This paper provides a sufficient condition under which the optimal policy of a monopolistic seller who is considering the tradeoff between price discrimination and information disclosure is at one of two extremes: either buyers are given access to all the available information, or the seller makes no disclosure at all.

A sufficient condition for all-or-nothing information supply in price discrimination

LI CALZI, Marco
2005-01-01

Abstract

This paper provides a sufficient condition under which the optimal policy of a monopolistic seller who is considering the tradeoff between price discrimination and information disclosure is at one of two extremes: either buyers are given access to all the available information, or the seller makes no disclosure at all.
2005
Rendiconti per gli Studi Economici e Quantitativi
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10278/28316
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