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Discourse and the Contemporary Chinese Media
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Strategic Narratives across the Strait: A Comparative Analysis of the English, Italian, and Arabic Versions of *The Governance of China* (I)*

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ABSTRACT

The *status quo* in Cross-Strait relations is a delicate thread carefully constructed through language, resulting in strategic semantic ambiguity. This research examines translation's role in reframing 'strategic narratives' on the Taiwan issue for different target audiences, using the English, Italian, and Arabic versions of *The Governance of China* (I) as a case study. The English version uses inclusive language and softens claims for a broad readership. Catering to specific cultural sensibilities, the Italian translation amplifies emotional rhetoric, while the Arabic edition adapts kinship and moral metaphors for greater resonance. Across all versions, rhetorical devices such as family metaphors, historical references, and economic portrayals build a perception of inevitability regarding the PRC's position on Taiwan. This situates translation as a site of ideological negotiation, reframing narratives to persuade readers of China's legitimate claim.

Keywords: Arabic; Cross-Strait relations; discourse analysis; English; institutional translation; international audiences; Italian; political discourse; strategic narratives; Xi Jinping.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Since being appointed General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and President of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Xi Jinping has made enhancing China's 'discursive power' a key pillar in China's overall political agenda. Under the slogan 'tell China's story well', China's international communication approach has been broadened and reorganised. Scholars have examined the CCP's changing approach to communication, noting increased emotional leverage (Brown 2022) and new ways of disseminating official narratives through social media, i.e. digital propaganda (Chen 2022). The key role of strategic narratives (Lams 2018) in China's domestic and foreign policy is also widely recognised, as is the importance of political communication for China's soft power (Zappone 2016) and domestic governance under Xi (Gallelli forthcoming).

To make this story heard beyond China's borders, it must be translated. This research explores how China's official 'story' is framed and/or reframed through translation (Baker 2014), taking selected speeches from the first volume of *The Governance of China* (TGOC) as a case study. It thus operates at the intersection of discourse analysis and translation studies, critically analysing translation's role in reframing narratives. Specifically, it integrates an analysis of CCP-crafted "strategic narratives" (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle 2013) with an examination of translation's role in re-moulding these for foreign audiences. The analysis will focus on the translation into English, Italian and Arabic.

The publication of the first volume of TGOC marks a departure from previous political practice, as Xi Jinping is the first Chinese leader to have his speeches and writings collected in a volume soon after being appointed (Zappone 2018). Among the various topics covered in TGOC, the study focuses on the speeches addressing the "Taiwan issue", which is compelling because it is all about language: the so-called *status quo* in Cross-Strait relations is based on the "strategic semantic ambiguity", enabling the various actors (notably Beijing, Taipei, and Washington) to interpret the current status of Cross-Strait relations differently (Congiu and Onnis 2022; Pelaggi 2022a, 2022b; Pelaggi and Morandi 2025). For instance, the distinction between Beijing's 'One China principle' (*yi ge Zhongguo yuanze* 一个中国原则) and the 'One China policy' (*yi ge Zhongguo zhengce* 一个中国政策) upheld by Washington and other countries is not merely terminological: it reflects a delicate balance between *de facto* autonomy and *de jure* independence of Taiwan (Pugliese and Insisa 2025). The 'One China principle' implies that there exists only

one China and that Taiwan belongs to ‘China’², while the ‘One China policy’ supported by Washington makes no explicit claim about Taiwan’s sovereignty³.

Thus, “strategic semantic ambiguity” is first and foremost constructed through language: language has been the key tool for preserving the *status quo* and is a key factor that may change it. This makes the Taiwan issue a particularly interesting case study for analysing translation’s role in recrafting and adjusting China’s official narrative for different foreign audiences.

2. TRANSLATING STRATEGIC NARRATIVES: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND TRANSLATION

This study adopts a discourse analysis perspective to examine the translation strategies employed in the official English, Italian, and Arabic versions of TGO, exploring how translation “constructs” (Baker 2014, 159) the narratives on Taiwan for foreign audiences.

Translation studies have been fruitfully integrated with discourse analysis methodologies (Munday and Zhang 2017; Wang and Munday 2021), with a strong focus on political discourse in general (Schäffner 2004) and Chinese political discourse in particular (Li and Wang 2023; Valdeón and Li 2024). The school of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has been a fertile ground for synergies between the two fields. For example, Fairclough’s text-based discourse analysis has been adopted to analyse the discourse reproduced by the translation of Chinese political language (Wang and Xia 2011) and some aspects of Fairclough’s text-based analysis are also incorporated in this study. Li (2013) employs CDA methodology for a diachronic analysis of the translation strategies adopted by Chinese authorities from Deng Xiaoping’s era to Hu Jintao’s presidency, including the Taiwan issue.

The translation strategies adopted for TGO have attracted considerable attention⁴. Ma, Yuan, and Zeng (2024) propose a model for analysing and translating aphorisms and images, taking the four volumes of

² The KMT and the CCP disagree on the definition of which side represents the legitimate China.

³ There is no univocal definition of the ‘One China policy’, as various versions exist worldwide, making its meaning even more ambiguous (Goldstein 2023).

⁴ For a literature review, see Yuan, Ganapathy, and Moindjie 2024.

TGOC as case studies. Wang (2023) instead investigates the translation process beyond the final results, highlighting the varying translation perspectives of different stakeholders involved in the English version (translator-in-chief, foreign expert, and editors). Zappone (2018), one of the translators of the first two volumes, uncovers the political process behind the Italian version. Most studies, however, focus on only one foreign-language version of the volumes (usually English). Comparison among multiple languages is quite rare. Moreover, no studies have ever integrated the examination of “strategic narratives” in the analysis of translation strategies adopted for TGOC.

We propose integrating research on “strategic narratives” into the translation level to analyse how translation affects the ideological visions embedded in the source text and, therefore, alters the “representation” (Hall 2003) of social and political life proposed by the target text. Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2013) define “strategic narratives” as those stories that political actors craft “to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics” and thereby shape “the behaviour of domestic and international actors”. Therefore, while discourses are bodies of knowledge upon which the representation of social and political reality rests, narratives are crafted from these discourses to steer the audience towards a future goal. The scholars distinguish three types of narratives: first, “system narratives”, “about the nature of the structure of international affairs”, describing how the general situation is, what causes it to be so, and how it should be in the future; second, “identity narratives”, concerned with “the identities of actors in international affairs that are in a process of constant negotiation and contestation”, the construction of We-ness, its sense of belonging, and what or who this collective “We” excludes (Self-Other relationship); third, “issue narratives”, assigning meaning to specific events. Concerned with circumscribed events or specific aspects and the meaning attached to them, issue narratives are more narrowly focused than systemic narratives (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 3-11).

So far, the study of strategic narratives has been confined to the field of international relations. However, we propose to integrate it with the study of translation’s role in recrafting narratives. This approach helps us unpack the strategic narratives centred on the Taiwan issue and the translation strategies adopted to make them heard abroad. Since the words and language used to describe Cross-Strait relations result from a highly politically controlled process (Brady 2017), it is particularly interesting to examine how they are rendered in other languages.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1. *The case study: “The Governance of China” and its politics of translation*

Published in four volumes between 2014 and 2022 by Foreign Language Press (FLP), TGOE stands as the most authoritative collection of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, a concept officially introduced at the 19th National Congress of the CCP in October 2017. Concurrently released in both Chinese and English and to date available in 42 languages, TGOE was specifically designed for dissemination to a broad foreign readership, aiming at international publicity to amplify China’s voice (Zappone 2021, 283).

To achieve this goal, the English version of TGOE adopts a communicative translation strategy to address an international and diverse intended readership. The work was mainly the collective product of FLP in-house translators and foreign experts, whose identity is not specified in the book.

In contrast, the Arabic and Italian editions target a more specific and restricted audience. The Arabic edition of TGOE appeared in 2014, as part of the multilingual release of the first volume. Its translation team, not mentioned on the colophon, reportedly consisted of FLP in-house translators and Arab native speakers employed in China’s political communication sector or teaching Arabic at renowned Chinese universities. The Arabic translation appears to have prioritised accuracy, comprehensiveness, and ideological correctness.

With a similar approach, the Italian translation of the first volume was published in 2016. Unlike the English and Arabic versions of TGOE, it involved cooperation between FLP and the Italian publisher Giunti Editore S.p.A. The translation team consisted of three Italian native speakers from the academic community, whose names appear in the book’s colophon, coordinated by Giunti’s chief editor. FLP selected Chinese experts to review and approve the draft. However, this cooperation was imbalanced: the concerns of Chinese experts and reviewers on ideological correctness often limited the Italian team’s priority on efficient interlingual communication and readability (Zappone 2021, 292). These varying production dynamics and translation strategies across different languages become particularly critical when tackling sensitive topics.

This study compares the English and Arabic editions (major languages translated in-house) with the Italian edition (a minor language translated externally). This comparative approach serves to examine how the variables of major versus minor language, and in-house versus out-sourced translation – that interact with the related dynamics between Chinese and native translators – affect the representation and discursive positioning of Chinese political discourse in the target texts.

With this goal in mind, we selected all of Xi Jinping's speeches on the Taiwan issue included in the first volume of TGOC (Xi 2014a, 230-243; Xi 2014b, 252-267; Xi 2014c, 242-261; Xi [2016] 2019, 289-305), delivered between April 2013 and May 2014. Although the corpus is limited in terms of length, the speeches included in TGOC (I) are nonetheless sufficient for a synchronic analysis aimed at understanding whether and how the Taiwan issue is framed and reframed through translation in different languages. Further research is also needed to explore the diachronic evolution (if any) of the translation strategies adopted across the different languages.

3.2. *Why strategic narratives matter to the Taiwan issue*

As stated above, Cross-Strait relations are an area where strategic communication matters even more than in other fields. Relations across the Taiwan Strait operate through a delicate rhetorical interplay (Pelaggi 2022b), whose precarity is often revealed by escalating military crises.

As one of the most complex political scenarios of the post-WWII era, Taiwan's sovereignty has remained an unresolved issue from the very beginning (West and Insisa 2024, 189) due to the lack of a true peace treaty at the end of the civil war between the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT). Since 1949 and throughout the Cold War, both Beijing and Taipei waged propaganda campaigns to influence international public opinion, proposing two different interpretations of which side represents the "legitimate China" (Rawnsley 2000).

Later on, the Taiwan issue became even more complex as a critical number of states switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC, especially since 1971, when the PRC was seated at the United Nations and the Republic of China (ROC) was consequently expelled. Nowadays, only 12 countries have diplomatic relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC (n.d.). This has undoubtedly been a success for Beijing, which has always claimed its goal of 'unifying the motherland'. However, with the democratisation of Taiwan since the 1980s and the emergence

of a ‘Taiwanese identity’, the CCP faces more ideological challenges than before. In recent decades, both sides have shifted from raw propaganda activities characterising the Cold War to more target-oriented strategic narrative endeavours (Insisa 2021).

While scholars have analysed the core frames (Brady 2017) and strategic narratives on the Taiwan issue (Insisa 2021), the role of translation in recrafting these narratives for foreign audiences remains unexplored. This study addresses this gap by focusing on the CCP’s official narrative at the dawn of Xi Jinping’s new era. Specifically, it examines the translation strategies adopted for the first volume of TGOC, published in 2014 (Xi Jinping 2014a, 230-243). That year was crucial for Cross-Strait relations due to the outbreak of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement, which was specifically aimed at opposing the passage of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) – an economic agreement between the two sides of the Strait that would have led to closer ties between them – by the then-ruling KMT in the legislature without a clause-by-clause review. The Movement marked a turning point in Taiwan’s contemporary history, as it “established a domestic political climate particularly receptive to [the] narratives” promoted by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (Insisa 2021, 514). Chief among these narratives was a strong emphasis on a Taiwanese identity (juxtaposed with a Chinese identity) and democratic alignment (in opposition to Chinese authoritarianism).

3.3. Analytical method

We coded the texts by narrative type (i.e. systemic, identity and issue narratives) and analysed the various rhetorical and linguistic devices employed in each passage to support the given narrative. Drawing on CDA methodology (Fairclough 2015) and studies on Chinese political language features (Link 2013), we focused on communicative features such as keywords and their collocations, references to actors, metaphors, modals, as well as grammatical and syntactic structures. In the following steps, we turned to the English, Italian, and Arabic translations, examining whether they preserved or modified the original rhetorical devices. In this latter case, we investigated how effectively the translation choices altered or modified the narrative tenets.

Given the brevity of the selected texts, we conducted our analysis collaboratively using a shared Excel file, with each round reviewed by all authors to ensure coherence and reliability.

4. RESULTS

4.1. *Translating systemic narratives*

China's core systemic narrative frames the Taiwan issue as a domestic matter, positing that Taiwan has always been an integral part of China, and that any attempt at Taiwan independence constitutes a violation of China's sovereignty. This narrative is sustained by Beijing's premise that the contemporary PRC is the natural heir to 'Imperial China'. Even at the height of Maoist attack against Chinese tradition, the very idea that the territory of the dead-Qing Empire belonged to the newly established communist government was never dismissed.

The key systemic narrative on Taiwan and its language have evolved significantly since 1949. In the earliest years, China's authorities vowed to 'liberate' (*jiefang* 解放) Taiwan, "the last inch of soil that belongs to China" (Li 2013, 193). This harsh rhetoric was also motivated by the fact that, in theory, the Civil War was still ongoing, as no peace treaty had even been signed. It is worth noting that Chiang Kai-Shek also intended to reconquer the mainland sooner or later (Rawnsley 2000, 14). However, as early as the mid-1950s, Beijing prioritised diplomatic means and peaceful initiatives. The late 1970s marked a further strategic shift, introducing the 'one country, two systems' (*yi guo liang zhi* 一国两制) formula, later applied to Hong Kong and Macao (Li 2013, 193-194; Pelaggi and Morandi 2025): the island would have been allowed to maintain its socio-economic system provided it recognised the PRC as the only legitimate China in the world.

Jiang Zemin's presidency largely remained aligned with Deng's legacy, though rhetoric hardened in response to Taiwan's more assertive approach in defending its autonomy and promoting its international visibility (Pelaggi and Morandi 2025). Indeed, under Jiang, representatives from Beijing and Taipei "agreed to disagree" on the meaning of "one China", namely, PRC in Beijing and ROC in Taipei.

Under Hu Jintao, China's strategic narrative was enriched with the 'peaceful development of the Cross-Strait relations' (*liang'an guangxi heping fazhan* 两岸关系和平发展) formula, a much less rigid approach that appears "to recast the trajectory of Cross-Strait relations in more gradualist and ostensibly benign terms" (Pelaggi and Morandi 2025). This formulation reflected China's growing confidence that economic cooperation across the Strait was a viable means of political engagement, a belief

seemingly validated, as Cross-Strait relations did improve significantly in economic terms under Ma Ying-jeou's presidency (2008-2016)⁵.

Xi Jinping's rise prompted another shift in China's strategic narrative: while maintaining the key formulas developed by previous administrations, his 'Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' (*Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing de Zhongguomeng* 中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦) increasingly frames 'unification' (*tongyi* 统一) as essential for 'China's rejuvenation', this described as a goal to be realised by 2049. Thus, while Xi never refers to a specific timetable for the 'reunification' of Taiwan, he appears "careful *not* to make explicit what may seem implicit" (Bush 2019, 7).

The timeframe appears central to China's strategic narrative under Xi. In the analysed corpus (see *Appendix 1*), the Chinese source presents the overall timeframe 'with the eyes on the long term future' (*zhuoyan changyuan* 着眼长远), for a 'gradual resolution' (*zhubu jieju* 逐步解决) of 'political divergences', stressing that 'these problems absolutely cannot be passed down generation after generation' (*zong bu neng jiang zhe xie wenti yi dai yi dai chuan xiaqu* 总不能将这些问题一代一代传下去; Xi 2014a, 232). The English translation, instead, uses the more ambiguous expression "sooner or later", which leaves open the question of both timing and approach – a one-shot solution or a gradual process. This latter case was instead conveyed in the Italian ("per gradi", 'gradually') and Arabic versions (تدرجياً, 'gradually'), both framing the resolution in the long term ("in prospettiva", 'in the long term'; بالنظر إلى المستقبل البعيد, 'looking to the distant future'; Xi [2016] 2019, 291; Xi 2014c, 248). However, the Italian wording displays a sense of impatience on the issue 'dragging on indefinitely' ("non possiamo lasciare che si trascini all'infinito"), while the Arabic plural first-person negative future tense emphasises the PRC's assertive agency (لن نسمح ببقائها هكذا، جيلاً بعد جيل, 'we will not allow them to remain as such, generation after generation').

As Bērziņa-Čerenkova (2025, 6) noted, Beijing's strategic ambiguity in framing 're-unification' as the only and inevitable long-term option rather than assigning it a specific timeframe appeals to multiple audiences. It aims to weaken Taiwanese resistance, reassure regional powers and, domestically, promise an eventual triumph without demanding immediate action, thereby strengthening the CCP's rule and Xi's power by linking unification to national rejuvenation.

⁵ See section 4.3.

Looking at terminology, the explicit reference to ‘unification’ is expressed by *tongyi* 统一, consistently applied to Taiwan, as well as to the cases of Hong Kong and Macao. Within the examined corpus, this term appears three times: in the section 10 title (*tuijing zuguo tongyi* 推进祖国统一), though its reference is omitted in the English and Italian translations, and in the concessive formula *liang'an suiran shangwei tongyi* 两岸虽然尚未统一 repeated twice⁶. Where *tongyi* is translated, a key divergence emerges: by using the ‘re-’ prefix, the English (“to reunify”) and Italian (“riunificare”) translations explicitly (re)frame the event as a return to a prior unity, a nuance not inherent in the Chinese morphemes, but aligned with the PRC’s standard terminology in official English-language documents on Taiwan. As for the Arabic translation, while the explicit connotation of ‘reunification’ appears in the section 10 title (إعادة توحيد), in the other occurrences the simpler ‘unification’ (توحيد) is found. However, unlike the passive or stative English and Italian constructions (“Although the mainland and Taiwan are yet to be reunited”, Xi 2014b, 257; “Sebbene la Cina continentale e Taiwan non si siano ancora riunificate”, ‘Although the mainland and Taiwan have not yet reunified’; Xi [2016] 2019, 294), the Arabic dual verb conjugation of the achievement-oriented verb حَقَّق (‘to achieve’, ‘realise’) carries a proactive, agent-driven nuance that enhances the perception of two parties equally involved and responsible for political unification (البر الرئيسي وتايوان لم يحققا التوحيد بعد, ‘the mainland and Taiwan have not achieved unification yet’; Xi 2014c, 251). This frames unification as a mutual endeavour, rather than a top-down imposition, reinforcing the ‘one family’ (*yi jia ren* 一家人) metaphor (see *Appendix 2*).

4.2. Translating identity narratives

China’s official identity narratives on Taiwan primarily focus on Taiwan and Mainland China belonging to the ‘Chinese nation’, with their language reinforcing Taiwan’s historical and cultural ties to Mainland China while avoiding any representation of a distinct ‘Taiwanese

⁶ This formula always refers to Taiwan. Throughout TGOC, the term *tongyi* appears ninety-one times. Of the six occurrences referring to the ‘motherland’ (*zuguo* 祖国), four relate to the re-unification of Hong Kong and Macau; one to the need to protect the unity of the motherland against the risks of terrorism, and one to the major historical tasks of the Party today: ‘completing the unification of the motherland’ (*wancheng zuguo tongyi* 完成祖国统一).

identity'. The act of naming Taiwan follows a top-down, controlled process, with guidelines on word usage issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office (*Guowuyuan Taiwan shiwu bangongshi* 国务院台湾事务办公室)⁷, directing the PRC's government officials, media, and citizens to avoid wordings that might present Taiwan as an independent country (Brady 2017). Ironically, amid growing tensions between the two sides of the Strait in spring 2025, a Chinese journalist referred to China and Taiwan as two countries – a slip swiftly censored (Bandursky 2025).

In accordance with official guidelines, in the analysed corpus, the term 'Taiwan' (台湾) is used only after 'the mainland' (*dalu* 大陆) or as specification in 'Taiwan's side' (*Taiwan fangmian* 台湾方面), highlighting that it is a region of China. Translations are usually consistent with the Chinese texts, with their wordings contributing to framing Taiwan as a part of China⁸.

Beyond terminology, an entire set of linguistic and rhetorical devices emphasises Taiwan's affiliation with the "Chinese nation": family metaphors, idioms and quotations from Chinese literature and classics, as well as parallel syntactic structures. For these devices, translation strategies vary across languages. The English version maintains the family metaphors when central to the rhetoric and the argument (e.g., the "one family" principle), but neutralises repetitions and parallelisms, resulting in a less emphatic text compared to the Chinese.

Conversely, the Italian version attaches great importance to conveying the emphatic value of the text, occasionally even at the expense of readability. Some passages even sound alienating to an Italian reader (see *Appendix 3*): for instance, when Xi Jinping wishes happy New Year of the Horse, the cultural reference to the Chinese zodiac is lost in the English text ("I wish you all a happy New Year and every success!"; Xi 2014b, 257) but is maintained in the Italian ("Anche se in ritardo, vorrei augurare a tutti un felice anno del Cavallo: che ci faccia galoppare verso il successo!"; 'Though belated, I'd like to wish everyone a happy New Year of the Horse: may it make us gallop toward success!'; Xi [2016] 2019, 294).

⁷ The Taiwan Affairs Office, an agency under the State Council, coordinates with the CCP Central Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the PLA, and other relevant bodies to oversee China's Taiwan-related propaganda efforts and institutions (Brady 2017, 24).

⁸ The people of Taiwan are generally appended with people "in Taiwan", with the preposition "in" giving an account of geographical location rather than cultural affiliation. The only exception is the Italian translation of 来自台湾各界的朋友们 as 'Taiwanese friends' (Xi [2016] 2019, 297).

The Arabic version expands on such rhetoric. It enhances the family metaphor (*liang'an yi jia qin* 两岸一家亲) by incorporating an explicit reference to “kinship” ties absent in all the other editions (المواطنون على جانبي المضيق منحدرون من أسرة واحدة، وتجمعهم القرابة ‘The citizens on both sides of the strait descend from one family, and kinship unites them’; Xi 2014c, 254). This addition amplifies the narrative of Chinese national and cultural unity and may also be a cultural adaptation. The emphasis on kinship resonates with scholarship identifying the family as the “most powerful social idiom” throughout the Arab region, where national movements often “narrate the nation as a family to mobilise love for the nation” (Joseph 2018, 1).

In the Chinese version of this passage (see *Appendix 4*), the key identity marker *tongbao* 同胞 (‘compatriot’, lit. ‘born of the same womb’) and its compound *liang'an tongbao* 两岸同胞 (‘compatriots of the two sides’) reinforce this idea of shared identity (Grano 2022). While the English version varies between “the people of both sides of the strait” or an inclusive personal “we”, both the Arabic and Italian translations craftily explore a different nuance. The Arabic version consistently uses المواطنون على جانبي المضيق / من على جانبي المضيق (‘the citizens on/from both sides of the straits’), while the Italian edition displays multiple wordings, such as “i cinesi delle due sponde” (‘the Chinese of the two sides’) and “i connazionali di entrambe/ambo le sponde” (‘the connationals of both sides’). However, these choices shift the narrative from kinship and cultural identity to legal belonging to a state, subtly encouraging Arab and Italian readers to interpret Taiwan as already part of the PRC.

A further key element is the representation of history. In Xi Jinping’s speeches, Taiwan’s history starts with its ‘colonization’ from the continent: Xi Jinping never mentions the indigenous population living on the islands nor the Dutch colonisation before some people from Mainland China “crossed the dangerous ‘Black Ditch’ hundreds of years ago to seek a new life in Taiwan” (Xi 2014b, 262). His account (Xi 2014a, 238) focuses on Taiwan’s colonial experience under the Japanese Empire (1895-1945), always employing a passive structure that avoids the explicit mention of the Japanese Empire to emphasise the consequences of a weak Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu guoli chanruo, dao zhi Taiwan bei waizu qin zhan. [...] zai Taiwan bei qin zhan de kuanan sui yue li* 中华民族国力孱弱，导致台湾被外族侵占。[...]在台湾被侵占的苦难岁月里，‘the national strength of the Chinese nation was feeble, causing Taiwan to be invaded and occupied by foreigners. [...] in the bitter years when Taiwan was invaded and occupied’; Xi 2014a, 238). Aimed at the Chinese-speaking

community of both sides, this representation is instrumental to sustaining the view of a prosperous future when the Chinese nation will have ‘rejuvenated’.

Translation approaches diverge (see *Appendix 5*): the English translation, targeting a broader international community, always specifies the agent, reframing the entire narrative around the malign agency of the Japanese who “took advantage of [China’s weakness] to occupy Taiwan” (Xi 2014b, 262). By doing so, it emphasises that Taiwan was occupied by a ‘foreign’ country – Japan, a WWII Axis power. By contrast, neither the Italian nor the Arabic version specifies Japan as the agent, but they diverge in their evoked feelings: the Italian, in line with the Chinese, highlights China’s past weakness (“la forza della nazione cinese era così fragile da condurre all’invasione e all’occupazione straniera di Taiwan. [...] Negli anni tragici dell’occupazione [...]”), ‘the strength of the Chinese nation was so feeble that it led to the foreign invasion and occupation of Taiwan. [...] During the tragic years of the occupation [...]’; Xi [2016] 2019, 299); through the Arabic generic reference to colonial rule using the specific wording الاحتلال الأجنبي (‘the foreign occupation’), strategic evocation of colonial trauma can resonate more deeply: besides evoking the former imperialistic trauma in Arab countries, reference to ‘occupation’ is still widely used today in pro-Palestine media narratives to designate Israel itself⁹.

As previously noted, any construction of a ‘We’ entails the representation of ‘the Other’. In this corpus (see *Appendix 6*), ‘the Other’ is represented by the ‘separatist forces [advocating] for “Taiwan independence” and their separatist activities’ (*Taidu’ fenlie shili ji qi fenlie huodong* ‘台独’ 分裂势力及其分裂活动; Xi 2014a, 235). The Chinese narrative enacts a dehumanisation process by labelling them as ‘forces’ (*shili* 势力) rather than people. “Forces” is not neutral: it is a negatively connoted term, also used for “terrorist and separatist forces” in China’s official narrative about Xinjiang (Gallelli 2022). Translations are consistent with this dehumanising practice: the English text employs “forces and activities for ‘Taiwan independence’” (Xi 2014b, 258), notably also using inverted commas for “Taiwan independence”, a narrative which is also mirrored by the Arabic translation (“قوى استقلال تايوان، الانفصالية ونشاطاتها الانفصالية”, ‘Separatist “Taiwan independence forces” and their separatist activities’; Xi 2014c, 252). Interestingly, the Italian version diverges by mentioning

⁹ For instance, *al-Quds Al-Arabi* commonly refers to the Israeli army as ‘Occupation Army’ (جيش الاحتلال).

the ‘Taiwanese independence movement’ (“Le forze e le attività separatiste del Movimento indipendentista taiwanese”, ‘Separatist forces and activities of the Taiwanese independence movement’; Xi [2016] 2019, 295-296), which repositions independence advocates within a political frame.

4.3. *Translating issue narratives*

Issue narratives seek to represent the ‘story’ of specific events or aspects, linking particular issues to other strategic narratives, thereby reinforcing them. As noted earlier, in the twenty-first century, Chinese leadership has perceived growing economic cooperation as a pathway to eventual political integration, and this stands indeed at the core of the issue narratives articulated in Xi Jinping’s speeches.

Narratives simplify complex processes into linear and accessible plots. In the case of economic cooperation, this narrative unfolds as follows: its roots lie in the ‘concept of one family’ (*ben zhe liang’an tongbao yi jia ren de linian* 本着两岸同胞一家人的理念; Xi 2014a, 230), reinforcing the strategic narrative of a shared identity. It is associated with the metaphor of a journey – a path to be followed, or a navigated voyage anchored in the 1992 Consensus (Xi 2014a, 239). This journey was historically disrupted by Japanese occupation and civil war, but had resumed by the time of Xi Jinping’s speeches (2013-2014).

In the analysed corpus, such narratives are associated with the work of the Economic Cooperation Committee (ECC), a bilateral institutional mechanism established under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed between China and Taiwan in June 2010, during the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou.

In the Chinese version (see *Appendix 7*), Xi Jinping presents the framework agreement as an opportunity for ‘increasing institutionalisation of economic cooperation’ across the Strait (*tigao jingji bezuo zhiduhua shuiping* 提高经济合作制度化水平; Xi 2014a, 231), a concept the Arabic version echoes (رفع المستوى المؤسسي للتعاون الاقتصادي), ‘raising the institutional level of economic cooperation’; Xi 2014c, 247). The English translation, however, introduces the possessive “our”, absent in the original Chinese, suggesting that the ECFA could encourage an equitable and mutual process for negotiating a shared set of norms (“We hope that both sides can accelerate the negotiation of subsequent agreements following the signing of the ECFA, and improve our rules in respect of

economic cooperation”; Xi 2014b, 253). The Italian version introduces even greater ambiguity, referring to a general ‘adaptation to standards’ in the field of economic cooperation (“livello di adeguamento agli standard nell’ambito della cooperazione economica”; Xi [2016] 2019, 290) that may even transcend the framework agreed upon by the two sides. These translation choices adapt the original text to foreign reader expectations, downplaying the sense of a deliberate push by the PRC towards a predetermined outcome: not simply ‘coordination’ (*xietiaoxing* 协调性), but ‘economic integration’ (*jingji ronghe* 经济融合) between the two sides, depicted as constituent parts of the same national economy – that of the Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu jingji* 中华民族经济; Xi 2014a, 230, 232).

Another main point of this issue narrative is that economic cooperation brings benefits to all involved parties. These benefits are framed in diverse ways throughout the corpus. When both sides are portrayed as mutual beneficiaries, the active voice is employed, and cooperation is described as win-win (*huli shuangying* 互利双赢) or as bringing mutual gains (*deli* 得利). When Taiwan alone is the recipient, a passive structure is used (*shouyi* 受益, ‘to benefit from’), thereby implying a misalignment between the two sides. However, when benefits transcend the economic domain and refer to the broader goal of peaceful cross-strait development (see *Appendix 8*), the verb *zaofu* 造福 (‘bringing prosperity’) is utilised to articulate the CPC Central Committee’s ultimate goal. The English and Italian editions retain this nuance with reference to benefits (“bringing benefits to the people and the Chinese nation as a whole”, Xi 2014b, 256; “a favore dei cinesi di entrambe le sponde e di tutta la nazione”, ‘for the benefit of the Chinese of both sides and the whole Chinese nation’, Xi [2016] 2019, 293). However, the Arabic version, using the expression تحقيق الخير (‘to achieve/realise goodness’) conveys a broader ethical sense, suggesting not only material prosperity, but also moral righteousness (تحقيق الخير للمواطنين على جانبي المضيق والأمة الصينية, ‘realising good for the citizens on both sides of the Strait and the Chinese nation’, Xi 2014c, 250). In doing so, the CPC is constructed as a benevolent and morally guided actor, one that claims to know what is ultimately good for the people on both sides of the Strait and for the ‘Chinese nation’ as a whole.

Chinese economic development (see *Appendix 9*) is presented as an opportunity to be seized by the Taiwanese, “to create a better future” (Xi 2014b, 263). Once again, the English version foregrounds shared agency using the inclusive wording “none of us” (“None of us can choose

our history”; Xi 2014b, 263), absent in the Chinese source (*lishi bu neng xuanze* 历史不能选择, ‘History cannot be chosen’; Xi 2014a, 238-239). Similarly, the Italian version amplifies this inclusive tone, attributing priority to the Taiwanese in accessing the benefits of mainland development: “vorremmo condividere le opportunità di sviluppo della Cina continentale anche e prima di tutto con loro” (‘we would like to share the opportunities for development in mainland China also and first of all with them’; Xi [2016] 2019, 300). This mirrors the English phrasing, “We [...] would also like them to be first in sharing the opportunities brought by the mainland’s development” (Xi 2014b, 263). By contrast, the Arabic translation remains closer to the Chinese original (*ye yuanyi shouxian tong Taiwan tongbao fenxiang Dalu fazhan de jiyu* 也愿意首先同台湾同胞分享大陆发展的机遇, ‘and we are also willing to first share the development opportunities of the mainland with the Taiwanese compatriots’, Xi 2014a, 238-239; نرغب أولاً أن نشارك المواطنين في تايوان في التمتع بثمار تنمية البر الرئيسي, ‘we desire first of all to participate with the citizens in Taiwan in enjoying the fruits of the mainland’s development’, Xi 2014c, 257). Here, China is portrayed as a generous actor, enabling others (i.e., Taiwan) to access the fruits of its economic progress. Whether or not such benefits are actively sought by Taiwanese compatriots remains ambiguous. The narrative omits any mention of the potential risks or drawbacks of closer economic ties, nor does it acknowledge that such cooperation may be – and has been – instrumentalised as a political tool by Beijing.

Ultimately, China’s issue narratives concerning economic cooperation serve a dual purpose: to construct a persuasive internal logic of shared prosperity and inevitable integration, and to convince the international community of the legitimacy and benevolence of its claim over Taiwan.

5. CONCLUSION

This comparative analysis of the English, Italian, and Arabic translations of *The Governance of China* (I) reveals how translation functions not only as linguistic transfer, but as a political act. Across all three versions, we observed how China’s strategic narratives on the Taiwan issue – systemic, identity, and issue-related – are reframed in nuanced ways to address the expectations, sensitivities, and interpretive frameworks of

different target audiences, while also serving the goal of legitimizing the PRC's claims.

The English version is the result of a team of in-house translators well familiar with central guidelines on word usage, but also skilled in crafting the kind of strategic ambiguity that allows the narrative to cater to a broad audience spanning different cultural communities. It tends to emphasise inclusiveness and balance, often employing collective pronouns to soften authoritative claims, while still aligning with official PRC terminology.

The Italian version, by contrast, is the outcome of the unbalanced work of a heterogeneous team of translators; as a result, it produces a dissonant narrative where emphatic structures and emotional resonance are sometimes amplified to match the cultural sensibilities of the intended readership – at times even exceeding the original in rhetorical force – while also introducing greater autonomy in the framing of political actors.

The Arabic version is perhaps the most ideologically aligned with the source text: it retains much of its structure and intent, but adapts rhetorical elements – especially kinship and moral metaphors – to resonate with Arab cultural and historical sensibilities.

Notably, divergences in lexical and syntactical choices – such as “reunify” vs. “unify”, or active vs. passive structures – reflect deeper interpretive shifts that reframe agency, legitimacy, and identity across linguistic borders. Family metaphors, historical references, and portrayals of economic cooperation all serve as strategic devices to shape a perception of inevitability around the PRC's position on Taiwan while tailoring the narrative to distinct political and cultural environments.

Ultimately, this study highlights how, in the context of the Taiwan issue, translation functions as a site of ideological negotiation – where official discourse is not merely transferred, but strategically reframed to support its international positioning and narrative control.

APPENDIX 1

*Translating systemic narratives:
time-framing the unification (emphasis added)*

ORIGINAL PASSAGE IN THE FOUR EDITIONS	ENGLISH BACK-TRANSLATION
<p>着眼长远, 两岸长期存在的政治分歧问题终归要逐步解决, 总不能将这些问题一代一代传下去。(Xi 2014a, 232)</p>	<p>With the eyes on the long term [future], the issue of political divergences that have long existed between the two sides must eventually be gradually resolved; these problems absolutely cannot be passed down generation after generation.</p>
<p>Sooner or later we will have to resolve the political disputes that have long existed in cross-Straits relations rather than leave them to later generations. (Xi 2014b, 254)</p>	
<p>In prospettiva, il problema della divergenza politica che separa da tempo le due sponde dovrà alla fine essere risolto per gradi; non possiamo lasciare che si trascini all'infinito, generazione dopo generazione. (Xi [2016] 2019, 291)</p>	<p>In the long term, the problem of political divergence that has long separated the two sides will eventually have to be resolved gradually: we cannot let it drag on indefinitely, generation after generation.</p>
<p>بالنظر إلى المستقبل البعيد، ستحل تدريجياً في نهاية المطاف، الخلافات السياسية القائمة بين جانبي المضيق منذ فترة طويلة، ولن نسمح ببقائها هكذا، جيلاً بعد جيل. (Xi 2014c, 248)</p>	<p>Looking to the distant future, the existing political disagreements between the two sides of the Strait, present since a long time ago, will be solved gradually at the end of the course, and we will not allow them to remain as such, generation after generation.</p>

APPENDIX 2

*Translating systemic narratives:
the matter of (re)unification (emphasis added)*

ORIGINAL PASSAGE IN THE FOUR EDITIONS	ENGLISH BACK-TRANSLATION
大陆和台湾虽然 尚未统一 ，但同属一个中国，是不可分割的整体。(Xi 2014a, 234)	Although the mainland and Taiwan have not yet unified , they both belong to one China, which is an indivisible entity.
Although the mainland and Taiwan are yet to be reunited , they belong to one and same China, which is an indivisible whole. (Xi 2014b, 257)	
Sebbene la Cina continentale e Taiwan non si siano ancora riunificate , fanno comunque parte entrambe di “una sola Cina” e sono un tutt’uno indivisibile. (Xi [2016] 2019, 294)	Although the mainland and Taiwan have not yet reunified , both are still part of “one single China” and are an indivisible whole.
وعلى الرغم من أن البر الرئيسي وتايوان لم يحققا التوحيد بعد ، لكنهما ينتميان إلى صين واحدة ويشكلان كيانًا لا يتجزأ إطلاقًا. (Xi 2014c, 251)	Although the mainland and Taiwan have not yet achieved unification , they still belong to one single China and constitute an absolutely indivisible entity.

APPENDIX 3

Translating identity narratives: cultural references (emphasis added)

ORIGINAL PASSAGE IN THE FOUR EDITIONS	ENGLISH BACK-TRANSLATION
给大家拜个晚年，祝大家 马年吉祥、一马当先、马到成功! (Xi 2014a, 236)	Let me wish a belated Happy New Year to everyone, I wish you all an auspicious year of the Horse. Like a horse, may you always take the lead and achieve swift success!
I wish you all a happy New Year and every success! (Xi 2014b, 257)	
Anche se in ritardo, vorrei augurare a tutti un felice anno del Cavallo: che ci faccia galoppare verso il successo! (Xi [2016] 2019, 294)	Though belated, I’d like to wish everyone a happy New Year of the Horse: may it make us gallop toward success!
وأقدم لكم تهنئة، ولو متأخرة، بعيد الربيع التقليدي، متمنيًا أن ترافقكم البركة في عام الحصان، وأرجو لكم الخير والنجاح! (Xi 2014c, 254)	I extend to you a wish, albeit belated, for the traditional Spring Festival, hoping that the blessing accompanies you in the Year of the Horse, and I wish you [all the] good and success!

APPENDIX 4

*Translating identity narratives:
the “one family” metaphor (emphasis added)*

ORIGINAL PASSAGE IN THE FOUR EDITIONS	ENGLISH BACK-TRANSLATION
<p>两岸同胞一家亲，根植于我们共同的血脉和精神，扎根于我们共同的历史和文化。我们大家都认为，两岸同胞同属中华民族，都传承中华文化。(Xi 2014a, 237)</p>	<p>The compatriots of the two sides are one family, rooted in our common bloodline and spirit, grounded in our common history and culture. We all believe that the compatriots of the two sides both belong to the Chinese nation, and collectively inherit and pass on Chinese culture.</p>
<p>The closeness between us is rooted in our blood, our history and culture. We all believe that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are members of one Chinese nation, and we all inherit and pass on Chinese culture. (Xi 2014b, 257)</p>	
<p>I cinesi delle due sponde formano un'unica famiglia la cui origine è nel medesimo sangue e medesimo spirito e le cui radici affondano nella nostra comune storia e cultura. Sappiamo tutti che i cinesi delle due sponde appartengono alla stessa nazione e che entrambi siamo eredi della stessa cultura. (Xi [2016] 2019, 298)</p>	<p>The Chinese of the two sides form a single family, whose origin lies in the same blood and in the same spirit, and whose roots sink deep into our common history and culture. We all know that the Chinese of the two sides belong to the same nation and that we are both heirs to the same culture.</p>
<p>المواطنون من جانبي المضيق من أسرة واحدة، وتجمعهم القرابة، وهذه المشاعر متصلة في دمنا وروحنا المشتركة، وفي تاريخنا وثقافتنا المشتركة. نرى جميعنا أن المواطنين من جانبي المضيق ينتمون كلهم إلى الأمة الصينية، ويريثون الثقافة الصينية. (Xi 2014c, 254)</p>	<p>The citizens from both sides of the Strait descend from one family, and kinship unites them, and these feelings are deeply rooted in our shared blood and spirit, and in our shared history and culture. We all see that the citizens from both sides of the Strait all belong to the Chinese nation, and inherit the Chinese culture.</p>

APPENDIX 5

*Translating identity narratives:
the representation of Taiwanese history (emphasis added)*

ORIGINAL PASSAGE IN THE FOUR EDITIONS	ENGLISH BACK-TRANSLATION
<p>今年是甲午年。120年前的甲午，中华民族国力孱弱，导致台湾被外族侵占。[...] 在台湾被侵占的苦难岁月里，无数台湾同胞用鲜血和生命来证明自己是中国人，是中华民族大家庭中不可分离的成员。(Xi 2014a, 238)</p>	<p>This year is <i>Jiawu</i>. In <i>Jiawu</i> 120 years ago, the national strength of the Chinese nation was feeble, causing Taiwan to be invaded and occupied by foreigners. [...] In the bitter years when Taiwan was occupied, countless Taiwanese compatriots used their blood and life to prove themselves to be Chinese, inseparable members of the great family of the Chinese nation.</p>
<p>A hundred and twenty years ago China was a weak country, and the Japanese aggressors took advantage of this to occupy Taiwan. [...] In the bitter years when Taiwan was under Japanese occupation, countless Taiwanese compatriots shed their blood, and many laid down their lives, proving they were inseparable members of the extended family of the Chinese nation. (Xi 2014b, 262)</p>	
<p>Questo è il trentunesimo anno del ciclo sessagesimale. Esattamente centoventi anni fa, la forza della nazione cinese era così fragile da condurre all'invasione e all'occupazione straniera di Taiwan. [...] Negli anni tragici dell'occupazione, moltissimi taiwanesi hanno versato il loro sangue e dato la vita per provare di essere cinesi, di essere componenti indissolubili della stessa famiglia: la nazione cinese. (Xi [2016] 2019, 299)</p>	<p>This is the 31st year of the 60-year cycle. Exactly 120 years ago, the strength of the Chinese nation was so feeble that it led to the foreign invasion and occupation of Taiwan. [...] During the tragic years of the occupation, countless Taiwanese shed their blood and gave their lives to prove they were Chinese, indissoluble components of the same family: the Chinese nation.</p>
<p>العام الحالي هو عام "جياوو" الصيني. في عام جياوو قبل 120 سنة، كانت الأمة الصينية ضعيفة في قوة الدولة، مما أدى إلى الاحتلال الأجنبي لتايوان. [...] في أيام الاحتلال الأجنبي لتايوان، أثبت عدد لا يحصى من المواطنين في تايوان أنهم صينيون بدمهم وحياتهم، وأنهم أعضاء لا يمكن فصلهم من أسرة الأمة الصينية الكبيرة. (Xi 2014c, 256)</p>	<p>The present year is the Chinese year "gīyāwū". In the year gīyāwū 120 years ago, the Chinese nation was feeble in its national strength, which led to the foreign occupation of Taiwan. [...] In the days of the foreign occupation, an uncountable number of citizens in Taiwan proved, with their blood and their lives, that they were Chinese and inseparable members of the great family of the Chinese nation.</p>

APPENDIX 6

*Translating identity narratives:
the representation of ‘the Other’ (emphasis added)*

ORIGINAL PASSAGE IN THE FOUR EDITIONS	ENGLISH BACK-TRANSLATION
<p>“台独”分裂势力及其分裂活动仍然是对台海和平的现实威胁，必须继续反对和遏制任何形式的“台独”分裂主张和活动，不能有任何妥协。(Xi 2014a, 235)</p>	<p>Forces for “Taiwan independence” and their separatist movements are still a real threat to the peace in the Taiwanese Strait. It is necessary to continue opposing and curbing any form of separatist advocacy or movement for “Taiwan independence”, and there cannot be any compromise.</p>
<p>Forces and activities for “Taiwan independence” remain a real threat to the peace of the Taiwan Straits. It is therefore incumbent upon us to oppose and contain any rhetoric or move for “Taiwan independence” without any compromise. (Xi 2014b, 258)</p>	
<p>Le forze e le attività separatiste del Movimento indipendentista taiwanese sono ancora una minaccia reale per la pace nello Stretto di Taiwan, è dunque necessario continuare a combattere e a reprimere qualsiasi forma di attività e posizione indipendentista: non ci può essere compromesso alcuno. (Xi [2016] 2019, 295-296)</p>	<p>Separatist forces and activities of the Taiwanese independence movement are still a real threat to peace in the Taiwan Strait; it is therefore necessary to continue fighting and suppressing any independentist activity and position: there can be no compromise whatsoever.</p>
<p>”قوى استقلال تايوان“ الانفصالية ونشاطاتها الانفصالية، لا تزال تشكل تهديدًا واقعيًا للسلام في مضيق تايوان، ولا بد من مواصلة مقاومة وكبح دعوات ”استقلال تايوان“ ونشاطاتها بمختلف أشكالها، ولن تكون هناك أبدًا أي مساهمة في هذا الصدد. (Xi 2014c, 252)</p>	<p>Separatist “forces of Taiwan independence” and their separatist activities still constitute a real threat to peace in the Taiwan Strait, and it is necessary to continue resisting and curbing the appeals to “Taiwan independence” and their activities with their different forms, and here there will never be any compromise on this matter.</p>

APPENDIX 7

*Translating issue narratives:
the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (emphasis added)*

ORIGINAL PASSAGE IN THE FOUR EDITIONS	ENGLISH BACK-TRANSLATION
<p>第三，希望两岸加快经济合作框架协议后续协议商谈进程，提高经济合作制度化水平。 (Xi 2014a, 231)</p>	<p>Third, we hope that the two sides accelerate the process of negotiation on follow-up agreements to the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, and increase the institutionalisation level of economic cooperation.</p>
<p>Third, we hope that both sides can accelerate the negotiation of subsequent agreements following the signing of the ECFA, and improve our rules in respect of economic cooperation. (Xi 2014b, 253)</p>	
<p>Terzo, speriamo che i negoziati sugli accordi seguiti alla firma dell'ECFA vengano velocizzati e che il livello di adeguamento agli standard nell'ambito della cooperazione economica tra le due sponde venga ulteriormente alzato. (Xi [2016] 2019, 290)</p>	<p>Third, we hope that negotiations on agreements following the signing of the ECFA will be sped up, and that the level of adaptation to standards in the field of economic cooperation between the two sides will be further raised.</p>
<p>ثالثاً، نتطلع إلى تسريع عملية التفاوض اللاحقة بعد الاتفاقية الإطارية للتعاون الاقتصادي بين جانبي المضيق، ورفع المستوى المؤسسي للتعاون الاقتصادي. (Xi 2014c, 247)</p>	<p>Third, we look forward to accelerating the subsequent negotiation process after the Economic Cooperation Framework agreement between the two sides of the Strait, and raising the institutional level of economic cooperation.</p>

APPENDIX 8

*Translating issue narratives:
economic benefits and beyond (emphasis added)*

ORIGINAL PASSAGE IN THE FOUR EDITIONS	ENGLISH BACK-TRANSLATION
<p>新形势下，中共中央将继续实行既定的大政方针，致力于巩固深化两岸关系和平发展，造福两岸同胞，造福中华民族。(Xi 2014a, 233)</p>	<p>Under the new circumstances, the CPC Central Committee will continue to implement the established strategic policy guidelines, and devote itself to consolidating and deepening the peaceful development of the relations between the two sides of the Strait, bringing prosperity to the compatriots of both sides and to the Chinese nation.</p>
<p>Under the new circumstances, the CPC Central Committee will continue to follow its established policies and commit itself to consolidating and pushing forward the trend of peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and bringing benefits to the people and the Chinese nation as a whole. (Xi 2014b, 256)</p>	
<p>Alla luce di queste nuove circostanze, il Comitato Centrale del Partito Comunista Cinese continuerà a mettere in pratica le politiche stabilite, si dedicherà a rinsaldare e ampliare lo sviluppo pacifico tra le due sponde a favore dei cinesi di entrambe le sponde e di tutta la nazione. (Xi [2016] 2019, 293)</p>	<p>In light of the new circumstances, the CPC Central Committee will continue to implement the established policies, [and] will devote itself to consolidate and broaden the peaceful development between the two sides, for the benefit of the Chinese of both sides and the whole Chinese nation.</p>
<p>في الوضع الجديد، ستواصل اللجنة المركزية للحزب الشيوعي الصيني انتهاج سياساتها ومبادئها الثابتة سعياً وراء تمتين وتعميق التطور السلمي للعلاقات، وتحقيق الخير للمواطنين على جانبي المضيق والأمة الصينية. (Xi 2014c, 250)</p>	<p>Under the new situation, the CPC Central Committee will continue to follow its established politics and principles aiming at consolidating and deepening the peaceful development of the relations, and realising good for the citizens on both sides of the Strait and the Chinese nation.</p>

APPENDIX 9

*Translating issue narratives:
prioritizing Taiwanese access to mainland development (emphasis added)*

ORIGINAL PASSAGE IN THE FOUR EDITIONS	ENGLISH BACK-TRANSLATION
<p>我们尊重台湾同胞自己选择的社会制度和生活方式，也愿意首先同台湾同胞分享大陆发展的机遇。历史不能选择，但现在可以把握，未来可以开创。(Xi 2014a, 238-239)</p>	<p>We respect the social system and way of life that the Taiwanese compatriots have chosen themselves, and we are also willing to first share the development opportunities of the mainland with the Taiwanese compatriots. History cannot be chosen, but the present can be grasped, and the future can be opened up.</p>
<p>We respect the social system and the way of life chosen by the people of Taiwan, and would also like them to be first in sharing the opportunities brought by the mainland's development. None of us can choose our history, but we can all seize the moment and create a better future. (Xi 2014b, 263)</p>	
<p>Rispettiamo il sistema sociale e lo stile di vita che i taiwanesi hanno scelto per loro stessi e vorremmo condividere le opportunità di sviluppo della Cina continentale anche e prima di tutto con loro. Non possiamo sceglierci la nostra storia, ma possiamo afferrare il presente e possiamo creare il futuro. (Xi [2016] 2019, 300)</p>	<p>We respect the social system and way of life that the Taiwanese have chosen for themselves, and would also like to share mainland China's development opportunities first and foremost with them. We cannot choose our own history, but we can seize the present, and create the future.</p>
<p>نحترم النظام الاجتماعي وأسلوب الحياة اللذين اختارهما المواطنون في تايوان بأنفسهم، ونرغب أولاً أن نشارك المواطنين في تايوان في التمتع بثمار تنمية البر الرئيسي. التاريخ لا يمكننا أن نختاره، لكن يمكننا أن نتمسك بالحاضر، ويمكننا أن نشق طريق مستقبل أفضل. (Xi 2014c, 257)</p>	<p>We respect the social system and way of life that the citizens in Taiwan have chosen themselves with, and we desire first of all to participate with the citizens in Taiwan in enjoying the fruits of the mainland's development. We cannot choose history, but we can hold fast to the present and open up a path to a better future.</p>

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