This paper studies efficient and egalitarian allocations over a single heterogeneous and infinitely divisible good.We prove the existence of such allocations using only measure-theoretic arguments. Under the additional assumption of complete information, we identify a sufficient condition on agents’ preferences that makes it possible to apply the Pazner–Schmeidler rule for uniquely selecting an efficient egalitarian equivalent allocation. Finally, we exhibit a simple procedure that implements the Pazner–Schmeidler selection in a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a singlegood
LI CALZI, Marco;
2009-01-01
Abstract
This paper studies efficient and egalitarian allocations over a single heterogeneous and infinitely divisible good.We prove the existence of such allocations using only measure-theoretic arguments. Under the additional assumption of complete information, we identify a sufficient condition on agents’ preferences that makes it possible to apply the Pazner–Schmeidler rule for uniquely selecting an efficient egalitarian equivalent allocation. Finally, we exhibit a simple procedure that implements the Pazner–Schmeidler selection in a subgame-perfect equilibrium.File in questo prodotto:
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