Real, Invented or Applied? Some Reflections on Scientific Objectivity and Social Ontology

In this article the debate between realism and constructivism is introduced in order to explore what connotations should be endorsed by a meaningful concept of ontology in the context of scientific discourse. The model of scientific ontology discussed in this article is L. Daston's 'applied mataphysics'. An applied mataphysics is concerned with what constitutes the world studied by working scientists. It therefore includes those special categories of phenomena which constitute the referents of scientific investigations - different from, though not less real than, everyday 'objects'. By embracing a Kantian view of objectivity, Daston suggests some ways out of the often stilted debate between realism and constructivism, but at times her position falls pray of its own solutions. A critical, in-depth discussion of the pros and cons of subscribing to an 'applied metaphysics' à la Daston is pursued in this article, as well as a comparison with a number of both more and less radical alternatives to it.