We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.

Incentives and Implementation in Marriage Markets with Externalities

Matteo Maria Triossi Verondini
Writing – Review & Editing
2019-01-01

Abstract

We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.
2019
185
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10278/3718170
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