

'Verbose Dialectics' and the Anthropological Circle: Michel Foucault and Jean Hyppolite*

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Having already served as director of the École Normale Supérieure for ten years, in April 1963 Jean Hyppolite was elected professor of the Collège de France. Among the congratulatory letters from his former students held in the Fonds Jean Hyppolite is that of Michel Foucault, then Maître de conférences in psychology at the University of Clermont-Ferrand. In it, Foucault confides to Hyppolite the significance this event held for his generation: his teacher was for them, he writes, the 'sole philosophical model'.¹ This verdict is reaffirmed in the course of the address Foucault gave in honour of Hyppolite at the École Normale on 9th January 1969² and even more strongly the following year in 'The Order of Discourse', his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France.³ There Foucault declared that all of the 'philosophical problems' that his generation had found themselves having to address had been posed by

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1 Letter dated 15th April 1963, Fonds Jean Hyppolite, Library of the École Normale Supérieure.

2 Michel Foucault, 'Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968', in *Dits et écrits*, Vol.1. (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), pp. 779-85.

3 Michel Foucault, 'The Order of Discourse', trans. by Ian McLeod in Robert Young, ed., *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, (Routledge: London, 1981), pp. 48-78.

Hyppolite in his 1953 book, *Logic and Existence*,⁴ a book from which, Foucault added, he had drawn the very 'meaning and possibility' of his work.⁵

That Foucault expressed himself in these terms was not surprising. In 1970, two years after Hyppolite's death, the student had succeeded the teacher. Foucault's chair, proposed by Jules Vuillemin and entitled 'The History of the Systems of Thought', had replaced that of 'The History of Philosophical Thought' held by Hyppolite. In the copy of *The Order of Things* that he had given to Marguerite Hyppolite in 1975, Foucault wrote that he owed 'everything' to her husband.⁶ Foucault had met Hyppolite almost twenty years earlier when the former had been a teacher of the khâgne⁷ at Lycée Henri-IV.⁸ In 1949 Hyppolite, then professor at the Sorbonne, examined Foucault's mémoire de DES⁹ on 'La Constitution d'un transcendantal historique dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel' and from this point on the two philosophers' paths did not cease to cross at the École Normale (where Foucault delivered a course in psychology between 1953 and 1955). Finally, while Hyppolite had declined to examine Foucault's primary thesis 'Folie et Dérailson: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique'¹⁰, he had agreed to

4 Michel Foucault, 'Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968', in *Dits et écrits*, op. cit. Vol.1. p. 785

5 'There are many of us that owe him a debt.' Michel Foucault, 'The Order of Discourse', p. 76 – *translation modified*.

6 Cf. Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, trans. by Betsy Wing, (London: Faber & Faber, 1992), p. 18

7 Preparation for the entrance exams to the *École Normale Supérieure* involves two years of further study beyond the baccalaureate: the first year is known as the *hypokhâgne* and the second as the *khâgne* – trans.

8 Foucault is cited only once by Hyppolite, in a lecture in 1965 where he mentions 'the greatest works in the history of knowledge, the archaeologies of knowledge: Foucault'. See 'La Situation de la philosophie dans le monde contemporain', in *Figures de la Pensée Philosophique*, Vol.II, (Paris: PUF, 1971), p. 1035.

9 The mémoire de DES (diplôme d'études supérieures) is roughly equivalent to a master's degree thesis – trans.

10 Letter dated 15th April 1963. Op.cit. [Translator's note: Foucault's thesis was published in 1961 under the title *Folie et Dérailson; Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* and in a second edition in 1972 under the title *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*. Except where reference is made explicitly to the thesis itself, this work is referred to in the following as *The History of Madness*, and quotations are sourced, following Bianco, from the 1972 edition (here in the translation of Jonathan Murphy & Jean Khalifa, (London: Routledge, 2006)].

examine his secondary thesis on *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*.¹¹

We might nonetheless ask to what extent Hyppolite constituted the 'sole philosophical model' for a whole generation and above all, in what sense his book could have given Foucault's research its 'meaning' itself. In his 1963 letter Foucault returns to an episode relating to his principal thesis:

I shook my head the day you told me that my book [*The History of Madness*] was Hegelian; but in truth I was moved; that which is philosophical in it [...] was yours, and out of tact you had no doubt feigned not to recognize this.

If this sentence was indeed the avowal of a real philosophical debt and not merely flattery, we ought to seek to understand what could be 'Hyppolitian' in the general approach of Foucault's research, and more precisely, what could be Hegelian in *The History of Madness*, a work of which Hyppolite was no doubt an attentive reader.¹² Responding to this question will allow us to understand the development of Foucault's thought during the 1950s and to evaluate Hyppolite's importance for a whole generation of philosophers.

First of all, we will look to Hyppolite's work in the 1950s in order to describe the effect of Heidegger's later philosophy on his interpretation of Hegel. Next, we will analyse two lectures given by Hyppolite prior to Foucault's departure for Sweden in 1955 – two lectures which the third part of this article will then come to relate to Foucault's earliest works, while in the fourth and final section we will turn to *The History of Madness*.

11 Along with many others, this thesis is held in the Jean Hyppolite Archives at the library of the École Normale Supérieure.

12 In his *En devenant Foucault. Sociogenèse d'un grand philosophe* (Paris: Croquant, 2006), p. 45, José-Luis Moreno Pestaña observes that referring to Hyppolite as one's teacher was one of 'the intellectual gestures which serve as ritual cement to a generation of intellectuals'.

Hegelianism is not a Humanism

The 1940s in France were dominated by a quasi-obsessive interrogation of the relation of man to history. This problematic was altogether renewed when, at the start of the 1950s, there occurred what Anson Rabinbach has characterised as a textual event: the publication of the 'Letter on Humanism' – first in an incomplete version in 1948 in the journal *Confluences* and then in 1953, in *Les Cahiers du Sud*, this time in its entirety.¹³ The principal consequence of this text (whose consecutive translations came to problematise what was until then the 'humanist' interpretation of Heideggerian thought) was the dissolution of confidence – implicitly contained in Kojève's lectures on Hegel,¹⁴ the 'humanist' interpretations of Marx, and Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's 'existentialist' philosophy¹⁵ – in human subjectivity as agent and centre of history.

Like many of his contemporaries, Hyppolite was struck by what his student Michel Déguy did not hesitate to call a 'Heideggerian thunderbolt'.¹⁶ This thunderbolt was so electrifying that it reverberated

13 Anson Rabinbach, 'Heidegger's Letter on Humanism as Text and Event', *New German Critique*, 62, (1994), pp. 3-38.

14 For a more detailed analysis of Kojève's 'humanist' presumptions and the suppositions of 'humanist' interpretations of Heidegger during the 1930s and 1940s, see Stefanos Geoulanos, *An Atheism that Is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 2010.

15 Although in the wake of the liberation, between 1944 and 1948, the majority of essays on 'existentialism' sought to determine whether Sartre was or was not a student of Heidegger, whether existentialism was or was not a veritable humanism, whether Heidegger was or was not a Nazi philosopher, after 1948 this questioning shifted towards Heidegger's fundamental ontology and its relation to anthropology. This is the case in two articles by Alphonse de Waelhens on the essence of truth ('Introduction et commentaire', in *Martin Heidegger, De l'Essence de la vérité*, (Louvain-Paris: Vrin-Nauwelaerts, 1948), and 'Platon et l'humanisme', *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 46 (1948), pp. 490-6; Mikel Dufrenne's article on Kant and metaphysics ('Heidegger et Kant', *Revue de métaphysique et de la morale*, 56 (1951), pp. 35-87; 'La foi et la pensée d'après Heidegger', *Philosophies chrétiennes*, (Paris: Fayard 1955), pp. 108-32; 'Le Problème de l'être chez Sartre et chez Heidegger', *L'Année propédeutique*, t.10., 7-8 (1958), pp. 424-432; 'L'Onto-théologique Hégélienne et la dialectique', *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*, 20 (1958), pp. 646-723).

16 Michel Deguy, 'Entretien du 26 Novembre 1988', in Dominique Janicaud, *Heidegger en France*, 2nd Edition, (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001), p. 68.

among most of his students including those who would become neither phenomenologists nor Heideggereans, such as Foucault, and it is certainly no accident that between 1951 and 1952, if his biographies are to be believed, the latter began to read Heidegger.

Hyppolite, no doubt in part through the intermediary of his student Henri Birault, was perfectly aware of developments in German philosophy.¹⁷ He had sought to contribute to its diffusion in France in publishing Jean Beaufret's translation of the *Poème du Parménide* in the 'Épiméthée' imprint he directed, in attending the Cerisy colloquium¹⁸ on Heidegger, and even in seeking to invite him to the École Normale.¹⁹ He had published several essays on Heidegger and had devoted two courses to him in 1951-1952 and 1952-1953 (a long commentary on 'The Essence of Truth' and a course entitled 'Ontologie et anthropologie ou rapports entre la finitude et l'ontologie'). In an essay dating from the 1950s, while

17 Henri Birault, assistant in philosophy at the Sorbonne between 1954 and 1957, published only one book, his principal thesis, which was supervised by Ferdinand Alquié. It was defended very late in 1970 and was entitled: 'L'expérience de la pensée. Essai sur le développement de l'idée critique dans la philosophie contemporaine' (published under the title of *Heidegger et l'expérience de la pensée* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978)). His secondary thesis on Nietzsche and Pascale, first supervised by Hyppolite and then by Henri Gouhier following the former's death, was never published. In 1951 he taught at the Lycée Henri-IV and was a member of the jury for the agrégation. Between 1954 and 1958 he was assistant at the Sorbonne: he delivered two courses in 1954, one on 'What is Philosophy?' before this text was translated ('Qu'est-ce que la Philosophie?', *L'Année Propédeutique*, Paris, CDU, vol. VII, no.3-4, pp. 136-48, no.5-6, pp. 224-235, no.9-10, pp. 411-20, no.11-12, pp. 491-501), and the other on 'Kant and the Problem of Human Existence'. The opening of his first essay on Heidegger in 1951 is paradigmatic: 'There is no possible doubt today: Heidegger's philosophy, insofar as the word 'philosophy' is still suitable to such a 'thought' – is before all else, in increasingly exclusive fashion, a meditation on the essence of truth – a meditation which, in growing increasingly profound, is converted into a meditation on the 'truth of essence' or of being'. (Henri Birault, 'Existence et vérité d'après Heidegger', in *De l'être et des dieux*, (Paris: Le Cerf, 2006). p. 297).

18 'Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? Autour de Martin Heidegger', colloquium organised by Jean Beaufret, 27th August – 4th September 1955.

19 On Hyppolite's role in introducing Heidegger into the heart of the École Normale, see also Michael Sprinker's interview with Jacques Derrida ('Politics and Friendship: An Interview with Jacques Derrida.' trans. by Robert Harvey in *The Althusserian Legacy*, ed. by E. Ann Kaplan and Michael Sprinker, (London: Verso 1994), pp. 183-231).

treating his friend Sartre as a 'simple moralist',²⁰ Hyppolite contends that Heidegger is 'the greatest contemporary philosopher', the one to have given back to philosophers the possibility of 'believing, in the face of science and the technologies of world domination, in the validity of philosophy, in the primacy of ontology'.²¹ His contemporaries owe to Heidegger, he adds, 'this philosophy of philosophy, this question of being – and the being of being – which constitutes the originary element'.²² Hyppolite deems that the German philosopher had, most of all, opened a 'new problematic of being'; a problematic that at last permitted one to go 'to the things themselves'²³ and hence 'further' than the 'positivism' of Husserl and Bergson. Unlike the philosophies of the latter thinkers, Heidegger's philosophy does not allow itself, to be 'enlisted by anthropology'²⁴ since it conceives 'the unveiling and errancy' of man seeking to accede to truth as 'a characteristic of being itself'.²⁵ Accordingly, during the 1950s Hyppolite closes almost all of his essays by stressing the necessity of opening the properly anthropological dimension of the questions he broaches to an approach that is 'ontological' and 'fundamental'. Just as *Sein und Zeit* (a work made famous by the publication of *Being and Nothingness*) is but an anthropological introduction to ontology, so Hegel's *Phenomenology* should not be read as anything other than an introduction to the *Logic*.

The 'Heideggerean thunderbolt' that had struck Hyppolite had repercussions for his Hegelian studies most of all, especially for *Logic and Existence* which was published in 1953. Kojève's interpretation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* had led to a dualist ontology which had profoundly influenced Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Bataille, along with many other authors of this generation (an ontology which opposes human action, conceived as the negative motor of history, to the plenitude of nature). In taking into account *The Science of Logic*, Hyppolite rejects the Kojévian reading of Hegel since it remains, in his view, 'purely

20 Jean Hyppolite, 'La Psychanalyse chez Jean-Paul Sartre', in *Figures de la pensée philosophique*, vol.II, p. 786.

21 Jean Hyppolite, 'Note en manière d'introduction à *Que signifie penser?*' in *Figures de la pensée philosophique*, vol.II, p. 613.

22 Ibid., p. 610.

23 Jean Hyppolite, 'Ontologie et phénoménologie chez Martin Heidegger', in *Figures de la pensée philosophique*, vol. II, p. 613.

24 Ibid., p. 624.

25 Ibid., p. 620.

anthropological'.²⁶ From *Logic and Existence* on, Hyppolite's interpretation of Hegel is no longer centred upon understanding the human subject as the source of negation, but on the study of the development of the dialectic of being – a development that is to be interpreted 'phenomenologically', as that of sense coming to its realisation in absolute knowledge. According to Hyppolite, the emergence of absolute knowledge ought not to be situated, as Kojève thought, at the level of the transition towards self-consciousness which perfects the dialectic of consciousness presented in the *Phenomenology*, but at the level of the transition towards logic which the end of the book itself calls for. At the end of the *Phenomenology*, self-consciousness is shown to be but a simple stage of the self-reflexivity of being. As a consequence, while the *Phenomenology* describes the itinerary to be followed in order to arrive at absolute knowledge, it presupposes an ontological reflection surpassing man and coinciding with the self-expression of the absolute. This self-expression, this logos that Hyppolite describes in rather Heideggerean terms, is not the discourse of man about being; it is the discourse of being through man. According to Hyppolite, Hegel thinks 'the adventure of being and not that of man'²⁷ and that 'the adventure of man is also an adventure of being'. This is a 'speculative adventure through man and his consciousness of self, an adventure of being, as the sense of being'.²⁸ Thus, it is only on the basis of the dialectic which 'pushes difference into opposition' and accounts for empirical diversity through the concept of internal difference, that Hegelian philosophy can pass from a philosophy of essence in which thought and being, idea and empiricity, are separated, to an ontology or logic of sense in which sense is immanent to experience (both human and historical). And it is in this sense that Hyppolite – using an expression that will be taken up by Deleuze – can affirm that 'immanence is complete' in the Hegelian system. Hyppolite frequently relates the dedication to immanence of this system with Nietzsche's famous dictum on the death of God.²⁹

26 Jean Hyppolite, 'La Phénoménologie de Hegel et la pensée française contemporaine', *Ibid.*, p. 241.

27 Jean Hyppolite, 'Note sur la Préface de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit', in *Figures de la pensée philosophique*, vol. I, p. 337.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 336.

29 See the first chapter of *Logic and Existence*, trans. by Leonard Lawlor & Amit Sen, (Albany: SUNY Press 1997), pp. 57-9.

Accordingly, in the problematic relation between logic and existence (a relation posed in and by language), existence must be sacrificed. In order to understand the *Logic*, the very idea of the subject and of man must be 'reduced', 'placed in parentheses',³⁰ for only on this condition will it be possible to 'return to the things themselves'.³¹ Hyppolite will reinvoké such an epoché on several occasions, most notably at a colloquium on Husserl in 1957 where he will formulate the hypothesis of a 'transcendental field without subject'.³² On 18th January 1969 Georges Canguilhem would come to say that one of Jean Hyppolite's merits was to have made French philosophy lose 'consciousness of what it had hitherto regarded as Consciousness'.³³

Logic and Existence thus puts to an end all humanist readings of Hegel. The book constitutes a veritable rupture.³⁴ Nonetheless, as Foucault will underline in his 1969 homage, Hyppolite's book ends upon an aporia, or rather a problem that Hyppolite did not succeed in resolving and which his students thus inherit. The necessary historicity of absolute

30 'Speculative philosophy will be a reduction of the human condition. The *Logic's* dialectical discourse will be the very discourse of Being, the *Phenomenology* having shown the possibility of bracketing man as natural Dasein' (Jean Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence*, p. 42 – translation slightly modified). 'Hegel does not want to do without experience but to reduce (in the modern sense of the term) anthropology'. (Ibid., p. 166).

31 Jean Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence*, p. 2.

32 In *Husserl et la pensée moderne*, ed. By Herman Leo Van Breda (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 319. This idea will be picked up by Derrida in regard to writing in his *Edmund Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry': An Introduction* (trans by J.P. Leavey (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989)), and by Victor Goldschmidt in order to characterize the first chapter of *Matter and Memory* (Victor Goldschmidt, 'Introduction', in *Les Annales bergsoniennes I*, ed. By Frédéric Worms (Paris: PUF, 2002), pp. 73-128).

33 Georges Canguilhem, 'Hommage à Jean Hyppolite (1907-1968)', *Revue de la métaphysique et de la morale*, 84, no. 4 (1969), pp. 548-550.

34 In his study of the reception of Hegelianism in France, Michael S. Roth accurately argues that Hyppolite 'borrowed heavily from Heidegger, who provided the language that made a retreat from historicism legitimate [...] Hyppolite's 1952 [*sic*] essay on the Logic makes clear the link between the concern with the System of Hegel and the abandonment of the radical humanism of the 1940s. Heidegger's understanding of the role of philosophy vis-a-vis the human, of the person as vehicle of Being and not as subject, provided the bridge over which this retreat could be made'. (*Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 69).

knowledge poses, as Hyppolite himself recognised, 'new, possibly insoluble, problems'.³⁵ In effect, if logos and its self-determining dialectical movement are eternal and history can always be conceived as a self-negation of this eternity, no negation internal to history allows itself to be tied to this eternal movement. History is thus the scene of a passage, but a passage which is not in itself a historical fact. It is only in resorting to a transcendent logos situated 'beyond' history that we may confer a meaning and a direction upon history. Thus the Hegelian teleology always risks falling back into anthropologism. This problem, which is none other than that of the differential relation of genesis and ideality, history and logic, becoming and origin, becomes the crucial problem of the transition of the 1950s. The majority of Hyppolite's students will come to resolve it by reducing history to a series of discontinuities deprived of sense and in the search for a new concept of difference without the negative and without the possibility of reconciliation.

With this 'Heideggerean' reading of Hegel's *Logic*, Hyppolite's approach to history and to the history of 'philosophical thought' is significantly altered. No longer sustained by a dialectical movement which would risk dragging philosophy back into anthropology, historical development will henceforth be presented only as a repetitive movement by which being reveals itself through man; similarly, the history of philosophy will henceforth be conceived only as the place [*lieu*] where being expresses itself through philosophers. Hyppolite will even come to say that man only exists insofar as he is a philosopher³⁶ and, as such, 'revealer' of the meaning of being.

Mental Pathology and Fundamental Problematics

In 1952, after having obtained a diplôme in psychology and an agrégation in philosophy, Foucault was asked to deliver a course in psychology at the Université de Lille and the École Normale, thanks to

³⁵ Jean Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence*, p. 29.

³⁶ 'History does not produce the Logos, the self-knowledge of the Absolute, as we produce an effect according to a plan conceived in advance. Philosophy is not a conscious end, but man exists because he is a philosopher'. Jean Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence*, p. 246. See also Michael S. Roth's commentary in *Knowing and History*, op cit., p. 77.

the support of Jules Vuillemin and Louis Althusser. Since 1948, the future author of *For Marx* had been 'caïman'³⁷ and promoter of the 'Georges Politzer' circle, whose objective was to bring together 'normaliens' with cadres and intellectuals of the Communist Party.³⁸ From the end of the 1940s the party's ideological line had been going through a period of hardening, involving the condemnation of existentialism and of psychoanalysis, Lysenkoism, generalised Zhdanovism, etc. Pronounced attacks against non-Marxist intellectuals all aimed at denouncing the alienating, mystificatory and so 'anti-human' character of bourgeois ideology, and so at opposing to the latter the only 'humanist' philosophy possible – dialectical materialism. Foucault took leave of the Party in 1951, but he long remained a sympathiser, becoming a 'Nietzschean communist.' His position was irenic: he took notes on Heidegger on the backs of communist student pamphlets and read Pavlov and Husserl, as well as Marx and the existentialist psychopathologists. In 1953-1954, more or less at the same time, he composed two texts: *Maladie mentale et personnalité*, commissioned by Althusser, and a 'Preface', solicited by Jacqueline Verdeaux, to Ludwig Binswanger's *Dream and Existence*, a copy of which he sent to Jean Hyppolite. This copy bears a dedication which clearly depicts Foucault's conception of the hierarchical relation between psychology and philosophy: 'To Monsieur Hyppolite', he writes, 'these pages, however psychological, serve as the pretext for philosophy – in homage, and as a symbol of gratitude'.³⁹

During this period Foucault pursued his apprenticeship in psychology at Sainte-Anne hospital. Meanwhile, Hyppolite participated for a whole year in Dr Jacques Lacan's seminars (not yet known as 'Lacan'⁴⁰) which took place at the same hospital, while also attending Dr

37 A traditional nickname for tutors who assist normaliens in preparing for the agrégation examination, it refers to a crocodile from the Cayman Islands – trans.

38 See Jean-François Sirinelli, 'Les normaliens de la rue D'Ulm après 1945: une génération communiste?', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 32, (Oct-Dec 1986), see also Jean-Pierre Mochon's mémoire de DEA, 'Les Élèves de L'École normale supérieure de la rue d'Ulm et la politique, 1944-1962', *Université de Lille 3*, 1996.

39 Hyppolite's copy, held in the library of the École Normale, S Phi g 3287 L B 8. On this point see the illuminating pages that Jose-Luis Moreno Pestaña has devoted to the hierarchisation of possibilities in Foucault's work in his *En devenant Foucault*, op cit., (notably p. 64).

40 Foucault does not seem to know nor specially appreciate Lacan during the 1950s. In *Maladie Mentale et Personnalité*, (Paris: PUF, 1953), p. 123, Foucault

Henri Baruk's consultations at the Charenton asylum.⁴¹ In addition to the 'Commentary on Freud's Verneinung'⁴² the new director of the École Normale gave two lectures directly related to Foucault's interests: 'Psychanalyse et philosophie'⁴³ and 'Pathologie mentale et organisation'.⁴⁴

In 'Psychanalyse et philosophie' Hyppolite begins by situating existentialism in relation to psychoanalysis; he thus highlights the interest of the psychoanalytic explication of 'concrete man' given by Sartre and Binswanger. But immediately following this 'humanist' opening, Hyppolite invites us to 'go further', to go beyond anthropology which is 'always unsatisfactory'.⁴⁵ In his view, the crucial question is no longer the Kantian 'what is man?' but the Heideggerean 'what is being?' While the psychoanalytic and Heideggerean⁴⁶ approaches share points in common, the differences exceed the similarities: 'psychoanalysis is

disqualifies psychoanalysis for its conversion of the simple social givens of a determinate moment of history, into the founding norms of human subjectivity.

41 A neuropsychiatrist, Henri Baruk (1897-1999) was professor at the Sorbonne and, from 1932, medical director of the Maison de Charenton. Baruk adopted a moral and philosophical approach to mental illness, and was concerned with the wholeness of the person (see for example, 'Le problème de la personnalité: ses aspects psychophysiologiques, psychopathologiques, moraux et sociaux', *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger*, 146, 2 (1956), pp. 441-493. He cites *Logic and Existence* in his *Traité de psychiatrie: sémiologie, psychopathologie, thérapeutique, étiologie* (Paris: Masson, 1959). The relation between Hyppolite and Baruk is brought to light by Didier Éribon in his biography (*Michel Foucault*, op cit., p.71).

42 Jean Hyppolite, 'Commentaire parlé sur la Verneinung de Freud', in *Figures de la pensée philosophique*, vol.I, pp. 385-396.

43 Jean Hyppolite, 'Psychanalyse et philosophie', *Ibid.*, pp. 373-84.

44 Jean Hyppolite, 'Pathologie mentale et organisation', *Ibid.*, vol.II, pp. 885-90.

45 Jean Hyppolite, 'Psychanalyse et philosophie', *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 383.

46 At numerous points in Hyppolite's oeuvre the analogy between existentialism and psychoanalysis is drawn; not only in two other texts on Freud (besides 'Philosophie et psychoanalyse' and his 'Commentaire parlé sur la Verneinung de Freud', 'L'existence humaine et la psychoanalyse', in *Figures de la pensée philosophique*, Vol.I, p. 397-405, and 'Philosophie et psychoanalyse', *Ibid.*, pp. 406-42), but also in other essays. In the 1954 conference paper 'Ontologie et phénoménologie chez Martin Heidegger', (*ibid.*, vol.II, pp. 615-24), the problematisation of the anthropological apparatus underlying psychoanalysis is the same: 'There is in Heidegger an approach as concrete and as historical as that of Freud in his psychoanalysis [...], but while in Freud the question is empirical and anthropological, concerned with this or that being – and not the being of beings – Heidegger's analytic is oriented by the horizon opened by being'.

bogged down by an anthropological foundation' while 'the originality of Heidegger' lies precisely in his attempt to exceed anthropology. Heidegger's important gesture is 'to have defined Dasein [...] by [...] the question of being [...], and to have defined man [...] by the question of metaphysics itself, to have carried out the exegesis of this metaphysics in its history, in its origins, in its meaning, in its phenomena of repetition'.⁴⁷

There is an analogous movement to the argument in 'Pathologie mentale et organisation'. Setting out from his experience as a philosopher at the Charenton asylum, the experience had convinced him, he says, that 'the study of madness – alienation in the profound sense of the term – lies at the centre of anthropology'.⁴⁸ Visiting this asylum, this place which is 'the refuge of those who can no longer [...] live in our inter-human milieu',⁴⁹ allows the philosopher to analyse the separation between the mad and the 'normal'⁵⁰ and, through the latter, to illustrate the question of 'mental alienation' which arises for 'the man said to be normal'.⁵¹ Hyppolite concludes that mental alienation is not simply the result of a failure in the relation of man to his milieu; it proceeds as well from a failure in the relation of Dasein to being. The problem is thus situated 'between anthropology and ontology':⁵² the flight from the inauthenticity of quotidian life in which madness consists is not only the loss of 'an equilibrium which could be technically defined',⁵³ it is also – as Heidegger teaches us in 'The Essence of Truth'⁵⁴, though he is not named here – 'errancy itself'. Madness thus poses, 'the question of human essence in all its profundity and of [...] our relation to being'; it 'places us at the heart of human errancy between the flight from a world that is [...] too human [...] inauthentic, and an authenticity which, in its ontological meaning, poses the problematic of being itself'.⁵⁵ The only philosopher to have understood this problem, Hyppolite concludes, is Nietzsche, but he 'only grasped it by risking losing himself in it'.⁵⁶

47 Jean Hyppolite, 'Psychoanalyse et philosophie', *ibid.*, vol.I, p. 384.

48 *Ibid.*, p. 384.

49 Jean Hyppolite, 'Pathologie mentale et organisation', *ibid.*, vol.II, pp. 885-6.

50 *Ibid.*, p. 886.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 889.

52 *Ibid.*

53 *Ibid.*, p. 890.

54 See section 7 of this essay entitled 'Untruth as Errancy'.

55 Jean Hyppolite, 'Pathologie Mentale et Organisation', p. 889.

56 *Ibid.*, p. 890.

Anthropology and Ontology

The two articles to which I have referred – the 'existentialist' text 'Introduction to Dream and Existence' and the 'Marxist' text *Maladie mentale et personnalité* – appear to be responses to Foucault's first works. Or rather, they seem to allow the putting back into question, in light of Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology', the 'humanist' paradigm shared by the majority of philosophical orientations in fashion in the immediate post-war period – notably Marxism and existentialist phenomenology.

In his preface to Binswanger's book, Foucault announces his wish to 'situate existential analysis within the [more general] development of contemporary reflection upon man' and 'to show, by observing the inflection of phenomenology toward anthropology, what grounds have been proposed for concrete reflection on man'.⁵⁷ This project is unclear: it seems to belong to a transitional phase in Foucault's thought, a phase that is no doubt aporetic. In his preface to Binswanger's work, Foucault himself writes that 'the dividing line' between Dasein and Menschsein, between 'ontology and anthropology', appears 'difficult to trace'; he avows that the 'ontological conditions of existence create problems', declaring in a prophetic tone the intention to put them aside for 'another time in which to approach them'.⁵⁸

Maladie mentale et personnalité is a work very much marked by a version of Marxism conforming to the humanism of the French

⁵⁷ Michel Foucault, 'Introduction', trans. by Forest Williams in *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, 19, 1 (1984-1985), p.31. Anthropology is defined thus (pp. 31-2): 'It is an undertaking which opposes anthropology to any type of psychological positivism claiming to exhaust the significant content of man by the reductive concept of homo natura. It relocates anthropology within the context of an ontological reflection whose major theme is presence-to-being, existence (Existenz), Dasein [...] The theme of inquiry is the human 'fact,' if one understands by 'fact,' not some objective sector of a natural universe, but the real content of an existence which is living itself and is experiencing itself, which recognizes itself or loses itself, in a world that is at once the plenitude of its project and the element of its situation. Anthropology may thus call itself a 'science of facts' by developing in rigorous fashion the existential content of presence-to-the-world. To reject such an inquiry at first glance because it is neither philosophy nor psychology, because one cannot define it as either science or speculation, because it neither looks like positive knowledge nor provides the content of a priori cognition, is to ignore the basic meaning of the project'.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 32-3.

Communist Party – even if this version is enriched by the contribution of the 'existentialist' psychoanalysts. The objective of this book is to confront the representation of mental illness belonging to scientific knowledge with 'a reflection on man himself', and with 'the relation, historically situated, of man to the man who is mad and the man who is true'.⁵⁹ The book thus aims to frame the problem of mental illness through anthropology. In the final two chapters, in which Foucault deals with madness, we again find the terms or the conceptual apparatus that Hyppolite will problematise in his lectures. In the penultimate chapter entitled 'Illness and Existence,' mental illness is said to correspond to an 'abandonment to the inauthenticity of the world';⁶⁰ in the final chapter ('The Psychology of Conflict'), it is conceived as the 'non-dialecticised' result of a 'contradiction between the individual and his milieu'. Mental illness is thus subject to 'two types of conditions: social and historical conditions, which ground psychological conflicts within the real contradictions of the milieu; and the psychological conditions that transform the conflictual content of experience into the conflictual form of the reaction'.⁶¹ Man's mental drift comes from his incapacity to resolve the conflict which he maintains with his milieu: man is alienated because he 'cannot recognise himself as man in the conditions of existence which man himself has constituted';⁶² these conditions are evidently historical and, as a consequence, susceptible to change. 'Real psychology' is thus that which seeks to 'dis-alienate' man,⁶³ taking into account these two psychological and historical dimensions of madness.

This model of psychology is taken up by Georges Politzer (an author dear to Merleau-Ponty, whose courses in psychology Foucault

59 Michel Foucault, *Maladie mentale et personnalité*, (Paris: PUF, 1954), p. 2.

60 Ibid., p. 69.

61 Ibid., p. 92.

62 Ibid., p. 102.

63 On this point Foucault writes: 'To wish to detach the ill individual from his conditions of existence and wanting to separate illness from its conditions of appearance is to enclose oneself in the same abstraction; it is to make psychological theory complicit with the social practice of internment: it is to wish to keep the ill individual in his alienated existence. True psychology must free itself from these abstractions which obscure the truth of illness and alienate the reality of the ill; for when it is a question of man, the abstraction is not simply an intellectual error; the true psychology must rid itself of this psychologism, if it is true that, like all the human sciences, it must have de-alienation as its aim.' (Ibid., p. 110)

attended at the Sorbonne and the Collège de France), but especially by many Marxists. Didier Éribon reports that between the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, Foucault 'made much of a book that left an impression on this whole generation: Georges Politzer's *Critique des fondements de la psychologie* – published in 1928 but out of print. The students had only one copy and passed it around fervently'.⁶⁴ *Maladie mentale et personnalité* – a book that regurgitates Politzerian terms such as 'drama,' 'dramatic' or 'concrete man' – does not stray from the Communist Party dogma established several years beforehand by Jean Kanapa in the 'Preface' he had written for a collection of Politzer's texts on psychology.⁶⁵

However, this Marxian interpretation of madness (conceived as an alienation resulting from a series of irresolvable social contradictions) is completely abandoned in the second version of the book dating from 1962 – *Mental Illness and Psychology* – and in 'Folie et Dérailson' (the thesis that Foucault writes in Sweden during the second half of the 1950s and which he defends in 1961). The humanist and 'Politzerian' Marx is in effect displaced in these two works by a 'Heideggerean' Nietzsche. Foucault summarises the evolution of his intellectual trajectory in a famous interview in the 1970s: he explains there how, after having studied Hegel, he moved from Marx to Heidegger, and then discovered Nietzsche, specifying that he could not have discovered the latter without the interpretation given by Heidegger.⁶⁶

Mental Illness and Psychology substitutes the study of the 'real [social] conditions of madness' for reflection on 'psychopathology as a

64 Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, pp. 30-1.

65 Georges Politzer, *La crise de la psychologie contemporaine*, (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1947).

66 Interview with Gilles Barbadette and André Scala, 'The Return of Morality', in *Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984*, ed by Lawrence D. Kritzman, (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 242-254. 'For me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher. I began by reading Hegel [i.e., Hyppolite's translation and commentary], then Marx [i.e., the Marx of the PCF and Althusser's 'Politzer Circle'] and I set out to read Heidegger in 1951 or 1952 [thanks to Hyppolite and Vuillemin]; then in 1952 or 1953 – I don't remember anymore – I read Nietzsche [...]. My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger. I nevertheless recognize that Nietzsche outweighed him, [...] I had tried to read Nietzsche in the fifties but Nietzsche alone did not appeal to me – whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger: that was a philosophical shock!'

fact of civilization'. Chapter V of this work no longer questions 'the historical meaning of alienation' but 'the historical constitution of mental illness'. Chapter VI, for its part, abandons 'the psychology of conflict' for an understanding of madness as an 'overall structure'. As Pierre Macherey accurately put it, the Marxian myth of an unalienated human essence is replaced by the 'representation of a definitive relation of man to himself, which precedes all his historical experiences and relativises them in measuring them by his own fundamental truth'.⁶⁷ In these two works dating from 1961 and 1962 Foucault thus moves from an anthropological question concerning mental illness to an ontological question concerning madness. And Macherey concludes that in the conclusion of *Mental Illness and Psychology* there takes shape 'an interpretation of history as a process of concealment of truth, whose inspiration is indisputably Heideggerean: if there is no psychological truth of madness – *homo psychologicus* being only a late invention of our culture – it is because madness itself, in its essential and timeless truth, rends history with its lightning flashes'.⁶⁸ One of these lightning flashes, as Hyppolite had already indicated, is Nietzsche, who appears alongside Bataille, Artaud, Van Gogh, and Strindberg in the final chapter of *The History of Madness* entitled 'The Anthropological Circle'. There, Foucault underlines 'the coherence of an anthropological thought that ran permanently underneath the diversity of scientific formulations'⁶⁹ which accompany the analysis of the phenomena of mental illness.

More broadly, in *The History of Madness* history ceases to be presented as it was in *Maladie mentale et personnalité*, as a process of resolving contradictions and notably, of the contradiction which produces mental alienation. On the contrary, the history of madness is but the repetition of the same gesture of exclusion of madness from the space of the logos which is language, history, culture, humanity. As Foucault clearly spells it out in the 'Preface' to *The History of Madness*, insofar as madness is a 'dull sound' and a 'murmur' 'without any speaking subject and without an interlocutor' and thus an unnameable and 'unhuman' [*inhumain*] phenomenon, it constitutes the 'condition of possibility' or

67 Pierre Macherey, 'At the Sources of Histoire de la folie: A Rectification of its Limits', in *In a Materialist Way*, trans. by Ted Stolze, ed. by Warren Montag, (London: Verso, 1998), p. 90.

68 Ibid., p. 95 Translation altered – Trans.

69 Michel Foucault, *The History of Madness*, trans. by Jonathan Murphy & Jean Khalfa, (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 522.

'transcendental' which is not historical, but rather 'historial' – of human history conceived as the plenitude of meaning.⁷⁰ The division between reason and unreason, a historial structure which conceals the 'truth of madness', recalls the Heideggerean idea of history as the forgetting of being, and its reduction to beings. As with Heideggerean being, we cannot speak of madness without effacing and dismissing it, even though both constitute a quasi-transcendental condition of human language. This interpretation also constitutes a sort of perversion of the Hegelian logic described by Hyppolite in *Logic and Existence*. In the homage that he gives to his teacher, Foucault appears to use Heideggerean expressions; this is the case when he says that Hyppolite's voice was that of 'philosophy itself', that a 'philosophical discourse acquires determination, tears itself from its silence', or again, when he concludes that for Hyppolite, 'philosophy is never actualised or present in any discourse or any text', because 'philosophy does not exist' but rather 'hollows out all philosophies by its perpetual absence' by inscribing 'in them the lack with which they are ceaselessly developed, pushed forward, then disappear and are succeeded, and remain for the historian in the state of suspension in which he must take them up again'.⁷¹

This mutation in Foucault's thought is confirmed by a letter addressed to Hyppolite from Uppsala in November 1956. Foucault confides to him that in Sweden there is 'much talk [...] of M. Hyppolite, of the École and of the death of God'. He ends his missive with the hope 'that M. Hippolyte [*sic*] might return' to Sweden.⁷² On the invitation of his former student, Hyppolite did deliver a series of lectures. In the lecture 'Histoire et existence'⁷³ delivered at Uppsala, Hyppolite had

70 Ibid., p. xxxi-xxxii: 'The plenitude of history is only possible in the space, both empty and peopled at the same time, of all the words without language that appear to anyone who lends an ear, as a dull sound from beneath history, the obstinate murmur of a language talking to itself – without any speaking subject and without an interlocutor, wrapped up in itself, with a lump in its throat, collapsing before it ever reaches any formulation and returning without a fuss to the silence that it never shook off. The charred root of meaning. That is not yet madness, but the first caesura from which the division of madness became possible'.

71 Michel Foucault, 'Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968', In *Dits et écrits*, vol.1. pp. 783, 780, 782.

72 Michel Foucault, undated letter, Jean Hyppolite archives at the library of the École Normale Supérieure.

73 Jean Hyppolite, 'Histoire et existence', in *Figures de la pensée philosophique*, vol. II, p. 975-986. Hyppolite had also given a lecture on 'Hegel et Kierkegaard dans la

retraced the adventures of French reflection upon history since existentialism. The concept of existence, of Dasein or 'being-there' – he had stressed – refers to the concept of 'situation' and even to that of 'historical situation,' while the problem of the sense of the historical situation refers in turn to the problem of the general sense of history. The lecture ends with two observations. The first concerns the difference between the positions taken by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in relation to communism, a difference which was at the root of their break. The second sought to 'open an other problem':⁷⁴ to relate French existential philosophy to the new aspects of Heideggerian philosophy. Thus, Hyppolite sought to distance himself from his two colleagues: all existentialists remain humanists insofar as they conceive history as the history of men and not of being. Only Heidegger comes to 'enlarge [...] the problem' in taking into consideration a temporality which is no longer properly historical, because men are dismissed from their roles as actors. This 'history' is nothing other than the 'unveiling of being which operates through them in a certain temporality [...]. The liberty of man will – Hyppolite concludes – be less his own adventure than the adventure of being through him'.⁷⁵ As a consequence, the anthropological questioning of man by man must be subordinated to a more fundamental questioning of being by man. This latter questioning must in the last instance be understood as the discourse of being itself, a discourse of being creating itself in history, not thanks to man, but despite him.

The Verbose Dialectic

This epistemological recasting also affects the concept of alienation which Foucault had used abundantly until 1954. The use of this concept, central to Hegel and Marx, is grounded upon the following postulate: there exists a human identity or essence that can serve as a standard against which the degree of man's dispossession or alienation can be judged. Moreover, this concept constitutes the core of a philosophy of history which, in containing an ahistorical residue in the concept of man, remains anthropocentric.

pensée française contemporaine', *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 196-208.

74 Jean Hyppolite, 'Histoire et existence', *Ibid.*, p. 986.

75 *Ibid.*

This category is forcefully dismissed in *The History of Madness*, notably in the chapter entitled 'The Anthropological Circle' in which, in a coup de théâtre, Nietzsche appears. Foucault produces a genealogy of the anthropological apparatus which has structured the knowledge of man – including psychiatry and psychology – since the 18th century. This apparatus hangs upon a notion of alienation which Foucault does not hesitate to characterise as 'mythological'. This notion of alienation both involves and produces truly alienating practices: to put it more accurately, it is these practices as well as the institutions which deploy them that allow the mythological concept of alienation to be constituted. It is thus the series 'institutional asylum space – a priori of medical perception – truth of the human being', a series which Foucault describes in a very discerning way, which makes possible the formation of this concept of alienation which constitutes a fundamental element of the anthropological apparatus. Nonetheless, as emphasised in a recent essay whose salient points we will take up here,⁷⁶ Foucault's history of the emergence of the concept of alienation borrows Hegelian figures in a surprising manner. In particular, it is guided by the developments of the unhappy consciousness found in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and by Hyppolite's interpretation of the latter in his famous *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. The unhappy consciousness is a double consciousness because it interiorises the opposition between master and slave. It is the split, or rather the hesitation, between purely contingent determination and immutable certainty of self. In the final stage of the unhappy consciousness, the singular consciousness wants to alienate its particular will in order to be nothing but the universal will which it locates in God. This alienation, which is concretised in an impossible and guilty ascetic will, remains deprived of all means of dialectical overcoming, and so consciousness does not cease to humiliate itself in registering its exile within being – the impossibility of escaping its singularity.

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* this figure of the unhappy consciousness is surpassed by that of reason, which is universal self-consciousness, identical to being itself, the first figure of spirit prior to its objectification in history. These are the two figures used by Hyppolite in

⁷⁶ Emmanuel Gipay, 'Les deux genèses du dispositif anthropologique: Foucault lecteur de Hegel et de Kant', *Lumières*, 16, 'Foucault lecteur de Kant: le champ anthropologique' (2011).

Genesis and Structure (more precisely, in his concluding remarks), to bring judgment upon French philosophers as a whole:

[They] generally prefer [...]the 'unhappy consciousness' to [...] 'spirit'. They take up Hegel's description of self-certainty which fails to be in-itself but which, nonetheless, exists only through its transcendence toward that in-itself; but they abandon Hegel when, according to him, specific self-consciousness – subjectivity – becomes universal self-consciousness – thingness – a movement through which being is posed as subject and subject is posed as being.⁷⁷

For Hyppolite, French philosophy had found itself entangled in a repetition of the dialectic without overcoming the unhappy consciousness. For Foucault (who had no doubt read and re-read *Genesis and Structure* during his DES⁷⁸), the anthropological apparatus animated by the 'verbose movement of alienation'⁷⁹ or by the 'verbose engagements of the dialectic',⁸⁰ is to be returned to the perspective of an incomplete dialectic, turning in circles, 'becoming involved in the game of incessant resumptions, adjustments between the subject and the object, between the inside and the outside, between lived experience and knowledge'.⁸¹ Foucault thus takes up the figure of the unhappy consciousness, but instead of limiting its scope, as Hegel does, to the moment of the birth of the Church in the middle ages, or to use it, as Hyppolite does, in order to read French thought of the 1930s and 1940s, he makes it the figure of all modernity – a modernity read through the history of madness. As Emmanuel Gipay has shown, this figure guides Foucault's analysis of the birth of psychiatry [*aliénisme*]. In this analysis we find the salient points of the Hegelian description of the unhappy consciousness: a

77 Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by Samuel Cherniak & John Heckman, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 204-5.

78 The same Hyppolite who emphasised the importance of the *Phenomenology* since the liberation: 'After 1946, the *Phenomenology* – along with Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* and Merleau-Ponty's *The Phenomenology of Perception* – becomes the fundamental book that is referred to in all French philosophical milieus'. (Jean Hyppolite, 'La Phénoménologie de Hegel et la pensée française contemporaine', in *Figures de la pensée philosophique*, vol.I, p. 235.

79 Michel Foucault, *The History of Madness*, p. 528.

80 Michel Foucault, *The History of Madness*, p. 530 – translation altered.

81 Ibid. – translation altered.

consciousness which alienates its will to that of another, which faces the guilt of not managing to do so completely, and which becomes an object for itself. Finally, let us briefly take up these three points.

First of all, Foucault stresses that the doctor, far more than being just a depository of knowledge, is for the madman a moral guarantor. He is the representative of the values which will assist the patient to realise his human essence or his truth. The patient or 'the alienated', is certainly not deprived of his human truth which remains inalienable. But madness is nonetheless conceived as an accident related to the perversions of the social world – accidents which ought to spontaneously disappear once the patient is deprived of all possibility of satisfying his perversions, as in the case of his internment. Thus, the will of the madman is alienated before the general will of all that the doctor and his moral order incarnate.

Next, Foucault shows how practices introduced by Tuke and Pinel – 'tea parties,' the imposition of silence or of delirium – aim to make the patient perceive himself as an object through the gaze that he casts on the other patients or the gaze that other patients cast on him when they judge him on the basis of the moral values mobilized by the doctor. Through the gaze of the other, the subjectivity of the patient is divided: on the one hand there are the values of the doctor or the general will, on the other, the singularity of the patient or his own will. The figure of thought which accompanies the birth of psychiatry [*l'aliénisme*] is thus the unhappy consciousness wherein the subject, which understands itself as a determinate 'I', is incapable of moral universality.

But given this figure of the unhappy consciousness characterising modernity, it remains impossible, according to Foucault, to conceive an overcoming such as the one defended by Hegel: the Hegelian overcoming, insofar as it is dialectical, can only bring us back to the figure of the unhappy consciousness; the overcoming of the unhappy consciousness by the 'verbose dialectic' can only lead us to another divided consciousness. This overcoming without veritable overcoming to which Foucault refers corresponds to nothing less than the disappearance of the anthropological apparatus itself, to the erasure of the figure of man, to the death of 'normal' man and to the end of all 'verbose'

dialectics. This is announced, in a tone both prophetic and very Heideggerean, yet no less explicit and black and white, in the final chapter of *The Order of Things*⁸² entitled 'The Anthropological Circle'.

⁸²The guiding thread that links *The Order of Things* (1966) and the secondary thesis on Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology (1961) lies in the course entitled 'Problems of Anthropology' which Foucault gave at the École Normale in 1954-1955, while he was tasked with the course in psychology (Michel Foucault, 'Problèmes de l'anthropologie', transcribed by Jacques Lagrange from his own notes; 68 pages, Michel Foucault archives, Imec, Caen, C. 2.1 /FCL 2. A03-08). This course takes into consideration the 'theories of man' of the past fifty years (Husserl, Scheler, Binswanger, Jaspers, Keyler, Storms and Strauss are all cited), in which, according to Foucault, man ceases to 'be an object, to be nature, and begins to be history'. (p. 4). According to Foucault, this type of questioning on man had already been engaged with by Kant who – as Heidegger had emphasized in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (translated into French at the end of 1953) – had, in his course on logic, grounded the three first critical questions in the fourth: 'what is man?' According to Foucault, this question does not signify 'what is the truth of the being of man?' but rather, as Heidegger suggests, 'how can human beings live in the truth?' (p. 24). If, according to Foucault, Kant's importance lies in his having placed the anthropological question within the framework of a critical problematic, the German philosopher does not define man's 'concrete essence' and is content to delineate it from his natural characteristics (p. 47). This failure will be repeated in all the other anthropological attempts up to Feuerbach. Only evolutionism and notably, the recovery of this theory by Nietzsche and by Freud would come to extract the question of man from anthropology: just as Kant had substituted the critique of knowledge for the 'classical critique of error,' evolutionist anthropology 'would substitute the study of conditions for the investigation of the truth of man' (p. 47).