidegger is now looking for a different example, different from the example of his own perception of the lectern as a professor short in stature (the lectern deemed ‘too high’), but also different from the similar, and somewhat specular perception of a farmer (the lectern as ‘the place of the teacher’). Heidegger says that “what he would see, gazing at this object, is difficult to say precisely”.

perhaps something to do with magic, or something behind which one could find good protection against arrows and flying stones. Or would he not know what to make of it at all, just seeing complexes of colours and surfaces, simply a thing, a something which simply is?

Heidegger’s question is a rhetorical one. We do not know what she or he would see, but he would not be seeing a mere complex of colours and surfaces for sure. The reason why this person does not see colours and surfaces might raise problems. Heidegger, in fact, defines this person “unscientific (not culture-less)”; however, I think that this specification is not relevant to Heidegger’s point. Perhaps, it is more difficult, for this person, to formulate a “misguided interpretation, diversion from a pure seeing into the experience”; that is, it is more difficult, for an unscientific person (if this category makes sense at all), to formulate a misleading definition of the experience of the lectern as a *Fundierungszusammenhang* of lines,

colours and surfaces. However, the point of Heidegger's argumentation is not that of establishing a difference between these experiences. In contrast, it shows that however different these might be, they all share the same structure. Heidegger notes: "So my seeing and that of a Senegal Negro are fundamentally different (*sind doch grundverschieden*). All they have in common (*das Gemeinsame*) is that in both cases something is seen". The fact is that every 'seeing' is by essence individual. Let me stress that now the question is no longer – as in the case I have examined above [...] – the possibility of the same experience of the same 'chalk' despite the differences in spatial and temporal orientation; now the difference appears to be more radical.

My seeing is to a high degree something individual, which I certainly may not — without further ado — use to ground the analysis of the experience (Erlebnisanalyse). For this analysis is supposed to yield universally valid scientific results in conjunction with the elaboration of the problem. Assuming that the experiences were fundamentally different, and that only my experience existed, I still assert that universally valid propositions are possible. This implies that these sentences would also be valid for the experience of the Senegal Negro.

What kind of valid propositions can we formulate in relation to this experience? It might seem that we are now in a difficult situation, because we are facing an experience (the *Erlebnis* of the lecturer of a Senegal Negro) which is different from more 'familiar' ones (the *Erlebnis* of the teacher, that of the farmer). However, if we look closely, this third example only *accentuates* the fact that every seeing as such "is to a high degree something individual". Thus, the difference – just like the case of perception – is structural; but there is also a 'common structure' that constitutes a form of identity of the sense beyond and before differences in perception and interpretation.

Heidegger suggests bringing to givenness this experience again (*..bringen wir uns das Erlebnis des Senegalnegers nochmal zur Gegebenheit*). Heidegger provides a further characterization of this experience, and this is precisely this characterization that allows him to formulate, on the basis of these three highly individual experiences, a universal claim to the point that these experiences are *ihrem Wesenkern nach absolut identisch*.

Even if he saw the lectern simply as a bare something that is there, it would have a meaning for him, a moment of signification. There is, however, the possibility of showing that the assumption of the transplanted unscientific (not culture-less) Negro seeing the lectern as simply something is non-sensical (widersinning) but not contradictory, i.e., not impossible in a formal-*logical* sense. The Negro will see the lectern much more as something 'which he does not know what to make of. The meaningful character of 'instrumental strangeness', and the meaningful character of the 'lectern', are in their essence absolutely identical.

(Senegalneger sähe das Katheder als blosses Etwas, das existiert, widersinnig, nicht widersprechend, d.h. *logish*-formal unmöglich ist. Vielmehr wird der Neger das Katheder sehen al sein Etwas, 'mit dem er nichts anzufangen weiss'. Das Bedeutungshafte des 'zeuglichen Fremdseins' und das Bedeutungshafte 'Katheder' sind ihrem Wesenkern nach absolut identisch).

Even if Heidegger's 'Negro from Senegal' would not see something related to magic, or a shield, but "a bare something", something "which he does not know what to make of", this would still "have a meaning for him", it would still be "a moment of signification". Heidegger characterizes this moment as something "non-sensical but not contradictory, i.e., not impossible in a formal-*logical* sense". Heidegger here does not use the expression "unssinning", but "widersinning". From a phenomenological point of view, the difference is relevant, since it refers to different forms of non-sense. It might be significant that Heidegger, when defining the kind of meaningfulness of the experience of the 'instrumental strangeness',

he makes use of one expression (*widersinning*) instead of another (*unsinnig*); in this case, the experience of 'not knowing where to start' is more like a 'round square' (a material counter-sense) than 'or and' (a grammatical non-sense). One might say that the experience of the lectern is a counter-sense, but it still makes sense, since it still belongs to the sphere of meaning, it does not contradict the 'grammar of the manifold'.

More importantly, Heidegger himself makes use of the expression counter-sense in *Being and Time*, in order to explain a very similar experience to this one. In § 32 Heidegger makes some important distinctions within the notion of *Sinn*. While the terms *Sinnvoll* and *Sinnlos* refer to the *Dasein*, the term *Unsinn* indicates an *ontological determination* of the being "whose mode of being is unlike the *Dasein*", and the term *Widersinning* indicates a *possible determination* of this being. Strictly speaking, only the *Dasein* has *Sinn*, only *Dasein* is *Sinnvoll*; objects can be meaningful and have sense only indirectly, since the sense (the upon-which of the projection) is not the object, what is understood. Objects in general, being "whose mode of being is unlike the *Dasein*", are ontologically *unsinning*. Heidegger stresses that "*nur das Unsinnige kann widersinnig sein*". Heidegger describes this possibility in this terms: "Vorhandenes kann als im *Dasein* Begegnendes gegen dessen Sein gleichsam anlaufen, zum Beispiel hereinbrechende und zerstörende Naturereignisse". This is an example of how, in fact, the *Dasein* can have experience of something that cannot be *appropriate* according to the projection: the sense of this 'something' cannot be articulated according to 'expectations'.

To return to our question, what is to be stressed is the fact that the incomprehensibility does not involve a complete disarticulation of the sense. The question is: what kind of structure, what *Wesenkern* does constitute the *Erlebnis* of the lectern is always meaningful? To be sure, this kind of experience is not "Als-Frei"; the

experience in the form of “to not know what to make of something” is *essentially* different from the hypothetical experience of something Als-frei (“das Nur-noch-vor-sich-Haben von etwas liegt vor im reinen Anstarren *als Nicht-mehr-verstehen*”). In the experience of “to not know what to make of something” the object is not yet *completely* articulated by reference to a totality of indications. Not knowing where to start indicates precisely that we can only start from the object. At the same time, we do not start from the materiality of this object (we do not start from ‘sensations’) – we start from it as an object we cannot make any sense of, as an object we can make nothing of; we look at this object and we ask “what is for”. This amounts to say that the object is already considered in relation to a certain possible totality of indications and relevance. The two experiences are then essentially similar according to their essential core (*ihrem Wesenkern nach*). One might say that the essential structure of the experience is pre-delineated in the same way, but accomplished differently. The issue we want now to address is: given the ‘essential identity’ in what we might call the ‘formal-ontological’ structure of the ‘something in general’, what factors do play a significant role in the possible variations of this structure? After the remark on the essential identity between the two experiences, Heidegger says:

In the experience of seeing the lectern something is given *to me* from out of an immediate environment [*Umwelt*]. This environmental milieu (lectern, book, blackboard, notebook, fountain pen, caretaker, student fraternity, tram-car, motor-car, etc.) does not consist just of things, objects, which are then conceived as meaning this and this; rather, the meaningful is primary and immediately given to me without any mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension. Living in an environment, it signifies to me everywhere and always, everything has the character of world. It is everywhere the case that ‘it worlds [*es weltet*], which is something different from ‘it values’ [*es wertet*]. (The problem of the connection between the two belongs to the eidetic genealogy of primary motivations and leads

into difficult problem spheres. (*Das Problem des Zusammenhang beider gehört zur Idee der eidetischen Genealogie der primären Motivationen and führt in schwierige Problemsphären*).

Heidegger states again that things are always given in an immediate *Umwelt*. They are always meaningful. However, he now mentions a difficult problem that he formulates in an Husserlian way, that is – roughly speaking – between meaningfulness in the sense of the world (as a totality of the indications) and the meaning of “values”. Living always “signifies to me everywhere and always” in both these senses. Heidegger defines this problem in term of *Zusammenhang*; this connection is the object of an eidetic genealogy and leads to difficult spheres of problem. As far as I can see, Heidegger mentions this problem in these terms only here. However, the question concerning the role of meanings in the constitution of the sense (and therefore of non-sense) is not completely absent from his perspective.

For example, Heidegger refers to this problem in Ga 20 [275/202], where Heidegger speaks of an “interconnection” between the meaningfulness as connections of indications and the meaning as a meaning of a “word”, and as something having “value” (*Wert*).

Meaningfulness, as we use the term, understood negatively to begin with says nothing about meaning in the sense of value and rank. In another sense, meaning also signifies the *meaning of a word*, meaning as something which word-combinations (*Wortverbindung*) can have. Even this sense of meaning is in a certain way connected (*hängt...zussammen*) with what we call meaningfulness, in fact much more properly (*eigentlicher*) than the first sense of meaning and meaningfulness in terms of value. That such delimitations, which we are making here quite formally in regard to the bare words, already become necessary itself points to a certain embarrassment (*Verlegenheit*) in the choice of the right expression for the complex phenomenon which we want to call meaningfulness. And I frankly admit (*ich gestehe offen*) that this expression is not the best, but for years I have found nothing better, in particular nothing which gives voice to an

essential connection (*wesentlichen Zusammenhang*) of the phenomenon with what we designate as meaning in the sense of the meaning of words, inasmuch as the phenomenon possesses just such an intrinsic connection (*innerem Zusammenhang*) with verbal meaning (*Wortbedeutung*), discourse. This connection between *discourse and world* will now perhaps still be totally obscure (*noch ganz dunkel sein*).

Heidegger admits being embarrassed with the choice of the right expression for the complex phenomenon which we want to call meaningfulness. The first sentences suggest that the reason for this embarrassment lies in the fact that the *Bedeutsamkeit* is still too close to the idea of meaning as *Wortbedeutung*, *Wert*, *Wortverbindung*. As we have seen [§12], it is *against* this idea of meaning that Heidegger introduces, in these very first paragraphs, the notion of *Verweisung* as a formal indication of the meaning. The embarrassment depends on the fact that the word *Bedeutung* means precisely what the word *Bedeutsamkeit* is not supposed to mean. Heidegger then explains – and this is the important point – that the reason why “this expression [*Bedeutsamkeit*] is not the best” is that “it does not give voice to an *essential* and *internal connection* between world and discourse.

I cannot provide here a detailed account of the notion of *Rede* in *Being and Time*. I shall focus only on the role that discourse and meanings play in the articulation of the sense. For example, Welton [p. 361] asks if the nexus of indications is articulated *also* by the discourse (for example, by “semantic oppositions”), or if the sense is only “unfolded” by the discourse. The question concerns the relation between these two different dimensions (indications, meanings). We have seen that, according to Heidegger, the sense is the structure of what is articulated or articulable, and this articulation always refers to a totality of significance, relevance and indications. In order to see which role verbal meanings play in the articulation of the sense, we must turn our attention to Heidegger’s concept of “discourse” (*Rede*),

introduced in § 34 of *Being and Time* (entitled *Da-sein und Rede. Die Sprache*). Heidegger emphasizes that the “discourse” plays an original and significant role in the articulation of what Heidegger calls *Verständlichkeit*, translated as “intelligibility”. What is relevant for our discussion is the fact that this ‘condition’ seems to precede the appropriation of the sense, so to speak. “Intelligibility is also always already articulated before its appropriative explication” (*Verständlichkeit ist auch schon vor der zueignenden Auslegung immer schon gegliedert*). “Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility. Thus it already lies at the basis of interpretation and statement” (*Rede ist die Artikulation der Verständlichkeit. Sie liegt daher der Auslegung und Aussage schon zugrunde*).

What is important to stress is that Heidegger is not asserting that “explication” *depends* on the “discourse”, but that the explication has always already in view a certain articulation. In this sense, the articulable (*Artikulierbare*) in the explication, the sense, is already ‘articulated’ (*gegliedert*) in the discourse. It is here important to discern on the one hand the articulation of sense in the appropriation/development of the explication, on the other hand the articulation of the discourse. While the explication *articulates* the meaning by refering to a totality of *indications*, the discourse has *already articulated* the sense within a totality of *meanings*: “What is structured in discoursing articulation as such, we call the totality of significations (*Das in der redenden Artikulation Gegliederte als solches nennen wir das Bedeutungsganze*)”. Welton [p.362] explains this difference very clearly:

What *can* be articulated, sketched out beforehand in understanding, the explicable as such[...] is as a *nexus of sense*. What *has been* or *is* articulated in the process of talking (*redende Artikulation*) forms a nexus of meaning. The system of differences which we find in discursive articulation as such is a whole of meanings, thus linking talk, the linguistic, and meaning. If we collapse meaning and sense we miss their essential interplay.

In the light of this considerations, we can now consider what Heidegger states in the previous paragraph (§33) concerning the role of “concepts” in assertions (my emphasis).

A significant articulation of what is pointed out always belongs to the statement as communication that defines; it *operates within a definite set of concepts*. The hammer is heavy, heaviness belong to the hammer, the hammer has the property of heaviness. The fore-conception always contained in the statement remains mostly inconspicuous because *language always already contains a developed conceptuality*¹⁰³.

Heidegger’s notion of discourse as *Bedeutungsganze* accounts for the fact that the articulation of the sense is always also articulated in terms of “meanings”; we shall see that the difference between “explication” and “statement” lies that in the former the articulation in meanings is not yet a relation between concepts (like in the statement ‘the hammer has the property of heaviness’). In the light of what we have seen, the essential connection between world and language can be better defined as a relation between the totality of indications and the totality of meanings.¹⁰⁴ How do these two ‘conditions’ of the articulation/appropriation of the sense relate to each other? And what role does discourse, as an *already given*

¹⁰³ “Zur Aussage als bestimmender Mitteilung gehört jeweils eine bedeutungsmäßige Artikulation des Aufgezeigten, sie bewegt sich in einer bestimmten Begrifflichkeit: Der Hammer ist schwer, die Schwere kommt dem Hammer zu, der Hammer hat die Eigenschaft der Schwere. Der im Aussagen immer auch mitliegende Vorgriff bleibt meist unauffällig, weil die Sprache je schon eine ausgebildete Begrifflichkeit in sich birgt”.

¹⁰⁴ “Das in der redenden Artikulation Gegliederte als solches nennen wir das Bedeutungsganze. Dieses kann in Bedeutungen aufgelöst werden. Bedeutungen sind als das Artikulierte des Artikulierbaren immer sinnhaft. [...] Das Bedeutungsganze der Verständlichkeit *kommt zu Wort*. Den Bedeutungen wachsen Worte zu. Nicht aber werden Wörterdinge mit Bedeutungen versehen. Die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede ist die Sprache. Diese Wortganzheit, als in welcher die Rede ein eigenes ‘weltliches’ Sein hat, wird so als innerweltlich Seiendes wie ein Zuhandenes vorfindlich”.

articulation, play in the constitution of the “intelligibility”? As a matter of fact, Heidegger does not dwell on this problem, and as we shall see the fact that Heidegger does not deal with this question might affect his very notion of temporal synthesis.

Dahlstrom [2001, p. 195] speaks of “a surprising silence” and notices that “Heidegger has all too little to say about the role of language or discourse in the hermeneutic as-structure”. “Predication, assertion, and thematization are thrown together with the intention of showing how they are merely a derivative of, if not an antipode to, hermeneutic understanding”. I think that Dahlstrom is right: Heidegger seems to have a merely negative idea of words and meanings and he creates a strong opposition between a ‘dynamic’ and ‘original’ level (in which meanings have their genesis, as such) and a ‘semantic’ and ‘idealized’ one (in which meanings become an ‘ideal unity’). Dahlstrom refers to the lecture *Logic*; but his remarks hold true for *Being and Time* as well. Dahlstrom also says that “in some respects the relative lack of attention paid to discourse in this connection is surprising, since Heidegger argues the previous semester that seeing is dependent upon saying rather than vice versa”.

The fact is that in Heidegger’s account of meaning and sense, ‘normality’ plays a paradigmatic role. This is maybe why it is hard to tell what kind of condition of sense the language (meanings, concepts) is, and when and how this condition plays a decisive role. In an interesting footnote in *Logic* [144/122] we read:

A chalkboard, if it were *unintelligible* (*unverständlich*), would, as such, *not be present here* (*..als solche gar nicht vorhanden*) - Unless it were understood (*wenn nicht verständlich*) as for-writing-on, it would be hidden (*verborgen*). The same with a door unless it is understood as for-entering-and-existing. These things are intelligible because we ourselves move among and operate with them (*diese verständlich, weil wir es selbst sind, darin uns bewegen*) although we do so in such

a taken-for-granted , so (*selbstverständlich*) way that we forget this state of affairs in its basic structure as constituting (*Konstitution*) these things (my emphasis).

Heidegger makes clear that a chalkboard cannot appear as such (it would remain hidden) unless we understand it as something for writing on. The constitution (*Konstitution*) rests upon this 'function', the 'for' of serviceability. What Heidegger does not say, however, is the role that language plays in this process of constitution, in the process of making things intelligible. Even more important is the question concerning the role that language, as an *already given* articulation of the sense in meanings, can play precisely when dealing with something unexpected or unknown (to use Heidegger's example, the lectern for a person from a culture which has no schools as we understand it). The language as totality of meanings might play an important role in the articulation of the sense precisely in those cases in which we struggle to identify an object in relation to a totality of indications.

The problem is that, as I aforesaid, the guideline of Heidegger's notion of sense and meaning is always constituted by 'seeing something as something' (a hammer, a house); Heidegger always moves from how we normally, first and foremost, we 'see' things. I think that this approach makes it difficult to define the interaction between indication and meanings; it makes difficult to 'separate' these two structures and to see how each structure operates and what kind of condition of sense it is. This is not just a lack of attention on Heidegger's side, but the consequence of a certain methodological approach to the structure of sense. For example, still in *Logic* [120/143] we read:

We restrict (*beschränken*) our investigation to statements about things in the lived world (*Umwelt*dinge), postponing discussion about whether this is proper or not. Later it will become clear that this limitation is not a limitation at all).

The fact that Heidegger's analysis is limited to things that we encounter in our world, that is not things of the world (possible tools of possible worlds), but things of our world, is far from being a naïve assumption. It is a methodological choice. Heidegger even says that this is not a limitation at all. The issue concerning the righteousness (*Recht*) of this choice *ist jetzt nicht zu erörtern*. As far as I can see, Heidegger never discussed the righteousness of this approach, and I think he has never doubted its validity.

§ 16. The Form of the As-structure

In the light of what we have seen, the as-structure appears to be the original structure of every articulation of the sense and even of the articulation of something *widersinning*. Now, despite the importance of this notion, Heidegger does not provide any systematic account of it. In part, the reason of this lies in the formal indicating nature of this concept. Formal indicating concepts (and for Heidegger all philosophical concepts *should* be formally indicating), cannot be defined once and for all. In our previous discussion of the notion of *Verweisung*, we have seen in what extent formal indicating concepts are not concepts in a strict sense (universal concepts). The only text in which Heidegger takes into consideration the as-structure *as a structure* is Ga 29/30. The concept of as-structure is here presented as a formal-indicating concept; and also in this context Heidegger wants to avoid any formalization of a structure (in this case, the as-structure) in terms of relation. Besides, in this lecture Heidegger establishes an essential relation between world and as-structure; the as-structure is the very guideline for the question concerning the *Offenbarkeit des Seienden als solchen im Ganzen*.

Heidegger speaks here of a *ganz elementaren "Als"* ; despite its simplicity, says Heidegger, the "as" is *etwas Rätselhaftes*. On the one

hand, the “as” appears to be a “relation”, a possible form of relation among others (“is”, “or”, “and”); in this case, a relation of identity (‘this *as* that’); of course, this form of identity is different from that of predication (‘this is that’). The whole point of Heidegger’s distinction between hermeneutic and apophantic (and, in his interpretation of Kant, between veritative and predicative synthesis) is about distinguishing between these two forms of identity. At the same time, as I have already suggested, the as-structure is not just one form of relation, but the form of every relation in general.

Let us turn our attention to the text and see how Heidegger, dealing with this notion, makes use of the formal indication.

We said that the 'as' cannot exist on its own account, that it is a relation (Relation) which moves from one term to the other-something as something. This characterization is formally correct (*formal richtig*) insofar as we can in fact bring the 'as' closer to us in the form of a relation. But we can easily see that with this utterly vacuous determination (*leersten Bestimmung*) of the 'as' – an 'as'-relation (*Beziehung*) – we have already relinquished (*ausgeben*) its proper essence (*Eigewesen*) ... For the 'and' is also a relation between two terms (*Gliedern*), and furthermore the 'or'-'a and b', 'c or d'. Now one might object that there is no danger in characterizing the 'as' in terms of a 'relation' as long as we remember that the characterization specific (*spezifische Kennzeichnung*) to this relation must be ascertained and taken into account as being distinct from the 'and'-relation, for example. Yet it is precisely here that the fateful character (*Verhängnisvolle*) of any formal characterization reveals itself. For it is questionable whether we do thereby grasp the essence of the 'as' at all, even if we attempt to identify its specific character. It is questionable because the whole phenomenon already gets levelled down through the apparently innocuous because always correct--characterization of the 'as' in terms of a relation. What I mean is this: If for example we designate something as a relation, we thereby suppress the dimension within which the relevant relation can be what it is. On account of the suppression of this dimension, the relation in question gets put on the same level as every other relation. [Ga 29/30 p. 424/292]

The passage is very complex and rich. Heidegger says that one might define the “as” in terms of relation, and we can do the same with the “or” or the “and”: both these expressions indicate forms of relations. However, when we define the *as* a relation its dimension (*Dimension*) is suppressed (*unterschlagen*). Heidegger considers a possible objection: “one might object that there is no danger in characterizing the ‘as’ in terms of a ‘relation’ as long as we remember that the characterization specific to this relation must be ascertained and taken into account as being distinct from the ‘and’ -relation, for example”. But Heidegger thinks that even if we characterize the specific sense in which the “as” is a relation, we are already determining it dogmatically, namely as a species of the genus “relation”, or, more formally, as an empty relation. And it does not matter if we try to define the “as” by way of comparison, namely as a form of relation *distinct* from others. This is precisely the point that Heidegger, as we have seen [*supra*, §13] makes in *Being and Time*, when he notes that rigorously, the sign is not a *kind* of indication.

In this context Heidegger is operating in the same way, introducing the formal indication of the “as”. Heidegger says that a “formal characterization does not give us the essence (*die formale Charakteristik nicht das Wesen gibt*)”:

On the contrary, it merely (*nur*) indicates (*anzeigt*) precisely the decisive task (*Aufgabe*) of grasping the relation in terms of its proper dimension (*eigene Dimension*), instead of levelling down this dimension through such formal characterization. Designating the 'as' in terms of a relation tells us nothing about the 'as' as such, but merely directs us toward our proper and peculiar task. That is why I speak of formal indication in connection with such a characterization of the 'as'. The full import of this for the entire conceptuality of philosophy cannot be expounded here.

We can make use of formal definition only as long as the formality merely indicates the task of grasping the proper dimension of a

relation (for example: Verweisung, Als). Thus when Heidegger says that the formal characterization does not give the essence, this claim can be understood in two ways: 1) a formal-determining characterization *suppresses* the essence; 2) a formal-indicating characterization *only* indicates the task of grasping the essence.

In our previous considerations on the concept of *Verweisung*, we have seen that the introduction of this formal-indicating concept was meant to avoid one *particular* interpretation of the phenomenon of meaning, one particular ‘meaning’ of this phenomenon (the meaning in the sense “word” and “value”). We can now ask what the formal indicating notion of “as” is supposed to avoid. We already know that this notion gives expression to the articulation of the sense in all its forms. Thus the question to be addressed is what kind of misinterpretation of the articulation of the sense Heidegger wants to avoid. The answer lies in the very idea of relation as a formal form of connection between terms. The “as-structure” is not a connection between terms, an identity between terms. Quite interestingly, in these pages Heidegger emphasizes the originality of the as-structure as form of identity.

The essential point is that the sense of ‘identity’ or ‘unity’ of the ‘as’ is precisely what distinguishes this structure from every relation (as relation between terms); and to a certain extent, the reason why the as-structure has *a priority* over other forms or relations (and, or) is that the “as” gives expression to a form of unity so original that it cannot be understood as a relation of identity between terms. In these pages Heidegger defines the as-structure as *vorgängige einheitbildende Vernahmen von etwas als etwas*.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ In this context, Heidegger does not say much about the structure of “and” and “or”; he does not say, for example, if also the “and” and the “or” can (or must) be understood by reference to an original dimension. The fact is that in Heidegger’s perspective, to put it roughly, the “seeing something as something” is the condition of “seeing this or that”. We see “this hammer and that nail”, “this heavy hammer or the other hammer”.

Thus the as-structure cannot be defined in terms of relation. But there is another concept that might be of help in defining this structure: the notion of synthesis. We shall see that in *Logic* Heidegger shows some doubts about the possibility of a formal definition of the as-structure as unity of synthesis and diaresis. Now, in this lecture Heidegger tells in which sense we can say that to the as-structure it belongs a synthesis.

If, however, the “as”-structure belongs to such a synthesis – although how remains obscure initially – then we can glean something more from this. The $\sigma\upsilon\nu$ means a together (*Zusammen*), a unity (*Einheit*), and manifestly one that is not a piecing together (*Zusammenstückung*), but an *original* unity which, earlier than parts (*früher als die Teile*), is a whole (*Ganzheit*). $\sigma\upsilon\nu$ – whole – as a whole? The “as”-structure itself thereby shows an essential connection (*Wesenzusammenhang*) with the second structure we are asking about here: the “as a whole”. [p. Ga 19/30, 457/315]

Heidegger’s use of the term *Ganzheit* as original synthesis is determined by his interpretation of Kant’s intuition as “syndotic unity”, as totality that precedes the parts (I will return on this problem in the next part). At the same time, Heidegger’s characterization of the as-structure as whole-part relation can be understood in a phenomenological sense, in relation to Husserl’s mereology. I have already suggested that the relation between whole and part constitutes a decisive point of contact between Heidegger’s phenomenology of meaning and his phenomenological interpretation of Kant. Besides, Heidegger makes use of the whole-part relation in order to characterize the unity and originality of the *Dasein*. We can say that in Heidegger synthetic structures are always articulated as forms of totality; it is as totality that these structures are original

forms of synthesis.¹⁰⁶ What Heidegger finds in the whole-part relation is a form of unity very peculiar, notably a form of original synthesis or relation, radically different from any synthesis or relation as ‘connection’ between different and pre-existing terms. Heidegger makes a very ‘formal’ use of the whole-part relation, in the sense that different forms of totalities disclose different forms of object as unity of manifold. However, as we shall see, question arises as to the principle of the variations of these structures.

Dahlstrom [2001, p. 83] rightly notes that Heidegger’s exposition “presupposes a certain mereology, elaborated in the Third Logical Investigation”. But Heidegger makes use of this mereology also to characterize his own form of categorial intuition: the hermeneutic-as. Besides, in Heidegger’s perspective categorial acts have this structure only in a derivative sense, as moments of a more original whole (the hermeneutic-as). In *Logic* [p. 151/127] Heidegger presents the as-structure as a “basic, unified structure (*einheitliche Grundstruktur*)”; the structure “expressed in the “as” cannot be further broken down into pieces (*Stücke*) but is simply to be interpreted more originally as a whole in its wholeness (*Ganzheit*)”. Thus we can say that both Heidegger’s as structure and Husserl’s categorial intuitions are articulated as whole-part relations. The question to be addressed is what kind of possible modifications this structure allows. It must be seen how this structure is articulated in each context.

§ 17. Manifold As: Veritative, predicative, apophantic Synthesis

The definition of categorial acts in terms of whole and part is to be found already in the VI Logical Investigation, in particular in the § 48

¹⁰⁶ Øverenget [1998, p. 71] claims that “the very foundation of Heidegger’s reappropriation of the *Seinsfrage* in fact presupposes an even more foundational distinction, the theory of wholes and parts. There is simply no way of utilizing the concept of categorial intuition without also accepting this theory”.

(significantly entitled "*Charakteristik der kategorialen Akte als fundierte Akte*"). In this paragraph Husserl cautions that the *ideal* relation between whole and part (namely, this relation as synthetic articulation of complex acts) must not be understood as a *real* relation; this would be like confusing "grundverschiedenen Dingen", notably, two different "forms of connection": sensible (or real) and categorial. Husserl makes clear that the "parts" connected in the "whole" of categorial acts are not "real moments" of the object. *To a certain extent*, and under certain conditions, we can say that also for Heidegger categorial connections are not real connections; or better: in Heidegger's perspective, categorial acts are no *longer* connections that belong to the real object (where real indicates the object as it is constituted in first place). Keeping using this analogy: the "too heavy" of the hammer is a real determination of the object; the statement "the hammer has the property of the heaviness" is a categorial and ideal articulation of the object. However, as I suggested in order to see how the relation between whole and part operates within Heidegger's phenomenology we must look at to its *concrete* modifications.

We can start by recalling a passage from Ga 27. The notion of truth is here presented as a "durchgreifende und organisierende durchwaltende Ganze" [p. 61]. Heidegger explains that the proposition has sense and stability only in relation to a totality ("der Satz hat Sinn und Halt nur in einem durchgreifenden Ganzen"). He takes the example of the assertion 'the chalk is white'; Heidegger draws a distinction between (a) predicative-relation as relation between predicate and subject ("Prädikatsbeziehung des Prädikats auf das Subjekt") and (b) assertion-relation, as relation between the predicative-relation with the object of the assertion ("Aussagebeziehung der ganzen prädikativen Beziehung auf das, worüber ausgesagt wird"). Heidegger presents this difference as a *Zweideutigkeit*. We have already discussed this ambiguity in the first

part, in relation to Heidegger's interpretation of state of affairs. In that context, the propositional relation (here predicative-relation of the predicate to the subject) was defined a propositional whole (whose members are subject and predicate) and the relation of identity (here assertion-relation) an intentional whole. The difference between these two forms of totality, and the very possibility of their confusion, lies in the twofold meaning of the being as (a) *Strukturmoment des Sachverhaltes, Verhältnisfaktor, copula*, and (b) as *Wahreverhalt*. Now Heidegger clarifies that these relations (predicative identity between subject and predicate, intentional identity between the intend-proposition and the intuited) are both founded on the truth as original totality.¹⁰⁷

This threefold distinction between truth, assertion-relation and predicative-relation is worthy to note, for it anticipates the threefold structure of the syntheses of *Kantbuch* (with the significant difference that Heidegger, in this text, does not make use of the term "relation"); this threefold structure of syntheses is not yet well-defined in the *Interpretation*. Thus Ga 27 (1928) can be seen as intermediate stage between Heidegger's interpretation of Kant of 1927/1928 and the *Kantbuch* (1929). In this text Heidegger makes a threefold distinction between "veritative synthesis", "predicative synthesis" and "apofantic synthesis" (or "formal-apophantic" synthesis).

This structure can be understood by reference to the distinction between hermeneutic-as and apophantic-as, even though in the first structure presents three terms. The fact is that while the "veritative synthesis" corresponds to the "hermeneutic as", the "predicative

¹⁰⁷ Ga 27, p. 68: "Diese Ortsbestimmung aber ist zweideutig, sofern der Satz zugleich Prädikation und Aussage ist. Wenn überhaupt zum Satz gehörig, kann die Wahrheit nur in der Aussagebeziehung liegen. Diese Aussagebeziehung, die Beziehung zum Worüber, gründet jedoch selbst in dem notwendig zugrundeliegenden Aufenthalt bei Seiendem, innerhalb welchen Aufenthaltes allein ein Worüber zugänglich und durch die prädikative Aussage bestimmbar ist".

synthesis" (in Ga 27: assertion-relation) refers to the first and more original *meaning* of the "apophantic as", notably, "pointing out". What Heidegger calls "apophantic synthesis" (in GA 27: predicative relation) seems to be a moment of the assertion as "predication" (the second meaning of "assertion" that Heidegger distinguishes in § 33 of *Being and Time*).

Let us now turn our attention to the threefold synthesis of the *Kantbuch*. Roughly speaking, the difference concerns three different levels: 1) the veritative synthesis, as synthesis that makes possible the object in the first place; 2) the predicative synthesis, as synthesis that states something (a concept) about something (an object). 3) an apophantic synthesis as relation between concepts (subject and predicate). Let us consider these threefold distinction as Heidegger presents it in the *Kantbuch*.

1) "...die wahr-(offenbar)machende, veritative Synthesis": "Accordingly, the synthesis of thinking and intuiting accomplishes the making evident of the encountered being as object. We will therefore call it the veritative synthesis which makes [something] true ([or] evident. This [synthesis] coincides with the above-mentioned "bringing-forward" of the relevant determinateness of the beings themselves".

2) "...der einigenden Einheit des Begriffes in seinem Prädikatcharakter"; "Urteil [als] Vorstellung der Einheit des Bessteins verschiedener Vorstellungen". Heidegger quotes Kant "'A judgment is the representation of a unity of the consciousness of various representations, or the representation of the relationship between the same, insofar as they constitute a concept.'" Judgments are "functions of unity," i.e., a representing of the unifying unity of concepts in their character as predicates. This unifying representing we name predicative synthesis".

3) “Urteilen als Verbinden von Subjekt und Prädikat”: “..the joining of subject and predicate”.

As I have anticipated, to understand the meaning of these distinctions, we must focus on the whole structure of which these distinctions are moments. In particular, it is important to understand how these different moments relate to each other, how they are determined by the ‘whole’.

The relation between these forms of syntheses is presented by Heidegger himself as a relation between parts of the same structure: the “essential structure of the knowledge”. Heidegger characterizes the ‘essence’ of the knowledge as a “Struktureinheit”, as a “ursprünglich reiche Ganzheit, strukturelle Zusammengehörigkeit” of modes of synthesis; these syntheses are “zusammengeschlossen” or “notwendig aufeinander eingespielt”, even though the first one has *a priority*, since it “constitutes” (*ausmacht*) this structure in its totality. The predicative synthesis *belongs* (*gehört*) to the veritative, while the apophantic is incorporated (*eingebaut*) in the predicative.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ *Kantbuch*, p. 29: “Demnach sind in der veritativen Synthesis, die das Wesen der endlichen Erkenntnis überhaupt ausmacht, notwendig die Prädikative und die apophantische Synthesis zu einer Struktureinheit von Synthesen zusammengeschlossen”.

p. 60: “Nun sind aber in der vollen Struktur der endlichen Erkenntnis mannigfaltige Synthesen notwendig aufeinander eingespielt. Zur veritativen Synthesis gehört die prädikative, in die wiederum die apophantische eingebaut ist. Welche von diesen Synthesen ist gemeint, wenn nach der Wesenseinheit der reinen Erkenntnis gefragt wird? Offenbar die veritative; denn sie betrifft ja die Einheit von Anschauung und Denken. In ihr sind aber die übrigen notwendig miteinander geschlossen”.

p. 64: “The same function which gives unity to the various representations *in a single judgment* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in a single intuition* which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of the understanding”. With this sameness (Selbzigkeit) of the synthetic function, Kant does not mean the empty identity of a tying-together which is formal and which works everywhere (die leere Identität eines überall wirkenden formalen Verknüpfens), but instead the original, rich wholeness of one which is composed of many members and which, like intuiting and thinking, is a particularly efficacious unifying and giving of unity (die ursprünglich reiche Ganzheit eines vielgliedrigen, als Anschauen und Denken zumal wirkenden Einigens und Einheitgebens). At the same time, this says: the modes (Weise) of synthesis named earlier—the formal, apophantic [model of the judging function], and the predicative [model of conceptual reflection] belong together (gehören zusammen) in the oneness (Einheit) of the essential structure (Wesenbau) of finite knowledge as the veritative

Heidegger's terminology makes very clear that we are dealing with a complex and yet unitary structure; the question arises as to the internal articulation of this structure, as to its 'dynamic'. For example, one might ask whether judgment (predicative synthesis) belongs to the veritative *also* in the sense that its very form originates within the first synthesis.

This interpretation of the synthesis as original structure plays an essential role in Heidegger's reading of Kant. Indeed, in this perspective the predicative synthesis (judgment) is only one possible form of synthesis, a form that belongs to the more original structure of the veritative synthesis. This allows Heidegger to separate what in Kant is identified: the synthesis of productive imagination and the functions of understanding. In a well-known passage of the *Critique*, Kant says that "the same function which gives unity to the various representations *in a single judgment* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in a single intuition*". Heidegger [64] comments this passage as it follows:

With this sameness (*Selbkigkeit*) of the synthetic function, Kant does not mean the empty identity of a tying-together which is formal and which works everywhere (*die leere Identität eines überall wirkenden formalin Verknüpfens*), but instead the original, rich wholeness of one which is composed of many members and which, like intuiting and thinking, is a particularly efficacious unifying and giving of unity (*die ursprünglich reiche Ganzheit eines vielgliedrigen, als Anschauen und Denken zumal wirkenden Einigens und Einheitgebens*).

I will devote to this problem a paragraph of the next part. For the moment, let me just note that for Heidegger the *sameness* of these two functions does not indicate a coincidence or an identity, but a possible articulation of the original structure of the synthesis.

synthesis of intuition and thinking. Here sameness means: an essential, structural belonging-together (strukturelle Zusammengehörigkeit)".

Now, the question is: how are we to understand the relationship between these different levels or modes of synthesis? In order to shed more light on the differences between these structures we must now turn our attention to Heidegger's distinction between hermeneutic and apophantic-as. As it is well-known, with these concepts Heidegger refers to two radically different dimensions or structures of meaning: an original one and a derivate one. *Broadly speaking*, the distinction between hermeneutic and apophantic-as corresponds to the *categorical* difference between *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit* (as determination of the being "whose mode of being is unlike the Dasein"). But this does not amount to say that we can explain the first with the second. On the contrary, according to the hypothesis of this thesis, the distinction between being *zuhanden* (ready to hand) and being *vorhanden* (present at hand), can be further *characterized* in relation to the difference between hermeneutic and apophantic-as, understood as different forms of *synthetic totality*. For sure the distinction between *zuhanden* and *vorhanden* can be explained, as Heidegger also does, as a temporal modification of the temporal scheme called "presence". However, question arises as to whether temporality can explain for this modification and for the manifold modifications of the very general category of the 'ready to hand'.

Keeping in mind our previous considerations on Heidegger's concept of meaning as totality of indications and on the as-structure as whole-part relation, we can now try to define the difference between hermeneutic and apophantic-as focusing on the notion of *Ganzheit*. Thus we ask how each structure involves a different form of totality.

In the § 33 of *Being and Time* Heidegger intentionally presents the difference between hermeneutic and apophatic in a very schematic way, namely opposing, on the one hand, the primordial act of interpretation of the hammer as too heavy, on the other hand,

the theoretical sentence “the hammer is heavy”. Heidegger is here interested in showing the radical difference between these two dimensions; he wants to emphasize the *derivative (abkünftiger)* character of the assertion, as derivative *modification* of the primordial hermeneutic-as. The question for him is: “But how does the assertion become a derivative mode interpretation? What has been modified? “Inwiefern wird sie aber zu einem *abkünftigen* Modus der Auslegung ? Was hat sich an ihr modifiziert?)”. I am not sure that Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, is really able to provide a *complete* answer to this problem. To put it roughly, Heidegger seems to answer only to the second question (what has been modified?) and not the first (how does the assertion become a derivative mode interpretation?).

As we shall see Heidegger himself recognizes that there are “interim stages” between these two acts (for example the assertion “too heavy, another hammer!”). But for the moment let us focus on these extreme cases.

Something *at hand with which* we have to do or perform something, turns into something “about which” the assertion that points out is made. [...] Now the access is first available for something like *qualities*. That *as* which the assertion determines what is objectively present is drawn *from* what is objectively present as such.¹⁰⁹

Heidegger presents a difference between two forms of object: the object-Womit and the object- Worüber: the first is the object with-which we have to do, the second is the object about-which we assert something. What is determined about the object is now *taken from* the object itself: under this restriction we can now find something like qualities.

¹⁰⁹ “Das *zuhandene Womit* des Zutunhabens, der Verrichtung, wird zum »*Worüber*« der aufzeigenden Aussage. Jetzt erst öffnet sich der Zugang zu so etwas wie *Eigenschaften*. Das Was, *als* welches die Aussage das Vorhandene bestimmt, wird *aus* dem Vorhandenen als solchem geschöpft. [...]”.

Let us see what this modification entails in terms of as-structure. Indeed, “die Als-Struktur der Auslegung hat eine Modifikation erfahren”.

The “as” no longer reaches out into a totality of relevance in its function of approaching what is understood. It is cut off with regard to its possibilities of the articulation of referential relations of significance.¹¹⁰

The “as” refers no longer to the original totality, the totality in which the sense has been *appropriated* and *developed*. What the “as” *now* refers to, can no longer be articulated according to its possibilities. We can no longer ‘develop’ the sense in relation to a totality of indications. The hammer is cut off from the totality: “indications” become irrelevant and what only matters, that is, the only relevant totality, is the hammer as it constitutes the ‘whole’ objectual region. The paradigmatic form of articulation of this totality is the form of categoric form $S = p$.

Heidegger makes clear that this modification is a “specialty of the statement” and that only through the assertion.

The as gets pushed back to the uniform level of what is merely objectively present. It dwindles to the determination that belongs to the structure of just letting what is objectively present be seen. *This levelling down* of the primordial “as” of circumspect interpretation to the as of the determination of objective presence *is the specialty of the statement*. Only in this way does it gain the possibility of a pointing something out in a way that *merely look at it*. [my emphasis].¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ “Das “Als” greift in seiner Funktion der Zueignung des Verstandenen nicht mehr aus in eine Bewandtnisganzheit. Es ist bezüglich seiner Möglichkeiten der Artikulation von Verweisungsbezügen von der Bedeutsamkeit, als welche die Umweltlichkeit konstituiert, abgeschnitten”.

¹¹¹ “Das “Als” wird in die gleichmäßige Ebene des nur Vorhandenen zurückgedrängt. Es sinkt herab zur Struktur des bestimmenden Nur-sehen-lassens von Vorhandenem. Diese Nivellierung des ursprünglichen “Als” der umsichtigen

As Heidegger says, once the “seeing” is cut from the totality of indications, the only things visible are “qualities”. But as Heidegger says in § 18, indications are not qualities (“Das ‘Zeigen’ des Zeichens, das ‘Hämmern’ des Hammers sind aber nicht die Eigenschaften des Seienden.[..] Zuhandenes hat allenfalls Geeignetheiten und Ungeeignetheiten”).

The focus of Heidegger’s presentation is precisely the opposition between two different structures: a one in which the “as” indicates a totality of indications and connections, a one in which the “as” indicates a totality whose parts are qualities. But how are “qualities” possible in general? How is possible that, within “the uniform level of what is merely objectively present”, something ‘different’ can appear, so to speak, as relevant or worthy of attention (the heaviness of the hammer)? Heidegger answers in this very paragraph, in a passage I have quoted above: every assertion “*operates within a definite set of concepts (bewegt sich in einer bestimmten Begrifflichkeit)*” The hammer is heavy, heaviness belong to the hammer, the hammer has the property of heaviness. The fore-conception always contained in the statement remains mostly inconspicuous because *language always already contains a developed conceptuality*”.¹¹² In this sense, I think that we can say that the apophantic-as is cut of from the totality of indications, but not from what Heidegger, in the § 34, calls *Bedeutungsganze*, the totality of meanings; this ‘seeing’ is no longer ‘interested’ in *articulating* the sense in relation to the totality of indications that *was* relevant; but it

Auslegung zum Als der Vorhandenheitsbestimmung ist der Vorzug der Aussage. Nur so gewinnt sie die Möglichkeit puren hinsehenden Aufweisens”.

¹¹² “Zur Aussage als bestimmender Mitteilung gehört jeweils eine bedeutungsmäßige Artikulation des Aufgezeigten, sie bewegt sich in einer bestimmten Begrifflichkeit: Der Hammer ist schwer, die Schwere kommt dem Hammer zu, der Hammer hat die Eigenschaft der Schwere. Der im Aussagen immer auch mitliegende Vorgriff bleibt meist unauffällig, weil die Sprache je schon eine ausgebildete Begrifflichkeit in sich birgt”.

still remains related to a totality of meanings, since the totality of meanings has *already been* articulated by the discourse. But Heidegger does not dwell upon the problem of how exactly conceptualization operates within this totality, and if there are special forms of indications that pre-delineates this conceptualization.

As we have seen, the difference between object-*Womit* and object-*Wöruber* indicates here two opposite examples. Heidegger considers the form of a statement that determines – in line with the structure S is P – a merely present object. But it is important to recall that Heidegger (in the § 33 of *Being and Time*) distinguishes three different significations of assertion. In *Logic* Heidegger stresses that “these three meanings [pointing out, determining, communication] are not just empty or invented distinctions within the meaning of ‘statement’. No, each of them refers to a specific *structural moment* of λόγος” (my emphasis)”. In *Being and Time* Heidegger says that these three significations of assertion “are interconnected and delineate in their unity the full structure of the statement”. This suggests that every statement presents these three aspects. However, question arises as to the different possible modifications of this structure. To put it differently: the fact that every assertion, as such, is also predication, does mean that every assertion is predication in the same sense? In the terms of the *Kantbuch*: does every predicative synthesis have the formal structure of the apophatic synthesis?

The fact is that, as Heidegger notes in *Logic* [134], we usually understand the assertion as an act of determining, and therefore as an act of predication, while the assertion is *determining* only because it is an act of *pointing out*. Once we understand the assertion as pointing out, also the sense of the predication changes. Heidegger’s example is very clear. The “too heavy!” of the assertion “the

hammer is too heavy” is not a predicate like the “heavy” of the assertion “the hammer is heavy”.

In *Being and Time*, in fact, Heidegger locates the primordial meaning of assertion in the “pointing out” (*Aufzeigung*), and he makes precisely the example of the assertion “the hammer is too heavy”. He says that what is discovered here is “a being in the mode of its being at hand”. Then Heidegger defines the second meaning of assertion, the assertion as “predication”. Here “a ‘predicate’ is ‘asserted’ about a ‘subject’, the latter is *determined* by the former”. “What is asserted in the second signification of assertion, what is determined as such, has been narrowed down in its content as opposed to what is asserted in the first signification of the term”, that is, “the hammer itself”. As we can see, what is asserted in the assertion as pointing out is the thing itself (the hammer as too heavy): the being in the mode of its being at hand; in the assertion as predication what is asserted is a predicate (the *being-too heavy* of the hammer). With this distinction Heidegger has in view the difference (that we have considered in the previous part), between the state of affairs as relation of truth and the state of affairs as relation between contents. In the first case, the assertion “the chair is yellow” refers to the *fact* that chair is yellow; in the second, the assertion refers to the *being-yellow* of the chair, to the being yellow *as quality* (predicate) that belongs to the chair (subject). In that context we have seen that this ambiguity depends on the very structure of the assertion, for this structure presents the structural moment of the “being”, which can be understood as intentional relation of coincidence and as predicative relation, copula. The target of Heidegger’s criticism of assertion is precisely this confusion between two different meanings of assertion, two different meanings of the ‘being’. 1) pointing out that something, a certain ‘state’ or ‘relation’, *is*; 2) determining something (a subject) as something (predicate).

Seen in this light, it appears difficult to understand in which sense, exactly, every assertion is also predication. More precisely, it is not clear if the two meanings *refers* to different structures, or if the two *meanings* refer to two different *aspects* of the same structure. The fact that Heidegger presents his distinction as a distinction between “meanings” suggests that this second solution is the right one. The crucial difference lies in how the predication is interpreted: in relation to the primordial meaning of the assertion or in relation to the second. According to the first meaning, what is asserted is the “being at hand”, the object just as it is given in relation to a totality of indications (“the hammer is too heavy!”), according to the second, what is asserted is the being-heavy, the predicate as opposed to the subject of the assertion. It is only as predication *in this sense* that the object of the assertion “no longer reaches out into a totality of relevance”. In other words, the reason why the object of the assertion becomes an object merely present at hand lies in a modification within the *meaning* of the predication. This difference concerns the very structure of the object-worüber, the ‘form’ or the type of totality constitutive of the object.

According the §34 of *Being and Time*, the *Worüber* is a “structural moment” of the discourse as such. Every discourse, and not only assertion, is a discourse about something. Whishing is always whishing about something.¹¹³ Of course the sense of this ‘something’ is different; as we have seen, even within the assertion

¹¹³ From this point of view we must consider the difference between *Worüber* and *Wowon*. Ga 21, p. 143/120: “Λόγος is the act of indicatively showing the thing being spoken about, which earlier, when we were clarifying the concept of statement, we characterized as the statement’s subject matter [*das Worüber*]*—*as contrasted with what the statement predicates [*das Wowon*] about that subject matter”. In Ga 19 (p. 599) Heidegger distinguishes between two forms of *Ganzheit*: 1) the *Worüber* des Sprechens, *das Worüber* der Rede überhaupt; Heidegger defines this *Worüber* a unitary pre-given whole (..dieses Einheitliche des vorgegebenen Ganzen), a “noch unabgehobene Gegenbeheit”; 2) the *Wowon* of the discourse, as what to which the discourse is directed in the process of ‘thematic consideration’ “Das Wowon [ist] das thematisch Herausgehobene: das, was wir in der Grammatik das Subjekt des Satzes nennen”.

the sense of this about-which can be different, according the sense of the predication.¹¹⁴ Thus we have different forms of discourse; the assertion is only one possible form of discourse. Besides, the *worüber* as object no longer related to a synthetic totality is only one possibility of the assertion.

As we have seen, in the § 33 of *Being and Time* Heidegger recognizes that “there are many interim stages between an interpretation which is completely wrapped out in heedful understanding and the extreme opposite case of a theoretical statement about objectively present things: statements about events in the surrounding world, description of what is at hand, ‘reports on situations’, noting and ascertaining a ‘factual situation’. These ‘sentences’ cannot be reduced to theoretical propositional statements without essentially distorting their meaning. Like the latter, they have their ‘origin’ in circumspect interpretation”. From this point of view, the difference between hermeneutic-as and apophantic-as seems to be quite schematic; it should be specified not only in relation the different forms of discourse, but also in relation to different forms of assertions. What is interesting, I think, is the fact that one cannot reduce the assertion to the categorial form S is p.

Heidegger in *Logic* [157-8/132-3] notes: “when I make the statement, “This chalk is too scratchy,” I do not mean to determine the thing I have in my hand as something possessed of the property of grittiness or scratchiness. Rather, what I mean to say with my statement is that it is an *obstacle* to my writing. The statement is interpretatively related to my writing activity, my primary concern to

¹¹⁴ It might be worthy to *worüber* is also an Husserlian expression. In the § 94 of *Ideas* Husserl speaks of *Gegenstände worüber*, indicating the object of the judgment. Seen in this light, Heidegger’s use of this expression is quite. On the one hand, he opposes object- *worüber* and object-*womit*, in order to sharp the difference between two forms of object. On the other hand, he intends to show that the object *worüber* is not, first of all, object of a judgment in strict sense.

write". This statement cannot be understood if we focus on the being, on the "is"; we must focus on the "too". Heidegger makes also the example of the assertion "the roses are in bloom". "One then says that these things, the roses, have the property or condition of blooming. That is not what anyone means when he or she says, 'the roses are in bloom'". The problem, I think, lies in the fact that Heidegger intentionally takes into account only two extreme *opposite* forms. The first one, original because still related to the origin of its meaning (the circumspect interpretation), and the second one, derived from the first. Thus the question concerning the 'origin' of assertions like "the roses are in bloom" is not posed. In a footnote of *Logic* [156/131] we read: "There are various levels between a functional involvement with something, on the one hand, and a pure determining on the other. However, our analysis deals chiefly with the two extremes". Then Heidegger indicates three levels: 1. A assertion in and for a practical function; 2. a determining that describes one's specific lived world; 3. a determining as assertion about what is just there, what merely occurs". Heidegger, for methodological reasons, is interested in the opposition between "the assertion in and for practical function" and the thematic assertion.

The aim of these considerations was to show that what Heidegger calls as-structure is a formal structure that can be articulated in manifold forms. What is difficult is to understand how these structures relate to each other, especially if one considers Heidegger's 'differential' framework (the distinction between primordial interpretation and derived assertion). Indeed, every form appears to be related to the original whole, the hermeneutic as; however, the assertion brings into view something *new*, not only something less *original*. How (or where) do apophantic forms originate? As a matter of fact we cannot find any account of the originality of the assertion in Heidegger.

Heidegger seems more interested in establishing a sharp distinction between original-as and derived-as. In this sense, he considers the assertion only to the extent that he can establish a relation of foundation between these two levels, for example, between the 'too heavy' of the hammer and the 'heaviness' as predicative and conceptual determination. For sure, as Heidegger notes, the assertion 'the roses are in bloom' cannot be explained as an assertion in the sense of predication and determination; but it cannot be understood as originating in the primordial circumspection neither. Question arises as to the originality of this assertion, insofar as *what* this assertion points out (*that* the roses are in bloom), namely its *worüber* cannot be understood as a *womit*.

§ 18 'Dynamic' and 'Unity' of the As: from Predication to Temporality

I have suggested that in his account of interpretation and assertion, Heidegger, for methodological reasons, works with an opposition between original interpretation and derived assertion. In fact, establishing this difference Heidegger claims the autonomy of the as-structure as a whole *vis-à-vis* the structure of predication. From this point of view, the § 12 of *Logic* is very interesting. In fact, we find the first detailed presentation of the difference between hermeneutic and apophantic-as and, more important, in this context Heidegger struggles with the definition of this structure: he realizes that hermeneutic-as cannot be defined by reference to anything like predicative forms (as unity of synthesis and diarsis). On the contrary, these forms have their roots in the unity of the "as". Thus the problem of the unity of the as-structure leads Heidegger to the claim the temporal character of this structure.

Heidegger is discussing the relation between two different kind of characterizations of assertion: as truth/false; as synthesis/diarsis.

Heidegger obviously rejects the idea that these two characterizations are correlated (in the sense that truth assertion is synthetic and a false one is diaretic):¹¹⁵ Synthesis and diarsis are both moments of every assertion as such. After he makes this point Heidegger asks: “What have we gained by this discussion of the various forms of simple assertions with regard to σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις?” On the one hand, the answer is “nothing”. “As concerns an insight into their very structure, it has achieved nothing. On the contrary, that structure has gotten even more obscure and puzzling (*dunkler und rätselhafter*). [140/118]. On the other hand, Heidegger also recognizes a “positive” role in this discussion. Heidegger stresses that connecting (*Verbinden*) and separating (*Trennen*) “belong to every statement as such and therefore go together essentially and therefore are a matter of a unified phenomenon that originally constitutes the unity of a statement as such”. In this sense “even though the structure itself is not yet entirely clear, nonetheless the result is not merely negative”. In what is this consideration ‘positive’? “It is also positive insofar as we have gained a reference point and a direction (*in dem gewonnenen Hinweis und in der Anweisung*) for understanding this connecting that is a separation and this separation that is a connecting, together *as a unified phenomenon*” [my emphasis]. Synthesis and diarsis, as determinations of every assertion as such, provide us an indication of an *unified phenomenon*, a structure in which every synthesis is already a diarsis and every diarsis a synthesis. Heidegger says that the problem is now *if*, and if yes *how* “this unified phenomenon of the “as”—which sense making and understanding always have—*can*, and first of all *must*, be through σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις (*Die Frage wird jetzt sein, ob am*

¹¹⁵ “But no one can seriously hold this position, namely that in order to always speak the truth, one would simply have to avoid negative statements. No, there are negative statements that are also true (uncovering), just as there are affirmative statements that cover-over”.

Ende das, was mit σύνθεσις und διαίρεσις , Verbinden und Trennen gemeint ist, diese Phänomen des Als ist, und inwiefern dieses einheitliche Phänomen des Als, das dem Bedeuten und Verstehen zukommt, durch σύνθεσις und διαίρεσις gefasst werden kann und zunächst gefasst werden muss)" [146/123].

On the one hand this structure is helpful, for it does provide us an indication concerning the "as-structure" : "we see that the act of sense-making (*das Bedeuten*), owing to its as-structure, can in fact be understood with the help of these formal determinations of σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις". On the other hand, however, these determinations are formal and empty: "the formal structure of σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις does not get to the authentic (*eigentlich*) sense of the comportment (*Verhalten*) itself [...] Σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις are merely empty, formal determinations, and they are not intrinsically and exclusively adapted to making-sense—even though *their* own ultimate origin may have to be understood in terms of sense-making" (*Σύνθεσις und διαίρεσις sind nur formal-leere Bestimmungen, die nicht als solche schon von Hause aus einzig auf dieses Bedeutung zugeschnitten sind, obwar vielleicht gerade das Verständnis ihres egeine letzten Ursprungs von da her genommen werden muss*). [149/125]. Thus, these formal determinations originate in the meaning but cannot authentically (*eigentlich*) account for the meaning in terms of *Verhalten*: they are formal precisely because they are no longer related to the meaning as *Verhalt*. These determinations are inadequate for they are derived from the meaning as *Verhalten* and they no longer reach this dimension.

What these structures cannot grasp is precisely the *dynamic* and the *unity* constitutive of the meaning as *Verhalten*. Of course we *can* explain the hermeneutic-as in terms of synthesis and diariesis, saying for example that this individual-door (synthesis) is a genera door for-entering (diariesis). But for Heidegger this would be like spoiling the whole phenomenon. As noted by Dahlstrom [p. 192]: "...while the

hermeneutic 'as' (taking x as a door) involves both combining and separating, these features by themselves do not capture its dynamics of straightforwardly, nonthematically having something, dynamics in which from the outset both the horizon (the unit of a concrete "from...where and where..to?") and what is encountered belong together". It is precisely this *dynamical unity* between *horizon* and *object* that the synthesis and diresis cannot account for.

On the one hand, in *Logic* Heidegger radicalizes the idea that meaning cannot be thought by reference to predicative structures and therefore in terms of meanings or concepts (even though, as we have seen, the totality of meanings does play a role in the articulation of the sense). For sure, we cannot explain the structure of the meaning as *Verhalten* within this framework. On the other hand *Logic* also radicalizes the idea that this dynamic structure is essentially temporal. Let me quote a passage from *Logic* [147/124].

Thus the direct grasping (*schlichte Erfassen*)¹¹⁶ of something that is given in the lived world in the most natural way is constantly a *returning* to what I encounter (Zurückkommen auf ein Begegnendes), a constant (standing) return that is necessary a returning¹¹⁷ because my own authentic being, as concerned-dealing-with-things-in-the-world has the property of always-already-being-ahead-with-something (*weil nämlich mein eigentliches Sein als besorgendes In-der-Welt-zu-tun-haben charakterisiert ist als Immer-schon-vorweg-sein-bei-etwas*).

Because my being is such that I am out ahead of myself, I must, in order to understand something I encounter come back *from* this being-out-ahead *to* the thing I encounter. Here we can already see an immanent structure of direct understanding *qua* as-structured comportment (*Als-mässigen Verhaltens*), and on closer analysis it turns out to be *time*.

¹¹⁶ Eng. "understanding"

¹¹⁷ The English edition reads: "a returning that is necessary" instead of "a returning that is necessary a returning" ("ein standing Zurückkommen, das notwendig *ein Zurückkommen* ist, weil...").

The dynamical structure that Heidegger is here presenting is the *point of origin* of the meaning. It appears that for Heidegger all the 'directions' and 'senses' of intentional structures are rooted in the temporality as essential structure of the *Dasein*. I will discuss the priority of temporality in the next section, where I shall provide an account of Heidegger's idea of synthesis as pure synthesis of the temporal manifold. For the moment, I would like to emphasize the import of Heidegger's interpretation of the as-structure as temporal structure.

As we have seen, the as-structure gives expression to different forms of relations with things; every dealing with something, every form of 'having' something, every form of knowledge have this structure. Roughly speaking, this structure gives expression to a form of *identification* (something as something) that allows a manifold of indications (the door as door-for) and meanings (the door as red) to be unified, in such a way that what is identified is always, at the same time, *determined* and *open*. What does it mean, exactly, the claim that the *understanding*, as "as-structured comportment", is temporal? How does temporality make possible the 'dynamical unity' of the as and how does temporality allow a 'formal indicating' form of identity?

As I said, I will not take into account Heidegger's concept of temporality directly, namely considering *Being and Time*. Instead I will focus on Heidegger's idea of time-related synthesis and on his interpretation of Kant's three-fold synthesis of apprehension, reproduction and recognition. Heidegger's interpretation of the synthesis of recognition as synthesis of identification will shed more light on the relation between temporality and as-structure.

However, before to move into the next section, I would like to recall what Heidegger, in § 69 b of *Being and Time*, says about this relation between temporality and as-structure. We read:

The way the present is rooted in the future and in the having-been is the existential and temporal condition of the possibility that what is projected circumspect understanding can be brought nearer in a making present in such a way that the present itself must adapt itself to what is encountered in the horizon of awaiting retention; that is, it must explicate itself in the schema of the as-structure.¹¹⁸

Heidegger says that the “as-structure” is *that* structure in terms of which the present *explicates* itself according what is projected by the understanding. What does it mean that the present ‘explicate’ itself in terms of as-structure? The as-structure is the structure of the explication (namely of the articulation, appropriation and development of the sense in relation to a totality of indications and meanings); the present explicates itself in terms of “as”: what is understood – in the explication of the sense – is always understood “as something”. The structure of the present, as what is always explicated in terms of “as”, is what Heidegger calls [§ 69 a] “das gewärtigend-behaltende Gegenwärtigen” (“the making present that awaits and retains”): this is what Heidegger calls “Verwurzelung der Gegenwart in der Zukunft und Gewesenheit”, as condition of possibility of the “as”. If the present can be “explicated” in term as present in which “something” is encountered “as something”, it is because the present, as *gewärtigend* and as *behaltende*, ‘contains’ a manifold of retained-indications, awaited-relevance, meanings) only in relation ot which something becomes meaningful “as something”.

¹¹⁸ “Die Verwurzelung der Gegenwart in der Zukunft und Gewesenheit ist die existenzial-zeitliche Bedingung der Möglichkeit dafür, daß das im Verstehen des umsichtigen Verständnisses Entworfenene in einem Gegenwärtigen nähergebracht werden kann, so zwar, daß sich dabei die Gegenwart dem im Horizont des gewärtigenden Behaltens Begegnenden anmessen, das heißt im Schema der Als-Struktur auslegen muß”.

III. THE TEMPORAL SYNTHESIS

In the previous part I have emphasized the presence in Heidegger's phenomenology of different structures of unity of manifold. In that context the problem of temporality was intentionally left aside, in order to focus on these specific structures. In our perspective, the relation (of foundation? of interconnection?) between temporality and synthetic structures is the core-problem of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant. As we shall see, Heidegger explicitly defines Kant's categories as pure forms of unity of manifold (even though Heidegger would not speak of "form"); at the same time, these forms are essentially temporal. But for Kant these categories are also (if not essentially) categories of understanding; Kind finds in the judgment the *Leitfaden* for the categorial problem.

What is interesting of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is that here Heidegger focuses precisely on the relation between categories and temporality. As we have seen, pure categories (in the sense of categorial intuition) cannot be grasped by way of abstraction; forms or structures of meaning are not to be found in what is given in a strict sense. Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's transcendental logic emphasizes precisely the fact we cannot grasp a pure category by way of reflection or generalization (what Heidegger calls here "ontic conceptualization"), for categories in general refer to a "pure synthesis of pure manifold". I would like to quote a very indicative page of Heidegger's *Interpretation* [286/194]. Heidegger first quotes KrV, A 78/B 104, where Kant draws a distinction between the task of the general logic and the task of transcendental logic.

By means of analysis different representations are brought under one concept-a procedure treated of in general logic. What transcendental logic, on the other hand, teaches, is how we bring to concepts, not representations, but the *pure synthesis* of representations. What must first be given-with a view to the *a priori*

knowledge of all objects-is the *manifold* of pure intuition; the second factor involved is the *synthesis* of this manifold by means of imagination. But even this does not yet yield knowledge. The concepts which give *unity* to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in representation of this necessary synthetic unity, furnish the third requisite for the knowledge of an object; and they rest on the understanding."

In this case, I have used Norman Kemp Smith's translation (the same used by the editor of Heidegger's lecture). In fact the Cambridge edition translates "Aber nicht die Vorstellungen *auf* Begriffe, sondern die *reine Synthesis*.." with "..bring under concepts not the representations but the pure synthesis of representations"; as Heidegger stresses, the difference between bringing *under* or bringing *to* concepts is crucial: it indicates two different conceptualization as related to two different manifolds, respectively, empirical and pure.

Let us see how Heidegger comments this passage.

These introductory sentences touch again on the difference between analysis and synthesis – in such a way that at this point a fundamental distinction between ontic and ontological concept-formation emerges (*ein grundsätzlicher Unterschied zwischen ontischer und ontologischer Begriffsbildung*). Concept-formation in ontic terms proceeds in such a way that, by comparison, reflection, and abstraction, it brings the manifold which is given in advance (the appearance) into a unity

According to this process this concept is applicable to other possible empirical objects. By contrast, concept-formation in ontological terms does not bring objects given in advance "under" (*unter*) concepts, but rather brings pure synthesis of the pure manifold "to concepts" (*die reine Synthesis der reinen Mannigfaltigen 'auf Begriffe*) [..]This means that the task here is to work out, with reference to the full essential structure of pure imaginative time-related synthesis, the unity which structurally belongs to this synthesis and which is designated as a pure concept of understanding. (*Das Bedeutet: Es soll hier im Blick auf die volle Wesenstruktur der reinen imaginativen zeitbezogenen Synthesis die ihr strukturmassig zugehörige Einheit herausgestellt werden, welche Einheit als reiner Verstandesbegriff bezeichnet wird*). To bring pure synthesis to its concept means phenomenologically and ontologically to interpret a basic phenomenon of knowledge unto its essential structure

(*Wesenstruktur*). To bring representations under concepts means to think and to determine objects ontically. To “bring pure synthesis to concepts” is to work out and grasp (*Heraustellung und Erfassung*) the categories and categorical connections (*kategoriale Zusammenhängen*) in ontology. To “bring under concepts” is the ontic knowing of the positive sciences. Put differently, the distinction we just made makes clear that categories cannot be obtained by way of empirical-ontic abstraction and generalization (*Verallgemeinerung*), much less by purely logical ways. We can neither pose nor resolve the problem of categories in a positive science. The entire ontological problematic is one of *a priori essential knowledge (apriorischen Wesenserkenntnis)*.

Heidegger establishes a strong opposition between “ontic” and “ontological” conceptualization. This difference refers to two quite different tasks and methods: that of positive science and that of phenomenology. The “ontological problematic” is understood as related to “*a priori essential knowledge*” and “categorical connections”; these categorial connections are forms of “pure synthesis of the pure manifold”. These pure categories cannot be obtained by way of *Verallgemeinerung* (that is, the *Generalisierung* and *Formalisierung*).

Heidegger puts a lot of emphasis on the difference (that Kant himself underscores in the text) between bringing “under concepts” and “bringing to concepts”; the difference between empirical and pure manifold can be understood in relation to these two different forms of conceptualization. Positive sciences bring an *empirical manifold under* concepts; phenomenology and ontology bring a *pure manifold to* concepts.

Let me stress that, from this point of view, the authentic ontological problematic is a one of categories and not a one of pure intuition. Heidegger makes this point very clear in the *Interpretation*.

Int., p. 118 [eng. p. 82]: The difference between in se and sub se means that space and time have their parts within themselves and not, like a concept, under themselves. Space and time are not notions, they are thus not categories. Since

concepts have the definite individual under themselves, Kant arrives at the following difficult problem. The ontic concept "table" indicates something general. But the categories too are concepts and, as ontological concepts, in a certain way also have what is ontic under themselves. In what way now do ontic-general concepts contain something under themselves and in what way do ontological concepts do so-that is the central problem of the doctrine of schematism.

Kant gives us at least two forms of pure unity of manifold: the pure intuition and pure categories. The question we shall address is: how are we to understand that the authentic ontological problematic is about "categories" and how are we to understand a category as "pure synthesis of pure manifold"? To address these questions I suggest, first of all, to define, in which sense, for Heidegger, the "pure manifold" already contains a synthesis; then I shall ask how this pure manifold allows a categorial synthesis.

§ 19 The temporal Origin of pure Categories

Discussing Heidegger's interpretation of categorial acts, we have already touched upon the problem of the intertwining between forms of synthesis and forms of predication. This dogmatic intertwining amounts to what Dahlstrom calls the "logical prejudice", a prejudice of which Kant himself was victim, as shown by the fact that he finds in the judgment *Letifaden* for the categorial problem.

In a well-known passage of the Critique [...] Kant explicitly says that the same function that unifies different representation in a judgment *also* unifies different representations in one intuition. In the previous part I have dealt with the way Heidegger interprets and appropriates of this problematic (and in his perspective dogmatic) statement. Heidegger, in fact, claims that the 'identity' between synthesis and function of judgment is only one possible form of articulation of the broader and richer structure of the synthesis. To put it roughly: if every judgment is synthesis, not every synthesis is judgment.

In the *Interpretation* [p. 291/197] Heidegger deals with this passage more extensively and his interpretation is more clear. We can appreciate how indeed Heidegger approaches this problematic relation between synthesis and judgment.

The same function of understanding which gives unity to various representations, *in one judgment*, also gives unity to pure synthesis *in one intuition*. But "unity" and "giving unity" do not have the same meaning in each case. To *give unity* to representations in one *judgment* means to constitute the form of judgment as *form*. To *give unity* to pure *synthesis* of various representations means to contribute to the content which corresponds to this synthesis a *further content-factor belonging to it* [290/197] (*ein weiteres zugehöriges Inhaltsmoment*).

Heidegger notes that "giving unity" has not the same meaning in each case. In the first case giving unity means to constitute the form of judgment as *form*, in the second, it means "to contribute to the content which corresponds to this synthesis a *further content-factor belonging to it*". Let me note that here Heidegger speaks of a *rein Synthesis*, a pure synthesis, while in Kant text we read *blosse Synthesis*, that is, a mere or simple synthesis. Heidegger operates a similar 'translation' interpreting Kant's definition of synthesis in A 78/B 103¹¹⁹: the "designation of the synthesis as *mere* effect of the *power of imagination* means that this synthesis is the *pure* effect of that power, that this synthesis comes purely from the power of imagination".

Heidegger then understands these two functions as two different forms of unification: the first one constitutes a logical form, the second constitutes a *further content factor* that contributes to the

¹¹⁹ "Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we should have no knowledge whatever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious. To bring this synthesis *to concepts* is a function which belongs to the understanding, and it is through this function of the understanding that we first obtain knowledge properly so called".

content of the synthesis. This content is what the synthetic activity (judgment) refers to.

Let us see what Heidegger means with this opposition between a logical form and a content. We have already seen that in Heidegger's perspective logical forms are not only formal structure, but also "moments" of an intentional relation (and formal relations are rooted on these intentional relations). Heidegger interprets Kant's categories as structures presenting both a content, the origin of which is to be found in the original temporality, and a form that co-determines the content. Heidegger's interpretation radicalizes the first aspect, since temporality is here understood as the place origin of categories as such. In this sense we can speak (as Heidegger does) of a "twofold *character of categories*": as logical forms and as transcendental contents. Heidegger then stresses that "*the table of judgment contains the indices for the number and system of categories, but this table is not the source of their origin. We must dearly grasp this as the outcome of these six paragraphs which precede the table of categories*".

In order to justify this claim Heidegger makes reference to § 10 of the *Critique*. In particular, Heidegger tries to motivate (and defend) Kant's introduction of the notion of imagination in the §10. The introduction of this third faculty in this context, as Heidegger also notes, has aroused many problems in Kant scholarship.

First of all, Heidegger notes that "Kant here introduces a new fundamental source, the power of imagination. However, he does not simply arbitrarily introduce this third fundamental faculty as a hypothesis, but rather [it emerges] under the pressure of the phenomenon that up to now he has identified as synthesis and that is quite certainly neither intuition nor thinking". In Heidegger's view, Kant introduces this faculty under the pressure (*unter dem Zwang*) of the phenomenon characterized as "synthesis": it is the *characterization of the (pure) synthesis* (in its difference with the

function of judgment) that makes intelligible the role of the imagination. In Heidegger's perspective, thus, the introduction of the imagination is not only understandable, but even necessary.

Heidegger further elaborates his argument by reference to the passage of the § 10 that I mentioned above [288/196]. One might find in this the indication of Kant's identification of the synthesis with the function of judgment. But Heidegger intends to show that even though synthesis and judgment *overlap* each other, they do not *coincide*. Heidegger admits that this last paragraph seems "to destroy everything", that is, it seems to destroy his interpretation of imagination as place of origin of categories. Let us take this passage again.

[1] The same function which gives unity to the various representations *in a judgment* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition*; and this unity in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of understanding. [2] The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means (*vermittelt*) of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means (*vermittelt*) of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general.

Heidegger splits up this passage into two parts, (I have indicated these two parts in the text). Heidegger says that even though these two sentences say "basically the same thing", the second one "is more detailed and more clear". Therefore, "in our interpretation we begin with the second sentence". Indeed, in the second sentence Kant *makes explicit* that, if the understanding can *also* introduce a transcendental content of its representations, it is by means of a synthetic unity of the manifold (which is possible only as imagination). However, the subject of the sentence is the understanding, and not the imagination. Heidegger rethorically asks: "does Kant state flatly that the logical functions of the activity of

understanding *as such* produce the content of pure concepts of understanding? By no means. He states that understanding introduces into its representations a transcendental content – indeed "by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general," i.e., *by means of* the imaginative, time-related pure *synthesis of the power of imagination*. This "by means" is decisive". (*der imaginativen zeitbezogenen reinen Synthesis der Einbildungskraft*).

While there is no doubt that Kant, in fact, distinguishes between these two levels, Heidegger's interpretation of the imagination as "time-related" is, to say the least, debatable. Besides, it must be noted that Heidegger's focus is entirely on the role of imagination in the *production* of a transcendental content, while nothing is said about the origin of the logical forms. Heidegger's interpretation, as a matter of fact, establishes a strong opposition between these two aspects: categories as transcendental contents and categories as logical form. Heidegger insists on this opposition by distinguishing, for example, pure concepts as "notions" and as "categories"; with this terminological distinction he wants to emphasize the 'abstract' or 'conceptual' character of the Kant's categories as logical forms, as *formal structures or formal relations*.

Terminologically, we can grasp the ambiguity (*Zweideutigkeit*) of the notion of pure concepts of understanding for what will follow by saying that *for Kant pure concepts of understanding are in one sense notions and in another sense categories*. On the one hand they are viewed from *the logical form of the activity of understanding*. But at the same time they are grasped as *primal concepts whose content springs from the pure imaginative, time-related synthesis*. [Interpretation, p. 301/205].

Let me recall that in the previous paragraphs of this lecture Heidegger provides an interpretation of the difference between transcendental and general logic. In a nutshell, Heidegger shows that

while Kant's formal logic is *pure* because it makes abstraction from any content (therefore, it is pure from a *methodological* point of view), the transcendental logic is pure because *its content* is pure (therefore, its pureness is *thematic*). Kant's ambiguity lies in the fact that for him a category is not only a pure synthesis of the pure manifold, but *also* a notion, a general concept, a form derived obtained by way of abstraction, 'reflecting' upon the judgment. In this sense, the same distinction between "form" and "content" is problematic; pure categories are pure and are forms (forms of unity of manifold), and yet they are transcendental contents, they provide a *further content-factor, ein weiteres Inhaltsmoment*: they are 'moment of sense' in which logical forms are supposed, in Heidegger's perspective, to originate.

Heidegger draws a sharp distinction between the Leitfaden of categories and their place of origin [293/199].

These forms [categories] in their totality and articulation can be an *index* for *completeness and division* of pure concepts of understanding. This is the only legitimate sense of speaking of the table of judgment as a clue (*Leitfaden*) for the discovery of pure concepts of understanding. By contrast, their *origin* occurs in pure time-related synthesis of the power of imagination.

The only legitimate sense of the judgment as *Leitfaden* is as *index*, as 'list' that allows us to 'organize' the plurality of categories; but this does not mean at all that judgment tells us something *about the origin* of categories.

Another important argument that Heidegger presents here is to be found in Kant's decision (in A 82-3/B 108) of postponing the *definition* of the categories. Kant presents this decision as something "deliberate", and he also says that he *might* possess these definitions: "In this treatise I deliberately refrain (*übersehe.. geflissentlich..*) from offering definitions of these categories, even though I may possess them" (*ob ich gleich im Besitz derselben sein*

möchte). But Heidegger [297/202] doubts of the spontaneity of Kant's decision, suggesting that his refrain might have deeper reasons. Heidegger asks: "Is Kant actually distancing himself from an explicit disclosure of the origin of categories merely because this disclosure is a lengthy and not absolutely necessary business? Or does this sliding over an explicit disclosure of the origin [of the categories] at the present juncture have other, deeper reasons?". According to Heidegger, the reason for doubting the sense of Kant's refrain lies in the fact that, at this stage of his investigation, Kant has not yet *disclosed* the *place of origin* of the categories. Heidegger says: "precisely with regard to what we worked out as the actual place of the origin of categories, we must ask: *Could* Kant carry out such a disclosure of the origin [of categories] even if he had *wanted* to? No! For Kant brought to the fore only the general dimension of the place of origin [of the categories]; he did not yet show (1) how the pure synthesis of pure power of imagination relates to the manifoldness of time and (2) why this synthesis can be at all related to this manifoldness". Thus according to Heidegger "with the outstanding sincerity of his thinking, Kant later admitted that the reason for leaving out the explicit derivation of categories was not the worthlessness of the task, but rather a fundamental embarrassment in the face of the possible resolution of the problem". Heidegger refers to A 241.¹²⁰ Here we read:

In the above presentation of the table of categories, we relieved ourselves of the task of defining each of them as our purpose, which concerns only their synthetic employment, did not require such definition; and we are not called upon to incur any responsibility through unnecessary undertakings from which we can be relieved. It was no evasion but an important prudential maxim, not to embark upon the task of definition, attempting or professing to attain completeness and

¹²⁰ Heidegger stresses that this remark is "of course crossed out in the second edition"; "freilich" because – according to his exegetic scheme – in the second edition Kant recognized *a priority* of the intellectual synthesis over the imaginative one.

precision in the determination of a concept, so long as we can achieve our end with one or other of its properties, without requiring a complete enumeration of all those that constitute the complete concept. But we now perceive that the ground of this precaution lies still deeper. We realize that we are unable to define them, even if we wished.

Heidegger remarks:

It was not an "evasion" but a "precaution" which prompted Kant to leave out the exposition of individual categories. And the deeper reason for this precaution lay in the fact that Kant was not able to [offer an exposition of individual categories], even if he had wished. Kant clarifies this reason right before the remark that we just quoted, when he emphasizes that "we cannot define any one of them in any real fashion, that is, make the possibility of their object understandable, without at once descending to the conditions of sensibility, and so to the form of appearance."

Indeed, in this context Kant does say that a definition (as we read in the second edition: a *real* definition) of categories implies a reference to the condition of sensibility. For example, we read that "no one can explicate the concept of magnitude as such, except perhaps by saying that it is that determination of a thing whereby we can think how many times a unity is posited in it. Yet this how-many-times is based on successive repetition, and hence on time and the synthesis (of the homogeneous) in time".¹²¹ Heidegger finds in the *condition* of sensibility something essential: "*Pure concepts of understanding, the categories, are grasped in their necessary structural moment (Strukturmomenten) when they are taken as*

¹²¹ A similar remark is made by Kant in B 128, where he calls the attention to the difference between the category of substance and the subject as moment of the logical function of categorical judgment. He notes that "...the function of the categorical judgment-e.g., all bodies are divisible - is that of the relation of subject to predicate. But the understanding's merely logical use left undetermined to which of the two concepts we want to give the function of the subject, and to which the function of the predicate. If, on the other hand, I bring the concept of a body under the category of substance, then through this category is determined the fact that the body's empirical intuition in experience must be considered always as subject only, never as mere predicate".

concepts which spring from pure imaginative relation to time". Thus one might say that Heidegger radicalizes only *one aspect* of the problem of categories, only *one condition*: the sensibility (time). In this perspective, the difficulty of defining categories amounts to the fact that we must first have disclosed the "place of origin" of categories: the time-related imaginative synthesis. The ontological conceptualization itself, in its difference from the ontic conceptualization (abstraction, universalization), must be referred to this place of origin, temporality. For Heidegger pure categories are not primitive concepts, *Stammbegriff*, but original concepts, concepts that have definite origin and can therefore be explained in relation to this origin. A question arises as to whether we can really explain the genesis of logical forms and more in general of structures of meaning by reference to temporality. I will say more about this problem in the *Conclusions*.

§ 20. Category überhaupt: Heidegger's Deduction

In both the *Interpretation* and the *Kantbuch* Heidegger elaborates his concept of synthesis in relation to the so-called A-Deduction; the "place of origin" of the categories is to be found precisely here. I have already noted that in *Logic* (Heidegger's first detailed interpretation of Kant) he does not show any particular interest in this section. As Heidegger also says, the essential core of Kant's *Critique* lies in the schematism. In *Logic* we read: "This chapter on the schematism is the real center of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The whole structure of the book stands or falls with the doctrine of the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding and with the sustainability of this doctrine" [*Logic*, p. 358/295]. Thus, in the *Interpretation* Heidegger upholds this idea: it is "in this chapter that we must look for the hinge upon which the entire *Critique* turns [*Interpretation*, 168/115]". Hence we can say that Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation appears to be determined by two

focal points: the schematism and deduction. In what follows I will try to define how Heidegger actually understands the relation between these two sections of Kant's text. To a certain extent, one might say that if the chapter on schematism is the core of the Critique, the A-Deduction appears to be the foundation of this core.

Let me start by making a very general remark on the meaning of Kant's Deduction. Benoist [1996], for instance, has suggested to see in Kant's Deduction a "préjudiciel" use of the notion of synthesis. This holds true for the A-Deduction in particular. Benoist says: "Le trois 'synthèses' explicitent les conditions transcendentales (et non seulement logiques) que doit remplir ce 'donné' pour être un donné 'qualifié', c'est-à-dire pur être tenu pour un objet. Reste, imparable et énigmatique, la question du fondement de son devenir objet, la question de la synthèse en tant que telle. [...] Ma si ici Kant est amené à réélaborer la notion de synthèse, c'est que tel n'est pas le propos: il s'agit de savoir comment pour nous un objet en general est possible, et il faut donc *deduire la synthèse elle-même* [...]. L'usage de la notion de 'synthèse' dans les trois 'Synthèses' est préjudiciel. Il attend d'être fondé et légitimé dans l'ostension du sens de la synthèse in général, comme ajointement de l'entendement et de la sensibilité..." (p. 182).

I have quoted this passage because, to a certain extent, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's threefold synthesis might appear somewhat formal, insofar as it 'only' shows the possibility of an object *überhaupt* as "unity of manifold", leaving aside the question concerning how exactly the object is synthetically articulated. The questions we must now address are these: how does Heidegger deal with the 'generality' of the notion of synthesis as it is presented in the *Deduction*? The relation between deduction and schematism is important for us for it brings to the fore the question concerning, so to speak, two different dimensions of the problem of the synthesis: the originality of time, the time as "place of origin" of the unity of

manifold *in general*, temporality as formal condition of every unity of manifold in general, and the possible *articulations* of the unity of manifold. But let us turn our attention to Heidegger's text.

In his presentation of the *Deduction*, as we have already seen, Heidegger does insist on the idea of "origin", on the "place of origin" of categories. Heidegger [*Interpretation*, p. 303/206] asks if Kant, in his Deduction (*Deduktion*) of pure concepts, also wants to offer a "derivation" (*Ableitung*) of them. But then Heidegger rhetorically asks: "Or does "deduction" mean something else?" Heidegger recalls the results of the previous part of his interpretation: what the Deduction is *really* about is the idea that the place of origin of categories lies in the temporal-imaginative synthesis: "pure concepts of understanding must spring from (*entspringen*) this synthesis". Heidegger clarifies the meaning of this *entspringen*: concepts "have their *content* in accord with a definite origin (*bestimmte Herkunft*)"; this origin is precisely the pure and temporal synthesis. Now, Heidegger says that an important distinction must be drawn between two different problems (in part, we have already touched upon this problem in the previous paragraph). We read:

In fact, regarding this task of disclosure of the essence¹²² (*der Enthüllung des Wesens*) of pure concepts of understanding, – we must distinguish between *delimiting the place of origin in general* (*Umgrenzung des Ursprungsortes überhaupt*) (i.e., determination of that which, in general,¹²³ constitutes a category as category [*der Kennzeichnung dessen, was überhaupt eine Kategorie als Kategorie konstituiert*]) and *elucidation of individual categories* (*Aufhellung der einzelnen Kategorien*).

Heidegger then distinguishes between two different tasks: the delimitation (*Umgrenzung*) of the place of origin of categories *in*

¹²² The English edition translates *Wesen* with ownmost inner possibility. The reasons of this translation are explained in the introduction. However, we do prefer to keep using the term essence.

¹²³ The English edition omits the second *überhaupt*.

general: what *in general* constitutes a category as a category; and the elucidation (*Aufhellung*) of what each particular category is. The question is: how do these two tasks relate to the task of *der Enthüllung des Wesens*? Heidegger at the beginning of this passage, says that “ist hinsichtlich dieser Aufgabe der Enthüllung des Wesens der reinen Verstandesbegriffe zu unterscheiden...”. One might ask if the task that Heidegger calls *Enthüllung des Wesens* of the pure concepts, namely the disclosure of the pure categories (plural), coincides with the *Umgrenzung* of its place of origin, or if it is a broader task that includes also what Heidegger calls here the *Aufhellung* of each category. To put it differently: is the disclosure of the essence of categories only a question of “origin” or also a question of “elucidation”? In the following lines Heidegger provides an answer to this question, saying that if “now a ‘deduction of the pure concepts of understanding’ is to be undertaken anew, *deduction* can only mean *disclosure of the origin of categories*, i.e., clarification of their essence by a regress to what pertains to them (*Aufklärungs ihren Wesens im Rückgang auf das, was zu ihnen gehört*).

In the light of this remark we can now define the specific goal of Heidegger’s interpretation of the three-fold synthesis in terms of disclosure of the essence of a category as “pure synthesis of pure manifold” and in terms of a consideration of the essence of a category in relation to what pertains to this essence, as originating in temporality. “In other words the issue which is to be dealt with in transcendental deduction presupposes the radical inquiry into the original ontological essence of these concepts” [311/211].

Some lines before Heidegger makes another important remark. He says that “Kant deals only with the first question. Thus, however ambiguous the outcome of the first part may be *in other respects*, still *the structure of that which belongs to a category is clear*, namely the three elements of pure knowledge mentioned above: time, the power of imagination, and logical function of understanding (my

emphasis)". Heidegger is saying that despite some ambiguities, Kant accomplishes the task of the *Deduction*, disclosing the essence, disclosing what characterizes a category *as such*; or at least, according to Heidegger Kant sees with a certain clarity the structure that belongs to categories.

However, as we shall see, Kant did not completely succeed in the disclosure of the very "essence" of categories, for these three elements are not grasped in their origin in temporality. Indeed, in Heidegger's view Kant lacks an actual understanding of this dimension of origin. In Kant the essence of pure concepts of understanding, despite the delimitation (*troz aller Umgrenzung ihres wahren Ursprungsortes*), still remains in the dark (*dunkel*). We do not yet have the full (*vollen*) ontological concept of categories". Let me stress this point: what Kant *does not have* is the concept (singular) of categories (plural); Kant does not have the concept of what a category is *in general*, therefore he does not have a full ontological concept of what constitutes an object in its objectivity. Heidegger will find this notion of category (possibility of an object in general) in Kant's synthesis of recognition. What is at stake in this section of the Critique is the possibility of the "something in general", of the object=X. Heidegger says: "What is it upon which the possibility of a thought of something in general is grounded, indeed grounded such that this something is in itself the possible unity for a manifold of given determinations? We shall return to this question in our discussion of the synthesis of recognition". [340/231].

In the following paragraphs I shall attempt to provide an account of Heidegger's 'deduction' of the essence of a category in general as "pure synthesis of pure manifold". With regard to this task, I shall first take into account the notion of pure manifold (pure intuition) and define the "pure synthesis of pure manifold" as a categorial modifications of the pure intuition. Secondly, I will tackle Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's three-fold synthesis.

However, I would like to dwell on the relation between deduction of the essence of a category in general and elucidation of categories.

Heidegger says that [429/291 “thus the fundamental problem [of the *possibility* of synthetic judgment] is resolved, and now we have only to be concerned with presenting concretely precisely these synthetic principles *a priori* in their system”. Heidegger notes: “But now, between transcendental deduction and systematic presentation of all principles we find the piece entitled ‘The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding’). We have frequently stated that this piece is the central piece of the *Critique*”.

What is Kant’s schematism really about? Heidegger spends a lot of time telling us what is the goal of the *Deduction* (the delimitation of the essence of every category as such). But what about schematism itself? Heidegger recognizes that “it is difficult to gain insight into the significance of this piece because of the Kantian architectonic of the presentation”. In the schematism, says Heidegger,

Kant attempts to grasp the synthesis *a priori* of the productive power of imagination in a unified and original manner. He makes this attempt in such a way that he no longer tries to work out more clearly the pure essence (*reine Wesen*) of categories, but rather [to work out] the basis of this essence, the essence of categories, (*den Grund dieses Wesens*) that is, the pure transcendental propositions of time”.

We must read this passage attentively. Heidegger distinguishes between the “pure essence” of categories – what is supposed to be the object of *Deduction* – and the *Grund*, the fundament of this essence, the pure transcendental propositions of time, the object of schematism. What does it mean, for the essence of a category, to be based on, or founded on something? Does this passage indicate a different answer to the problem concerning the disclosure of the essence of categories as delimitation of their essence to the temporal origin? The fact is that the way Heidegger’s temporal interpretation of

deduction, in part, collapses the very distinction between these two levels. Heidegger says that “in the way in which we set out to interpret the transcendental aesthetic and analytic, especially the transcendental deduction”, the problem of the schematism is *grundsätzlich schon behandelt*. Then Heidegger explains that if we consider schematism from the point of view of the structure of Kant’s exposition (*Von der Anlage der kantischen Darstellung her gesehen*), the schematism is a foundation (*Begründung*) of the transcendental deduction; but from the point of view of “our interpretation”, the schematism is an *Anweisung* (an indication) to the original sphere of the foundation (*Begründung*) of the possibility ontological knowledge. What Heidegger is saying, I think, is that while Kant’s schematism gives a foundation to the *Deduction*, insofar as *in this part* of the critique Kant deals with temporal propositions, in Heidegger’s perspective schematism (and its temporal propositions) they are indications of the original sphere of foundation of ontological knowledge, namely the three-fold and temporal synthesis as place of origin of every category as such (therefore, of every temporal schemata).

The question is: does this dimension of origin contain only the essence of categories *in general* or do we find here also a *principle* of their multiplicity? I shall address this problem in the *Conclusions*, where I will suggest precisely that the multiplicity of categories cannot be derived from temporality and that even the ‘delimitation’ of a category in general to temporality might presuppose other schematic conditions. But what is Heidegger’s position about this problem?

Heidegger says [400/271]:

Disclosure (*Enthüllung*) of what relation to objects generally (*überhaupt*) means on the basis (*Grunde*) of transcendental subjectivity and bringing into sharper focus

the functional *connection between the three syntheses* (die *Herausstellung des funktionalen Zusammenhangs der drei Synthesen*) in the unity of time-related transcendental apperception – this disclosure of transcendental subjectivity as uncovering of the *pure possibility of objectness in general is itself (in sich selbst) an elucidation of categories*.

The disclosure of what, in general, is a relation to an object is – as relation possible, as we shall see, only as unity of a manifold – is in itself an *elucidation* of categories. Heidegger here uses the term *Aufklärung*; as we have seen, in a passage that precedes the interpretation of the *Deduction*, this term is used as equivalent of *Enthüllung* (...*Aufklärung* ihren Wesens im Rückgang auf das, was zu ihnen gehört). Question arises as to the sense of this *Aufklärung*, in relation not only to the *objectness* in general (*Gegenständlichkeit überhaupt*) but also in relation to the possibility of manifold categories.

Heidegger is well aware of the problem; indeed he speaks not only of what *a category* is general, but also of *categories*, as regional forms of unity of manifold, as “*unities*” of manifold. The term region must be understood in a Husserlian sense and, most important, in a broad sense; let me recall that in *Being and Time*, *Zuhandenheit* is a category of Being. What is interesting of this lecture is that Heidegger explains what a category is in general and how we have to understand the possibility of *different* categories. Firstly, categories are defined in relation to their essence (as temporality) and in relation to their structure (unity of manifold). Secondly, categories are here presented as forms of unity that belong to the temporality as “original whole”, and as they are themselves forms of (regional) totality. Heidegger suggests to think the possibility of categories as variations *within, or of* (and we shall see that there is an important difference here) the pure manifold of time, understood as “totality”.

More precisely, categories belong essentially to the original whole of the pure time-related imaginative synthesis. Thus it would not do at all to set up an isolated analytic of concepts and then to inquire into their employment in a subsequent part. The question is the following: What belongs to pure synthesis as such and how do its concrete variations (*konkreten Abwandlungen*) look as regional principles of nature? [p. 430/292]

We shall see that the problem of categories, the problem of their *possibilities* (plural), lies precisely in their being modifications or variations of the pure intuition. At the same time, it arises the question whether or not time itself can originate these variations.

Heidegger also defines this problem in a more Kantian terminology, defining categories as “rules (*Regeln*) of synthesis”; these rules are “unities (*Einheiten*) which belong to pure imaginative synthesis and their *a priori* possible changes (*Abwandlungen*) determine every object in an *a priori* manner” [421/285]. In another passage [382/259] we read:

These rules of positing “in uniform fashion” [Heidegger quotes from KrV, A 113] that is, the indications (*Vorzeichnungen*) of the synthesis of the manifold, which are understood in advance and accepted as binding—these rules are nothing but unities which lie in the possible free forms (*freien Formen*) of synthesis as such. As the faculty of rules, understanding presents these rules to itself.

As we shall see, a ‘category’ is a form of enclosed unity, a definite totality that pre-delineate or indicate a form of possible unity of manifold. These forms of totality, that enable the experience, are constituted by subjectivity, they are ‘accomplished’ in the subject, founded (*gegründet*) on *Grundverhaltungen* of the subject [see. 333/226]. But this does not mean that they are arbitrary ‘productions’ or ‘inventions’.

Heidegger finds in Kant’s notion of synthesis – in the idea of categories as unity of manifold – something decisive for this thinking; he says that if we understand Kant radically enough, “then we shall

arrive at the philosophically fundamental problematic of *Being and Time*". In this perspective, the "being" (and categories in general) no longer means the same as *Vorhandenheit*; rather, "being" indicates a "universal sense which encompasses in itself all possibilities of regional variation (*regionalen Abwandlungen*). However, as I said the relation between temporality as 'universal' form of the being and regional variations, if quite complex, for is not clear in which sense the pure synthesis of pure manifold relates to temporality; it is not clear whether categories are categorial variation of temporality or temporal variation that discloses categories. (On the relation between regional variations, temporality and universality of the Being I will say more in the *Conclusions*).

§ 21. The Manifold of the Pure Intuition

Heidegger's definition of the problem of categories in terms of "pure synthesis of pure manifold" entails a rejection of every form of "ontical conceptualization" (universalization in broad sense); the task of what Heidegger calls "ontological conceptualization" is defined in terms of bringing to concepts the "pure synthesis of pure manifold"; a category is a pure synthesis of pure manifold. What does it mean "pure manifold"? Even though the task of the ontological conceptualization is defined by Heidegger in relation to Kant's transcendental logic, the idea of pure synthesis of pure manifold presupposes the interpretation of Kant's aesthetic, notably of the notion of pure intuition.

Let us take into account Heidegger's interpretation of pure intuition in the § 23 of *Logic*. Here Heidegger makes clear in which sense Kantian "form of intuition" is not only a "form", but itself "intuition".

What characterizes the form of intuition as *pure* intuition is the peculiar *kind* of manifold given through it. Heidegger stresses [p. 274/228] that the manifold of pure intuition is not something

“undifferentiated”, but it has the “character of a determinate manifoldness (*Mannigfaltigkeit*)”.

Kant saw that the manifold of each sense’s field of givenness has the determinate character of “one-after-another” or of “at-the-same time.” This applies to each particular sense and to sense in general. Insofar as it is a manifold, whether in the general or specific sense, it has the character of manifoldness. To put it more generally and yet more specifically, Kant saw that the manifold of every field of sense has the determinate character of one-after-another or of at-the-same time. It does not matter whether the self-giving manifold of a sense’s field is explicitly ordered in its one-after-another-ness and shows up as delineated, differentiated, determined, ordered numerically; *or* whether it shows up as undelineated, undifferentiated, undetermined, and unordered (*unausgeprägt, ununterschieden, unbestimmt und ungeordnet*). To begin with, it is phenomenally irrelevant whether the manifold is ordered and shows up in a specific order. Whether ordered or not, it is still a manifold. Whenever something encounters the senses, the encountering thing *qua* encountering is always presented on the grounds of a prior view of what lets a manifold meet the senses as a manifold. A pre-view of a manifold as such is the precondition for anything being able to be given as a manifold. (“*Begegnet etwas, so ist das Begegnende, sofern es überhaupt begegnet, schon vorgestellt auf dem Grunde eines vorgängigen Hinblicks darauf, was Mannigfaltiges als Mannigfaltiges begegnen läßt, d. h. jedes Gebbare innerhalb einer Mannigfaltigkeit setzt in sich schon den Hinblick auf Mannigfaltigkeit als solme voraus*”).

The point of Heidegger’s argumentation is that *no matter* how factually a manifold is encountered, this manifold is always encountered *as a* manifold: “on the grounds of a prior view of what lets a manifold meet the senses as a manifold”. This means that the character of manifoldness is strictly related to the *possibility* of an *order*, however each order might be articulated. It is here very important to keep distinct two different possibilities: that of a *primordial* order as possibility of ordering – “the ground of a prior view of what lets a manifold meet the senses as a manifold” – and that of a *specific-objective* order. “What Kant saw was this: letting a manifold encounter the senses entails (as we now interpret it more

precisely in phenomenology) a pre-viewing of something on the basis of which we can speak of an order or a lack of order at all". The very difference between *order* and *lack of order* presupposes this pre-view of the possibility of an order in general.

Heidegger's characterization of pure intuition in terms of "order" and "ordering" (*Ordnung*) has a technical sense. The term *Ordnung* goes back to Heidegger's early lecture. In these lectures the term has mostly a negative function, for it indicates any form of objective relations that belong not only to material regions, but also to the formal region. However, in *Logic* Heidegger makes a broader and positive use of this term. In this context, Heidegger speaks of "konstitutiven Momente der Ordnung", *Hinblick* and *Worauf*, to refer to the pure intuition as pre-view on the manifold and as principle-in-terms-of which of a pre-view can be determined.

In the §23 b [284/235] Heidegger wants to "pursue the connection (*Zusammenhang*) of the idea of order with the phenomenon of the form of intuition". He writes:

Suppose we have a bunch of spheres of different sizes and made of different kinds of material—and suppose they are to be ordered. The bunch of spheres is unordered, and the task is to sort them out and group them. But how? The assignment—"The spheres are to be ordered"—is insufficiently defined because nothing has been said about what the job entails (*eine unterbestimmte Aufgabe; unterbestimmt, weil darin nicht mitgesagt ist, was zu ihr gehört*). We know the unordered is to be ordered, but the question is: Ordered in terms of what? (*im Hinblick worauf?*)

[..]

In the case of the spheres, the pre-viewed basis-on-which could be color (*kann das Worauf des Hinblicks z. B. die Farbigkeit sein*). Then all the spheres of the same color, [285] regardless of their size and material quality, are grouped according to specific colours. Those colours are taken from out of the given (*vorgegeben*) manifold before us, because I would hardly order them in terms of green if I found no green spheres in the manifold.

Colours are *principles of order* that we can find in things itself, in what we encounter. Heidegger seems to imply that I cannot order a manifold of objects according to a quality which is not be found in those things, or at least in one of them. Heidegger does not dwell into details concerning the *different* possible articulations of this ‘impossibility’. (Of course, ordering numbers according colours and ordering not-green spheres according the green are not the same thing). In any case, what Heidegger’s example is meant to show is the difference between two forms of manifold, the difference between two principles or possibilities of order of the manifold: a one in which the *already given* manifold provides material principles (colours “taken from out of the *vorgegeben* manifold”) and a one in which the given *manifold* is pure, and therefore it gives a difference of principle of order. In this sense, one might say that the very difference between empirical and pure intuitions is a difference between two different forms of manifold. Heidegger in fact stresses that it is not necessary or “required” (*notwendig*), for the “pre-viewed basis-on-which”, to be taken from the already-given manifold.

For example, I could order the spheres serially in terms of the order in which they catch my eye each time I cast my glance directly at then manifold (*..gemäß der Folge, in der mir jeweils eine beim unmittelbaren Hinsehen auf die vorgegebene Mannigfaltigkeit auffällt*). In this case the pre-viewed basis-on-which is not a determination (*Sachbestimmung*) that belongs to the spheres themselves, but is a possible mode of a particular way of encountering them (*ein möglicher Modus eines bestimmten Begegnens*), the mode of “immediately catches- my-eye.”

Introducing these examples (colours, the temporal order of perception), Heidegger wants to emphasize the difference between two radically different “basis-on-which”, two different principles of ordering. If the first is taken from the already given objects, the second is defined as a “possible mode of a particular way of

encountering them". This possible mode, this principle, is anything like determinations of "already given objects": not only in the sense of objects that I actually find already there, in front of me, but also in the sense of already given (or imagined) objects in general. Heidegger makes the example of time. However, time is more than an example; time is the exemplar, paradigmatic, and ultimately the most original form of unity of manifold. Heidegger, from this point of view, does share with Kant what Benoist [1996] calls the "noetic priority of time".

Broadly speaking, time is the most universal and less 'objective' principle of order; time is not 'regional' but 'universal'.¹²⁴ Everything can be ordered in relation to time. Things seem to be different in the case of the space: the spatial order, of course, is not taken from the things, and yet not everything can be ordered in spatial terms. What is important to stress here is that Heidegger does claim *a priority* of temporality over other forms of unity of manifold (space, colours...). As we shall see, it is not very clear how, in Heidegger's perspective, this universal-original form of unity of manifold relates to others. To be sure, Heidegger does not exclude that particular forms of order (colours for example) are given in our experience. However, for him temporality is the universal form of manifold *in which* other forms of *Ordnung* are given and very likely these forms are subordinated to temporal categories.

Heidegger for example writes:

¹²⁴ *Kantbuch*, p. 48: "In this way both pure intuitions, space and time, are allotted to two differentl regions of experience (*Erfahrungsbezirke*), and at first it appears to be impossible to find a pure intuition which constitutes every instance of knowledge of the Being of experienceable beings and which, therefore, permits the problem of ontological knowledge to be formulated universally. Now to be sure, in addition to the association of both pure intuitions with the two regions of appearances, Kant states this thesis: "Time is the formal *a priori* condition of all appearances whatsoever". Hence, time has a preeminence over space. As universal, pure intuition, it [time] must for this reason become the guiding and supporting an essential element of pure knowledge, of the transcendence which forms knowledge".

A basis-on-which that is drawn simply from the things themselves is distinct and different according to the ontological regions (Seinsregion) that the objects belong to. If the task is to put Bach's fugues in order, color would certainly be excluded as a possible basis-on-which, as would material quality.

I cannot order Bach's fugues according to the colour, understood as sensible quality. But what is to be excluded is *Farbigkeit und materielle Beschaffenheit*. I could not order the compositions according, for example, the material quality "sound". Let me stress that the problem does not lie in the ontological region *as region*, but in the ontological region as *material region*; the problem does not lie in the form of the region as "totality", but in the materiality of this form.

We have already anticipated that one of the greatest discoveries of Kant is the idea of pure intuition as form of original (not conceptual) unity of manifold. Let us now turn our attention to this problem and see how Heidegger, indeed, defends this idea of pure intuition as pure manifold. The question to be answered is this: in what precisely is the pure intuition a form of unity different from the unity of a concept?

A first argument for Heidegger's thesis concerning the non-conceptuality of pure intuition is to be found in Kant's *metaphysical Exposition* of the concept of space.

KrV, B 40: "Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Now one must, to be sure, think of every concept as a representation that is contained in an infinite set (Menge) of different possible representations (as their common mark), which thus contains these under itself; but no concept, as such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations within itself. Nevertheless (gleichwohl) space is so thought (for all the parts of space, even to infinity, are simultaneous). Therefore (also) the original representation of space is an *a priori* intuition, not a concept".

The aim of Kant's argumentation is to show that space is not a concept in a strict sense; the sense in which parts of space are contained in the unique infinite space – the sense of this “in” – is different from the sense in which a set of representations are contained in an empirical concept. Kant stresses the originality of this form of relation by using, respectively, the preposition “under” and “within”: parts of space are contained *within* a representation, while conceptual representations are contained under a concept. One might say that the distinction between “bringing to concepts the pure synthesis of pure manifold” and “bringing an empirical manifold *under* concepts” already presupposes this distinction between “within” and “under”. In fact, as long as the difference between *bringing-to* and *bringing-under* concept refers, as Heidegger suggests, to two forms of manifold (empirical and pure), distinguishing pure intuition and empirical concepts is a preliminary step of the ontological conceptualization.

Let us focus on Kant's argument. Kant defines the parts of a concept in terms of *Menge*, namely as an amount, a certain extension of representations that a concept, *potentially*, contain under itself; parts of space are *simultaneously* contained, even *to infinite*, in the original representation of space. Kant says that “*therefore (also)*”, space cannot be a concept: it cannot be a concept because no concept as such can be thought as containing an infinite set of representations *within* itself” (and, to be more precise, as contained representations simultaneously). This “within” indicates a special kind of ‘inclusion’.

We can emphasize this point referring to an interesting passage of the first edition. Heidegger often quotes the sentence: “We present space as given as an infinite magnitude (*der Raum wird al seine*

undendliche Grosse gegeben vorgestellt). In the first edition we find an interesting explanation of this statement.¹²⁵

Kant writes:

We present space as given as an infinite magnitude. A universal (*allgemeiner*) concept of space (which is shared by a foot as it is by an ell) cannot determine anything as regards magnitude (*kann in Ansehung der Grosse nichts bestimmen*). If the boundlessness in the progression of intuition did not carry with it a principle of the infinity of intuition, no concept of relations would do so (*Wäre es nicht die Grenzenlosigkeit im Fortgange der Anschauung, so würde kein Begriff von Verhältnissen ein Principium der Undendlichkeit derselben bei sich führen*).

What Kant is saying here is that if space were a universal concept it could not determine the magnitude of any other object. “Foot” and “ell” could not be concepts that function as unit of measurement; a “foot” would be just an empirical concept, a concept that contains *under* itself a *possible set* of representations. But “foot” and “ell” do not refer to an empirical manifold, to a certain number of singulars objects that can be defined as “foot”, but refer to every object as much ‘big’ as a foot or a ell. These concepts refer to the pure manifold of space, namely to a pure magnitude.¹²⁶

Now the question is: granted that parts of space and time are not contained “under”, but “within” a pure intuition, *what* are these parts? Both concepts and pure intuitions, indeed, give “determinations”: the difference lies in the fact that in the first case the determinations are “thought”, in the second determinations are

¹²⁵ Husserl [see. *Ideas I*, §149] seems to have in mind this passage, when he speaks of progress (*Fortgang*) of intuition.

¹²⁶ B 138: “Space and time and all their parts are intuitions, thus individual representations along with the manifold that they contain in themselves (see the Transcendental Aesthetic), thus they are not mere concepts by means of which the same consciousness is contained in many representations, but rather are many representations that are contained in one and in the consciousness of it; they are thus found to be composite, and consequently the unity of consciousness, as synthetic and yet as original, is to be found in them. This singularity of theirs is important in its application (see § 2 5)”.

“given”. What does legitimate this distinction? The pure intuition is a peculiar form of manifold in which every part (determination) is *already distinguished* in relation to a whole, that is: determinations are not combined or produced by the activity of thinking, but they already given in their peculiarity. Heidegger says: “to make that clearer: ‘given’ is distinct from ‘thought’. So ‘given’ means: not thought, neither produced nor producible by the understanding and its basic activity of combining” [Logic, p. 299/247]. Heidegger [Logic, p. 300/248] emphasizes the fact that the “manifold is not articulated simply in such a way that, within the manifold, one thing is distinguished from another”. Heidegger presents this specific form of *distinctness* of the part in relation to the whole by opposing this kind of manifold to a mere multiplicity (which he defines here with the Latin term *moltitudo*).

Logik, p. 300/248]: In other words, what we encounter is not a simply multitude (*einfach moltitudo*) as the Scholastics would put it, something “just-different-in-general.” The character of manifoldness in this manifold that we encounter is not a simple empty otherness (*leere Andersheit*). No, we encounter the manifold in terms of its manifoldness. This manifoldness must itself be *given* in its own particular way, because the articulations made on the basis of this manifoldness are relevant to the issue in this sense (*weil die Artikulationen von dieser Mannigfaltigkeit her sachaltige sind*): this is not simply different from that, but is next to that, and that is behind this; and yet another is under or over that. These specific characters—next to, behind, in front of, under—are ones that, even if I had all the time in the world, I could never conjure up by pure thought out of the mere distinction of one thing from another. Next to, behind, in front of, under—these have to be given— which means that, of their essence, they are the pre-viewed that is given in a pre-view. And as what is essentially given—i.e., given as this determinate manifoldness as such—they are the condition that makes possible a determining comprehension of a specific “next to” or “over” or “under.”

Heidegger says that “this manifoldness must *itself be given in its own particular way* because the *articulations made on the basis of this manifoldness are relevant to the issue in this sense*: this is not

simply different from that, but is next to that, and that is behind this; and yet another is under or over that”(my emphasis); this manifold must be given, for it has its own articulation, an internal articulation that cannot be obtained by way of combination. “...die Artikulationen von dieser Mannigfaltigkeit her sachaltig sind; the internal articulations matters because they are, as it were, internal and not external: as manifold, the pure intuition cannot give one determination, and then another, and then another again (a multiplicity): it gives *at once* a manifold of articulations, already articulated according, so to speak, their specific position within the whole. Empirical concepts are ‘combinations’ of the mere-already given manifold: their generality does not really articulate things, does not distinguish things in relation to a manifold (right or left, before or after); on the contrary, they produce an *undifferentiated* multitude: they ‘generalize’ the individual as a part only numerically different from others. These differences are here what Heidegger calls a “simple empty otherness” (*leere Andersheit*).

As I have suggested, a way to define the originality of pure intuition is by stressing the fact that determinations (or articulations) cannot be “invented” or “combined”. “Next to, behind, in front, under”, says Heidegger, are “specific characters” that “*even if I had all the time in the world, I could never conjure up by pure thought out of the mere distinction of one thing from another*” (my emphasis). In *Logic* Heidegger criticizes the definition of spatial articulations in terms of “relation”; the criticism is just the same we have seen displayed by Heidegger in his definition of structures of meaning (*Verweisung, Als-Struktur, Bedeutung*).

Therefore, these features—next to, over, under, in front of, behind— that make up the pure manifoldness of space in general, are conditions of possibility of every possible determinate spatial relation. That means that “next to,” “over,” and “under” are not determinate kinds of relations— they are not species of the genus “relation-in-general”—any more than intuition is a species of concept. “Relation-in-

general” simply can- not be determined to a particular species called “Next to” or “Under,” because relation-in-general is not the underlying basis of the “next to” and the “under” and the “over” in the sense of making them possible— as if first there had to be “relation” in order that there could be a “next to.” It’s the other way around. Only because the next-to is intrinsically what it is, can it, *qua* next-to, be understood as a relation. If I determine the “next-to” or the “under” as relations, I say nothing about them *as* a “next-to” or *as* an “under.” “Relation” is also a feature of phrases like “more boring than” or “more stupid than.” As regards their content, “more boring than” and “next to one another” have nothing to do with each other. They are completely disparate, and yet I can determine both of them as relations. So, in calling both of them “relations,” I am saying nothing. That is, “relation” says nothing about the content that belongs to the essence of “next-to” or “under.”

We can observe that just as a formal definition of spatial determinations like “next-to” or “under” in terms of relation “does not say nothing about them “*as* a “next-to” or *as* an “under”, in the same in Ga 29/30 Heidegger says [*supra*, §15] that the formal definition the *Als-Struktur* as a form of relation among others (Heidegger makes the examples of the “and-relation”, the “or-relations”), “does not give us the essence” of the this structure, its specificity.¹²⁷ From this point of view, one might say that the formal-indicating approach constitutes for Heidegger a kind of grammar of the manifold, a kind of formal ontology that functions in relation to every possible form of pure manifold (temporality and structures of meaning). Precisely the notion of formal indication allows us to ‘see’ different forms of unity of manifold.

According to the definition of pure intuition we have seen so far, also the colour is form of pure intuition; colours are given, not “producible by the understanding and its activity of combining” (can I invent a colour?); in any case, shades and different colours make

¹²⁷ However, we can note that in that context the “as” appears as a form of relation having a priority over the others; the difference between “as” and “or” is not, in Heidegger, a difference between articulations of the same manifold, as the “under” and the “next-to” for example.

sense only in relation to a chromatic scale. I insist on this point because it is important to see what Heidegger is really looking for, what kind of “pure manifold” he has in view. There is a passage of *Logic* (we have already quoted it) that shows us very clearly what Heidegger finds essential of Kant’s pure intuition (and by consequence of the temporal form of intuition). Pure intuition is a “possible mode of a particular way of encountering things”. What does Heidegger exactly mean with this definition?

At the beginning of this paragraph [p. 273/227] Heidegger recognizes that “each sense (and Kant does not analyse this further) has its own distinct field (*Feld*). Colours can never be heard, sounds can never be seen. But colours and sounds each have their own *determinate mode of access* (*Zugangsart*). And for its part, each sense’s field of givenness embraces a *distinct manifold* (*bestimmte Mannigfaltigkeit*) of what can be given perceptually within that field. Whatever can be given within the field of a sense must be investigated according to its relevant *a priori* structure” (my emphasis). Heidegger recognizes that Kant “like all philosophy up to know” omitted such *Ästhesiologie der Sinne*, except for Husserl (Heidegger refers to the Göttingen lectures as a “the first attempt to carry out such a specifically phenomenological investigation”). However, one might ask which role this investigation could have in Heidegger’s perspective. Heidegger only says that this investigation is “the precondition for anything like a scientific psychology in the sense of research into actual data”. The question to be addressed is why, among different possible “determinate manifold”, time has *a priority* as an eminent “way of encountering things”, and not just one *determinate mode of access*. I have already noted that in Heidegger’s perspective all ‘intentional comportments’, every *direction* of intentionality (being directed toward, begin dealing with) is to be understood as a temporal modification. It seems that time more than any other “pure manifold” allows modalization, can ‘modify’ itself

introducing *relevant* variations, variations relevant in relation to the constitution of the object. As we shall see, indeed, Heidegger's temporality can be understood as a manifold that contains not only *relevant articulations* but the possibility of *relevant variations*. We have seen that Heidegger defines the essence of a category in general in terms of "temporality" and in terms of "variation".

In the next paragraph I shall take into account the difference between space as form of intuition and space as formal intuition (in Heidegger's perspective: geometrical representation); the aim is, first of all, to strengthen the idea of originality of pure intuition; secondly, this consideration will shed more light on Heidegger's concept of category.

But before tackling this problem, there is another aspect of Heidegger's interpretation of pure intuition that I would like to consider: the specific character of unity of the manifold as "totality". In this respect, I shall refer to the presentation that Heidegger gives in the *Interpretation* [§9]. Heidegger, in order to explain the specific character of unity of the pure intuition, speaks of "syndosis". This term is an elaboration of the concept of synopsis, an expression that Kant – as far as I can see – uses only in A 94, referring to the unity of the synthesis of apprehension as unity of sense. As a matter of fact, Heidegger's interpretation of the synthesis of apprehension can be seen as a 'deduction' of the specific form of totality of the pure intuition [see]. In this sense, the presentation that he gives here (and also in *Logic* and in the first paragraphs of the *Kantbuch*) is somewhat preliminary.

Heidegger [134/93] defines the unity of the pure intuition as "an advance unifying giving together (*vorgängig einigendes Zusammengeben*) of the pure manifold of space and time"; pure intuition is "an original togetherness (*ursprüngliches Zusammen*) whose unity is not the connecting of what is scattered (*Verbindung des Zerstreuten*), is not a synthesis". Heidegger says that the term

“synopsis” is still “misleading, as if the manifold of pure space and pure time is only given in their one wholeness when I intuit this manifold together sequentially”. As a matter of fact, we shall see that Kant’s idea of unity of intuition can be interpreted as a kind of synthetic and progressive unity (in which the parts precede the whole); from this point of view, the problem does not lie, as Heidegger suggests here, in the ambiguity of the term synopsis, but in Kant’s notion of apprehension. The fact is that in Heidegger’s view Kant *does not* think the unity of the intuition as a synthetic composition, or even as act of the mind, but as an original unity, and this is why the expression is misleading.

Heidegger’s characterization of the unity of intuition as “syndotic” unity and as totality that precedes the parts is very important. As we shall see in the next section, the idea of pure synthesis of pure manifold can be understood as a categorial modification within the structure of the pure manifold as totality. A way of approaching the issue concerning the possibility of these categorial variations is by considering the relationship between the pure manifold of pure intuition and the formal intuition.

§ 22. Categorial Modifications and pure Synthesis

The consideration of Heidegger’s interpretation of the difference between form of intuition and formal intuition will help us shed more light on the specific kind of originality of the unity of the pure intuition. Moreover, this discussion will allow us to underline some difficulties and problems of Heidegger’s definition of a category in general as “pure synthesis of pure manifold” and as categorial “variation”.

Broadly speaking, the difference between form of intuition and formal intuition brings to the fore the problem of the relation (be it of independence or foundation) between two levels, sensibility and understanding. More precisely, the problem concerns the

relationship between the unity of the space as a pure intuition and the unity of space as an object of geometrical representations (formal intuition). In the *Interpretation*, we read: “First, a very general remark. In and through the formal intuition, space is first determined as the object of a science: the object of geometry. A form of intuition is the *pure* manifold, the pure manifold as such”.

This theoretical problem is first of all an exegetic one. Indeed the distinction between form of intuition and formal intuition is to be found in a note of § 26 of the Critique. This note, in its difficulty, forces the interpreter to take a stand concerning the relationship between sensibility and understanding, recognizing or denying the possibility of a *syndosis* in Heidegger’s sense, the possibility of a synthesis within the intuition.¹²⁸ From this point of view, different interpreters do not just read the note differently; they make a different philosophical use of it. A significant example is to be found precisely in the different interpretations that Heidegger, on the one hand, and Cohen and Natorp on the other, gave to this note. In *Logic* [296/244] we read that “the Marburg School, for example, has interpreted it in a way diametrically opposed to the way that I just did”.¹²⁹ In Heidegger’s view, this note “misled the Marburg interpreters of Kant, with a supposedly genuine appeal to Kant himself, to explicate space and time as forms of intuition in terms of the formal intuition and to dissolve the transcendental aesthetic into the (transcendental) logic” [*Interpretation*, p.131/91].

The difference between form of intuition and formal intuition, in Heidegger’s view, is to be understood as a difference between an original and derivative representation.

¹²⁸ The interpretation of this note is controversial in Kant’s scholarship. See the debate between Longuenesse [1993] and Fichant [1997, 2014].

¹²⁹ Ga 25, § 9, Heidegger says: “Natorp takes this note as ‘a correction to the presentations of the transcendental aesthetic’. But this note shows the opposite”. Heidegger quotes from *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften*, p. 276.

Let us recall that Kant called the forms of intuition "original" representations. But when he now speaks of a formal intuition in addition to a "form" of intuition, then the question arises whether formal intuition, when compared to the form of intuition (which is an *original* representation), is not a *derivative* representation.

Let me note that Heidegger's approach to this note shares with the neo-Kantian reading the idea that formal intuition coincides with geometrical representation; in this sense, the difference lies in how we understand the relationship (of opposition, derivation or foundation) between these two 'forms', between these two forms of 'unity'.

In order to defend, against Cohen and Natorp, the idea of geometrical space as a *derivate part* of the original unique space, Heidegger makes use of a text that he considers particularly important, namely Kant's review of Kastner's *Abhandlung*. According to Heidegger, this document shows that "Kant [...] never intended to dissolve the transcendental aesthetic into the transcendental logic". He quotes a passage in which Kant makes a distinction between metaphysical space and geometrical (plural) spaces. The difference concerns, on the one hand, the originality of the unique space, and on the other, the derivative character of the parts of space of geometrical representations. Heidegger stresses that this difference can also be thought in terms of 'having' the space (in the intuition) and 'describing' it (in the construction). "Kant says that 'Metaphysics must show how one can *have* the representation of space, while geometry teaches how one can *describe* such space. "Through the former, space is observed as *given* prior to any determination of space; through the latter, a space is *made*". The geometrician "must acknowledge that the many spaces can only be thought as parts of the single original space".

This relation of foundation between geometrical representation and pure intuition is explained by Heidegger [Logic, 295/244] by

highlighting that the unity that brings together spatial constructions is “itself a kind of space”; and so the limitations of the space, namely its determinations (point, line, surface) are themselves spatial. (“.,die Einheit, in der ich räumliche Gebilde und räumliche Bestimmungen zusammenbringe, selbst räumlicher Art ist, d. h. die Einschränkungen des Raumes, Punkt, Linie, Fläche und dergleichen, sind selbst Raum”). “Space, line, figure: all these determinations presuppose a pure manifold”. All these terminations are nothing but determinations of space; all concepts of geometry (at least in the Euclidian geometry) would not make any sense without this reference to space, that is, as parts or limitations of the unique space: “On the basis of an original unity as wholeness the pure manifold of spatial relations now becomes limited, and in such limitations that manifold becomes *unified unto certain spatial figures*”.

Now that we have sketched out Heidegger’s general approach to the relationship between pure intuition of space and geometrical construction, we can focus on Heidegger’s interpretation of the note. The following is the note:

Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains more than the mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension of the manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation (*nämlich Zusammenfassung des Mannigfaltigen, nach der Form der Sinnlichkeit gegebenen*) so that the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the representation. In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all concepts, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible (*sie vor allem Begriffe vorhergehen, ob sie zwar eine Synthesis, die nicht den Sinnen angehört, durch welche aber alle Begriffe von Raum und Zeit zuerst möglich werden, voraussetzt.*) For since through it (as the understanding determines the sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions, the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding (§ 24) (*Denn da durch sie (indem*

der Verstand die Sinnlichkeit bestimmt) der Raum oder die Zeit als Anschauungen zuerst gegeben werden, so gehört die Einheit dieser Anschauung apriori zum Raume und der Zeit, und nicht zum Begriffe des Verstandes).

Heidegger's 'commentary' starts from the last sentence. I have underscored Heidegger's insertions. "For since through it {i.e., the synthesis} (as the understanding determines the sensibility) space or time are first *given* as intuitions {i.e., first properly as determined intuitions}, the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding. (B 161)". The decisive point of Heidegger's argumentation lies in the relationship between *givenness* and *synthesis*, namely on the idea that space and time are given, and yet given through a synthesis which makes space and time given as intuition (...*durch sie der Raum oder die Zeit als Anschauungen zuerst gegeben werden*). Heidegger says: "Kant saw that there is in this case an entirely original synthesis—a very peculiar "synthesis"; this synthesis is peculiar because it refers to (or depends on) something "given". Heidegger does not find strange Kant's use of the expression synthesis; on the contrary, it is necessary. Kant puts together "synthesis" and "given" in order to stress the specific character of manifoldness of space, as an intuition that *gives* a manifold in its *unity*.¹³⁰ It is in this sense that Kant "hat gesehen, daß eine ganz ursprüngliche Synthesis hier vorliegt, eine ganz eigenartige 'Synthesis'".

¹³⁰ "Many have taken exception to the words 'are given' and have suggested that Kant changed his way of speaking here because elsewhere he says that something is thought by way of synthesis and is given by way of intuition, whereas here he says that something—namely, this unity—is *given by way of synthesis*. Kant has to speak this way because the unity itself has a spatial character. And we need not invoke some change in terminology or identify an allegedly vague use of language. Rather, we should see that he had to say 'given'n this case, even though the synthesis cannot be given in itself. But in this case it *can* be given, because what the synthesis gives—the unity—is space: a spatial determination in the form of a limiting of space. What is more, Kant wrote the word "given" in italics—so we should presume that, in employing the term, he gave some thought to it and, given the difficulty of the analysis here, did not use some vague form of talking"(my emphasis).

A significant and decisive aspect of Heidegger's interpretation is the interpretation of the *indem*. As noted by Dufour [2003]: "Car la synthèse des concepts est conditionnée par la synopsis de l'imagination, comme le montre la parenthèse, dans laquelle le *indem* prend un sens tout différent de celui qu'il pouvait avoir pour Cohen. Chez Cohen, la parenthèse a une fonction explicative et le terme *indem* le sens d'un 'parce que'. Chez Heidegger, la parenthèse introduit une action parallèle et le *indem* le sens d'un 'pendant que'." We can assert that space and time are not given if, or as long as, the understanding determines the sensibility, but rather, *when* the understanding determines the sensibility, space and time are (*already*) given through a synthesis.

At this point one might object that Heidegger's is not really providing an interpretation of *the note*, but only of the last sentence. As a matter of fact, the presentation of this note in *Logic* is partial. Thus we can ask what the part that Heidegger, as it were, 'avoids' to interpret, might tell us about the formal intuition. Let us consider the text.

Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains more than the mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension of the manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the representation.

Der Raum, als Gegenstand vorgestellt, (wie man es wirklich in der Geometrie bedarf), enthält mehr, als blosse Form der Anschauung, nämlich Zusammenfassung des Mannigfaltigen, nach der Form der Sinnlichkeit gegebenen, in eine anschauliche Vorstellung, so dass die Form der Anschauung bloss Mannigfaltiges, die formale Anschauung aber Einheit der Vorstellung gibt.

Kant states that space, represented as an object (a representation, this one, required in geometry), entails and contains more than the simple form of intuition. What is this 'more' about? The problem lies

in the interpretation of the very first line: “Der Raum, als Gegenstand vorgestellt, (wie man es wirklich in der Geometrie bedarf)...”. In particular, it is important to see that space *as object*, first of all, is a *condition* and not a *result* of a geometrical construction. I am here following the very insightful interpretation proposed by Michela Summa [2014]. If I understand correctly, Summa’s solution consists in separating formal intuition and geometrical concept and suggesting that Kant, in this note, is not dealing with a two-fold distinction (or, as in Heidegger, an opposition) between form of intuition/pure intuition and formal intuition/geometrical concept, but with a three-fold distinction between form of intuition (the mere manifold), formal intuition (which is *more* than form intuition: “the comprehension of the manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation”) and geometrical concepts (as they imply the space as an object in the second sense, as a formal intuition).¹³¹ In this perspective, thus, the “Zusammenfassung des Mannigfaltigen, nach der Form der Sinnlichkeit gegebenen, in eine anschauliche Vorstellung”, is not possible neither as a form of intuition (which gives a mere manifold) nor as a geometrical representation; this form of unity of manifold (*Zusammenfassung des Mannigfaltigen*) belongs to the space as object (pure intuition/formal intuition). In other words, Kant wants to say that space, in order to be

¹³¹ Summa [2014] p. 63: “.. in the cited passage, indeed, Kant refers to space in three senses: (1) to space as form of intuition; (2) to the concepts of space; and (3) to space “represented as an object”. The first sense refers to the space as the form of sensibility of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*. The second sense refers to the geometrical concepts of space, (notably *quantum* and figure)[..] The third sense, finally, refers to the still intuitive representation space as a unity, which results from a synthesis of the manifold given to sensibility. It is important to emphasize that, with this distinction, Kant does not mean to say that there are effectively three spaces. On the contrary, Kant is quite resolute in his claim that there cannot but be one space, which has for him geometric (Euclidian) properties. Yet, this unique space can be differently apprehended: (1) as the form of intuition; (2) through geometric concepts; and (3) as the object of a formal intuition. Precisely, this distinction may shed new light on how the idea of the stratification is also implied in Kant’s account of space. The space as form of intuition (space 1) belongs to the lower layer of sensibility, whereas geometrical space is constructed through to the higher layer of the understanding (space 2)”.

a geometrical object, must be first all given as object, namely it must contain the *comprehension of the manifold in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation*.

Let me also note that this interpretation also makes sense considering the context in which the footnote occurs. Kant says: “But space and time are presented *a priori* not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions (containing a manifold), and hence are presented with the determination of the unity of this manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic)”. What Kant is saying is that space is not only a form but also an intuition that *contains* a manifold and gives this manifold with the determination of the unity. In this sense, what is at stake in the first sentence of the note is, first of all, the difference between form of intuition and pure intuition (or formal intuition as equivalent of pure intuition).¹³²

These remarks do not invalidate Heidegger’s interpretation, but shed a different light on it. Firstly, it must be noted that Heidegger ‘blindly’ follows the neo-Kantian reading of the note and takes for granted that what this note is about is a difference between form of intuition and geometrical representation. Heidegger, in this sense, moves from very similar assumptions; in this sense, it is true that – as we read in *Logic* – the Marburg School “has interpreted it in a way diametrically opposed to the way that I just did”. These two interpretations are *diametrically opposed* but also reveal a peculiar symmetry, since they both assume the equivalence object=geometrical object.

In *Interpretation*, Heidegger briefly refers to the first sentence of the note. It is very interesting to see how, moving from this

¹³² It might be interesting to note that in some circumstances Kant seems to use the terms pure intuition, form of intuition and formal intuition as equivalent. For example: B207/A166: “Appearances, as objects of perception, are not pure (i.e., merely [blosse] formal) intuitions”; B 457: “Space is merely the form of outer intuition (i.e., it is merely formal intuition) but not an actual object that can be intuited externally”. B324/A268: “its own possibility [of the form] presupposes a formal intuition (time and space) as given”.

assumption, Heidegger is forced to read Kant's phrase "the comprehension of the manifold given [...] in an intuitive representation" as a kind of intellectual synthesis. Intuitive representation, says Heidegger, "means that, through an objectification, space as originally given is now something intuited, which presupposes the original wholeness. The geometrical representation of space is a formal intuition, i.e., a form of intuition which is determined by forms of understanding or categories".

I have stressed on this problem for two reasons. Firstly, as we shall see, in his interpretation of the synthesis of apprehension Heidegger recognizes in the intuition a first stage of objectivation; at the same time, however, in Heidegger's perspective the difference between form of intuition as mere manifold and the pure intuition as unity of manifold collapses.

Heidegger's interpretation of the relation between intuitive space and geometrical space is also indicative of his attempt to delimit the "totality" of the pure intuition from any other form of objectivation, as limitation of this totality. At the same time, Heidegger's very idea of category implies that the pure synthesis is some sort of limitation or modification of the temporal intuition.

In this sense, a sharp distinction must be drawn not only between pure intuition and geometrical concepts but also between pure intuition as infinite magnitude, as *quantum*, and the category of quantity, as *quantitas*. In *Logic*, Heidegger remarks that Kant's terminology is misleading as long as one considers these two terms as they sound today. However, according to the Latin (and Kantian) use, *quantitas* refers to "a specific amount" (to "this or that quantum" ;"this much beer") while *quantum* means for Kant the "much-ness", the magnitude or the quantity as pure character of space, the possibility of every determinate *quantitas*. In this sense, Heidegger asserts that Kant cannot define the space as a quantity "because 'quantity', according to Kant, is a determination which

belongs to the understanding — it is a category — and Kant wants to insist that space is something given and that this condition of givenness is of the very essence of space”.

The discussion of the difference between space as pure magnitude and space as categorially determined quantity allows Heidegger to make a remark concerning the sense of the “infinity” of space. It must be noted that in his interpretation of Kant Heidegger makes a massive use of the idea of *Ganzheit*, while the characterization of pure intuition as “infinite” remains in the background. The reason for this is that the notion of infinite, in this context, entails the idea of a progression, namely the idea of a determination, as if the infinity of the intuition were a consequence of the endless of the synthesis. Indeed, Heidegger notes that “infinite is a determination of quantity”. Heidegger highlights that the infinite “according to its idea it has to do with the question of how-much”: “it still refers to a certain quantity: an endless quantity—or as one says, a quantity that I can go on determining *ad infinitum* without ever reaching a limit”. Consequently, Heidegger asks: “what does it mean when Kant says that space (as well as time) is an *infinite* magnitude?” How is Kant’s characterization of the intuition as infinite definition to be understood? Heidegger underlines that “the ability to be endlessly determined (in the sense of ‘never reaching an end’) is not and *cannot be* the meaning of ‘infinite’ in this context”.

The question, then, is why even speak about infinite at all. And in fact Heidegger asks what else infinite can mean: “Aber was heißt dann überhaupt *noch* ‘unendliche’ Größe?” [302/250, my emphasis]

From what I said about “endlessness,” it is clear that “infinite” does not refer to something in the field of continuity but rather something that underlies continuity itself (*was der Kontinuität selbst zugrunde liegt*) and that Kant expresses in this way: Space and time are infinite magnitudes. This means that insofar as space and time get determined, they are always in relation to what is determined as the

whole is in relation to the part (*..sie sind, sofern sie bestimmt werden, in Bezug auf jedes Bestimmte immer das Ganze zum Teil*).

By rephrasing, what Heidegger suggests is that, if it makes any sense to speak of “infinity”, *it is not* in relation to the infinity of the progression of a categorial synthesis (the category of quantity), namely in relation to the ‘how *much*’ or ‘how *long*’ of this synthesis, but in relation to *how* the categorial determination of space is given, that is, as *always* part of the whole. As long as (*sofern*) space and time are determined, they *always* are, in relation to what is determined (space or time), *as* the whole is in relation to the part. In other words, the expression “infinite” does not indicate a relation with an impossibility of determining a *possible determination* (we *cannot* tell how long time lasts, how big space is); the expression “infinite” indicates a character of this the relation with the possible determination: the character of ‘being *always* only a part of a whole’. In my view, it is precisely this notion of totality that we find in Heidegger’s concept of death in *Being and Time*, as *possibility* of the impossibility (possibility of having the “how” of our relation with the whole, as relation with something of which we are always part) and not as impossibility of the possibility (the ontic impossibility of experiencing the death, the death as impossibility of every ontic possibility). In this sense, the relationship with death in terms of ‘how long’ is inauthentic from a phenomenological – and not ethical – point of view.

Thus, the reason why Heidegger gives priority to the notion of totality over the notion of infinite is that between the whole and the part there is no continuity: “The character of wholeness is essentially different from the character of the part, or more exactly, the character of part-ness”. (*Der Charakter Ganzheit ist aber vom Charakter Teil oder, genauer gesprochen, Teilheit wesentlich unterschieden*). In this sense, one might say that time and space are

actual infinite only as long as they are thought as a whole, namely as something that *always* exceeds the parts, as moments that receive their 'position' or meaning in relation to this whole.

From what we have seen so far concerning the difference between pure intuition, geometrical concepts and mathematical categories, we can draw the conclusion that Heidegger's idea of pure manifold does find in the notion of totality a paradigmatic form of originality. Categorial-mathematical modifications take place as 'parts' of this structure. Now the question is: does this idea of categories hold true also for Heidegger's idea of categories, namely for Heidegger's "pure synthesis of pure manifold"? Is this form of synthesis anything like a categorial determination or limitation of a pure intuition?

The fact is that the very relation between whole and part is not some static form of relation. Indeed, Heidegger recognizes some difficulties concerning the determination of this structure and, most importantly, in the definition of what "possible categorial modifications" this structure allows. In *Logic* [303/250] we read:

We have tried to give a phenomenological interpretation of what Kant means by his simple and lapidary propositions about space and time as infinite given magnitudes, and from what we have said, it should now be clear where the difficulties lie regarding a more precise determination of these phenomena: they lie in understanding how wholeness relates to part-ness, and in seeing which categorial modifications (*Modifikationen*) are possible here. As of today, even the most elementary structures of these basic concepts still elude us despite all efforts to work them out. Once again it is Husserl who has made the only independent and productive advances, in *Logical Investigations*, volume 2, Third Investigation, "On the Theory of Wholes and Parts."

The decisive point is that these "categorial modifications" refer to the general structure of the relationship between whole and part. The question is important because Heidegger seems to think the

categoriality precisely as a 'modification' or 'variation' of the pure manifold (or *within* the manifold).

The difficulty in defining the relationship between pure intuition (originality) and synthesis (categorial modification) is evident in a very interesting passage of the *Interpretation* [276/188]. Heidegger says that the "questionable (*fragliche*) synthesis" is a "pure synthesis" (Heidegger's emphasis), "if (*wenn*) the manifold is not empirical but is given *a priori*, as is the manifold in space and time". "This synthesis is "pure" with regard to the character of the purity (*Reinheit*) of the manifold *which this synthesis in its own way unifies (in ihrer Weise einigt)*". Heidegger then suggests that the synthesis unifies this manifold *in its own way*. One might ask how we are to understand this "its own way" or "mode" of the synthesis. But Heidegger immediately states:

But then is not this pure synthesis exactly what we characterized as syndosis of the pure intuitions of space and time, in accord with which space and time are pure, unified, pre-given totalities? Is this syndosis perhaps a mode (ein Modus) of the synthesis in question? Is this synthesis perhaps identical with syndosis, if we grasp syndosis radically enough with regard to time as the most original because universal (universale) pure intuition? But this is already an area of phenomena which we can clearly bring before our eyes, but which is still hidden from us, and of which Kant had only a faint notion.

As we can see, in this part of the lecture, Heidegger is cautious about any claim concerning the nature of the synthesis. But he does say something interesting. On the one hand, he says that this synthesis might be identical with the pure intuition (the syndosis); but this holds true *only if* we understand the pure intuition as the most original because it is (a) *temporal* and (b) *universal*. On the other hand, he also says that the very syndosis, the pure manifold of pure intuition, might be identical to a mode of the pure synthesis. I shall return on this problem in relation to Heidegger's interpretation

of Kant's three-fold synthesis. Let me just note that for Heidegger the problem lies in the fact that, on the one hand, temporality is that universal pure manifold or pure intuition (syndosis) that constitutes the synthesis in general; on the other hand, the very idea of pure intuition in general (syndosis) is a mode of the synthesis.

As we have seen before [§18], Heidegger opposes categories, as contents that originate in the time-related synthesis, and logical forms, as general structures of predication (obtained by way of generalization). This suggests that the "pure synthesis" is a synthesis "of the manifold" in a very particular sense: as a synthesis that belongs to this very manifold, as a possible modification of it. I have already suggested that temporality can be understood precisely as a peculiar manifold that allows significant and relevant variations. Perhaps, it is in this sense that the categories are both "pure intuition" and "pure synthesis". The problem to be addressed is whether and how temporality is not only the origin of the form of a category *in general* but also the ground of possible categorial variations.

In *Interpretation* the categorial is defined by Heidegger as predicative structural moments of the pure synthesis.

p. 305/207: Therefore I claim that *the task of Deduction of pure concepts of understanding* consists in disclosing (*Enthüllung*) the original ontological essence of categories as such, i.e., in disclosing the inner possibility of the essence of pure synthesis seen in its pure predicative structural element (*der inneren Möglichkeit des Wesens der reinen Synthesis in ihrem rein prädikativen Strukturmoment*)

This predicative structural moment is what Heidegger, in § 7 of *Kantbuch*, calls "pure predicative synthesis", as a "special sort" of synthesis that belongs to the "pure synthesis". In another passage of the *Kantbuch* [61/43], Heidegger says that the "problem of the pure veritative or ontological synthesis must hence be brought to the question: How does the original (veritative) 'synthesis' of the pure

Synopsis and the pure reflecting (predicative) synthesis appear?" (*wie sieht die ursprüngliche (veritative) 'Synthesis' der reinen Synopsis und der reinen reflektierenden (prädikativen) Synthesis aus?*). What Heidegger is looking for is a possibility of a pure reflection, a pure thinking (according the terminology of the *Kantbuch*) as possibility of producing different forms of unity of manifold

How is the relation between "syndosis" and "categories" articulated? The problem is that Heidegger's "pure synthesis of pure manifold", as I have already suggested, can be understood in two different ways, namely in a more Kantian way, as a synthesis *of the* pure manifold, as a categorial articulation of the manifold as *formal* and *sensible* condition; or in a more 'phenomenological' way, as a synthesis *within* the pure manifold. In other terms, given that the pure synthesis, as Heidegger claims, is pure *because* what is unified (the pure manifold) is pure, the question arises whether and how the *synthesis itself* is pure, namely, as an *independent* form or as a possible *moment* of the manifold itself. Heidegger seems to choose for this second possibility. In the Conclusions I will consider both these possibilities.

§ 23. The phenomenological Legacy of Kant's Synthesis

So far I have approached Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's synthesis without making any reference to Husserl, and without asking in what extent his phenomenological interpretation is phenomenological in a Husserlian sense. However, if we want now to provide an account of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's *A-Deduction*, we must say something about the phenomenological (Husserlian) background of Heidegger's "phenomenological" interpretation of Kant. This for at least two reasons. First of all, these sections of the *Critique* deal with questions – as suggested by Heidegger's interpretation – intrinsically phenomenological (the object as unity of manifold, as possibility of regional variations);

secondly, I think that a very significant (even though not explicit) point of contact between Husserl's and Heidegger's approach to the first *Critique* is to be found in their reading of the three-fold synthesis of Kant's A-Deduction. This does not mean at all that Husserl's and Heidegger's interpretations of this section have the same meaning. However, I think that a brief consideration of Husserl's approach to this problem might help us to shed more light on Heidegger's interpretation. In this sense, in what follows I will refer to Husserl's approach to Kant only insofar it makes more intelligible Heidegger's interpretation of the synthesis.

Before tackling this problem I would like to make a preliminary remark. At the very last page of the *Interpretation* Heidegger says:

When some years ago I studied the *Critique of Pure Reason* anew and read it, as it were, against the background of Husserl's phenomenology, it opened my eyes.

I think that Kontos [1994] is right when he locates in *Ideas I* this background. In particular Kontos refers to Heidegger's massive use of the notion of "region" and to the interpretation of synthetic *a priori* judgments as foundation of a "regional ontology". Besides, at the end of § 24 of *Logic*, Heidegger explicitly says that we owe to Husserl's *Ideas* the possibility of asking these questions: "What is known *a priori* in mathematical natural-scientific knowledge?"; "What determinations reside within what-is-known by this knowledge as such?"; "What resides within the whole of the what-is-known in mathematical physics?"; "the fact that we can pose the question this precisely has been made possible by Husserl's clear (or relatively clear) elaboration of this problematic in his *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology*".

The question of the influence of Husserl's *Ideas I* on Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of Kant is even more interesting if one considers what Heidegger says in *Logic* [283/285], about the

distinction between sensibility and understanding. Heidegger says that “Kant has neglected to plow up the field phenomenologically and categorially, where these two stems —and especially what is supposed to mediate them [that is, intuition, thinking and imagination] – might grow in the first place”, “Husserl is the first one to see and elaborate the fundamental importance and universal significance of this task in his *Ideas*. People characterize that text as Kantian, but in its foundations it is essentially more radical than Kant could ever be”. This amounts to say that the *Kantbuch*’s idea of pure ontological synthesis as original unity of intuition and thinking, and more in general his interpretation of the imagination as the origin of the two stems of knowledge (intuition and thinking) have something to do with Husserl, and notably with *Ideas I*. Thus, the question is: in which way has Husserl, in *Ideas*, seen and elaborated (*gesehen und ausgearbeitet*), for the first time and in all its fundamental importance and universal significance (*in ihrer grundsätzlichen Tragweite und universalen Bedeutung*), the task (*Aufgabe*) of a *phänomenologische und kategoriale Durchackerung des Bodens, dem diese beiden Stämme und erst recht das, was sie vermitteln soll, allererst entwachsen können ?*

Of course we cannot deal here with this huge question. In what follows I shall try to provide only a partial answer to this problem, suggesting that Husserl’s brief remark, in *Ideas I*, on Kant’s A-Deduction, might have indicated to Heidegger, if not a possible solution, at least a possible way of approaching the problem of the categorial distinction between sensibility and understanding. As it is well-known, in § 62 of *Ideas I* Husserl says: “Thus, for example, the transcendental deduction in the first edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* was actually operating inside the realm of phenomenology, but Kant misinterpreted that realm as psychological and therefore he himself abandoned it”. We shall see that Heidegger himself

recognizes the presence, in Kant, of a psychological interpretation of the synthesis.

One might object that in *Logic* Heidegger does not express any particular preference for the A-Deduction yet. However, in the *Interpretation*, only less than two years later, Heidegger carries out this phenomenological a categorial task of *Durchackerung* of thinking and intuition precisely by reference to Kant's A-Deduction.

A comparison between Husserl and Heidegger concerning Kant's Deduction is not only thematically but also methodologically difficult, because as I said these two interpretations are different in nature. As a matter of fact, only Heidegger presents a systematic and detailed account (almost a commentary) of Kant's A-Deduction. Besides, Heidegger's interpretation, as it is well-known, is highly 'interpretative', 'violent', as proved by his interpretation of the three-fold synthesis in the light of his own idea of original-ecstatic temporality. However, despite all these differences it still remains worthy to read Heidegger's interpretation in the background of Husserl's phenomenology.

I have suggested to locate in the notion of synthesis the phenomenological legacy of Kant's A-Deduction. But in which sense is this notion so important in phenomenology? In a passage of the *Interpretation* [139/95] which I have recalled in the *Introduction*, Heidegger says that "under the title 'synthesis' Kant brings together a series of quite different phenomena without differentiating them sufficiently from one another and without allowing them to emerge from their common root. To bring order into this tangle of confusing ambiguities is the main intention of our interpretation; and this is not an incidental task, because we know that it is for the sake of synthesis that the whole *critique* exists". It is therefore difficult to say what exactly the notion of synthesis is about, and then, *in relation to which* particular sense of the "synthesis" Kant's A-Deduction is so

relevant. But here comes into play the phenomenological notion of synthesis, as an indication of how to bring order to this confusion.

Heidegger's interpretation of the three-fold synthesis, as we can read, does not only try to differentiate those different forms of synthesis, that we find in Kant still confused; in his interpretation Heidegger also brings back these forms to a common root, namely temporality. But we can leave aside for the moment Heidegger's interpretation and focus on another question: what does it mean, from an Husserlian point of view, to *bring order* into the ambiguity of the synthesis? What is the focal problem of a phenomenological interpretation of the synthesis?

A first important indication is suggested by Michela Summa; she argues that Kant's A-Deduction, in a phenomenological perspective, brings to the fore the problem of the stratified structure of the experience. "These passages also seem to imply a stratified account of experience. As we have seen, a basic lawfulness within sensibility is required in order for intuition and association to be possible. These, on the other hand, can be accomplished even apart from higher intellectual functions. The complex synthetic order that grounds cognition in the proper sense is grounded by the threefold synthesis of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. The relationship among these three syntheses can be understood, in Husserlian terms, as foundational. For without a basic unity of apprehension, no reproduction and no recognition would be possible". As we shall see, Heidegger's interpretation as well can be read as an attempt to account for different structures of unity and manifold (for example, the intuition as unity of manifold sensations; the regional unity of manifold intuitions). A question arises as to the relation between these forms of unity.

As we shall see, Heidegger holds that every specific or empirical form of synthesis (apprehension as synthesis of *intuition*, reproduction as synthesis of *association*, recognition as synthesis of

the *concept*) as long as it constitutes a relation with an object, is *in itself* a certain articulation of the *entire structure* of the ontological synthesis (a certain interconnection between apprehension, reproduction and recognition, understood as ontological forms of synthesis). In this sense, he seems to provide an account of how *in general* different articulations or levels of the synthesis are possible. But he does not say much about the differences between these configurations and the relation between, for example, apprehension and reproduction (not as ontological moment of the whole structure of synthesis, but as two forms of empirical synthesis). However, in an Heideggerian perspective, it might be difficult to speak of a foundational relation. As we have seen in the second part, Heidegger rejects the idea of *Fundierungszusammenhang* as “a simply bad and misguided interpretation, diversion from a pure seeing into the experience” [Ga 58/59, § 14]. This approach characterizes Heidegger’s phenomenology since its very beginning (the lecture from which I have quoted is the *Kriegnotsemester* of 1919) and is still present, perhaps more radically, in his interpretation of Kant’s A-Deduction, in particular, as we shall see, in the idea that every objectual unity of manifold requires a form a categorial form of identification. The specific form of identification re-shapes the totality of the structure of synthesis, with the consequence that there is no real ‘independent part’.¹³³

As we shall see, the focus of Heidegger’s interpretation lies in the idea of object as unity of manifold and on the role that the synthesis of identification plays in the constitution of the object. We can say that for Heidegger the ‘manifold’ is nothing without the ‘unity’, and the unity is only possible by means of a synthesis of *identification*.

¹³³ In this sense, Welton [2000, p. 369] notes that “at the center of the difference between Husserl and Heidegger is the fact that Heidegger rejects Husserl’s thesis that complex have a certain levels of sense that are independent. Heidegger envisioned constitution not in terms of strata of sense, some more basic than others; rather, he replaced the image of core with overlying strata by an emphasis upon function and therefore transformation”.

Quite interestingly, De Santis [forthcoming] has shown how, in Husserl's perspective, Kant's doctrine of the synthesis is relevant precisely in relation to the notion of identity and, most importantly, as synthesis of identification (namely, in relation to the idea of identity as constituted through a synthesis). De Santis remarks that for Husserl even though "Kant did not actually 'discover' the *Intentionalität*, by discovering the synthesis he has *de facto* also discovered what makes "intentionality" possible. "Husserl is clear: *die Grundform der Synthesis*—the one without which there would be no intentionality—is that of *identification*". However, if the identification can be defined as the *Grundform* of synthesis, and therefore the fundamental form of intentionality, this will be only possible as long as the term is understood in a broad and, as it were, formal way. "Husserl's account is broad enough, as we believe, to be held as a general description of the meaning of the "synthesis" as such—hence, as embracing the totality of its *Leistungen*". As we shall see, both these two aspects, which we might call *priority* and *broadness* of identification, are significantly present in Heidegger's interpretation (precisely under the title "synthesis of identification").

Pradelle has shown very clearly how the universalization of the synthesis involves, at the same time, the universalization of the identity. "L'universalisation de la synthèse n'est possible que sur fond de distinction entre deux formes essentielles de la synthèse: la synthèse active et la synthèse passive". However, "loin d'exclure l'identification, la synthèse d'association l'implique au contraire, puisque toute association de deux données s'effectue sur fond d'une homogénéité de contenu qui sert de pont intentionnel entre elles pour fonder une nouvelle unité".¹³⁴

¹³⁴ "...il faut, par conséquent, dissiper l'équivoque qui affecte la notion d'identification, en distinguant au moins deux formes fondamentales de synthèse d'identification. D'un part, la conscience identificatrice d'un objet mondain ou d'une unité pré-empirique – où, loin d'être explicite et d'emblée garantie par l'orientation noétique de la conscience, l'identité demeure implicite et conditionnée par les possibilités d'association des contenus. D'autre part, la

In the light of what we have seen so far, we can reformulate the question concerning the legacy of Kant's A-Deduction in more precise terms. We can say, borrowing from Pradelle, the phenomenological legacy of the threefold synthesis lies in the possibility of a "morphology of the synthesis", understood as morphology of synthesis of identification. Thus the question is: how does Heidegger think the identification? How many forms of identity are there?

Before considering Heidegger's interpretation and trying to answer to these questions, it is important to see the *kind* of relation that Heidegger, approaching the *Deduction*, establishes between the three forms of synthesis. To being with, Heidegger remarks [Interpretation, p. 337/229] that, to be sure, Kant actually speaks of a threefold synthesis, "*but* it must be said more precisely: we are dealing with the three modes of pure imaginative ontological synthesis, that is, with this synthesis in the mode of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition". What Heidegger sees as a necessary clarification ("..it must be said more precisely") is that these three *forms* of synthesis are *all* "modes (*Modi*) of pure imaginative synthesis". If Heidegger finds this remark necessary, it is precisely because Kant's text goes in opposite direction. Heidegger recognizes that in fact "this interpretation seems inevitably to contradict the fact that Kant refers only *one* of these syntheses – that of the reproduction – to the power of imagination, by speaking of a "Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination." Let us see how Heidegger supports this interpretation.

Heidegger stresses that in his deduction Kant always starts from an empirical synthesis and then he moves on to a pure one.

synthèse proprement catégoriale d'identité..". Pradelle notes that Kant did not work out this different notion of identity (and their different conditions), therefore he assimilated "les conditions de l'*objectualité* et celles de l'*objectivité* – à savoir celles du rapport à l'object et celles de la validité pour quiconque, indépendant de la factualité singulière du sujet" (281).

However we do know that here Kant is dealing in each case with empirical synthesis at first, in order then to move on to pure synthesis. What is remarkable and also the key for understanding the three parts is that empirical syntheses *in* intuition, *in* imagination, and *in* the concept are grounded upon pure syntheses which are rooted in the pure synthesis of the pure time-related power of imagination. In other words, taken empirically and psychologically, perception, the power of imagination, and thinking are three faculties of the soul. But when we take the subject in its transcendental and basic ontological constitution (Grundverfassung), then we see that all three faculties just mentioned are grounded in pure time-related synthesis, that is, in the synthesis of the power of imagination. As a precaution, Kant also does not speak of synthesis *of* intuition, *of* the power of imagination, but of synthesis *in* intuition, *in* the power of imagination, namely of the empirical synthesis. This does not address the fact that this synthesis itself springs from the power of imagination (*Das lässt offen, dass diese Synthesis selbst aus der reinen Einbildungskraft stammt*) [Interpretation, p. 338/229]

Let us start from the last sentence. Kant does not address (or leaves in stand-by: *lässt offen*) the fact that the synthesis *itself*, of which apprehension, reproduction and recognition are modes, originates in the pure capacity of imagination: as pure possibility and not as empirical faculty. Thus, imagination is both *a* form of empirical synthesis (among apprehension and recognition) and *the* form of every synthesis as ontological (that is, the ground of apprehension, reproduction and recognition). This “pure” or “ontological imagination” refers to the possibility of a “pure synthesis of pure manifold” we have already discussed; in other words, when Heidegger speaks here of synthesis of imagination as condition of every synthesis, he has in mind Kant’s notion of imagination in § 10; and, most important, he has in view the imagination as possibility of a “pure synthesis of the pure manifold”.

The point of Heidegger’s argumentation is this: on the one hand, that is, on an *empirical* and *psychological* level, imagination is a mode of synthesis, an *Handlung* of the mind, a possibility that human beings possess among others (perceiving for example). Kant’s point

of departure is always a specific and concrete form of synthesis as correlate of a faculty or capacity of the subject. But these forms of synthesis, and therefore faculties themselves, are nothing but empirical 'possibilities' of the pure synthesis. This amounts to say that the synthesis is not a product of a faculty, but rather every faculty is a 'hypostatization' of a mode of synthesis. From this point of view, "what is remarkable and also the key for understanding" is precisely the distinction between these two levels: what allows Heidegger to say that the "syntheses *in* intuition, *in* imagination, and *in* the concept", indicate that *in* the empirical intuition (as empirical *synthesis* of apprehension), *in* the imagination (as empirical *synthesis* of reproduction) and *in* the concept (as empirical *synthesis* of recognition), there is always already a pure synthesis; this synthesis that makes possible, for intuition, imagination and concept to be what they are. The fact that Kant speaks of synthesis "in" and not "of" is taken by Heidegger as a precaution; this is to say, for example, that the synthesis in the intuition does not belong to intuition itself.

Heidegger's approach to Kant's threefold synthesis is determined by this idea that there is in Kant a sort of 'empirical prejudice'. On the one hand Heidegger recognizes that what Kant is looking for is a pure ontological synthesis; on the other hand, Kant's point of departure is always an empirical form of synthesis. We read [336/229]: "The theme for investigation is the *pure ontological synthesis*. But Kant proceeds so as to describe first the empirical *ontic* synthesis and then to carry the results over to the pure synthesis. As it were, Kant provides the result of the analysis of the empirical synthesis with the preliminary designation of "pure": There is neither an explicit characterization of this approach nor a justification of the possibility of this simple move from observation of ontic synthesis to observation of the ontological one".

We can say that Kant's empirical prejudice consists, first of all, in the dogmatic assumption of an empirical form of synthesis; secondly,

in the fact that the results of the description of this empirical synthesis are then extended on a pure level.

Let me also note that Heidegger's interpretation entails that the difference between empirical and pure (in Kantian terms: *a priori*, for "pure" refers specifically to mathematic knowledge) is no longer a difference between two levels of knowledge (in the sense, for example, of the synthesis of apprehension, as unity of sensations or as the unity of the pure intuition as object); rather it is a relation of co-implication. This aspect is quite important in Heidegger's interpretation, as we shall see.

§ 24. The Synthesis of Apprehension

Following the order of Kant's presentation, the first synthesis that Heidegger takes into account is the "synthesis of apprehension". Broadly speaking, this form of synthesis operates at the level of the intuition (*within* one intuition), as unification of manifold sensations. From this point of view, this synthesis refers to what is given in a *strict sense*, refers to *what* the intuition *contains* (the matter of the intuition); the synthesis of apprehension deals with the possibility of the manifold as presented in *one* intuition (as Heidegger says: the manifold as *a* manifold).

We can already see how, in Heidegger's perspective, this form of synthesis rests upon an empirical prejudice, namely the idea that we are *first* given an empirical manifold of sensations. But let us turn our attention to Heidegger's text and see how he presents this *problem*.

Heidegger notes that Kant's "presentation begins with the statement: 'Every intuition contains a manifold'. Kant here has in mind the manifold of impressions...". On the one hand, Heidegger says that "to be sure, we factually intuit a manifold in every intuiting, without further ado"; on the other hand he asks: "What sustains this 'without any ado'?" [343/ 233]. It is important to understand the sense of Heidegger's question. The possibility Heidegger is looking for

is not just *a possibility*, the possibility, for a given-manifold, to be *also a manifold*. Heidegger is asking about the possibility of *the fact* that we always factually intuit a manifold as *a manifold*.

However, that intuition contains a manifold does not yet mean (*besagt nicht*) that what is intuited is intuited "as a manifold." What is contained in intuition as undifferentiated possession (*als ungehobenen Besitz*), as it were (*gleichsam*), must first of all be articulated (*artikuliert*) as a manifold of impressions. To be sure (*zwar*), we factually (*faktisch*) intuit a manifold in every intuiting, without further ado (*ohne weiteres*). That is, what is contained in intuition gives itself to us as manifold without any ado. However, the problem is just this: What *sustains* this "without any ado"? What is the ground for the possibility that what is offered by intuition is offered *as manifold*? (*Worin gründet dieses 'ohne weiteres', welches ist der Grund der Möglichkeit, dass das, was die Anschauung anbietet, sich als Mannigfaltiges darbietet?*) The question, when geared more generally toward our guiding problem, is this: Where is the ground for the possibility that what is non-objective (*das Ungegenständlich*) can offer itself intuitively as *somehow objectively* (*als irgendwie gegenständlich*) intuited? On what basis can intuition offer something objective? It is by no means self-evident that we are offered something like a manifold (*dass sich uns so etwas wie ein Mannigfaltiges darbietet, ist ganz und gar nicht selbstverständlich*).

The problem of the apprehension, as Heidegger understands it, concerns the fact that while intuition does give us a manifold *as a manifold*, intuition of itself does give the 'principle', or the condition, of this possibility. The intuition does not actually contain the 'reason' of its order; in this sense, to recall what I have said above, the synthesis of apprehension is a synthesis "*in the intuition*" and not "*of the intuition*": the unity of the empirical intuition does not belong to the intuition. The fact that we are given *a manifold* is not self-evident at all (*ist ganz und gar nicht selbstverständlich*). Heidegger presents a more general formulation of this problem *according to the guiding problem (...auf das leitende Problem orientert)* of his interpretation of Kant's Deduction, namely, according to the problem of the object as unity of manifold. In this perspective the problem

concerns the possibility that something non-objective (in the sense, for example, of scientific determinations) is somehow given as objective (in the sense of a unity of manifold). It is true that Heidegger, at the beginning of this quotation, seems to suggest that we are *first* given a manifold as something undifferentiated; however, this seems to be a *manner of speaking* (*..gleichsam*). One might say that Heidegger's interpretation of the synthesis aims to show that a completely inarticulated manifold is possible only as *manner of speaking*.

I have insisted on this passage because it shows very clearly the way Heidegger understands the problem of the synthesis in general, that is, rejecting the idea that we are given something 'undifferentiated'. The synthesis of apprehension brings to the fore the problem of the possibility of the manifold *within* the intuition, the possibility of a manifold of sensations as given in one intuition.

Now we can turn our attention to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's text. Let me start by quoting the section of the text which constitutes the object of Heidegger's analysis [A 98].

Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another; for as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity. Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then to take together this manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis of apprehension, since it is aimed directly at the intuition, which to be sure provides a manifold but can never effect this as such, and indeed as contained in one representation, without the occurrence of such a synthesis. [Cambridge]

Jede Anschauung enthält ein Mannigfaltiges in sich, welches doch nicht als ein solches vorgestellt werden würde, wenn das Gemüt nicht die Zeit, in der Folge der Eindrücke aufeinander unterschiede: denn als in einem Augenblick enthalten, kann jede Vorstellung niemals etwas anderes, als absolute Einheit sein. Damit nun aus diesem Mannigfaltigen Einheit der Anschauung werde, (wie etwa in der Vorstellung

des Raumes) so ist erstlich das Durchlaufen der Mannigfaltigkeit und dann die Zusammennehmung desselben notwendig, welche Handlung ich die Synthesis der Apprehension nenne, weil sie geradezu auf die Anschauung gerichtet ist, die zwar ein Mannigfaltiges darbietet, dieses aber als ein solches, und zwar in einer Vorstellung enthalten, niemals ohne eine dabei vorkommende Synthesis bewirken kann.

Kant says that *every* intuition “contains a manifold in itself”; however, a manifold could not be “represented as such” if our mind did not distinguish, in the succession of impressions, different (manifold) moments. This premise of Kant’s argumentation seems to be that “in one moment no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity” (*.. in einem Augenblick enthalten, kann jede Vorstellung niemals etwas anderes, als absolute Einheit sein*). Heidegger rephrases in this way: [345/ 234]; “As contained in each case in one now, in one ‘moment’, each representation is only an in-itself simply unique, isolated, for-itself dissociated, absolute this (*..nur ein in sich schlechthin einziges, isoliertes, für sich abgelöstes, schlechtinniges Dieses*)”.

Now, the consequence that one might draw from this idea is that, since one moment can contain only one sensation, in order for the intuition to be a manifold, time is needed, as sequence of impressions. From this point of view, time is the first *condition* of the manifold (of the manifold ‘in general’). Indeed this section of Kant’s Deduction begins with this general remark (a remark of which Heidegger makes an essential and ontological use):

Wherever our representations may arise, whether through the influence of external things or as the effect of inner causes, whether they have originated *a priori* or empirically as appearances - as modifications of the mind they nevertheless belong (*gehören*) to inner sense, and as such all of our cognitions are in the end subjected (*unterworfen*) to the formal condition of inner sense, namely time, as that in which they must all be ordered (*geordnet*), connected (*verknüpft*), and brought into relations (*in Verhältniss*).

As Heidegger stresses, this remark *precedes* the passage we are commenting. This amounts to say that this remark sheds a different light on the following lines. The problem is to define how exactly this formal remark *affects* the following considerations on the relation between manifold and unity; that is, the problem is to define in which sense time is not only a formal condition of the manifold (as it is in Kant), but also (as it is in Heidegger) a concrete condition of the unity of this manifold.

As we have seen, Kant says that “Jede Anschauung enthält ein Mannigfaltiges in sich, welches doch nicht als ein solches vorgestellt werden würde, wenn das Gemüt nicht die Zeit, in der Folge der Eindrücke aufeinander unterschiede”); Kant then recognizes that a certain *distinctiveness* of time lies at the basis of the manifold. However, he also says that “in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then to take together this manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis of apprehension, since it is aimed directly at the intuition, which to be sure provides a manifold but can never effect this as such”. Let me stress that Kant is referring to the fact that, granted that we are given a manifold (“...every intuition contains a manifold in itself”) we *still* have to represent it *as such*, as a manifold (“...every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such”).

In this sense, it seems that the synthesis of apprehension is not, as Heidegger suggests, “in the intuition”, that is, already given in every empirical apprehension (as the ontological condition of intuition); rather, this synthesis seems to be a “synthesis of the intuition”, namely a synthesis that *refers* to the intuition, an *Handlung* of the mind directed to the object given in the intuition. From Kant’s presentation, in fact, it seems that what is self-evident is *not* the fact that we are given a manifold as *a manifold*. Rather, what is self-

evident for him is the fact that we are given 'just' a manifold. The unity is not *already* given, and the manifold must be *articulated, enacted* by the act that Kant calls "synthesis of apprehension" ("Damit nun aus diesem Mannigfaltigen Einheit der Anschauung werde[...] so ist erstlich das Durchlaufen der Mannigfaltigkeit und dann die Zusammennehmung desselben notwendig, welche Handlung ich die Synthesis der Apprehension nenne"). In this sense, the idea of an undifferentiated (*ungehoben*) manifold that still requires to be articulated (*artikuliert*), this idea is not for Kant just a *manner of speaking*. Indeed Kant characterizes this synthesis as an operation that must be exercised *also a priori*, namely "in regard to representations that are not empirical".

Now this synthesis of apprehension must also be exercised *a priori*, i.e., in regard to representations that are not empirical. For without it we could have *a priori* neither the representations of space nor of time, since these can be generated only through the synthesis of the manifold that sensibility in its original receptivity provides. We therefore have a pure synthesis of apprehension.

Seen in this light, the "pure synthesis of apprehension" is not an ontological synthesis already given *in* the empirical intuition, but *a synthesis* that can be exercised *also a priori* (that is, in relation to a pure manifold). Precisely in this sense space and time are objects, formal intuitions that make possible the *a priori* representation of space and time as object ("..without it [this synthesis] we could have *a priori* neither the *representations* of space nor of time.."). Hence we are back to the problem of formal intuition and of the sense of pure intuition as "object". Kant's definition of pure intuition as *object* (for example, as object *of* a geometrical construction, as object *required* by geometrical construction) can be now reformulated in relation to the concept of *synthesis*, that is, by asking if what makes possible space and time as objects is an intellectual synthesis or a synthesis that belongs to the intuition. In this second case, Kant's

account is more phenomenological and Kant would make an ‘improper’ use of the term synthesis (as *Handlung*, as an operation that *enacts* the unity of the manifold). It all depends on how we understand this act of synthesis, on how we understand the *unity* that the synthesis is supposed to realize (*bewirken*), as the result of an operation or a construction (geometrical representation) or as an original unity already given in the intuition. Thus Heidegger’s idea of an essential co-implication between empirical intuition and pure synthesis presents some problems in relation to Kant’s text, for the synthesis appears to be an act directed, and not included in the intuition.¹³⁵

In Heidegger’s perspective the fact that Kant presents the synthesis as synthesis “in the apprehension” is far more important than how he actually elaborates this notion.

We are dealing with an apprehending synthesis "in intuition," an apprehending synthesis in relation to what is given in intuition. However, this explanation is not enough. Had Kant meant only this, then it would have been sufficient to say apprehending synthesis "*in relation to* intuition" (mit Bezug auf) or apprehending synthesis "*at the point of* intuition' (an..). Nonetheless Kant states deliberately (*mit Bedacht*) that this mode of synthesis is "*in* intuition." Apprehension and along with it the power of imagination belong to intuition as what constitutes this synthesis precisely when we take this intuition in its primary function in the whole of knowledge [340/231].

In Heidegger’s view, Kant uses the expression “in” intentionally and on purpose (*mit Bedacht*), in order to stress that this synthesis is not *about* something, is not *related to* something, as it might be suggested if *he had* used expressions like “mit Bezug auf”. However,

¹³⁵ Let me also note that Kant’s idea of a synthesis performed *also a priori*, i.e., “in regard to presentations that are not empirical”, seems to confirm Benoist’s claim [1999, p. 80] that Kant’s theory of synthetic depends on a generalization of the structure of synthesis as ‘intuition + concept’; in this case in fact the synthesis *a priori* would be nothing but the same function of synthesis applied to a different intuition, to a pure manifold.

as we have seen, Kant does present the synthesis as an act that *refers* to something. This suggests when his definition of the synthesis as synthesis “in the intuition” might be less intentional than Heidegger believes or wants.

Besides, curiously enough Kant’s synthesis of apprehension seems to be articulated, just as the entire Deduction, in a threefold way: intuition (sensation), manifold (time), unity (synthesis). These three moments are in Heidegger equi-primordial moments (parts) of an original structure (whole). As we shall see in more detail, Heidegger’s interpretation of the threefold synthesis as original structure implies that every ontical synthesis (in this case, apprehension) is itself a form of unity of apprehension, reproduction and recognition (as ontological syntheses). Since Heidegger’s interpretation moves from the consideration of the threefold synthesis as an original whole, the unity of the apprehension must be *already* and *originally* present in the intuition. But let us see how Heidegger deals with this ‘threefold’ articulation.

From a certain point of view, it might seem that the premise of Kant’s argumentation lies in the idea of a coincidence between *impression* and *instant*; this would entail the idea that time is, as it were, a ‘proliferation’ of instants (that is, the idea that we have a manifold only *as long as* we have manifold impressions). Heidegger, indeed, recognizes that here “Kant’s expression is ambiguous”, and that “we could interpret him to mean that the sequence of impressions is the presupposition (*Voraussetzung*) for differentiation of time (*Zeitunterscheidung*). But the inverse is the case” [344/233].

The fact is that the very notion of “instant” is an abstraction. The interpretation of the three-fold synthesis aims precisely to ‘deconstruct’ notions like instant, phase, present. The synthesis – as we shall see in more detail in the next paragraphs – is not some sort of act directed to a pre-given homogeneous manifold (instant or phase).

The most difficult and important point of Heidegger's interpretation is to show that time itself is more than an undifferentiated manifold of instants; time is for Heidegger a manifold that gives principle of distinctiveness for these instants. Kant says that the intuition could not contain a manifold, "if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another (*wenn das Gemüt nicht die Zeit, in der Folge der Eindrücke aufeinander unterschiede*)". The manifold of sensations is a consequence of the fact that time is in itself *differentiated*; however, as I have suggested, in Heidegger time also contains the principle of the *unity* of this manifold.

We have seen that in Heidegger's view Kant's claim concerning the *identity* between impression and instant is ambiguous (*zweideutig*), for it can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it suggests that the sequence of impressions is the *Voraussetzung* for differentiation of time". But for Heidegger it is just the opposite. On the other hand, the identity between impression and instant indicates something different: the temporal nature of the instant. What makes the sensation an *absolute Einheit* (Kant) is its being distinguished in *relation to time*.

For each impression, each representation, is initially precisely *this* unmistakable "idea" (*unverwechselbare Idee*) which the impression or representation is regardless (*abgesehen*) of their content, *only through relation to time*. Even when the same impression with the same content returns, this second impression is necessarily another impression and different from the preceding one, insofar as it originates (*entsteht*) in a new now.

The reason why an instant contains only one sensation is that what we call sensation is that 'point' that originates in a now; we must define the sensation in relation to time (that is, as what originates in a now) and not the other way around. There is something *unverwechselbar* in the idea that the sensation, *regardless*

the content, is always related to time, and only in relation to time we can explain the 'absoluteness' of the sensation. That fact that the content *does not matter* (namely the fact that if the 'same' sensation comes back it will be already *another* sensation), can be explained by considering that they originate in different instants, in different now. We can see why Kant's argument is, as Heidegger says, *zweideutig*: the identification between sensation and instant can be interpreted in two ways: 1) the sensation as 'causal' condition of the instant; 2) the instant as phenomenological condition of the sensation.

Heidegger characterizes the temporal nature of the now as a possibility of 'orienting ourselves' within the manifold of time, by saying "now, now, now".

While intuiting, mind must distinguish time in the sequence of impressions, that is, the mind must be oriented (*orientiert sein*) to time as the succession of nows . The mind must always already, whether explicitly or not, say now-now-now. Kant describes the factual case as follows. In the sequence of impressions the mind must distinguish time and thus always already relate every impression to a now which must always be *said*: now this, now this. Phenomenologically we must formulate this more precisely, by saying that only on the background of a now which is *always already said* (*des je schon gesagten*) in an advance view of the differentiated succession of nows can the offer of impressions *as* a sequence of impressions be made.

What allows us to define one sensation (namely the now as 'moment' in which something 'originates'), also allows us to define a manifold sensation. As Heidegger remarks, we do not only say "now", we say "now this, now this". The now, then, appears to be the condition of both the unicity of a sensation (as originating in one instant) its manifoldness. However, it is important to see how this preview of the succession of nows (instants) also entails the unity of this manifold. The fact is that the mind does not just say "now this, now this, now this"; the *orientation* towards the succession entails more than the possibility of distinguishing each impression as

“original”. This is why Heidegger defines the orientation to the now with temporal adverbs (*immer, schon*): the mind must “*always already*, whether explicitly or not, say now-now-now”. Heidegger makes clear this point when he says that “phenomenologically we must formulate this *more precisely*” and he clarifies the pre-view of the succession as “background of a now which is *always already said* (*des je schon gesagten*). If Heidegger can speak of *Hintergrund*, of a background of nows, it is only insofar as ‘saying now’ is something that is always *already said*. The now could not be a background if we were given only original and undifferentiated ‘points’. The background is more than the being given of succession of *original impressions*, it is the being given of this succession *as succession* of impressions. The orientation to the now entails that we do not distinguish different *points*, different *nows*, but *different* points, different *forms* of now: *right now, no longer now, not yet now*. In this sense Heidegger can say that “precisely what *seemingly* isolates each impression, namely the now, is what offers simultaneously the possibility of seeing the many as many” (my emphasis).

Thus we see that orientation to a now which in itself is a just-now and a right-now, offers the possibility of originally comprehending, in the unity of a now, a just-now-no-longer and a right-now-not-yet-in such a way that right-now and just-now are always related to an actual now. Right-now and just-now still reside in the light of the actual now. Both still have the character of the immediate now, so that the now contains in itself the possibility of an articulation of a plurality.

The kind of plurality that Heidegger has in mind is that of the pure manifold of pure intuition; but of course the analysis of the time clearly presupposes Husserl’s analysis of temporality. A consideration of Husserl’s temporality could shed more light on Heidegger’s interpretation of the threefold synthesis.

We cannot fully grasp the peculiarity of this temporal orientation if we make use of linear representation. Instead, we can look at the

idea of pure intuition as totality. In this context in fact Heidegger explains the apprehension by reference to the concept of *syndosis* as original unity: “Pure intuition of time is not simply an isolated grasping of a whole lot of nows that simply have no relation to one another. Rather each now as now, in order to be intuited as what it is, requires to be taken together with other nows”. But the possibility of the unity of manifold as original totality of past and present presupposes, as we shall see, the synthesis of recognition.

As it has been noted by Summa [2014] the synthesis of apprehension shows that there is always a “minimal kind of order necessary for the intuition of indeterminate objects”; therefore “we cannot properly talk about a generalized chaos”. In this sense “Kant seems to recognize some inner lawfulness and autonomy in the domain of sensibility”. For Heidegger as well, as we read, without synthesis of apprehension “we cannot even speak of *a* manifold”. Thus Heidegger defines the synthesis of apprehension as a “first stage (*erste Stufe*) of *objectification* (*Vergegenständlichung*), since “what offers itself does so *as a manifold*” [348/236]. Heidegger also says that the “analysis of pure apprehension shows that this apprehension constitutes (*konstituiert*) the first stage of objectification (which amounts to letting an intuitive offer be offered) (*das Darbietenlassen eines anschaulichen Angebots*); that is, apprehension [Heidegger quotes from A 102] is “the transcendental ground for the possibility of all modes of knowledge whatsoever, because knowledge is primarily intuition” [353/239]”. The apprehension, thus, is what makes possible the intuition in its pure receptive function, in its capacity of *seeing* (perceiving) “a manifold as a manifold” .

What is the role of this first form of objectivity? In which sense is this ‘*first*’? The problem is that Heidegger, as far as I can say, does not say much about this forms of objectivity, about the relation (of foundation? of interconnection?) between the unity of perception

(manifold of sensations) and other forms of synthesis, and about the 'conditions' of this form of object.

§ 25. The Synthesis of Reproduction

We can now take into account Heidegger's interpretation of the second section of Kant's text: "On the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination". Broadly speaking, the consideration of this synthesis is important for two reasons: on the one hand, this form of synthesis sheds more light on the structure of the apprehension, namely on the empirical possibility of "a manifold as a manifold of sensations"; on the other hand, it brings to the fore the problem of the possibility of a different *kind* of empirical manifold: a manifold of intuitions. We can say that for both Heidegger and Kant, from the "reproduction" depends the very possibility of a manifold in a *dynamical* sense, a manifold that gives different 'things' or 'objects' and not just different sensations (as different moments of the object). At the same time, the possibility of reproduction brings to the fore in a very clear way the role of synthesis of recognition in both apprehension and reproduction. In other terms, the synthesis of reproduction is the proof of the fact that the three syntheses are different moments of the same original structure, and that apprehension, reproduction and recognition are all (ontical) forms of unity of manifold.

If the 'key-argument' to to understand the apprehension was the structure of the now as unity of manifold, the distinctiveness of the now as "always already now", the 'key' to understand the reproduction is the past. The *twofold* role of the synthesis reproduction, in relation to the manifold of sensations and in relation to a manifold of intuitions, can be understood precisely in relation to the possibility of the past.

The specific term that Heidegger uses is *Behalten*, retaining. As we shall see, this term – a *technical* term of Heidegger's notion of

temporality in *Being and Time* – refers, on the one hand, to the *pure* possibility of the past, understood as a manifold that *can be* (potentially) retained and reproduced; on the other hand, it refers to what is *factually* retainable as ‘relevant’ in relation to an object (or a region) as a whole. It is in this sense that the term is used in *Being and Time* [§ 69 a]; as we have seen, in this context Heidegger locates in the “*gewärtigend-behaltende Gegenwärtigen*” (“making present that awaits and retains”) the condition of possibility of the explication of the present in terms of “as-structure”.

As we have seen, in the first synthesis Kant moves from the empirical fact that we are given *a* manifold of sensations. Now, says Heidegger, Kant moves from the “empirical fact” of the association.

The empirical fact (Tatbestand) from which Kant now proceeds is no longer the isolated (isolierte) impressions in their sequence (Abfolge), but the fact that such often (oft) successive representations which often appear together (zusammen aufgetreten) (for example, this eraser and chalk) “accompany” and are associated with one another. (sich ‘vergesellschaften’, sich assoziieren).

Heidegger speaks of a “peculiar” type of “connection” (die Eigentümlichkeit dies Verknüpfung), for this connection entails a “peculiar intuiting”. The peculiarity lies in the fact that the intuition is no longer isolated and confined to a manifold of sensations, but it is now an intuition of manifold ‘things’. This kind of intuition shows the possibility of a peculiar synthesis or connection (association); at the same time it brings to the fore the problem of the condition (or conditions) of possibility of this ‘pure possibility’. In an Heideggerian perspective, the eraser and the chalk appear together because they are both useful things. Heidegger has in view the world as a totality of indications or references, a totality of relevance or significance; Kant has in view the region of nature. Heidegger emphasizes that now, dealing with this synthesis, the object is the *object of the*

nature, the object in relation to the unity of a region. But as I said, what is at stake here is, more in general, the very possibility of a unity of manifold 'objects' (things, tools).

Heidegger suggests that "we do best to translate this term [synthesis of reproduction] quite literally. In this synthesis we are concerned with a synthesis whose character is reproduction, that is, *it brings forth again (Wieder-vor-führen)*". "What is meant here is bringing-forth again (*Wiedervorführen*) of something which was already once brought-forward (*as schon einmal Vorgeführtes*), that is, was offered in the apprehending unity of a manifold". The reproduction is a re-production, in the sense of 'showing again', or bringing forth again, what was already offered in the apprehension. Reproduction is not a re-intuition, a numerically different intuition of a (pseudo)*identical* object; reproduction is a *different intuition* of the *same* object, not *another* intuition of the same object. Heidegger notes that this peculiar intuiting "does not immediately go back to an affection (*nicht unmittelbar auf eine Affektion zurückgeht*). Rather this intuiting of a manifold offers something by itself from out of itself (*eines Mannigfaltigen bietet von sich aus selbst etwas dar*)". But how are we to understand that that intuition offers something by itself? Heidegger immediately says: "However, what is offered is not something freely invented, but something which directly corresponds to the being-extant-together of objects" (*..freilich nicht etwas frei Erfundenes, sondern gerade solches, was dem Zusammenvorhandensein der Gegenstände entspricht*). The question arises as to what *determines* the reproduction, as to what, as it were, circumscribes and defines the possibility (or possibilities) of an intuition *nicht unmittelbar auf eine Affektion zurückgeht*.

Kant says that the law of reproduction "presupposes that the appearances *themselves* are actually subject to such a rule, and that in the manifold of their representations an accompaniment or succession takes place *according to certain rules*". Let us take Kant's

well-known example of the cinnabar: “if the cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy[...] then my empirical imagination would never even get the opportunity to think of heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the representation of the color red”.

This brief and rich presentation is difficult because it deals with two ‘aspects’ of reproduction; “reproduction” indicates the possibility of retaining (*Behalten*) or bringing forth again (*Wiedervorführen*) what was given *in* the apprehension, namely, it means going beyond the *isolated impression*. But it can also indicate the possibility of retaining or bringing forth again *already given apprehensions* (and not just *what* was given in the apprehension as part of the same phase). In this sense, the synthesis of reproduction can be understood as the condition of possibility of the region nature.

The problem for Kant here is the enabling (*Ermöglichung*) of the object called nature in its regional totality (*in seiner Ganzheit selbst*). The relation (*Beziehung*) to this object called nature is possible only when the mind already has the aptitude (*Eignung*) of retaining and bringing forth again what mind intuits directly (*zuvor direkt Angeschautes behalten und wiedervorführen zu können*).

Heidegger makes clear that the question concerning the “*necessity of retaining*”, has to do with the elucidation (*Aufhellung*) of the relation to the object called nature. However, in Heidegger’s perspective, the synthesis of reproduction is essential in relation to the possibility of the object in general (for example, as unity of sensation).

Kant argues indirectly: If what is empirically offered in each case in a now would simply slip away with the passing away of the now (*mit dem abfliessen des Jetzt auch schlechtihin entfallen*), then the mind would never have the possibility of reaching out and back for something which has existed already (*zu etwas Vorigem über- zurückzugreifen*), except when mind intuits the same (*dasselbe*) again. But

then in fact mind would intuit the respective thing for the second time but not *as the same thing*.

Mind would be tied firmly to each phase of the now (*das Gemüt wäre festgebannt auf die jeweilige Phase des Jetzt*). If the whole range of the manifold of a region of objects is to be made accessible generally, then a possibility is needed for freely connecting what is offered beyond each phase of the perceived. (*Soll der volle Umkreis des Mannigfaltigen einer Gegenstandsregion durchgängig zugänglich werden, dann bedarf es der Möglichkeit der freien Verbindbarkeit des Angebots über die jeweilige Phase des Wahrgenommenen hinaus*).

The horizon of possible unification dare not be limited (*eingeschränkt*) to the wideness or narrowness (*Weite oder Enge*) of a now which is always isolated in itself. Then the mind would constantly fall (*fielen*) from one phase of the now into another totally unconnected (*unverbundene*) phase, in such a way that the earlier would simply be lost. [...] One cannot even speak of a sequence of such states as a many (*von einer Folge solcher als mehrerer*) because in each phase all earlier ones would be lost, and each would be merely absolute in itself in complete isolation from others

Indeed, the problem, as Heidegger presents it, concerns the possibility of a region, the possibility of “freely connecting what is offered beyond each phase of the perceived (*Möglichkeit der freien Verbindbarkeit des Angebots über die jeweilige Phase des Wahrgenommenen hinaus*)”, is “what makes accessible the whole range of the manifold of a region of objects (*volle Umkreis des Mannigfaltigen einer Gegenstandsregion durchgängig*)”. Just as in the presentation of the synthesis of apprehension, also here Heidegger makes use of the ‘hypothesis of chaos’.¹³⁶ To what kind of ‘possibility’ does this hypothesis refer? The fact that Heidegger presents the synthesis of reproduction as the condition of the

¹³⁶ Summa [2014] also emphasizes the methodological meaning of the hypothesis or possibility of chaos in relation to the understanding the differences between levels of synthetic constitution. In her view, different forms of chaos “reverberates” different “understanding of the lawfulness in sensible experience”. As we shall see, Heidegger does make use of this hypothesis or possibility of chaos in his interpretation of the threefold synthesis. In his perspective a pure chaotic experience is impossible however. This is also the result of Heidegger’s ‘variation’ on the experience of the lectern that we have considered above : a pure non-sense is impossible, for the sense is always articulated (even in the form of something *widersinning*).

possibility of a region (as manifold of objects) might suggest that the hypothesis refers to the possibility of an isolated intuition of a sequence of impressions (an isolated apprehension). This is indeed suggested in the first and in the second part of the quotation: “One cannot even speak of a sequence of such states *as a many* (*von einer Folge solcher als mehrerer*)”; what is impossible is a plurality of sequences, not the plurality of (or within) *one* sequence (apprehension); the horizon of the possible *unification* is not “limited (*eingeschränkt*) to the wideness or narrowness (*Weite oder Enge*) of a now”, that is, no matter how wide or narrow, no matter how many sensations a now includes in its extension; the problem has to do with the possibility of a *connection* between phases; without reproduction “the mind would constantly fall (*fielen*) from one phase of the now into another totally unconnected (*unverbundene*) phase”. Reproduction refers to the possibility of a free *Verbindbarkeit* if what is and was offered within, and in relation to, the *Umkreis* of region of objects.

However, in the first part of this quotation Heidegger seems to refer to a broader notion of reproduction (“...the possibility of reaching out and back for something which has existed already [*zu etwas Vorigem über- zurückzugreifen*]). In this sense, the problem that Heidegger addresses in this section concerns the role of the reproduction in *both* the apprehension, as intuition of manifold sensations in *one sequence*, and the imagination, as intuition of manifold sequences in one region. Heidegger’s reproduction must be understood in relation to the *broader* perspective of the guiding-problem of the possibility of the object as unity of manifold.

The question is this: What does this indirect demonstration of the necessity of a retaining (*behalten*) mean for the elucidation of the relation to an object? To what extent is it manifest that, beyond empirical reproduction, a pure reproduction is necessary? Empirically, the mind must have the possibility to retain, to go back

empirically in the dimension of the no-longer-now. This possibility of *empirically retaining* presupposes the possibility of an *a priori retaining*.

I have said that for Heidegger the possibility of reproduction is already presupposed in the apprehension, notably in the form of the past of the now. We have seen that precisely the possibility of the givenness of the past *in its distinctness* constitutes a manifold as *a manifold*. The past must be given as past, the now must be given as 'no longer now' (as different from the 'right now') in order for the apprehension to be a manifold. In a similar way, in order to have manifold objects (a region), the phase of the now must be given in a different form, namely as past. Heidegger says that in "*the pure reproductive synthesis* [...] time *as past* offers itself immediately – not as the present but immediately as it itself, as past". Then Heidegger stresses again the fact that "the capability of freely bringing back again (*freie Wiederbringenkönnen*) the now which has flowed away is as such not dependent upon this now's *now* being still offerable as a now. Rather retaining is capable of bringing forth without the presence of the nows".

Heidegger asks: "What does this indirect demonstration of the necessity of a retaining (*behalten*) mean for the elucidation of the relation (*Beziehung*) to an object?" The question is not a rhetorical one. We shall see that the possibility of reproduction, as pure possibility, explains nothing in terms of objectivity. Heidegger stresses that the synthesis of reproduction "provides the possibility of an unhampered (*ungehinderten*), *in principle* renewed prinzipiell *durghängigen*) bringing forth of the past – a renewed bringing forth in principle, because we are *factually* incapable (*faktisch imstande*) of bringing about everything from out of this horizon of alreadyness in a clear, unclouded and unbroken manner (*alles aus diesem Horizon des Gewesenen wieder eindeutig und ungetrübt, lückenlos herbeizuholen*)". But this factually impossibility does not matter.

Heidegger says that “it does not disprove the existence [*Bestehen*] of a pure reproduction”; on the contrary, “in the realization of the impossibility of bringing it back, we realize that we can move (*bewegen*) at any time in the horizon of alreadyness. We can place ourselves quite freely at any given point in time (*Wir können uns in jeden beliebigen Zeitpunkt ganz frei versetze*). That is why for Kant pure intuition is a pure *play* (*Spiele*) of the power of imagination”.

The past is here understood as a pure manifold in which we can move, of which we can ‘dispose’ as it were: the manifold of pure intuition as condition of the play of the power of imagination. The fact that factually I cannot place myself in any temporal point, the fact that I cannot actually retain and reproduce *everything*, this is a proof of the fact that the past is given in the form of a manifold of which, *in principle*, I can *freely* dispose: “I must have an open horizon of the past at my disposal (*..ich muss einen offen Horizon der Vergangenheit überhaupt zur Verfügung haben*). “This pure synthesis of retaining constitutes the mind's being able to *distinguish* something like time”. But does this involve that the past is given in its *distinctiveness* as past? Does this concept of synthesis of reproduction *really* answer the question that Heidegger himself asks a few lines before, namely the question concerning the meaning of the *demonstration* (*Aufweis*) of the *necessity* of the retaining for the *elucidation* (*Aufhellung*) of the relation to an object? What is the meaning of this possibility of a ‘free play of imagination’ for the constitution of the object?

In itself, the pure manifold of the past is given as a “clear, unclouded and unbroken” manifold. Let me recall that Heidegger, as we have seen, says that without reproduction “the mind would constantly fall (*fiele*) from one phase of the now into another totally unconnected (*unverbundene*) phase”. Question arises as to the sense in which the reproduction is a condition for the connection (the free *Verbindbarkeit*) of different phases. Heidegger’s presentation of pure

reproduction shows the possibility of this *Verbindbarkeit*. The fact is that the pure reproduction, as possibility of a “clear, unclouded and unbroken”, is completely useless in terms of objectivity, namely this possibility alone cannot constitute any form of object as unity of manifold.

The synthesis of reproduction is here presented as a formal (and therefore empty) condition of the manifold. Therefore, the interpretation of reproduction as pure possibility is an ‘abstraction’, for it does not account for the recognition as condition of the reproduction itself. Within this formal or abstract framework, the possibility of reproduction oscillates between two meanings: the possibility, *in principle unhampered*, of retaining everything; the *factual impossibility* of retaining everything. This perspective does not account for a third notion of possibility, that we might define “ontological” or “categorical”; this concept of possibility refers to the possibility of a *pure synthesis* of the pure manifold, the possibility of a pure ‘limitation’ or ‘categorical variation’ of the pure manifold.

Heidegger is well aware of these difficulties. This section is brief precisely because the synthesis of reproduction is a condition that requires a further condition. As we shall see, Heidegger says that “there is actually already too much indicated with the concept of bringing-forth-again (*Im Begriff des Wiedervorführens liegt eigentlich schon zuviel*)”. From this point of view, the very notion of pure reproduction is, at the same time, necessary (for every empirical reproduction presupposes this pure possibility) and problematic (for pure reproduction itself requires to be determined, oriented). I think that this is the reason why Heidegger speaks not only of *pure* synthesis of reproduction (the pure possibility of retaining the past) but of *productive* synthesis of reproduction. And this is why he does not find strange at all that Kant refers to the *reproductive* synthesis as *transcendental* act of imagination (namely, as an act of the

imagination as *productive* faculty). There is an essential relation between pureness and productivity.

In a very interesting note of the *Kantbuch*, Heidegger takes a position against Riehl, who suggested to remove “reproductive” and writing instead “productive”.

Kant says: " ... the reproductive synthesis of the power of imagination [belongs] to the transcendental acts of the mind." Now Kant usually calls the non transcendental power of imagination (i.e., the empirical) the reproductive imagination. If one takes reproductive as "empirical" in this sense, then the previously cited sentence becomes meaningless. Riehl ("Korrekturen zu Kant," *Kantstudien*, vol. V [1901], p. 268) thus proposes writing "productive" instead of "reproductive." This would indeed remove the alleged inconsistency, but at the same time it would also remove in general the sense that Kant wants to express with the sentence, for it should indeed show directly that the productive, i.e., here the pure power of imagination, is purely reproductive in that it makes possible reproduction in general. The insertion of "productive" only makes sense, then, if it does not replace the "reproductive," but if instead it determines it more precisely. Given the entire context, however, that is superfluous. If it is to be improved, then it must read "pure reproductive synthesis."

As Heidegger makes clear, if the insertion of “productive” makes any sense it is only as specification of the term “reproductive”: by saying “productive” we determine more precisely the reproduction; in this specific context, however, it seems that the term “productive” emphasizes more the pureness of the “reproduction”, than productivity as categorial condition of the pure reproduction.

As I have said, the synthesis of reproduction is always determined *not only factually* (to put it roughly: the incapacity of recalling everything) but in relation to another sense of the possibility, more or less implicitly present in Kant’s text. Kant, indeed, says that reproduction “presupposes that the appearances themselves are actually *subject to [...] a rule* and that in the manifold of their representations an accompaniment or succession takes place

according to certain rules; for without that our *empirical imagination would never get to do anything suitable to its capacity, and would thus remain hidden in the interior of the mind, like a dead and to us unknown faculty*" (my emphasis).

A capacity of imagination completely 'free', without rules, would remain hidden, like a dead and unknown faculty. But this consideration holds true not only for the faculty of imagination but also for the pure possibility or reproduction; for without a rule, without a direction, past would remain somewhat hidden, a pure and empty potentiality. Kant makes the well-known example of the cinnabar. Kant seems to argue that, in order for the reproduction to be possible, a regularity must be found in the appearances; however, implicitly Kant also shows that the regularity requires a rule, the limitation of the possibilities of the reproduction. To be sure "if cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy, if a human being were now changed into this animal shape [...] then my empirical imagination would never even get the opportunity to think of heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the representation of the color red; or if a certain word were attributed now to this thing, now to that, or if one and the same thing were sometimes called this, sometimes that, without the governance of a certain rule to which the appearances are already subjected in themselves, then no empirical synthesis of reproduction could take place". What I want to stress is that both possibility and impossibility of the empirical reproduction involves a certain pre-determination of possibilities, a rule; in this case, empirical concepts (human being, animal, cinnabar).

But let us consider the following lines. "Suppose now that we can establish that even our purest *a priori* intuitions provide us with no cognition except insofar as they contain a [certain] combination of the manifold, viz., a combination (*Verbindung*) that makes possible a thoroughgoing (*durchgängige*) synthesis of reproduction" (my emphasis). It is precisely in this terms that Heidegger presents the

synthesis of reproduction: the possibility a *durchgängig Gegenstandsregion*; *Möglichkeit der freien Verbindbarkeit*; we have suggested that the *pure* manifold of the past, as “unhampered (*ungehinderten*), *in principle* renewed *prinzipiell durghängigen*) bringing forth of the past” is *not yet*, to borrow from Kant, “a combination (*Verbindung*) that makes possible a thoroughgoing (*durchgängige*) synthesis of reproduction”, precisely because it is only the formal condition of the combination. Kant in fact recalls that “even our purest *a priori* intuitions provide us with no cognition *except insofar as they contain a [certain] combination* of the manifold”. Kant addresses here the problem of the *sufficient conditions* of reproduction, the problem of the synthesis as combination of the manifold, and therefore as knowledge (or, in Heidegger’s way, as relation with the object). Kant makes these examples:

Now, obviously, if I want to draw a line in thought, or to think the time from one noon to the next, or even just to present a certain number, then I must, first of all, necessarily apprehend in thought one of these manifold presentations after the other. But if I always lost from my thoughts the preceding presentations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of the time, or the sequentially presented units) and did not reproduce them as I proceeded to the following ones, then there could never arise a whole presentation; nor could there arise any of the mentioned thoughts – indeed, not even the purest and most basic presentations of space and time.

In this very passage Heidegger finds what he calls Kant’s indirect argument (or “indirect demonstration”), namely the argument concerning the *pure* possibility of the synthesis of reproduction. However, this argument, more than indirect, is implicit. As we have seen, Heidegger finds here the pure possibility of the reproduction as possibility of both the intuition of a manifold of sensations and a manifold of intuitions (regional unity). He leaves aside the problem,

that Kant *already* addresses in this context, concerning the conditions of the combination of the manifold, the conditions of the reproduction as knowledge. The fact is that Heidegger is more interested in presenting a broad notion of synthesis of reproduction, even though he cannot avoid to deal with the recognition as condition of reproduction.

Heidegger's strategy can be better defined focusing on his interpretation of the very last lines of this section. Kant states: "hence the synthesis of apprehension is linked inseparably with the synthesis of reproduction". (The sense of this claim is understandable in the light of Kant's example: "But if I always lost from my thoughts the preceding presentations [...] and did not reproduce them as I proceeded to the following ones, then there could never arise a whole presentation").

From this passage Heidegger draws the conclusion that "*Apprehension itself is not possible without reproduction. Already in seizing what is immediately given as intuitive there occurs a reaching beyond and reaching back to something which from out of the moment-phase of a now each time necessarily flows or is about to flow into the very next no-longer-now. But just as apprehension is necessarily open toward what has already been retainable [des behaltbaren Gewesenen], in the same way and inversely everything retainable as something which can be brought forth must be capable of being displayed in each actual phase of the now of apprehension*". However, Heidegger's claim has a different sense: in Kant apprehension requires reproduction as conceptual construction of the intuition according rules. In Heidegger apprehension requires a reproduction as moment of the intuition itself. In other words: the kind of reproduction that Kant presents as condition of the apprehension is the reproduction as condition of a conceptual synthesis.

§ 26. The Synthesis of Identification

So far, we have taken into account the role of the past as pure possibility of a manifold, leaving open the question concerning the possibility of the unity of this manifold. In the synthesis of apprehension, however, this unity was already presupposed; the apprehension, in fact, contains more than a manifold of 'points' of 'now'; it contains the unity of a manifold of nows, given in their distinctiveness (as 'no longer now', 'right now', 'not yet'). In other terms, we have presupposed the "orientation to the now"; this orientation makes possible the apprehension of a sequence *as a sequence*, the intuition of a manifold *as a manifold*. Manifold impressions are encountered in the pre-view of different 'forms' of now, so that 'each' now is always *the* now of a sequence.

We have found a *similar* problem in relation to the synthesis of reproduction: how is it possible, for the past, to be a distinct moment of the manifold and not merely a re-intuition, an intuition that gives 'more' and 'again' the present? The synthesis of reproduction, as possibility of a *Verbindung* of the manifold, exacerbates a problem *already* present in the apprehension, namely the problem of the possibility of the past *as such*. This is why, as I have suggested, Heidegger works with a broad notion of reproduction (the "retaining *a priori*" as pure possibility of "bringing forth again"). I have argued that this possibility, in itself, is not yet a sufficient condition for constituting a relation with an object. The reproduction requires the 'integration' of the third synthesis, the synthesis of recognition.

Heidegger's interpretation of the synthesis of recognition is introduced by an important consideration concerning the *Zusammengehörigkeit* among apprehension, reproduction and recognition.

The outcome of part two was that the phenomenon which was worked out under part one, the synthesis of apprehension, is not possible without a fundamental connection with the synthesis of reproduction. Now it will be shown that the synthesis of reproduction, too, in turn will not be possible without the synthesis of recognition (*Nunmehr soll sich zeigen, dass auch die Synthesis der Reproduktion wiederum nicht möglich ist ohne die Synthesis der Recognition*). Thus this synthesis too necessarily belongs to apprehension (*Demnach gehört diese auch notwendig mit der Apprehension zusammen*) [354/240].

Heidegger says: "...the synthesis of apprehension, is not possible without a fundamental connection with the synthesis of reproduction. Now it will be shown that the synthesis of reproduction, *too, in turn* will not be possible without the synthesis of recognition (*Nunmehr soll sich zeigen, dass auch die Synthesis der Reproduktion wiederum nicht möglich ist ohne die Synthesis der Recognition*). Thus this synthesis *too* necessarily belongs to apprehension (*Demnach gehört diese auch notwendig mit der Apprehension zusammen*) [my emphasis]". Heidegger's line of reasoning seems to be this: *since* the apprehension has an essential connection with the reproduction, and *since* the reproduction requires the recognition, *thus (demnach) also (auch)* the synthesis of recognition belongs to the apprehension. How are we to understand this 'argument'? I think that if Heidegger's argument is phenomenological, it cannot be a mere syllogism; and, most important, it cannot intend to establish any hierarchy between different forms of syntheses. On the contrary, different forms of synthesis are different configurations of this structure. For example, the apprehension, as intuition of a manifold of sensations, entails a specific form of relation between apprehension, reproduction and recognition; the apprehension of a tool (Heidegger), or the apprehension of a causal relation (Kant), are recognition and reproduction in a different sense.

Heidegger is well aware of the problem concerning the internal articulation among apprehension, reproduction and recognition. In a very important passage he writes:

If (*ween*) the essence of objectness (*Gegenständlichkeit*) of the object lies (*besteht*) in unity and if the three mentioned modes of unification are all constitutive (*konstitutive*) for enabling the relation to the object, then (*dann*) the three modes of synthesis must be interrelated (*in sich selbst zusammengehören*) regardless of what each is factually capable of doing (*ganz abgesehen davon, was sie je faktisch vermögen*). And this gives rise to the question: How and where is the interrelationship of the three syntheses organized (*organisiert*)? What is the transcendental ontological ground (*Grund*) of this *necessary* interrelationship? This is to say that the three syntheses are not simply placed side by side (*einander nebengeordnet*), that the third one in particular is not simply added onto the other two but in the end has a *priority* (*Vorrang*) over the other two. [357/241]

To be sure, these three forms of synthesis are not 'pieces': "the three syntheses are not simply placed side by side. Heidegger also says that "if the objectness of the object lies in unity and if the three mentioned modes of unification", "then the three modes of synthesis must be interrelated *regardless* of what each is factually capable of doing" (my emphasis). In this sense, the interconnection between the three syntheses belongs to the structure of what an object *in general* is; *therefore* these syntheses are *a priori* "interrelated", *regardless* to what each form of synthesis is capable of doing. Heidegger, as we have seen, complains about the fact that Kant's point of departure of his analysis of the synthesis is always an empirical form of synthesis, a 'faculty' or 'capacity' of the subject. But Heidegger remarks, more in general, also means that one cannot consider and thematize the reproduction only as a *pure* possibility; the reproduction is to be considered only *as long as* it constitutes (along with apprehension and recognition) an object; and the same goes for the apprehension. In this sense, we should have no limitations as to what an object *can be*. Here object indicates only the unity of a manifold, the correlate of

the a *necessary* interrelationship between the three synthesis (with a *priority* of the recognition).

This is the sense of Heidegger's claim that "the inner connection of the three syntheses is radically established in terms of the problem of enabling something like the object's 'standing over against' (Die innere *Zusammengehörigkeit der dreie Synthesen wird aber durchgängig begründet in der Orientierung auf das Problem der Ermöglichung von etwas wie Gegenstehen von Gegenstand..*)": in order for the *Zusammengehörigkeit* to be *fully* or *entirely* (*durchgängig*) founded, this interconnection must be oriented toward the problem of the object (the possibility of the *Gegenstehen* of an object). Only in terms of object this interconnection can be, as Heidegger says, *durchgängig begründet*, founded without exceptions.

The reason why I stress this point is that, as we I have suggested, Heidegger distinguishes between the general problem of the object as unity of manifold (for example, as unity of manifold impressions) and the regional unity as condition of manifold objects. *In principle*, the *stability* of the interconnection between these syntheses does not require a regional unity (...*der volle Umkreis des Mannigfaltigen einer Gegenstandsregion durchgängig*); in other words: what is required, to borrow from Kant, is a "thoroughgoing (*durchgängige*) synthesis of reproduction", a *Verbindung* of the pure manifold, which does not mean necessarily a connection or association between different intuitions within a regional unity. The apprehension itself seems to be already a unity of manifold, it already contains the possibility of a combination of the manifold. However – and this is why I have said *in principle* – it is difficult to find place, in Heidegger, for the autonomy of this basic condition. Heidegger does not make explicit the relation (of foundation? Of independence?) between the unity of the manifold in the sense of a regional (or wordly) unity (the totality of the nature, the totality of indications and relevance) and the unity of the manifold in the sense of the unity of sensations.

Let us now turn our attention to Heidegger's interpretation of the third synthesis. Heidegger explicitly recognizes that with the interpretation of this synthesis he is basically dealing with something that we cannot find in Kant. "We must explicitly emphasize that *in interpreting the third synthesis we go way beyond Kant*, because now the problem of the common root of both stems of knowledge becomes acute [359/243]". Heidegger refers to one aspect in particular: the interpretation of the recognition in relation to the future.

The question concerning the priority of the future would require an analysis of Heidegger's idea of original temporality; in particular, we should ascertain *why* and *how* all possible modifications of the ecstatic-whole are (as I think) always 'enacted' by a modification of the future. In turn these considerations would require a close consideration of the meaning of the distinction – that only makes sense in relation to the future – between authenticity and inauthenticity, as 'primordial' form of manifold. I cannot deal with this difficult problems in this context (I will just make a brief remark in the conclusions).

As I have said, the third synthesis brings to the fore the crucial role of the unity in relation to the possibility of the manifold. In this perspective the term "recognition" is, says Heidegger, "quite misleading (*missverständlich*)". This is why he introduces the term "identification" (*Identifizierung*). "The fundamental act which enables that we take what we retain as what we have already intuited and grasp it as the same is the act of *identification*. Without the synthesis of identification it would be impossible to grasp *any* (*eines*) objective interrelation (...die Erfassung eines gegenständlichen Zusammenhanges..)[361/244]". The term is quite important from a phenomenological point of view. We have seen that this notion (that Heidegger finds in Husserl's Sixth logical investigation) plays an important role in Heidegger's definition of the problem of truth; we

have also seen that Heidegger's as-structure is indeed a form of identification. Hence Heidegger's interpretation of the identification as time-related synthesis will shed more light on *Being and Time's* claim about the temporality of the as-structure.

Let us see how the identification operates in relation to apprehension and reproduction. Heidegger's presentation is brief but very rich. Let me note that Heidegger, also in this presentation, makes use of the 'hypothesis of chaos'. Heidegger presents the role of the synthesis of identification by showing what the manifold would be without this form of synthesis. This possibility is somewhat artificial and it aims to show that the very distinction between apprehension and reproduction would not make any sense without the synthesis of identification; apprehension and reproduction make sense only as long as they constitute an object as unity of manifold.

Heidegger's argument is defined by himself as an explanation of "the necessary interrelation of the three syntheses *with respect to the relation to the object*" [360/244, my emphasis].

Synthesis of apprehension is needed so that the intuitive offer (*Angebot*) becomes an offer (*Dar-gebot*) as such and stands over against (*gegen-steht*) in the most elementary manner (*in der elementarste Weise*). But apprehension would be incapable of making accessible (*zugänglich zu machen*) a relation to the object (*Gegenstandbeziehung*) as such and in its totality (*Ganzheit*), if each apprehension and what it seizes, necessarily isolated in a now, would irretrievably sink back into the past. [...] What is previously offered must thus be capable of being brought forth again; it must be retainable.

The kind of *Gegenstandbeziehung* Heidegger is here talking about is a very "elementary" one. The object is here defined as a "totality", which does not necessarily mean a regional totality. Heidegger *seems* to argue that the accessibility of the object as a whole depends on the possibility of retaining and reproducing "what is previously

offered". But Heidegger immediately asks: "what do we gain by this possibility (*was wäre damit gewonnen*)?"

Granted the possibility that we can retain all what we previously intuited, what do we gain by this possibility? (*was wäre damit gewonnen*)? We could (*könnten*), so to speak (*gleichsam*), run again and again through (*immer wieder durchlaufen*) the sequence of offers, in the direction of what is past and back to what is just now present. This would only widen the span of the accessible offer (*die Spannweite des verfügar Angebots erweitert*), would only increase the possibility of surveyability of the whole (*Übersehbarkeit des Ganzen nur gesteigert*) [..]

In itself, the possibility of reproduction would only increment the amplitude of what is given; the reproduction would only give "more" of what is given, would only increase the quantity and the extent of what is given, in a sort of *hypothetical* uniform and overwhelming present. Heidegger says that we could (*könnten*), so to speak (*gleichsam*) run again and again through (*immer wieder durchlaufen*) the sequence of offers. But even assuming this 'hypothesis', asks Heidegger, "does this mean that we could return to what we previously intuited in the sense of intuiting it *again*?" The answer is negative. Let me stress that the problem is not *only* the possibility of an intuition of manifolds 'things', 'objects', but *also* the possibility of the intuition of a manifold of sensations. The fact is that the very distinction between these two forms of unity (*a sequence* of impressions in one intuition; *manifold sequences* of impressions in one region) does not make any sense without the synthesis of identification.

Thus Heidegger introduces the synthesis of recognition:

We can do this [return to what we previously intuited in the sense of intuiting it *again*] only if we can recognize (*erkennen*) what we previously intuited *as the same* as what we intuit now. There is actually already too much indicated with the concept of bringing-forth-again (*Im Begriff des Wiedervorführens liegt eigentlich schon zuviel*). Re-production is impossible if I cannot reproduce what flows away in

the past as the same by recognizing it again [as the same]. Thus apprehension leads necessarily to reproduction and reproduction to recognition as its complement. [...]

Reproduction, in order to be what really reproduction is supposed to be, presupposes the possibility of recognizing the object as the same that *was* intuit. This is why Heidegger says that : “there is actually already too much indicated with the concept of bringing-forth-again (*Im Begriff des Wiedervorführens liegt eigentlich schon zuviel*)”; this *too much* is precisely the third synthesis, the synthesis of identification. The reproduction can be a “bringing-forth-again” only if we identify of what is reproduced as what is ‘again’ and not ‘for the first time’.

Thus we can say (with Heidegger) that in itself “bringing-forth-again what is previously perceived *does not help if we cannot identify it as the same*”. On the contrary: the possibility of the synthesis of bringing again would precisely *run counter to the goal of enabling a complete experience. (...würde gerade dem Ziel der Ermöglichung einer geschlossenen Erfahrung zuwiderhandeln)*. This possibility would constantly introduce anew an *endless and boundless* manifold within which “the same” perhaps returns without our being able to grasp it *as the same*, if we would reside outside the possibility of identification”[emphasis is mine].

Heidegger elaborates his claim making the example of the description of an auditorium. We start from the apprehension of manifold objects: chalkboard, lamp, chalk, etc. Of course, says Heidegger, the “further I go and the further I press on in describing [these things], the further removed [from me] is what is seen at first. But we have the possibility of reproduction – we can retain lamp or piece of chalk *as seen*. But what about this piece of chalk that I saw here? I just saw a piece of chalk and only this belongs to the stock of what belongs to this auditorium. But how can I now say this, because now I am describing the hard seats and do not see the chalk but only

visualize it? For who tells me that the chalk that I visualize now belongs to the auditorium? I can return to the place of the chalk and confirm that. But what do I confirm here? That here there is a piece of chalk. And previously I perceived a piece of chalk. Hence there would be two pieces of chalk which belong to the auditorium. This will be denied, and we will be told that it is self-evident that there is only one piece of chalk". Of course, says Heidegger, we do not see that there are two pieces of chalk only because we have perceived the same piece of chalk two times. We do say that we have perceived *the same* piece of chalk, but two times. Heidegger asks: "But is this so self-evident (*selbstverständlich*)?"

The fact is that reproduction and apprehension, so to speak, are 'mechanical structure' and as such they cannot really 'distinguish' when an impression is part of a new objectual unity and when it constitutes a new object. "Assuming that we could accomplish the apprehension and we could likewise retain, then we retain merely the objects we perceived, in fact as often as they were perceived. But the fact that the piece of chalk is manifest in all the various apprehensions and reproductions as *one and the same* [piece of chalk] is not sufficiently accounted for by the simple apprehending and reproducing". Only identification allows us to distinguish a manifold (the two perceptions of the chalk) and refer this manifold to the perception (as perception of the same object). How exactly does the identification introduce this distinction? In relation to what is it possible this distinctiveness of the manifold, this 'orientation' within the past and present? Identification itself does not contain this principle. In this sense Heidegger says the third synthesis, the one that makes possible reproduction and apprehension, or better, the one that *determines* the interplay between present and past as related to the same object, is neither identification nor re-cognition.

The identification which first enables apprehension and this in unison with reproduction itself, is not the original (*ursprüngliche*) act which endows unity (*Aktus der Einheitgebung*) [...] All identification presupposes already having a unified interrelation of beings (*Aller Identifizierung liegt die Vorwegnahme eines einheitlichen Zusammenhangs von Seiendem zugrunde*). In identifying – and that means apprehending and reproducing – we are always already awaiting a unity of beings (*sind wir je schon einer Einheit von Seiendem gewärtig*). Essentially and in the order or structure of the syntheses, the synthesis mentioned in the third place is the primary one. This synthesis is primarily neither a re-cognition nor an identification but opens up and projects in advance a whole – a whole which is in fact in one way or another disclosable and appropriable in apprehension and reproduction (*...sondern der vorwegnehmende Entwurf eines so oder so faktisch enthüllbaren und in der Apprehension und Reproduktion anzueignenden Ganzen*).

What can be “disclosed” in the apprehension and reproduction – what is *retainable* in unity with an *intuition* – is decided by the anticipation of the unity; this anticipation *factually* determines the unity of the threefold synthesis as a certain form of totality. As we have seen before, these categories are unities, forms of unity of the pure synthesis of pure manifold, totalities as possible regional variations of temporality. In the light of Heidegger’s interpretation of the three-fold synthesis, the idea of “pure synthesis of pure manifold” can be better understood as a *form of totality* that predelineates a specific form of *identification*. Categories are factual limitations of the pure possibility of reproduction essentially different from the factual possibility or impossibility of the pure reproduction. Heidegger’s interpretation of the threefold synthesis involves the notion of as-structure; *in principle*, these structures *determine nothing as to what an object can be*, but only *how* in general an object is possible, namely as identification of a ‘sphere’ of relevance and reproducibility. This is why I have insisted on the apprehension as intuition of manifold sensations as basic form of unity of manifold. The question is whether or not, in Heidegger’s perspective, also this basic form of unity of manifold requires the anticipation of a unity;

the answer, I think, is yes, for this very basic form of object already involves the anticipation of a totality (the object as totality of sensations) that predelineates what is relevant (retainable, reproducible) and what is not.

Thus a categorial modification of the temporal manifold is always required for the constitution of an object as unity of manifold. The fact is that in this perspective the idea of category is very broad and formal; it indicates every possible “pure synthesis of pure manifold”. We can stress this point taking into account an interesting passage from Kant’s discussion on causality [A192/237]. Kant makes two examples of succession (subjective and objective): the apprehension of a house and the apprehension of ship floating down the river. In the apprehension of the house the succession of perceptions is arbitrary (I can start from the bottom or from the top); in the apprehension of the ship the apprehension of the succession follows the law of causality. In this case “my perception of its position lower down in the course of the river succeeds the perception of its position higher up, and there is no possibility that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should be perceived first lower down and afterwards higher up in the river”. The order in the perception is here “determinate”, the apprehension is “tied” to this order. In the perception of a house, instead, “my perceptions could, in apprehension, start from the house's top and end at the bottom, but they could also start from below and end above; and they could likewise apprehend the manifold of the empirical intuition by proceeding either to the right or to the left. Hence in the series of these perceptions there was no determinate order making necessary the point in apprehension where I must begin in order to combine the manifold empirically. In the perception of what occurs, however, this rule is always to be found, and through it the order of the perceptions succeeding one another (in the apprehension of this appearance) is made necessary”.

Kant is interested in the condition required for an objective reproduction; but in a phenomenological perspective the very possibility of looking at something, starting from one side or from another and starting again and again, is itself problematic, for it requires a form of unity of manifold. The absence of a rule (causality for example) entails the presence of another rule. For this reason the reproduction is never 'subjective', but always determined according certain forms or categories. Precisely the possibility of a merely subjective succession' already involves a certain rule, the ability of referring the manifold of sensations to the apprehension itself and not to the object.

CONCLUSIONS

As we have seen in the second part, even the most 'strange' or 'unexpected' experience presents a kind of lawfulness, no matter how basic and minimal. To put it roughly, even when we know nothing about an object, we still know *what kind* of lawfulness we should be looking for. To borrow from Merleau-Ponty [1962, p. 495] again, we always find our way into multiplicity. Heidegger does not dwell much upon these basic forms of unity of manifold and he does not address explicitly the problem of how, in fact, different forms of synthesis are interconnected in our experience. His interpretation of the synthesis aims only to show how, in general, the object is only possible in relation to the *anticipation* of a possible categorial unity of manifold. This does not mean at all that Heidegger yields to a naïve subjectivism. On the contrary, if reproduction and apprehension were completely arbitrary, the so called "subject" would be overwhelmed by an undifferentiated manifold, and perhaps we could not even speak of a subject at all. One might say that subjectivity itself is always 'subjected' to categories as rules of synthesis, as unities that pre-delineate, indicate and anticipate a possible unity of manifold (of which, for example, a certain idea of

“subject” is only a possibility).¹³⁷ However, a question arises as to how different categorial variations of the manifold are effectively possible. In other terms, granted that the synthesis of identification (the anticipation of the unity) is the condition of the interplay between present and past (and therefore of the manifoldness of time in its distinctiveness), what are the conditions of identification itself? What kind of conditions do make possible the multiplicity of forms identification as related to different forms and regions of unity of manifold? And how *many* conditions are there?

Let me note that by asking about the condition of the identification, or more precisely, by asking about the (plural) conditions of the identification, we are thereby suggesting that temporality itself, or better, temporality alone, is not a *sufficient* condition for the identification, but only a *necessary* and *formal* condition of the unity of the manifold *whatsoever*. We have already seen that in Heidegger’s perspective the task of the interpretation of Kant’s *Deduction* is to disclose the *essence* of a category *überhaupt*, as pure synthesis of the temporal manifold. The difficulty lies in deciding if the alleged ‘formality’ of this concept of category is a *limit* that Heidegger *did not want* to overcome (because he was well aware of the fact that temporality, as horizon of the understanding of the being, does not produce the conditions for categorial and regional variations), or if this limitation is something that Heidegger *intended* to overcome by elaborating a concept of temporality as origin of *categorial* and *regional* variations of the sense of the *Being*.

Let us turn for a moment our attention to Heidegger’s discussion of temporality in Ga 24 and Ga 28. In these pages Heidegger presents

¹³⁷ For example, in a passage of *Interpretation I* I have already quoted [382/259] categories are presented as “rules” and as “indications” of the synthesis: “these rules of positing “in uniform fashion” [Heidegger quotes from *KrV*, A 113] that is, the indications (*Vorzeichnungen*) of the synthesis of the manifold, which are understood in advance and accepted as binding—these rules are nothing but unities which lie in the possible free forms (*freien Formen*) of synthesis as such”.

his idea of temporal schematism.¹³⁸ Here Heidegger describes the concept of temporal ecstasis as schematic horizon (for example, the horizon of the *presence* as scheme of every *present* in general). Temporal schemes are “horizons” in the sense that they “pre-delineate”, namely they give a specific direction to temporality. This is why Heidegger makes this important remark on the concept of “horizon”: “horizon, ὁρίζειν, is not at all primarily related to looking and intuiting, but by itself means simply that which delimits, encloses, the enclosure” [Ga 26, p. 268-70/308]. Therefore Heidegger notes that “of itself the ecstasis does not produce a *definite possible*, but it does produce the *horizon of possibility in general*, within which a definite possible can be expected”. The ecstasis “nonetheless provides something, just something futural as such, futurity as such, i.e., possibility pure and simple”. To be sure, past, present and future give by themselves a pre-delineation, they have their own *directionality* and therefore they are *pure* possibilities. Who could not see the essential difference between past, present and future? In fact, it seems that no empirical imagination or reflection could ever *invent* or *negate* that we are given these determinations as pure moments of a pure manifold.

However, our analysis of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s three-fold synthesis has shown that the synthesis of identification is the condition of reproduction, as possibility of the past *as past* (and this in two senses: the past as a part or moment of the same temporal phase; the past as a different temporal phase within a regional unity). In this light, the idea that past and present are *in themselves* different temporal horizons, namely horizons having *their own* specific directionality, appears somewhat problematic. Without identification, in fact, the past (the capacity of reproduction) would remain a pure potentiality (a capacity hidden in our soul, to say it

¹³⁸ As I stated in the *Introduction*, it was my intent to address this problem in the light of Heidegger’s interpretation of the three-fold synthesis.

with Kant). Even more radically, as Heidegger's 'hypothesis of chaos' shows, without synthesis of identification the temporal manifold would not present any distinct moment and the subject would be overwhelmed by a unique and uniform phase of presence. Without identification the manifoldness of time would not even have the character of the manifoldness; temporality would only increase the *amount* of what is given in each phase, at the expenses of its distinctiveness (as a matter of fact, we could not even speak of "phase").

One might object that there is identification *already* in the simple apprehension, so that no categorial anticipation is required in order to distinguish different moments of the time. In fact, as we have seen, Heidegger notes that there is something *unmistakable* (*unverwechselbar*) already in the idea of unicity, absoluteness and originality of the *impression*, and this because every impression is *in relation to time*, namely as a part of the original temporal whole: what we call "impression" is what is given *right-now*, *in between* a *right-before* and a *not-yet*. However, in Heidegger's perspective one should doubt of the validity of this argument. As we have noted, in fact, Heidegger strongly rejects the idea of a *Fundierungszusammenhang* between independent layers of synthesis; in this perspective the alleged 'simplicity' of this form of temporal unity of manifold is phenomenologically no less rich and complex than a regional unity of manifold.¹³⁹ In other terms, one might ask whether a categorial variation of the manifold is required in order, for a subject, to refrain from every 'activity' and, as it were, merely 'listen' to impressions and affections.

¹³⁹ From this point of view, even though Heidegger's interpretation radically differs from a neo-Kantian, in that it strongly rejects the idea that pure intuition and unity of manifold always require an intellectual synthesis, it still remains similar in that it recognizes that even basic and intuitive forms of lawfulness requires some sort of categorial conditions, even though not an intellectual one. What actually relevant here is how categoriality is defined, how and in relation to what category are defined.

The idea that the distinctiveness of temporal determinations requires a categorial condition sheds a different light on Heidegger's concept of temporality as "pure manifold". Past, present and future, one might say, are not just given as spatial determinations, as the right and the left. As a matter of fact, the very idea of pure intuition *in general* – that is, the idea that we can speak of "pure intuitions" independently from what each intuition gives – appears more problematical.¹⁴⁰

In relation to Heidegger, what is at stake here is the sense of the notion of temporality (*Temporalität*) as transcendental horizon of the understanding of the *Being*. In particular, temporal horizons seem to be 'abstract concepts' as it were. To be sure, *every* thinkable variation of the *Being* (for example, the nature) shows temporal characters. But temporal horizons do not produce *those* categorial variations *in relation to which* past and present are distinguished as parts of the *same* manifold, of the same 'region' or 'totality'. To put it differently, temporality does not tell us how those categorial variations, in relation to which past and present are *relevant* and *meaningful* (and therefore given as past and present), are actually possible.

Let us have a closer look at Heidegger's idea of schematic temporality. Köhler [1993] calls the attention to the fact that Heidegger's schemes are both *horizons* and *pre-delineations* (limitation); therefore he suggests to find an analogy with Kantian schematism in this 'duplicity' of the scheme as both horizon and *pre-delineation* of the *formal structure* of the ecstasis (*Vorzeichnung der formalen Struktur des Wozu der Entrückung' zu* [Ga 24]).¹⁴¹ But how

¹⁴⁰ This also suggests that the term "pure intuition" refers to different forms of manifold, in the sense that different manifolds are given in a different way: spatial manifold, colours and time are not "pure intuitions" in the same sense, they are different type of what Heidegger calls "syndosis".

¹⁴¹ "In der Kantischen Schematismuslehre gibt das schema jedoch zugleich die Regel der möglichen Versinnlichung der Begriffe an. Eine vergleichbare Aufgabe fällt dem 'horizontalen Schema der Ekstase' mit der 'Vorzeichnung der formalen

are we to understand the idea of temporal schemes as “formal pre-delineations” of a unity of the manifold? One might answer that temporal schemes are formal because they *merely* indicate (or pre-delineate) a temporal direction as pure horizon for *possible* categorial unity of manifold. But the problem lies in the fact that temporal horizons, as “simple possibilities”, appears to be too much “formal”, that is, ‘generic’, for they require, as Heidegger’s interpretation of the synthesis of reproduction shows, the integration of the synthesis of identification. Let me rephrase this problem. The question concerns, on the one hand, Heidegger’s use of the idea of formal indication (that is, the formal as pre-delineation of a possible unity of manifold) in relation to temporal horizons (as pure possibilities), and on the other hand, his use of Kant’s concept of “scheme” in relation to this idea of temporality.

One might ask in what extent *every* form of unity of manifold *originates* as a variation of temporality, so that temporal determinations are not mere general concepts obtained from concrete forms of categorial unity of manifold, but a formal (and *in this sense* schematic) pre-delineation of the sense in relation to which different articulations are ‘intelligible’ or ‘meaningful’. A slightly different way to address this problem is by asking whether temporality can actually constitute significant pre-delineation, limitation or categorial modification. Kant finds this pre-delineation in concepts as rules for the construction of a synthesis of the manifold.¹⁴² What ‘function’ does play in Heidegger’s temporality the role that concepts play in Kant’s schematism?

Struktur des Wozu der Entrückung’ zu [Ga 24, p. 429]”; “Die Divergenz der Heideggerschen Schematisierung des Seinsinnes zum Schematismus Kants tritt überdeutlich zutage; was in Heideggers Konzeption davon bleibt, ist jedoch eine analoge Struktur oder rein analoger Mechanismus, der wesentlich in der Doppelstruktur des Schemas (Horizon – Verfahren der Regelung des Entwurfs) begründet liegt, und der es Heidegger erlaubt, den Schematismus als Prinzip einer Strukturierung des Sinnes von Sein zu verwenden”.

¹⁴² On Kant’s notion of synthesis as construction I would like to refer to the insightful Ferrarin [2015].

If we look at Heidegger's idea of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) in *Being and Time*, the distinction between authentic and inauthentic temporality suggests that temporality is a kind of manifold that can *generate* from itself possible modifications and synthesis of the manifold. Such modifications are indeed possible as modalizations of a *moment* of the temporal manifold, namely the future. According to Heidegger, even though past, present and future are "equiprimordial" (or "co-original"), the future still has a "priority" (*Vorrang*), precisely as *that* ecstatic moment that enacts modifications in the whole structure of temporality.¹⁴³ It is here interesting to note that future appears to be the only temporal determination of which we can 'make sense' without any reference to categorial limitation. Do we need any categorial identification to 'distinguish' the future? Is not the future the example of the fact that the manifoldness of time is already given before every categorial articulation and, most important, beyond any anticipation of a possible unity of manifold?

To be sure, this idea of an auto-variation (or auto-modalization) of temporality presents a strong argument for the pureness of temporal determinations. The problem is that, as far I can see, the only possible modalization of this manifold is inauthenticity. Besides, this idea of an auto-modalization of the future does not exclude, but *on the contrary*, it brings to the fore even more radically the question concerning how temporality is co-determined by other structures of meaning and sense, especially considering that temporality, as inauthentic, is always determined by other conditions, as for example language (grammar, concepts), history and memory. Thus the question to be addressed is: in what extent temporality alone can account for variations of temporality itself and for radical variations in the structures of meaningfulness?

¹⁴³ This aspect is stressed in particular by Kontos [1996]. Notably, Kontos remarks that Heidegger's temporality is basically structured as a polarity between a pure ecstasis, the future, and the present as *quasi* un-ecstatic temporal form.

Now I would like to make a concrete example of how variations in the structure of meaning might affect the structure of temporality. In the second part we have seen that the “sign”, as “ontical concretion” of the formal-indicating structure of “indication” (Verweisung), can be defined *indication* according to different senses. Signs, for us, are “tools”, and therefore they are also indications (since indication is the ontological structure of every being ready-to-hand). Things seem to be quite different in what Heidegger calls primitive world, in particular in fetishism and magic. Also here we find “signs” as type of indications, but these signs are not “tools”. The primitive *Dasein* has not yet discovered the sign as an ontical concretion of an indication; therefore, the sign is not yet discovered as something that can be “used for...”. Thus, Heidegger speaks of “remarkable coincidence” between the sign and what is indicated (*..merkwürdige Zusammenfallen des Zeichens mit dem Gezeigten*).¹⁴⁴ In his review of Cassirer’s second volume of the *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, (published in Ga 03) Heidegger describes the primitive world as permeated by an “overwhelming” and “uniform presence”. The mythical *Dasein* (to use the term that Heidegger uses in his review of Cassirer’s book on mythical thought and in Ga 27) is described as living in a kind of uniformity and indistinctness: “A basic feature of the mythical consciousness of Objects lies in the fact that a demarcated boundary is *lacking* between what is dreamt of and what is experienced while awake, between what is merely imagined and what is perceived, between image and the object that is formed in the image, between word (meaning) and thing, between what is merely wished for and what is actually possessed, and between what is living and what is dead. Everything remains in *one* uniform level of Being that is immediately present, by which mythical *Dasein* is

¹⁴⁴ Heidegger says that “the sign has not yet become free from that for which it is a sign” (*ein Noch-nicht-frei werden des Zeichens vom Bezeichneten*). Also Cassirer [1965] speaks of an immediate unity of thing and signification.

dazed". Thus one might ask whether temporality can explain this kind of categorial modification of the structure of sign, as a kind of modification *so radical* to affect the very distinctiveness of temporality and perhaps the very validity of the distinction between authentic and inauthentic temporality. One might also to what extent these modifications in the structure of world and meaningfulness can be understood within the horizon of temporality (as transcendental horizon for the understanding of the *Being*). Perhaps temporality is just the best way, for us, to *make sense* of categorial modifications of structures of meaning, is translating these structures into temporal terms, saying for example that the primitive *Dasein* exists in one "uniform" and "immediately present" level of Being". But in this case, the sense in which the temporality can be defined as the horizon for the understanding of the Being is quite different. Temporality would be *that* form of unity of manifold in relation to which *we* (as philosopher or as phenomenologist) understand (and try to imagine) how *it would be* to live according *other* forms of unity of manifold and meaning.

* * * *

Now I would like to indicate some possible lines of investigation concerning the problem of the unity of the manifold.

1. It might be interesting to consider Heidegger's interpretation of pure intuition in a more critical perspective, taking into account different possible manifolds, investigating the difference in their form (since time, space and colours are not given in the same way), and asking about how these forms relate to each other.

2. Another interesting question concerns the role of empirical concepts and meanings in the concrete articulation of pure manifolds. I think that Heidegger's rejection of the logical prejudice

does not allow him to consider the positive role that meanings , concepts and grammar might play in the articulation of pure manifold (colours, spatial orientation, temporality).

3. As I have seen on different occasions, Heidegger's account of meaningfulness is quite rigid and schematic, as shown by the fact that he always makes use of two opposite examples: the hammer as a tool and the hammer as object of a thematic assertions. It is true that Heidegger recognizes that between these two cases there are different "interim stages", but they are precisely interim *stages*, namely, forms of meaningfulness defined in relation to the two paradigmatic examples of the tool and the object of a thematic assertion. Heidegger does not dwell upon these "interim stages" and also his interpretation of temporality takes its orientation from the opposition between these two forms of objects (tool and object in a strict sense).

I have already noted that this opposition is too rigid. Heidegger overemphasizes some aspects of our everydayness at the expense of others. Besides, he oversimplifies the complex and various phenomenon called "knowledge". As noted by Moran [2000], from this point of view Husserl's approach is far more rich and less schematic than Heidegger's. For Husserl, for example, knowledge is more than a deficient mode of praxis. He also seems to take more seriously the role of curiosity and imagination in both everydayness and knowledge¹⁴⁵. The fact that Heidegger does not stress this aspect

¹⁴⁵ In this respect, Moran rightly points out how Husserl's account of experience is indeed more complex and rich compared to Heidegger's: "...Husserl's account of cognitive intentionality, which recognizes the importance of the disinterested theoretical attitude for scientific knowledge, has been underestimated and misunderstood by Heidegger, who treats scientific cognition as a deficient form of practice"; Moran quotes a very interesting manuscript written in May 1931 and significantly entitled *gegen Heidegger*, where [I quote from Moran] "Husserl emphasizes that 'the theoretical interest' as he calls it is motivated, like the artistic, by a desire to play freed from concerns for the necessities of life, and this theoretical curiosity is by no means a deficient mode of the practical as Heidegger had claimed". Husserl says that "Special motives are required in order to make the theoretical attitude possible, and, against Heidegger, it does appear to me, that an

is important and has several consequences in his account of sense and meaningfulness. In Heidegger's perspective one cannot find any account of the role of creativity and imagination (and therefore concepts) in the constitution of the sense (in everydayness, in scientific and philosophical knowledge). Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's imagination as temporality is, from this point of view, highly indicative, since imagination is considered only as long as it pre-delineates and produces temporal determinations. Kant's "free play" of imagination is confined to the temporal manifold and to its 'laws' (the original totality of past, present and future). One might say that a 'lack of imagination' affects Heidegger's phenomenology of meaning. Imagination, phantasy and concepts do not have any thematic or methodological meaning; they do not produce nor disclose new (or relevant) forms of unity of manifold.

original motive lies, for science as for art, in the necessity of the game (*Spiel*) and especially in the motivation for a playful 'intellectual curiosity', one that is not springing from any necessity of life, or from calling, or from the context of the goal of self-preservation, a curiosity which looks at things, and wants to know things, with which it has nothing to do."

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