We prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems with multi-unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.

Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note

Matteo Triossi
Writing – Review & Editing
2017-01-01

Abstract

We prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems with multi-unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10278/3716083
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