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Jörg Hüttner und Martin Walter



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Inhalt

- 1 Timpler als Aufgabe der Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung – ein
Eröffnungswort 1
Jörg Hüttner und Martin Walter
- 2 De natura et constitutione Physicae et Metaphysicae: Theses Timpleri
Baccalaureales (1588) et Magistrales (1589) 16
Clemens Timpler, recenserunt Joseph S. Freedman et Martin Walter
- 3 A Short History of My Work on Timpler (1970–2026) and Its Projected
Continuation 32
Joseph S. Freedman
- 4 Timpler-Forschung rückwärts – von Max Wundt zu Christian Thomas
(1699) und zur Frage eines ‚deutschen Empirismus‘ 51
Jörg Hüttner
- 5 Intelligibile: Das supertranszendente, gegensatzlose ‚Objekt
überhaupt‘. Timplers Metaphysik als Aufbruch in die Moderne 107
Theo Kobusch
- 6 Das Gymnasium Arnoldinum und die Historische Bibliothek 145
Ulrich Kraaibeek
- 7 Timpler's Semiramism 162
Riccardo Pozzo
- 8 Forging an Encyclopaedic Metaphysics: Ramism, Scotism and Christian
Philosophy in Clemens Timpler 174
Simon J. G. Burton
- 9 Timplers Maulwurf 199
Martin Walter
- 10 The First Experimental Postulation of a 'Real Vacuum' by Timpler in
1605 235
Jörg Hüttner and Martin Walter

- 11 Timpler über das Gedankending (*ens rationis*) 249
Joshua Keatley und Daniel Novotný
- 12 Teleology and Causation in Clemens Timpler 277
Nabeel Hamid
- 13 Pensare il nulla: la più difficile delle eredità (da Timpler a
Clauberg) 311
Alice Ragni
- 14 Timpler and Leibniz – From a Methodical System of the Intelligible to a
Rationalistic Worldview 333
Serhii Secundant
- 15 Nachtrag zu Timplers *Metaphysicae* (1666) – ein Unikat im Besitz von
Leibniz? 364
Jörg Hüttner und Christian Michel
- 16 Objects of Thought: Clemens Timpler and the Emergence of the “Object
Problem” in Early Modern Philosophy 374
Marco Sgarbi
- 17 Clemens Timplers Kognitionstheorie – Einleitung, lateinische Texte mit
deutscher Übersetzung 387
Sascha Salatowsky
- 18 Ein Stammbuchblatt Timplers für Morsius 458
Martin Walter
- Verzeichnis von Timplers Systemschriften 463
- Index nominum memorabilium 467
- Autorenverzeichnis 473

Objects of Thought: Clemens Timpler and the Emergence of the “Object Problem” in Early Modern Philosophy

Marco Sgarbi

Abstract Clemens Timpler plays a pivotal role in the early development of the object problem, offering a significant precursor to Alexius Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie*. Timpler's redefinition of metaphysics as an *ars contemplativa* centered on the intelligible diverged from Aristotelian traditions by extending the scope of inquiry to include not only beings (*ens*) but also non-beings (*nihil*). This radical expansion positioned the intelligible as the foundation of metaphysical exploration, asserting that even the “nothing” could serve as an object of intellectual consideration. Timpler's emphasis on intelligibility spurred the emergence of *gnostologia* in early modern philosophy, where thinkers such as Valentin Fromme and Abraham Calov sought to establish a science of the knowable, distinct from metaphysics. By reframing metaphysics around the intelligible, Timpler set the stage for future explorations of objectivity, making his work a cornerstone in the historical trajectory of answering the object problem.

1 Introduction

In 1904, in the essay *Ueber Gegenstandstheorie*, Alexius Meinong sought to bring to scholars' attention “an area of knowledge, which is sometimes overlooked, sometimes not sufficiently appreciated in its distinctive character.”¹ He questioned which discipline would be most appropriate for the study of the object (*Gegenstand*) considered in itself, in an absolute and general sense; that is, a discipline capable of addressing the “object problem” as the subject of philosophical inquiry.² He expressed the desire “to know whether, among the sciences that are accredited by scientific tradition, there is one within which we could attempt a theoretical consideration of the object [of knowledge], or from which we could at least demand this.”³ He believed that this science

1 Meinong, Alexius (1960): “The Theory of Objects”, in: *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, New York, 76–117: 77.

2 For a general introduction on the “object problem” or on the “objects of thought” see Crane 2013.

3 Meinong 1960, 78.

had never been pursued explicitly.⁴ A possible candidate discipline that, throughout the history of philosophy, has dealt with the constitution of the object, is metaphysics. However, according to Meinong, this discipline is not sufficiently universal as a science to qualify as a true science of objects. In fact:

Without doubt, metaphysics has to do with everything that exists. However, the totality of what exists, including what has existed and will exist, is infinitely small in comparison with the totality of the objects of knowledge.⁵

According to Meinong, metaphysics is inadequate because it deals only with what exists and not with what is not real. Yet, even what is not real is still an object. This fact went unnoticed because the non-real is often conceived as mere nothingness and, therefore, not as an object, and because the “non-real is conceived as something for which science has no application at all or at least no application of any worth.”⁶ For Meinong, the non-real is evidently an object, as “ideal objects,” despite lacking real existence (*Existenz*), nonetheless possess a certain subsistence (*Bestand*). Meinong gives the example of mathematical objects, whose mode of being is never existence but always subsistence. Reflecting on mathematics and its many applications, Meinong states, “there is thus not the slightest doubt that what is supposed to be the object of knowledge need not exist at all.”⁷ To reinforce this, he asserts that:

I cannot conceal from myself at present the fact that it is no more necessary to an Object that it be represented in order not to exist than it is in order for it to exist. Further, even if there were a reference to it, the most that could result from its being represented would be a sort of existence – “existence by way of representation.” [...] To express it more exactly: If I say, ‘Blue does not exist,’ I am thinking just of blue, and not at all of presentation and the capacities it may have. It is as if the blue must have being in the first place, before we can raise the question of its being (*Sein*) or non-being (*Nichtsein*). [...] Blue, or any other Object whatsoever, is somehow given prior to our determination of its being or non-being, in a way that does not carry any prejudice to its non-being. [...] if I should be able to judge that a certain object is not, then I appear to have had to grasp the object in some

⁴ Meinong 1960, 100.

⁵ Meinong 1960, 79.

⁶ Meinong 1960, 79.

⁷ Meinong 1960, 81.

way beforehand, in order to say anything about its non-being, or more precisely, in order to affirm or to deny the ascription of non-being to the object.⁸

Ultimately, for Meinong, there must be a concept of an object prior to determining whether this object has existence (*Existenz*) or is not. This conceptual presence is precisely what Meinong refers to as subsistence (*Bestand*). If this is the case, he argues, then the property of being or non-being does not essentially depend on the object considered in itself but on the objective being of the object, which Meinong calls the *Objektiv*. To understand what the object considered in itself is and how it differs from the *Objektiv*, Meinong explains that every cognition of an object is twofold (literally a “double fact,” *Doppeltatsache*), consisting of a cognitive act and what is known, the form and matter of knowledge. The cognitive act that determines the knowledge of the object is independent of the matter of the object, even though what is known can only be known through this act. Thus, the matter of the object – that is, the object considered in itself – remains unchanged, whether the object exists or not, independent of the cognitive act that apprehends it as existent or non-existent, as being or non-being.

Given these considerations, Meinong addresses the initial question of whether a science of the object is possible and whether such a science has ever existed in the history of philosophy, asserting that:

There is no object which could not at least in possibility be an object of cognition ... assuming an intelligence of unlimited capacities, there is nothing unknowable; and what is knowable, is ... All that is knowable is given – namely, given to cognition. To this extent, all objects are knowable. Given-ness as a most general property can be ascribed to Objects without exception, whether they are or are not.⁹

All objects are knowable insofar as they are given to the intellect in their givenness, regardless of whether their existence is determined or not. This implies that their status as existing or non-existing is irrelevant to their knowability. Such knowable objects can only be marginally addressed by logic or epistemology; rather, there is a need to conceive an independent science dedicated to their study, which Meinong termed the “theory of objects.”¹⁰

8 Meinong 1960, 83–84.

9 Meinong 1960, 92.

10 Meinong 1960, 97–99.

Meinong’s theory of objects was intended to constitute a genuinely new discipline within the philosophical landscape. However, doubts arose regarding the originality of this reflection.¹¹ It is reasonable to question whether Meinong was unaware of the extensive philosophical engagement with the “object problem” within the German territories over the preceding three centuries. This philosophical tradition explored the study of the object within metaphysics or its potential establishment as a separate science. This line of inquiry can be traced back to Clemens Timpler, whose ideas appear to resonate closely, even verbatim, with those articulated by Meinong in his *Gegenstandstheorie*.

2 Clemens Timpler and the Intelligible

Timpler is renowned for his original definition of metaphysics, in which the intelligible is placed at the center as its primary object.¹² Timpler defines metaphysics as a “contemplative art, which deals with all that is intelligible, insofar as it is intelligible to the natural human mind through the light of reason without any conception of matter.”¹³ In other words, the intelligible refers to everything that can be understood by natural reason and is devoid of matter, meaning it is not sensible. Framed in these terms, Timpler’s metaphysics appears to align smoothly with the Aristotelian epistemological tradition. For Timpler, as for any other Aristotelian philosopher, the intelligible constitutes the object of the intellect – that is, something apprehended by noetic activity without any reference to matter, thereby being immaterial or incorporeal. These intelligibles correspond to Aristotle’s τὰ νοητά.

Consequently, Timpler’s metaphysics should not seem particularly controversial and might even be seen as fully in line with a well-established philosophical tradition that emerged from the mid-sixteenth century, especially in Protestant Germany, following the influence of Jesuit thinkers like Pedro da Fonseca, Benedict Perera, and Francisco Suárez. However, there is an element of controversy in Timpler’s definition for at least two reasons.

First, as scholars have rarely emphasized sufficiently, Timpler’s metaphysics is neither a science, nor an art, nor a discipline in the Aristotelian sense. While acknowledging that metaphysics could be regarded as a type of post-physics or

11 On Meinong see Lenoci 1972; Modenato 2006; Jacqueline 2015.

12 On Timpler see Freedman 2009; Freedman 2011.

13 Timpler *Metaphysicae* 1604, 1: “ars contemplativa, qua tractat de omni intelligibili, quatenus ab homine naturali rationis lumine sine ullo materiae conceptu est intelligibile.” – Note: the translations of Timpler into English are by me.

trans-physics, analogous to first philosophy, wisdom, or even natural theology, Timpler explicitly states that metaphysics is not an art as defined by Aristotle, “*non esse artem rationes aliorum.*”¹⁴ Instead, he describes metaphysics as a “methodical teaching, which concerns some knowable matter and is useful in human life.”¹⁵ This definition is not entirely unique in the history of philosophy. A strikingly similar definition can be found in Henry More’s *Enchiridion metaphysicum* (1671), which claims that “metaphysics is the art of rightly contemplating incorporeal things insofar as they become known to the natural light of our faculties,”¹⁶ and further argues that “metaphysics is here called an art, not in the sense in which Aristotle understands art, as a productive habit guided by reason [...] but rather insofar as it signifies a teaching, or a methodical comprehension of homogeneous principles.”¹⁷ In Timpler’s view, metaphysics is therefore a preparatory methodology for other fields, not a science that provides necessary and definitive knowledge about its object. This methodology, however, focuses on the intelligible. For Henry More, the intelligible generally referred to incorporeal, spiritual, and immaterial entities that could be contemplated correctly through intellectual notions.

For Timpler, however, the intelligible was something more. This is the second aspect that distinguishes Timpler’s approach from other Aristotelian approaches. Timpler’s concept of the intelligible encompasses not only those corporeal entities that can be grasped intellectually, but also those that cannot be fully grasped – namely, nothingness (*nihil*). In other words, nothingness becomes an object of metaphysics as well. This does not mean that nothingness is conceived as the absolute nothing. Timpler does not regard the absolute nothing as an intelligible object of metaphysics. He explains that there are two types of intelligible entities. The first is understood in absolute terms, directly and *per se*, and is the object of direct intellection, meaning it generates a determinate notion. The second type of intelligible entity is a non-material object of thought that is understood through the negation of something else, where no determinate notion is possible. It is within this second type of intelligible entity that nothingness resides, along with all privations and negations. As Timpler states, “nothingness is intelligible through the notion of something else, which

14 *Metaphysicae* I 1604, 4.

15 *Metaphysicae* I 1604, 5: “doctrina methodica, quae de re aliqua scibili utilisque in vita humana.”

16 More 1671, 1: “metaphysica est ars recte contemplandi res incorporeas quatenus è lumine naturae facultatibus nostris innotescunt.” See Reid 2012.

17 More 1671, 3: “metaphysica hic arts dicitur, non eo sensu quo Aristoteles Artem accipit, pro habitu utique fabricativo cum ratione [...] quatenus scilicet significat doctrinam, sive Methodicam comprehensionem Praeceptorum homogeneorum.”

is affirmed of it in absolute terms."¹⁸ This nothingness is not, strictly speaking, something (*aliquid*), but it can still be partially conceived in relation to something. This concept of nothingness bears a resemblance to Kant's treatment of nothingness, though in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, nothingness included *ens rationis*, negations, privations, and impossibilities, while for Timpler, *ens ratio-nis* was not nothingness but part of the category of *aliquid*.¹⁹ Kant's idea of an object, in general, being problematically assumed before determining whether it is something or nothing, seems to align with Timpler's concept of the intelligible while also resembling Meinong's concept of the object. However, Timpler would reject Meinong's claim that "in order to be able to judge that a certain object is not, it is necessary to have had to grasp the object beforehand,"²⁰ because for Timpler, nothingness is not understood through the concept of the object itself, which cannot be apprehended, being nothing, but through the concept of the object of which it is the privation. Furthermore, Timpler would dispute Meinong's attribution of non-being to mathematical objects, which, for Timpler, fall within the realm of *aliquid* (or *ens rationis*).

It is crucial to note that Timpler's metaphysical emphasis on nothingness was not widely accepted. Many contemporaries continued to explore nothingness in relation to being, within metaphysical discussions, asserting that nothingness could only be conceived through its reference to being (*ens*). The distinction between Timpler's notion of nothingness and traditional Aristotelian metaphysics lies in his insistence that nothingness should be treated as part of the intelligible. This emphasis, viewed by some as an eccentric attempt at originality, led many philosophers to openly distance themselves from Timpler's ideas. This divergence was not necessarily due to a rejection of the discussion of nothingness but rather to the belief that such an emphasis on nothingness was unnecessary and detracted from the primary subject of metaphysics – its nature and the reasons for its study.

Nevertheless, Timpler's perspective encouraged seventeenth-century metaphysicians, particularly in the German territories, to engage deeply with the nature of metaphysical objects and the problem of the intelligible. In this context, one can see a partial response to Meinong's original question regarding the necessity of establishing a science of objects. Most metaphysicians of the time rejected Timpler's definition of metaphysics as an art or methodology

18 *Metaphysicae* I 1604, 23.

19 The connection between Timpler and Kant likely traces back to Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten or similar sources, as Timpler does not employ the distinctions between the possible and impossible as Kant does. See Sgarbi 2010.

20 Meinong 1960, 84.

and instead proposed metaphysics as a science. This shift entailed the assertion that the object of metaphysics must be knowable – it must be something rather than nothing – because, in Aristotelian terms, the intellect must become what it thinks. Thus, the problem of the intelligible – considering the object before determining whether it is something or nothing – was redirected into specialized considerations, leading to the establishment of independent disciplines such as *gnostologia*, which I have discussed elsewhere.²¹ Here, my primary interest lies in examining how certain authors engaged with the problem of the intelligible in response to Timpler, offering reflections on the “object problem” that seem to provide a partial answer to Meinong’s inquiry.

3 The “Object Problem” After Timpler

The first author to reflect on the problem of the object and the necessity of establishing an autonomous science to study it was Valentin Fromme, with his *Gnostologia, hoc est doctrina generalia totius philosophiae fundamenta methodice per praecepta, praeceptorum exegesis, exempla & consecutaria exhibens* (1631). The title reminds us of Timpler’s definition of metaphysics as an art. Like Meinong, Fromme highlights the necessity of a discipline that addresses the object of knowledge in general. Metaphysics, traditionally considered the discipline of studying objects of knowledge, usually deals with only a specific kind of object – namely, “being.”²² However, Fromme, in a manner analogous to Meinong, argues that “being” is not the most abstract concept of thought. Before the concept of “being,” there is the notion of any possible object of the mind in general, regardless of whether it is “being” or “nothing.” For this reason, he established the discipline of *gnostologia* as the science of the *scibile*, that is, the “knowable *qua* knowable.”²³

In a more ambiguous manner, he later refers to this discipline as the “discourse or doctrine of the knowable (*scibile*), the intelligible (*intelligibile*), or the cognizable (*cognoscibile*),”²⁴ following the common distinction among different acts of cognition codified within the Aristotelian tradition of his time. In this framework, the knowable (*scibile*) corresponds to the object of ἐπιστάμῃ (scientific knowledge), the cognizable (*cognoscibile*) refers to the object of εἰδέναι or γινώσκειν (cognition in general), and the intelligible or thinkable

21 Sgarbi 2022. See also Leinsle 1985.

22 Fromme 1631, *Letter to the reader*.

23 Fromme 1631, 1.

24 Fromme 1631, 2.

(*intelligibile*) corresponds to the object of νοεῖν (intellectual apprehension).²⁵ Fromme, unlike Timpler, seems to focus on the knowable because he believes it is this object that can be the subject of scientific knowledge.

Fromme considers the generic object of *gnostologia* as constituted of a double aspect, exactly as Meinong with the *Doppeltatsache*:²⁶ the material aspect, or what is known, thought or cognized, in opposition to the formal aspect – that is, the way of knowing, thinking or cognizing. The matter under investigation is every possible object of knowledge that might be considered in any specific science, but what is really important is the mode, because it considers the object of knowledge in general.²⁷ Later in his treatise, Fromme will characterize this manner of considering as conceivability (*conceptibilitas*), that is, the possibility of being an object of the mind, a characteristic that Meinong calls objectivity (*Gegenständlichkeit*).²⁸

In particular, for Fromme the knowable is representative of something either existing in the world or subsisting in the mind. In other words, the representation is the psychological transposition of the object of the mind. Every knowable can be said to be real by representation, and what cannot be represented must be rejected.²⁹ The reality of the knowable depends therefore on its possibility of being an object of the mind, of being a representation (what Meinong calls (*Vorstellung*), that is from its conceivability. Specifically, according to Fromme, a representation must be objective, that is, it refers to a thing (independently of its existence or subsistence),³⁰ warning, however, that negations, fictional entities, or second notions are only analogically considered knowable.³¹ This means, however, that Fromme also includes non-existing things in the category of objects of knowledge in general, since they subsist in the mind. Knowledge of them is different from what is known to exist in the external world. The former are merely thinkable or intelligible; the latter lead to a specific cognition. Unlike Timpler, shifting the focus from the intelligible to the knowable, Fromme groups together what Timpler considered properly intelligible, namely an *aliquid* (such as the being of reason, negations, and

25 See for instance Zabarella 1602, 6–45.

26 See Pozzo 1998.

27 Fromme 1631, 2–3.

28 Fromme 1631, 104.

29 Fromme 1631, 22: "Omne scibile sit verum per repraesentationem, & quicquid non representatur, quia non habet fundamentum in re, merito rejicitur."

30 Fromme 1631, 16–17.

31 Fromme 1631, 18–19: "Negationes autem, privationes, entia ficta nuda realitates ac notiones secundae, & id genus alia, non nisi analogice, & juxtapositionem ad scibilia realia & propriae dicta."

privations), with what was considered not properly intelligible by Timpler – namely a *nil* rather than an *aliquid*.

Alongside Fromme, in 1633 Abraham Calov published his *Gnostologia seu doctrina de cognoscibili qua tali*. Calov's project seems to be an implicit response to Timpler's theorization and his attempt to found metaphysics on the concept of the intelligible. Unlike Fromme, who, albeit not always in a consistent manner, in his *gnostologia* deals with the knowable (*scibile*), for Calov the focus of investigation is the cognizable (*cognoscibile*): "knowable or more exactly cognizable is the object of *gnostologia*."³² In more consistent way with the Aristotelian tradition, he prefers to employ "knowable" only in reference to scientific knowledge, and to opt for the more generic term "cognizable" for every kind of cognition. Like Fromme, the cognizable is constituted by matter and form. Matter is what is known, while form is its way of cognizing – meaning its knowability (*scibilitas*).³³ In this specific case, Calov shifts his attention to scientific knowledge and not to every kind of act of cognition. He uses the term "*scibilitas*" and not "*cognoscibilitas*." Knowability is limited in Calov's view to all real and existing things in the world known to the human mind. What can be known to the human mind is called nature, and nature is the representational foundation of all knowables.³⁴ Only that which is in nature is scientifically knowable. That which is outside nature is not scientifically knowable; it is only cognizable in a generic sense. To know (*sapere*) what is beyond nature is uncertain because it has no representational foundation and it seems to pertain only to higher intellects like those of the angels and God.³⁵ It is based on mere conjectures, which lack the possibility of having a yardstick in experience. Only what has a representation in the intellect and exists in the world can be scientifically known. The consequence of this is that Calov excludes mathematics from scientific knowledge, that is among knowables, including it, however, among cognizables.

Following in the footsteps of Calov, many other authors continued the attempt to develop an autonomous discipline concerning the object of knowledge. One of these is Heinrich Nicolai with his *Cursus philosophicus* (1652). Nicolai clearly identifies *gnostologia* as a theory of objects in general, that is the cognizable.³⁶ The cognizable is "what the human understanding can perceive,

32 Calov 1633, 3: "Scibile vel potius cognosci[bi]le est objectum Gnostologias." See Savini 2009; Sgarbi 2009.

33 Calov 1633, 7: "Intrinseca sunt objecti materiale, sc. Entitas, & formale, s. scibilitas."

34 Calov 1633, 10: "Naturam esse fundamentum repraesentativum omnis scibilis."

35 Calov 1633, 10: "Extra naturam in naturalibus sapere est temerario speculationibus indulgere in Natura patefacta immediate ad Deum referre est."

36 Nicolai 1652, 1.

and which can stand for the object."³⁷ In this way, *gnostologia* becomes more generally a theory of the object, or rather of the representation of the object. Also, Valentin Fromme in 1631 emphasizes how *gnostologia* should establish itself as an independent science since it has a different object in comparison to all the other philosophical disciplines. This object is the cognizable or knowable – the most generic object of all. This object is not considered a being in itself, but through its possibility of being known – that is, its knowability. In 1662, Georg Meier in his *Gnostologia cognitionis humanae fundamenta* establishes that the object of *gnostologia* is the cognizable, adding that "all that is is a cognizable,"³⁸ whereas Calov asserted that "the intelligible is all that is."³⁹ Despite this difference, Meier and Calov endorse the same position: for both of them what characterizes the cognizable is its givenness. *Gnostologia* even intercepted international trends with Samuel Strimesius, an eclectic philosopher, sensible to the new approaches of theories of knowledge coming from England. In 1680, in his *Lineae gnostologicae seu logicae Peripateticae reformatae rudimenta*, Strimesius clearly identifies *gnostologia* with a special kind of logic, that of the "the cognizable as such."⁴⁰ The cognizable is everything that generates an idea, and this can either be sensible if coming from outside the mind, or intelligible if coming from within.⁴¹ At the very beginning, this idea is an inadequate cognizable reproducing only the object itself, but later it becomes adequate, providing perfect knowledge of the cognizable through its attributes. From this it follows that the uncognizable is something that cannot produce an idea in the mind. Once again, the criterion for being an object is the ability to be represented in the mind. In 1699, Johann Gottfried Zeidler in his *Gnostologia oder Allwisserey* asserts that the knowable is the object of the understanding. In the knowable there is the matter considered as the content of knowledge that designates what is known, and the knowability according to human understanding. Zeidler points out that a non-being cannot be a cognizable (*cognoscibile*, *Wißliche*), and the more a thing has being, the more it is intelligible, and on account of this beings existing in reason are less cognizable than actual existing things.⁴² From Calov onwards, the focus is increasingly

37 Nicolai 1652, 2: "Cognoscibile quicquid ab intellectu humano ulla ratione percipi potest, eique pro objecti, esse potest."

38 Meier 1662, 46: "omne quod est, cognoscibile est."

39 Calov 1633, 5: "Intelligibile est omne quod est."

40 Strimesius 1680, 6: "Perfectissima Logicae Definito est, quod sit Sapientia Cognoscibilis, qua tale est."

41 Strimesius 1680, 8 (*Lineae gnostologicae*): "Est vero Cognoscibile, quodcunque Ideam gignit, vel Externam & Sensibilem; vel Internam & Intelligibilem."

42 Zeidler 1699.

shifting from metaphysics, as it was for Timpler, to an independent theory of the object of knowledge, to a theory of representation.

4 Conclusion

The exploration of Clemens Timpler's philosophical contributions reveals his pivotal role as a precursor to Alexius Meinong's theory of objects. Timpler's focus on the intelligible as the central object of metaphysical inquiry and his subsequent influence on the development of *gnostologia* demonstrate his critical importance in the history of philosophy. By emphasizing the intelligible, Timpler laid the groundwork for considering objects independently of their existence, a notion that resonates deeply with Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie*.

Timpler's distinctive definition of metaphysics as an *ars contemplativa* dedicated to the study of all intelligible entities deviated from traditional Aristotelian frameworks. His radical inclusion of the *nihil* (nothing) within the intelligible expanded the scope of metaphysics, suggesting that even what lacks material existence can still be an object of intellectual consideration. This perspective prefigures Meinong's assertion that objects need not exist to be objects of thought, as their intelligibility is a condition separate from their ontological status.

However, Timpler's contribution extends beyond a mere anticipation of Meinong's insights. His emphasis on intelligibility catalyzed the development of *gnostologia* as an autonomous discipline in early modern German philosophy. Figures like Valentin Fromme, Abraham Calov, and Heinrich Nicolai adapted and expanded Timpler's ideas, systematically exploring the concept of the knowable (*scibile*) or the cognizable (*cognoscibile*) as distinct from being (*ens*).

The trajectory of *gnostologia* underscores a shift from metaphysics toward a specialized theory of representation and cognition. While Timpler placed the intelligible at the heart of metaphysics, subsequent thinkers like Fromme and Calov delineated *gnostologia* as a separate field focusing on the conditions of knowability and the representational nature of objects. This discipline sought to establish systematic principles governing the relationship between the mind and its objects, thereby laying the conceptual foundation for later theories of intentionality and objectivity. Despite the eventual divergence from Timpler's original metaphysical framework, his pioneering work initiated a tradition of reflection on the intelligible and its epistemological implications. Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* can thus be viewed not as an isolated innovation but as a continuation and refinement of a line of inquiry inaugurated by Timpler and sustained by gnostological developments.

In conclusion, Clemens Timpler's philosophical legacy lies in his reconfiguration of metaphysics around the intelligible and his role as the progenitor of a tradition that sought to understand objects in their givenness to the intellect. His ideas not only prefigured Meinong's theory of objects but also provided the impetus for an enduring inquiry into the nature of knowledge and its objects, which was later disrupted by Kantian transcendentalism. By doing so, Timpler established himself as a seminal figure whose influence extends across centuries and whose work continues to resonate in contemporary philosophical discourse.

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