

Introduction: Europe in the World?

Luiza Bialasiewicz

L'Europe ne dit pas ce qu'elle fait; elle ne fait pas ce qu'elle dit. Elle dit ce qu'elle ne fait pas; elle fait ce qu'elle ne dit pas.

[Europe does not say what it does; it does not do what it says. It says what it does not do; it does what it does not say.]

Pierre Bourdieu

The past decade has witnessed growing attention to Europe's role as an international actor. EU and national politicians have begun to speak quite openly of a 'European geopolitics' or, at least, of the need for a distinct geopolitical vision for the Union. Popular and political attention to the question of Europe's geopolitical role has been matched by growing interest among scholars as well, with a great deal of speculation devoted in recent years to the changing dynamics and nature of EU power. Nonetheless, as one edited collection noted in its opening pages, Europe (or, 'EU'rope, its institutional incarnation, the term that we will predominantly adopt in this volume) 'remains largely an "unidentified international object", with a rather mercurial existence and impact' and the even more vexed question of 'European power' simply falls into 'the gaps within the literature of international political analysis' (Elgstrom and Smith 2006: 1). Though not for lack of fanciful characterizations: 'EU'rope has been variously described as a 'soft power', a 'civilian' or 'civil' power, a 'normative power', a 'transformative power', an 'ordering power' or even an 'uncertain power'.¹ Yet despite this abundance of terms (and recalling the words of the late Pierre Bourdieu cited at the outset), the role of the EU as an international actor remains undefined or at best ambiguous in its expressions, effects and nature.

With the appointment in December 2009 of a new EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton, and the creation of a European External Action Service (EEAS) that is to function as the Union's foreign ministry and diplomatic corps, the EU appears to be taking on what we could term a distinct geopolitical persona. Yet as Merje Kuus (2010: 381) and other observers have noted, while 'the making of the EEAS illustrates the emergence of a European diplomatic culture and, more broadly, the operation of the Union as a (geo)political subject', it is as yet unclear how effective the Service will be in

¹ Some reviews include Bialasiewicz 2008, Clark and Jones 2008, Diez 2005, Hettne and Soderbaum 2005, Laïdi 2005, Manners and Whitman 2003.

1	crafting what is to become a single ‘European’ geopolitical vision (and praxis). As	1
2	Kuus (2010: 381) suggests,	2
3		3
4	the EEAS is to advance EU rather than national interests, but the Union is a	4
5	peculiar political subject that operates both through its own institutions and	5
6	through the Member States. The Service is to be independent, but accountable	6
7	to the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament. It has its own headquarters,	7
8	budget, and staff, but its diplomats are to be either seconded or transferred from	8
9	the Commission, the Council Secretariat, and the Member States’ diplomatic	9
10	services. The EEAS’s geographic and thematic desks are to manage the Union’s	10
11	external relations, except in enlargement, trade, and development. The agency’s	11
12	relationship with national foreign ministries is to be complementary because	12
13	EU foreign policy is supposedly agreed upon by the Member States, but nobody	13
14	really believes this [...].	14
15		15
16	As this book goes to print, it is of course too early to comment on the potential	16
17	effectiveness of the new External Action Service in shaping a common EU	17
18	geopolitics and a coherent set of foreign policy goals, or to assess what ‘sort’ of	18
19	international actor the EU will become. The chapters that make up this edited	19
20	collection aim to provide, rather, a novel contribution to the debate on ‘EU’rope’s	20
21	role in the world by tracing some of these often ambiguous, often ‘invisible’, ways	21
22	in which, over the past decade or so, the EU and its various constituent institutions	22
23	have acted upon – and (re)made – particular places in the world.	23
24	Drawing on a wealth of empirical material and case studies that range from	24
25	the Arctic to East Africa, the nine contributions provide a critical geopolitical	25
26	reading of the ways in which particular places, countries, and regions are brought	26
27	into the EU’s orbit; the ways in which they are made to ‘work’ for Europe. The	27
28	analyses presented here thus look at the ways in which the spaces of ‘EU’ropean	28
29	power and ‘actor-ness’ are narrated and created, in both formal policy documents	29
30	and in popular geographies, but also at how ‘EU’rope’s discursive (and material)	30
31	strategies of incorporation are differently appropriated by local and regional elites,	31
32	from the southern shores of the Mediterranean to Eastern Europe and the Balkans.	32
33	The chapters also highlight, however, the tensions between the ideal Europe of	33
34	policy statements and proclaimed ‘European values’ and ‘EU’ropean practices:	34
35	political, geopolitical, and economic.	35
36	The question of contemporary EU border management is of particular concern	36
37	here, for borders, in many ways, are the sites where ‘EU’rope’s contradictions	37
38	come to light in most striking fashion. French political sociologist Zaki Laïdi	38
39	(2005) argued some time ago that it is at ‘EU’rope’s borders that we can best	39
40	discern ‘the distinct aesthetics of European power’; where we can best perceive	40
41	that which Peter Sloterdijk (1994) has called the uniquely European process of	41
42	‘ <i>translatio imperii</i> ’. To echo Etienne Balibar (1998; also 2009) – and as several	42
43	of the chapters here highlight – ‘EU’rope’s borders are no longer merely the	43
44	‘shores of politics’ but, rather, the ‘spaces of the political itself’. Examining the	44

1 EU's 'border-work' (Rumford 2008) allows, therefore, unique insight not just 1
 2 into the making and management of borders themselves but also into 'EU'ropean 2
 3 geopolitics; into the distinct ways in which 'EU'rope projects itself into the world, 3
 4 the ways in which it makes 'European spaces'. 4

5 Is there, however, something uniquely – specifically – 'European' about the 5
 6 ways in which the EU engages with the world, something that we could term 6
 7 a distinct mode of 'EU geopolitics'? What do we make of Pierre Bourdieu's 7
 8 characterization of that which he called the 'European *trompe l'oeil*' – and saw 8
 9 as the distinctly 'European' form of conceiving (and doing) politics? Surely there 9
 10 is more to 'EU'rope, also in its external projections, than simply ambiguity and 10
 11 contradiction (most evidently, between its *ideal* role as a normative and 'gentle' 11
 12 international actor – and the *real* exercise of 'EU'ropean power, whether through 12
 13 border-making or development policies)? Perhaps we should, rather, reframe the 13
 14 question. 14

15 Various scholars reflecting upon the future of the European project have identified 15
 16 what Luisa Passerini usefully describes as a seemingly 'unresolvable tension 16
 17 between the normative and the empirical levels of European identity' (Passerini 17
 18 2012). Commenting on this tension in his seminal *Geofilosofia dell'Europa* already 18
 19 almost two decades ago, Italian political philosopher Massimo Cacciari suggested 19
 20 that 'Europe has always been a term that designates what Europe *will be*, or would 20
 21 like to be, or should be. The figure of Europe has historically always been a *task*' 21
 22 (Cacciari 1994, see also Cacciari 2006). Although Cacciari's comments refer to 22
 23 a much longer European historical trajectory, other analyses of contemporary 23
 24 Europe-making have similarly noted that the European project, from its earliest 24
 25 days, has always been also – if not above all – 'aspirational'.² 25

26 Zygmunt Bauman's characterization of Europe as *An Unfinished Adventure* (the 26
 27 title of his 2004 book) highlights precisely the notion of a 'never-accomplished' 27
 28 Europe. Bauman argues that the 'essence of Europe' has always tended to run 28
 29 ahead of the 'really existing Europe': 'it is the essence of "being a European" 29
 30 to have an essence that always stays ahead of reality, and it is the essence of 30
 31 European realities to always lag behind the essence of Europe'. We should best 31
 32 understand the European project, he suggests then 32

33 33
 34 as an in-principle-unfinished object, an object of scrutiny, critique, and possibly 34
 35 remedial action [...] a continuous process – forever imperfect yet obstinately 35
 36 struggling for perfection – of *remaking the world*. (Bauman 2004: 8, emphasis 36
 37 in the original) 37

38 38
 39 The making and (re)making of worlds is, after all, the key discursive task of 39
 40 geopolitics, as critical geopolitical scholars have long argued: invoking particular 40
 41 imagined geographies, particular 'geographical imaginations' of the world 41

42 42
 43 ² For a review of some of these understandings, see Bialasiewicz, Elden and Painter 43
 44 2005. 44

1 and making them seem to be, as Gearoid O'Tuatha (1996) suggests, 'the only
 2 possible real'. Such imagined geographies are often sustained by myths and
 3 distinct narratives about 'the ways in which the world works'. Various myths of
 4 origin have served as a particularly important support to most national geopolitical
 5 visions (Dijink 1996). Europe – as a political project and as a geopolitical actor –
 6 has its own set of founding myths.

7 The image that figures on the cover of this volume – Russian artist Valentin
 8 Serov's (1910) *The Rape of Europa* – evokes the classical myth of the capture and
 9 voyage of *Europa*, the daughter of Agenor, King of Tyre. The story of *Europa*'s
 10 abduction by Zeus (here transformed into a bull) has inspired artists and poets
 11 through the ages, but it has also profoundly shaped European self-understandings.
 12 As various scholars have argued (see, among others, Passerini 2002, Wintle
 13 2009), the myth of *Europa* has long served to ideally connect Europe to other
 14 shores, 'extending' it to the world, constituting it as a 'voyage' or, in Zygmunt
 15 Bauman's terms, as 'an adventure'. It is not by chance that a ceramic mural
 16 depicting *Europa*'s journey adorns the Paul-Henri Spaak Building of the European
 17 Parliament in Brussels.

18 The ideal of Europe as a 'voyage', as an 'endless adventure' that looks out
 19 *into* the world, that sees itself as having a particular 'mission' or 'duty' *to* the
 20 world, is not unproblematic, of course. As Michael Heffernan (1998) has argued,
 21 the European ideal was always indelibly tied to the (re)making and claiming of
 22 space – first within Europe, and subsequently beyond it. This understanding of a
 23 forever mobile, forever expanding Europe was also, always, fundamentally bound
 24 to the belief in Europe as the embodiment (and vanguard) of universal progress.
 25 Jacques Derrida (1992) has described it as Europe's 'logic of exemplarity': Europe
 26 as, at once, a distinct and unique place *and* as universal model, universal 'heading'
 27 (*cap*) for the rest of the world.

28 We should pay heed to the traces of such ideal visions in contemporary
 29 'EU'ropean geopolitical imaginations and practices. As Bachmann and Sidaway
 30 (2009: 106) suggest, it is crucial that we understand how many contemporary
 31 'EU'ropean geopolitical imaginations 'simultaneously internalise and occlude
 32 prior visions of Europe and European world roles'. The task of critical geopolitics
 33 is to take such ideal imaginations seriously, in all of their ambiguity and frequent
 34 contradiction, and to understand what effects, what geographies they are
 35 contributing to produce.

36
 37

38 **The Chapters**
 39

40 The first section of the book – 'Making the Spaces of EU Action' – speaks directly
 41 to this concern, looking at some of the ways in which 'EU'rope creates its spaces
 42 of international action. Sami Moisio's opening chapter focused on EU spatial
 43 planning, interrogates the geographies – both material *and* ideal – that underpin the
 44 notion of 'Europeanization'. It does so by examining European spatial planning as

1 'a distinct politics of scale' that has direct 'constitutive effects on the geography of 1
 2 Europe'; that, literally, 'makes European spaces' – and that increasingly also brings 2
 3 extra-European spaces 'into Europe'. Through a critical analysis of the European 3
 4 Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) and the workings of the European 4
 5 Spatial Observation Network (ESPON), Moisisio suggests that we conceive of 5
 6 European spatial planning as a distinct 'geopolitical narrative (and practice) that 6
 7 seeks to fundamentally re-think Europe's spatial and scalar organization'. 7

8 Alongside the broader theoretical/conceptual discussion, the chapter also 8
 9 provides an analysis of one specific EU-sponsored territorial network, an 9
 10 INTERREG project based around the Baltic Sea Region. Since 1999, INTERREG 10
 11 projects have been crucial in implementing European spatial planning and in 11
 12 creating a European community of 'spatial experts', bringing together policy- 12
 13 makers and professionals across Europe. But, as Moisisio argues, such projects 13
 14 have also been key in disrupting the borders of the EU and in drawing in non- 14
 15 members into the Europeanization process. He suggests that, indeed, 'EU spatial 15
 16 planning may well be considered as one of the EU's key mechanisms in creating 16
 17 closer political, economic and even cultural links to neighbouring states without 17
 18 offering them full membership'. Through macro region-building practices such as 18
 19 the Baltic initiative discussed here, 19

20
 21 EU spatial planning increasingly seeks to extend the European "growth machine" 21
 22 also beyond the EU's territory. It consists of practices whereby the EU seeks to 22
 23 turn "less European" spaces into fully European ones, both within the EU and 23
 24 beyond. EU spatial planning thus provides a crucial setting for the dissemination 24
 25 of "best European practice", within and beyond the borders of the EU. 25

26
 27 Like Moisisio's contribution, Alun Jones' chapter focuses on (EU)rope's use of 27
 28 region building as a powerful geopolitical tool. Jones' focus lies with a region 28
 29 that has for long been at the heart of EU geopolitical agendas: the Mediterranean. 29
 30 As Jones argues here, ever since the EU's formation, the Mediterranean 'has been 30
 31 cast as the most problematic flank of Europe' and a key space for 'EU-orchestrated 31
 32 regionalising efforts'. What is more, it has long been seen as a space within which 32
 33 the European Union 'regards itself as having a natural legitimacy to act in order 33
 34 to ensure its own security, promote good neighbourliness, and stave off potential 34
 35 threats to European and global order'. 35

36 The chapter offers a geopolitical analysis of the various 'Mediterranean- 36
 37 building' initiatives that, over the years, have attempted to symbolically, 37
 38 territorially and institutionally construct a 'Mediterranean region' as a space 38
 39 for EU action, from the Association Agreements of the 1960s, to the Barcelona 39
 40 Process, to the Union for the Mediterranean launched in the summer of 2008. 40
 41 The EU's construction of the Mediterranean as a space characterized by an 41
 42 alleged geopolitical and geo-cultural fracturing (which 'EU'rope has a legitimate 42
 43 entitlement to correct through regionalization agendas), and as an 'unsettled 43
 44 space with potentially unsettling consequences for 'EU'rope', has had powerful 44

1 political – and policy – effects. Such constructions have framed all recent EU 1
 2 initiatives for the Mediterranean, including those formulated under the auspices 2
 3 of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched in 2003. As Jones argues, 3
 4 the ENP emerged as a discursive formation from a critical re-evaluation of the 4
 5 EU's potential role as a normative 'force for good' in the Mediterranean and as a 5
 6 necessary 'response to the practical issues posed by proximity and neighbourhood' 6
 7 with the EU holding a vital interest in seeing 'greater economic development and 7
 8 stability and better governance there'. 8

9 As with prior EU initiatives aimed at 'making' a 'Mediterranean region', the 9
 10 ENP and its sister policies cannot, nonetheless, be seen as simply 'a uni-directional 10
 11 process of power, authority and collective action being mobilized and orchestrated 11
 12 by the EU'. Jones' analysis suggests, rather, that EU action in the Mediterranean 12
 13 has been characterized by much more complex and often ambiguous processes of 13
 14 'leverage, resistance and opposition to efforts to stimulate wide-ranging political 14
 15 and economic reform agendas'. What is more, 'EU'rope's Mediterranean partners 15
 16 have become very adept in their political dealings with the EU in order to secure 16
 17 their own (often conflicting) interests, highlighting the tenuous nature of the 17
 18 projection of 'European' norms, rules and standards that presumably lies at the 18
 19 heart of such region-building initiatives. 19

20 This is also a concern that lies at the heart of third chapter in this first section 20
 21 of the volume, Veit Bachmann's consideration of the EU's role as a development 21
 22 actor. Bachmann's contribution – 'European Spaces of Development: Aid, 22
 23 Regulation and Regional Integration in East Africa' – analyses the ways in which 23
 24 the spaces of interaction between the EU and developing countries are shaped by 24
 25 what he describes as a distinctly 'EU'ropean mode of policy conduct. The chapter 25
 26 illustrates how EU development policy acts to 'transfer the modus operandi of 26
 27 the EU's system of political-economic organization to European external relations 27
 28 and thus determine the structure of the international system, as well as the ways 28
 29 and modes of interaction for different actors in it'. The main vehicle through 29
 30 which this geopolitical and geoeconomic project is being promoted, he argues, is 30
 31 regional integration. As Moisiu and Jones also suggest in the preceding chapters, 31
 32 the promotion of intra- and interregional cooperation (and of specific modes of 32
 33 regulation) thus becomes a powerful force in 'Europeanizing' the world – literally, 33
 34 by making the world work in 'European ways'. 34

35 In his discussion, Bachmann traces the emergence of understandings of 35
 36 Europe as a 'civilian power' in the post-World War II period and notes how such 36
 37 understandings have progressively been transferred to the EU's 'external' conduct 37
 38 as well, with 'a key objective of European external relations to promote the spaces 38
 39 of interaction it had developed internally within the international system'. Attempts 39
 40 to legitimize a global role for the EU, he suggests, have generally been based 'on 40
 41 its (perceived) success in transforming a war-torn continent into an area of relative 41
 42 peace and prosperity, associated with the creation of a civilianized system', as 42
 43 well as its unique experience of regional integration, seen as 'a way of achieving 43
 44 democracy and lasting peace'. 44

1 This is an important point that speaks also to a number of other contributions 1
 2 in this collection – and to the question of European ‘myth-making’ evoked at the 2
 3 outset. For it is not only the case of extending the European space by extending 3
 4 the space of its putative values (so, by making the ‘internal’ also ‘external’), as 4
 5 described in Bachmann’s interviews. Increasingly, the EU’s ‘external’ conduct is 5
 6 seen as *a key confirmation of ‘EU’rope’s own* (‘internal’) *identity*, presumably 6
 7 based within /confirmed by such values. As Lucarelli and Fioramonti (2009) have 7
 8 argued, the identification of EU core values and the definition of an international 8
 9 role for the EU are, increasingly, part of the same identity-building process: while 9
 10 ‘internal’ EU values and principles are transposed also into ‘external’ political 10
 11 conduct, ‘external’ conduct is, increasingly, key to sustaining a particular ‘internal’ 11
 12 European political identity. The definition of the EU’s ‘external’ role and its 12
 13 distinct nature as a geopolitical actor is, more and more, the key locus around 13
 14 which ‘EU’ropean identity is defined – and performed.³ 14

15 Nonetheless, as Bachmann’s contribution points out, there still exists a 15
 16 wide divide between the ‘economic’ and ‘political’ policy fields, and respective 16
 17 underlying interests. This disjuncture (and often divergence) is a crucial challenge 17
 18 for ‘EU’rope, particularly because ‘those policy areas in which the EU’s self- 18
 19 representation is closest to its external image (e.g. diplomacy, promotion of 19
 20 democracy, etc.) are also those in which the EU’s power is perceived to be less 20
 21 developed and effective’ (Fioramonti and Poletti 2008). With the preponderance, 21
 22 in most contexts, of the EU’s ‘economic’ role, ‘EU’rope’s normative claims reveal, 22
 23 as Bachmann notes, discrepancies both with policy practices affecting developing 23
 24 countries, as well as with the perceptions of external cooperation partners (who 24
 25 frequently characterize these policies as ‘economic imperialism’, ‘coercive’, 25
 26 ‘exploitative’). 26

27 Some of the disjunctures between the EU’s ‘imaginative geographies’ and 27
 28 the EU’s actions are also the focus of the next two chapters in this section. Alex 28
 29 Jeffrey’s chapter entitled ‘The Masks of Europe in Contemporary Bosnia and 29
 30 Herzegovina’ looks at the role played by Bosnia and ‘the Balkans’ in the European 30
 31 imaginary as a key site for *both* the delimitation of the ‘European Self’, but also 31
 32 a key space for the extension and projection of Europeanness and, especially, 32
 33 ‘European values’. Drawing on ethnographic field work in Bosnia spanning a 33
 34 period of six years (2002–2007), Jeffrey unpicks the discourses that have framed 34
 35 Bosnia initially as a ‘European problem’ and, subsequently, as a ‘state on its path 35
 36 to Europe’. The chapter begins by interrogating the ‘Balkanist’ imaginaries that 36
 37 made possible the ‘geopolitical making of Bosnia as a site of intervention, cast 37
 38 38

39 _____ 39
 40 3 It is important to note that there has been a significant shift from EU programmes 40
 41 focussed on Cultural Action in the 1980s–1990s, to efforts by the Commission to 41
 42 communicate ‘EU’rope’s ‘global role’. Such geopolitical performances are marked by 42
 43 distinct ‘visual economies’ (to cite David Campbell, 2007), and distinct ‘imaginative 43
 44 geographies’ that connect ‘home’ (Europe) and ‘away’ (the world) in ways that deserves 44
 44 our critical attention. 44

1 out as a “non-European” Other’ and the subsequent mechanisms, institutional 1
 2 and ideational, put into place to ‘bring Bosnia into Europe’. Jeffrey focuses in 2
 3 particular on the concept of ‘transition’ (‘from a Balkan past to a European future’) 3
 4 and its deployment by both international actors and Bosnian political leaders as a 4
 5 ‘virtuous narrative’ where ‘increasing integration in European structures affords 5
 6 democratic opportunities for the Bosnian citizen’. 6

7 The title of the chapter – ‘The Masks of Europe’ – refers to what Jeffrey sees 7
 8 in the Bosnian context as ‘the invocation of Europe as a mask, a performance 8
 9 that occludes political power behind a discourse of democratic virtue’. So what 9
 10 does the discourse of Europeanization, as invoked here, mask or occlude? What 10
 11 is meant by ‘Europeanization’ in the Bosnian/Balkan context? Jeffrey’s analysis 11
 12 points to what he terms ‘a sovereignty paradox’ that underpins European rubrics 12
 13 in Bosnia, for while ‘idealising forms of solidarity based on broad social and 13
 14 cultural affiliations’, Europeanizing discourses ‘simultaneously seek to promote 14
 15 the state as the primary territorialization of political life’. Thus though ‘notionally 15
 16 cosmopolitan in its invocation of an ethical and political community operating 16
 17 beyond the particularities of an individual state’, he argues that ‘the evidence from 17
 18 Bosnia suggests that European ideals look to solidify forms of citizenship and 18
 19 territory firmly rooted in the state’. Indeed, looking at the move ‘from Dayton 19
 20 to Brussels’, Jeffrey suggests that the Europeanization of the Bosnian transition 20
 21 process has not significantly reconfigured the power relations of international 21
 22 intervention. 22

23 What is more, within Bosnia itself, designations of Europeanness are similarly 23
 24 malleable. Drawing on the notion of ‘nested orientalisms’, Jeffrey describes how 24
 25 Serbian politicians in Bosnia stake claim to European credentials to assert cultural 25
 26 primacy and, in particular, distinction from ‘non-European’ Bosniaks. ‘Europe’ 26
 27 here does not serve as a marker of virtue but, rather, a ‘mask’, a foil, for other 27
 28 political manoeuvres: specifically, as support for ‘radical Serbian Europeanism, 28
 29 structured around essential cultural differences and founded on the rejection of 29
 30 Bosniak claims to a European heritage’. 30

31 Richard Powell’s contribution, the final chapter in this section, looks to 31
 32 a relatively recent focus in the EU’s geopolitical strategies: the Arctic. Powell 32
 33 traces how ‘the High Latitudes’ have been progressively created/envisioned 33
 34 as a strategic region for EU action and as a ‘European problem’. Through an 34
 35 analysis of the European Community’s and later the European Union’s evolving 35
 36 geopolitical imaginaries of ‘the Arctic’, the chapter highlights how an expansion 36
 37 in the EU’s strategic preoccupations to issues such as energy security and global 37
 38 climate change has also brought an extension in its ‘areas of interest’ and strategic 38
 39 concern. As Powell highlights, the EU’s interest in the Arctic is firmly embedded 39
 40 in broader debates around climate change and energy security, and ‘EU’rope’s role 40
 41 in the High Latitudes is profoundly marked by a conviction of the EU’s ‘unique 41
 42 position to respond to global climatic and security challenges’. 42

43 The chapter also very usefully brings to light another notable characteristic 43
 44 of EU geopolitics, remarked upon by several of the previous chapters: the ever- 44

1 present tensions between ‘national’ and ‘European’ geopolitical visions and 1
2 foreign policy choices and priorities, but also considerable tensions between the 2
3 various constitutive institutions of the EU themselves (most notably, between the 3
4 Council of Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament). 4
5 As in the case of the debates that surrounded the constitution of the Union for the 5
6 Mediterranean (discussed in Jones’ chapter) that, at the end, became a Union of 6
7 27+ states, so too in the case of the Arctic there has been a progressive extension of 7
8 geopolitical responsibility: the Arctic is no longer simply the concern and strategic 8
9 prerogative of Northern European countries (Norway, Denmark/Greenland, 9
10 Iceland, Sweden and Finland) but, rather, a ‘wholly European problem’. 10
11 The EU’s increasing concern for (and involvement in) what the European 11
12 Parliament in a 2008 resolution on ‘Arctic Governance’ described as ‘the ongoing 12
13 race for natural resources in the Arctic which may lead to security threats for 13
14 the EU and overall international instability’ also highlights the EU’s role as 14
15 international norm and law-maker. This (self-appointed) role, however, often runs 15
16 up against other understandings of the law and legal architectures including, in 16
17 the case of the Arctic, indigenous ones. Much like Jeffrey’s chapter that remarks 17
18 upon the paradox of ‘EU’rope’s ‘statalizing’ influence, Powell similarly suggests 18
19 that the EU’s presumed affirmation of ‘subsidiarity’ runs into rough waters in the 19
20 Arctic where EU institutions have tended to propound a rather centralizing vision 20
21 of governance. As the EU ‘constantly strives to expand both the spatial extent 21
22 and its legal/epistemic sphere of influence, arguably often into areas occupied 22
23 by citizens of other polities’, Powell argues that it risks undermining ‘the many 23
24 successes that have been established in Arctic governance by devolving decision- 24
25 making to indigenous groups and organisations’. 25
26 The second section of the volume – ‘The EU as (B)ordering Actor – is 26
27 dedicated entirely to the question of EU border (geo)politics. As the outer edges of 27
28 a putative European space, EU borders not only demarcate the identity of what lies 28
29 within (‘Europe’), but also determine relations with ‘the World’. It is at/through 29
30 borders that the European space is constituted and selectively stretched, marking 30
31 and making a new geopolitical role for ‘EU’rope. The chapters in this section 31
32 look, in particular, to some of the ways in which EU border-work is increasingly 32
33 projected globally through an array of measures and practices that off-shore and 33
34 out-source EU border control and management. 34
35 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen’s ‘Out-sourcing Asylum: The Advent of 35
36 Protection Lite’ opens this discussion by looking specifically at attempts by EU 36
37 states to extend asylum and migration policy beyond the territorial confines of the 37
38 Union. The chapter notes how the EU’s increasing externalization and, indeed, 38
39 ‘extra-territorialization’ of asylum is fundamentally transforming Member States’ 39
40 understandings (and respect) of the obligations associated with refugee protection, 40
41 resulting in what Gammeltoft-Hansen terms ‘protection lite’, with states ‘driving 41
42 a race to the bottom in search of what counts for “effective protection”’. 42
43 As Gammeltoft-Hansen outlines, the contemporary international refugee 43
44 protection regime is very much the heir to its Westphalian heritage and operates 44

1 (and is bound) within a territorial logic. Protection 'is not guaranteed in a global 1
2 homogenous juridical space but materializes as a patchwork of commitments 2
3 undertaken by individual states, tied together by multilateral treaty agreements'. 3
4 This is also true for the Member States of the European Union, despite an 4
5 evolving common asylum policy. The main legal obligation of (individual) states 5
6 is not to send back (*refouler*) a refugee where he or she risks persecution. This 6
7 basic obligation kicks in when an asylum-seeker or refugee arrives within the 7
8 territory or jurisdiction of the state in question. As Levy and Vaughan-Williams 8
9 also suggest in their chapters, EU states fearing the burden of asylum processing 9
10 have been keen to develop mechanisms preventing asylum seekers from even 10
11 arriving, adopting a variety of 'off-shore' and 'remote control' migration control 11
12 mechanisms. Gammeltoft-Hansen describes how such *non-entrée* policies have 12
13 entailed a drive among European states to shift the responsibilities for asylum- 13
14 seekers and refugees first among each other, and subsequently to third states. 14
15 'In this game', he notes, 'the defining mechanism for allocating responsibility 15
16 to states remains firmly grounded in the principle of territorial division; whatever 16
17 state territory or jurisdiction a refugee is within, that state is responsible for not 17
18 returning that person to a place in which he or she may be persecuted'. However, 18
19 beyond the fundamental obligation of *non-refoulement*, other rights under the 19
20 refugee protection regime 'are granted according to a principle of territorial 20
21 approximation', that is, 'progressively according to the 'level of attachment' a 21
22 refugee obtains to a given country' (with the most sophisticated rights, such as 22
23 access to welfare, employment and legal aid, only granted when the refugee is 23
24 'lawfully staying' or 'durably resident' in the territory of the host state). 24
25 What this also means, however, is that refugees or asylum-seekers that 25
26 are not present in a state's territory but de facto under its jurisdiction (such as 26
27 on the high seas or in the territory of a third state) are only entitled to a very 27
28 basic set of rights centred upon the *non-refoulement* obligation. This is one of 28
29 the main problems Gammeltoft-Hansen identifies with the 'off-shoring' of EU 29
30 migration controls. As he argues, 'when states attempt to prevent the triggering 30
31 of the territorial mechanism that make them responsible for granting certain 31
32 rights to asylum-seekers or subsequently to shift the burden for bestowing these 32
33 rights on to third countries', it is not only a question of 'whether protection will 33
34 be afforded elsewhere', but also of 'the quality of this protection'. He takes to 34
35 task, in particular, the 'safe third country' rule and its adoption by EU states 'as a 35
36 procedural mechanism for shifting responsibility for asylum processing'. 36
37 Gammeltoft-Hansen's analysis highlights, in particular, the shift in EU Member 37
38 States' refugee and asylum policies to a rubric of management, as part of what he 38
39 terms 'the political management of safety', framed by notions of a 'procedural 39
40 economy' and 'burden sharing'. The question of the protection of basic rights – 40
41 presumably a cornerstone of the European polity, at home as well as abroad – is, 41
42 increasingly, subsumed with the managerial (and ostensibly value-free) notion of a 42
43 'rights economy'. Gammeltoft-Hansen argues, indeed, that the push to redistribute 43
44 responsibility for protection onto third states is 'an attempt by European states to 44

1 achieve a market mechanism of rights, in which protection is routinely realized at 1
2 the lowest possible cost'. This, of course, has grave consequences for the quality of 2
3 the protection provided, but also creates ever new forms (and scales) of exclusion: 3
4 'the unchecked shifting of burdens on to states situated closer to the country of 4
5 origin is likely to become an incentive for these states to introduce more restrictive 5
6 recognition procedures, thus limiting the number of asylum-seekers who gain 6
7 access to these rights in the first place'. 7

8 Adam Levy's chapter looks to a model project in the EU's expanding archipelago 8
9 of 'remote' border management: the European Border Assistance Mission 9
10 (EUBAM) and its attempts to modernize and securitize the Moldova-Ukraine 10
11 frontier in line with Schengen standards. As Levy notes, the EUBAM is seen by the 11
12 European Commission as a radically new mode/model of border control. Framed 12
13 within the broader rhetoric of the European Neighbourhood Policy (discussed also 13
14 by Jones in this volume) and the role of 'EU'rope's neighbours as a putative 'Ring 14
15 of Friends', the EUBAM is presented as a paragon of 'neighbourly success' in 15
16 the management of borders and the 'friendly' extension of the EU's 'integrated 16
17 border management'. Promising, as Levy points out, 'more efficient approaches to 17
18 harmonization, security and risk [by] using the language of threat perception and 18
19 intelligence assessment', the EU's new border management mechanisms focus 19
20 on 'data collection and document security, paying special attention to particular 20
21 metrics and definitions like illegal entries, criminal apprehensions and expedited 21
22 removals'. 22

23 It is, therefore, no longer a question of (just?) drawing lines but, rather, 23
24 sharing 'best practices' with those who now should carry out the EU's border- 24
25 work (Levy, revealingly, cites the characterization of EUBAM's director Ferenc 25
26 Banfi: 'EUBAM is not against enemies, but is looking for friends'). Despite being 26
27 labelled a 'partnership' (and marketed as a fast track to full EU membership 27
28 because of the assumed benefits of harmonizing controls with accession standards), 28
29 such efforts to externalize the management of EU borders are, however, 'really 29
30 [about] securitization', resulting in 'a more restrictive and asymmetric border that 30
31 actually limits mobility for most categories and populations' and 'imposes fresh 31
32 obligations on countries of migrant origin, which are becoming destination- and 32
33 transit states given their new proximity to the EU'. The region thus becomes 'the 33
34 latest kind of buffer zone', designed to protect 'EU'rope from the latest in a line of 34
35 barbarians (see also van Houtum, 2010). 35

36 It is important to note how the language of 'civilian and civilianizing' 36
37 'EU'rope marks such new attempts at securing the European perimeter. The goal, 37
38 as Levy notes, is to secure the border using 'European expertise' to pre-empt, 38
39 collectively, threatening movements and flows; the key agent in this mission is, 39
40 indeed, no longer the classical 'border guard' but rather the 'expert advisor'. 40
41 Yet such 'security partnerships' (as they are termed) are, as the EUBAM study 41
42 demonstrates, 'insecurity partnerships' for third country nationals, with the 42
43 technical and managerial language of partnership and collaboration simply masking 43
44 new modes and models of political and economic exclusion. As Levy concludes, 44

1 the EUBAM ‘embodies rule at a distance’, seeking ‘to re-territorialize and extend 1
 2 the surveillance of mobility and security risks in order to re-scale vulnerabilities’ 2
 3 and using third-countries as ‘spatial fixes’ in order to avert perceived threats from 3
 4 uncontrolled immigration or terrorism, simply relocating unwanted migrants to 4
 5 ‘EU’rope’s borderlands. 5

6 The third contribution in this section, Nick Vaughan-Williams’ ‘Off-Shore 6
 7 Biopolitical Border Security: The EU’s Response to Migration, Piracy and 7
 8 “Risky” Subjects’, builds on Levy’s case study and provides a discussion of 8
 9 three further examples of the selective stretching of the EU’s borders: attempts to 9
 10 deter illegal immigration via land, air, and maritime surveillance in Western and 10
 11 Northern Africa; the policing of EU maritime trade routes in response to the threat 11
 12 of piracy off the Somali coast in the Indian Ocean; and the implementation of 12
 13 new virtual border security practices involving the on-line monitoring of allegedly 13
 14 ‘risky’ individuals and groups in cyberspace. Looking at the ways in which the 14
 15 EU deploys its ‘border work’ in ever more sophisticated ways, Vaughan-Williams 15
 16 draws on the work of Giorgio Agamben to sketch out how the global projection 16
 17 of the EU’s borders can be theorized as what he terms ‘a generalized biopolitical 17
 18 border’. 18

19 The chapter identifies a number of key characteristics to the new EU border 19
 20 regime. The first is the ‘principle of pre-emptive bordering’ that aims ‘to take “the 20
 21 border” to the perceived locus of threat *before* that threat arrived on the shores 21
 22 of the EU’, even if such pre-emptive bordering often risks countervailing the 22
 23 EU’s own legislation in the matter of asylum and refugee rights (as Gammeltoft- 23
 24 Hansen’s chapter highlights). EU institutions have been quite explicit, indeed, in 24
 25 asserting that ‘with new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad’ 25
 26 (Council of the European Union 2003: 7). This is true not only with regard to the 26
 27 control of migration flows, but also the protection of other ‘EU’ropean interests. 27

28 In his discussion of the EU’s attempts to stave off the threat of Somali pirate 28
 29 attacks in the Gulf of Aden under the auspices of the EU NAVFOR Project, 29
 30 Vaughan-Williams remarks upon a second characteristic of the EU’s ‘off-shore’ 30
 31 border work: the ‘flexing’ of sovereignty and international law that allows for 31
 32 such interventions. Citing the work of Germond and Smith (2009: 579), Vaughan- 32
 33 Williams suggests that the EU’s new maritime frontiers are, increasingly, ‘hybrid 33
 34 spaces, which *legally* are situated outside of the EU, but which *functionally* lie 34
 35 inside its strategic zone of interest, and whose stability is essential’ (emphasis in 35
 36 original). 36

37 The selective extension of the EU’s borders does not only take place on land 37
 38 or sea, however. As Vaughan-Williams points out, the creation of the new Europe- 38
 39 wide border surveillance system termed EUROSUR that relies on a variety of 39
 40 electronic bordering practices to track potentially ‘risky’ subjects, in transit to 40
 41 and through the EU, further disrupts ‘traditional notions of the relation between 41
 42 borders and territory’: border controls become ‘peripatetic nodes of security that 42
 43 zigzag across “domestic” and “international” space globally’. 43

44 44

1 If the borders of ‘EU’rope are no longer (only) ‘a static frontier at the outer- 1
2 edge of sovereign territory, but increasingly mobile and diffused across a global 2
3 terrain (and throughout land, sea, air, and cyberspace)’ as Vaughan-Williams 3
4 argues, this also complicates any ‘straightforward geopolitical imagination of 4
5 “Europe” as being an entity whose “inside” and “outside” is clearly definable’. It is 5
6 more appropriate (and analytically useful), he suggests, to think not in terms of EU 6
7 ‘borders’ but rather in terms of EU ‘bordering practices’ and ‘border performances’, 7
8 thus highlighting ‘the activity and spatial (and *temporal*) “thickness” of “the 8
9 border” otherwise belied by the static metaphors of “lines”, “limits”, and “walls”’. 9
10 Vaughan-Williams stresses, moreover, that we need to see such border practices 10
11 and border performances as also ‘body performances’. Drawing on the work of 11
12 Agamben, he highlights how ‘EU’rope’s borders ‘are continually (re)inscribed 12
13 through mobile bodies that can be risk assessed, categorized, and then treated as 13
14 either ‘trusted travellers’ or ‘bare life’, marking out ‘the politically qualified life of 14
15 the “European citizen” [...] against the bare life of the “non-European” migrant’. 15
16 The final chapter in this section examines in detail one of the ‘black holes’ 16
17 described by Vaughan-Williams, where EU laws and obligations are suspended. 17
18 In his ‘Geographies of Migration Across and Beyond Europe: the Camp and the 18
19 Road of Movements’, Shinya Kitagawa focuses on one of the most infamous 19
20 of these sites, the migrant detention camp on the Italian island of Lampedusa. 20
21 The Lampedusa ‘Temporary Stay Centre’ (CPT) has a key symbolic role in 21
22 the geographies of migration that traverse the Mediterranean and over the past 22
23 decade have made it into what various human rights organizations have called 23
24 Europe’s graveyard. There have been over 10,000 documented deaths along the 24
25 EU’s maritime frontiers in the past ten years – a figure that would swell further 25
26 if we added those missing at sea, or those who did not even make it to the boats 26
27 supposed to ferry them to their European Dream, those who died along the way, 27
28 somewhere in the Niger or Libyan desert.⁴ 28
29 Between 2002 and 2008, the number of migrant arrivals on Lampedusa 29
30 increased exponentially, from slightly under 10,000 in 2002 to almost 31,000 in 30
31 2008. The Lampedusa CPT has been the object of several investigations, including 31
32 by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, for its failures to uphold 32
33 migrants’ basic rights as well as correct procedures relating to the processing of 33
34 refugee and asylum claims. Since 2009, it has also been a fundamental ‘gateway’ 34
35 in the Italian State’s new ‘push-back’ (*respingimento*) policy under the terms of 35
36 its bi-lateral agreements with Libya, with all migrants intercepted in international 36
37 waters by Italian Coast Guard vessels now deported directly to Libya. 37
38 38
39 _____ 39
40 4 UNITED, the European Network Against Nationalism, Racism, Fascism and in 40
41 Support of Migrants and Refugees, has since 1993 been keeping a ‘List of Deaths’. The List 41
42 includes all reported deaths that have occurred as a consequence of ‘EU’ropean immigration 42
43 and deportation procedures. On 20 June 2010, International Refugee Day, their estimate 43
44 stood at 13,824. 44

1 Beyond providing an account of the development of the camp and the 1
 2 evolution of its role in policing 'EU'rope's borders, however, Kitagawa's 2
 3 analysis also places the Lampedusa CPT within a broader geography of EU 3
 4 border-work. He argues that we should conceptualize places like Lampedusa 4
 5 'as temporary "stages" of a continuing bordering process that connects both 5
 6 European and non-European spaces'. 6

7 Drawing on Giorgio Agamben's theorization of 'the camp' and, in particular, 7
 8 Agamben's comments on Italian CPTs as distinct 'spaces of exception', 8
 9 Kitagawa notes how the migrant detention camps disrupt our taken-for-granted 9
 10 understandings of both territorial borders – and of the territorial rights usually 10
 11 associated with presence on state territory. The migrants detained in the Lampedusa 11
 12 CPT, he argues, are not considered *within* the national borders of the Italian State; 12
 13 they are stripped of all juridical status, removed from all vestiges of citizenship. 13

14 The Italian (and other EU) camps are, nonetheless, just one stage in migrants' 14
 15 journeys. Thanks to international agreements such as the one with Libya noted 15
 16 above, policies of off-shoring and out-sourcing migration control now directly 16
 17 deport migrants to other camps, outside of EU territory. Those sent back from 17
 18 Lampedusa, as Kitagawa documents, are often subjected to chain-deportation, 18
 19 transported ever further 'South', from Italy, to Libya, to Niger and beyond. 19

20 Kitagawa also comments, however, on what he terms 'movements of de- 20
 21 identification' that accompany the procedures of detention and eventual expulsion. 21
 22 Such 'de-identification' takes place within the mobile practices of the migrants 22
 23 themselves (through actions such as the burning of passports and the taking 23
 24 on of new identities), but is also enforced within the camps through a variety 24
 25 of biopolitical measures (such as the reduction of migrants' identities to their 25
 26 biometric data). He concludes the chapter with a consideration of what the de- 26
 27 territorialization (and off-shoring) of 'EU'rope's borders – accompanied as it is by 27
 28 the de-identification of migrant bodies – means for the idea of Europe as a space 28
 29 of rights. 29

30 This question is a fitting one with which to close this volume for it goes to the 30
 31 very heart of the disjuncture between 'EU'rope's ideal geopolitical imaginations 31
 32 and its geopolitical practices, whether these are enacted within EU territory or 32
 33 elsewhere. If the European space now also extends into the world, beyond the 33
 34 confines of the current EU 27, then should not too the EU's obligations? Reacting 34
 35 to the Italian situation described in Kitagawa's chapter, but also plans afoot by 35
 36 other Member States to out-source migration controls to third countries in the EU 36
 37 'Neighbourhood' and beyond, a number of EU-based human rights organizations, 37
 38 including the European Council on Refugees and Exiles and Amnesty 38
 39 International's EU Office, released a communication at the end of February 2010, 39
 40 re-stating EU Member States' obligations and, in particular, the fact that these do 40
 41 not – and cannot – stop at the physical boundaries of the EU: 41

42
 43 Regardless of where border controls take place and of who implements them, 43
 44 methods to prevent unauthorized entry must leave room for the identification 44

1	of persons in need of international protection so they are not returned to any	1
2	country where they will face persecution. Member States obligations under	2
3	international and European refugee and human rights law do not stop at the	3
4	physical boundaries of the EU. This responsibility is not only moral and political	4
5	but also legal. EU Member States cannot abdicate their principles, values and	5
6	commitments by doing outside their borders what would not be permissible in	6
7	their territories.	7
8		8
9	Understanding the political and geopolitical implications of the ongoing (re)	9
10	making of European spaces – whether through increasingly ‘creative’ border-	10
11	work or through the making of regions and ‘Neighbourhoods’ for ‘EU’rope – is a	11
12	pressing task for political geographers. We hope that the chapters in this volume	12
13	can contribute in small part to this aim.	13
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